Read an article and answer questions with a short answer.
1. Are humans, by nature, fundamentally different from one another?
2. What are the three main reasons that people fight?
3. What is the State of Nature?
4. What do individuals have to surrender to form a complex society?
I want these questions to be answer twice. I mean by that the same answer but reword it.
The Social Contract
Thomas Hobbes
CHAPTER 0
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English philosopher who played a
crucial role in the history of social thought. He develops a moral and
political theory that views justice and other ethi_cal ideals as resting on
an implied agreement among individuals to relmqmsh the nght to do
whatever they please, thus achieving security for all.
Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as
Concerning Their Felicity, and Misery
Nature hath made men so equal , in the faculties of body, and mind;
as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stron-
ger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reck-
oned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so
considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any
benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the
strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the stron-
gest: either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that
are in the same danger as himself.
A
nd
as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the ans grounded
upodn wo
rd
s, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general an tnfal11ble rules c 11 d · . ‘
fe
w
th· . . ‘ a e science; which very few have, and but in ings, as being not a nat’ v f 1 b
(as prudence) wh·1 1 k I e acu ty, orn with us; nor attained ,
‘
1
e we oo after som 1 )
1 equality amongst m h eone e se, find ye t a grea te r en, t an that of st h F experience· which 1 . rengt . or prudence, is but
, equa hme, equally bestows on all men , in ;h ose
Fro 111 T ho1nas Hob] . .
L _ )es . Lev ia th an ( 165 } ) . 154
C H A PT E R 20 TH E SO C IAL C ONTRACT 155
thin gs th ey equ a ll y a pply th e mselves unto. That which
l
. · d · bl · may perhaps
a
ke such equa 1ty m ere I e, 1s but a vain conceit f , tU . . . o ones own
·sdom whtch almost all men thmk they have in a gre t d w1 , . a er egree
I all
th e vulgar; th a t 1s , than a11 men but themselves and c h ‘ t 1 . . , a 1ew ot ers
1
.
10
m by fam e, or for concurrmg with themselves they ap F ‘ w , prove. or
such is the n ature of me_n , that howsoever they may acknowledge
many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned· t
1
. h b · ‘ ye
th ey will hardly be ieve t ere e many so wise as themselves: For the
see their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But thi:
prove th rather ~hat _men are in t~at point equal, than unequal. For
th ere is not ordmanly a greater sign of the equal distribution of any
thing, than that every man is contented with his share.
from this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attain-
ing of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing,
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;
and in the way to their end, (which is principally their own conserva-
tion, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or
subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an
invader hath no more to fear, than another man’s single power; if one
plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be
expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and de-
prive him , not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or
liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of another.
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any
man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force,
or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see
no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more
than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also
because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their
own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than
their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be
at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their
power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their
d~fe_nce, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of do-
minion over men, being necessary to a man’s conservation, it ought
to be allowed him.
_Again, men have no pleasure , (but on the contrary a great deal of
gnef) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe
t~em all. For every man looketh that his companion should value
him , at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all sig ns of con-
tempt o d . ‘ r un ervalumg, naturally endeavours , as far as he d a res
w
156
pART II
MORAL THEORIES
that have no common power to kee
(w
hich amongst thhem make them destroy each other) tp thelr\ i
oug to , o ex
quiet, is far en his contemners, by damage; and frorn Oth toq a
ter value from ers h grea . . ‘ y
the example. of man, we find three pnncipal
. the nature . d . cause
So that in ·t·on· secondly, d1ffi ence; th1rdly, glor s of
F. t compeU I ‘ • h y. quarrel. irs ‘ h n 1· nvade for gain; t e second, for sac maket ma . i.ety·
The first, . n The first use violence, to make the ‘and
. d for reputauo . . h’ld lllselv
the th1r , ‘s persons wives, c 1 ren, and cattl es
f other men ‘ . e; th
masters O c d them. the third for tnfles, as a word, a srnile . e
d to de1en , . , a d1f
seco. n , . . d any other sign of undervalue, either dire . –
r nt opm10n, an . k. d d h . . ct in
1ere by reflection in their 1n re , t e1r fnends th .
their persons, or . , e,r
. their profession, or their name.
nauon, d · h t’ 1· ·
b
‘t •s manifest that unng t e 1me men 1ve without Here y 1 1 ‘ . . a
common power to keep them all 1n a’:e, they are 1n that ~ondition
which is called war; and such a war, as 1s of every man, agamst every
man. For WAR, consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but
in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently
known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the
nature of war; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of
foul weather, lieth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination
thereto of many days together: so the nature of war, consisteth not in
actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the
time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every g, no mstruments f . . orce; no k 1 d account of time· no now e ge of the face of the earth; no _It may seem strange to so’mand short. e confirm d b e passion d . ‘ h e Y experience L _s, esire perhaps to have t e C HAPT E R 20 THE SOC IAL CONT RA CT 157
him self, when _taking a jo~rney, he arms himself, and seeks to go It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men To this war of every man against every man, this also is conse- e_ aculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might sions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in 158 P A R T 11 MORAL T H EO RI ES
so litude. It is co n s~ q~ e nt a lso ~o th e sa~e c~n~iti~n, that there be 11 ·b·1· t f ‘t · · ally place d in ; t houg h with _a p~ss1 1 1ty to come ou o 1 , consisting Part! T h e p ass ions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; de . . 1. . sire of such t hin gs as are necessary to com mo 10us 1v1ng; and a hope b Of the First and Second Natural Laws, By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification A LAW OF NATURE, (lex naturalis,) is a precept, or general rule, And because the condition of man, (as hath been declared in the CI; A Pl’ER. ~O
. . . Tl-It soc1AL CONTaACT Preserving his hfe against h. . 159 condition, every man has a right t ‘ It followeth th . every thing endureth, there can bis natural right of e:e another’s . 11 h . . g out the tun h’ n, ow nanly a owet men to hve. And conseq . . e, w •ch nature d’ 1 b . . . n eavour pea a hope of o taznzng zt; and when he cannot obt . . ce, as Jar as he has ranc of wh· h ‘ taineth the first, and fundamental law of nat . h” ~c rule, con- all means we can, to defend ourselves. 0 nature; which is, by . . . ‘ re commanded to endeavor peace, 1s derived this second law; that a man be willing, when Of Other Laws of Nature A · · · nd original of nd 1n this law of nature, consisteth the fountain a . ht the not p . niust is ;ust. B erformance of covenant. And whatsoever is not u :J • ‘ f not Perforrn . . h former chapter, ance on either part, (as hath been said 1n t e 160 PART II MORAL THEORIES
are invalid; though the original ofjuSlice ?e e making of c 1 yet tnJUSUCe actual Y t ere . e such fe ts;
k h ta en away; w 1c . ion of
d Th cannot be one. . ‘ u~ust ‘ ust be some coercive power, to compel m can at ment, gre · h’ h t e1 . nd to make good that propnety, w IC by mutu 1 r Ul tract men acq , . a an.
d on. an o a propriety begins. and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleging, that every ene t, as shall put a · . . the dispraise and . , rev1 mg but I h specious reasoning . ‘ h a so t e power of other men …. This . or t e question is not of r . . 0 t e parties h as performed already; or CHAPTER 20 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT where there is a power to make him perform; there is the question e1r error h. h th ‘ w ic errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as othe/’ e per_isheth; and if he live in society, it is by the errors of ga1nst the . contribut reason of his preservation- and so as all men that or themselves.
man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time,
wherein men live without other security, than what their own
strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal In such
con
as require much fi O moving, and removing such things
I ‘ arts; no lett • · f a l, continual fear and d ers, no society; and which is worst o r ‘ anger of . I so itary, poor, nasty, brutish vio ent death; and the life of man,
h
t mgs· th e man th h . ‘ at nature should h . ‘ at as not well weighed these
mvade a d d t us disso . . ‘. n estroy one an th ciate, and render men apt to
to this In£ o er: and h .
sam erence, made from th . e may therefore not trusung
· et him h · h t erefore consider wit
well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even
in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be
Jaws, and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done
him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed;
of his fellow citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children,
and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much
accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us
accuse man’s nature in it. The desires, and other passions of man, are
in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from
those passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws
be made they cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have
agreed upon the person that shall make it.
condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over
all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For
the savage people in many places of America, except the government
of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust,
have no government at all: and live at this day in that brutish manner,
as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life
there would be, where there were no common power to fear; by the
manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull
government, use to degenerate into, in a civil war.
were in a condition of war one against another; yet in all times, kings,
and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency,
are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators;
having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another;
that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their
kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a pos-
tur~ of war. But because they uphold thereby; the industry of their
s~bJects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompa-
nies the liberty of particular men.
~ue~t; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong,
JUStice and iajustice have there no place. Where there is no common
~ow:r, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud,
t~e t war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of
b
em am h pas . an t at were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and
pro pri e ty, no d o m 1 n ion , no mine a nd thine d1stmct, but only that to b a
every man ‘s, that h e can get; a nd for so long, as he can keep it. A e
t hus muc h for th e ill co ndition which many by mere nature is actu 11d
i n t h e passions, partly m his reason. Y
d
the ir industry to obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenien~
a r t icl es of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement
T h ese articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws of
Nature : whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two follow.
ing c h a pters.
and of Contracts
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale,
is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself,
for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life;
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgment,
and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
of the word, the absence of external impediments: which impedi-
ments, may oft take away part of a man’s power to do what he would;
but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as
his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him.
found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is
destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and
lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT,
consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth,
and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as
o bliga tion, and liberty, which in one and the same matter are
inconsiste nt.
precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every
one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there
is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in
–
. . is enern1es .
A d h c o every th· , at in s h body. n t ere1ore, as long as th. Ing: even to o uc a
. e no secu . ry rnan to strong or wise soever he be,) of livin _nty to any rna (h
1
h uent y it Is a or 1-rule of reason, t at every man, ought toe d precept, or gener
azn zt, that he all helps, and advantages of war. The first b h may seek, and use
. Th ure, w tch Is to kp and follow zt. . e second, the sum of the right f ‘ see eace,
From this fundamental law of nature by which men a
others are so too, as Jarf orth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it
necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as
long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh; so
long are all men in the condition of war. But if other men will not lay
down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to
divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey, (which no
man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that
law of the Gospel, whatsoever you require that others should do for you, that
do ye to them. . . .
From that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to an-
other, such rights as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind,
there followeth a ‘third; which is this, that men perform their covenants
made: without which covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and~ h • ‘ . . ·11 · the con 1-t_ e nght of all men to all things rema1n1ng, we are stl m
tion of war
JDSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no ng _
be th. ng· and conse en transferred and every man has right to every 1 ‘ h to
quent1 . ‘ . ant is made, t en b Y, no action can be UilJUSt. But when a coven h than
reak it is Unjust; and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no 0 ~ ~r
Ut because covenants of mutual trust, where there is fear O )
th
• • .
h can be none, ttll the caus f ovenan
O
. h while men are m the natural cond’t• ar be
1
erefore before the names of Just and . war
h m
have place , t ere en equ c. nee of their covenants, by the terror of som ally
to the penorma e puni h
er than the benefit they expect by the breach of hs _-
convenant, a • a con
. re in recompense of the umversal right they b ·
. d such power there 1s none before the erection f
commonwealth. An~ this is also t~ be gathered out of the ordinary
definition of justice m the Schools. for they say, that ;ustzce ,s o,, con.
stant will of giving to every man his ~wn. therefore where there is no
own, that is, no propriety, there 1s no mJusuce; _and where there is no
coercive power erected, that is, w~ere ~here 1s no c?mmonwealth,
there is no propriety; all men havmg nght to all thmgs: therefore
where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the
nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants: but the
validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil
power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that
The fool hath said in his heart, there is no such thing as justice;
man’s conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own
care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he
thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not
make: keep, or not keep covenants, was not against reason, when it
conduced to one’s benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be
covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and
that such_ bre_ach of them may be called injustice, and the observance
of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether injustice taking away
the fear of God (for th c 1 h h ‘d . . ‘ . , e same 100 at sa1 m his heart there 1s no
God,) may not someti d · h . mes stan wit that reason, which dictateth to
every man his own go d· d . such a b fi O ‘ an particularly then, when it conduceth to
1
. man ma cond1t10n, to neglect not only
F h is nevert eless false
nty of performance on . hp OI~uses mutual, where there is no secu-
ere t d e1t er side· as h h c e over the parties . . ‘ w en t ere is no civil power
nants· b · promismg· for s h • · ut either where one f h ‘ . uc promises are no cove-
161
whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other
to perform, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifes-
tation whereof, we are to consider; first, that when a man doth a
thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen, and reck-
oned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident
which he could not expect, arriving may turn it to his benefit; yet
such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that
in a condition of war, wherein every man to every man, for want of a
common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man
can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruc-
tion, without the help of confederates; where every one expects the
same defence by the confederation, that any one else does: and there-
fore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help
him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be
had from his own single power. He therefore that breaketh his cove-
nant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason
do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for
:~ace an~ defence, but by the error of them that receive him; nor
th ~n he is received, be retained in it, without seeing the danger of
e means f h. . societ h O _is security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of
men, which h ld quently a . e cou not foresee, nor reckon upon; and conse-
e not t h” . ‘ ‘ of What is good ; 18 destruct10n, forbear him only out of ignoran ce