Choose one of the texts (in the reading materials assigned this week ) and explain what is most significant about it – there is no wrong or right answer – the significance of the text is entirely yours to explore, judge and explain
- How does the text you chose tie in with the events/transformations you have been learning about so far.
- Does the text you read tie in with any events you have experienced or can relate to? Tell us how
Grammar & style rules:
- write at least 250 words, and break up your thoughts into paragraphs! One topic/argument per paragraph!
- remember to cite any sources you are using, and identify clearly which of the three assigned readings you are basing your essay on
This week’s material are two primary sources by two influential actors in world history. Kwame Nkrumah led Ghana to independence from Britain in 1957, and was its first president. Ernesto “Che” Guevara was an Argentinian revolutionary, who fought alongside Fidel Castro against foreign influence and capitalist excess on the island.
The last source is an article by Mark Gasiorowski in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 261- 286, about the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953, with significant US support.
All three sources build on the mood in the 1950’s. WW2 is over – but world peace is fragile, and notions about what independence means, and how it is to be achieved, and who gets to decide, are a big part of this.
Nkrumah-1965
This is the introduction to Kwame Nkrumah’s book : Neo-colonialism: the last stage of imperialism (1965) – technically it belongs in the next decade – but the ideas he discusses were germinating in the 1950’s – that’s why it is in this week’s readings.
social ideals of the rebel army guevara 1959
[if you are reading the graphic novel “Cuba My Revolution” – the novel and this primary source are connected!]
mossadeq overthrow 1953
[if you are reading Persepolis, this is a great secondary source (ie what historians call an analytic/explanatory article using a lot of primary sources as evidence) about the context that immediately precedes the time in which Persepolis happens, and explains a lot of what is related in the graphic novel. It is also an excellent example of a well-written, and well cited scholarly article}
1
Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism (1965)
Kwame Nkrumah
Introduction
THE neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage. In the past it
was possible to convert a country upon which a neo-colonial regime had been imposed — Egypt in the nineteenth
century is an example — into a colonial territory. Today this process is no longer feasible. Old-fashioned
colonialism is by no means entirely abolished. It still constitutes an African problem, but it is everywhere on the
retreat. Once a territory has become nominally independent it is no longer possible, as it was in the last century, to
reverse the process. Existing colonies may linger on, but no new colonies will be created. In place of colonialism as
the main instrument of imperialism we have today neo-colonialism.
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the
outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed
from outside.
The methods and form of this direction can take various shapes. For example, in an extreme case the troops of the
imperial power may garrison the territory of the neo-colonial State and control the government of it. More often,
however, neo-colonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means. The neo-colonial State may be
obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products from
elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial State may be secured by payments towards the cost
of running the State, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary
control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power.
Where neo-colonialism exists the power exercising control is often the State which formerly ruled the territory in
question, but this is not necessarily so. For example, in the case of South Vietnam the former imperial power was
France, but neo-colonial control of the State has now gone to the United States. It is possible that neo-colonial
control may be exercised by a consortium of financial interests which are not specifically identifiable with any
particular State. The control of the Congo by great international financial concerns is a case in point.
The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of
the less developed parts of the world. Investment under neo-colonialism increases rather than decreases the gap
between the rich and the poor countries of the world.
The struggle against neo-colonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from operating in
less developed countries. It is aimed at preventing the financial power of the developed countries being used in such
a way as to impoverish the less developed.
Non-alignment, as practised by Ghana and many other countries, is based on co-operation with all States whether
they be capitalist, socialist or have a mixed economy. Such a policy, therefore, involves foreign investment from
capitalist countries, but it must be invested in accordance with a national plan drawn up by the government of the
non-aligned State with its own interests in mind. The issue is not what return the foreign investor receives on his
investments. He may, in fact, do better for himself if he invests in a non-aligned country than if he invests in a neo-
colonial one. The question is one of power. A State in the grip of neo-colonialism is not master of its own destiny. It
is this factor which makes neo-colonialism such a serious threat to world peace. The growth of nuclear weapons has
made out of date the old-fashioned balance of power which rested upon the ultimate sanction of a major war.
Certainty of mutual mass destruction effectively prevents either of the great power blocs from threatening the other
with the possibility of a world-wide war, and military conflict has thus become confined to ‘limited wars’. For these
neo-colonialism is the breeding ground.
2
Such wars can, of course, take place in countries which are not neo-colonialist controlled. Indeed their object may be
to establish in a small but independent country a neo-colonialist regime. The evil of neo-colonialism is that it
prevents the formation of those large units which would make impossible ‘limited war’. To give one example: if
Africa was united, no major power bloc would attempt to subdue it by limited war because from the very nature of
limited war, what can be achieved by it is itself limited. It is, only where small States exist that it is possible, by
landing a few thousand marines or by financing a mercenary force, to secure a decisive result.
The restriction of military action of ‘limited wars’ is, however, no guarantee of world peace and is likely to be the
factor which will ultimately involve the great power blocs in a world war, however much both are determined to
avoid it.
Limited war, once embarked upon, achieves a momentum of its own. Of this, the war in South Vietnam is only one
example. It escalates despite the desire of the great power blocs to keep it limited. While this particular war may be
prevented from leading to a world conflict, the multiplication of similar limited wars can only have one end-world
war and the terrible consequences of nuclear conflict.
Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without
responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned
colonialism, the imperial power had at least to explain and justify at home the actions it was taking abroad. In the
colony those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by
their opponents. With neo-colonialism neither is the case.
Above all, neo-colonialism, like colonialism before it, postpones the facing of the social issues which will have to be
faced by the fully developed sector of the world before the danger of world war can be eliminated or the problem of
world poverty resolved.
Neo-colonialism, like colonialism, is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries. The
temporary success of this policy can be seen in the ever widening gap between the richer and the poorer nations of
the world. But the internal contradictions and conflicts of neo-colonialism make it certain that it cannot endure as a
permanent world policy. How it should be brought to an end is a problem that should be studied, above all, by the
developed nations of the world, because it is they who will feel the full impact of the ultimate failure. The longer it
continues the more certain it is that its inevitable collapse will destroy the social system of which they have made it
a foundation.
The reason for its development in the post-war period can be briefly summarised. The problem which faced the
wealthy nations of the world at the end of the second world war was the impossibility of returning to the pre-war
situation in which there was a great gulf between the few rich and the many poor. Irrespective of what particular
political party was in power, the internal pressures in the rich countries of the world were such that no post-war
capitalist country could survive unless it became a ‘Welfare State’. There might be differences in degree in the
extent of the social benefits given to the industrial and agricultural workers, but what was everywhere impossible
was a return to the mass unemployment and to the low level of living of the pre-war years.
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, colonies had been regarded as a source of wealth which could be
used to mitigate the class conflicts in the capitalist States and, as will be explained later, this policy had some
success. But it failed in ‘its ultimate object because the pre-war capitalist States were so organised internally that the
bulk of the profit made from colonial possessions found its way into the pockets of the capitalist class and not into
those of the workers. Far from achieving the object intended, the working-class parties at times tended to identify
their interests with those of the colonial peoples and the imperialist powers found themselves engaged upon a
conflict on two fronts, at home with their own workers and abroad against the growing forces of colonial liberation.
The post-war period inaugurated a very different colonial policy. A deliberate attempt was made to divert colonial
earnings from the wealthy class and use them instead generally to finance the ‘Welfare State’. As will be seen from
the examples given later, this was the method consciously adopted even by those working-class leaders who had
before the war regarded the colonial peoples as their natural allies against their capitalist enemies at home.
3
At first it was presumed that this object could be achieved by maintaining the pre-war colonial system. Experience
soon proved that attempts to do so would be disastrous and would only provoke colonial wars, thus dissipating the
anticipated gains from the continuance of the colonial regime. Britain, in particular, realised this at an early stage
and the correctness of the British judgement at the time has subsequently been demonstrated by the defeat of French
colonialism in the Far East and Algeria and the failure of the Dutch to retain any of their former colonial empire.
The system of neo-colonialism was therefore instituted and in the short run it has served the developed powers
admirably. It is in the long run that its consequences are likely to be catastrophic for them.
Neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of
small non-viable States which are incapable of independent development and must rely upon the former imperial
power for defence and even internal security. Their economic and financial systems are linked, as in colonial days,
with those of the former colonial ruler.
At first sight the scheme would appear to have many advantages for the developed countries of the world. All the
profits of neo-colonialism can be secured if, in any given area, a reasonable proportion of the States have a neo-
colonialist system. It is not necessary that they all should have one. Unless small States can combine they must be
compelled to sell their primary products at prices dictated by the developed nations and buy their manufactured
goods at the prices fixed by them. So long as neo-colonialism can prevent political and economic conditions for
optimum development, the developing countries, whether they are under neo-colonialist control or not, will be
unable to create a large enough market to support industrialisation. In the same way they will lack the financial
strength to force the developed countries to accept their primary products at a fair price.
In the neo-colonialist territories, since the former colonial power has in theory relinquished political control, if the
social conditions occasioned by neo-colonialism cause a revolt the local neo-colonialist government can be
sacrificed and another equally subservient one substituted in its place. On the other hand, in any continent where
neo-colonialism exists on a wide scale the same social pressures which can produce revolts in neo-colonial
territories will also affect those States which have refused to accept the system and therefore neo-colonialist nations
have a ready-made weapon with which they can threaten their opponents if they appear successfully to be
challenging the system.
These advantages, which seem at first sight so obvious, are, however, on examination, illusory because they fail to
take into consideration the facts of the world today.
The introduction of neo-colonialism increases the rivalry between the great powers which was provoked by the old-
style colonialism. However little real power the government of a neo-colonialist State may possess, it must have,
from the very fact of its nominal independence, a certain area of manoeuvre. It may not be able to exist without a
neo-colonialist master but it may still have the ability to change masters.
The ideal neo-colonialist State would be one which was wholly subservient to neo-colonialist interests but the
existence of the socialist nations makes it impossible to enforce the full rigour of the neo-colonialist system. The
existence of an alternative system is itself a challenge to the neo-colonialist regime. Warnings about ‘the dangers of
Communist subversion are likely to be two-edged since they bring to the notice of those living under a neo-
colonialist system the possibility of a change of regime. In fact neo-colonialism is the victim of its own
contradictions. In order to make it attractive to those upon whom it is practised it must be shown as capable of
raising their living standards, but the economic object of neo-colonialism is to keep those standards depressed in the
interest of the developed countries. It is only when this contradiction is understood that the failure of innumerable
‘aid’ programmes, many of them well intentioned, can be explained.
In the first place, the rulers of neo-colonial States derive their authority to govern, not from the will of the people,
but from the support which they obtain from their neo-colonialist masters. They have therefore little interest in
developing education, strengthening the bargaining power of their workers employed by expatriate firms, or indeed
of taking any step which would challenge the colonial pattern of commerce and industry, which it is the object of
neo-colonialism to preserve. ‘Aid’, therefore, to a neo-colonial State is merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-
4
colonial master, passing through the neo-colonial State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the form of
increased profits.
Secondly, it is in the field of ‘aid’ that the rivalry of individual developed States first manifests itself. So long as
neo-colonialism persists so long will spheres of interest persist, and this makes multilateral aid — which is in fact
the only effective form of aid — impossible.
Once multilateral aid begins the neo-colonialist masters are f aced by the hostility of the vested interests in their own
country. Their manufacturers naturally object to any attempt to raise the price of the raw materials which they obtain
from the neo-colonialist territory in question, or to the establishment there of manufacturing industries which might
compete directly or indirectly with their own exports to the territory. Even education is suspect as likely to produce a
student movement and it is, of course, true that in many less developed countries the students have been in the
vanguard of the fight against neo-colonialism.
In the end the situation arises that the only type of aid which the neo-colonialist masters consider as safe is ‘military
aid’.
Once a neo-colonialist territory is brought to such a state of economic chaos and misery that revolt actually breaks
out then, and only then, is there no limit to the generosity of the neo-colonial overlord, provided, of course, that the
funds supplied are utilised exclusively for military purposes.
Military aid in fact marks the last stage of neo-colonialism and its effect is self-destructive. Sooner or later the
weapons supplied pass into the hands of the opponents of the neo-colonialist regime and the war itself increases the
social misery which originally provoked it.
Neo-colonialism is a mill-stone around the necks of the developed countries which practise it. Unless they can rid
themselves of it, it will drown them. Previously the developed powers could escape from the contradictions of neo-
colonialism by substituting for it direct colonialism. Such a solution is no longer possible and the reasons for it have
been well explained by Mr Owen Lattimore, the United States Far Eastern expert and adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in
the immediate post-war period. He wrote:
‘Asia, which was so easily and swiftly subjugated by conquerors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
displayed an amazing ability stubbornly to resist modern armies equipped with aeroplanes, tanks, motor vehicles and
mobile artillery.
‘Formerly big territories were conquered in Asia with small forces. Income, first of all from plunder, then from
direct taxes and lastly from trade, capital investments and long-term exploitation, covered with incredible speed the
expenditure for military operations. This arithmetic represented a great temptation to strong countries. Now they
have run up against another arithmetic, and it discourages them.’
The same arithmetic is likely to apply throughout the less developed world.
This book is therefore an attempt to examine neo-colonialism not only in its African context and its relation to
African unity, but in world perspective. Neo-colonialism is by no means exclusively an African question. Long
before it was practised on any large scale in Africa it was an established system in other parts of the world. Nowhere
has it proved successful, either in raising living standards or in ultimately benefiting countries which have indulged
in it.
Marx predicted that the growing gap between the wealth of the possessing classes and the workers it employs would
ultimately produce a conflict fatal to capitalism in each individual capitalist State.
This conflict between the rich and the poor has now been transferred on to the international scene, but for proof of
what is acknowledged to be happening it is no longer necessary to consult the classical Marxist writers. The
5
situation is set out with the utmost clarity in the leading organs of capitalist opinion. Take for example the following
extracts from The Wall Street Journal, the newspaper which perhaps best reflects United States capitalist thinking.
In its issue of 12 May 1965, under the headline of ‘Poor Nations’ Plight’, the paper first analyses ‘which countries
are considered industrial and which backward’. There is, it explains, ‘no rigid method of classification’.
Nevertheless, it points out:
‘A generally used breakdown, however, has recently been maintained by the International Monetary Fund because,
in the words of an IMF official, “the economic demarcation in the world is getting increasingly apparent.”’ The
break-down, the official says, “is based on simple common sense.”’
In the IMF’s view, the industrial countries are the United States, the United Kingdom, most West European nations,
Canada and Japan. A special category called “other developed areas” includes such other European lands as Finland,
Greece and Ireland, plus Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The IMF’s “less developed” category embraces
all of Latin America and nearly all of the Middle East, non-Communist Asia and Africa.’
In other words the ‘backward’ countries are those situated in the neo-colonial areas.
After quoting figures to support its argument, The Wall Street Journal comments on this situation:
‘The industrial nations have added nearly $2 billion to their reserves, which now approximate $52 billion. At the
same time, the reserves of the less-developed group not only have stopped rising, but have declined some $200
million. To analysts such as Britain’s Miss Ward, the significance of such statistics is clear: the economic gap is
rapidly widening “between a white, complacent, highly bourgeois, very wealthy, very small North Atlantic elite and
everybody else, and this is not a very comfortable heritage to leave to one’s children.”
“Everybody else” includes approximately two-thirds of the population of the earth, spread through about 100
nations.’
This is no new problem. In the opening paragraph of his book, The War on World Poverty, written in 1953, the
present British Labour leader, Mr Harold Wilson, summarised the major problem of the world as he then saw it:
‘For the vast majority of mankind the most urgent problem is not war, or Communism, or the cost of living, or
taxation. It is hunger. Over 1,500,000,000 people, some-thing like two-thirds of the world’s population, are living in
conditions of acute hunger, defined in terms of identifiable nutritional disease. This hunger is at the same time the
effect and the cause of the poverty, squalor and misery in which they live.’
Its consequences are likewise understood. The correspondent of The Wall Street Journal previously quoted,
underlines them:
‘… many diplomats and economists view the implications as overwhelmingly — and dangerously — political.
Unless the present decline can be reversed, these analysts fear, the United States and other wealthy industrial powers
of the West face the distinct possibility, in the words of British economist Barbara Ward, “of a sort of international
class war”.’
What is lacking are any positive proposals for dealing with the situation. All that The Wall Street Journal’s
correspondent can do is to point out that the traditional methods recommended for curing the evils are only likely to
make the situation worse.
It has been argued that the developed nations should effectively assist the poorer parts of the world, and that the
whole world should be turned into a Welfare State. However, there seems little prospect that anything of this sort
could be achieved. The so-called ‘aid’ programmes to help backward economies represent, according to a rough
6
U.N. estimate, only one half of one per cent of the total income of industrial countries. But when it comes to the
prospect of increasing such aid the mood is one of pessimism:
‘A large school of thought holds that expanded share-the-wealth schemes are idealistic and impractical. This school
contends climate, undeveloped human skills, lack of natural resources and other factors — not just lack of money —
retard economic progress in many of these lands, and that the countries lack personnel with the training or will to
use vastly expanded aid effectively. Share-the-wealth schemes, according to this view, would be like pouring money
down a bottomless well, weakening the donor nations without effectively curing the ills of the recipients.’
The absurdity of this argument is demonstrated by the fact that every one of the reasons quoted to prove why the less
developed parts of the world cannot be developed applied equally strongly to the present developed countries in the
period prior to their development. The argument is only true in this sense. The less developed world will not become
developed through the goodwill or generosity of the developed powers. It can only become developed through a
struggle against the external forces which have a vested interest in keeping it undeveloped.
Of these forces, neo-colonialism is, at this stage of history, the principal.
I propose to analyse neo-colonialism, first, by examining the state of the African continent and showing how neo-
colonialism at the moment keeps it artificially poor. Next, I propose to show how in practice African Unity, which in
itself can only be established by the defeat of neo-colonialism, could immensely raise African living standards.
From this beginning, I propose to examine neo-colonialism generally, first historically and then by a consideration
of the great international monopolies whose continued stranglehold on the neo-colonial sectors of the world ensures
the continuation of the system.
The 1953 Coup D’etat in Iran
Author(s):
Mark J. Gasiorowski
Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), pp. 261-
286
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 19 (1987), 261-286 Printed in the United States of America
Mark J. Gasiorowski
THE 1953 COUP D’ETAT IN IRAN
INTRODUCTION
In retrospect, the United States sponsored coup d’tat in Iran of August 19,
1953, has emerged as a critical event in postwar world history. The government
of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq which was ousted in the coup was the
last popular, democratically oriented government to hold office in Iran. The
regime replacing it was a dictatorship that suppressed all forms of popular
political activity, producing tensions that contributed greatly to the 1978-1979
Iranian revolution. If Mosaddeq had not been overthrown, the revolution might
not have occurred. The 1953 coup also marked the first peacetime use of covert
action by the United States to overthrow a foreign government. As such, it was
an important precedent for events like the 1954 coup in Guatemala and the 1973
overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile,’ and made the United States a key
target of the Iranian revolution.
Although the 1953 coup is thus an important historical event, its story has not
yet been fully told. The most widely circulated account of the coup, that of
Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer who directed it, contains many errors and
omissions.2 This study seeks to clarify the roles played by the United States and
Britain in the coup, based on recently released diplomatic records and on inter-
views with most of the key U.S. and British participants.3 This account is more
complete than Roosevelt’s and the others that have so far appeared. Moreover,
because all of the major U.S. and British participants who are alive and willing
to speak on the subject have been interviewed for this study, and because all of
the currently available U.S. and British diplomatic records dealing with the coup
have been examined, this study is likely to remain the most complete account of
U.S. and British involvement in the coup for some time to come.
Three main questions guide this study. First, why did the United States
become involved in the coup? Second, what roles did Britain and the various
Iranian participants play? Third, how important was the U.S. role in the over-
throw of Mosaddeq? While none of these questions can be answered definitively,
the material presented in this study sheds considerable light on each.
THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL CRISIS AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARD IRAN
On April 29, 1951, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah of Iran, yielded to a
rising tide of popular pressure and appointed Mohammad Mosaddeq to be
? 1987 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/87 $5.00 + .00
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262 Mark J. Gasiorowski
Iran’s new prime minister. Mosaddeq was a lawyer and wealthy landowner who
had been a prominent political figure in Iran since the early 1900s. In his long
years in public service, Mosaddeq had gained a reputation as a liberal democrat
and an ardent nationalist. By the late 1940s, he had identified himself with two
main issues: a desire to transfer political power from the royal court to the
parliament (known as the Majlis), and a desire to increase Iran’s control over its
oil industry, which was controlled by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC). In the late 1940s, these two issues were becoming increasingly
prominent in Iranian politics. Moreover, they had become closely interrelated by
this time: the British had become extremely powerful in Iran, due mainly to their
control over the oil industry, and they used their power in part to help the Shah;
the Shah, for his part, was widely viewed as a British puppet and had refused to
renegotiate or nationalize the AIOC concession.4
These two issues came to eclipse all others in 1949, when a new oil agreement
favorable to the AIOC was announced and when the Shah then tried to rig the
16th Majlis elections. These actions enraged the opposition. Large demonstra-
tions ensued and an organization known as the National Front was formed to
coordinate opposition to the Shah and to the British. Mosaddeq soon emerged
as its defacto leader.
The National Front was a broad coalition of groups and political parties based
mainly on the urban middle and lower classes. Its main components were the
progressive, nationalist Iran party, led by Karim Sanjabi and Allahyar Saleh and
composed mainly of leftist, anti-Soviet intellectuals; the Toilers’ party, led by
Mozaffar Baqai and Khalel Maleki and composed of both workers and leftist
intellectuals; and the Mojahidin-i-lslam, led by Ayatollah Abul Qassem Kashani
and composed mainly of workers, bazaar merchants, and rank-and-file clergy.
Associated with the National Front (but not formally affiliated with it) was the
Pan-Iranist party, a shadowy, ultra-nationalist group composed mainly of lower
class toughs. The National Front also attracted a large number of unaffiliated
individuals, particularly among the middle class. The main opposition organiza-
tions not affiliated with the National Front were the communist Tudeh party and
the Fedayin-i-Islam.5
In 1950, the National Front led frequent demonstrations against the Shah and
the British. It also managed to elect eight candidates to the 16th Majlis, including
Mosaddeq. Once in the Majlis, the National Front deputies continued to press
for a reduction of the Shah’s powers and, after June 1950, for nationalization of
the oil industry. In March 1951, Mosaddeq submitted a bill calling for nationali-
zation of the oil industry to the Majlis. This bill was quickly passed, and
Mosaddeq was soon appointed prime minister. On May 1, immediately after
taking office, Mosaddeq signed the nationalization bill into law.6
The nationalization law quickly brought Mosaddeq into direct conflict with
the British government, which owned 50% of the AIOC’s stock and was not
prepared to accept outright nationalization. In the ensuing months, the British
adopted a three-track strategy designed to reestablish their control over Iran’s oil
by either pressuring Mosaddeq into a favorable settlement or by removing him
from office.7
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 263
The first component of this strategy consisted of a series of legal maneuvers.
The International Court of Justice was asked to arbitrate the oil dispute. A
negotiating team was sent to Tehran with a proposal that recognized the principle
of nationalization but called for the AIOC to market Iran’s oil on a 50-50 profit-
sharing basis. This proposal was rejected by Mosaddeq in June 1951. Negotiations
were reopened in August under a mission led by Richard Stokes. Stokes’s
proposal differed little from the previous British offer, and was soon rejected by
Mosaddeq. The British thereafter refused to negotiate directly with Mosaddeq
and relied instead on appeals to the International Court, the United Nations, and
on mediation by the United States.
The second component of the British strategy was to undermine Mosaddeq’s
base of support by imposing economic sanctions on Iran and carrying out
military maneuvers in the region. The AIOC began a production slowdown in
May and prevented tankers from loading oil at Abadan. By the end of July,
these steps had evolved into a full-fledged blockade, which was joined by the
other major oil companies. A British paratroop brigade was sent to Cyprus in
mid-May and the cruiser Mauritius was sent to Abadan. These actions led
Mosaddeq to announce that the first shot fired would “signal the start of World
War III.”9
With the collapse of the Stokes negotiations, the AIOC announced that it
would take legal action against anyone buying Iranian oil. Britain asked its
European allies to discourage their citizens from seeking employment with the
newly-formed National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In early September, an
embargo was begun on British exports to Iran of iron, steel, sugar, oil processing
equipment, and goods that could be resold for dollars. Twenty thousand oil
workers were laid off by the AIOC at Abadan, forcing Mosaddeq to put them on
the government payroll. Sterling conversion privileges were cancelled and other
financial restrictions were imposed which violated a memorandum of under-
standing between the two governments. Four British destroyers joined the
Mauritius in September and held firing practice near Abadan. British land and
air forces in the region were also strengthened.?1
The third component of the British strategy was to try to remove Mosaddeq
from office. This was to be achieved mainly through covert political action,
undertaken with the help of a network of pro-British politicians, businessmen,
military officers, and religious figures. The principal figures in this network were
the Rashidian brothers, who had been the main British agents in Iran since the
early 1940s. Another important element in the British net was a group of
prominent, pro-British politicians. These included Sayyid Zia Tabataba’i, whom
the British sought to install as prime minister, and Jamal Emami, who headed a
pro-British faction in the Majlis.”
The British began to pressure the Shah to install Sayyid Zia even before
Mosaddeq came to power. The Shah was apparently agreeable, and was re-
portedly discussing the matter with Sayyid Zia when the Majlis nominated
Mosaddeq. These efforts continued after Mosaddeq assumed office. In June
1951, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, leaders of the Conservative opposi-
tion in Britain, suggested to the Foreign Office that an Anglo-American approach
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264 Mark J. Gasiorowski
be made to the Shah to oust Mosaddeq. This meant, in their words, carrying out
“a coup.”‘2 Plans for covert action had, however, already been developed by this
time; the removal of Mosaddeq was viewed as “objective number one.””3 Oddly
enough, several members of the British parliament began to lobby the Foreign
Office at this time on behalf of Ahmad Qavam, a venerable Iranian politician
and former prime minister. The Foreign Office responded that “certain other
plans are now under way” and “we have our money on another horse,” referring
to Sayyid Zia.14 Throughout the summer of 1951, pressure to remove Mosaddeq
was brought to bear on the Shah, who was sympathetic but remained paralyzed
with indecision.’5
After the collapse of the Stokes negotiations, all available means were used in
attempting to oust Mosaddeq. Stokes met with the Shah shortly after the
negotiations broke down and implored him to dismiss Mosaddeq. The Per-
manent Undersecretary in the Foreign Office called for an “indirect and behind
the scenes” effort to remove Mosaddeq and noted “an encouraging growth of
opposition in the Majlis.”16 This was a reference to efforts by Jamal Emami and
his faction to disrupt the Majlis. The Foreign Office developed a set of guidelines
for dealing with Mosaddeq’s successor, whom it presumed would be Sayyid Zia.
These included a loan from the AIOC and a modus vivendi agreed to by Sayyid
Zia calling for a return of the AIOC under a different name. The Minister of
Fuel and Power optimistically speculated that these measures might just enable
Britain to avoid full nationalization.17
These efforts were taken one step further in early September by the British
Ambassador in Tehran, Sir Francis Shepherd, who reported that the Shah was
in favor of a change of government and the opposition was about to overthrow
Mosaddeq. The Foreign Office then announced that the oil negotiations had
been suspended and that it saw no hope of reaching an agreement with Mosaddeq.
This statement, which was “designed to encourage the opposition group headed
by Sayyid Zia,” led Mosaddeq to accuse the British of trying to overthrow him.’8
The actions of the British government, as discussed above, were accompanied
by a new round of further British economic sanctions and military activities. The
United States protested vigorously; U.S. policymakers believed that Mosaddeq
was “anxious to reach an agreement,” and advised the British to negotiate.19 The
British decided instead to increase their pressure on Mosaddeq. After British
workers were expelled from the oilfields on September 20, plans were made to
invade Abadan. The Iranian naval commander at Abadan was persuaded by the
British to put up only token resistance. Prime Minister Attlee notified President
Truman of the invasion plan. Truman responded that the United States would
not support an invasion and again recommended negotiations. Attlee was then
forced to tell his cabinet that “in view of the attitude of the United States
Government, [he did not] think it would be expedient to use force to maintain
the British staff in Abadan.”20
U.S. opposition caused the British to abandon their attempt to overthrow
Mosaddeq at this time. The oil dispute was then brought before the United
Nations, where Mosaddeq received a warm reception from U.S. officials and
gained considerable sympathy in the international community. Having failed to
reverse the nationalization law or to oust Mosaddeq, and with their main
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 265
candidate for the premiership by now thoroughly discredited, the British began
to search for other options in Iran.
One soon materialized. Ahmad Qavam, whose overtures had been rejected
earlier in 1951, sent several emissaries to the British in late 1951 and early 1952.
In March 1952, Julian Amery, a Conservative MP with considerable experience
in the Middle East, was sent unofficially to Paris to meet with Qavam. Qavam
then returned to Tehran to build support for his candidacy. A list of possible
cabinet ministers was drawn up and given to the British for approval. Support
was given to Qavam in the form of help from pro-British Majlis members and an
agreement on a plan to end the oil dispute. Qavam told George Middleton, the
British Charge in Tehran, that he would “ensure that the traditionally cordial
relations [between Iran and Britain] were restored, that he wanted [the British]
back as partners in the oil industry, that the British must return, and so on.”21
He met in early June with U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson. Henderson was
“inclined to think that he might be the best bet” as a successor to Mosaddeq,
although State Department officials were less enthusiastic.22
By this time the British had also begun a covert effort through the Rashidians
to create friction among the leaders of the National Front. Tensions emerged as
early as March 1952, when Mosaddeq openly criticized Kashani’s attempts to rig
the 17th Majlis elections. Tensions also emerged at this time between Mosaddeq
and Hossein Makki, another key National Front figure. Robin Zaehner, an
Oxford professor working for MI6 (the British intelligence service) in Iran at this
time, claimed that this tension was “created and directed by the brothers
Rashidian.”23 It is, of course, impossible to determine how important these
British actions were in creating these tensions, but they may well have played a
significant role.
Mosaddeq was evidently aware of these activities. He retaliated suddenly on
July 16 by resigning from office, after clashing with the Shah over who would
control the military. The Shah then appointed Qavam prime minister. Plans for
Qavam’s accession had apparently not yet been completed. Massive demonstra-
tions calling for Mosaddeq’s return were organized by the National Front. These
demonstrations became violent; at least 69 people were killed and over 750 were
injured. The Shah refused to use the police to crush the demonstrations. Since
Qavam had no popular following, Mosaddeq’s supporters dominated the streets
of Tehran and other cities. Mosaddeq was triumphantly swept back into office
on July 21.24
These events had ominous ramifications. Morale in the army dropped pre-
cipitously, particularly after Mosaddeq subsequently purged the officer corps.
The British and their supporters were panic-stricken. Middleton reported that
the court had been “fatally weakened,” and that henceforth it might not be
possible “to stop the drift towards communism.” He described July 21 as “a
turning point in Iranian history. Previously the small ruling class determined the
prime minister, with [the] Shah as umpire. Now the consent of the mob is the
decisive factor.”25
The Qavam episode also created serious problems for the National Front. The
Tudeh party was becoming increasingly powerful; efforts were made to bring it
under control. Mosaddeq quarreled bitterly with Kashani and other National
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266 Mark J. Gasiorowski
Front leaders over cabinet appointments and over Mosaddeq’s request for
emergency powers. The Pan-Iranist party began to split into factions. More
ominously, a group of military officers led by Fazlollah Zahedi began to plot
with the Rashidians against Mosaddeq. Zahedi, a retired general and member of
the Senate who also headed the Retired Officers’ Association, had been arrested
by the British in 1941 for planning “a concentrated move against allied troops
in Persia.”26 He had been a minister in Mosaddeq’s first cabinet and had
supported the National Front until the July uprisings,27 when the resurgence of
Tudeh activity and the disintegration of the military apparently drove him into
opposition.
Zahedi and the Rashidians began to plot against Mosaddeq shortly after
the latter returned to office on July 21. A Kashani emissary and National
Front leaders Makki, Baqai, and Abol Hassan Haerizadeh approached Zahedi
and expressed their dissatisfaction with Mosaddeq. Zahedi apparently gained
Kashani’s support in exchange for a role in the selection of post-coup cabinet
members. From this point on, Kashani, Makki, Baqai, and Haerizadeh worked
against Mosaddeq in loose collaboration with Zahedi and were among Mos-
addeq’s staunchest opponents. Zahedi met with a British embassy official and
expressed his opposition to the growth of U.S. influence in Iran. The embassy
officer cabled London for advice, saying “I don’t want to set [the Rashidians] off
working up a coup d’etat and then have to call it off.”28
Zahedi spent August and September trying to build support. He obtained the
backing of Abul Qasem Bakhtiari, a tribal leader with whom he had worked
closely for the Nazis during World War II. Zahedi met with Middleton and
asked for assurances that the British would not oppose him, would obtain U.S.
acquiescence in the plot, and would agree to an oil settlement on terms similar to
those reached with Qavam. Middleton reported this to London and was told to
give Zahedi assistance. Arms were provided to the Bakhtiari by MI6. Middleton
met with U.S. Ambassador Henderson, who was noncommital about Zahedi.
Either Zahedi or a close lieutenant also met with Henderson on September 8.
Henderson was told that Mosaddeq could not stop the communists, but that a
government which could would soon come to power.29
As with the Qavam plot, Mosaddeq evidently learned of Zahedi’s plans and
moved to stop him before they could be implemented. Arrest warrants were
issued on October 13 for the Rashidians and General Abdul Hossein Hejazi, a
Zahedi ally who had been dismissed in August as head of the military college. A
General Aryana was dismissed from the army in connection with the plot, and
Zahedi was saved from arrest only by parliamentary immunity. Three days later,
on October 16, Mosaddeq broke diplomatic relations with Britain.30 Lacking a
base for operations inside Iran, the British henceforth were forced to rely on the
United States to deal with Mosaddeq.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN UNDER THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION3
In comparison with countries such as Germany, Italy, Greece, and China, Iran
was not of great concern to U.S. policymakers in the late 1940s. The Tudeh
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 267
party had been seriously weakened in the 1945-1946 Azerbaijan crisis and Iran
was relatively stable. The United States had no significant economic interests in
Iran at this time. Anglo-U.S. military strategy called for Britain rather than the
United States to defend Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion.32 Very little U.S.
aid was given to Iran in the 1940s. Because of its long border with the Soviet
Union, Iran was of some interest for espionage and other covert activities.
However, these were on a much smaller scale than similar activities elsewhere
and did not really affect Iran itself.
In 1950, the gradual reemergence of the Tudeh and growing unrest caused by
the oil dispute and a severe recession within Iran led U.S. policymakers to
become increasingly concerned about Iran. The Shah’s leadership ability was
criticized. Iran was described as “dangerous and explosive,” and a possible
“second China.”33 Steps were taken to remedy the situation. A $23 million per
year military aid agreement was signed. A small Point Four aid program was
begun. A $25 million Export-Import Bank loan was approved (although never
actually granted) and a $10 million International Bank loan request was sup-
ported. The CIA and embassy staffs in Tehran were increased. Henry Grady,
who had played a key role in the Greek Civil War, was named Ambassador to
Iran.34
By early 1951, U.S. involvement in Iran had increased considerably. After the
nationalization law was enacted, the Truman administration pursued two main
goals regarding Iran. First, Iran was to be kept in the Western camp at all costs.
Second, stability was to be maintained in the world oil market. These goals did
not call for undermining the Mosaddeq government. U.S. officials stated that
they had “no intention… of challenging Iran’s sovereignty,” and frequently
expressed support for Iran’s independence.35 Although a covert action program
had been started in Iran by the Truman administration (see below), and while
covert action had been used extensively elsewhere, this program was designed to
weaken the Soviet position in Iran rather than that of Mosaddeq.36 U.S. policy
toward Iran under Truman was to support the Mosaddeq government and seek
an end to the oil dispute through diplomatic means. U.S. officials were, however,
aware of British covert activities against Mosaddeq in this period and occasionally
discussed these activities with their British counterparts.37
Soon after the AIOC was nationalized, U.S. officials developed a plan to ease
the effect of the British oil blockade on U.S. allies. Under this plan, U.S. oil
companies were asked to provide oil voluntarily to those allies that had been
adversely affected by the blockade. Some 46 million barrels of oil were delivered
under this plan in the first year of the blockade, which was estimated to be 20%
of Iran’s total 1950 production. Although it was undertaken to ensure that oil
would be available to U.S. allies in the event of a general war,38 this plan had the
effect of strengthening the British blockade and hence inadvertently helped to
undermine the Iranian economy and the Mosaddeq government.
At the same time, diplomatic efforts were begun to try to resolve the oil
dispute. U.S. officials called for a negotiated settlement and pledged not to
interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. The British were advised to pay “lip service” to
the principle of nationalization, accept a 50-50 division of profits, and refrain
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268 Mark J. Gasiorowski
from using force. British officials were “bothered” and “annoyed at the American
attitude of relative indifference.”39 Averell Harriman was sent to Tehran after the
first round of negotiations broke down to press for new talks. His efforts led to
the Stokes negotiations. While these ultimately failed, Harriman is credited by
Dean Acheson with preventing a war between Britain and Iran. After the Stokes
mission collapsed, the British began their covert efforts to install Sayyid Zia.
U.S. officials repeatedly pressed the British to resume negotiations.40 As discussed
above, Truman’s personal intervention was largely responsible for preventing a
British invasion of Iran at this time.
Mosaddeq went to the United Nations in October. He traveled to Washington
and was received warmly by President Truman and other U.S. officials. Mean-
while, a new U.S. approach to the oil dispute was being developed. This plan
recognized Iran’s desire for an end to British control over its oil resources and
distanced the United States considerably from the British. The U.S. proposal
called for the establishment of a consortium to market oil purchased from the
NIOC. This consortium was to be made up initially of Royal Dutch/Shell and
other major oil companies. When anti-trust considerations led the U.S. majors
to back out, a similar package was arranged involving independent U.S. oil
companies. When this fell apart in the fall of 1952, a third plan was worked out
in which anti-trust laws were to be waived to permit the participation of the U.S.
majors. This package was rejected by Mosaddeq in late 1952, but was agreed to
in essence by his successor in 1954.41
In conjunction with these diplomatic activities, the United States began covert
efforts to monitor and manipulate the political process in Iran. Since the late
1940s, the CIA had been carrying out five basic types of covert activity in Iran.
First, stay-behind networks had been organized among the tribes in southern
Iran to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion. Second,
escape and evasion routes had been set up for use in a major war. Third, cross-
border espionage and subversion operations were being launched into the Soviet
Union using Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and other ethnic groups living on both
sides of the border. Fourth, Soviet activities in Iran were being monitored with
espionage and counter-espionage operations. Finally, an operation codenamed
BEDAMN had been started in 1948 to counter Soviet and Tudeh influence in
Iran.42
BEDAMN was a propaganda and political action program run through a
network headed by two Iranians, codenamed Nerren and Cilley, and apparently
funded at $1 million per year. Under the propaganda arm of BEDAMN, anti-
communist articles and cartoons were planted in Iranian newspapers, books43
and leaflets critical of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party were written and
distributed, rumors were started, etc. The political action arm of BEDAMN
involved both direct attacks on Soviet allies in Iran and so-called black operations
designed to turn Iranians against the Tudeh. Attacks on Soviet allies typically
involved hiring street gangs to break up Tudeh rallies and funding right-wing,
anti-communist organizations such as the Somka and Pan-Iranist parties, who
regularly battled Tudeh mobs in the streets of Tehran. Black operations included
the infiltration of agents provocateurs into Tudeh demonstrations to provoke
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 269
outrageous acts, paying religious figures to denounce the Tudeh as anti-Islamic,
and organizing attacks on mosques and public figures in the name of the
Tudeh.44 These activities complemented more benign, overt activities with the
same general goal carried out by the U.S. embassy staff and the U.S. Information
Agency.
BEDAMN was also used to weaken the National Front by undermining its
mass base, which consisted mainly of organizations such as the Toilers’ and Pan-
Iranist parties and crowds led by popular figures such as Kashani. Efforts were
made to detach Kashani and his followers from the National Front using
propaganda, often quite vulgar, that depicted Mosaddeq as a corrupt and
immoral person who was exploiting Kashani. Money was also given to a mullah
named Mohammad Taqi Falsafi to try to build a clerical alternative to Kashani.
Other mullahs were encouraged to adopt a more fundamentalist line to drive
them away from Mosaddeq. Efforts were made to turn the Toilers and the Pan-
Iranists against Mosaddeq and to provoke splits in these organizations. This was
done by buying influence among the leaders of these groups through Iranians in
the BEDAMN network, who disguised their CIA connections. In a particularly
noteworthy case, a CIA contract officer approached Baqai in September or
October of 1952 and encouraged him to break with Mosaddeq; Baqai was
subsequently also given money. Similar approaches may have been made to
Kashani, Makki, and Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Behbehani.45
By November 1952, Kashani, Baqai, Makki, and several other National Front
leaders had turned against Mosaddeq. Similarly, the Pan-Iranists had split into
pro- and anti-Mosaddeq factions by this time, and Khalil Maleki and his
followers in the Toilers’ party had split with Baqai and formed a pro-Mosaddeq
organization known as the Third Force.46 It is, of course, impossible to determine
the degree to which BEDAMN was responsible for this. Most Iranian political
figures at this time were extremely opportunistic and ambitious, and could have
had many reasons for turning against Mosaddeq. This was especially true of
Kashani, Baqai, and Makki. Furthermore, the Rashidians were carrying out
similar activities at this time on behalf of the British. The CIA officers who
directed BEDAMN are themselves unclear as to its impact; one described it as
“important” in encouraging Kashani and Baqai to split with Mosaddeq, while
another said it was “limited” in scale. While the CIA thus cannot be credited
exclusively with provoking these splits in the National Front, it may well have
had a significant role.
An issue which is in some ways more important is the question of who
authorized these attacks against Mosaddeq and the National Front. As described
above, the official policy of the Truman administration was to support Mosaddeq
and not to undermine his government. The State Department, headed at the time
by Dean Acheson, unquestionably followed this policy. It thus appears that the
decision to undermine Mosaddeq through BEDAMN was taken within the CIA
itself. Since the top CIA officials with responsibility for covert operations at this
time are now either dead or unable to recall who might have authorized these
actions, it is impossible to determine where in the CIA chain of command this
“rogue elephant” component of BEDAMN originated.47
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270 Mark J. Gasiorowski
THE OVERTHROW OF MOSADDEQ
On November 1, 1952, the staff of the British embassy left Tehran in a caravan
for Beirut, ending the long era of British domination in Iran. The Rashidian
network and several deep-cover operatives had been left behind, but it was clear
that the British position in Iran had become very weak. Accordingly, Christopher
Montague Woodhouse, the chief MI6 officer in Iran at the time, was sent to
Washington to seek U.S. support for a tentative plan to overthrow Mosaddeq.48
Woodhouse’s plan called for a coordinated uprising to be engineered by the
Rashidians and certain Bakhtiari tribal leaders, with or without the Shah’s
approval. Although the British had been conspiring with Zahedi since August,
they put forward several names as possible leaders of the coup. Woodhouse took
his plan first to the CIA. Frank Wisner, the head of CIA covert operations,
Allen Dulles, Wisner’s deputy, and Kermit Roosevelt, Wisner’s Middle East
division chief, all favored a coup. However, lower-level Iran specialists in the
CIA were opposed to the idea, as was the CIA station chief in Tehran, who
viewed it as “putting U.S. support behind Anglo-French colonialism.” Discus-
sions were also held with State Department officials. Woodhouse was told that
Truman would not agree to the plan, but that Eisenhower, who had just been
elected president, probably would.49
Zahedi continued to intrigue in this period, although the departure of the
British undoubtedly hampered his efforts. Arms and money continued to flow
into the Bakhtiari region, where Abul Qasem Bakhtiari was trying to enlist the
support of the other khans. Zahedi reportedly promised to establish a “Free
South in Iran,” where the Bakhtiari would be given autonomy under the leader-
ship of Abul Qasem. In January 1953, Zahedi’s Majlis allies, led by Kashani,
fomented a major dispute in the Majlis, apparently trying to create conditions
that would lead to Mosaddeq’s ouster. This effort came to an end on January 19,
when Mosaddeq received a 59 to 1 vote of confidence.50
In mid-February, Zahedi approached several army generals about a possible
coup. His son, Ardeshir, told U.S. embassy officials that he was about to seize
power, and identified his probable cabinet. At about the same time, a group of
Bakhtiari tribesmen led by Abul Qasem and members of the Retired Officers’
Association attacked an army column in Khuzestan province and caused many
casualties. Mosaddeq retaliated by arresting Zahedi and several others and
threatening to resign. The Shah then announced that he would take a vacation
abroad, which provoked widespread unrest. A large anti-Mosaddeq crowd organ-
ized by Kashani, the Somka party, and pro-Zahedi military officers gathered at
the Shah’s palace and marched toward Mosaddeq’s home, calling for his removal.
Violent clashes then took place with a larger, pro-Mosaddeq crowd. The U.S.
embassy reported that the “present probability is that the Mosaddeq Government
will fall.”51 Mosaddeq managed to evade the hostile crowd, however, and loyal
army units eventually restored order.
A similar incident occurred in late April, when the chief of the National
Police, General Afshartous, was kidnapped and murdered. MI6 had planned the
kidnapping in order to provoke a coup, but had not intended that Afshartous be
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 271
murdered. Zahedi, Baqai, and several of their asssociates (including Kashani’s
son) were implicated in the killing, and warrants were issued for their arrest.
Kashani, as president of the Majlis, helped Zahedi avoid arrest by giving him
bast, or sanctuary, in the Majlis; Baqai was protected by parliamentary immunity.
Mosaddeq charged that the conspirators had also intended to kill the defense
and foreign ministers and that their goal was to install Baqai as prime minister.
Afshartous had been regarded as courageous, uncorrupt, and staunchly loyal to
Mosaddeq. His murder was a severe blow to the morale of the National Front
and demonstrated clearly the ruthlessness of the conspirators.52
These events added considerably to the turmoil that had gripped Iran since the
summer of 1952. After the February riots, rumors of a coup circulated in the
army and unrest continued to simmer among the Bakhtiari. The pro-Mosaddeq
Qashqai tribe made plans to attack the Bakhtiari and march on Tehran in the
event of a coup. The Tudeh had been very active in the February riots and
remained so in the weeks that followed, leading Mosaddeq to order a wave of
arrests. Despite its increased visibility, however, the Tudeh apparently did not
gain in strength during this period.53
More significantly, Mosaddeq’s once-unchallenged position as leader of the
nationalist movement grew increasingly precarious. As discussed above, key
National Front figures such as Kashani, Baqai, and Makki had been conspiring
against Mosaddeq since the summer of 1952. Inasmuch as these figures held
great sway over the urban lower classes, this weakened Mosaddeq’s base of
popular support. The defection of these leaders into the opposition also under-
mined Mosaddeq’s position in the Majlis. Kashani, as speaker of the Majlis, had
tried to oust Mosaddeq in January 1953. After the incidents of February and
April 1953, Majlis debates over the causes of the February incident and Baqai’s
role in the murder of Afshartous served as forums for further attacks against
Mosaddeq. By the summer of 1953, battle lines had clearly been drawn between
Mosaddeq and his supporters in the Iran party and the Third Force, on the one
hand, and Zahedi, Kashani, Baqai, and their allies, on the other.54
While Zahedi and his associates were carrying out these attacks on Mosaddeq,
the new Eisenhower administration began seriously to consider the idea of a
coup. As mentioned above, top CIA officials had already decided that a coup
was necessary. Since the November 1952 elections, Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles had been discussing the idea with his brother, Allen Dulles, who
had been named director of the CIA. Top U.S. and British officials met on
February 3, 1953, only two weeks after Eisenhower’s inauguration, to review the
situation. A decision was taken at this meeting to develop and implement a plan
to overthrow Mosaddeq and install Zahedi. The operation was to be led by
Roosevelt, and was given the codename AJAX. U.S. officials had previously
described Zahedi as “unscrupulous” and “an opportunist”; now he was viewed as
a strong figure who could take decisive steps to bring Iran back firmly into the
55
Western camp.
Roosevelt traveled to Iran several times in the following months to prepare for
the coup. He and another CIA officer met frequently with Zahedi in this period,
and financial assistance may have been provided to Zahedi. An American Iran
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272 Mark J. Gasiorowski
specialist working under contract for the CIA was sent to Nicosia in mid-May to
develop a detailed plan for the coup with an Iran specialist from MI6. The
American then went over the plan with Roosevelt in Beirut. The two flew to
London in mid-June to discuss the plan with British officials. Final approval
came at a June 25 State Department meeting.56
The coup plan had four main components. First, the propaganda and politi-
cal action capabilities of BEDAMN were to be turned immediately against
Mosaddeq. Second, opposition figures were to be encouraged to create a dis-
turbance that would dramatize the situation by taking bast in the Majlis. Third,
since the Shah had not been consulted about the coup, his agreement to dismiss
Mosaddeq and appoint Zahedi was to be obtained. Finally, the support of key
active-duty military officers was to be sought. The idea of a Bakhtiari uprising
was dropped, presumably because Abul Qasem had recently been arrested.
These efforts were to be carried out with the help of the Rashidian and
BEDAMN networks and several officers in the Tehran CIA station. The
Rashidians had been turned over to the CIA by MI6 when the British left
Tehran in November 1952. The CIA station was augmented for AJAX. The
station chief (who had opposed the coup) was replaced by a former journalist
who had covered the Azerbaijan crisis and knew many prominent Iranians. A
CIA paramilitary specialist with recent experience in Korea was brought in and
given responsibility for liaison with the Iranian military officers involved in the
plot.
Mosaddeq’s position grew more precarious in June and July of 1953. Demon-
strations by pro- and anti-Mosaddeq crowds and the Tudeh occurred almost
daily. The Majlis was the scene of continual disputes between pro- and anti-
Mosaddeq forces over issues such as the February riots, Baqai’s role in the
Afshartous killing, control over the army, and elections for a new speaker.
Fistfights broke out in the Majlis in early June. On July 1, Mosaddeq achieved a
major victory over his opponents when Abdullah Moazami, a Mosaddeq sup-
porter, was elected by a vote of 41 to 31 to replace Kashani as speaker. After
further attacks by the opposition, a group of Mosaddeq supporters resigned en
masse from the Majlis in protest. In late July, a group of deputies loyal to
Haerizadeh and Baqai took bast in the Majlis. With the Majlis thus paralyzed,
Mosaddeq decided to close it and seek new elections. Because of the opposition’s
threat to prevent a quorum, Mosaddeq was forced to hold a public referendum
on the issue in early August. The referendum was rigged which caused a great
public outcry against Mosaddeq.57
The United States by this time had thoroughly committed itself to under-
mining Mosaddeq through BEDAMN. CIA participants have described this as
“an orchestrated program of destabilization” and “an all-out effort.”58 BEDAMN
was at least partially responsible for the demonstrations and Majlis activity that
plagued Mosaddeq at this time.59 As with the anti-Mosaddeq BEDAMN activities
described previously, it is impossible to gauge how effective these actions really
were; but it seems safe to assume that they were significant.
Several efforts were made in this period to persuade the Shah to back Zahedi.
Henderson met with the Shah on May 30. The Shah told him that Zahedi was
not an “intellectual giant,” but that he would be acceptable if he had broad
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 273
support, would come to power through parliamentary means, and would be
given “massive economic aid” by the United States or Britain.60 A second
attempt was made in late July. A U.S. Army colonel and an MI6 officer were
sent to France to locate Princess Ashraf, the Shah’s twin sister, who was
gambling at the casinos in Deauville. Ashraf agreed to speak to her brother after
receiving an unauthorized promise that he would be supported in the style to
which he was accustomed by the United States if the coup failed. Ashraf arrived
in Tehran on July 25, but Mosaddeq prevented her from seeing her brother.61 A
third attempt was made a week later by U.S. Army General Norman Schwartz-
kopf, who had commanded the Iranian Gendarmerie in 1942-1948. Schwartzkopf
managed to see the Shah, who refused to commit himself to the CIA plan.
Schwartzkopf then advised Roosevelt to see the Shah personally. Arrangements
were made through the Rashidians. The Shah agreed to support the plan after
official U.S. and British involvement had been confirmed through a special radio
broadcast.62
Having obtained the Shah’s concurrence, Roosevelt’s team was now able to go
ahead with the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddeq and appoint-
ing Zahedi were drawn up and signed by the Shah. On the night of Saturday,
August 15, the firman dismissing Mosaddeq was delivered to him by Colonel
Nematollah Nassiri, commander of the Imperial Guard. Mosaddeq had been
warned of the plot, probably by the Tudeh; he denounced the firman as a forgery
and had Nassiri arrested. Troops loyal to Mosaddeq set up roadblocks through-
out the city. Opposition deputies, military officers suspected of plotting with
Zahedi, and the Shah’s minister of court were arrested. A massive search was
begun for Zahedi and a reward of 100,000 rials was offered for his arrest.
Armored forces that had been assigned to move into Tehran in conjunction with
the delivery of the firmans failed to arrive. Without informing Roosevelt’s team,
the Shah fled the country in panic, first to Baghdad and then to Rome.63
The arrest of Nassiri completely disrupted the original coup plan, forcing
Roosevelt and his team to improvise a new strategy. Contingency plans were
made for Roosevelt, Zahedi, and a few other key participants to be evacuated in
a U.S. military attache’s airplane. Zahedi was brought to a CIA safe house,
where he remained in hiding until Mosaddeq was finally overthrown. A number
of diverse and uncoordinated actions were then undertaken by Roosevelt’s team
in the hope that a second, successful coup could be triggered.
The first was an effort to publicize the Shah’s dismissal of Mosaddeq and
appointment of Zahedi. Copies of the firmans were made by CIA officers on
Sunday, August 16, and distributed by Nerren and Cilley and two American
newspaper reporters. Since Mosaddeq had not publicly announced receipt of the
firman, this served to publicize the Shah’s actions. The two reporters were taken
to meet Ardeshir Zahedi at the house of one of the CIA officers. Ardeshir told
them about the firmans and characterized Mosaddeq’s attempt to arrest his
father as a coup, since the latter had been appointed legally. This information
was quickly published in The New York Times and elsewhere.64
After the firmans were distributed, efforts were made to generate support
for Zahedi in the military. A declaration calling for the armed forces to support
the Shah was drawn up and circulated. Military supplies were distributed to
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274 Mark J. Gasiorowski
pro-Zahedi forces by the U.S. military advisory mission. Efforts were also made
to gain the support of garrisons in other cities. Messengers were sent to
Kermanshah and Isfahan, using forged travel documents previously obtained
from CIA headquarters. Colonel Teimur Bakhtiar, the garrison commander at
Kermanshah, led a column of tanks and armored cars toward Tehran. The
Isfahan commander refused to cooperate, however.65
As these events were unfolding, Nerren and Cilley hired a large crowd to
march into central Tehran on Monday, August 17, shouting Tudeh slogans and
carrying signs denouncing the Shah. This “fake” Tudeh crowd, which was paid
for with $50,000 given to Nerren and Cilley by a CIA officer the previous
evening, was designed to provoke fears of a Tudeh takeover and thus rally
support for Zahedi. The crowd was soon joined by real Tudeh members, who
were not aware that it was a CIA provocation. The combined crowd attacked the
Reza Shah mausoleum and tore down statues of the Shah and his father. These
demonstrations continued on the following day, leading Henderson to demand
that they be broken up by the police, who were still in their barracks at this time.
In what was to be a fateful decision, Mosaddeq acquiesced. The Tudeh retaliated
by ordering its cadres off the street. On Wednesday, most of the police were to
turn against Mosaddeq, while Tudeh crowds remained off the streets and did not
attack the pro-Zahedi crowds that appeared on that day.66
Once the firmans had been publicized and steps had been taken to rally the
military behind Zahedi, Roosevelt’s team began to look for ways to trigger an
uprising against Mosaddeq. The most obvious way to do this was through the
clergy, preferably through a popular figure such as Kashani. The CIA team had
no direct ties with Kashani, so the Rashidians were asked to make such an
arrangement through their allies among the clergy. The Rashidians reported
back that such an uprising could not be arranged until Friday, when weekly
prayers would be held. Fearing that Mosaddeq’s net would soon close in around
them, Roosevelt asked the Rashidians how he could contact Kashani. He was
directed to a Rashidian ally named Ahmad Aramesh. Two CIA officers met with
Aramesh on the morning of Wednesday, August 19, and gave him $10,000 to
pass on to Kashani. Kashani then apparently arranged to have an anti-Mosaddeq
crowd march from the bazaar area into central Tehran. Similar crowds were
probably organized independently by the Rashidians and by Nerren and Cilley,
possibly through Ayatollah Behbehani and a mob organizer named Shaban
Bimokh.67
This crowd was joined by army and police units and by onlookers who were
angered by the “Tudeh” demonstrations of the previous days or had become
disillusioned with Mosaddeq. Government office buildings and the offices of pro-
Mosaddeq newspapers and political parties were attacked. Mosaddeq refused to
send the army or police to break up this crowd. A pro-Zahedi army detachment
seized the radio station and began to broadcast pro-Zahedi bulletins. Air Force
General Guilanshah led a column of tanks to the CIA safe house where Zahedi
was hiding. Together with a group of pro-Shah demonstrators, these forces then
seized the army headquarters and marched on Mosaddeq’s home. There a nine-
hour battle ensued in which some 300 people were killed. The walls around
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 275
Mosaddeq’s house were destroyed with tank and artillery fire. The house was
stormed, and Mosaddeq escaped over the roof. He surrendered to Zahedi the
next day.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE U.S. ROLE IN THE COUP
The three questions posed in the introduction to this study can now be answered.
What motives led U.S. policymakers to overthrow Mosaddeq? It is often
argued that the main motive behind the coup was the desire of U.S. policymakers
to help U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production.68 On the face
of it, this argument has considerable merit. The Eisenhower administration was
certainly favorable to U.S. business interests, and the Dulles brothers’ law firm
had often represented U.S. oil companies in legal matters. Moreover, the final
agreement worked out in 1954 with the Zahedi government gave U.S. companies
a 40% share in Iranian oil production, which had previously been controlled by
the British.
While this view cannot entirely be refuted, it seems more plausible to argue
that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover
in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to
prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s,
and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world
domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952
elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having
“lost China.” Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its
views into practice: the State Department was purged of homosexuals and
suspected communists, steps were taken to strengthen the Western alliance, and
initiatives were begun to bolster the Western position in Latin America, the
Middle East, and East Asia. Viewed in this context, and coming as it did only
two weeks after Eisenhower’s inauguration, the decision to overthrow Mosaddeq
appears merely as one more step in the global effort of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration to block Soviet expansionism.69
Moreover, the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this
time. A glut existed in the world oil market. The U.S. majors had increased their
production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss
of Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production
in these countries which would create tensions with Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders.
Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there
would be risky. U.S. oil companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and
1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that partici-
pation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to
maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet hands. In order to gain the
participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a
large anti-trust case then being brought against them. The Eisenhower administra-
tion shared Truman’s views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and
also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not
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276 Mark J. Gasiorowski
want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major effort by U.S. policy-
makers to persuade them to become involved.70
The Eisenhower administration therefore seems to have been motivated mainly
by fears of a communist takeover in Iran rather than by a desire to promote U.S.
commercial interests. It should be noted that most middle level State Department
and CIA officials did not believe that a coup was necessary to avert a communist
takeover. Neither Henry Byroade, the Assistant Secretary of State with responsi-
bility for the Middle East, nor Ambassador Henderson favored a coup in early
1953. As discussed above, Iran specialists in the CIA and the CIA station chief in
Tehran were also opposed to a coup. CIA analysts did not regard Mosaddeq as a
communist and the Tudeh was not believed to be capable of seizing power at this
time. Rather, the Tudeh was thought to be pursuing a “popular front” strategy
by infiltrating the army and the government bureaucracy and trying to gain favor
with Mosaddeq and other National Front leaders. CIA analysts had concluded
in November 1952 that a Tudeh takeover was not likely before the end of 1953.
Moreover, the Iranian economy had become relatively stable by this time, so a
general collapse was not viewed as imminent. The fears of a communist takeover
that prompted the coup therefore seem to have originated at the highest levels of
the CIA and the State Department, and were not shared by lower-level Iran
specialists.71
What roles did Britain and the various Iranian participants play? The British
role in the coup itself appears to have been limited to assistance in the formula-
tion of the original coup plan and the contribution of the Rashidian network.
The original plan, of course, had little bearing on how the coup actually occurred,
and the Rashidians do not seem to have played a particularly crucial role in the
coup itself. Of much greater significance was the British role in undermining
Mosaddeq’s position throughout the time he was prime minister. The British
plotted against Mosaddeq almost continuously, backing three major, protracted
efforts to oust him. Britain also instituted an oil embargo and a variety of other
economic sanctions against Iran. These activities were largely responsible for the
gradual erosion of Mosaddeq’s base of support. The consequent erosion that
occurred contributed to his downfall, and as such, these actions helped to bring
about the overthrow of Mosaddeq.
Four main groups of Iranians were involved in the coup. First, an obvious role
was played by Zahedi and his immediate allies, including his son, Abul Qasem
Bakhtiari, and military officers such as Hejazi, Nassiri, Guilanshah, and Bakhtiar.
Zahedi and several of these figures had been conspiring against Mosaddeq for
about a year before the coup; the others led military units or played important
support roles in the coup itself. Second, former Mosaddeq allies such as Kashani
and Baqai worked to undermine Mosaddeq’s base of support in the year before
the coup, and Kashani at least appears also to have played an important role in
the coup. Third, Nerren and Cilley and the Rashidians played key roles in
carrying out the coup and in supervising anti-Mosaddeq activities in the period
before the coup. Finally, the Shah himself played a significant, although reluctant,
role in acquiescing to the coup.72 Beyond these specific people, a relatively small
but indeterminate number of Iranians either volunteered or were hired to partici-
pate in anti-Mosaddeq demonstrations and other activities.
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 277
How important was the U.S. role in overthrowing Mosaddeq? Although it is
impossible to give a definitive answer to this question, the evidence presented
here suggests that the coup could not have occurred at the time and in the
manner it did without considerable U.S. assistance. U.S. officials planned and
directed the coup, and financed it with at least $60,000.73 Zahedi, its nominal
leader, hid in a CIA safehouse until the coup was virtually completed. The Shah
was not consulted about the decision to undertake the coup, about its manner of
execution, or about the candidate chosen to replace Mosaddeq; he was also quite
reluctant to support the coup and fled the country at the first sign of failure.
Moreover, the anti-Mosaddeq actions undertaken by the United States through
BEDAMN in the year before the coup had played a key role in preparing the
groundwork for it by undermining Mosaddeq’s base of support.
However, it is possible that Zahedi or other Iranians, at a later date, could
have overthrown Mosaddeq. Yet only three groups appear to have been capable
of overthrowing Mosaddeq. First, Zahedi and his allies might conceivably have
been able to oust Mosaddeq without U.S. help. Although a solo coup by Zahedi
and his allies cannot entirely be ruled out, it seems unlikely that such an effort
would have succeeded. Zahedi had been trying unsuccessfully for almost a year
to overthrow Mosaddeq. He did not have substantial popular support, and the
Shah refused to back him without a commitment from the United States.
Moreover, warrants had been issued for Zahedi’s arrest which forced him to
operate clandestinely.
A second possibility is that Kashani or some other popular figure might have
seized power by coopting Mosaddeq’s base of support. As discussed above,
Mosaddeq’s popularity had declined considerably by the summer of 1953
primarily because of the defection of Kashani and other National Front leaders.
However, while Kashani had been a legitimate contender for the premiership in
late 1952, his star had since faded. He had lost much of his support by breaking
with Mosaddeq and associating himself with Zahedi. This is evidenced by his
defeat in the July 1953 elections for the Majlis speakership and by his virtual
disappearance from Iranian politics after the coup.74 Although Baqai might once
have been able to challenge Mosaddeq, he too had been tarnished by his attacks
on Mosaddeq and by his alleged role in the Afshartous murder. No other
opposition figure had the popular support necessary to displace Mosaddeq as
leader of the nationalist movement at this time.
A third possibility is that the Tudeh party might have overthrown Mosaddeq,
either in a coup or through the gradual infiltration and subversion of the
government. The Tudeh was, however, still much weaker than it had been at its
peak in 1946. The U.S. embassy was deliberately overstating both the strength of
the Tudeh and the degree to which Mosaddeq was cooperating with it in its
public statements in this period. Since U.S. officials were the main source of
negative information on the Tudeh, this suggests that the threat of a Tudeh
takeover was widely overestimated in Iran at this time.75 The Tudeh had decided
against a coup as recently as April 1953, and the CIA regarded a Tudeh takeover
as unlikely at least until the end of 1953.76 While a Tudeh seizure of power
through popular front tactics cannot be ruled out, this was at best a distant
prospect. The Tudeh had no representatives in the Mosaddeq government and
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278 Mark J. Gasiorowski
was still illegal and thus forced to operate clandestinely. Most Iranians were very
wary of the Tudeh. Mosaddeq had taken strong measures against the Tudeh as
late as August 18, 1953, and presumably would have blocked any direct threat by
the Tudeh as he had those of Qavam, Zahedi, and Kashani. Moreover, it can be
assumed that the United States and Britain would have used force to prevent any
serious attempt by the Tudeh to seize power.
Not only was a coup unlikely without U.S. help, but Mosaddeq’s position at
this time was not as precarious as is commonly believed. Although the Iranian
economic situation had been described by U.S. analysts as “desperate” in late
1951, stimulative fiscal policies begun in the summer of 1952 had produced a
modest recovery by the end of the year. Efforts were made to sell oil to countries
such as Japan and Italy in early 1953. Business was described as “brisk” in May
1953 by the U.S. commercial attache in Tehran, and both agriculture and non-
oil exports were reported to be doing well.77 Moreover, Mosaddeq still retained
considerable support at this time in organizations such as the Iran party and the
Third Force, among the urban lower and middle classes in general, and in the
military.
CONCLUSION
Based on recently released diplomatic records and on interviews with many key
participants, this study has presented an account of the 1953 coup in Iran that is
more complete than others that have so far appeared. The main details presented
here that have not appeared elsewhere are: (1) the British efforts to oust Mosaddeq
in the period before the coup; (2) the closely related British efforts to undermine
Mosaddeq through covert action carried out by the Rashidians; (3) similar U.S.
efforts to undermine Mosaddeq through BEDAMN; (4) Zahedi’s activities in the
year before the coup; and (5) several key details of the coup itself, such as the
formulation of the original plan, the decision to evacuate after the original
attempt failed, the U.S. role in organizing the “fake” Tudeh demonstrations, and
the roles of Aramesh and (apparently) Kashani in organizing the crowds that
stormed Mosaddeq’s home on August 19. These new details clear up some of the
errors and omissions that appear in Roosevelt’s account. They also strengthen
Roosevelt’s implicit contention that the U.S. role in the coup was decisive. After
the coup, the Shah reportedly told Roosevelt “I owe my throne to God, my
people, my army-and to you.”78 Although each of these forces may have played
a role in the coup, this statement would have been more accurate if the Shah had
reversed their order of importance.
The 1953 coup ended the slow, halting progress that Iran had been making
since the early 1900s toward a more representative form of government and
toward freedom from foreign interference. These two aspirations were embodied
in Mosaddeq’s movement; with the coup, he became a martyr to these causes. In
the years after the coup, an authoritarian regime was gradually consolidated in
Iran with massive assistance from the United States. Martial law was instituted
and remained in effect for several years. Thousands of National Front and
Tudeh supporters were arrested. Pro-Mosaddeq demonstrations in the Tehran
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 279
bazaar and at Tehran University were broken up. A successor to the National
Front known as the National Resistance Movement was suppressed. The Qashqai
tribe was attacked and its leaders were sent into exile. Press censorship was
instituted. A secret police force was established that soon evolved into the
notorious SAVAK. Majlis elections in February 1954 were blatantly rigged.79
Except during a brief period in the early 1960s, the instruments of dictatorship
were kept firmly in place until the Iranian revolution began to unfold in 1978. By
then, any hope of establishing a democratic alternative to the Shah had long
since been lost.
The 1953 coup was thus a decisive turning point in Iranian history. Had the
coup not occurred, Iran’s future would undoubtedly have been vastly different.
Similarly, the U.S. role in the coup and in the subsequent consolidation of the
Shah’s dictatorship were decisive for the future of U.S. relations with Iran. U.S.
complicity in these events figured prominently in the terrorist attacks on American
citizens and installations that occurred in Iran in the early 1970s, in the anti-
American character of the 1978-1979 revolution, and in the many anti-American
incidents that emanated from Iran after the revolution, including, most notably,
the embassy hostage crisis. Latter-day supporters of the coup frequently argue
that it purchased twenty-five years of stability in Iran under a pro-American
regime. As the dire consequences of the revolution for U.S. interests continue to
unfold, one can only wonder whether this has been worth the long-term cost.
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
NOTES
Author’s note: I would like to thank Peter Avery, Edward Azar, Carol Bargeron, Richard Cottam,
Fred Halliday, Homa Katouzian, Nikki Keddie, Hedayat Matin-Daftari, Nasser Pakdaman, Bill
Royce, Khosrow Shakeri, and several people who must remain unnamed for their valuable assistance
and for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
‘Kermit Roosevelt, the leader of the coup, was asked to undertake similar operations against
Arbenz in Guatemala and Nasser in Egypt. See The Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1979, 5-8. At
least one participant in the coup went on to achieve considerable notoriety with similar operations in
Syria, Nepal, and Vietnam. See The Wall Street Journal, October 19, 1979, p. 1. No less an authority
than Richard Helms, CIA director from 1965 until 1973, described the 1953 coup to me as an
important model for CIA covert operations elsewhere (telephone interview, Washington, D.C., July
26, 1984).
2Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For a good discussion of the
flaws in this account see the reviews by Richard Cottam, in Iranian Studies, 14, 3-4 (Summer-
Autumn 1981), 269-72, and Thomas Powers, in The Nation, April 12, 1980, 437-40. The first public
account of the coup in the American press was leaked by the CIA during the 1954 U.S. elections. See
Richard and Gladys Harkness, “The Mysterious Doings of CIA,” Saturday Evening Post, November
6, 1954, 66-68. Incomplete accounts are also given by Andrew Tully, CIA, the Inside Story (New
York: Morrow, 1962), ch. 7; Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980), pp. 77-88; Christopher Montague Woodhouse, Something Ventured (Lon-
don: Granada, 1982), chs. 8-9; Sepehr Zabih, The Mosaddeq Era (Chicago: Lake View Press, 1982),
ch. 8; and Jonathon Kwitney, Endless Enemies (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), ch. 10. Each of
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280 Mark J. Gasiorowski
these omits many key details. A highly fictionalized and romanticized account by a key participant is
Ardeshir Zahedi, Five Decisive Days (unpublished manuscript, n.d.). This is an English translation of
an article published in the Iranian newspaper Ettela’at soon after the coup.
3The main diplomatic records used for this study are those available at the U.S. National Archives
and the British Public Records Office. The people interviewed include all but one of the CIA officers
directly involved in the coup who are alive today (one refused to speak on the subject), five CIA
officers who worked on Iran at CIA headquarters in Washington at the time of the coup, two of the
three most senior U.S. foreign service officers in Iran at the time (the third, Ambassador Loy
Henderson, is now dead), two other foreign service officers and the U.S. Naval Attache stationed in
Tehran at the time, the two Assistant Secretaries of State with responsibility for the Middle East in
1951-1953, two of the key British participants, and many knowledgeable Iranians. These interviews
were conducted by the author between the summer of 1983 and the summer of 1985. Because of the
sensitive nature of this topic, the names of many key sources and participants cannot be revealed.
Except where noted, all details reported here that were obtained in interviews have been corroborated
with a second source to ensure their accuracy.
40n Iranian politics in this period see Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), chs. 13-15; and Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two
Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chs. 4-5. On the oil dispute see L. P.
Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955).
50n the composition of the National Front see T. Cuyler Young, “The Social Support of Current
Iranian Policy,” Middle East Journal, 6, 3 (Spring 1952), 125-43.
6Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 250-67.
7For the most complete account of British policy toward Iran in this period see Elwell-Sutton,
Persian Oil, esp. chs. 16-18.
8Ibid.
9Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 507.
‘?”Reports Persians Trying to Recruit Oil Technicians,” 20 August 1951, FO/371/91579 (sources
referenced in this way are from the Public Records Office in London); “Exports to Persia,”
17 December 1951, FO/371/98634; “Monthly Economic Report,” September 25, 1951, Record
Group 59, Box 5490 (sources referenced in this way are from the National Archives in Washington);
“Financial Restrictions on Persia,” 12 September 1951, FO/371/91491; Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil,
p. 257.
“Documentary evidence on the British net is fragmentary, but gives some indication of its depth.
See, for example, “Les Follies Imperiales,” 18 March 1952, FO/248/1541. This is a report by the
British Charge and the top MI6 officer in Tehran on the Shah’s most intimate views, as recounted to
them by his confidant Ernst Perron. “Action in the Persian Situation Advocated by M. Kaivan,”
3 July 1951, FO/371/91461, gives a list of pro-British political figures obtained from a British agent
in the Iranian labor movement. For a description of this agent’s network see “Trade Unions in
Persia,” 6 January 1952, FO/371/98731. The Rashidians are referred to as “the brothers” in the
account of these events by Woodhouse, Something Ventured, chs. 8, 9.
:2″Record of Interdepartmental Meeting,” 20 March 1951, FO/371/91525; “Political Situation,”
28 April 1951, FO/371/91457; “Notes of a Meeting to Discuss Persia,” 28 June 1951, FO/371/91555.
13″Records Conversation with Miss Lambton,” 15 June 1951, FO/371/91548; “Discusses the
Position in Persia,” 21 June 1951, FO/371/91550.
4″American Assistance to the Persian Oil Dispute,” 2 July 1951, FO/371/91559; “Persia Oil
Dispute: Views of Mr. Horace Emery,” 12 July 1951, FO/371/91570; “Persian Oil Situation,”
21 June 1951, FO/371/91565.
I5″Reports Conversation with the Shah on 30th June,” 2 July 1951, FO/371/91461; “Reports on
Conversation with the Shah,” 16 July 1951, FO/371/91462; “Record of a Luncheon Party Given by
the Shah,” 5 August 1951, FO/371/91577.
I6″Encloses Short Account of Talks,” 1 September 1951, FO/371/91584; “View that HMG Should
Refrain From Any Statement,” 26 August 1951, FO/371/91582.
“7The New York Times, August 27, 1951, 12:2, September 3, 1951, 1:6; “Approach to a New
Persian Government,” 8 September 1951, FO/371/91590; “Change of Government,” 4 September
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 281
1951, FO/371/91587; “Suggests Lines to be Taken to Prevent Complete Nationalization,” 5 September
1951, FO/371/91587.
‘8″Assessment of the State of Public Opinion,” 4 September 1951, FO/371/91463; “Departmental
Comments,” 19 November 1951, FO/371/91614; The New York Times, September 10, 1951, 1:7.
Shepherd’s report was heatedly disputed by Stokes, who argued that “mucking about with discredited
old men .. .will get us nowhere.” See “Note by the Lord Privy Seal,” 22 September 1951,
FO/371/91590. In fact, the Shah had recently told Shepherd that he preferred Qavam to Sayyid Zia,
and on September 17 stated that Mosaddeq could not be replaced at that time. See “Discusses the
Shah’s Preference in Regards to a Prime Minister to Succeed Mosaddeq,” 31 August 1951,
FO/371/91462; and “Record of a Conversation with the Shah on 17th Sept.,” 18 September 1951,
FO/371/91463. Not surprisingly, Shepherd was soon given another post.
‘9″Text of State Department’s Views,” 21 September 1951, FO/371/91589.
20″Text of Reply From President Truman,” 26 September 1951, FO/371/91591; “Persian Oil
Dispute,” 28 September 1951, FO/371/91592; “Draft Telegram to Tehran,” 27 September 1951,
FO/371/91592; “Record of a Conversation with the American Ambassador,” 1 October 1951,
FO/371/91596; CAB 128/20, pp. 231-34 (British cabinet records). The subordination of the Iranian
commander and the plan to invade Abadan were recounted to me by a retired MI6 officer involved in
these events in a January 1985 interview. Kermit Roosevelt, CIA operations deputy for the Middle
East, was aware of these activities at the time, and confirms the critical role played by Truman
(personal interview, Washington, D.C., June 5, 1985). Roosevelt was also aware of the British plots
with Qavam and Zahedi described below, but did not discuss them with the British at the time. The
United States had also expressed strong opposition to British plans to use military force in Iran in
May 1951. See “The Position of the United States With Respect to Iran, NSC Action No. 473,” May
17, 1951, Record Group 59, Box 4107.
21″Qavam’s Proposals,” 7 January 1952, FO/371/98683; “Intervention of Mr. Julian Amery,”
7 February 1952, FO/371/98683; “Qavam’s Proposals,” 25 March 1952, FO/371/98683; interview
with Sir George Middleton, London, January 16, 1985; “Internal Situation,” n.d., FO/248/1531.
Qavam also approached the U.S. Embassy for support as early as October 1951. See Richards to
Acheson, October 30, 1951, Record Group 84, Box 29.
22Ibid.; Acheson to Henderson, June 16, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29.
23″Internal Situation.” On Kashani, see Yann Richard, “Ayatollah Kashani: Precursor of the
Islamic Republic?” in Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Religion and Politics in Iran (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1981), pp. 101-24.
24Henderson to Acheson, August 3, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29. Ample evidence that the
British were not yet ready for Qavam to assume the premiership is contained in “Internal Situation.”
25″Annual Report on Persian Army for 1952,” 12 September 1952, FO/371/98638; “Internal
Situation.”
26Ibid.; The New York Times, August 15, 1952, 2:8, August 20, 1952, 1:1; Henderson to Acheson,
August 3, 4, 15, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29; “Recent Developments in Pan-Iranism,” July 1,
1952, Record Group 59, Box 4109; “Article by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, M.P.,” 27 August 1953,
FO/371/104570. This article is from The Listener, August 27, 1953. See also Fitzroy Maclean,
Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), p. 266.
27Henderson to Acheson, July 7 and 21 and October 17, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29.
28″Internal Situation.” Kashani was also intriguing with the Tudeh at this time. In a 90-minute
meeting in late September, Tudeh leaders reportedly agreed to back Kashani for the premiership in
exchange for a promise to expel U.S. military advisors, close U.S. consulates in Iran, and restrict the
movement of U.S. citizens in northern Iran. See Henderson to Acheson, September 28, 1952, Record
Group 84, Box 42. Kashani was also reported to have taken money from the Tudeh. See “Internal
Situation.” Kashani was quoted by a Time reporter as saying “since the Tudeh party is fighting
against imperialism, they are with us.” See “The TIME Correspondent’s Interview with Ayatollah
KASHANI,” October 18, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 129. Apparently believing that Kashani was
trying to seize power with Tudeh help, a Special Estimate was prepared by the CIA on Mosaddeq’s
chances of remaining in office. See “Prospects for Survival of Mosaddeq Regime in Iran,” SE-33,
14 October 1952. Sayyid Zia told a British embassy officer on October 12 that Kashani was
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282 Mark J. Gasiorowski
supporting Zahedi with the intention of eventually deposing him and seizing power himself. See
“Internal Situation.”
29Ibid.; “Tribal Affairs and Tribal Policy,” n.d., FO/248/1521; Middleton interview (London,
January 16, 1985); Henderson to Acheson, September 9, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29. Zahedi is
not named in the latter telegram, but it clearly refers to him. The supply of arms to the Bakhtiari was
related by a confidential source in a January 1985 interview and is confirmed in “Intrigues Among
the Bakhtiari Tribes,” November 28, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 28. Since the early 1900s, Britain
had maintained close ties with most of the Bakhtiari khans, whom they paid to protect the oilfields.
Abul Qasem Bakhtiari was not pro-British; rather, he was regarded as a “troublemaker” by the
British and their Bakhtiari allies for inciting tribesmen against the other khans. See “Tribal Affairs
and Tribal Policy.”
30New York Times, October 13, 1952, 4:1; October 16, 1952, 6:4; “Annual Report on Persian Army
for 1952,” 9 December 1952, FO/371/98638. It seems unlikely that Zahedi was prepared to act
against Mosaddeq at the time of these arrests. One indication of this is that the MI6 officer in charge
of the Rashidians was in London on leave at this time (confidential interview with an associate of this
officer, January 1985).
3’Much of the material presented in this and the following section was obtained in interviews with
participants in these events. Except where indicated, all material provided by these sources was
corroborated with at least one additional source. Since these sources spoke to me on a confidential
basis, they are not named here. In order to establish the veracity of this account, confidential sources
for certain critical events are identified below by the roles they played rather than by name.
32See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Documents Resulting From Conversations with the British in
Regard to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, JCS 1819, November 25, 1947.
33U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. V, The Near East,
South Asia, and Africa (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 491-99, 510, 523.
34Ibid., pp. 509-29, 551, 604; U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 22, 570, June 5, 1950, 922;
William E. Warne, Missionbfor Peace: Point Four in Iran (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 18.
35U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 24, 622, June 4, 1951, 891, and 25, 630, July 23, 1951, 131.
36See the discussion below on the BEDAMN program. On CIA covert action under Truman see
Ray S. Cline, The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1981),
pp. 119-26. The Truman administration’s opposition to the use of covert action against Mosaddeq
was emphasized to me in interviews with the two Assistant Secretaries of State responsible for the
Middle East at this time: William Rountree (Maggie Valley, NC, August 25, 1984), and Henry
Byroade (Potomac, Md., August 7, 1984).
37Conversations of this sort occurred frequently between embassy and intelligence officials stationed
in Tehran. Higher level talks were first held in Washington in May 1952, as the British were plotting
to install Qavam. A British specialist on Iran discussed with State Department officials a list of 18
possible candidates, including both Qavam and Zahedi. See U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum
of Conversation, Subject: Iran,” May 16, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29. On July 29, shortly after
the tumultuous Qavam episode, similar talks were held in which at least one U.S. official “was
perfectly willing that the possibility of a coup should be examined.” See “Anglo-U.S. Discussions
About the Persian Internal Situation and the Oil Question,” 29 July 1952, FO/371/98691. These
events were confirmed in my interview with Byroade. U.S. discussions with the British about these
matters appear to have been aimed at maintaining liaison rather than influencing British policy.
38National Security Council, National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum
Demands and Potential Supplies, NSC 138, December 8, 1952, pp. 9-10.
39Yonah Alexander and Allen Nanes, eds., The United States and Iran: A Documentary History
(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1980), pp. 215-17; The New York Times, May
22, 1951, 24:4; “Washington Talks,” 10 April 1951, FO/371/91470; “Reports Discussion with Mr.
Acheson,” 17 May, 1951, FO/371/91535; “Comments on Grady’s Interference,” 6 June 1951,
FO/371/91545.
40Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 507-8; “Message from S. of S.,” 10 September 1951,
FO/371/91463; “Text of State Department’s Views,” 21 September 1951, FO/371/91589; “Persian
Oil Dispute,” 28 September 1951, FO/371/91592.
4’George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle World (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), ch. 31;
Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 509-11; “Record of Talks,” 4 October 1951, FO/371/91595;
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 283
“American Proposal that the Royal Dutch/Shell Group Should Take Over and Operate the Abadan
Refinery Considered Impractical,” 6 November 1951, FO/371/91610; interview with Paul Nitze,
Washington, D.C., July 5, 1984.
42This general description of CIA activities in Iran and that of the BEDAMN program in the next
few paragraphs were pieced together from interviews with seven former CIA officers who were active
in Iran in this period. For a feasibility study of stay-behind networks in the Qashqai region see
“United States Attitude Toward Formation of ‘Free Government’ in Iran,” Record Group 59, Box
6980a, October 14, 1948. The CIA was also engaged in routine intelligence-gathering activities in Iran
at this time. This involved maintaining contact with a broad cross-section of Iranian political figures,
monitoring the Iranian press, meeting with allied intelligence officers, etc.
43A particularly effective project carried out under BEDAMN was the production of a fictionalized
autobiography of the Iranian poet and Tudeh member Abul Qasem Lahuti, who was living in the
Soviet Union. Although Lahuti subsequently denounced the forgery over Radio Moscow, many
Iranians still believe it to be accurate. The figure of $1 million was related to me by one former
participant in this program in an August 1983 interview.
44One such operation was the organizing of a “fake” Tudeh attack on the Harriman mission in the
summer of 1951. See Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 95. Several people were killed in the ensuing riots,
which were blamed on the Tudeh. Roosevelt believes that this operation may have been carried out
by Nerren and Cilley, without the approval of their CIA superiors (Roosevelt interview).
45Kermit Roosevelt believes that these other figures may have been approached, but cannot say this
with certainty (Roosevelt interview). I was unable to confirm or disprove this in interviews with other
participants in these events. All other details related in this paragraph were obtained from the sources
described in footnote 42 and confirmed independently by at least one additional source.
46The split in the Toilers’ party occurred on October 12, 1952. British embassy officials were aware
of U.S. support for Baqai at this time. See “Internal Situation,” n.d., FO/248/1531. On the split in
the Pan-Iranist party see “The Friendly Relationship …,” 10 June 1053, FO/371/104568, and
“Pan-Iranism: The Ultimate in Iranian Nationalism,” February 6, 1952, Record Group 84, Box 29.
The latter document refers to a “mysterious mastermind” directing the Pan-Iranists, whom one
knowledgeable CIA figure believes was the CIA director of BEDAMN (August 1983 interview). The
Soviets were apparently aware of these activities. In early August 1953, a statement was made on
Radio Moscow that the United States had armed Baqai and his followers. See “Visit of General
Schwartzkopf to Persia,” 6 August 1953, FO/371/104569. The Iran party, Mosaddeq’s strongest
supporters in the National Front, had even split by the end of 1952. See “Internal Affairs,” 24 April
1953, FO/371/104567.
47CIA covert operations were authorized under National Security Council Directive NSC-10/2,
which permitted activities “against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign
states or groups.” See William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Docu-
ments (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 132. In the parlance of the time, this
meant that covert action could be used against the Soviet Union and its allies. See Cline, The CIA
Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey, pp. 119-26. While the anti-Soviet and anti-Tudeh activities carried
out under BEDAMN clearly fell within these guidelines, activities against the National Front clearly
did not, since the National Front was not regarded as communist or pro-Soviet. It therefore seems
unlikely that this component of BEDAMN would have been authorized by the CIA Director or his
top deputies. My assumption is that it originated either with the director of the BEDAMN program
or with the head of Near East operations.
48Woodhouse, Something Ventured, pp. 116-19.
49Ibid.; Roosevelt interview; Byroade interview. The quotation of the station chief’s view was
related to me by a retired CIA officer in an August 1983 interview; this officer claims to remember it
from a telegram written at the time.
50″Intrigues Among the Bakhtiari Tribes”; Henderson to Acheson, January 18, 1953, Record
Group 59, Box 4115; Henderson to Acheson, January 19, 1953, Record Group 59, Box 4117. See
also articles in The New York Times for this period. The Majlis vote was on a bill to extend
Mosaddeq’s emergency powers.
5″”Internal Affairs,” 18 February 1953, FO/371/104562; “Internal Affairs,” 24 February 1953,
FO/371/104562; “Internal Affairs,” 28 February 1953, FO/371/104563; “Internal Affairs,” 1 March
1953, FO/371/ 104562; “Dr. Musaddiq’s Quarrel with the Shah,” 23 February 1953, FO/371/ 104563;
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284 Mark J. Gasiorowski
“An Assessment of the Internal Situation in Persia,” 2 March 1953, FO/371/104563; “Internal
Affairs,” 10 March 1953, FO/371/10463; “The Friendly Relationship….” The British embassy was,
of course, closed at this time. Material in the British files on this period was obtained primarily from
U.S. and Commonwealth sources.
5The role of MI6 is described in Iran Times, May 31, 1985, 1. See also “The Murder of the Persian
Chief of Police Afshartus,” 24 April 1953, FO/371/104565; “The Murder of Chief of Police
Afshartus,” 8 May 1953, FO/371/104566; “Summary for the Period April 30-May 13, 1953,”
23 June 1953, FO/371/ 104568.
53″Internal Situation,” n.d., FO/371/10463; “Internal Affairs”; The New York Times, March 9,
1953, 12:2, and March 10, 1953, 4:5; “Change of Government Tribal Administration,” 10 April
1953, FO/371/104565; “Internal Situation,” 13 August 1953, FO/371/104569; “Iranian Political
Trends … ,” April 24, 1953.
54See “Iranian Political Developments from the End of March to the Overthrow of the Mosadeq
Regime .. .,” October 28, 1953; and Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 277-82.
55Roosevelt interview. The February meeting is described in Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 120-24.
For U.S. views on Zahedi see Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Iran.”
5These events and the outline of the original coup plan given in the next paragraph were
recounted to me by the American Iran specialist in an August 1984 interview.
57The events of this period are fairly well covered in The New York Times. See also “Dr.
Musaddiq’s Move to Dissolve the Majlis,” 21 July 1953, FO/371/104569; “Dissolution of the 17th
Majlis,” 4 August 1953, FO/371/104569; USARMA Tehran to DEPTAR, WASH DC, 3 March
1953, Record Group 59, Box 4113; “Political Events July 25-31, 1953,” July 31, 1953, Record Group
59, Box 4110.
5These quotes are from confidential interviews conducted in July and August of 1984. One activity
undertaken through BEDAMN at this time was a propaganda campaign to portray Mosaddeq as
having Jewish ancestry.
59Mosaddeq later charged that this Majlis unrest was the work of foreign agents. See “Prime
Minister’s Radio Address of July 27, 1953,” July 28, 1953, Record Group 59, Box 4116. Six new
anti-Mosaddeq newspapers suddenly appeared in Tehran at this time. U.S. embassy officials, unaware
of the CIA’s activities, were suspicious about the source of funding for these newspapers. See
USARMA Tehran to DEPTAR, 3 March 1953.
60″Ambassador Henderson’s Report,” 2 June 1953, FO/371/ 104659.
61This account is from a confidential interview with the colonel, conducted in March 1984. For
Ashraf’s account of these events see Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1980), pp. 134-40.
62Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 147-49, 156-57.
63The details of the coup presented in this and the following paragraphs are based on my interviews
with key participants and on New York Times articles from this period. Many people argue that the
handwriting on the firman indicates that it had been drafted on a blank sheet of paper that had
previously been signed by the Shah. The Tudeh party had evidently infiltrated the network of officers
recruited for AJAX; details of the coup plan were reported by Tass on July 15 and in Tudeh
newspapers as early as August 13. See “Dr. Musaddiq’s Move to Dissolve the Majlis”; “Persian
Army Officers Attempt to Overthrow Dr. Musaddiq,” 16 August 1953, FO/371/104569. In Baghdad,
the Shah asked the U.S. ambassador whether he should publicly express opposition to Mosaddeq.
See “Situation in Persia,” 19 August 1953, FO/371/104570. The Shah’s ultimate destination appar-
ently was London. See The New York Times, August 19, 1953, 1:3-4.
64One participant in these events claims that Nerren and Cilley wanted to end their involvement in
AJAX at this point, but were persuaded to remain by Roosevelt, who threatened to have them killed
(August 1983 interview). The role of the two reporters is described in Kennett Love, “The American
Role in the Pahlavi Restoration On 19 August 1953” (unpublished manuscript, The Allen Dulles
Papers, Princeton University Library, 1960).
65The New York Times, August 19, 1953, 1:3-4; U.S. Senate, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The Mutual Security Act of 1954, Hearings, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, April 3, 1954,
pp. 503-4, 509. Ardeshir Zahedi, in Five Decisive Days, pp. 41-62, describes an elaborate plan
formulated after the arrest of Nassiri to set up an independent state called “Free Iran” near
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The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran 285
Kermanshah. Local army and air force units were to establish a base from which to seek control over
the whole country. Key oil and rail installations in Tehran were to have been sabotaged to create a
diversion. While a number of plans were discussed by the American and Iranian conspirators, none
of the CIA sources I interviewed could recall such a plan.
66The CIA role in organizing this “fake” Tudeh crowd, which played a critical role in the coup and
is not discussed in other published accounts, was confirmed to me in interviews with at least five CIA
participants. One retired CIA officer told me that the station later learned from its Tudeh informants
that the Tudeh’s decision to pull its crowds off the streets came after it realized that the original
crowd was a “fake” (August 1983 interview). Several of my sources indicated that Nerren and Cilley
may have used their contacts with leaders of the Pan-Iranists to mobilize part of this crowd. This is
consistent with the observation by U.S. embassy personnel that this crowd contained “an unusual
mixture of Pan-Iranists and Tudeh” members. See Mattison to Dulles, August 17, 1953, Record
Group 59, Box 4110. Henderson’s conversation with Mosaddeq is described in his 1972 interview
with the Columbia University Oral History Research Office (pp. 15-18). The Tudeh later reevaluated
its role in these events and concluded that it should have been more supportive of Mosaddeq. See
Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966),
pp. 219-21.
67A report of the plan to organize demonstrations on Friday appeared several weeks later in The
Times of India. See “Transmits a Further Series of Articles,” 16 June 1953, FO/371/104568. One
CIA participant told me in an August 1983 interview that by Wednesday Mosaddeq’s forces had
located the general neighborhood where Zahedi was hiding and were preparing to seize him. Neither
of the CIA officers who delivered the money to Aramesh could confirm to me that it went to
Kashani; both, however, believe that it did (August 1983 and March 1984 interviews). Several days
after the coup the British received a report from the Iraqi ambassador in Tehran that the Shah and
Zahedi together had visited Kashani, kissed his hands, and thanked him for his help in restoring the
monarchy. See “An Account of Conversation,” I September 1953, FO/371/104571. One CIA officer
told me that Kashani’s son visited him several times after the coup to remind him of the role played
by his father (July 1984 interview). An observer of the coup reported later that so much American
currency had found its way into the bazaar that the black market exchange rate fell from over 100
rials to the dollar to under 50. See Love, “The American Role in the Pahlavi Restoration,” pp. 40-
41. All of the people involved either directly or indirectly in the coup whom I spoke to believe that
the Aramesh-Kashani connection was not the only source of funding for the crowds that appeared
on August 19. Most of these sources assume that the other figures mentioned here were also involved,
though none could confirm this positively.
68See, e.g., Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign
Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 412-20; and Bahman Nirumand, Iran:
The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 5.
69See Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Volume One (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), chs.
26-27; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate For Change, 1953-1956
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), chs. 5-6, esp. p. 163. One top policymaker described the plan
to overthrow Mosaddeq to me as a “high priority” for the Dulles brothers (Roosevelt interview).
7?See U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The International Petroleum Cartel, The
Iranian Consortium and U.S. National Security, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, February 21, 1974,
pp. 27-28; and Burton I. Kaufman, The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity
in the Cold War Era (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), chs. 2-3.
7’Byroade interview; interviews with Gordon Mattison (Bethesda, MD, June 30, 1984) and Roy
Melbourne (Chapel Hill, NC, February 1, 1984). Byroade and Henderson both went along with the
coup reluctantly, according to these sources. Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments in
Iran Through 1953, NIE-75, 13 November 1952 (this document was obtained from the CIA under the
Freedom of Information Act); Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research, Iran’s
Political and Economic Prospects Through 1953, OIR No. 6126, January 9, 1953; National Security
Council, United States Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran, NSC 136/1, November 20,
1952. The Tudeh’s “popular front” strategy was described to me in a confidential interview with the
CIA desk officer for Iran at this time (July 1984). The original proponents of the coup seem to have
been the Dulles brothers, Wisner, and Roosevelt.
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286 Mark J. Gasiorowski
7Although the coup is widely portrayed as the culmination of a struggle for power between
Mosaddeq and the Shah, I found no evidence that the Shah took an active role in any of the events
that led to Mosaddeq’s overthrow, other than to give it his reluctant approval. The U.S. and British
diplomatic records are full of references to the Shah’s weakness and indecision in this period. Indeed,
Zahedi was selected by U.S. and British officials rather than by the Shah, and they had to go to great
lengths to persuade him to cooperate.
73This figure refers to the payment used to hire the “fake” Tudeh crowd and that given to Aramesh.
In addition, an indeterminate amount of money from the normal operating budget of BEDAMN
($1 million per year) was used to pay for the disturbances that immediately preceded the coup. This
figure compares favorably with Roosevelt’s statement that the entire cost was under $100,000
(Countercoup, p. 166). After the coup, roughly $1 million that had been provided for AJAX but not
spent was given by Roosevelt to Zahedi or the Shah to meet government expenses (Roosevelt
interview).
74Kashani’s support in the Tehran bazaar, once his greatest stronghold, had declined considerably
by the summer of 1953. See “Comments on the Political Significance of the Tehran Bazaar Organiza-
tion,” 19 December 1953, FO/371/109986.
75This view was expressed to me by Anthony Cuomo, the U.S. embassy officer responsible for
monitoring the Tudeh in Tehran at this time (personal interview, Rome, January 5, 1985). Much the
same was said by several CIA officers stationed in Tehran at the time.
76See footnote 71. The CIA had penetrated the Tudeh party at a very high level at this time and
was intercepting all of the orders given to its cadres, so these reports can be regarded as very
accurate.
77″Monthly Economic Report,” November 2, 1951, “Quarterly Economic and Financial Review,
Iran, Fourth Quarter 1952,” January 17, 1953, “Quarterly Economic and Financial Review, Iran,
First Quarter, 1953,” April 17, 1953, “Quarterly Economic and Financial Review, Iran, Second
Quarter, 1953,” July 18, 1953, “Monthly Economic Survey, Iran, April 1953,” May 12, 1953, and
“Monthly Economic Survey, Iran, July 1953,” August 14, 1953, Record Group 59, Box 5490. See
also Homa Katouzian, “The Strategy of Non-Oil Economics: Economic Policy and Performance
under Musaddiq” (paper presented at the Conference on Iranian Nationalism and the International
Oil Crisis, 1951-1954, University of Texas, Austin, September 26-27, 1985).
78Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 199.
79″Internal Situation Reports,” n.d., FO/371/104571; “Political and Economic Developments in
Iran,” 19 November 1953, FO/371/104572; “Comments on the Political Significance of the Tehran
Bazaar Organization”; “Kashani’s Press Conference on Dec. 5,” 9 December 1953, FO/371/104572;
Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 457-59; “Fortnightly Political Summary, Nov.
16-Nov. 29,” 1 January 1954, FO/371/109985; “Fortnightly Political Summary, Period August 21-
September 6,” 8 September 1954, FO/371/109985; “Fortnightly Summary for the Period March
13-March 26th,” 26 March 1954, FO/371/109985.
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- Contents
- Issue Table of Contents
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International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, Aug., 1987
Front Matter
The 1953 Coup D’etat in Iran [pp.261-286]
Toward the Study of the Psychodynamics of Mothering and Gender in Egyptian Families [pp.287-305]
Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology [pp.307-335]
Army, Regime, and Society in Fatimid Egypt, 358-487/968-1094 [pp.337-365]
Book Reviews
untitled [pp.367-368]
untitled [pp.369-371]
untitled [pp.371-372]
untitled [pp.372-373]
untitled [pp.373-378]
untitled [pp.378-379]
untitled [pp.379-380]
untitled [pp.380-383]
Notes and Comments
The Inflationary Process of the Iranian Economy: A Re-Examination of the Evidence [pp.385-388]
The Inflationary Process of the Iranian Economy: A Rejoinder [pp.388-391]
Letter to the Editor
[Editorial] [p.392]
Back Matter
juliette levy
juliette levy
juliette levy
juliette levy
juliette levy
juliette levy
juliette levy
juliette levy