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Commentary
Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
Moral Identity and Developmental Theory
Commentary on Krettenauer and Hertz
Daniel Lapsley
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind. , USA
Key Words
Moral development · Moral identity · Personality · Selfhood
The notion that self-identity and morality are deeply implicated has long-stand-
ing roots in both ethical theory and psychology. In ethical theory it is evident in Har-
ry Frankfurt’s [1971] account of what it means to be a person: A person (as opposed
to a wanton ) is someone who cares about morality. A person cares about the desir-
ability of one’s desires (second-order desires) and then wishes to will them all the way
to action (second-order volitions). Similarly, Charles Taylor [1989] argued that iden-
tity is defined by reference to things that have significance for us. It is the result of
strong evaluation about what is worthy or unworthy, and these discriminations are
made against a horizon of significance that frames and constitutes who we are as per-
sons. He writes, “My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications
which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to
case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done or what I endorse or oppose”
[Taylor, 1989, p. 27].
The affinity of selfhood and morality is a theme in several psychological tradi-
tions as well. Erikson [1968, p. 39] argued, for example, that an ethical capacity is the
“true criterion of identity,” but he also noted that “identity and fidelity are necessary
for ethical strength” [Erikson, 1964, p. 126]. This suggests that moral identity is the
clear goal of both moral and identity development and that in the moral person the
two developmental tracks are ideally conjoined. Similarly, Damon and Hart [1982]
showed that, within each domain of the “Me Self” (physical, active, social, psycho-
logical), the highest level of self-understanding implicates a moral point of view. This
suggests that the moral self is the clear outcome of self-development [Lapsley, 2005].
Indeed, recent research has shown that morality is considered indispensable to self-
hood; it is the moral self that is essential to our identity, more than personality traits,
Daniel Lapsley
Department of Psychology, University of Notre Dame
118 Haggar Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556 (USA)
E-Mail danlapsley @ nd.edu
© 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel
0018–716X/15/0583–0164$39.50/0
www.karger.com/hde
E-Mail karger@karger.com
Moral Identity and Developmental Theory 165
Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
memory, or desires [Strohminger and Nichols, 2014]. It may well be that, for all the
contingent facts about ourselves, it is our moral integrity that is the necessary fact of
the “real me” [Carr, 2001].
Of course few have done more than Blasi [1984, 1985] to elevate the importance
of moral identity in post-Kohlberg moral development research. For Blasi, the moral
person is someone whose very selfhood is constructed on moral grounds; it is some-
one whose desires reflect a wholehearted commitment to morality. Morality is essen-
tial, important, and central to self-understanding; and, to the extent that not everyone
prioritizes morality in this way, it is also a dimension of individual differences.
Blasi’s account of moral self-identity struck a chord. It encouraged reflection on
the link between personal agency and the construction of moral ideals. It raised ques-
tions about how best to understand moral character. It opened up possibilities for
engaging other psychological literatures, particularly those regarding personality and
cognition, with the goal of deriving robust integrative models of moral functioning
[Lapsley & Stey, 2014]. It is implicated in research on the moral ideal self [Hardy,
Walker, Olsen, Woodbury, & Hickman, 2014], moral exemplars [e.g., Colby & Da-
mon, 1992; Walker & Frimer, 2007], and social-cognitive accounts of moral person-
ality [Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004].
From these perspectives, Krettenauer and Hertz [this issue] assembled what they
call the “standard model” of moral identity: Moral identity is the degree to which be-
ing a moral person is important to an individual’s identity [Hardy & Carlo, 2011]. The
goal of moral identity development, on the standard account, is the integration of self
and morality; it is the integration of values with motivational and emotional systems.
The authors add an important codicil to the standard account: The integration of
self and morality is not available to children. Childhood, on this account, is “void of
identity.”
But the authors think that Blasian moral identity has been given enough time to
show its mettle and has not delivered all that it promised. It promised to offer a reso-
lution of the judgment-action gap, but there are doubts about whether moral iden-
tity is a better predictor of behavior than moral affect. It implied a developmental
model that has not been adequately tested, let alone vindicated. For example, indices
of moral identity are uncorrelated with age over the course of adolescence and emerg-
ing adulthood. Krettenauer and Hertz are concerned to understand why the develop-
mental claims of the standard model have proved unavailing and to offer a number
of recommendations by way of remedy.
In their view one reason for the paucity of developmental research is the “top-
down logic” that has characterized research on moral identity. This means that extant
research focuses on the measurement of moral identity in adolescents and young
adults and has neglected charting the developmental trajectories that get us to adult
manifestations. A second reason is that current (adult-centric) measurement strate-
gies are insensitive to the developmental features of moral identity even if develop-
mental research were undertaken. So, on their view, we need both a new conceptual
understanding of moral identity and new ways to measure it. Certainly, both are wel-
come.
Krettenauer and Hertz propose a way of rescuing the developmental claims of
moral identity by linking it to three domains that show more developmental promise.
One might find evidence of development in literatures that track the increasing dif-
ferentiation and integration of self-development. Harter [2012] showed, for example,
Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
166 Lapsley
that self-conceptions are both increasingly differentiated as one moves from early to
late adolescence but also more deeply integrated. Hence the rhythm of development
bids the adolescent to differentiate real versus ideal selves, or display multiple selves
across different contexts, or create self-evaluations that differ across domains, but, at
the same time, integrate disparate selves into a higher-order generalization, create a
global sense of self-worth, or coordinate disparate and contradictory aspects of the
self into a coherent self-system. Perhaps something like this can be deployed to un-
derstand the rhythm of moral identity development.
Self-determination theory is also held out as a promising source of developmen-
tal claims. The continuum of self-determination moves from several forms of extrin-
sic regulation (external, introjected, identified, integrated) to authentic internal self-
regulation where the self is experienced as the locus of causal agency [Ryan & Deci,
2000]. Perhaps this continuum is a model of how moral identity development might
proceed. Finally, one might look for developmental themes in life story narratives
[e.g., McAdams, 2009; McAdams & Pals, 2006]. For example, moral identity develop-
ment could be a matter of creating a life story but one that follows either an essential-
ist (where the focus is on self-traits) or narrative line. In the narrative approach, a life
story is constructed in a way that brings coherence to past and future conceptions of
self-identity.
This is perhaps enough to reprise the major themes of Krettenauer and Hertz’s
thesis. What is attractive about the proposal is just how strongly integrative it is. It
folds the “self-importance” aspect of moral identity within the context of what Harter
[2012] has to say about differentiation and integration in the development of the self.
It locates moral identity as a moment in the growth of internal motivation as outlined
in self-determination theory. It holds out a place for moral self-identity in the way we
make sense of our lives through personal narrative.
Hence, self-important moral traits will show differentiation and integration; be-
havior will be self-regulated increasingly by internal sources of motivation and be
connected to larger narratives of the responsible self-as-agent. Indeed, the narrative
understanding of the responsible self anticipates connections to important new con-
structs [e.g., moral agency; see Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010]. Moreover, as the authors
point out, their scheme aligns with three layers of personality as conceptualized by
McAdams [McAdams, 2009; McAdams & Olson, 2010; McAdams & Pals, 2006], a
conceptualization that has strong heuristic value.
These are entirely plausible and welcome suggestions. Indeed, Krettenauer and
Hertz propose a highly interesting and possibly field-expanding contribution to mor-
al identity theory to the extent that it burnishes the developmental claims of the the-
ory. Yet there are grounds for caution. My concern is that the proposal overstates its
developmental promise and gives slight notice to the real strengths of extant theo-
retical approaches which seem to offer a much more promising basis for building the
developmental case for moral identity.
One problem is that, of the three alternatives, only the differentiation-integra-
tion angle is explicitly developmental. The authors themselves seem deeply ambiva-
lent about the developmental bona fides of the narrative level of abstraction; and the
external, introjected, identified, and integrated modes of external regulation in the
continuum of self-determination are characteristic adaptations to social contexts and
are not stages of development, as the authors note. Moreover, the fact that all four
modes can be motivating to the self-same individual seems like a problem for a de-
Moral Identity and Developmental Theory 167Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
velopmental theory (without further exposition) and not a mere caveat (as the au-
thors would have it). And in self-determination theory, the importance of autonomy-
supporting contexts cannot be overstated, so a moral identity theory premised on
self-determination would have to include a contextual or situational element that is
thinly described in the present account. A social-cognitive approach does much bet-
ter on this score, as I will argue below.
The authors blame the top-down logic of current approaches to moral identity
for the current lack of developmental specification. But this cannot be correct. The
so-called top-down logic is, in fact, required of developmental accounts that accord
with the orthogenetic principle [Werner, 1957]. The authors implicitly commit to an
orthogenetic account of development in their embrace of the differentiation-integra-
tion of self-development. Indeed, Harter [2012] appeals to differentiation-integration
just to underscore the cognitive developmental aspects of self-construction.
But, if any developmental process accords with the orthogenetic principle, it is
cognitive development. Here a conception of the end-point is crucial for making
sense of the developmental processes. The top-down logic makes developmental ex-
planation possible. The end-point makes reference to a standard that allows one to
distinguish progressive development from mere change, and the standard is instanti-
ated in the conceptualization of the end-point. Put differently, developmental change,
if it is to count as an instance of development, is evaluated in terms of how closely it
approximates the final stage of the developmental process [Kitchener, 1983]. Indeed,
“the developmental end-state is a normative standard of reference by means of which
we can evaluate the direction of development and its degree of progress towards this
goal” [Kitchener, 1986, p. 29]. Far from an impediment to developmental analysis, a
conceptualization of the end-state is utterly required. Hence, the authors cannot si-
multaneously reject (what they call) top-down logic while also touting an approach
to self-development (e.g., in terms of increasing differentiation-integration) that re-
quires it.
There is also a sense in which the authors appear to have given up on moral iden-
tity development, or else have overstated the developmental promise of the approach
they favor. More than once they remind readers that there is no moral identity in
childhood and that all the action is in adolescence and young adulthood. Apparently
there is not much action for all that given that moral identity does not appear to be
correlated with age over this period. But surely correlations with age over a restricted
range have little probative value and are an ambiguous indicator of development in
any event.
Yet even if we accept the authors’ conclusion that the lack of correlations with
age during adolescence counts against the standard model, it would seem odd that
the remedy is to completely abandon childhood in the search for developmental pre-
cursors. To do so leaves us in a far worse place than the standard model that does not
give up on early developmental precursors of moral identity. The authors do ac-
knowledge some evidence of moral-self integration in childhood but do not follow
the implications of this for establishing a developmental line for moral self-identity
in young adulthood. Instead, we are referred to the personological approach favored
by McAdams [McAdams, 2009; McAdams & Pals, 2006] for our developmental intu-
itions.
The difficulty is that the “new Big Five” is not a theory of development but rath-
er a taxonomy of perspectives that frame a unified science of personality. It is more
Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
168 Lapsley
metatheory than theory. It tells us where to look for moral personality (e.g., in dispo-
sitional traits, characteristic adaptations, self-defining life narratives) but not with
any specificity for the purposes of theory-building. I agree with the authors that per-
sonal life story narratives are a hugely important component of any theory of moral
identity, but we get no closer to a developmental story by waving our hands at “char-
acteristic adaptations” or “dispositional traits.” Here we are simply naming things
that must have preceded construction of life story narratives. What we have not done
is the hard work of articulating a theory of development that yields moral identity
(even as life story narratives) as an outcome. With the approach favored by the au-
thors, we have substituted a taxonomy of categories relevant for personality for de-
velopmental theory and hence are no closer to a developmental analysis of moral
identity.
But we are closer to a developmental analysis of moral identity than the authors
acknowledge. Although Krettenauer and Hertz mention Blasi’s sadly neglected ac-
count of identity modes, they pass over his own seven-stage developmental account
of moral character that ranges from early life to adulthood [Blasi, 2005]. At the high-
est stage, there comes into clear focus the notion of “wholeheartedness” [a notion
derived from Frankfurt, 1988] that refers to a commitment to structure the will
around moral desires. Wholehearted commitment to moral desires, to the moral
good, becomes an aspect of identity to the extent that not to act in accordance with
the moral will is unthinkable. It is hard to say whether this sequence has empirical
promise, but we should also not conclude too hastily that childhood is a theoreti-
cal void with nothing of interest to contribute to a developmental story for moral
identity.
In my view, the social-cognitive account of moral self-identity has more resourc-
es for achieving what Krettenauer and Hertz say they want, which is a theory that ac-
counts for behavior and has a developmental story to tell (and one that reaches all the
way down into early childhood). Aquino and colleagues, for example, have developed
an impressive research program that documents the many powerful ways that moral-
identity centrality moderates behavior of all kinds and in many settings [e.g., Aquino,
Freeman, Reed, & Lim, 2009]. This research program has shown that our self-concept
is a mélange of different identities of which morality is but one and that the key vari-
ables of interest are not so much differentiation-integration but rather the availabil-
ity and accessibility of moral identity as a social-cognitive construct. The chronicity
of social-cognitive-moral schemes is the defining feature of moral personality [Laps-
ley & Narvaez, 2004]. Moreover, social-cognitive theories of moral personality read-
ily account for the dynamic interaction between persons and contexts, for “situation-
ism” in the display of moral behavior, and for individual differences. And there is a
plausible developmental story, too.
A plausible developmental account of the moral personality would not begin in
adolescence, as Krettenauer and Hertz might prefer it, but in early childhood [e.g.,
Lapsley & Hill, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004]. This account must have several fea-
tures. It must track the sort of developmental change that yields adult moral identity
as an outcome. It must pick out notions of wholeheartedness but also key social-cog-
nitive variables such as availability, accessibility, and chronicity. It should also an-
ticipate novel facts, some of which are corroborated [following Lakatos, 1978].
Where should we find the developmental source of wholeheartedness that char-
acterizes the standard model of adult moral identity? Perhaps it is found in the emer-
Moral Identity and Developmental Theory 169Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
gence of conscience and the committed compliance of young children to sensitive
and responsive adult caregivers [Kochanska, 2002a]. Children with a strong history
of committed compliance to parents are likely to see themselves as embracing par-
ents’ values and, on this basis, construct a moral self that regulates future behavior
[Kochanska, 2002b]. Indeed, in one study Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, and Yoon
[2010] showed that toddlers with a strong history of internalized “out-of-sight” com-
pliance (at 25–52 months) were competent, engaged, and prosocial at 80 months of
age. But this effect was mediated at 67 months by the moral self. Kochanska et al. sur-
mised that the self-regulation of the moral self might be due to the high (chronic) ac-
cessibility of moral schemas, which is precisely the mechanism anticipated by social-
cognitive accounts of moral self-identity [Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Laps-
ley, 2009].
We have also attempted to articulate a developmental account of the moral self
from a social-cognitive perspective [Lapsley & Hill, 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004].
On this account, moral chronicity is built on the foundation of generalized event rep-
resentations that characterize early sociopersonality development [Thompson, 1998].
These prototypic knowledge structures are progressively elaborated in the early dia-
logues with caregivers who help children review, structure, and consolidate memories
in script-like fashion [Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, 1992]. Autobiographical memory is
also constructed within this “web of interlocution.” Parents help children organize
events into personally relevant autobiographical memories which provide action-
guiding scripts that become frequently practiced, habitual, and automatic. A sense of
the morality can become a part of the child’s autobiographical narrative to the extent
that parents reference norms, standards, and values in their dialogic interactions. In
this way, parents help children identify morally relevant features of their experience
and encourage the formation of social-cognitive schemas that are chronically acces-
sible. One attraction of this model is that it provides direct developmental lineage
between the autobiographical narratives of concern to adult moral identity with the
emergence of autobiographical self-narratives in early childhood.
Krettenauer and Hertz make a real contribution to the ongoing articulation of
moral identity theory. Every theory can use a little help, and their appeal to self-de-
termination theory, to the orthogenesis of self-concept development, and to life-
course personal narratives are useful emendations. I hope it leads to productive new
lines of research. But the rationale at the heart of their proposal, that it is all moti-
vated by an impatience for a developmental theory, is unpersuasive. The persono-
logical approach that is touted still requires developmental specification. It still needs
to show how developmental processes in childhood influence the trajectory of moral
identity in adolescence and adulthood, and it seems ill-equipped to do so. I think the
social-cognitive approach that I favor is an improvement: It is deeply integrative with
personality theory, it is a robust predictor of behavior, it accounts for contextual and
priming effects, and there is a plausible developmental framework that gets us to adult
forms of moral self-identity without abandoning child development. Although there
are positive reasons for integrating moral identity theory to the three lines of research
touted by the authors, impatience with the pace of developmental research is not one
of them.
Human Development 2015;58:164–171
DOI: 10.1159/000435926
170 Lapsley
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Original Paper
Human Development 2015;58:137–153
DOI: 10.1159/000433502
What Develops in Moral Identities?
A Critical Review
Tobias Krettenauer
Steven Hertz
Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ont. , Canada
Key Words
Adolescence · Development · Identity · Morality
Abstract
According to the standard model of moral identity development, moral identities
emerge during adolescence and early adulthood. Contrary to this assumption, however,
moral identity research has consistently failed to demonstrate any age-related change
in this developmental period. The present paper discusses implications of this non-find-
ing. It is argued that researchers need to broaden the scope of inquiry and include de-
velopmental aspects of the moral identity construct that have been neglected in the
past. Three areas are identified where moral identity development likely occurs in ado-
lescence and beyond: (1) context-dependent differentiation and integration of the self-
importance of moral values, (2) growth in internal moral motivation and (3) unfolding of
narratives of moral responsibility. It is suggested that any systematic investigation into
these areas will reveal important developmental changes in moral identities and, thus,
will confirm the developmental nature of the moral identity construct.
© 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel
The moral identity construct has made some history in psychology. Since being
introduced in the early 1980s by Blasi [1983, 1984], it has been subject of hundreds of
research articles, dissertations and book chapters. Conferences were organized
around the theme [Edelstein, Nunner-Winkler, & Noam, 1993; Narvaez & Lapsley,
2009] and major review articles published [Bergman, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005,
2011]. In the most recent edition of the Handbook of Moral Development , an entire
chapter was devoted to the topic [Walker, 2014]. This rise of the moral identity con-
struct coincides with the eclipse of Kohlberg’s stage model [Kohlberg, 1984]. In fact,
it can be seen as a response to two major limitations Kohlberg’s theory has been re-
peatedly criticized for: first, the difficulty of predicting moral action from moral judg-
ment within the stage model [see Walker, 2004]; second, the exclusive focus of this
model on moral cognition at the expense of other important aspects of moral func-
Tobias Krettenauer
Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University
75 University Ave. W.
Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5 (Canada)
E-Mail tkrettenauer @ wlu.ca
© 2015 S. Karger AG, Basel
0018–716X/15/0583–0137$39.50/0
www.karger.com/hde
E-Mail karger@karger.com
Human Development 2015;58:137–153
DOI: 10.1159/000433502
138 Krettenauer/Hertz
tioning, notably moral affect. The moral identity construct promised to bridge the
gap that separates moral judgment from moral action by providing a more inclusive
account of moral development which integrates moral cognition with emotions,
moral motivation, and the self [cf. Hart, 2005]. After more than 25 years of research
in this area, it seems fair to ask, ‘‘Did the construct deliver what it promised?’’
In the past 25 years, dozens of studies were conducted to investigate the relation-
ship between moral identity and moral behavior. Considering only those studies that
independently assess moral identity and moral behavior (and do not merely take
moral behavior as a marker of moral identity), Hertz and Krettenauer [2015] were
able to identify 77 experimental and correlational studies that investigated a broad
range of prosocial, ethical and antisocial behaviors in relation to individuals’ moral
identity. The vast majority of studies reported small to moderate effects of moral
identity consistent with the notion that moral identity strengthens individuals’ read-
iness to engage in prosocial action and to abstain from antisocial or harmful behavior.
Moreover, moral identity was repeatedly found to counteract situational pressures
and affordances for acting immorally [e.g., Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Felps, & Lim,
2009; Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011]. Even though the moral iden-
tity construct does not fare significantly better than other predictors of moral action
[notably moral emotions; see Malti & Krettenauer, 2013], these findings overall sug-
gest that a person’s moral identity is of considerable psychological import when it
comes to explaining moral behavior.
The moral identity construct has enjoyed great popularity as a predictor of ac-
tual behavior in academic fields outside developmental psychology. By contrast, the
issue of moral identity development has been investigated much less. When studies
reported age-graded change in adolescence or early adulthood, findings typically
turned out to be non-significant (for details see next section). Thus, there is little em-
pirical support for age-graded change in a developmental period that is commonly
considered crucial for moral identity formation. Correspondingly, leading advocates
of the construct openly concede ‘‘a paucity of developmental research’’ [Lapsley &
Stey, 2014, p. 97] and lack of knowledge regarding ‘‘precursors of moral identity and
developmental trajectories’’ [Hardy & Carlo, 2011, p. 214]. Evidently, the moral iden-
tity construct has not taken roots in developmental psychology so far, and its initial
promise to provide a vantage point from which to build an integrative theory of mor-
al development is far from being fulfilled.
The present paper represents an attempt to change this situation. By discussing
what features of a moral identity likely undergo systematic developmental change, we
hope to stimulate further investigations into the topic of moral identity development,
which ultimately will help to overcome the lack of developmental knowledge lament-
ed by scholars in moral identity research. Towards this end, we first will describe what
can be considered the standard model of moral identity development, which so far
has received very little empirical support. The lack of empirical evidence for age-
graded change in adolescents’ and young adults’ moral identities is due – at least
partly – to a top-down logic of research that places strong emphasis on the moral
identity construct as a predictor of moral action and largely neglects its developmen-
tal features. As a consequence, common conceptualizations and measures of moral
identity are not sensitive for detecting developmental changes in this construct.
Whereas moral identity research has been dominated by trait-based or sociocognitive
approaches, it is argued that a personological approach is most suitable for identify-
Moral Identities 139 Human Development 2015;58:137–153
DOI: 10.1159/000433502
ing areas of developmental change in moral identities. Three areas will be discussed
in detail, namely context-dependent differentiation and integration of moral values,
growth in internal moral motivation and the unfolding of narratives of moral respon-
sibility. Changes in all three areas are likely to occur in adolescence and beyond but
have been largely neglected by previous moral identity research.
Moral Identity Development: The Standard Model
Guiding Assumption
Moral identity has been defined as ‘‘the degree to which being a moral person is
important to an individual’s identity’’ [Hardy & Carlo, 2011, p. 212]. In other words,
if individuals feel that moral values such as being honest, compassionate, fair and
generous are central for defining their personal identity, they have a strong moral
identity. Following this definition, the goal of moral identity development is in the
integration of self and morality such that self-concerns and moral concerns become
unified. Researchers may employ different notions as to what this integration of self
and morality exactly entails and may rely on various methodological approaches to
assess it empirically. Still, in its most basic form, the idea of an integration of self and
morality has been the guiding principle for much research on moral identity develop-
ment, as the following examples covering three decades of moral identity research
demonstrate.
The idea of an integration of self and morality is clearly present in Blasi’s early
writings [Blasi, 1988, 1995] when he describes two aspects of moral identities: (a) the
centrality of moral values for the individual’s self-understanding and (b) the level of
their internalization or self-integration. Moral values can be more or less central in
defining the content of a person’s identity, as well as more or less integrated in the
self-system. Once integrated, they are experienced as self-ideals a person wants to
achieve rather than as social expectations one is supposed to meet. In Blasi’s [1995]
own words:
Values … are integrated with one’s motivational and emotional systems, are made the object
of agentic processes, including responsibility; and are finally taken as a basis for the construc-
tion of one’s self-concept and identity … These themes should not be seen as defining devel-
opmental steps, but rather, as being dialectically interrelated throughout one’s life. (p. 234)
Colby and Damon [1992] elaborated on the notion of an integration of self and
morality on the basis of a qualitative study of moral exemplars (i.e., people who dem-
onstrated outstanding and sustained moral commitment over their life course). They
found that moral exemplars expressed a marked unity between self and morality such
that their own personal interests and desires were identical with what they perceived
as morally desirable. Moral exemplars ‘‘… seamlessly integrate their moral commit-
ment with their personal concerns so that the fulfillment of the one implies the fulfill-
ment of the other’’ [Colby & Damon, 1992, p. 300]. This enables them to act with great
certainty, spontaneity, and little doubt or hesitation when acting morally.
Taking a more rigorous empirical approach than Colby and Damon [1992],
Frimer and Walker [2009] were able to further corroborate and expand the notion of
an integration of self and morality. According to Frimer and Walker’s reconciliation
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140 Krettenauer/Hertz
model of moral identity development, human motivation entails a fundamental du-
ality between agency and communion. Individuals normally work towards either
achieving their own goals or advancing those of others. This duality is overcome either
by prioritizing one motivational system over the other or by reconciling the two. Rec-
onciliation is the integration of agency and communion such that agential desires are
fulfilled through the pursuit of communal concerns. According to Frimer and Walker,
reconciliation lays the foundation for sustained moral commitment that often has
been considered a marker for a strong moral identity [see Hart, 2005]. Furthermore,
reconciliation is the hallmark of moral maturity. As Walker [2014] puts it, ‘‘In moral
maturity, agency and communion do become meaningfully integrated’’ (p. 513).
Timing
When does this integration of self and morality that constitutes a person’s mor-
al identity typically occur in the course of development? According to Blasi and Glo-
dis [1995] there is a shift in identity modes from Identity Observed to Management of
Identity that typically occurs sometime between middle adolescence and emerging
adulthood. In the Identity Observed mode, there is a split between inner feelings and
thoughts that reflect one’s genuine self, on the one side, and public appearance and
socially guided actions on the other. Management of Identity , by contrast, empha-
sizes inner standards, beliefs, values and goals that define one’s identity: ‘‘… identity
consists of managing one’s life and shaping oneself in order to approximate one’s ide-
als. Commitment to these ideals, fidelity in action, and concern for self-consistency
become, then, important aspects of the sense of self’’ [Blasi & Glodis, 1995, p. 424].
Commitment, fidelity and consistency are all qualities that describe essential features
of a moral identity. Thus, with changes in identity modes from Identity Observed to
Management of Identity , a moral identity becomes increasingly possible. According
to Blasi and Glodis this transition normally occurs in the years of middle adolescence
to emerging adulthood.
While expanding on his own research into the development of self-understand-
ing in childhood and adolescence, distributive justice, and moral exemplars, Damon
[1996] arrived at a similar conclusion. As demonstrated in research on children’s self-
understanding [Damon & Hart, 1988], younger children make no reference to their
moral beliefs or goals when describing themselves. This typically does not happen
before adolescence. As Damon [1996] wrote:
[Children] do not think of themselves as persons who are fair or not fair … Their moral
concerns do not translate into concerns about who they are. This segregation is resolved
towards the end of childhood, when in fact children do begin thinking about themselves in
terms of how kind, just, and responsible they are. (p. 217)
Along with this change in children’s self-understanding, Damon [1996] ob-
served greater consistency between children’s beliefs and actions particularly when
tempted to act selfishly or to cheat. Thus, according to Damon, early to middle ado-
lescence appears to be crucial for the emergence of a moral identity. This does not
preclude further development in later age periods. Colby and Damon [1993] de-
scribed changes across the lifespan as a dialectical process where moral goals lead to
moral actions, which in turn strengthen preexisting goals and commitments.
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Frimer and Walker [2009] refer to the reconciliation of agency and communion
as an Eriksonian crisis. Resolving this crisis becomes a critical developmental cross-
road that defines the range of future developmental outcomes available to the indi-
vidual. Frimer and Walker state that reconciliation is ‘‘a process that begins, at earliest,
in adolescence but may occur at any later point in the lifespan. Once established, we
believe integrated identity remains stable’’ [Frimer & Walker, 2009, p. 1671]. Note that
in more recent publications, Walker and collaborators shifted away from this focus on
adolescence and investigated the integration of agency and communion from child-
hood to old age [Dunlop, Walker, & Matsuba, 2013; Walker & Frimer, 2015].
The various accounts of moral identity development described above converge
with regard to three major developmental assumptions. First, it is assumed that the in-
tegration of self and morality that constitutes a moral identity is not available to children.
In this sense, children lack a moral identity. This does not preclude that less demanding
forms of morality-self integration occur in childhood [cf. Kochanska, Koenig, Barry,
Sanghang, & Yoon, 2010; Krettenauer, 2014; Krettenauer, Campbell, & Hertz, 2013].
Second, self and morality become increasingly integrated in adolescence or emerging
adulthood, giving rise to a moral identity. Third, once this integration is achieved, it al-
lows individuals to embark on different developmental pathways. Those who have inte-
grated self and morality to a considerable extent, and consequently have developed a
strong moral identity, will likely seek out for opportunities to put their moral commit-
ments into action, which in turn may further strengthen their moral identity. By con-
trast, those with weak moral identities will embark on non-moral careers, allowing them
to keep their agentic desires separate from communal or other moral concerns.
Taken together, these assumptions form what could be called the standard mod-
el of moral identity development. According to this view, moral identity development
consists of three phases. The first phase, childhood, is void of moral identity. It is fol-
lowed by the period of identity formation (adolescence to emerging adulthood). After
identities are formed, individuals embark on moral identity elaboration, which is
likely a multidirectional process where the moral identities of some individuals are
further strengthened and others’ not.
The Empirical Challenge: Lack of Evidence for Developmental Change
According to the standard model, a moral identity is not present in childhood
and emerges at some point in time between early adolescence and emerging adult-
hood. If most normally developing teenagers start to integrate moral values into their
self over the adolescent years (at least to some extent), a moderate association be-
tween moral identity and age is to be expected for this age period. However, studies
do not support this view.
Research on adolescents’ moral identity development typically is based on a list
of values, both moral and non-moral, that is presented to participants (e.g., being
honest, generous, responsible, caring, fair versus being athletic, energetic, organized).
Respondents are asked to rate these values according to their self-importance. A sum
score is derived that reflects the self-importance of moral values (sometimes in abso-
lute terms, sometimes relative to non-moral values). Whereas the standard model
would imply a positive correlation between moral identity and adolescents’ or young
adults’ age, this score was repeatedly found to be unrelated to age in several large-scale
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142 Krettenauer/Hertz
cross-sectional studies as well as two longitudinal studies covering the age period of
mid to late adolescence [Hardy, 2006; Hardy, Walker, Olsen, Woodbury, & Hickman,
2014; Hardy, Walker, Rackham, & Olsen, 2012; Krettenauer, 2011; Pratt, Hunsberger,
Pancer, & Alisat, 2003].
At this point, one may question the validity of adolescents’ self-reports regarding
the self-importance of moral values. However, even when the well-validated measure
developed by Aquino and Reed [2002] was used, no age differences between 15- and
20-year-olds were found [Krettenauer & Casey, in press]. Similar findings were re-
ported in studies with young adults [Gu, 2011; Matherne & Litchfield, 2012; McFerran,
Aquino, & Duffy, 2010; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2011; Reynolds, Dang, Yam, & Leavitt,
2014]. All these studies replicated the finding from the very first study on adolescent
moral identity development conducted by Arnold [1993] that did not reveal any rela-
tionship between the self-rated importance of moral virtues and adolescents’ age.
Thus, moral identity as assessed by current measures typically does not evidence
significant age-related increases in a developmental period that is considered crucial
for moral identity formation according to the standard model. To be sure, chrono-
logical age is only a proxy for development and more longitudinal data are needed to
draw definite conclusions. Still, the consistent failure of past research to document
any age-related change in adolescents’ and young adults’ moral identities warrants
further scrutiny.
Responding to the Challenge: Bringing Development to the Forefront
Considering the lack of empirical support for developmental change in moral
identities, skeptics of the moral identity construct [e.g., Nucci, 2004; Proulx & Chan-
dler, 2009] may contend that this finding is not accidental but reflects a major flaw of
the concept itself. Since its inception, the moral identity construct has been discussed
both as a developmental dimension and as an important dimension of individual dif-
ferences [Lapsley & Hill, 2009]. The lack of empirical support for age-graded change
in individuals’ moral identities may indicate that this construct primarily represents a
dimension of individual differences that undergoes very little change in the course of
development. The available data, at this point, do not refute this conclusion. Yet, in
view of the general literature on the development of morality, personality, and identity,
a general lack of change appears highly implausible. Young children do not have a
moral identity. Moral identities emerge in the course of development. The very notion
of an identity formation is the antithesis of stability. More importantly, many individ-
ual characteristics that are assumed to be highly stable over the course of development
(e.g., personality traits, aggressiveness, intelligence) undergo systematic change in the
way these characteristics are expressed in everyday behavior. From this perspective,
developmental change in moral identities is the default scenario. Stability is a particu-
lar instantiation of constancy in change [for a more elaborate discussion of this issue
as it applies to the concept of moral character, see Lerner & Schmid Callina, 2014].
With regard to moral identity development, two aspects of change need to be
distinguished: development of individual differences and general age-related change
in features defining a person’s moral identity. Development of individual differences
can be multidirectional and is not necessarily paralleled by general age-related trends.
Thus, some moral identities become stronger over time and others weaker, poten-
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DOI: 10.1159/000433502
tially yielding no general developmental trend in the way morality is integrated into
the self. Conversely, a general development trend is fully compatible with little to no
change in individual differences. Whereas the development of individual differences
and general age-related change are two analytically distinct aspects of development,
empirically they likely co-occur and interact in the course of moral identity develop-
ment. Thus, individual differences are transformed as moral identities develop from
less to more mature. At the same time, a general developmental trend can lead to
more or less stable individual differences as the rate of development slows down for
some individuals but not for others.
Evidently, the various forms of developmental change and their interactions
have been largely unexplored in moral identity research so far. As described at the
beginning, researchers have been focusing mostly on moral identity as a predictor of
moral behavior. In many studies, investigating age-related differences was peripheral.
This focus of analysis was justified by a top-down logic in research [cf. Lapsley & Stey,
2014]. According to this logic, it is advisable to first identify the critical features of a
mature adult moral identity that reliably predict moral behavior. Once this task has
been accomplished, researchers are assumed to be better equipped to track the devel-
opmental pathways that lead to the desired outcome [Walker, 2014]. This logic of
research certainly has its merits, however, it leaves earlier and less mature forms of
moral identity largely . As a consequence, the developmental processes that
link less developed with more mature forms of moral identity remain elusive. Identi-
fying a possible endpoint of development as such is not sufficient for extrapolating a
developmental history. Investigations into developmental change of important fea-
tures defining a person’s moral identity, therefore, are indispensable.
Taking these various lines of argument together, it is hardly surprising that re-
search to date has largely failed to empirically demonstrate the developmental nature
of the moral identity construct. Common conceptualizations and measures may not
be sensitive for important developmental changes in this construct. In order to iden-
tify these changes, researchers need to step up efforts on conceptual as well as em-
pirical grounds. They need to clarify conceptually what features of moral identities
likely undergo systematic developmental change as these features are not necessarily
implied in the prediction of moral action. Based on this conceptual groundwork, re-
searchers need to empirically investigate developmental change in moral identities
more systematically than has been done in the past.
In the second half of the present paper, we undertake a first step in this direction
by identifying important areas of moral identity development that have been neglect-
ed in previous research.
Areas of Developmental Change in Moral Identities
In his overview chapter, Walker [2014] distinguished three major approaches to
investigating issues of moral personality, motivation, and identity: trait-based, socio-
cognitive, and personological approaches. Trait-based approaches assume cross-sit-
uational consistency and temporal stability in behavioral dispositions relevant for
individuals’ moral conduct. Sociocognitive approaches, by contrast, stress the impor-
tance of situation-specific knowledge structures and schemas that guide self-regula-
tion and action. Personological approaches take up the integrative framework pro-
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144 Krettenauer/Hertz
vided by Dan McAdams [cf. McAdams & Pals, 2006] and argue that moral personal-
ity, motivation and identity need to be studied on different layers of abstraction that
are all equally important for describing the moral person. These layers address dispo-
sitional traits, characteristic adaptations, and the life story.
Even though trait-based, sociocognitive and personological approaches do not
explicitly address developmental change in moral identities, they largely differ with
regard to their ability to accommodate this issue. For trait-based approaches, the es-
sence of development is in stability. Change needs to be dealt with as an aberration.
For sociocognitive approaches, development results from more fundamental process-
es of schema formation and activation and, hence, is in itself not a topic of interest.
Correspondingly, ‘‘all social cognitive theories share a common defect, which is the
absence of a developmental account of the pathways that bring individuals to adult
forms of functioning’’ [Lapsley & Hill, 2009, p. 203]. The personological approach, by
contrast, is not committed to a particular personality theory that emphasizes either
stability or malleability. At the same time, it provides rich observations of personality
change across the lifespan [see McAdams & Olson, 2010]. A personological approach
to moral identity, therefore, seems to be most promising when trying to specify im-
portant areas of moral identity development that have been neglected in the past.
It is important to note, however, that the personological approach developed by
McAdams relates to personality in general and does not specifically deal with the
topic of moral identity. McAdams [2009] considers the life story as foundational for
a person’s identity. Consequently, within this framework the identity construct seems
to be restricted to individuals’ narratives about their past. In contradistinction to
McAdams, however, Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, and Hallett [2003] identified not just
one but two different strategies of identity construction: a narrative and an essential-
ist strategy. Self-continuity and identity can be achieved through the authorship of a
life story (narrative strategy), or it can be achieved by assuming immutable charac-
teristics that define the core self (essentialist strategy). To the extent that a person
adopts an essentialist strategy, traits become part of their identity. Finally, in many
areas of identity development, researchers emphasize the importance of future-ori-
ented commitments and life goals that constitute a person’s identity [cf. Schwartz,
Luyckx, & Vignoles, 2011]. These commitments qualify as characteristic adaptations
in McAdams’ terminology.
Thus, a moral identity is by no means limited to a person’s life story but can
manifest itself on all three layers of personality description as specified by McAdams:
dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and narratives. On the broadest, most
abstract, and least contextualized level, moral identities are reflected by those moral
traits individuals ascribe as important to themselves in general (e.g., being honest,
caring, tolerant, etc.). On an intermediate level, moral identities are represented by
different motivations and goal orientations individuals maintain in various areas of
their life (e.g., being a caring parent and a fair-minded colleague). On the least ab-
stract levels, moral identities are expressed in life stories about moral achievements
and failures in people’s lives. These life stories mitigate discrepancies and inconsis-
tencies among conflicting self-aspects [McAdams, 1993] and sustain a personal sense
of moral agency [Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010]. In the following section, we will point
out developmental changes on each level that can be reasonably expected but that
have not been documented in the moral identity literature so far because commonly
utilized measures of the construct are insensitive to these aspects.
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Self-Importance of Moral Values: Differentiation and Integration
It is commonly assumed that traits are highly decontextualized self-descriptions
that apply to all areas of life equally. At the same time, there is clear empirical evidence
that individuals make context-specific adjustments in global self-descriptions de-
pending on what social role is assumed [Diehl & Hay, 2007]. Thus, general self-de-
scriptions (such as being talkative, considerate, responsible) can vary depending on
whether a respondent sees herself in the role of a student, friend, romantic partner,
child, (co)worker, etc. [Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993]. More importantly,
this context-specific differentiation of self-representations marks an important devel-
opmental achievement commonly attributed to the age period of adolescence. Harter
[2012] describes the construction of multiple selves as a ‘‘critical developmental task’’
(p. 76) of adolescence that is attributable to cognitive growth and an increased dif-
ferentiation in social role expectations. In her own studies, she found an increased
differentiation in self-descriptions across various contexts (family, friends, school)
between early and middle adolescence that was accompanied by a heightened aware-
ness of conflict [Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, 1997; Harter & Monsour,
1992]. This increased differentiation was followed by an integration of conflicting
self-descriptions between middle and late adolescence owing to the development of
higher-order self-representations.
Morality is not limited to a particular social context but cuts across all areas of
life (e.g., family, school, friends). It can, therefore, reasonably be expected that the
self-importance of moral values varies across social contexts (to some extent, at least)
and that this context-dependent differentiation increases in adolescence. Even though
this expectation has not been investigated in the context of moral identity develop-
ment, a study of adolescents’ value differentiation using Schwartz’ typology [e.g.,
Schwartz et al., 2012] supports this view. In a large-scale cross-sectional study with
Israeli and German adolescents, Daniel, Schiefer, Möllering, Benish-Weisman,
Boehnke, and Knafo [2012] found that the value orientations of young adolescents
( M = 11.6 years) with regard to benevolence, achievement, conformity and self-direc-
tion were less differentiated across the three social contexts of family, school and
country than the value orientations of 16-year-olds. Thus, adolescents’ value orienta-
tions became more differentiated between early and middle adolescence. In this
study, value integration was not addressed.
In a cross-sectional interview study covering an age range from 14 to 65 years,
Krettenauer, Murua, and Jia [2015] investigated the context dependency of individu-
als’ moral identities. In this study, the self-importance of moral values was assessed
separately in the context of family, work/school (depending on participants’ age), and
community. It was found that cross-context differentiation increased from adoles-
cence to early adulthood, peaked around the age of 25 years, and decreased thereafter.
For older participants, centrality of moral values was not merely in the importance of
certain moral values but in the fact that these values were consistently important
across all areas of life. This may bolster individuals’ sense of moral agency as moral
actions may be more strongly experienced as emanating from the self rather than
from demand characteristics of a given situation. From this perspective, the integra-
tion of context-specific moral values may strengthen individuals’ moral identities.
It is important to note at this point that differentiation and integration refers to
a general principle of development [cf. Raeff, 2011] and, as such, is not limited to
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146 Krettenauer/Hertz
changes in cross-context coherence in the self-importance of moral values. As indi-
viduals grow older, they may become increasingly aware that morality matters to
them more in some areas of their lives than in others (fragmentation), or they may
realize that moral priorities change under varying circumstances (compartmentaliza-
tion). While these realizations may be at first experienced as self-contradictory and
confusing, individuals may later develop strategies to integrate their contextually dif-
ferentiated moral identities. They may create justifications for why morality is less
important in certain areas of their lives. Or, they may identify moral traits they con-
sider important amidst contextual variation. Thus, their moral identities may inte-
grate stable elements along with variable elements.
Growth in Internal Moral Motivation
The self-importance of moral values reflects an important aspect of a person’s
moral identity. However, it does not fully encompass the notion of an integration of
self and morality that has been guiding moral identity research [see Krettenauer,
2011]. Individuals may feel that a moral value (e.g., honesty) is important to them
because they want to avoid trouble and do not want to disappoint others. By contrast,
others may feel that honesty is a self-ideal they do not want to betray. In the former
case, self-importance of honesty is externally motivated whereas in the latter case the
motivation is internal to the self.
Developmental psychology has a long history of studying different forms of in-
ternal or autonomous motivation. Various models of ego and identity development
proposed a general developmental trend towards higher levels of internal motivation.
These models generally assume that, with development, individuals’ commitments to
life goals, values and ideals are increasingly experienced as self-chosen rather than
externally imposed by others [e.g., Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Loevinger, 1993; Marcia,
Waterman, Matteson, Archer, & Orlofsky, 1993]. Even Kohlberg’s stage model of
moral development suggests a decline in external motivation as adolescents move out
of the preconventional stages 1 and 2 and standards of individual conscience become
more salient at the conventional stages 3 and 4 [see Gibbs, Basinger, Grime, & Snarey,
2007].
While these models tend to view a high level of internal motivation as an end-
point of development in that, once achieved, it is maintained across a broad range of
domains, self-determination theory considers it a flexible attribute that is more con-
text-dependent [for an overview see Ryan & Deci, 2008]. According to self-determi-
nation theory, individuals’ motivation to act can be described along a continuum
defined by the poles of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. Extrinsically motivated
actions are instrumental to achieving standards set by others whereas intrinsic moti-
vation is inherent in the activity freely chosen by the individual. Intrinsic motivation
is limited to activities that are inherently gratifying and pleasurable. Actions that are
based on the desire to meet social expectations or cultural norms can hardly be in-
trinsic in this sense. However, individuals are able to integrate these expectations to
varying degrees, which leads to different levels of self-regulation along the continuum
that is defined by the polarity of extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. These levels are
labelled introjected , identified and integrated motivation [Ryan, 1993]. On the intro-
jected level, compliance with social expectations becomes independent of external
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contingencies. Yet, norms and rules are subjectively experienced as social expecta-
tions one is supposed to follow rather than as standards one wants to meet. This trans-
formation of ‘‘shoulds’’ into ‘‘wants’’ takes place once individuals develop identified
and integrated motivations. On the identified level, individuals express a basic per-
sonal agreement with a norm or societal expectation whereas on the integrated level
norms are experienced as self-ideals one wants to achieve.
Ryan, Kuhl, and Deci [1997] propose a general organismic tendency to progres-
sively rely on internal modes of motivation or self-regulation at the expense of exter-
nal regulation. At the same time, actual development of internal motivation depends
on environmental factors that support internal self-regulation [Grolnick, Deci, &
Ryan, 1997; Grolnick & Raftery-Helmer, 2014]. The various modes of self-regulation
are assumed to coexist dynamically in relation to the social environment. Internal
motivation may decline over time due to the prevalence of extrinsic contingencies in
a particular social context (e.g., school or workplace) but might increase in other con-
texts [e.g., Renaud-Dubé, Taylor, Lekes, Koestner, & Guay, 2010]. Because of this
context dependency, the various modes of self-regulation – as described by self-de-
termination theory – do not represent general behavioral dispositions but reflect
characteristic adaptions to a particular social context.
It is important to note that the four different forms of extrinsic motivation (ex-
ternal, introjected, identified and integrated) are not stages of development [Deci &
Ryan, 2014]. That is, individuals do not have to move sequentially through each form
of motivation in order to achieve the most integrated form. Moreover, individuals
may be motivated simultaneously by all four types of motivation, even when perform-
ing the same activity. Self-determination theory assumes that an integrated motiva-
tion typically does not emerge until late adolescence [Deci & Ryan, 2014]. Age-relat-
ed increases in internal forms of motivation over the lifespan have been reported
repeatedly with regard to personal goals [Sheldon, Houser-Marko, & Kasser, 2006;
Sheldon & Kasser, 2001], but also in the context of fulfilling social role obligations
[Sheldon, Kasser, Houser-Marko, Jones, & Turban, 2005].
There is very little empirical research that investigates the different forms of
modes of motivation as described in self-determination theory within the context of
morality. In a cross-sectional sample of 15- to 17-year-old adolescents, Hardy, Padil-
la-Walker, and Carlo [2008] reported a positive correlation of r = 0.16 between age
and an overall autonomy index that reflected the degree to which adolescents prefer
internal modes of moral motivation (identified and integrated) relative to external
modes (external and introjected). However, this positive correlation was mostly driv-
en by an age-related decrease in introjected motivation and not attributable to an
age-related increase in identified or integrated motivation. Similar findings were ob-
tained by Krettenauer [2011] in a longitudinal study of 13- to 19-year-old adolescents.
In this study, it was found that external motivation (extrinsic and introjected) de-
creased over a 1-year time interval whereas internal motivation (identified and inte-
grated) did not evidence any significant change. These findings may indicate that
development of moral motivation is characterized by a decline of external motivation
so that the relative (but not absolute) importance of internal moral motivation in-
creases with age. Such a trend would be consistent with the findings reported by Shel-
don et al. [2006] with regard to social role obligations.
Human Development 2015;58:137–153
DOI: 10.1159/000433502
148 Krettenauer/Hertz
Unfolding Narratives of Moral Responsibility
Moral identities inevitably include future-oriented life plans and goals. Other-
wise, moral identities could hardly function as a predictor of sustained moral com-
mitments. However, moral identities are not limited to this proactive function. As
Erikson [1959] noted, identities provide a sense of continuity over time as they inte-
grate past experiences with future-oriented life plans and goals. This integrative func-
tion of identities is particularly stressed in research on narratives [McLean & Pasu-
pathi, 2012]. By narrating a life story, individuals manage to connect past, present and
future; they create a sense of unity across varying social role contexts and situations.
Life stories may be either ‘‘big’’ or ‘‘small’’ [Bamberg, 2007]. They may reflect auto-
biographical accounts of formative life experiences generated in a self-reflective pro-
cess and directed to an imaginary audience, or they may occur as interactive dialogues
between conversational partners negotiating the meaning of an everyday event.
There is strong empirical evidence that life stories (‘‘big’’ and ‘‘small’’) develop
in adolescence and beyond. Life stories become temporarily, causally, and themati-
cally more coherent in adolescence [Habermas & Bluck, 2000; Habermas & de Sil-
veira, 2008]. Whereas children have no difficulties telling stories about their lives, it
is not before adolescence that these stories become imbued with an articulate sense
of self. As adolescents grow older, they more frequently make explicit connections
between past experiences and their current self [Habermas & Paha, 2001]. These self-
event connections take different forms [see Pasupathi, Mansour, & Brubaker, 2007];
past events may provide confirming evidence for stable traits, or they may point at
previously hidden personality characteristics that had been revealed by the event. Al-
ternatively, events may have caused personality change by providing a learning expe-
rience or by transforming one’s self-view beyond the specific event recalled. The ten-
dency to gain these more general insights from past events describes an important
development trend in adolescents’ small stories about hurting and helping others
[Recchia, Wainryb, Bourne, & Pasupathi, 2014]. Adolescents may also dismiss the
self-relevance of a past event by actively discounting it. Even then, self and event are
connected by negation.
While these trends have been reported repeatedly, it is an open question as to
how they jointly apply to moral identity development and the fact that people typi-
cally are able to recall events that both confirm and disconfirm their identity. Proulx
and Chandler [2009] demonstrated that 16- to 18-year-olds, more often than 13- to
15-year-olds, articulate a multiplist self-view when facing conflicting memories about
past moral and immoral behavior. They proposed a general developmental trend to-
wards increasing multiplicity and context dependency in adolescents’ self-views that
makes it possible to narrate one’s good behaviors as internally motivated and one’s
bad behaviors as externally provoked. Contrary to Proulx and Chandler’s account,
Krettenauer and Mosleh [2013] found that adults more often than adolescents made
a connection between past immoral behavior and their current self. Moreover, adults
explicitly acknowledged the conflictual nature of past moral and immoral behav-
iors more often than adolescents. Thus, adopting a multiplist narrative about one’s
(im)moral past may be the predominate strategy in adolescence but likely does not
define the endpoint of moral identity development.
Recently, Dunlop, and Walker [2013] argued that narrative forms of identity
construction may be far less common than generally assumed. Therefore, scholars
Moral Identities 149 Human Development 2015;58:137–153
DOI: 10.1159/000433502
may be mistaken in claiming that the creation of a life story is essential for identity
development. In light of this critique, it is important to note that, in the context of
moral identity development, life stories appear to be indispensable. By telling stories
about past moral achievements and failures while connecting them with their current
self, individuals self-reflectively and/or discursively define the scope of their moral
responsibilities [cf. Tappan, 1991, 2010]. They define which types of action, situa-
tions, and life circumstances are charged with moral responsibilities and what falls
outside this zone. Blasi [1983] argued that judgments of responsibility are essential to
bridge the gap between moral judgment and action. From a developmental perspec-
tive, it appears that responsibility is not an isolated judgment but the unfolding of
‘‘small’’ and ‘‘big’’ stories of assuming moral responsibility for certain actions and
denying it for others. These developing narratives of responsibility are essential to
bring dispositional moral traits and internal moral motivations to bear for moral ac-
tion.
Conclusion
When discussing the lack of empirical evidence for age-graded change in adoles-
cents’ and young adults’ moral identities, it was argued that scholars need to broaden
the scope of inquiry and include developmental aspects of the construct that may
have been previously neglected. By adopting a personological approach to moral
identity, we identified three areas of developmental change in moral identities that
have not been at the forefront of moral identity research so far. It was argued that
moral identity development likely proceeds (1) as context-dependent differentiation
and integration of the self-importance of moral values, (2) as growth in internal mor-
al motivation, and (3) as the unfolding of narratives of moral responsibility. These
three aspects of moral identity development represent three distinct layers of person-
ality description widely used in personality research (traits, characteristic adapta-
tions, narratives). We expect that any systematic investigation into one of these as-
pects will reveal developmental change in moral identities, confirming the develop-
mental nature of the moral identity construct. Furthermore, the three areas likely
influence each other reciprocally in the course of development, and form a dynami-
cally interrelated developmental system. In line with this view, Krettenauer [2011]
found that the centrality of moral values positively predicted growth in internal mor-
al motivation over time. Moreover, internal moral motivation was found to be associ-
ated with individuals’ narratives about past moral and immoral actions [Krettenauer
& Mosleh, 2013]. A detailed description of how these three areas intersect in moral
identity development is beyond the scope of the present paper and awaits future re-
search.
It is important to note, at this point, that development in all three areas is by
no means restricted to adolescence or emerging adulthood. From the perspective
adopted in this paper, moral identities emerge in adolescence and mature in adult-
hood. In other words, adolescence is considered the first step into developing an adult
moral identity [cf. Moshman, 2005]. Moreover, we identified three areas of moral
identity development where developmental change most likely occurs. This was by
no means meant to imply that moral identity development is limited to these three
areas.
Human Development 2015;58:137–153
DOI: 10.1159/000433502
150 Krettenauer/Hertz
Recently, Lerner and Schmid Callina [2014] presented a relational developmen-
tal systems model of moral character, arguing that moral character is not a fixed per-
sonality trait (or a combination thereof) that predicts moral conduct over extended
periods of time and independently of context. As noted by Mascolo [2014] in his
commentary to Lerner and Schmid Callina, from a developmental systems view, mor-
al character refers to particular psychological processes within a certain type of mor-
al identity where an individual ‘‘identifies himself with a sociocultural system of mor-
al values that have their origins outside of the self, which are thereupon internally
appropriated, transformed, and made one’s own’’ (p. 351). While the present study
did not explicitly employ a developmental systems view, it fully endorses the notion
that moral identities (similar to moral character) are anything but static and immu-
table entities but develop as individuals engage in meaningful relationships with so-
cial and cultural systems.
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A Comparat
iv
e Application of Developmental Psychoanalytic Theories
of Moral Development to Recent Literature Regard
in
g
Morality and Ethical Beha
vi
or in Female Adolescents
Katy Crone
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Psychology
June
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ii
A Comparative Application of Developmental Psychoanalytic Theories
of Moral Development to Recent Literature Regarding
Morality and Ethical Behavior in Female Adolescents
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
The Chicago School of Professional Psychology
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Psychology
Katy Crone
2010
Approved By:
MichaéfKomie, PhD, Chairperson
Associate Professor, The Chicago School of Professional Psychology
¦L·^ f/Xoyfo-
¿
?
/û
Ißfdan Jacpbo^itz, PhD, Merjiber
(ssociateJPfofessor, The Chicago School of Professional Psychology
in
Acknowledgments
I would first like to thank my dissertation chair Dr. Michael Komie, who has
diligently worked with me and provided me with support and feedback regarding my
dissertation and professional development. I would also like to thank Dr. Jordan
Jacobowitz, my dissertation reader and academic adviser, who has offered me the respect
and mentoring needed to complete my doctorate and this dissertation. It is through the
modeling and confidence of these mentors that I have persevered and grown into my own
professional identity.
I would also like to thank my friends and family for their support throughout
graduate school. I have been blessed with a wonderful set of classmates, colleagues, and
friends at the Chicago School and Psychological Consultations for which I am very
grateful. Finally, a special thanks is owed to Brian who has continued to show me
patience and support, despite the mental exhaustion and emotional distress often caused
by classes, practicum, and the construction of this dissertation. Thank you all.
iv
Abstract
A Comparative Application of Developmental Psychoanalytic Theories
of Moral Development to Recent Literature Regarding
Morality and Ethical Behavior in Female Adolescents
Katy Crone
This dissertation critically reviewed and integrated research regarding moral
development in female adolescents. The author utilized a theoretical lens based in
identity and self developmental psychological literature as authored by Erik Erikson,
Donald Winnicott, and Heinz Kohut. The author reviewed over one hundred sources of
both articles and books which presented theories and research regarding the moral
development and ethical behavior of female adolescents. Although written from a
psychoanalytic perspective, this dissertation utilizes concepts and conclusions drawn
from cognitive, behavioral, neurobiological, feminist, and socio-cultural theories and
areas of research. With an integration of these sources, current empirically-validated
research such as neurobiological findings on morality confirmed the relevance and
importance of psychoanalytical models of moral development. Internalized relational
experiences were found to impact an individual’s sense of security, emphasis on
engagement, and capacity for imagination, all of which influence her ability to navigate
moral situations. This dissertation also concluded that many factors regarding the female
adolescent experience within contemporary American culture are important in
considering female adolescent moral development in addition to internalized relational
experiences emphasized within psychoanalytic models of development.
?
Table of Contents
Copyright p
Signature Page iii
Acknowledgements iv
Abstract ?
CHAPTERhINTRODUCTION 1
The Problem 3
Research Questions
5
Theoretical Lens 6
Procedure 7
Plan of Dissertation 8
CHAPTER 2: PSYCHODYNAMIC CONCEPTS 10
Structural Model 10
Object Relations
12
Ego Psychology
15
CHAPTER 3 : ADOLESCENT STAGE OF IDENTITY FORMATION 17
CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING THE SELF 31
Donald Winnicott 3 1
Heinz Kohut
38
CHAPTER 5: COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL MODELS
44
Cognitive Development Stages of Jean Piaget 44
Kohlberg’s Moral Developmental Stages 46
vi
Carol Gilligan’s Work with Female Morality 48
Other Limitations in Kohlberg’s Stages
53
Modern Moral Models: Incorporating Neurobiology
56
CHAPTER 6: FEMALE ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT
63
The Female Experience in Adolescence 63
A Modern Social Culture
70
CHAPTER 7: AN INTEGRATION
84
Are Psychoanalytic Models of Female Adolescent Morality Relevant? 84
What Concepts Should Provide the Foundation for Developing
a Contemporary Psychoanalytic Model of the Emergence of Moral
Thinking and Behavior in Female Adolescents?
87
Are There Core Constructs in Current Psychoanalytic Thinking
Providing an Adequate Account of the Emergence of Identity and
Self in Female Adolescents in Relation to Moral Development?
93
How do Female Adolescents in the United States Integrate Culture,
Gender, and Identity to Develop a Cohesive Sense of Morality?
96
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION
99
Implications and Limitations of this Study 99
Future Directions of Research
101
REFERENCES
104
vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In the contemporary American society, crime rates and increasing violence call
for a closer focus on the ethical development of the nation’s children and adolescents
(American Psychological Association, 2002). Since
19
91
, arrests for female juveniles
have been on the rise for a variety of criminal offenses (Hawkins, Graham, Williams, &
Zahn, 2009). Beyond the seemingly universal societal goals of crime prevention, lowered
drug abuse, and the prevention of poverty, citizens of the United States have a major
stake in the moral development of the nation’s youth. The group of leaders and decision-
makers of the world will, in the future, be comprised of adults whose adolescent
development of the past will have laid the foundation for their choices in the future. Louis
Breger (19
74
) wrote that in adolescence, “choices persistently chosen, roles persistently
played, [and] actions persistently taken, all add up to what a person is” (p. 3
28
). In the
ever-changing culture, the challenges facing American youth are dynamically expanding,
and there is increasing importance placed on the type of people that adolescents become
(Abbott, 2001; APA, 2002).
The personal experience and psychology of an individual appear to dramatically
impact an adolescent’s development of identity, self, and moral agency (Erikson, 19
82
;
Konopka, 19
66
; Theran, 2009). Parental attachment and the developmental environment
impact a child’s moral self in ways that may be impacted by factors such as culture and
gender (Chauhan & Reppucci, 2009; Marsh, Clinkinbird, Thomas, & Evans, 2007;
Nunner-Winkler, 2007). Social scientists have sought to contribute answers to a number
of questions asked throughout the United States about the development, behavior, and
1
wellbeing of adolescents in America (Ellis & Wolfe, 2009; Konopka, 1966; Santrock,
2004). Historically, the field of psychology has identified biological, cognitive, social,
and emotional factors that may interact with an adolescent’s functioning and
development (Abbott, 2001; Santrock, 2004). Neuropsychological authors have shown
connections between early childhood experiences, the neurobiological reactions of a
child’s brain and autonomic system, and future behavioral patterns. The field of
neuropsychology, therefore, recalls the attention of moral researchers to early childhood
relational experiences and the development of an enduring personality or identity
impacting moral decision-making and moral action (Champagne & Meaney, 2006;
Pankseep, 19
98
).
It is likely that the emergence from adolescence is crucial to the formation of an
identity and self-cohesion in the remaining years of a person’s life (Erikson, 1982; Seigel,
1996). One major contributor to and effect of an individual’s identity and role within his
or her culture is a sense of moral judgment and values (Erikson, 19
61
; Garinger, 2000;
Turiel, 2007). An adolescent’s role and identity in society may be impacted by gender-
based expectations and considerations. Researchers in the field of moral development
have sought to examine potential differences in cognitive ethical reasoning (Kohlberg,
1984) and relational empathie stances (Gilligan, 19
88
) between males and females.
Studies and theories alike reveal the need for considerations of the gender and culturally
based variations experiences of developing children and adolescents (Ellis & Wolfe,
2009; Erikson, 1961; Garinger, 2000). While early psychoanalytic and cognitive research
mainly used male participants and clients to draw conclusions about developmental
2
psychology, more contemporary writers emphasize the importance of a more diverse and
comprehensive theory of moral development (Chauhan & Reppucci, 2009; Turiel, 2007).
The Problem
In the last fifty years, psychological research regarding moral development in
adolescents has strayed from psychoanalytic theories and frameworks (Langford, 19
95
).
However, psychoanalytic theories that emphasize early development remain relevant and
may provide some of the missing pieces to the cognitive-social theories on moral
development more popular today (Emde, Johnson, & Easterbrooks, 1987; Horton, Bleau,
& Drwecki, 2006). Louis Breger (1
97
4) hypothesized that one of the reasons adolescents
may seem mysterious or difficult to reach to parents and other adults could be the
distance adults typically place between themselves and memories of their own
“emotionally intense” adolescent experiences. Perhaps a similar process took place
within some of the psychological research communities that sought to explain adolescent
development at a safe distance through universal biological concepts or socially-
constructed frameworks. A sum of cognitive, behavioral, or social influences cannot fully
represent how adolescents develop personalities (Hauser, 1991) or internalize values.
Instead, emotional experiences such as attachment and early childhood relationships
contribute to the manner in which social and cultural expectations are mediated
(Anderson, Dombroski, & Swinth, 2001). Recent studies have attempted to identify
factors regarding appraisal and interpretation factors that contribute to moral competence
3
and behavior within development (Gross, 2007; Narvaez, 2008; Wainryb, Brehl, &
Matwin, 2005).
This author posits that the subjective inner experience of the adolescent must be
explored in a humanistic and individual basis in order to gain insight into identity, self,
and moral development. Concepts like gender and cultural context present major
implications regarding the experience of a female adolescent in her world and the way in
which she interacts ethically in society. A female adolescent’s perception of her own
context has been shown to be important as well, adding to the multifaceted and dynamic
influences to an individual’s experience to be studied (Hauser, 1991).
Unfortunately, gaps in the research and literature regarding the development of
identity, self, values, and morality still exist. Stuart Hauser (1991) explained that
significant psychoanalytic contributions to developmental psychology, especially
regarding adolescents, are missing within contemporary literature. Recent research
exploring moral development focuses on the early childhood stages of development
(Langford, 1995; Narvaez, 2008; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), neglecting to
address some of the growing problems among adolescent populations. Erik Erikson’s
(1961, 19
68
, 1982) theories regarding identity and adolescence may be especially useful
in providing a frame for future discussions regarding the factors and processes impacting
adolescent moral development in terms of identity formation. Likewise, a closer
examination into the development and maintenance of a cohesive self (Siegel, 1996;
Stolorow, Brandchaft, & Atwood, 1995) may contribute insight into adolescent
development, behavior, and well-being.
4
Researchers in the past four decades have highlighted the contextual nature of
constructs such as identity and self (Erikson, 1961; Turiel, 2007). The transitional stage
of adolescence is highly impacted by the current cultural context and specific subgroups
within this population (Hauser, 1991; Turiel 2008). The important components of a
female identity have been changing, according to research, due to the changes in the
feminine experience in American culture (Patterson, Sochting, & Marcia, 19
92
).
Specifically, research has identified gender differences regarding the distinctions in
female appraisal and interpretation of moral situations (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988;
Kochanska, 2002; Patterson et al., 1992). Carol Gilligan’s research and rhetoric regarding
gender differences and moral reasoning justify the need for a separate focus on the female
experience of moral development in adolescence (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).
Research Questions
There are a number of factors that impact the development of morality including
cultural, cognitive, and early relational experiences. This author is interested in the
missing influential pieces of moral development within the cognitive and cultural models
more popular today. This dissertation seeks to identify relevant concepts of moral
development that have been neglected within these models and ways more traditional
psychoanalytic theories may be applicable in post-modern literature regarding morality.
Are psychoanalytic models of female adolescent morality relevant? What concepts
should provide the foundation for developing a contemporary psychoanalytic model of
the emergence of moral thinking and behavior in female adolescents? Are there core
5
constructs in current psychoanalytic thinking providing an adequate account of the
emergence of identity and self in female adolescents in relation to moral development?
How do female adolescents in the United States integrate culture, gender, and identity to
develop a cohesive sense of morality? This dissertation is a comparative critical review of
the literature on female adolescent moral development, evaluating recent research in
relation to earlier psychoanalytic models and theories. Integrating intrapsychic and
interpersonal aspects of adolescent female psychology may present a clearer picture of
moral identity development in this population.
Theoretical Lens
This dissertation studies literature using a psychoanalytic lens and the adolescent
developmental stage of identity formation described by Erik Erikson (1982).
Particularly, this author was interested in Erikson works including Youth: Change and
Challenge (1961), Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968), and The Life Cycle Completed
(1982). This dissertation incorporates a Winnicottian conceptualization of a true and false
self, as well as his description on integrity and growth found in The Maturational
Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory ofEmotional
Development (19
65
), and Playing and Reality (19
71
), both written by Donald Winnicott.
Finally, this author uses a self psychological perspective as informed by the following
works by Heinz Kohut: The Restoration ofthe Self (19
77
) and How Does Analysis Cure?
(1984). Interpreting the viewpoints of Erik Erikson, Donald Winnicott, and
Heinz Kohut
6
regarding the development of an identity and self, this dissertation evaluates current
studies and literature in moral development.
Procedure
The author of this dissertation critically reviewed the literature within
psychoanalytic theories of moral development as well as the socially, cognitively, and
neurobiologically based moral models. Specifically, this dissertation reviewed
psychoanalytic models of moral development based in structural theory, American and
British object relations, ego psychology, and self psychology. The author also reviewed
and critiqued literature regarding morality based in cognitive and developmental learning
theories such as those offered by Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, and
neuropsychological authors self-identified as a part of the Neo-Kohlbergian group.
This dissertation then also reviewed contemporary literature regarding adolescent
development, female psychology, and the significance of culture in relation to female
adolescent morality. For the purposes of this dissertation, adolescent literature reviewed
focused on late adolescence and the formation of an identity, typically defined as between
the ages of fifteen and twenty-one. A focus on contemporary adolescents who were born
between the years of 1987 and 1993 allowed this author to conceptualize the effects of
today’s cultural context on adolescent development, the female identity, and trends in
morality. The author of this dissertation sought to update psychoanalytic theories with the
use of research and moral models developed regarding the moral development of
adolescent females within contemporary American society.
7
Critiques of these literary works involved this author asking questions such as, “Is
there a clear definition of morality?” “If there is a clear definition, how is it defined?”
Critiques were also based on the author’s acknowledgement of and sensitivity to possible
gender differences in the development of identity and morality. “Does the author address
gender?” Finally, this dissertation critiqued the literature by asking, “Are the theories
culturally relevant?”
Plan of Dissertation
This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of how moral development
occurs within the self and identity and the female adolescent experience with a review of
psychoanalytic theories and literature. The second chapter of this dissertation reviewed
the literature of “Early Psychodynamic Concepts of Morality.” Within this chapter,
concepts regarding morality and moral development were examined within Freud’s
structural model, British object relations, ego psychology, and American object relations.
This section also provided a background for the concepts of identity and self reviewed in
proceeding chapters by illustrating the foundation for ego psychological, object
relational, and self psychological theories. In the third chapter of this dissertation, the
author has sought to explain Eriksonian theories regarding identity formation and
adolescent development in “Erikson’s Adolescent Stage of Identity Formation.” This
chapter reviewed developmental theories of Erik Erikson regarding identity and virtues.
Fourthly, this dissertation explored, “Understanding the Self,” by closely examining the
construct of an authentic or cohesive self, especially as they are understood by Donald
8
Winnicott and Heinz Kohut. This chapter proposed factors necessary and involved in the
development and maintenance of the self and how that relates to a sense of morality.
This dissertation specifically examines the development of morality within female
adolescents with an integration of cognitive and theoretical models. In the fifth chapter of
this dissertation, “Cognitive and Social Models of Moral Development” were reviewed
and critiqued. These models are rooted in cognitive, social, neurobiological, and cultural
theories as a way to examine moral development and ethical behavior. “Female
Adolescent Development” was examined in the sixth chapter of this dissertation in terms
of psychoanalytic theories, cognitive theories, and social or cultural research. Within the
seventh chapter of this dissertation, the author integrates the previous six chapters of
theories of morality and female adolescent development. Finally, the author offers a
“Discussion” in the final chapter of this dissertation, identifying limitations of this study,
implications of the conclusions drawn in the integration, and areas for future research
regarding female adolescent morality. It was the goal of this dissertation to identify gaps
in the literature within four different areas of psychological theories and research,
including identity, self, adolescence, and morality. This author aimed to provide readers
with a new perspective regarding female adolescent morality that integrates these four
areas of study that each seem incomplete on their own.
9
CHAPTER 2: PSYCHODYNAMIC CONCEPTS
Structural Model
A focus on early childhood experiences and their effect on human psychology is a
common theme of psychodynamic psychology (Blanck & Blanck, 1974; Emde et al,
1987; Santrock, 2004; Summers, 19
94
). One of the first major figures in psychology to
hypothesize the importance of early relationships on the development of a healthy
individual was Sigmund Freud in his theories originating in Europe during the turn of the
20l century. In his 19
23
work, The Ego and the Id, in which he introduced his structural
theory, Freud divided an individual’s personality into internal mechanisms of the id, the
ego, and the superego.
Freud explained that the id is the most primal structure in a person’s psychology
that focused on the gratification of one’s needs. The id, an innate drive, was hypothesized
as often in conflict with social norms, conventions, or parental expectations. Freud named
the internal structure that developed in accordance with social and moral expectations the
superego. The superego, in Freud’s structural model, is the primary regulatory process of
ethical behavior. The superego is believed to develop through a child’s identification with
her parents and their set of cultural values, and this structure encourages individuals to
conform to social expectations in spite of personal drives or desires. The final component
of structural psychology is the ego, which Freud described as providing an individual
with the ability to cope with and negotiate the motivations of the id and superego (Freud,
1923).
10
For the purposes of this dissertation, Freud’s concept of superego is emphasized
due to its impact on moral development and ethical behavior. The superego functions as
an observer of the ego, taking on a judging and parental role. These functions seek to
“maintain intrapsychic and interpersonal harmony and facilitate social adaptation”
(Tyson & Tyson, 19
90
, p. 195). The development and maintenance of the superego,
therefore, is highly influenced by parental and social norms. Because gender and cultural
context often mediate these norms, a further examination of the female adolescent
experience is needed to grasp the development and functioning of the superego. Freud
emphasized differences in superego development for males and females based on
identification with same sex parents. This author will not review the specifics of these
theories because their relevance in contemporary American culture is questionable.
In general, the superego is believed to develop through a child’s wish to retain
parental love and maintain relationships with parents and the larger social system. The
child is able to do this by receiving and interpreting messages of approval or disapproval
from parents. Eventually, as the child begins to develop her own identity, these messages
must be negotiated with her own desires and values. These messages of what is
acceptable and unacceptable, good and bad, are in time internalized and adopted by the
child. However, many factors can impact and disrupt this internalizing process such as
inconsistent parental or cultural messages. Internalization may also be mediated by a
highly emotionally-charged interaction between parents and child. The amount of anxiety
or affect aroused in a child can therefore affect her ability to internalize a message or the
significance attached to that particular message.
11
Karen Horney, a psychoanalytic theorist whose views deviated somewhat from
Sigmund Freud’s ideas, emphasized this anxiety or “internal conflict” as a major
determinant of human behavior. Horney classified antisocial or aggressive behaviors as
resulting from hopelessness and the internal experience that one must struggle against
others for survival (Horney, 19
45
). This hopelessness may certainly be impacted by
societal messages, parenting, and the overall well-being of an individual within her social
context.
Another factor mediating an adolescent’s moral stance and internalization process
is her cognitive ability to make sense of and social and parental messages of positive or
negative reinforcement (Tyson & Tyson, 1990). The relationship between parent and
child, its strengths and weaknesses, present major implications for the internalization
process. Therefore, a closer examination of the affective, cognitive, and interpersonal
systems of a child is needed to better understand the internalization of a moral code.
Object Relations
After Freud’s work in structural psychology, a movement of object relational
psychology emerged in Great Britain, diverging from Freud’s traditional theories.
Melanie Klein, a student of Freud’s, extended the theoretical utilization of psychoanalytic
thought of the time by emphasizing the internalization of the parent or “early object” as
the psychological template by which a child develops relational behavior. Within
Kleinian object relations theory, a child is said to use relational experiences to integrate
an understanding of good and bad as well as feelings of love and hate. If this integration
12
process is successful, the child or adolescent should gain moral competence through the
building of sustainable relationships and the inclusion of pro-social behavior (Alford,
19
89
). Sigmund Freud’s daughter Anna Freud also wrote about the bidirectional
relationships important to child and adolescent moral development. Anna Freud
hypothesized that a child will perceive the world as either hostile or kind, depending
upon the nature of the child-parent bond. She added emphasis to the perception a mother
has of her child as well, stating a mother’s response to a child’s needs may be impacted
by her understanding as the child as either difficult or amiable. This early child-parent
relationship, Anna Freud concluded, determined the effectiveness of a child’s “internal
pleasure principle” to be externally controlled by the mother. It is by internalizing this
“external drive control” that a child develops the ability to self-regulate and reach “moral
independence” (Freud, 1965).
Melanie Klein emphasized the importance of ideals during childhood and
adolescent development and explained that an individual’s enduring ideals ultimately
negotiate his or her behaviors and relationships (Alford, 1989). Through an
internalization process, ideals develop, and self control eventually replaces parental
control. In this way, a person is rewarded with a sense of pride and personal value when
she lives up to her internalized moral standards in a similar way that her behavior may
have been reinforced by satisfied parents (Santrock, 2004).
Donald Winnicott emerged in the British object relational movement during the
first half of the 20th century when psychoanalysts were building upon the work of
Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, and Anna Freud. Winnicott proposed that an adaptation
13
takes place when an adolescent attempts to balance his or her individual ideals and the
ideals of the surrounding culture, ultimately creating a compromised organization of the
self. In Winnicott’s model, early relationships and the social environment are emphasized
as key components to an adolescent’s formation of the self (Winnicott, 1965). Ronald
Fairbairn, a member of the British object relational movement, also noted the adolescent
transitional period as a key time to learn the balance between dependence upon parents
and independence toward a mutual and “differentiated sense of self ‘ (Summers, 1994, p.
30
).
The object relational movement spread to the United States where theorists like
Otto Kernberg continued to identify key components and stages of psychological
development. Kernberg distinguished the fifth stage of psychological development as the
stage in which the superego is integrated into a person’s personality. This integration
requires the incorporation of one’s understandings of self and others which leads to ideal
representations of the self and others. Ideal representations may set the stage for prosocial
behaviors and internalized values (Summers, 1994). Ideal representations and
internalized values are likely to be highly impacted by the interpersonal cues experienced
by children and adolescents (Wainryb et al., 2005). Therefore, the relationships an
adolescent encounters and her ability to build positive relationships has a special
importance regarding the internalization of values and ideals.
14
Ego Psychology
Ego psychology, the name given to the branch of psychodynamic thought, gained
popularity in the 19
50
s and 19
60
s by expanding upon Freud’s structural theory and
focusing particularly on the ego (Blanck & Blanck, 1974). One of the ego’s core
responsibilities is to negotiate the internal and external expectations a person encounters
(Emde et al., 1987). Theorists like Edith Jacobson related the successful development of a
person’s superego to the co-current development of identity and self esteem. Like other
psychodynamic theorists, Jacobson noted a developmental stage during which individuals
shift from external regulation to a more internal structure (Blanck & Blanck, 1974).
Another ego psychologist, Heinz Hartmann, explained that human adaptation, in which
one modifies the self and his or her environment, as an ongoing process (Blanck &
Blanck, 1974). The environment as an influential factor presents major cultural
implications to be considered when examining the internalization of ideals and a female
adolescent’s development. Ego psychologist, Margaret Mahler also emphasized the
development of a gender identity within this developmental process (Blanck & Blanck,
1974). Meanings attached to being female within American culture must therefore also be
noted as providing insights for a female adolescent’s developing identity and sense of
morality.
Erik Erikson, an ego and developmental psychologist became widely known for
his theories of psychological development in the 1950s and 1960s. Specifically, Erikson
designed a series of eight developmental psychosocial stages that were based in findings
in biology, psychology, and culture at that time (1982). Erikson’s writings (1961, 1968,
15
1982) contributed significantly to theories regarding adolescence and the development of
values and personal identities with this developmental stage. Erikson explained that
within adolescence, individuals face the task of forming a comprehensive identity. One
major component of this model is the phenomenon during which adolescents experience
a search for “something to have faith in” (Erikson, 1968, p. 128). Emphasizing the
development of self consistency, Erikson named “ego ideals,” as especially important in
moral development during this period of lifespan. Current literature referencing the
adolescent’s identity, identify the development of a solid identity as highly impacting the
consistency of an adolescent’s moral motivation (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). Factors such as
parental identification, culture, and a sense of identity have been associated with the
development of empathy and interpersonal ethical behaviors in this life stage as well
(Damon, 19
83
).
16
CHAPTER 3: ADOLESCENT STAGE OF IDENTITY FORMATION
Erik Erikson described developmental stages throughout the lifespan from infancy
to late adulthood. According to his theories, the developmental task assigned to
adolescence involves the conflict between identity formation and identity diffusion.
Erikson explained that many factors impact an adolescent’s ability to navigate this
developmental task including sufficient ego development within childhood stages of
development (Erikson, 19
59
). To build ego strength, the child must overcome the
challenges of earlier years such as basic mistrust, shame and doubt, guilt, and inferiority
through personal abilities and with the encouragement and support of caregivers. Erikson
noted that ego strength is developed from stage to stage, and the formation of this
strength as well as an identity is crucial for future developmental successes (Erikson,
19
64
). Ego strength and identity play an important role in moral agency of adolescents as
well as moral development in general. Erikson described a shift in the significant
relationships used by adolescents to achieve identity formation and moral development.
In adolescence, individuals will increase the amount of feedback incorporated from peers
and information from other cultural role models, and this may present important
information regarding the female adolescent experience and development of identity
(Erikson, 1982).
The task of the ego in identity formation is to establish and maintain continuity
while remaining flexible enough to adapt to present and future challenges of
developmental stages (Erikson, 1964). Erikson stressed the importance of identity
formation in his book Identity: Youth and Crisis, “For, indeed, in the social jungle of
17
human existence there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of identity” (Erikson,
1968, p. 130). In order for identity formation to take place successfully, an adolescent
must synthesize personal ideals, roles at which she excels, and roles accepted by others.
Adolescents have the need and opportunity for autonomy, choices, and constructive
work. A balance between a trust in oneself and, at the same time, self consciousness must
be struck. Similarly, a trust in others and in ideals must be compromised with a natural
fear of commitment or stagnation in the beginnings of an identity and personality
(Erikson, 1968).
In his book Youth: Change and Challenge (1961) Erikson described a tension
within adolescence between separation and relation to adults. Adolescents exist in a
unique position between childhood and adulthood. At some times and contexts, an
adolescent may wish to take on a more childlike persona, perhaps enacting dependence
needs. In other situations, adolescents are quite adamant about their adult status and
strives for autonomy. This transition leads to a tension between being a child and an
adult. Erikson explained that a balance is found within this tension through
experimentation by adolescents with different roles and levels of maturity which leads to
a more deliberate sense of and understanding of one’s identity (Erikson, 1961).
Erikson described a feeling of urgency that is experienced in everyday
adolescence. An adolescent may feel like a helpless child in one moment and then like a
powerful adult in the next. Due to the “diffusion of time perspective,” an adolescent may
experience the disbelief that time brings major life changes but also fear that time will
bring disruptive changes simultaneously (Erikson, 1968). Erikson described adolescents
18
as seeking to be “reborn” in a reality that is reformulated to include past and present
understandings. Each adolescent develops a “historical perspective” that Erikson defined
as “a sense of the irreversibility of significant events and an often urgent need to
understand fully and quickly what kind of happening in reality determines others and
why” (Erikson, 1961, p. 12). The cognitive developmental capability of abstract thinking
defined by Piaget (1965) and others to develop within adolescence seems to align with
Erikson’ s view of an adolescent’s capacity to “imagine” beyond the immediate reality.
During adolescence, some individuals may experience regression in response to
internal conflicts arising from past and present circumstances. Erikson explained that an
adolescent may focus on her history because of the anxiety arising from the fate of
identity formation. In these cases an adolescent may fear failing as an individual or
succeeding by another’s standards and thereby becoming untrue to personal convictions.
Adolescents may resent the notion that personal identity is predetermined by historical
events and context, hoping to rise above social or familial circumstances but feeling
inadequate to achieve that, simultaneously (Erikson, 1961). Cultural norms and
expectations, particularly for female adolescents, present potential inhibiting messages.
Erikson described adolescents who are unable to adapt to “the human condition” as
becoming susceptible to isolation, suicide, and psychosis (Erikson, 1961). This failure to
achieve and integrated identity that balances individual and social expectations likely also
impacts the emergence of self understanding, self regulation, and moral values.
Within adolescence, one also seeks to balance individuality with community. A
new identification process takes place as the history of both the individual and her culture
19
are merged with the increasing awareness of new ideals and pursuits. Erikson explained
that adolescents must feel that their life has meaning in order to move forward in identity
development (Erikson, 1961). This requirement of identity formation implies that
adolescents will seek to make an imprint on their social world, and the way in which they
seek to do that will be influenced by familial and cultural context. The values and morals
introduced and modeled for adolescents are highly important in this stage and may be
either negatively or positively reinforced by role models.
An adolescent may not experience identity diffusion but rather develop a
“negative identity” in response to reinforcing or punishing messages received from
parents and peers. Erikson described various ways a negative identity may occur
including a “diffusion of industry” or a one-sided and possibly destructive preoccupation
with activities that may develop in some adolescents (Erikson, 1968). This type of
identity could be based in selfishness and therefore presents implications regarding the
development of an adolescent’s capacity of care for others. Adolescents may tend to
over-identify with peer groups. Erikson described the development of a negative identity
as often based in internal conflicts between identification with conflicting social or
familial influences. If an adolescent is recognized and successful within a pathological
role or strongly identifies with a negative role model, she may choose to embody that
identity. She may rather be recognized as a negative identity than go unrecognized by
parents and peers (Erikson, 1968). “Criminal incidents” may not have the same negative
meaning as they would in other lifespan phases, as the objectification of others may be an
attempt to feel certain about oneself (Erikson, 1968). The trends and norms among
20
American female adolescents in terms of antisocial behaviors change over time and differ
between subcultures. These norms can create reinforcements for adolescents who develop
a more stable identity and adult behavioral patterns at this time.
Erikson identified adolescence as the developmental phase through which an
“ethical sense” is developed. He wrote that the idealism of adolescence extends beyond
the morals of childhood by compromising personal identity formation and the
comparison of oneself to others. Adolescents develop ideology as a way to attain a sense
of order and morals in a confusing world. In order to maintain that ethical sense,
adolescents must believe that the adults who succeed are those adults who behave
ethically (Erikson, 1968). Observations adolescents make of adults in the media and in
their personal lives, therefore, present major implications regarding their moral
development. For example, adolescents may observe successful adults who unethical use
of power for personal gain, and these observations create a poor rubric for moral
development and pro-social behavior.
Similar to the superego described by Freud, Erikson identified a person’s
“conscience” as developing from an internalized inner voice of one’s parents. In
adolescence, this inner voice expands to allow an individual to envision goals beyond
oneself and one’s family and it is used in a person’s strive toward inner unity. Erikson
described a developmental task within the movement from one developmental stage to
the next of balancing “uprootedness” and “recognition.” These two concepts cause a
tension between being oneself—and individual, and belonging with others, respectively.
Adolescence often marks the “second uprootedness,” if individuals are not met with
21
enough recognition, safety, and trust in their environment. Erikson hypothesized in these
cases, adolescents will turn to one extreme or the other. In this way, some adolescents
will choose to rebel and reject the idea of belongingness by refusing to conform with
social norms. Other adolescents will choose the other extreme of completely conforming
with others at the sacrifice of their individual will or self (Erikson, 1964). Both of these
extreme choices create significant implications in terms of morality and ethical behavior.
In the first case, an adolescent may choose to rebel completely against the social norms
that involve morals and values, inciting a reckless disregard for the wellbeing of others.
In the second case, an adolescent may choose to unquestioningly follow a group of peers
that value unethical behaviors such as the violence and exploitation to which many gangs
ascribe. Erikson theorized that early adolescent traumas may also disrupt the
development of morality by interfering with the resolution of the Oedipal complex.
Erikson gave examples of these psychological traumas as including intrusive or
inconsistent parenting and “reciprocal negative reactions” between the adolescent and her
primary caregiver (Erikson, 1968).
In his 1964 book Insight and Responsibility Erikson used traditional structural
psychology language to expand upon the theories regarding the ego and superego. He
described the ego as the “guardian of individuality,” helping to compromise the inner life
of an individual with the importance of social success and social planning. He explained
that in the development of the superego, a man becomes his own “inner judge.” A healthy
amount of trust in oneself and in others during the early developmental stages is
necessary for moral development. In accordance with this theory, the ego serves to
22
balance the moral strivings and welfare of an individual. Erikson described a set of
virtues that one develops throughout the lifespan to help the ego in this balance for an
individual within a community (Erikson, 1964).
Erikson (1964) wrote that individuals develop a sense of “basic virtues, with
which human beings steer themselves and others through life” (p. 115). The development
of these virtues, like his psychosocial stages of development, depend upon the
establishment of each preceding one. Erikson separated the virtues into life stages of
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Within childhood, one is expected to develop
four virtues: hope, will, purpose, and competence. Hope may be instilled in a child in a
number of ways, and hope continues to be an important ingredient in adult wellbeing.
Erikson described hope as a confidence or trust in the mother (primary caregiver) who is
responsible for the child’s care. In adulthood, Erikson described religion or the idea of a
higher power as often providing “God care” or hope. The second childhood virtue, will,
is rooted in parental structure and rules. Will presents a key component of the balance
one finds between self restraint and action. Within infancy, a healthy child will come to
accept his or her lack of omnipotence as parents rule supreme within the household and a
child’s desires are not always gratified. Erikson emphasized a dichotomy between self
efficacy and the acceptance of the rules of others. The virtue of will therefore presents
implications for the moral competence and identity cohesion expected in adolescence
(Erikson, 1964).
Erikson’s third named virtue of childhood is purpose. Purpose, highly related to
identity formation, laying the foundation for cognitive planning and role playing. Erikson
23
explained that purpose is established in children by playing. Children use play to both act
out past events and try out new expectations. Erikson also emphasized the importance of
role playing in play so that children are able to try on roles of their parents and other adult
scripts (Erikson, 1964). Readers may infer that the integrity of parents and other role
models are crucial, even within early stages of childhood development and morality. The
final virtue of childhood is competence, which uses the previous virtues beyond
anticipation to action. Social norms and gender expectations play a role within the
development of this virtue because what is modeled, taught, encouraged, and accepted
from children impacts a child’s competence (Erikson, 1964).
Following childhood transitions, Erikson named one virtue to be achieved within
adolescence—fidelity. Erikson identified fidelity as the “cornerstone of identity” (p. 1
25
).
He explained that adolescence is marked by “rebellious impulses” alternating with
“compulsions” of restraint (Erikson, 1964, p.
103
). Ideology in this developmental stage
may be based in pro-social or anti-social values. The development of values and fidelity
toward those values within adolescence may lay the foundation for future ethical
competence. The solidarity common to adolescents among their peers may also present
important implications for relationships and interpersonal connectedness. The first adult
virtue identified by Erikson that followed fidelity was love. Erikson explained that the
virtue of love connects all the stages of development. He dubbed love as the most
important of all the virtues and wrote that an affiliation with others builds ego strength
for individuals. It is through love that an established identity can take chances within a
dyadic identity and an intimate bond. According to Erikson, true intimacy is only
24
possible after the completion of adolescence (Erikson, 1964). This assertion may present
important implications regarding the development of moral judgment and interpersonal
empathy among adolescents.
Erikson proposed that the development of love as a virtue does not necessarily
denote that the next adult virtue, care, will be developed. Instead, love can be selfish and
uncaring like sadism or the love of an association. Conversely, care implies that a man or
woman seeks to guide or accept responsibility for others, beyond their individual
personhood. This virtue of care is associated with the intergenerational pattern of
childcare within families. He also noted that the “need to be needed” by others is unique
to humans as a species. Emphasizing a divergence between male and female adults,
Erikson specified that for a woman, care is “anchored” in her physical womb which he
called a “model of care.” According to Erikson, a division of labor between the genders
does not occur within this progression of virtues until the adult virtues of love and care
develop (Erikson, 1964). Erikson accepted that gender and social expectations impact the
way virtues reveal themselves, indicating that a closer and more contemporary study
between males and females in adolescence and childhood would be beneficial.
Adolescents often experience an extreme polarity of what is believed to be love
and hate in an individual’s search for what she and others “stand for” (Erikson, 1961).
This confusion regarding one’s life narrative may lead to feelings of hopelessness or
apathy regarding personal behavioral choices and the potential consequences to those
choices. In this way, ethical development and moral competence must overcome anxiety
25
common and natural to this developmental stage, and the development of a
comprehensive life narrative may be quite important as well.
Erikson explained that identity formation is necessary for real intimacy that he
called “mutual psychosocial intimacy” (p. 1
35
). Without this intimacy, an adolescent may
feel isolated and disconnected from others (Erikson, 1968). Connectedness and intimacy
with others likely also presents key components of interpersonal morality. First loves, for
adolescents, are used to “hold themselves together,” in lieu of feeling uncertain about
one’s role and future. Love is a way for an adolescent to project a diffuse identity onto
another in order to feel clarified and whole (Erikson, 1968). Until adolescence, this love
and connectedness was mostly attained from parents and family members, but as
individuals become more involved with peers and social networks, other relationships
become important as well (Erikson, 1982).
It is within the developmental stage of adolescence that Erikson emphasized the
importance of cultural and social influence. Erikson warned that education and
participation within many realms present key components to the effective adaptation of
adolescents. He elaborated that adolescents need to feel involved with the construction
and maintenance of society so they may become invested in its upkeep and their place
within the world (Erikson, 1961). This insight presents major implications in terms of
gender differences and the acceptance of female identities within
American culture.
Adolescence may be an especially “stormy” time for gifted adolescents because of the
extensive choices and opportunities available in terms of pursuits, roles, and identity
(Erikson, 1968). The desire to develop one’s identity may be experienced as an intense
26
need to understand oneself and one’s place within a larger society which presents
implications of a gendered social experience.
Within adolescence, Erikson proposed a child may sublimate her dreams and
playfulness for more accepted pursuits. Through this sublimation, an identity is
developed. However, Erikson warned, if individual traits or pursuits are sacrificed in
order to seek social acceptance, the true self may be covered by a superficial identity
(Erikson, 1968). Erikson noted the importance of adult efforts within the adolescent’s
social environment to develop and nurture the “gifts” of a growing child (Erikson, 1968).
In this way, and adolescent may develop an adaptive identity that is both flexible and
stable. The specific female experiences and cultural messages to females must be
examined further to determine what kinds of adaptations a female adolescent identity
requires within American culture.
Erikson critiqued the developmental literature by Jean Piaget as missing key
pieces of the lifespan experience. Specifically, Erikson emphasized the importance of
accepting physiological development as a component of overall “functional unity”
(Erikson, 1964). However, by denying the role of physiology in developmental stages,
Erikson proposed that Piaget’ s developmental theories neglect to encapsulate one’s
experience of reconciling psychology and personality with his or her body throughout the
lifespan (Erikson, 1964). This refocus on the physiological experience of individuals
within psychological development underscores the potentially different experiences of
males and females throughout development.
27
Within childhood, task identification helps an individual to develop discipline and
learn about obligations. Erikson emphasized same-sex parental roles within this process,
describing observation and imitation of adults as a major component of identity formation
among children (Erikson, 1968). One might infer that the role of teachers, nannies, and
adult public figures may likewise influence the early stages of identity formation in
contemporary American society. According to Erikson, a complicated or vague parental
(adult model) presentation of his or her role will diminish the effectiveness of a child to
learn and take initiative in his or her own role (Erikson, 1968). The redefinition of gender
roles and familial distribution of power and tasks, therefore, presents the modern
American child with a challenge in his or her understanding and development of an
individual identity.
As outlined above, Erikson made some distinctions between the psychological
development of males and females in terms of identity, morality, and ego strength. He
emphasized the importance of “adaptation” among various cultures and contexts as a key
component to ego strength (Erikson, 1964). A similar adaptation must be applied to his
theoretical models developed in the 1960s, 70s, and
80
s. Erikson noted the importance of
parental figures and intergenerational influences to a child’s understanding of herself, her
culture, and her responsibility to others. He also warned, however, that as the changing
American culture causes decreases in the amount of time a child spends with her parents,
the influences relevant to a developing child will also change (Erikson, 1964). Erikson
has been credited with expanding developmental theories beyond mere sexual and
biological development to include cultural and social context as well as emphasizing
28
conscious aspects in addition to unconscious aspects of personality (Moshman, 2005). A
developing adolescent female in the twenty-first century will learn about herself and the
world around her from many sources beyond the traditionally described mother and
father.
Erikson pointed out that the female identity in American society is defined by the
male identity because she is forced to seek equality through male-dominated rules and
values. He explained that because men created their group identity as in power within
society, women (as a group) are forced to seek equality through male-defined values such
as career competition and autonomy. However, Erikson wrote that the male group
identity was often contrary to innate feminine values such as the “realism of
householding, responsibility of upbringing, resourcefulness in peacekeeping, and
devotion to healing” (p. 2
62
). In the late 1960s, he referenced the newly nuclear society
the world had become and warned that values he considered to be feminine brought
missing pieces to global harmony within this conflictual climate. Erikson also warned
that due to the male-defined society the world had become, women were either forced to
conform with the contemporary values or suffer low confidence in their personal values
(Erikson, 1968).
Erikson proposed that a female’s development of faith differs from a male’s
understanding that may be mostly based in logic. Instead, he wrote that a woman’s faith
and virtuous motivation relies more heavily upon hope and trust in humanity (Erikson,
1964). If Erikson’s gendered theory holds truth, then this hope and trust in humanity may
29
be in jeopardy given the current conditions of terrorism and negativity in our current
world.
Erikson’s writings on gender and culture must be studied with an understanding
of the cultural context in which they emerged. One could question whether such a
pronounced gender split still exists in today’s American society. Erikson wrote in the
1960s, a time in which the struggle among females in American society to redefine
themselves in terms of femininity and success was raw and evolving. A study by Matina
Horner in 19
69
also highlighted this struggle among women. Horner presented men and
women with achievement scenarios and asked them to respond to this academic success.
While the majority of men responded to this cue with positive consequences, 90% of
women responded with negative stories of a loss of femininity or a relationship as a
consequence of the success. Horner and subsequent authors hypothesized that this “fear
of success” among females negatively impacted their ability to strive for achievement
(Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Horner, 1969).
The identification with role models, both parental and cultural, within
contemporary American society, must be considered in order to gain more insight into the
female adolescent experience. Factors like gender roles and expectations may be seen as
mediating the identity formation process described by Erik Erikson. In future chapters,
this author explored the implications of gender and culture on the development of an
identity and the negotiation of a true self.
30
CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING THE SELF
Developed and transformed throughout the second half of the 20th Century, the
“self has been a construct of importance within psychoanalytic thought and theory.
Heinz Kohut is credited as being the founder of self psychology, an area of psychology
that emerged in the 1970s that continued with the trend of psychoanalytic thought. Like
structural theory, object relations, and ego psychology, self psychology emphasizes early
childhood experiences in later psychological development. Donald Winnicott described a
female adolescent’s self as emerging first through a trust in her caregivers due to “good
enough mothering” (Winnicott, 1971, p. 13). Self psychologists view early mirroring
relationships with parents as vital in determining the development of either a cohesive or
fragmented self, demarking psychological health or psychopathology. The “self,”
according to self psychology is a structure which includes but is not limited to ego
functioning, negotiating the internal needs of an individual in cooperation with others
(Kohut, 1977). In this way, the self functions for adolescents females within the
development of an identity and moral development.
Donald Winnicott
Kohutian self psychology was predated by the works of Donald Winnicott and
other psychoanalytic theoreticians interested in developmental psychology. Winnicottian
theory was largely based in his understanding of object relations and early childhood
experiences. In his 1971 work, Playing and Reality, Donald Winnicott outlined some
developmental requirements for a child’s development of the self. He noted that “good
31
enough mothering” is crucial for a child’s understanding of others through “object
usage.” In his theories, Winnicott (1971) presupposed that the initial and inherent instinct
of a child is destructive toward an object (or primary caregiver). Ascribing to the theories
of Sigmund Freud (1923) and Melanie Klein (1984), Winnicott explained that a child first
desires to destroy his mother who inevitably fails to grant the unending wishes of a baby.
At this time, it is crucial that the baby’s mother returns to the child and meets her basic
needs with love and care in order for the child to develop a basic sense of what is outside
of herself and1 how to use her mother in order to meet her needs. If good enough
mothering is not present, a child may remain self-centered and defensive with a
preoccupation to get her needs met with little regard or sense of the other (Winnicott,
1971). This survival-based position presented major implications in terms of a child’s
interpersonal and moral stance.
Another major result of the successful development of this object usage is the
development of a reality-based sense of self or identity. Winnicott (1971) explained that
in the early childhood exchange described above, a baby’s omnipotence is challenged,
leading to the beginning of an understanding of an individual’s cooperative role within
the social world. A mother who fails to meet the baby’s needs will conversely trigger a
child’s psychological defenses and jeopardize her future incorporation of reality. If within
an early experience, an infant’s space and development is invaded upon by the other, a
feeling of persecution can develop. Persecutory feelings can lead to a pathological
condition in which an individual cannot rid herself of the persecution, jeopardizing
prosocial interpersonal and moral behavior (Winnicott, 1971). The development of a self
32
and moral code therefore depend upon a female adolescent’s relational experiences and
unfolding self-understanding.
In his 1965 compilation of written articles, The Maturational Processes and the
Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory ofEmotional Development, Winnicott
described the process of developing morality in the context of establishing a “true self.”
He posited that morality develops naturally within a good enough environment, due to the
influence of an outside culture as well as an internal anxiety. Winnicott elaborated upon
earlier psychoanalytic theories regarding the internal conflict one experiences between
love and hate. He stated that relief from this conflict allows one to establish a healthy
level of guilt that will allow a person to effectively self-regulate and develop concern for
others (Winnicott, 19
58
). The “concern” for others, according to Winnicott and other
psychoanalytic authors, is rooted in an infant’s relation to her caregiver (Horney, 1945;
Winnicott, 1958).
Winnicott explained “concern” as extending beyond idealizing others, guilt
feelings, and the hope to not destroy the good other. Instead, he stated, it implies
responsibility and interconnectedness to others. The resolution of responsibility develops
within the process of infant care, as Winnicott described a good enough mother as
meeting the child’s needs, relating empathically to the child, and then conveying that the
child is also contributing to her in some way. In this way, a child develops an
understanding that she is able to relate positively to others. Through this process, concern
is established from a growing comfort with the tension between one’s destructive and
constructive ways of relating (Winnicott, 1963a). Though Winnicott does not explicitly
33
list factors required for how this resolution takes place over time, this author wonders if
the coexistence of love and hate is reconciled through experiences taking on different
roles within relationships.
Winnicott described role-taking, play, and creativity as occurring in a “potential
space” in which a child’s experience and culture may be expressed. In order for a child to
use her potential space, the confidence that her primary caregiver will continue to meet
her dependency needs must be present. By trying out different personality aspects of
oneself, with confidence this play will not sabotage the good enough mothering, a child
(and adolescent) is able to experiment with different roles and attributes. It is within the
context of experimentation that features of the true self are able to emerge. Ideally,
parents respond to a child and adolescent by empathically helping the child move from
dependence to independence. At times when a parent’s love is conditional or not secure, a
child will be more likely to develop a “false self.” This false self may emerge as a rigid
identity that is less likely to facilitate flexibility and satisfaction in one’s self. False self
development may also decrease one’s opportunity for an internalized morality and
identity to emerge (Winnicott, 1971).
Potential space allows a child to try out and establish interrelationships. The
interconnectedness, empathy, and overall capacity for deeper relationships taking place in
this potential space of emotional development leads to “imaginatively living” (Winnicott,
1971). Winnicott emphasized this type of imaginative living for adolescents as a way to
develop a stronger sense of morality than can be taught through lessons of “right” and
“wrong.” He argued that education of values through mediums such as parents, teachers,
34
and religion can be important, but a person must develop a personal “faith in” these
values in order for her to adopt them as her own internal moral code (Winnicott, 1963b).
Much like the identity development process described by Erikson, an adolescent must try
on moral messages in order to internalize values and develop an “innate morality”
(Erikson, 1961; Winnicott, 1963b).
Values are instilled when parents and other social influences give or withhold
approval to a child or adolescent’s behavior. Children develop “moral codes” by adopting
and critiquing social and familial values because they are unable to make sense of the
world around them without assistance and knowledge from those more experienced
(Winnicott, 1963b). In this way, the family and community in which an adolescent
develops impact the type of value subset developed and maintained.
Winnicott described the process of moral development as a constant interchange
of external and internal factors one introjects and projects in order to create a sense of self
(Winnicott, 1963b). Relational experience presents the most salient route toward innate
morality, as Winnicott stated, “there is more to be gained from love than by education”
(p. 100). He charged parents with the responsibility of providing a good enough model
for values. In this way an adolescent can rise above a simplistic reward and compliance
based system of guilt in order to develop an ethical identification. Winnicott also
presented volunteer service to others as a prime opportunity for adolescents to develop
feelings of contribution and responsibility. In this way, the destructive and constructive
sides of oneself can be further reconciled with a sense of purpose and self identity
(Winnicott, 1963b).
35
Within adolescence, one also develops the ability to tolerate ambivalence.
Winnicott’s proposed development of interpersonal responsibility, as described above,
becomes important during the developmental stage of adolescence because one must
reconcile love and hate of self and others in order to alleviate excessive guilt. Winnicott
proposed if underlying guilt is confusing and too much to bear to an adolescent, she may
commit immoral acts in order to make sense of the internal guilty feelings (Winnicott,
1958). In this way, unethical behavior may be a way to attach the confusing feeling of
guilt to a behavior that helps an adolescent better tolerate the ambiguity of her internal
experience. This author wonders about the possible relief of ambiguity that may be
achieved by immoral behavior when an adolescent is treated as though she is bad by
parental, peer, or societal messages. Winnicott warned that these patterns of unethical
behavior become especially problematic if the behaviors accrue secondary gains such as
the respect of ones peers. With the inclusion of secondary gains, an adolescent may
establish a pattern of reinforced unethical behaviors, developing an antisocial personality
and failing to establish a tolerance for ambivalence (Winnicott, 1958).
The adolescent task of identity formation seems relevant to Winnicott’s
description of a developed ability to self-realize. As a mother (or father) adapts to the
child’s needs, the child develops confidence and is able to relax. It is within this relaxed
state that a child can then separate from parental dependency and become independent.
Winnicott (1971) described the movement through emotional development stages as
“inherently aggressive” because children and adolescents eventually seek to take their
parents’ places in the adult world. He proposed that adolescent rebelliousness is an
36
adolescent’s way of existing in her own right. “Inborn aggression” is just one of many
instincts that a child and adolescent may express or inhibit within potential space and
later in social interactions. Winnicott advised parents to maintain power (limits without
over-control) over adolescents until they are mature and able to create a true self to move
forward toward adult development. He warned that handing over power too early can
reinforce a less mature and defensive stance in adolescents who will then likely continue
to take power and control over others. This kind of false maturity can be established for a
variety of reasons, including early sexual development (Winnicott, 1971). Winnicott’s
concept of false maturity may be important in understanding the controversial choices
made by teenagers successful in Hollywood and other circles. Winnicott posited that
adolescents who were given power too soon from their parents will seek power and
notoriety as a way to maintain the unstable identity established (Winnicott, 1971). In this
way, adolescent behavior of control and aggression may be attributed to the absence of an
adequate opportunity to idealize and develop in one’s own time.
Winnicott argued that adolescents require gradual growth in order to experience
and reconcile their personal goodness, evil, love, and hate. He referred to inner guilt as a
way for adolescents to self-regulate and test out different roles and identities in this
developmental stage. Winnicott (1971) distinguished between male and female
“elements,” he considered to be fundamental to aspects of a person’s identity and
personality. These elements, he explained, are often biologically driven and instinctual
within males but socialized for females. Winnicott warned that identification with
opposite sex elements are necessary in addition in order to avoid denial of true self
37
features. This hypothesis was likely influenced by the 1960s and 1970s culture in which
Winnicott wrote. A closer examination of current adolescent culture and contemporary
gendered societal messages is needed to update an understanding of self development. He
also emphasized the importance of multigenerational experiences as well, noting that
cultural influences are often cumulative. Within the lifespan, Winnicott described man as
a “unit” or “the summation of his cultural experiences” (Winnicott, 1971). He noted that
exposure and acceptance of cultural and individual personality aspects of a developing
child are necessary to the development of an identity as well. Because adolescents are not
yet disillusioned by the world, Winnicott proposed that they are able to maintain a level
of idealism that fosters creative growth in this time (Winnicott, 1971). In this way, the
development of the self, and in turn a cohesive sense of morality, is mediated by
countless factors and processes.
Heinz Kohut
Heinz Kohut contributed to the psychological community by solidifying the
concept of the self and the constructs he deemed necessary for proper self development.
The self, according to Kohut, is the core of a person’s personality. In his 1977 book
Restoration ofthe Self, Kohut hypothesized that in the absence of a true self, a person’s
more primitive drives will dominate. He described the ability to overcome these drives as
psychologically secondary and developing with more sophisticated developmental
achievements (Kohut, 1977). Therefore, the lack of a developed true self may impact a
female adolescent’s ethical or unethical behavior. Like Winnicott, Kohut described the
38
development of a true self as dependent upon the parents’ ability to respond with
empathy and encouragement to a developing child (Kohut, 1977).
Kohut explained the original selfobject of a child, or the primary caregiver, is
crucial to the development of the self. He also emphasized the importance of idealizing
selfobjects and transmuting the information and guidance of the selfobject into the child’s
repertoire of ideal behavior and self competence (Siegel, 1996). In this way, parental
rules and behaviors impact the child’s ideals and chosen behaviors. The “nuclear self
develops as the core self of a child and is based in the responsiveness of selfobjects to
various parts of the child which includes deliberate or unconscious encouragement or
discouragement (Kohut, 1977). One aspect of the self that is either reinforced or opposed
by a child’s parents could be the developing morals and values. One may therefore
conclude that the more basic and significant a moral code becomes to a child’s core self,
the more likely it will endure consistently across situations and contexts.
It is first the child’s developmental task to establish the self and in later stages of
adolescence and adulthood, it becomes one’s task to maintain the integrity of the self.
Kohut contended that childhood experiences create adult psychopathology and
personality, as the maintenance of the self is a constant and ongoing process throughout
the lifespan. In the earliest phase of self development, Kohut explained an infant requires
mirroring by her selfobject in order to maintain trust in caregivers and develop structures
of the self and personality. If this mirroring form of care giving is not attained by a child,
an activity or response will be chosen by the child in order to mend the relationship and
establish some sense of self. This activity is often illogical and ineffective because it is
39
chosen and pursued by an infant or child who does not fully understand herself or the
world around her. Consequently, maladaptive and often immoral behaviors are chosen,
especially in times that feelings of inadequacy are dominant in the self. A child may seek
to control others or hurt others in order to establish a sense of self esteem or agency.
Aggressive behaviors occur as a common response to an injury to the self because they
may be rooted in a need to punish or reject the unsatisfying parental selfobject. A child
may also develop paranoia toward others as a result of being hurt in early years of
development, presenting major implications regarding her interpersonal style throughout
the lifespan. Kohut believed this chosen activity with intended reparative effects becomes
a compulsion for that person, and one that will be repeated throughout the lifespan
despite its likely pathological effects (Kohut, 1977).
Kohut described “tension states” as occurring with anxiety when a person feels he
or she is encountering a threat to the cohesiveness of self or when a lack of cohesion is
detected (Kohut, 1977). How a child or adolescent attempts to resolve a tension state is
likely impacted by familial and cultural context that may model or reinforce aggression
or grandiosity. Kohut explained unethical behavior or interpersonal aggression may result
as “disintegration products” or the results of parental empathie failures a child
experiences as traumatic. A secondary psychological disintegration product potentially
resulting from a selfobject failure is destructiveness. This destructiveness may be directed
at one’s self, objects, or other people. Destructive rage that is expressed toward other
people in the form of hurtful or unethical behaviors is motivated by a perceived threat or
injury to the self, according to Kohutian theory. A “narcissistic injury” or one that was
40
inflicted upon the child’s self by the selfobject presents the most severe threat to one’s
self (Kohut, 1977). This destructive disintegration product may be prominent in the
behavior of abused or neglected children or as a reaction to other types of trauma that
severely threatened a child’s nuclear self due to a selfobject failure.
In contrast to destructive rage, a child may develop with an optimal amount of
empathy and frustration from her selfobject care and establish a behavioral pattern of
“nondestructive aggression,” or a healthy level of assertiveness allowing a child or
adolescent to maintain her self while encountering growth and experience in her external
world (Kohut, 1977). Kohut proposed this assertiveness could be achieved by adolescents
or adults after a previous pattern of rage and guilt that had resulted from selfobject
failures. He stated this transformation required repeated encounters of optimal and
satisfying replacement selfobject interactions over time (Kohut, 1977). This author
proposes that the post-childhood and ideal stage of development to acquire these
reparative relational experiences is adolescence, before relational patterns are solidified
and within the development of ideals and identity. Adolescents are faced with daily
challenges to previously established beliefs and understandings, and corrective
experiences may serve as a challenge to antisocial beliefs and behaviors.
Kohut posited the developmental stage in which identification and self cohesion is
challenged and established if the self has been crafted is adolescence. A “tension arc”
may develop between two poles of the self if there is an internal conflict between a
personal ambition and the ideals and values already developed in that person (Kohut,
1977). This type of tension may occur within any developmental stage, however it may
41
be particularly common within adolescence when a person is solidifying aspects of his or
her identity. Additionally, social expectations of gender may impact the ideals a female
adolescent develops, presenting her with the task of successfully overcoming the tension
within her self to maintain cohesion and continuity. “Self discontinuity” may result if
sameness cannot be achieved throughout the tension arc, and this lack of cohesion may
interfere with a female adolescent’s ability to internalize and crystallize a moral code
(Kohut, 1977).
Kohut described adolescence as a period of testing and challenge to the self and
identity. “A shakily formed self may perhaps not be able to weather the storms of this
period” (Kohut, 1977). He proposed adolescents must be provided with an idealizing
object in addition to self esteem building pursuits in order for the self to be maintained
and nurtured. Adolescence provides an individual with a second self development process
in which “selective inclusion and exclusion of structures” is negotiated. In order to
navigate one’s self through this second identification process, a balance must be struck
between the ideals and pursuits endorsed by selfobjects and one’s culture in addition to
the personal ambitions internal and intrinsic to an adolescent (Kohut, 1977). Although
Kohut did not describe the extent to which gender and culturally accepted gender roles
may play a part in this process, there is little doubt that female adolescents receive
different messages about identity and behavior than do their male counterparts.
Consequently, a further examination of these cultural expectations and how they may
affect a female adolescent’s navigation through a second identification process of self
development is needed to fully grasp the implications of Kohutian theory. In future
42
chapters, this author will examine aspects of American adolescent culture and gendered
social messages to gain insight about self development. Another factor involved in
development, cognitive appraisal and understanding of morality, can affect the
development of self and social expectations as well as mediate the internalization of
moral messages.
43
CHAPTER 5: COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL MODELS
When they emerged in the 1960s, Erikson’s theories underwent criticism, largely
due to their basis in Freudian psychosexual stages that emphasize the role of biology and
innate drives in human behavior. Other areas of psychology at this time emphasized
cognitive processes, social reinforcements, and cultural differences, hypothesizing that
surely these factors play a role in an individual’s ideals, goals, and identifications. As
psychoanalytic literature remained immersed in theory regarding fantasy and the
unconscious, the cognitive behavioral movement gained popularity among psychologists
in America (Santrock, 2004). Cognitive theories of morality emerged as a way to explain
moral behavior in a reality-based way through models of cognitive development and the
social learning hypothesis (Moshman, 2005).
Cognitive Development Stages of Jean Piaget
Developmental theories generated in 1 960s America largely focused on the
cognitive development of moral reasoning and incorporated both brain development and
social reinforcements as significant factors in childhood and adolescent behavior (Piaget,
1965; Santrock, 2004). Jean Piaget published works that emphasized the importance of
education and thinking processes in child development. Focusing on cognitive
psychology, Jean Piaget theorized that the development of morality and reasoning are
active processes related to biological development and cognitive capabilities. He
proposed that with an increasing age, adolescents develop an increasing sophistication in
their thinking. Entitled “formal operations,” Piaget described a cognitive development
44
stage that typically occurs after the age of eleven. An adolescent capable of formal
operations is able to think and reason more abstractly and logically than a younger child
(Piaget, 1965). Other researchers of cognitive development have stressed the importance
of social and didactic interactions from caretakers and other influences in developing
cognitive strengths such as formal operations (Bornstein, 1989; Haste, 1987). Piaget
described formal operations as relating to moral development because it is by using this
cognitive skill that an adolescent is able to develop a more autonomous and “inner ideal”
to inform moral decisions, beyond the simple obedience or a fear of punishment (Piaget,
1965). Additionally, it is through formal operational thinking that a child becomes able to
overcome egocentricism and take on the perspective of another, making it impossible to
develop empathy (Kegan, 1982).
According to Piagetian stages of development, children who are formal
operational become more able to think outside of the rules and consider the fairness of
rules and laws. In this way, they begin to question the intentions of behavior and gain
sophistication in thinking logically, abstractly, and deductively in terms of their morality
(Piaget, 1965; Santrock, 2004). Piaget described “moral realism” as a kind of universal
objective responsibility that exists outside of an interpersonal or cultural context (Piaget,
1977). However, Piaget’ s writings also emphasized reciprocity, cooperation, and mutual
respect as important components of morality, indicating that relational experiences play a
role in moral action (Piaget, 1965). Through mutually respectful relationships,
adolescents gain insight and experience that serves as a model for an internal moral
compass. Piaget (1965) proposed that “moral autonomy” is achieved when moral ideals
45
are independent of external pressures such as laws or societal expectations. Researchers
have described Piaget’ s theories in moral development as relating a natural process in
which children develop morality through first adult supervision and later within
cooperative play with peers, emphasizing a movement toward independence from parents
and other adults (Haidt, 2008). It is within the developmental stage of adolescence that
this transition from parental dependence to autonomy typically occurs, placing an
emphasis on successful movement through adolescence. The importance of reciprocal
relationships in developing this moral autonomy also highlights the need to consider the
interpersonal and social experiences unique to females in this developmental stage.
Kohlberg’ s Moral Developmental Stages
Based in Jean Piaget’ s described final stage of “formal operations,” within
cognitive development, Lawrence Kohlberg (1984) hypothesized that the development of
ethical reasoning related strongly to an individual’s ability to cognitively understand
moral dilemmas. His stages of moral development were designed as a progression of
moral understanding that runs parallel with the cognitive development of children and
adolescents. Kohlberg’ s research laid the foundation for a broader understanding of moral
development, emphasizing cognitive skills like “perspective taking,” as key to an
adolescent’s moral competence (Kohlberg, 1984).
Kohlberg’ s first stage of morality, entitled “heteronomous morality,” reflects a
child’s tendency to obey rules simply due to a fear of punishment. In this stage, children
demonstrate a self-centered approach to moral decisions. A development of
46
“individualism and purpose” develop in his second stage, and Kohlberg described
children in this stage as pursuing their own budding interests while allowing others to do
the same. In this way, children are not yet able to make moral decisions based on
empathizing with others and rather afford rights to all. Thirdly, children develop a moral
perspective in terms of mutual interpersonal expectations and relationships that is based
in trust, caring, and loyalty (Kohlberg, 1984). This third stage may require models of
respectful and caring relationships be present in the lives of developing children.
Interpersonal expectations are also likely impacted by gender expectations of one’s
family and surrounding culture. In Kohlberg’ s fourth stage, children develop an
understanding of social order and demonstrate what he called a social systems morality
(Kohlberg, 1984). Cultural groups and social systems to which an individual belongs will
influence the moral code considered and developed. Beyond understanding of social
order, a person may then develop an interest and understanding in social contracts and
individual rights within a society, where moral human rights at times transcend laws.
Finally, in Kohlberg’ s most advanced moral stage, a person reflects a grasp and respect
for universal ethical principles. Piaget’ s concept ofmoral autonomy likely contributed to
the understanding of this stage (Kohlberg, 1984).
These moral stages of development have been explored and debated for decades
as a great advancement in psychological research of their time. However, the cognitive
developmental stages that Kohlberg presented sparked debates and more questions
among researchers and psychologists (Kohlberg, 1984; Santrock, 2004). Again, critics
cited social and cultural contexts as playing an important and neglected role in moral
47
development. Other researchers like Carol Gilligan emphasized biases rooted in
masculine and Western cultural values in Kohlberg’ s stages. It became clear that the
psychological research community called for more studies of moral development that
included different cultures and both genders.
Carol Gilligan’ s Work with Female Morality
In the 1980s and 1990s, Carol Gilligan emerged as a leader in conceptualizing
moral development by identifying ways in which Kolbergian theories may have
neglected the unique experiences of women. Gilligan incorporated her backgrounds in
gender studies, ethics, psychology, and education into her literary works and research
studies. Her research on morality distinguished between a “justice perspective,” one that
is largely focused on the maintenance of the individual’s integrity and a “care
perspective,” that emphasizes the importance of connectedness with others. Noting some
of the distinctions researchers were finding at the time between male and females
regarding morality, Gilligan described relationships or the “care perspective,” as serving
as a model and inspiration for ethical behavior especially among females (Gilligan &
Attanucci, 1988, p. 74).
Carol Gilligan defined the self as being comprised of both individual autonomy
and social responsibility. Responsibility, she proposed, was developed through
relationships, and it becomes key in conceptualizing one’s self. Gilligan criticized
psychological rhetoric at the time that failed to acknowledge the interaction and relational
experience as foundational in understanding moral behavior. She contended moral
48
“autonomy” may imply a separateness from others and therefore neglect to account for
the dynamic way that two person’s identities interact within interpersonal and moral
situations (Gilligan, 1988). From Gilligan’s contributions, one can infer that the early
relationships in a person’s life and how these relationships serve as models, present a key
component of the moral development and ethical behaviors of adolescent females.
Aligning with Gilligan’s perspective on gender differences in moral and identity
development, Nona Lyons (1988) described different modes of “self definition” that
males and females utilize. She proposed that males often define themselves by using
language emphasizing separateness and individuality. Conversely, Lyons believed that
women more frequently use connectedness and affiliation in defining themselves. These
distinctions present implications for gender differences in moral motivation. Gilligan also
emphasized connectedness as a way that female adolescents seek to maintain the self
during a developmental period in which independence becomes more salient. Her
writings demonstrated the tumultuous experience during adolescence in which females
may struggle to individuate without detaching from the important parental relationship
(Gilligan, 1988).
Gilligan explained that adolescence is a key time to renegotiate the ideals and
realities of attachment and equality, and female adolescents may specifically experience
tension due to common social messages of gender inequality (Gilligan & Attanucci,
1988). Surely the lack of social equality existing between males and females in certain
cultures may impact a female adolescent’s ability to use perspective-taking skills.
49
Specifically, one might ask if a marginalized female can empathize and put herself in
another’s shoes if she does not feel that she has equal worth to that person?
In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women ‘s Development was
written by Gilligan and published in 1982. In this book, she examined themes and
common concepts of morality uncovered from interviews with females in late
adolescence. The most common thread to these moral-based interviews reflected a “wish
not to hurt others and the hope that in morality lies a way of solving conflicts so that on
one will be hurt” (p. 65). Ethical dilemmas presented by Kohlberg in his research,
therefore, were likely analyzed by females to make the choice that injures the least
amount of people, a style which may not have aligned with Kohlberg’ s ideal response.
Gilligan noticed a tension often arising for late adolescent females regarding an attempt
to be true to oneself without hurting others. These narratives revealed a common belief
among female participants that to be caring, one should not be ambitious. Because one
must rise above others to reach ambitions and gain power, an individualized approach to
success and Kohlbergian moral dilemmas contradicted moral care for many of Gilligan’ s
participants. In this way, assertion and decision-making powers also fell into a dangerous
category for females who both tried to maintain ties with others and did not often feel
entitled or competent to make major moral decisions (Gilligan, 1982).
Gilligan hypothesized that females may view decision-making as a man’s right
and fear the responsibility or vulnerability accompanying a moral decision that may be
perceived as the wrong choice. Narratives showed a tendency of women to punish
themselves for decisions while they had an easier time forgiving others for
50
transgressions. Gilligan likened this theme to the self sacrificing expectations for
femininity common to American culture. Without an adequate self concept, she proposed,
female adolescents will defer in their moral choices to feminine social conventions like
self sacrifice. As adolescents mature, they begin to perceive the gray areas of moral
dilemmas and the potentially complicating factors that come with making a moral
decision. In complex cases female adolescents may choose inaction in order to avoid
making a mistake or hurting someone with moral action (Gilligan, 1982).
In 1992, Carol Gilligan, and her colleague Lyn Mikel Brown extended theories
about female moral development with a collection of narrative interviews with
developing girls entitled, Meeting at the Crossroads: Women ‘s Psychology and Girls ‘
Development. The authors intended to provide insight regarding female social
development in childhood and adolescence based in the differences found in genders
within research at that time. They wrote about “psychological resistance” as playing a
role in behavioral differences between males and females. Defined as “the reluctance to
know what one knows and the fear that one’s experience, if spoken will endanger
relationships and threaten survival” (p. 41), Brown and Gilligan hypothesized that female
adolescents experience psychological resistance due the social and political gender
expectations in American society that often trivialize a woman’s voice (Brown &
Gilligan, 1992). This fear of endangering relationships may be particularly important
regarding peer relationships for female adolescents because of the important function of
peer companionship in that developmental stage. Therefore, moral choices arising in
51
adolescence may be influenced by group dynamics, peer pressure, and cultural norms for
female adolescents.
Navigating through adolescence with the goal of preserving relationships can be
especially challenging because of the tension between being true to oneself and
maintaining a relational tie with someone whose behavior and judgment may be flawed.
Brown and Gilligan (1992) related this difficulty back to the challenges females typically
experienced when analyzing Kohlbergian moral dilemmas. These authors contended that
because females often receive contradicting messages from culture, family, and peers,
there is no one correct ethical choice as his study proposed. Instead, the female narratives
Brown and Gilligan analyzed illustrated a kind of keen observance by young adolescent
females to anticipate the needs and desires of others and act accordingly. This
compromise was especially salient in adolescence, a stage in which females are
attempting to transition into the adult world and seek acceptance from others.
Independence, which Piaget (1977) deemed critical for moral development, may be more
challenging for female adolescents who seek closeness to others and receive social
messages that it is the role of females to nurture and not to push away. The understanding
of some female adolescents in Brown and Gilligan’ s study likened independence to
disconnection to others and therefore struggled deeply with the transition (Brown &
Gilligan, 1992).
Although Carol Gilligan did not directly discount or disprove the theoretical
moral stages of Lawrence Kohlberg, her research and writings reflected a resistance to
the cognitively reductionistic approach seen in the models of Piaget and Kohlberg
52
(Jorgensen, 2006). Gilligan emphasized social and relational context of individuals when
examining moral development (Brown & Gilligan, 1992, Gilligan, 1982; Jorgensen,
2006). Other researchers have echoed Gilligan’ s curiosity and identified relationships and
social context as key components to resolving ethical conflicts (Bornstein, 1989;
Hallpike, 2008; Turiel, 2008; Volling, Mahoney, & Rauer, 2009).
Other Limitations in Kohlberg’ s Stages
After the development of Kohlberg’ s moral states, the political climate of the
United States also began reflecting a transitioning and evolving society with new
perspectives. At this time, researchers and authors posed novel questions, to be asked and
answered by social scientists and clinicians based in cultural relativism (Shweder et al.,
1987). Social context and the richness of a person’s experiences are important in studying
moral development because these factors foster mental evaluation of cues and
environmental influences leading to the development of values and social behavior
(Miller, 1991).
In 1966, cultural psychologist Elliot Turiel researched Kolbergian literature
regarding morality, both supporting and critiquing his stages of moral development at
times. Turiel’s research suggested that “cognitive conflict” or “disequilibrium” occurs
when a person’s assumptions about morality or ethical behavior are challenged by a
reasonable dissenting opinion. Calling for a more elaborated understanding of morality,
Turiel indicated that moral development is highly dependent upon social experiences.
Social scientists like Turiel utilized Albert Bandura’ s “social learning theory,” introduced
53
in the 1970s. This theory posited that psychological functioning is based in “continuous
reciprocal interaction of personal and environmental determinants” (p. 1 1-12). Bandura
emphasized self regulation as a tool individuals use to mediate environmental factors
(Bandura, 1977). Concepts like morality and identity likely contribute to a person’s
ability and desire to self regulate within and across social contexts.
Similar to Bandura’s internalized concept of self regulation, Shweder et al. (1987)
introduced the idea of an intrinsic “natural moral authority” that differentiates between
moral values and social convention. In their 1987 writings, Richard Schweder and his
colleagues explained that morality is neither the rational reasoning of convention, as
Kohlberg hypothesized, nor is it entirely the result of social experiences ofjustice, as
Turiel conceptualized. Rather, these authors posited that individuals are equipped with
natural moral compasses that may or may not be followed. And the choice to follow
one’s compass may be impacted by many external factors as well.
Criticisms of Kohlberg’ s moral model challenged new research and theories to
study the effects of cultural differences like environment, ethnicity, and gender on
adolescent identity formation and moral development (Santrock, 2004). Psychological
theories emerging at the end of the 20th Century began incorporating ideas that were
rooted in feminism and social constructivism in the examination of adolescent
development. Eisenberg (1987) introduced an additional construct into the cognitive and
social views of Kohlberg, Turiel, Schweder, and others regarding morality. He
emphasized the role of self-attributions as an important variable mediating social context
and the development of moral thoughts and behaviors. Self-attributions further shed light
54
onto the differences researchers were finding in the moral judgment and behaviors of
different ethnic groups and genders.
Researchers examining the validity of Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental view
of morality often noticed a discrepancy between a person’s ability to logically reason
though hypothetical ethical dilemmas and one’s actual behavioral choices. Critics argued
that hypothetical ethical dilemmas do not necessarily represent the feelings and
complications that may be present in the actual context of moral choices (Denney &
Duffy, 1974; Eisenberg, 1987; Shweder et al., 1987; Wilson, 19
75
). Instead, there
seemed to be mediating social factors that deterred children and adolescents at times from
using the rational moral reasoning skills that were reflected in hypothetical dilemmas.
In the 1970s and beyond, research in morality reflected a curiosity of cognitive,
emotional, and sociobiological factors that may impact moral decisions (Haidt, 2008;
Wilson, 1975). Recent studies have examined neuropsychology as well in the realm of
self-regulation and morality. A person’s ability to neurologically integrate perceptions
and affect into behavior based in the executive functioning of the frontal lobe may be
especially relevant to the study of moral decisions and ethical action. According to one
study in 1996, human action related to altruism, rudeness, and racism was found to be
more automatic for participants than a conscious choice (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996).
Moral decisions, therefore, seem influenced by unconscious or inherent responses at
times and not always based upon cognitive reasoning, as Kohlberg initially hypothesized.
Some researchers have criticized the failure of the moral research communities in
the 1980s and 1990s to incorporate emotions into cognitive theories, thereby missing key
55
components to understanding moral decisions (Damasio, 1994; Haidt, 2008). Antonio
Damasio (1994) presented the “somatic marker hypothesis” in response to research with
brain-damaged participants that seemed to directly contradict the cognitive reasoning
based theories of moral development dominant since Kohlberg presented his theories on
moral development. Damasio found that humans use emotional and somatic reactions
from the emotional centers of the brain to inform themselves about positive and negative
actions in addition to cognitive reasoning. Jonathan Haidt also contended “moral
emotions” provide a person with an intuition about right and wrong ethical choices
(Haidt, 2008). Other researchers at this time reviewed neuropsychological research in
order to gain a better understanding of the factors involved in moral instinct and action
(Gross, 2007; Narvaez, 2008).
Modern Moral Models: Incorporating Neurobiology
Moral models continue to be developed and altered to provide information for a
modern American society. Researchers who self-identify as “Neo-Kolbergian” theorists
have emphasized the teaching of ethical competence in their moral models that originated
in the 1990s. In these studies, the construct of moral judgment, as it was studied by
Lawrence Kohlberg, is expanded to involve four psychological processes. These
processes include moral sensitivity, moral motivation, moral action, and moral judgment.
This “Neo-Kolhbergian” model has aimed to incorporate both micro and macro levels of
development into an understanding of adolescent morality, noting the influences of both
56
relational experiences and societal expectations on moral development (Narvaez & Rest,
1995).
Some modern moral models reclaim the utility of a “top-down” approach, from
culture to individual, in an understanding of moral development. Don Collins Reed
(2008) proposed the construction of a moral model that presents stages as “structures of
interaction” (p. 358). Reed critiqued Kohlberg’s study of moral reasoning, stating that
moral action preempts the cognitive reasoning of morality. Reed’s theory also attempted
to reconcile the differences observed in morals and values among different populations.
In his model, Reed stated that moral intentions are rooted in internalized past interactions
with others rather than an internal process of cognitive development. In his model of
morality, social cognitive development involves becoming more attuned to self, others,
and one’s social world rather than adhering to external rules and expectations. Reed’s
theory presented major implications in the study of adolescent moral action due to his
emphasis on role taking as a process through which adolescents reformulate and
reappraise their morals. Social factors like stable friendships among adolescents correlate
with less problematic and unethical behaviors (Carlo, Fabes, Laible, & Kupanoff, 1999).
Other moral models of the 21st Century have sought to incorporate
neurobiological findings in order to achieve a more complete picture to moral
development and ethical behavior. Darcia Narvaez (2008) presented the Triune Ethics
Theory (TET) in order to integrate cognitive and neuroscientific findings into a more
comprehensive study of morality and identify contextual factors important to optimal
moral development. She argued that emotions, thoughts, physiological responses, and
57
behaviors are inevitably intertwined. Many studies have shown the emotional and
neurological states constructed in early social development contribute to the design of a
lifetime of behavioral patterns (Champagne & Meaney, 2006; Panksepp, 1998).
Therefore, the brain’s circuitry and autonomic bodily reactions are highly impacted by
behavioral, physical, and emotional experiences within child and adolescent
development. And these neurobiological constructions contribute to a person’s ability and
tendency to make moral or immoral choices (Narvaez, 2008).
Narvaez’s theory of TET identified three types of ethics that are based in
evolution and primed by an array of experiences and neurobiological systems. First, the
ethic of security describes a person’s experience of seeking safety and security within the
world. This type of ethical approach is believed to be the most primal and common
among people who endure unsafe or abusive conditions. Neurological and biological
systems such as the parasympathetic and sympathetic systems that are continuously
activated because of fear, prime someone for self-preservation and will develop more
extensively than for a person who does not feel in frequent danger. Self-protective
behaviors will likely be specific to the life experiences of an individual adolescent and his
or her environment and may significantly mediate the moral decisions of a person when
she feels in danger. Additionally, a person who has an over-developed ethic of security
will be more likely to perceive danger in situations that others may not perceive as
dangerous (Narvaez, 2008).
The concept TET labeled as the ethic of security was described as the most basic
way a person makes moral decisions (Narvaez, 2008). Decisions made by individuals
58
who predominantly engage this approach will often be less ethical as the security of the
decision-maker becomes the main focus and motivation (Darley & Batson, 19
73
). This
concept becomes crucial in understanding the moral development and ethical action of
female adolescents. First, female adolescents who frequently have felt or feel in danger,
will more likely revert to these self-preserving motivations when making moral decisions.
This assertion presents major implications about female adolescents who have
experienced trauma and abuse or grow up in a culture that is hostile toward them.
Caregiver treatment of children has been shown to significantly affect the organization of
the parasympathetic nervous system and therefore the development of other
neurobiological systems as well (Anderson et al., 2001). Additionally, research studying
adolescent brain development indicates that the more primal brain areas (and therefore
primal behavior) often dominate behaviors of adolescents who have not yet fully
developed more sophisticated brain areas like the prefrontal cortex associated with
reasoning (Giedd, Blumenthal, Jeffries, et al., 1999). The neurological systems related to
the ethic of security will therefore be more commonly used among adolescents than the
more sophisticated brain areas required for moral reasoning.
The second neurobiological system identified by Narvaez is considered more
evolved than the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems and involves a different ethic
she names the ethic of engagement. The ethic of engagement primarily uses the central
nervous system including the hypothalamic-limbic system. The TET described this
system as being the primary emotional system driving a person toward intimacy with
another person. This drive is influenced by the care and attachment formed by children
59
with primary caregivers (Narvaez, 2008). Researchers have shown that the neurobiology
of attachment heavily mediates emotional and moral self-regulation (Gross, 2007;
Narvaez, 2008). Conversely, infants who were deprived of care and compassion have
shown changes in brain development that has been associated with hostility and
aggression in adolescent behavior (Kruesi et al, 1992). Chronic interpersonal stress such
as child abuse may disrupt both the development of the prefrontal cortex and emotional
functioning areas of the brain that are associated with controlling fear and using reason to
assess ethical situations (Quirk, 2007). These alterations in brain development are
associated with adult personality traits focused on self-preservation without an equal
focus on interpersonal morality (Henry & Want, 1998). This idea of the ethic of
engagement and interpersonal attachment as the root of moral behavior aligns with the
relational theories of moral development proposed by Carol Gilligan regarding females.
The TET theory concluded with illustrating the final neurobiological system
associated with moral judgment. Narvaez (2008) named the ethic of imagination as
engaging the neocortex and thalamic structures, associated with cognitive processing and
the nervous system. Those neurological systems provide the capacity for problem solving
and deliberate learning, primarily by utilizing the frontal lobe and amygdala (MacLean,
1990; Panksepp, 1998). This type of ethical processing may have been what Kohlberg
was assessing, as it is less associated with emotions and attachment and more highly
based in reason and logic. Higher order moral processing such as the ethic of imagination
is also less likely to be seen among adolescents due to the lack of brain maturation and
the ability to reason abstractly (Narvaez, 2008; Piaget, 1977).
60
Other brain functions important in ambiguous ethical situations include free
choice and critical thinking, also taking place in a person’s frontal lobe (Goldberg, 2002).
Damage to frontal lobes in early life has been associated with antisocial behavior and
difficulty in assessing moral dilemmas (Damasio, 1999). Orbitofrontal cortex damage has
been shown to be associated with low impulse control, trouble thinking ahead to
consequences, and emotional dysregulation. This area of the brain is particularly related
to adolescent behavior because it is not fully developed by adolescence (Goldberg, 2002).
Deliberate moral learning such as the ethic of imagination is associated with the frontal
lobe. Frontal lobe functioning may not always be available or utilized by adolescent
females who at times when they engage more primal neuropsychological systems
associated with security or attachment needs (Narvaez, 2008). Ethical dilemmas, like
those used in Kohlbergian research often present interpersonal information or needs in
which attachment centers of the brain are triggered. The ethic of imagination, therefore,
may be less common or less possible for immature adolescent minds. It is a kind of moral
judgment that incorporates social justice and expands beyond self-interest and self-
protection. Given the egocentric nature of many adolescents, complicated moral decisions
may be more based in the ethic of security or engagement, rather than imagination.
With an increase of complex and ambiguous situations in American society,
individuals must increase in cognitive capacity for reasoning in order to adapt her moral
code. The complexity ofthat society’s moral code increases in order to account for the
various and numerous social situations (Hallpike, 2008). American society, with all of its
complexities, must therefore present an incorporation of these factors into an
61
understanding of morality. Within American culture and literature, the focus on the
individual within moral development has been dominant. However, more contemporary
literature about moral psychology incorporates the norms and expectations of group
psychology. One recent researcher would like to see the study of moral psychology move
in a direction more focused on interconnectedness and cooperation within groups (Haidt,
2008). It is with this cultural and gender awareness that the author of this dissertation
seeks to synthesize theories of moral development.
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CHAPTER 6: FEMALE ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT
The Female Experience in Adolescence
Adolescence has been described in psychological literature as “a crisis” (Erikson,
1961), an “upheaval” (Breger, 1974), and an “inevitable and necessary storm” (Hill,
1993), due to the high rates of emotionality and sometimes difficult behaviors common to
young men and women in this developmental period. Physiological transitions within
puberty mark the onset of menstruation, an influx of hormones, and potentially drastic
anatomical changes among female adolescents. Estradiol increases females, effecting
physical growth as well as possibly increasing aggression in females (Santrock, 2004).
Environmental components also may influence biological systems during puberty.
Factors shown to impact the hormonal system include stress, eating patterns, exercise,
sexual activity, tension, and depression (Santrock, 2004). Variability in physiological
changes, then, may present in adolescents with different familial, athletic, mental health,
and interpersonal experiences.
The age of puberty onset varies by geographical region, though the average onset
for females is between the ages of eleven and fourteen. The experience of puberty for
females introduces sexuality into the developmental process, as an adolescent attempts to
form and understand her identity (Abbott, 2001). The temporal onset of puberty in
adolescents has been shown to be associated with differences in personality and
interpersonal relational stances among adolescents. Specifically for females, an early or
late onset of puberty, in relation to her peers, has been found to correlate with lower
levels of self esteem (Offerman-Zuckerberg, 1988). In accordance with Gilligan’s
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research of adolescent females, the physical and social changes that accompany
adolescence for females create a pressure to disconnect from childhood and enter an adult
culture that may seem difficult and more likely to judge a woman by her beauty and
sexuality (Gilligan, 1982). Abbott (2001) identified a shift in the process of self-
identification that occurs in adolescence. She stated an adolescent self concept emerges
according to relational or social perceptions, replacing the earlier childhood identity that
was highly based in a more singular self-appraisal. The self esteem of a female
adolescent and the social and relational messages she receives, therefore, present major
implications regarding her identity and sense of self.
Though gender socialization begins in childhood, the process continues into
adolescence and adulthood. Specifically, as adolescent females more extensively explore
their social world and cultural messages, they gain more information about what it means
to be female in American culture. The meaning of being feminine or masculine may vary
by culture and geographical region, and the gender identity that a female adolescent
forms is based in biological, familial, societal, and cultural components (Kimmel, 2004).
According to Michael Kimmel’ s (2004) theory, gender is constructed by an individual’s
identity, interpersonal interactions, and institutional messages, as well as an interaction
between these three constructs.
American research in gender role socialization has demonstrated a correlation
between masculine role socialization and the ability of a female adolescent to be
authentic to herself (Theran, 2009). Conversely, the internalization of feminine traits has
predicted a lowered psychological well-being among Caucasian female adolescents in the
64
United States (Smolak & Munstertieger, 2002). Both biological changes and gender-
specific social expectations create a unique experience of puberty and sometimes
challenging transitions in adolescence for females (Kimmel, 2004; Konopka, 1966;
Offerman-Zuckerberg, 1988). For both males and females, adolescence often marks the
onset of mental health disorders (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders, Fourth Edition [DSM-IV], 1994). Adolescence
is also associated with increasing occurrences of eating disorders, pregnancy, and suicide
among females (Abbott, 2001). In general, females report less body satisfaction in
adolescence than males (DeLatmater & Friedrich, 2002), and over one-half of teenage
girls use unhealthy weight control behaviors (Neumark-Sztainer, 2005). Approximately
one-fifth of all high school students reported seriously contemplating suicide in the
United States in 2005, and females were significantly more likely to consider suicide than
males across all ethnic groups (MacKay & Duran, 2007).
Writers and researchers studying female psychology in 1900s America called for
more attention to the specific experiences of women and girls in adolescence, citing
societal and familial failures that may result in growing rates of criminal behavior and
other concerns in teenage girls (Konopka, 1966; Offerman-Zuckerberg, 1988). Offerman-
Zuckerberg (1988) offered suggestions that may be causing adolescence and puberty to
be a time of “vulnerability and creativity” for females (p. 3). She theorized the fragility of
a female’s body image, sexuality, and sense of autonomy often results in feelings of
insecurity and destructive or morally questionable behaviors. Media sources paint a
picture of drug use, sexual activity, and bullying as common to adolescent females in
65
contemporary American society. The biological and interpersonal changes that some
females find difficult in adolescence may contribute to a strong need to define oneself
and form attachments that guarantee affiliation rather than isolation (Brown & Gilligan,
1992). At times when out-group and in-group rules are applied to peer populations,
affiliation may come at the price of mutual respect and care for others. One example of
this phenomenon is relational aggression found among many female peer groups in
American culture.
Social scientists have used the label “relational aggression” to describe the
indirect and often interpersonal expression of anger many adolescent females employ
rather than the outward physical aggression often more common to adolescent males
(Burton, 2009; Hadley, 2004). Gender differences in the expression of aggression have
been found in research since the 1960s (Feshbach, 1969; Hadley, 2004). Examples of
relational aggression include gossiping, verbal abuse, excluding others from a group, the
silent treatment, and cyber abuse (Burton, 2009). This type of relational warfare exhibits
common ways that adolescent females often perpetrate passive aggression toward each
other. The widespread nature of relational aggression creates a competitive and at times
unsafe culture for females who often act as perpetrators and victims at different times in
their adolescence. Influences like the competition between females exacerbated by the
media may also contribute to the widespread nature of relational aggression between
female adolescents (Burton, 2009). The inclination of a female adolescent to engage in
relational aggression is likely impacted by her development and cohesion of moral
values. Because researchers of relational aggression propose that much of what
66
influences the occurrence of these behaviors is culturally and social constructed, the
development of a stable moral identity may be important for female adolescents to
combat pressures to engage in this form of indirect aggression (Hadley, 2004). The
concept of relational aggression may present updates for Carol Gilligan’s earlier theories
regarding the interpersonal nature of female adolescent morality.
Relational aggression may be impacted by the socialization of females to use
verbal communication and suppress feelings of aggression (Burton, 2009). Females in
American society often receive messages about being “lady-like,” while males may be
reinforced to engage in activities like boxing and wrestling and more physical forms of
aggression and competition. Consequently, female adolescents who also experience the
feeling of anger often use more indirect ways of expressing that anger such as passive
aggressive interpersonal styles. Females may be socialized to express certain emotions
while males are often socialized to deny the very same emotions (Tavris, 1992). This
gender difference influences how a female adolescent may conceptualize herself, love,
and others around her, as a result. Additionally, Gilligan noted female adolescents are
often extremely attuned to others’ feelings and reactions (Gilligan, 1982). This kind of
attunement fosters a detail-oriented style for observing others’ insecurities, thus
providing information to be used in a relationally aggressive way (Burton, 2009). Though
Gilligan’s studies typically showed a desire of female adolescents to build and maintain
relationships, this author hypothesizes that a new girl culture has made it easier and more
important for females to maintain in-group cohesion through relational aggression.
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Although it is thought to be less common among females, physical aggression and
criminal behavior in adolescence impacts the lives and well-being of many female
adolescents in contemporary American society. Between 1991 and 2000, arrests for
females increased more or showed less of a decrease than male arrests in most types of
criminal offenses, including violent crimes. By 2004, females accounted for 30% of all
juvenile arrests (Hawkins et al., 2009). The moral development of adolescent females
likely highly impacts the widespread nature of criminal activity. The occurrence of being
victimized by physical and sexual assault has been shown to be a risk factor that
increases the likelihood that a female adolescent will engage in criminal activity.
Approximately 1.6 million adolescents reported they were victims of a violent crime in
the United States in 2004, and female adolescents were shown to be four times more
likely to be victims of sexual assault than women in any other age group (MacKay &
Duran, 2007).
Risk factors have been shown to interact with protective factors such as school
success to account for the likelihood of female adolescent criminal behavior (Hawkins et
al., 2009). The engagement of an adolescent in activities that allow her to develop and
practice autonomous decision-making and critical-thinking skills also reduce the
likelihood that she will become involved with the juvenile justice system (Scott &
Steinberg, 2009). The strongest protective factor against female adolescent antisocial
behavior according to many studies is the presence and attachment to a caring adult or
parent (Hawkins et al., 2009; Scott & Steinberg, 2009; Theran, 2009).
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Parenting and the parent child relationship influences the psychological well-
being and moral ability of female adolescents. Parental identification has been shown to
correlate with the development of empathy (Damon, 1988). The parental relationship
serves as a model for future relationships, and a poor attachment may predict a female
adolescent’s ability to develop a strong-willed voice and sense of self (Theran, 2009).
Although an adolescent is believed to internalize the values of her parents and self control
eventually replaces parental control, different parenting techniques have been shown to
be more or less effective in fostering moral growth (Kochanska, 2002; Santrock, 2004).
The level of affective discomfort children experienced about wrongdoing correlated
directly to the instruction of parents to point out the negative impact of the behaviors on
others (Volling et al., 2009). One research study indicated that children of mothers who
use a power-oriented discipline display less guilt and therefore seem thwarted in the
development of empathy. When gender differences were examined in this study, female
children showed more guilt than male participants in response to behaviors in general
(Kochanska, 2002). It is possible that the societal messages about females having less
power and at times less respect impact the discipline styles parents use for female
children as well as the way a child interprets parental interventions.
Gender impacts a female adolescent’s options, decisions, and behaviors in
multiple realms of her life (Abbott, 2001). Gisella Konopka (1966) theorized that a
double-standard of morality in American society exists for male and female adolescents.
Recent research has supported the idea of gender stereotyped moral expectations
(Nunner-Winkler, 2007). Behaviors like aggression among adolescents have historically
69
been judged differently according to gender (Hadley, 2004). In studying antisocial
behaviors among adolescent females, Konopka (1966) pointed out that behaviors such as
sexual promiscuity and substance abuse often directly relate to the past experience of
trauma or present experience of mental health symptoms among female adolescents. Her
work supported psychoanalytic models that emphasize early childhood relational
experiences in the moral development of female adolescents. Konopka presented major
implications for the study of morality within specific cultural groups of adolescents,
specifically populations in which abuse or trauma is common. The adolescent experience
of females is highly mediated by family experiences, ethnic group, socioeconomic status,
and other parts of the teen’s cultural context.
A Modern Social Culture
American culture also has a stake in the moral development of adolescent
females, as the female influence in government, business, and other powerful realms of
society continues to rise. Prosocial skills in adolescents are associated with better success
in school and consequent career success (Carlo et al, 1999). Kegan (1982) presented a
“paradox of morals” questioning whether what is moral is based in society or if society is
designed in response to what is moral. Parents use society values to discipline the will of
an adolescent that will help that adolescent better navigate through society. However,
there may be times that an adolescent’s “counterwill” aligns more closely with what is
right and moral than the societal expectation (Kegan, 1982). Political resistance
movements such as those who denounced slavery and the Holocaust despite societal
70
norms serve as an example of cases in which what is moral seems to be the opposite of
what society dictates. The female adolescent voice of opposition and moral agency
therefore present significant implications about the tone and climate of American society.
According to Erikson’s appraisal of 1960s society, industrialization has injured
man’s identity and contributed to a more enigmatic or diffuse purpose in life. He
maintained that the dichotomy between an individual and nature has been exacerbated by
American society’s increasing distance from basic and natural interactions (Erikson,
1964). In contemporary American society, adolescents are faced with more challenges
and opportunities than ever before (Abbott, 2001). With the cognitive, psychological, and
social development taking place within adolescence, adolescents may become more
aware of society as a whole and beyond the intimate dyadic relationships (Damon, 1983).
In terms of morality and identity, an individual’s moral standards or understanding of
ethics can at times conflict with familial, institutional, and cultural values (Turiel, 2008).
In these cases, the type of identity and strength of character an adolescent possesses
affects her behavior and moral agency.
Children and adolescents in the United States are expected to attend junior and
senior high school. American adolescents may attend private schools, public schools,
alternative schools, or engage in home schooling. The majority of American adolescent
females attend high school, many participating in oversized classrooms or enduring
potentially violent school climates. The size of an adolescent’s school has been shown to
play a role in prosocial development, as smaller schools allow for more familiar faces and
more opportunities for prosocial interactions (Carlo et al., 1999). The challenge and
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quality of instruction received by adolescents in high school may vary by the school as
well as be different depending on the student’s gender. One study in 1994 exposed the
tendency for teachers to call on male students for answers more than female students in
the classroom sending distinct messages about gender inequality to both boys and girls
(Kimmel, 2004; Orenstein, 1994). The quality of education a female adolescent receives
influences her development of self esteem and competency. Recent research also
indicated that the development and maintenance of goals among female adolescents were
strongly associated with a lower occurrence of high-risk behaviors that included sexual
promiscuity and drug use (Garinger, 2000). Facing and overcoming challenging
situations has been shown to be both a byproduct of strong identity formation in
adolescence and a major contributor to an adolescent’s preparedness to enter the adult
world (Csikszentmihalyi & Schneider, 2000; Nowinski, 2007).
In addition to educational instruction received in the classroom, adolescents attain
much of the necessary components that aid the transition from childhood to adulthood
within family systems. Family structure and parenting practices largely impact adolescent
life and moral development. Sibling relationships may impact prosocial development as
well because they provide an adolescent the opportunity to try out relational roles and
perspective taking. Parent and sibling relationships interact with the individual
temperament and personality of the adolescent to influence adolescent social
development and relational patterns (Carlo et al., 1999). Divorce and family conflict also
highly impact the experience of American teenagers today, and the picture of a typical
American family has transformed throughout history. Research that examined American
72
households in 2005 reported that 25% of non-Hispanic white adolescents, 60% of non-
Hispanic black adolescents, and 35% of Hispanic adolescents resided in a single-parent
household (MacKay & Duran, 2007). The self development of adolescents has been
shown to be challenged by experiences of family conflict and instability (Marsh et al.,
2007). In one study, youths who had experienced family conflict tended to have less
stable and inconsistent resources from which to develop a “sense of cohesion.” This
“sense of cohesion” mediated many factors of adolescent resilience. Unfortunately, as
researchers explained, children in abusive and conflictual families often learn to
externalize anger and create negative patterns of interpersonal interactions that decrease
the likelihood of both seeking or accepting help from positive resources (Marsh et al.,
2007). Behavioral patterns can include immoral choices and antisocial tendencies.
In 2002, research by Mann and Gilliom indicated there are two main mediating
factors between family conflict exposure and child adjustment—the child’s cognitive
appraisals of the conflict and the child’s feelings of emotional security. Both of these
factors may be affected and threatened by family discord. Researchers hypothesized that
family conflict invokes and reinforces a child’s thoughts and feelings of vulnerability and
threat. In this way, a child’s identity and continued perception of an inability to control or
cope with family conflict, abuse, or neglect may lead to helplessness, pessimism, and
perceived inadequacy. In order to avoid negative emotions and threats to the self,
therefore, children learn to cope with the abuse or neglect they encounter in the family
environment. As seen in many cases, coping techniques may evolve quite maladaptively,
especially when children have a faulty perception and poor modeling in their social
73
environment (Cummings, Davies, & Campbell, 2000; Erikson, 1968). In these cases,
children may develop the tendency to seek out risk behaviors such as drug use, unsafe
sex, or gang involvement. In addition to distracting an adolescent from his or her home
environment and disruptive parental relationships, these three behaviors can serve other
functions for an adolescent who is seeking symptom relief, dissociation from reality,
affection or intimacy with another, and acceptance by peers.
Parental socialization measures of connection and involvement, family regulation,
and psychological autonomy have been associated significantly with adolescent deviant
behaviors (Herman, Dornbusch, Herron, & Herting, 1997). Cummings, Davies, and
Campbell (2000) explained children from high conflict homes are more susceptible to
externalizing behaviors like excessive aggression, unacceptable conduct, vandalism,
noncompliance, and delinquency. Their research reflected that child reactions to family
conflict are more commonly to externalize rather than internalize behaviors. Normalized
aggressive or antisocial behaviors increase the likelihood of risk-taking behaviors in
abused adolescents. The absence of parents may create problems in the family structure
as well. Absentee parents can lead to less structure in the home and more delinquency
among adolescent children. Adolescent females whose fathers were not present have
shown the more disturbances in family relationships than males whose fathers were not in
their lives (Amato & Booth, 1997), perhaps indicating a significance in the preserved
family unit within female adolescence.
Studies have shown school connectedness, family connectedness, and religiosity
serve as protective factors for females in predicting engagement in criminal activity
74
(Good, Willoughby, & Fritjers, 2009; Hawkins, Graham, Williams, & Zahn, 2009). In
many cases, religion may provide answers to moral questions that may or may not be
internalized by American adolescents. Religious participation may also provide
adolescents with activities and role models to influence and interact with the development
of their identities (Smith & Denton, 2005). One recent study demonstrated the majority of
adolescents between the ages of thirteen and seventeen attended religious services at least
twice a month (52%) and reported that religion played an important role in daily life
(51%) (Smith & Denton, 2005). This study suggests religion may impact the culture and
life of a contemporary American teenager. The lifespan course of religiosity seems to
vary between different religions, but a drop in religiosity is often seen in late adolescence
with the co-occurrence of college attendance (Dillon & Wink, 2007). Adolescent
spirituality tends to reflect the level of spirituality of the adult culture in which they
reside with the most influential factor on spiritual involvement being the involvement of
the adolescent’s parents (Smith & Denton, 2005). Again, parental behaviors appear to
mediate adolescent choices and behaviors in a developmental phase associated with early
identity formation.
In adolescence, the reduction in religious service attendance may actually
correlate with an increase in independence and social development. Many adolescents
show a decline in religious service attendance while increasing involvement in prosocial
clubs (Good et al., 2009). These trends may relate to norms within peer groups and the
trend among adolescents to distance themselves from parental control in later stages of
identity development. Social comparison in adolescence serves as a significant tool in the
75
development of identity and self regulation (Bandura, 1991). Albert Bandura explained
self regulation takes place in part by comparing oneself to others, and cognitive
appraisals of these comparisons are reinforced by feelings of pride or shame evoked.
Additionally, the reactions of others to one’s actions present information and evoke
feelings contributing to the internalization of a self regulatory process (Bandura, 1991).
Adolescents use the people important in their communities and surrounding
cultures to fill social comparison roles. One important component of adolescent life,
therefore, is the social system in which they live. In 2004, two-fifths of the adolescent
population in the United States was comprised of non-white racial and ethnic groups. The
percentage of adolescents belonging to immigrant families grew to 22% in 2004 as well
(MacKay & Duran, 2007). The racial and ethnic background of an adolescent impacts her
development and experience in American society. One researcher proposed that ethnic
minorities, immigrant adolescents, and adolescents growing up in low socioeconomic
classes may not experience the stable “transitional period” required for identity formation
(Tartakovsky, 2009). These populations must be examined more closely to understand
how culture in adolescence shapes moral and identity development. Protective factors
shown to contribute to a more successful adolescent development include low incidences
of discrimination, and for immigrants, a smooth acculturation process (Tartakovsky,
2009).
The socioeconomic status of an adolescent’s family and neighborhood affects her
culture and experiences significantly (Cummings & Davies, 1994; Hawkins et al., 2009;
MacKay & Duran, 2007). In 2005, nearly 16% of adolescents in the United States lived
76
in families with incomes lower than the poverty threshold, with an additional 20% of
adolescent families living near this threshold. Adolescents from financially disadvantaged
families are more likely to experience poor health, become teenage parents, drop out of
school, and be unemployed as adults or earn less than average as adults (MacKay &
Duran, 2007).The socioeconomic status of an adolescent may also highly impact her
ability to feel safe or find motivations and meaning in life. The ability to find meaning in
life presents implications about an adolescent’s identity formation (Nowinski, 2007) as
well as the ability to foresee and desire to avoid negative consequences of unethical
behaviors. Residence in a disadvantaged neighborhood serves as a risk factor for female
adolescent engagement in criminal activity (Hawkins et al., 2009). The choice to engage
in antisocial behaviors among adolescents is associated with school engagement as well
as educational and occupational opportunities, both factors that are highly impacted by
one’s socioeconomic status. Adolescents belonging to lower socioeconomic statuses
more often viewed antisocial behaviors as socially acceptable than adolescents in other
economic classes (Cook, Buehler, & Henson, 2009). Past research has reflected factors
like low socioeconomic status and low parental involvement may increase a teenager’s
likelihood to join gangs, use drugs, or practice unsafe sex (Cummings & Davies, 1994).
Studies also indicate that the reasons why female adolescents engage in antisocial
behaviors may differ between African Americans and Caucasians. In one study
specifically, African American female adolescents indicated neighborhood violence as
most influential while Caucasian female adolescents cited family abuse as the most likely
factor to impact antisocial behavior (Chauhan & Reppucci, 2009).
77
Child abuse, trauma, and exposure to violence is a widespread experience among
adolescents, and these experiences highly impact adolescent culture and development. In
2007,
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4,000 children were estimated to be victims of maltreatment in the United States
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2009). Research indicates that
exposure to violence and criminal activity predicts unethical and risk-taking behaviors
among adolescents (Chauhan & Reppucci, 2009; Ellis & Wolfe, 2009). Teens being
raised in a violent environment also seems to more often seek control and status through
controlling and perpetrating crimes against others (Ellis & Wolfe, 2009). Research
examining intergenerational antisocial behavior indicates a relationship exists between
parental behavior and adolescent behavior. Specifically, childhood and adolescent
antisocial behavior is mediated by the parenting style and attachment with the child, as
opposed to a genetic predisposition to antisocial behavior. Additionally, depression
among caregivers proved to be a major factor impacting attachment and future antisocial
behavior among adolescents which presents major implications about the treatment of
mothers and fathers suffering from depression (Thornberry & Freeman-Gallant, 2009).
Incidents of sexual assault are greater within adolescence for females in the
United States than in any other developmental period, and the occurrences of dating
violence increase for females between the ninth to twelfth grade (MacKay & Duran,
2007). Dating and romantic relationships are important aspects of adolescent life, and it is
within adolescence typically that males and females learn to be romantic and sexual.
Often this time includes confusion and vulnerability regarding sexual experiences
(DeLatmater & Friedlach, 2002). An adolescent’s understanding of sex and sexuality
78
continues to adjust and crystallize throughout adulthood, but the crucial period of puberty
and adolescence supplies much of the sexual information that contributes to a lifetime of
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors regarding sex. Knowing oneself and accepting one’s
personal identity has been proposed to color the adolescent experience of dating (Fox,
2005). Dating scripts are more proactive for males than females who may behave mostly
in reaction to the plans, cues, and desires of male partners (Santrock, 2004). Sexual
behaviors among female adolescents may impact self, identity, and moral development
(Woody, D’Souza, & Russell, 2003). Regarding dating, male adolescents are more
concerned with physical attractiveness of their partner while females pursue interpersonal
connectedness (Santrock, 2004). Romantic relationships in adolescence may provide
practice for role taking, caring, empathy, and other interpersonal skills.
Sexual behaviors in adolescents may also affect males and females differently
emotionally, cognitively, and socially. The most typical female reason for regretting her
first experience with sexual intercourse is a failure to “save” herself, implying that sex is
often conceptualized by females as a loss of control or surrendering of one’s body
(Ingham, 2005). Oftentimes, especially due to religious values and a fear of pregnancy,
females engage in non-penetration sexual activities like oral and hand gratification,
perhaps as an attempt to “save” one’s body from actual intercourse. Compared to males,
females worry more about reputation, guilt, and pregnancy, and they are more likely to
claim love is a perquisite to sexual relations (Ingham, 2005). The gender differences in
moral decisions proposed by Gilligan may be evident in these findings. One study found
motivations for engaging in sex most common to males included curiosity and peer
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influences, while females most often listed a need to “feel safe and cared for.” This study
suggested that object relations theories can be generalized from parental relationships to
intimate sexual relationships, emphasizing the importance of the attachment relationship
as a contributor to the development of a personal identity and sexual behavior. Perhaps
one’s sexual identity is formed in an attachment relationship with one’s sexual partner. If
this is the case, the initial sexual experiences of a person are extremely important to his or
her development and self (Woody et al., 2003).
In addition to dating, friendships and other peer interactions highly impact the
daily lives of American adolescents. Stable friendships have been shown to be associated
with less problematic behaviors among adolescents (Carlo et al., 1999). A lack of social
skills is related to a lack of empathy as well as participation in violent and unethical
behaviors among adolescents (Ellis & Wolfe, 2009). One study showed female
adolescents significantly cite the relationships with friends and parents as impacting their
decision not to engage in antisocial behaviors whereas adolescent males typically focus
on other factors (Cook et al, 2009).
Drug and alcohol use among adolescents appears to be a part of today’s teen
culture. In one self report study from 2005, 28% of 12-20 year olds reported drinking
alcohol, 19% reported binge drinking, and one-fifth reported using marijuana in the past
month (MacKay & Duran, 2007). Alcohol has been shown to impair attention, appraisal,
declarative memory, and other cognitive processes that relate to the processing of
experiences, affect, and behavior (Curtain & Lang, 2007). The influence of drug and
alcohol use may impact an adolescent’s propensity to engage in antisocial behaviors.
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Additionally, vulnerability to developing a substance addiction peaks between the ages of
fifteen and nineteen. Positron emission tomography (PET) scans have shown that alcohol
dependent individuals will have reduced levels of brain metabolism in the left parietal
and right frontal cortex regions of the brain (Doweiko, 1999). This finding presents
implications for the effects of chronic alcohol use on a person’s neurological abilities
such as motivation, planning, speech, writing, calculating, and social knowledge.
Understanding and engagement in moral choices requires the use of adeptness in many of
these functions. The use and abuse of alcohol, therefore, jeopardizes the moral decisions
and development of female adolescents.
One study indicated adolescents may view certain behaviors such as sexual
activity and substance use as a personal choice as opposed to antisocial behaviors that are
considered moral decisions (Moore, 2000). This distinction may relate to the
understanding of who is hurt by the behavior—the self or another. Research has shown
that conformity to antisocial behaviors, including acts that are hurtful toward others,
increases during adolescence (Berndt, 1979). Female adolescent morality is highly
influenced by their experiences in relationships, role experimentation, and the
expectations of others (Abbott, 2001; Garinger, 2000). The present American culture and
the norms of the adolescent subgroup seem to play a large role in the development of
morality among female adolescents.
The rates of problematic adolescent behavior have been rising consistently since
the 1990s (APA, 2002). It is within the period of adolescence that attitudes and values
toward behaviors like substance use and other morally-impacted behaviors are developed.
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Modem societies in the United States present more options for adolescent choice with
increasing and often mixed messages from various sources like neighborhoods, peers,
families, and the media (Abbott, 2001). Research by Garinger (2000) identified cultural
influences as a dominant factor contributing to morality in female adolescents. The
increasing level of independence adolescents are experiencing from their parents in the
United States, often being replaced by more extensive relationships with peers, is
impacting moral development changes seen in adolescents (Abbott, 2001).
Changes in American culture contribute to the relevant issues among female
adolescents in regard to their development of an identity and moral competence. The
pressures and challenges adolescent females encounter may increase the amount of stress
and anxiety present in their lives. Adolescents who experience high levels of anxiety have
a more difficult time with identity formation as they often second-guess themselves and
the attributes important to their identities (Crocetti, Klimstra, Keijsers, Hale, & Meeus,
2009). The emergence of identity, self, and morality among female adolescents also
highly relates to the development of a personality and later life experiences. For example,
a longitudinal study conducted in 19
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(Kahn, Zimmerman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Getzels,
1985) suggested that females who scored low on a scale measuring identity in
adolescence were more likely to be divorced or separated from marriages in the when
surveyed in middle adulthood. Psychological concepts like self, identity, and internal
relational models represent important areas of interest when studying morality among
female adolescents. Research has indicated antisocial behaviors among female
adolescents are more likely to be impacted by intimate interpersonal experiences such as
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family or partner abuse rather than the broader cultural context, though both likely play a
role in moral development (Chauhan & Reppucci, 2009). The social constructs impacting
females in society must be incorporated to psychological developmental theories in order
to explore morality in American female adolescents.
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CHAPTER 7: AN INTEGRATION
Are Psychoanalytic Models of Female Adolescent Morality Relevant?
Psychoanalytic models of female morality have drastically changed and adapted
to developments in the field since Sigmund Freud (1923) presented the concept of the
superego. Though theories of superego development were based in the clinical
experiences of psychoanalytic therapists, cultural shifts in scientific research began
demanding measurable and replicable studies of human behavior. Behavioral and social
theories introduced a reductionistic view of modeling and external reinforcements that
serve as the basis for moral and immoral behaviors. Though leaders in psychological
research at this time presented compelling ideas such as Bandura’s social learning theory
(1977), other clinicians emphasized the importance of internal and individual factors in
moral choices. Jean Piaget (1965, 1977) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1984) studied the
cognitive development and reasoning skills playing a role in an individual’s ability to
resolve ethical dilemmas. Cognitive theorists refocused moral behavioral research on an
individual’s internal experiences and capacities. Feminist researcher, Carol Gilligan
(1982, 1988) responded to Kohlberg’s male-biased stages of moral development with
gender-based research of her own. Gilligan laced together intrapsychic development with
the social influences of gender-based behavioral expectations to examine how the
internalized messages girls receive mediate moral choice and agency.
Gilligan’ s focus on interconnectedness as moral motivation for female
adolescents aligns with psychoanalytic theories of moral development, stemming from an
infant’s dependence on her parent and the fear of abandonment and unmet needs. The
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refocus on female moral development by utilizing research information about
socialization and cognitive development sparks a returned look at the internalization
process of morality in development. In this way, psychoanalytic theories of moral
development continue to contribute unique glimpses into the way a person perceives
external and internal experiences and organizes these experiences into a dynamic
personality. Contemporary relational theories of psychology have updated psychoanalytic
literature by acknowledging the intrapsychic and interpersonal factors involved in all
experiences and therefore all moral decisions.
As psychodynamic psychology continued to transition into the closing of the 20th
century and into the 21st century, contemporary relational theories transformed traditional
intrapsychic psychoanalysis to include an interpersonal focus on relationships and
mutuality. In referencing adolescent development, Bendtro, Brokenleg, and Van Bockern
(1990) emphasized the importance of having the opportunity to be of value to others in
the development of an adolescent’s own value system. Within the contemporary
relational orientation, a large component to an individual’s self and capacity for empathy
seems contingent upon an established and internalized understanding of relationships
with others. Stolorow et al. (1995) used a relational stance in expanding upon self
psychological concepts rooted in Kohutian self psychology. Within their literary
contributions, “affect integration,” identified parental relationships with a child’s self as
key to the personality development and relational style of adolescents and adults. It is by
examining the social and interpersonal forces behind development, especially the
attachment between a child and her parents, that clinicians begin to understand the
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internalized identity and moral behaviors of an individual. Relational psychoanalytic
theories seek to encapsulate the internalized social and attachment messages about self as
others into a more complete understanding of personality and human behavior.
The area of neuropsychology has emerged in the past four decades with the
purpose of concretizing biological, cognitive, and emotional responses and how these
responses mediate human behavior (Damasio, 1994). Authors using neuropsychology to
inform their theories regarding morality like Darcia Narvaez (2008) reconcile some of the
demands of current scientific directions and the past research findings of theorists like
Piaget, Kohlberg, and Gilligan. Moral actions and decisions are based in internalized
relational experiences that establish connections and changes in a person’s brain and
autonomic system (Reed, 2008). Research has demonstrated that these internalized
emotional and neurological states impacted by relational experiences provide a basis for a
lifetime of behavioral patterns (Champagne & Meaney, 2006; Panksepp, 1988).
Behaviors considered moral or immoral are therefore included in the patterns designed by
early childhood attachments.
As earlier psychoanalytic authors suggested, the trust and gratification of an
infant’s relationships have been shown by neuropsychological research to lay the
foundation for personality development and moral behaviors. Freud’s proposed superego
may be defined as a child’s attempt to compromise between parental, social, and personal
motivations, with the overall goal of maintaining parental love and care. Also aligning
with neuropsychological findings, Melanie Klein proposed that a child develops
relational behavior by internalizing the parent or “early object” as a guide (Alford, 1989).
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More recent literature uses psychoanalytic concepts such as parental identification and
identity formation to predict moral behaviors and the development of empathy (Damon,
1983; Nunner-Winkler, 2007), solidifying the argument that psychoanalytic theories of
moral development are relevant to the current dialogue.
What Concepts Should Provide the Foundation for Developing a
Contemporary Psychoanalytic Model of the Emergence of Moral
Thinking and Behavior in Female Adolescents?
In wading through hundreds of pages written by various authors about key factors
in development and moral behavior, a distinct few concepts emerge as providing the
foundation for developing a contemporary psychoanalytic model of the emergence of
morality in female adolescents. Erik Erikson’s concept of identity proves to be especially
relevant regarding the developmental period of adolescence. Additionally, Erikson’s
theory posits that individuals either successfully develop an identity or do not (Erikson,
1959). An individual who has developed a cohesive identity will likely show consistent
behavioral responses in moral situations—either responding with empathy and care or
responding with apathy or malice. An individual without a solidified identity in place will
instead be influenced by social contexts, cognitive limitations, and behavioral
reinforcements. The seeming randomness or consistency of an adolescent’s moral
choices, therefore, are determined by and related to identity development.
A female adolescent’s development of identity can be impacted by relational
experiences, societal messages, and cultural norms. In adolescence, individuals seek a
compromise between parental, societal, and personal expectations. Erik Erikson
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explained that adolescents incorporate information from peers, in addition to parental
feedback, to establish a feeling of self esteem and self continuity (Erikson, 1982).
Gendered messages found in American families and communities, therefore, impact the
way a female adolescent develops her identity as well as the type of identity developed.
Erikson proposed role experimentation as the foundation for a more stable sense of self-
understanding and identity (Erikson, 1961). Therefore, the types of roles deemed as
socially-acceptable for females may mediate a female adolescent’s range of identity
qualities. Additionally, as ideology and an investment in one’s society in adolescence
provides a basis for the developing moral identity in adolescence (Erikson, 1968), the
gender inequality and discrimination existing in contemporary American society can
negatively impact identity formation in females.
Carol Gilligan (1988) stressed connectedness as a core component of being
female and therefore an important concept to consider when studying gender differences
in adolescence. Gilligan contended that the individuation process expected in adolescence
may be challenging to females who struggle to remain attached to the parental
relationship. Similarly, Nona Lyons (1988) echoed Gilligan’s emphasis on female
connectedness as a core element of self-definition and identity for females. In this way,
connectedness and the implications of gender expectations in a contemporary American
society present invaluable information regarding the establishment of a female’s identity.
In turn, the concept of identity, as a developmental stage common to adolescence must be
included when designing a comprehensive understanding about female adolescent
morality.
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Another important concept to be included in a contemporary psychoanalytic
theory of female adolescent moral development is the Kohutian sense of self. Heinz
Kohut (1977, 1984) and Donald Winnicott (1958, 1963, 1971) detailed a process through
which a child develops a self and the potential pitfalls to self development. Winnicott
wrote about “good enough mothering” as the basis for a female adolescent’s emerging
self. It is through the empathie care-giving, with realistic limitations, that a child is able
to develop a reality-based sense of self and establish a cooperative role in her world
(Winnicott, 1971). This “true self is then infused with concern and responsibility toward
others, as an adolescent recognizes her interconnectedness with others (Winnicott, 1958).
Through this interconnectedness, Winnicott proposed moral codes are established and
solidified by children who utilize relational experiences as well as emphasized cultural
values to determine behavior (Winnicott, 1963b).
Heinz Kohut echoed the Winnicottian theory that the development of a true and
cohesive self depends upon a caregiver’s ability to empathically respond and encourage a
growing child (Kohut, 1977). He emphasized the importance of a child receiving
mirroring and idealized guidance from caregivers in order to internalize or “transmute”
self esteem and moral competence (Seigel, 1996). Although the self is theorized to
develop within early childhood, adolescence presents a critical transition from
dependence to independence in which female adolescents may reinforce the
establishment of a cohesive or disintegrated self or begin a pattern of reparative relational
experiences. Specifically, Kohut proposed that adolescents may engage in aggressive or
relationally antisocial behaviors in order to protect themselves from previously
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internalized injuries to the self (Kohut, 1977). Conversely, adolescence may be the ideal
developmental period for corrective experiences that may challenge parentally
established feelings of destructiveness. The concept of the self certainly provides
important implications about an adolescent’s behavior and the mediation of identity
formation in adolescents, via relational experiences affecting self cohesion.
One example of how the self development impacts behaviors may be found in the
cases of parental neglect as described by one self psychologist (Siegel, 1996). Parental
neglect within childhood can impact the development of self structures and subsequently
lead to the development of maladaptive coping behaviors or poor decision-making in
adolescence. Kohut’ s theory of self psychology emphasized the importance of a child’s
needs being mirrored by a parent in order to develop a sense of safety and self-worth.
Parental identification and the parent-child relationship serve as a model for future
relationships and the development of empathy (Damon, 1988; Theran, 2009). Kohut
described the importance of parental prompting for the child to become more self-
sufficient at the proper time at which the child is capable of meeting challenges. The
process of idealizing a parent as a need-fulfiller is crucial for a child to transfer self-
centered narcissism into a more healthy integration of self-reliance (Siegel, 1996).
Studies indicate the attachment to a caring adult or parent is the most significant
protective factor against adolescent antisocial behavior (Hawkins et al, 2009; Scott &
Steinberg, 2009).
Female children and adolescent require mirroring and identification with an
idealized selfobject in order to develop and maintain a cohesive self. Unfortunately, many
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female children and adolescents fall victim to trauma, poverty, and abuse. Drug abuse
and depression among parents also negatively impacts the caregiver’s ability to provide
adequate nurturance, attachment, and support (Thornberry & Freeman-Gallant, 2009). If
a child’s needs are left unmet by parents who have less time or capacities to attend to
them, faulty self systems may develop. In one study, less monitoring from parents that
participants reported predicted higher narcissism scores for those participants. This 2006
article goes on to state that “love withdrawal,” by parents may promote unhealthy
narcissistic tendencies for a child and undermine the development of self structures
(Horton et al., 2006) and prosocial behavior. These underdeveloped self structures (as
seen by narcissistic personality traits) prevent a child from transitioning from external to
internal sources of competency.
Kohut (1977) described certain behaviors as “defensive and compensatory
structures,” that seek to cover up a defect in the self. Horton and colleagues (2006) align
with Kohution theory by explaining that the “narcissistic self seeks external validation
of behavior, consistent with poor choices and maladaptive interpersonal relationships.
The absence of one parent may be disruptive to the development of females in the home
and family relationships (Amato & Booth, 1997). In this way, narcissistic adolescents and
adults who may have experienced neglectful parenting as children are more likely to
become intensely emotional or aggressive in response to negative interactions with
others. Additionally, these adolescents may choose external regulating sources like drugs
and excessively invest in activities in which the approval of peers may be elicited.
Normalized antisocial behaviors in certain subcultures, peer groups, or families may
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increase the likelihood of participation in immoral behaviors. An underdeveloped self or
identity can jeopardize the development of a solid and consistent moral system in female
adolescents, and these concepts therefore provide vital information in conceptualizing
moral development in this population.
This author proposes a specific emphasis additional concept is also necessary in
providing the basis for a psychoanalytic model of moral development for female
adolescents. Attachment must be considered in examining female adolescent moral
development and prosocial tendencies. With respect to the neuroemotional differences
shown to take place within development in response to early relational experiences of an
individual, the subsequently developed attachment model is important to consider in a
contemporary psychoanalytic model of morality. Developed models for attachment,
closeness, empathy, and morality create changes in a child’s brain and biological
development. The Triune Ethics Theory (TET), presented by Darcia Narvaez (2008)
identifies some ways in which emotions, thoughts, physiology, and behaviors are
intertwined. Depending on a child’s caregiving experiences including instances the level
of perceived safety and security, biological systems such as the parasympathetic and
sympathetic systems are activated (Anderson et al., 2001). A child who grows up in an
unsafe environment with an insecure attachment may develop the tendency to use more
primal and self-protective behaviors in response to others due to her neurobiological
development. This kind of tendency directly relates to a female adolescent’s moral
behavior as self-protective motives are often not pro-social.
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Another relationally impacted neurobiological system includes areas of the central
nervous system including the hypothalamic-limbic system. This system is associated with
attachment and intimacy with others (Narvaez, 2008). Chronic interpersonal stress as a
child such as child abuse or other experiences of relational trauma can disrupt the
development of empathy and interpersonal morality for female adolescents (Henry &
Want, 1998; Kruesi et al., 1992). Researchers have also demonstrated supporting data
linking early relational development to a lifetime of behavioral patterns or a more stable
personality (Champagne & Meaney, 2006; Panksepp, 1998). Data regarding
contemporary American culture indicate high rates of violence and abuse among female
children and adolescents, especially minority populations (MacKay & Duran, 2007; U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2009). This presents a major implication
about the development of secure attachment, beyond a self-protective state, to moral
development among females and the subsequent neurobiological and moral
consequences.
Are There Core Constructs in Current Psychoanalytic Thinking
Providing an Adequate Account of the Emergence of Identity and
Self in Female Adolescents in Relation to Moral Development?
Ego psychologist Heinz Hartmann emphasized that human behavior constantly
adapts to the social environment throughout the lifetime, placing tremendous importance
on cultural factors. His contemporary, Margaret Mahler suggested gender identity as a
key component of developmental psychology, calling for attention and insight regarding
influences and meanings of being female in American culture (Blank & Blanck, 1974).
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Theories describing the emergence of identity and self in female adolescents, as
described by Erikson, Winnicott, and Kohut, provide important insight for contemporary
theories of moral development. However, these authors wrote from within specific
historical contexts, different from today’s American culture. Much of what is written
about females in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s is impacted dramatically by the cultural
undertones regarding gender differences and even gender inequality. Erikson
acknowledged that identity formation theories must be updated to reflect changes in
American culture such as an increasing number of mothers working outside of the home
and the increased number of divorces and one-parent households (Erikson, 1968). He
failed to provide adequate predictions for how these changes and changes in gender roles
will change an adolescent’s experience and identity because these determinations could
only be made by writers within a more contemporary society.
Self psychology theories emerging in the 1960s and 1970s also show outdated
inferences regarding family structure and gender development when applied to a
contemporary American society. Early caregiving relationships are hypothesized in
psychodynamic theories to impact how a person develops a sense of self and attachments
toward others. The strength and quality of the parent-child relationship influences a
female adolescent’s ability to develop a sense of self (Theran, 2009). Neurobiological
findings link these relationships and experiences of trauma or safety to lifelong
emotional, social, and behavioral tendencies, due to specifically emphasized brain and
physiological connections (Champagne & Meaney, 2006; Panksepp, 1998). Cognitive
and neurological research also suggests that cognitive capacities and personal strengths
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are related to identity formation and the roles an adolescent is able to fill in the world
(Csikszentmihalyi & Schneider, 2000; Nowinski, 2007; Piaget, 1965).
Like cognitive development and the intellectual capacities of female adolescents,
physical and anatomical differences may contribute to self and identity development as
well. Specifically, one study linked the temporal onset of puberty and self esteem in
female adolescents (Eisenberg, 1987). Sexuality and sexual identity may be impacted by
physiological changes or differences among female adolescents. Statistics regarding the
onset of mental illness in adolescence and the widespread occurrence to eating disorders
among female adolescents suggests that physiological and emotional changes taking
place in this developmental stage are especially important to examine when designing a
comprehensive understanding of a female adolescent’s identity and self.
Carol Gilligan (1988) explained that a female adolescent’s self consists of
individual autonomy and social responsibility. Nona Lyons (1988) extended this
perspective by proposing that while males often define themselves in a way that
emphasizes individuality, female adolescents strive more toward connectedness. These
gender differences must be further examined within a theory of identity, self, and moral
development for female adolescents. Gendered messages in a contemporary American
culture impact a female adolescent’s development of relational patterns and moral
behaviors (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Hadley, 2004).
Though traditional theories of identity formation and self development
acknowledge the social influences, a proper review of relevant aspects of contemporary
American culture is needed to explore those influences. Cognitive and relational
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development both impact and are impacted by cultural context. The constructivist views
of post-modern psychology, rooted in Albert Bandura’ s social learning theory (1977),
provide a more thorough model for examining the social factors involved in
psychological development. In many ways, a female adolescent’s self concept
materializes with the incorporation of relational and social perceptions as well as cultural
expectations (Abbott, 2001). The meaning of being female in a contemporary American
social context must be examined as well when hypothesizing about the identity, self, and
moral development of female adolescents. Factors such as geographical region,
socioeconomic status, and family environment may impact the moral, social, emotional,
and cognitive experiences of a female adolescent in the United States. Although
psychoanalytic theories of development provide crucial information and knowledge about
identity, self, and morality, no single piece of literature can encapsulate the infinite
number of interrelated factors impacting an individual female today.
How do Female Adolescents in the United States
Integrate Culture, Gender, and Identity to Develop
a Cohesive Sense of Morality?
Early experiences with caregivers set the stage for the neurobiological systems
that impact a female’s lifelong sense of security and attachment. Corrective emotional
experiences may help to repair faulty neurological connections and biological responses
when children initially grow up in hostile or unsafe environments. Environmental factors
such as parenting styles, family structure, culture, and gender expectations also impact a
female adolescent’s moral development through modeling and reinforcements.
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Emotionally, the parent-child relationship provides an attachment model in which a
female child internalizes pro-social and antisocial tendencies. Commonalities in
contemporary American culture such as gender inequality and differing behavioral
expectations for females provide a specific template of modeled, reinforced, and accepted
moral behaviors. A female may especially focus on the maintenance of relationships, and
therefore make moral decisions based upon cooperation and self-sacrifice.
Female adolescents face the task of identity formation as they gain more
independence and responsibility during their transition to adulthood. This stage forces an
adolescent to reflect upon past experiences and personal strengths as well as try out new
roles and challenge the status quo. An adolescent’s identity may be encouraged or
discouraged by peers, parents, and culture. In some instances, a female adolescent will
develop a false self in order to appease external expectations and at the price of internal
aspirations. The false self may behave in a way that is in line with societal moral
standards or opposed to the norm, especially if she lives within a violent subculture with
poor role models and less opportunity for education of the United States.
A child first typically learns about morality through parental rules and controls.
She may seek to follow parental moral standards in order to maintain the love, care, and
attachment gained from parents. Mixed or confusing messages from parents regarding
moral stances can complicate this process. Eventually, a child internalizes messages
communicated explicitly and implicitly about security and relationships in order to
formulate a self-regulating moral code. This moral code is subject to the child’s relational
experiences and cultural norms, as well her cognitive capacities. In an increasingly
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complex society with differing viewpoints, female adolescents cognitively equipped with
perspective-taking and abstract thinking abilities will show a better ability to navigate
through moral decisions. The more integrated and attuned a female adolescent’s self
system is, the more likely she will successfully develop a stable and adaptable identity.
This identity will serve as her guide throughout life’s moral situations, and it will help her
to understand herself, others, and the world in which she lives.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION
Implications and Limitations of this Study
The moral code an individual follows seems especially intertwined with a
personal sense of identity, typically believed to be shaped during adolescence. This
dissertation utilized past and present literature to identify necessary concepts for
understanding moral development among adolescent females. One implication of this
study is the importance of critically reviewing literature of different generations while
examining elements ofthat literature that may be context-specific and elements that may
be more contemporarily applied.
Concepts like the self and identity present major implications regarding the
experience of an adolescent and moral development. This dissertation demonstrated
important overlap in moral development theories often considered contradicting or
mutually exclusive. Interpersonal, cognitive, and neurobiological development research
has been included in this dissertation to create a more complete picture of moral
development and with the presence of self and identity for female adolescents. Research
orientations often focus on the distinctions and contradictions from one another much as
clinicians often strive for a cohesive clinical identity through theoretical positions. While
this author bases her clinical work in psychoanalytic theories, invaluable input has been
acquired from literature, colleagues, and mentors who identify more as cognitive-
behavioral, systemic, biological, or humanistic in orientation. It is within this
collaborative spirit that this author sought to synthesize theories from psychodynamic,
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neurobiological, cognitive-behavioral, feminist, and cultural developmental theories.
Literature focused on building a more comprehensive understanding and utilizing an
array of research and theoretical concepts will better bridge the gaps in research and
among the research community.
Issues of culture have been shown to effect moral development, ideas about
gender, and ethical behavior. Therefore, no single theory can universally explain the
development of all adolescent females throughout the world. This study was limited to
the United States, and conclusions drawn in the integration section are limited as well.
Geographical regions affect cultural influences such as exposure to media, religiosity,
socio-economic status, education, and family structure. All of these factors will likely
play a role in the development and enactment of an adolescent’s morals and values,
further limiting the ability to generalize conclusions of this study.
Additionally, as this dissertation presupposes, theories and research often need to
be updated to reflect the social context of a particular temporal period and generation.
Changes in American society present implications for differences in the adolescent
experience across generations. The time period believed to encompass puberty and
adolescence has changed within the past few decades, making it difficult to even narrow
down the subjects referred to as “adolescent females,” within psychological and social
literature (Abbott, 2001). Changes in expectations and roles for females continue to occur
in American culture, presenting challenges in examining female adolescents as a stable or
homogeneous population. Studies of female psychology can no longer focus only on one
realm of female life such as motherhood in seeking to offer a complete picture of the
feminine experience. Cultural expectations for females have also changed dramatically ii
regards to sexuality, motherhood, marriage, education, and career pursuits. These
constructs present immeasurable implications for the development and understanding of
identity and self for females in contemporary society. Though the scope of this
dissertation is limited when addressing each of these constructs, it will seek to contribute
insight and integrated information regarding the healthy development and clinical
treatment of adolescent females.
Future Directions for Research
Future research and theoretical moral models must reflect cultural and temporal
shifts and study the implications of changes such as religiosity declines or
transformations in gender expectations. The moral climate of a specific time period may
also be impacted by the level of industrialization and economic climate, for a variety of
factors, making it impossible to generalize American cultural trends to all regions of the
world. Future research should examine the impact of thematic changes in and an increase
in accessibility of media sources. Television shows embodying unethical behaviors
among adolescent males and females seem more prevalent and popular in American
culture today than ever before. Studies relating the media to morality that extend beyond
the popular debate regarding the effects of violence in the media will be helpful in
revealing future moral models as well as incorporating cultural influences specific to
contemporary American society. Morals and values of adolescents and adults are also
likely impacted by the ethical standards of political leaders and other visible leaders such
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as CEO’s and celebrities. Future research into the political business, and entertainment
ethical climates in the United States would benefit the ongoing understanding of moral
development and moral behaviors.
Research reviewed in this dissertation indicated a political climate reflecting more
gender equality may serve as a protective factor for identity development and self-
cohesion. Erikson’s writings on identity also emphasized the importance of proper
societal and interpersonal investment in the development of morality and prosocial
behaviors. Therefore, future research should study the important cultural and political
factors involved in increasing empathy and moral behavior among Americans. By
identifying factors involved with a cultural increase in moral and prosocial behaviors,
social scientists and political activists can seek to design communities and institutions
leading to the betterment of society. For example, writers have proposed that after-school
programs for females in violent neighborhoods could serve to protect the impact of
violent neighborhoods on the development of antisocial behaviors among teenage girls
(Chauhan & Reppucci, 2009).
Future research should also seek to understand how female adolescents are
affected by cultural and social messages and the changing roles in society. Identity and
self development in specific cultural groups such as Latino and Latina immigrants should
be examined by future researchers to accommodate changes in American demographics.
Future clinical research might also study moral competence in developmental^ delayed
and people who suffered a brain injury or stroke to design appropriate interventions and
support for these populations. Research in the field of mirror neurons raises important
102
questions about the development of empathy in individuals diagnosed with autistic
disorder and other developmental disorders. Future research might compare differences
in experiences between children and adolescents considered developmentally delayed and
not developmentally delayed in order to ascertain effective medical and psychosocial
interventions.
The intrapsychic and interpersonal experiences of adolescents should be further
examined as well. Research might address how teachers, parents, and therapists affect
identity formation, self cohesion, and morality in adolescence. The family structure was
noted as a possible influence on female adolescent development. Future research should
answer how important is a same-sex role model for female adolescents in identity, self,
and moral development. Differences in neurological or autonomic development between
genders must be examined in future research as well. Given the information gathered
about the number of abused and traumatized female adolescents in the United States,
research in the future may question how this difference in experience may lead to
differences in neurobiological and cognitive development. Neurofeedback as a possible
use for the promotion for interpersonal repair and treatment of females believed to
engage in antisocial behaviors may provide a new link between early childhood
experiences and future behavior as well as a new intervention to be used in clinical or
subclinical populations. Finally, future studies examining reparative relationships in
adolescence and how these relationships may change behavior and physiology might
provide an exciting and innovative direction for research in moral development.
103
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