Over the last month we have read a variety of secondary and primary sources dealing with the Abbasid Law, Literature, and Politics.
Our secondary authors for this paper split into two kinds of approaches. Kecia Ali and Suzanne Stetkeyvtch are focused more on gender and its role in Abbasid politics and society. Waines, Pomerantz, and Furlonge focus on more politics and economics.
Our primary sources give us almost infinite ways to understand the Abbasid period. They include: Abu Nuwas, Carousing with Gazelles, Jahiz “The Merits of the Turks,” Jahiz “Drink and Drinkers,” Attar’s biography of Rabi’a, and Miskawayh, The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate.
So for this paper, answer the following question:
The Question: Which historical approach, gender history or political-economic history helps a modern reader to best understand the primary sources for the Abbasid period?
Copyright © 2002. Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.
The Poetics of Islamic Legitimacy
Stetkevych, S. P. (2002). Poetics of islamic legitimacy : Myth, gender, and ceremony in the classical arabic ode. Indiana University Press.
Created from csun on 2022-04-04 04:12:51.
Copyright © 2002. Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.
Stetkevych, S. P. (2002). Poetics of islamic legitimacy : Myth, gender, and ceremony in the classical arabic ode. Indiana University Press.
Created from csun on 2022-04-04 04:12:51.
THE POETICS OF
ISLAMIC
LEGITIMACY
Myth, Gender, and Ceremony in the
Classical Arabic Ode
Copyright © 2002. Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.
Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych
Stetkevych, S. P. (2002). Poetics of islamic legitimacy : Myth, gender, and ceremony in the classical arabic ode. Indiana University Press.
Created from csun on 2022-04-04 04:12:51.
This book is a publication of
Indiana University Press
601 North Morton Street
Bloomington, IN 47404-3797 USA
http://iupress.indiana.edu
Telephone orders 800-842-6796
Fax orders 812-855-7931
Orders by e-mail iuporder@indiana.edu
© 2002 by Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any
means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or
by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher. The Association of American University
Presses’ Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this
prohibition.
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of
Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
Copyright © 2002. Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.
Manufactured in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Stetkevych, Suzanne Pinckney.
The poetics of Islamic legitimacy : myth, gender, and ceremony in
the classical Arabic ode / Suzanne Pinckney Stetkevych.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-253-34119-1 — ISBN 0-253-21536-6 (pbk.)
1. Qasidas—History and criticism. 2. Arabic poetry—622–750—History
and criticism. 3. Arabic poetry—750–1258—History and criticism.
4. Politics in literature. I. Title.
PJ7542.Q3 S757 2002
892′.7104309—dc21
2001008295
1 2 3 4 5 07 06 05 04 03 02
Stetkevych, S. P. (2002). Poetics of islamic legitimacy : Myth, gender, and ceremony in the classical arabic ode. Indiana University Press.
Created from csun on 2022-04-04 04:12:51.
Copyright © 2002. Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.
For Julian, Qays, and K halid
Stetkevych, S. P. (2002). Poetics of islamic legitimacy : Myth, gender, and ceremony in the classical arabic ode. Indiana University Press.
Created from csun on 2022-04-04 04:12:51.
Copyright © 2002. Indiana University Press. All rights reserved.
Stetkevych, S. P. (2002). Poetics of islamic legitimacy : Myth, gender, and ceremony in the classical arabic ode. Indiana University Press.
Created from csun on 2022-04-04 04:12:51.
The Third Century Internal Crisis of the Abbasids
Author(s): David Waines
Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient , Oct., 1977, Vol. 20,
No. 3 (Oct., 1977), pp. 282-306
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3631960
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the
Economic and Social History of the Orient
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. XX, Part III
THE THIRD CENTURY INTERNAL
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS
BY
DAVID WAINES
(Lancaster)
Part One
I. Introduction. The object of this essay is to explore the interrelation-
ship of certain economic and social developments in Iraq during the
second half of the 3rd/9th century and to examine how they contributed to the collapse of the ‘Abbisid caliphate in the early 4th/xoth
century.
During the century and a quarter following the death of Hirin al-
Rashid (193/809), the ‘Abb~sids had witnessed both the glory of a
golden age and the long descent toward frustrated impotence and
humiliation. The first perceptible shaking of the foundations was the
political fragmentation of the ‘Abbisid domains. One by one various
provinces slipped away from the effective control of the caliphs’ govern-
ment, first in regions on the periphery of the empire and, later, in
districts adjacent to the imperial heartland of Iraq. As the unchallenged
sway of the caliphs’ power retreated from the fringes of the empire,
these local dynasties were left in turn to struggle against the threats
of other rivals. Byzantium, too, the traditional foe of dir al-Isldm, was
finally able to exploit developments to its advantage and by the 4th/ oth
century the emperor’s eastern policy had been infused with a new
“spirit of confident aggression”l). Even the symbolic unity of the
Muslim community, long preserved in the single source of authority of
one caliph, was also challenged and broken; an Umayyad in Spain and
a Fitimid in Ifriqiya claimed equal rank and honour with the caliph in
Baghdad. Next, the caliphs’ wazirs were replaced by a series of military
i) Steven Runciman, The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and his Reign: A Study of
Tenth Century Byzantium, Cambridge (1929), 241.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 283
adventurers with the rank of amir al-umarad’ and ful
authority over all the provinces, in short, the ma
empire2). Shortly thereafter, the coup degrace was del
by the Dailamite Bilyid condottiere who had swiftly
base in south-west Persia and who brought Baghd
of the caliph under their control in 334/945 when
was appointed amir al-umarad’ with the title of M
more than a century thereafter ‘Abbisid history
Minorsky aptly called the Dailamite interlude.
2. Decline of imperial revenues. The process of politi
directly affected the resources of the imperial treasur
sequences for the power of the caliphate were rather
than critical at any
specific
By the
reign and
of the
Caliph
(320-329/932-940),
the creator
of stage.
the amirate,
tributes
lavish
gifts al-R.di
had largely replaced regular tax revenue from several important provinces of the empire3).
Evidence of declining imperial revenues is clear although the rate
and pattern of change are difficult to chart. The utility of the few available
tax rolls is limited by the evident errors of copyists in the transmission
of the documents resulting in discrepancies between the figures of
different manuscripts4) and the apparent normative rather than descriptive character of certain lists6). The paucity of the data itself and its
2) Miskawaih, Kitdb Tajdrib al- Umam wa Taciqib al-Himam, Edited & translated
by H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth, The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate,
6 Vols., London (1920-21), I, 351.
3) For the Hamd~inids of the Jazira, see Ibid., I, 405 ; for the SmSinids of Khurasin,
see Ibid., II, 23 and al-HamadIni, Takmila Tacrikh al-Tabari, Ed. by A. J. Kan’cn,
Beirut
(1961),
I26; for
the (i935),
Ikhshids
Ed.
by J.
H. Dunne,
London
44, of
225.Egypt see al-Si1i, Akhb~ir al-l.diwa’l-Muttaqi,
4) Compare the figures used by A. von Kremer in assembling his tax rolls, Cultur-
geschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen, Vienna (I875), Vol. I, 356-379 with the figures
in the de Goeje editions of Ibn Khurdidhbeh, Kitdb al-Masilik wa’l-Mamilik, Leiden
(1889), 8-14 and of Qudima b. Ja’far, Kitib al-Kharaj wa Sind’at al-Kitiba, Leiden
(1889), 237-239, 249-25I.
5) Martin Hinds has made this point effectively in his unpublished paper “Some
economic issues of the third/ninth century”. See references to Table I.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
284
D.
very
WAINES
uneven
assessment.
must
be
distribution
In
the
content
to
over
absence
deal
less
of
wi
of magnitude. The following
revenue covering the period f
of
al-Muqtadir
(d.
320/932).
Table I
Total Imperial Revenues
Date Revenue (dirhems)
172/788 479,5 50,000 )
179/795 467,170,000 b)
(circa) 184/800 520,272,ooo000 C
199/814 4I7,000,000 d)
204-237/819-85 I 394,509,000 e)
23 1-260/845-873 351,765,000 ‘)
303/915 217,500,000 , )
References. The following sources provide data on the imperial revenues for
period under consideration, many of which are referred to in the notes accompany
this and the following, Table II.
S~ileh el-‘ cAli, “A new version of Ibn al-Mutarrif’s list of revenues in the early ti
of Hartn al-Rashid”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, 14 (I9
303-3 io; H. Q. Samarraie, Agriculture in Iraq During the Third Century A.H., Bei
(1972); Martin Hinds, “Some economic issues in 3rd/gth century Iraq”, (unpublish
paper, presented to the research seminar and conference on the economic history
of the Middle East, Princeton, June, 1974); M. D. al-Rayyis, Al-Kharaj wa’l Nuztm
al-Maliyya l’l-Dawlat al-Islamiyya, 2nd ed., Cairo (1961); A. von Kremer, Cultu
geschichte des Orients, Vol. I, Vienna (1875); A. von Kremer, “Ober das Einnahme-
budget des Abbasiden-Reiches vom Jahre 306 AH (918-919)”, Denkschrtiften
phil.-hist. Klasse der Wiener Akadamie, 36, i, ( 1888), 283-362; H. Busse, “Das Hofbud
des Chalifen al-Mu’tadidbillah (279-289/892-902)”, Der Islam, 33 (1967), I1-3
Ibn Khurdidhbeh, Kitib al-Masdlik wa’l-Mamilik, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden (1889);
Qudima b. Ja cfar, Kitab al-Khardj wa Sind cat al-Kitaba, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leide
(1869); al-Jahshiyari, Kitib al-Wuzard’wa’l-Kuttib, ed. M. al-Saqqa, I. al-Abyh
A. Shalabi, Cairo (1938); Hilsl al-Sabi, Ruszm Dar al-Khilifa, ed. M. cAww
Baghdad (1964); HilMI al-S bi, Tuhfat al-Umard’ fi Ta’rikh al-Wuqard’, ed. ‘Ab
al-Sittir Ahmad Faraj, Cairo (i95 8).
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 285
Notes
a) S~ileh el-cAli, “A new version”, 306. The original sou
Kitdb al-Ta’rikh. The revenue figure dates from t
Rashid’s reign.
b) HilHl al-Sibi, Rustm, 28. The Dinar component of th
to dirhems at 1:22, the same as for the figure above
e) Al-Jahshiyhri, Kitab al-WquarJ’, 28I. The figure
adjustements made by Saleh el- CAli, “A new version”
than the actual total mentioned by al-Jahshiyvri. Dr.
prudently I think, that “al-Jahshiyvri’s total represen
should have been collected in any one of the earl
(quoted from his unpublished paper “Some econo
century”) Al-JahshiyHri uses the word taqdir, “estim
al-Sibi, Rushm, 28, does not; the latter figure, then,
in the year I79/795.
d) HilHl al-S~ibi, Ruskin, 29.
e) Qudima b. Ja’far, Kitdb al-Kharij, 249-251. The
converted at I:5 the rate given by Qudima. Von K
complete materials, arrived at the lower figure of 3
geschichte, I, 369).
f) Ibn Khurd~idhbeh, Kitib al-Masalik, 8-12; von Kr
293, 255, 340 dirhems (Culturgeschichte, I, 379).
g) Von Kremer, “Einnahmebudget”, 318.
Two observations may be made on these figu
revenues over the period steadily decreased
the period of relatively greatest decrease appe
half of the 3rd/9th century. Some of the dec
could be accounted for by the detachment of
and Khurasi.n under the Siminids from direc
government.
Political fragmentation and the rise of auton
ever, cannot alone account for the decrease
closer examination of the extant data on tax
interesting declining curve. Again, for the
Table I, the revenue of the Sawid of Iraq ca
in Table II.
6) This percentage was arrived at by assuming a rough average figure of 438
million dirhems for the period through the first half of the third century and then
calculating it against the amount for the year 303/91×5, that is, 217 million dirhems.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
286
D.
WAINES
Table II
Revenue of the Sawid of Iraq
Date Revenue (dirhems)
172/788 87,860,000 and more
184/800oo 87,700,00 and 14,
20zo4/819 I I2,416,o000o e)
231-260/845-873 94,035,000 d)
280/893 75,000,000 (?) e)
303/915 22,500,000 ‘)
Notes
a) Saleh el-Ali, “A new version”, 306.
b) Al-Jahshiyhri, Kitib al-Wuzari’, 281. See above Table I, note (c).
c) Qudima b. Ja’far, Kitib al-Kharaj, 239-240. This total does not include the
revenue of the Kuwar Dijla, since the figure given by Qudima belongs to the
later ‘ibra of 260 A.H. The Kuwar Dijla are also listed separately from the revenue
of the Sawed in the tax rolls of Khalifa ibn Khayyit and al-Jahshiyyri and were
not included in the totals shown in this table. Ibn Khurdidhbeh does give an
amount for the Kuwar Dijla, but it has been omitted from the total shown here
in order to maintain a fair comparison between the different lists.
d) Ibn Khurdidhbeh, Kitab al- Masiik, 8-14. See previous note.
e) This figure is, at best, a very crude estimate. It seems to be the only figure of
revenue from the Sawid for the period between the tax rolls of Ibn Khurd~dhbeh
and ‘Ali b. ‘IsiZ. The figure is derived from the value of a tax farm (damin) leased
in the year 280/893 and which, in the judgement of Adam Mez, Die Renaissance
des Islams, Heidelberg (1922), 123, included about half of the SawId. The value
of the lease, 2.5 million Dinars and the districts it comprised are mentioned in Hilil
al-Sibi, Kitib al-WiuarJ’, 12. See also H. Busse’s article listed in the references
to Table I.
1) Von Kremer, “Einnahmebudget”, 312.
Despite the less than satisfactory character of some of these figures
we may advance the following observation. Assuming on a rough
average that the annual revenue of the Sawld ran at a level of around
I00oo milion dirhems through the first half of the 3rd/9th century,
by the beginning of the 4th/Ioth century, therefore, revenue had
fallen by nearly eighty percent, a far more severe drop than for the
total revenue. By calculating in this manner it is evident, too, that
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 287
(without distorting the real character of
the third century was the period of critic
proportion (i.e. about 35%) of the overall
revenues is accounted for by a dramatic
Sawid itself.
These figures, of course, are only the merest skeleton of the tale.
They do, however, provide a preliminary indicator to an emergin
‘internal’ crisis of a major scale. During the political struggles which
dominate the pre-Biiyid amirate (324-334/935-945) the main actors them
selves acknowledged that Iraq no longer yielded an economic surpl
adequate to the maintenance of a viable power base in the face of increasingly competitive internal political conditions and the threat of
the Bfilyids from without7). Put briefly, Iraq had lost its primacy in t
empire as a source of revenue. Political fragmentation and the loss o
revenue resulting therefrom had made the caliphate critically depende
upon revenue from its home province at the very time when it n
longer produced the wealth of former times.
The nature of this ‘internal’ crisis of the third century, its economic
social and political aspects, will be discussed in the remainder of this
essay. Preliminary to this is a necessarily brief description of certain
general features of Iraq and its agriculture. In the concluding section
of the first part of this essay, it will be argued that the declining revenue
of the Sawid points, in fact, to the deteriorating conditions of t
agricultural system upon which the tax base rested.
3. Iraq: irrigation agriculture. The imperial home province as describ
by contemporary geographers was the vast area of flat alluvial lan
bounded in the north by a line from al-Anbir on the Euphrates t
Takrit on the Tigris, in the west by the Syrian steppe, in the south b
the steppe and desert areas of Arabia, the marshland (al-batad’ib) and
7) Among those sensitive to the conditions in Iraq at this time, there is the adv
of Abi Yisuf al-Baridi to his brother Abii ‘Abdallh, (Miskawaih, Tajarib, I, 34
the
I 6). reflections of the Caliph al-R.di upon the times in which he lived (al-Sili, Akhbbr,
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
2
8
8
D.
WAINES
north
shore
of
the
Persi
Zagros mountains and th
Allowing for minor regi
agriculture throughout
historically
set
of
land
of
aspect
relationships
and
water.
fruits,
time,
fertile
betwe
Nature,
vegetables
nature
and
imposed
w
c
res
human
settlement and cu
was the climate with its
between the winter and
would
fall
dry
was
attempt
the
out
too
to
and
to
su
these
elaboration
the
Euphrates,
ground
sparse
balance
gradual
exploited
the
i
of
resources
the
Diyila,
cultivation
were
the
perf
natural and artificial. Th
aggrading streams in th
Robert Adams in his imp
Levees, whether laid down by
for irrigation, offer a numb
Their back-slopes provide rel
…Because they are higher t
offer at least a relative deg
Similarly,
quently
they
settle
offer
into
some
p
low-lyin
8) Al-Istakhri, Kitab al-Mas
(1927), 78-79; Ibn Hawqal, Ki
Leiden
(1938),
23i;
al-Khatib
I, 11-12.
9) Robert M. Adams, Land Behind Baghdad: A History of Settlement on the Diyala
Plains, Chicago (1965), 9. Village settlements concentrated along the watercourses
provided greater security against marauding bands and wild animals (al-Istakhri,
Kitab al-Masilik, 86).
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 289
to these natural advantages must be added a still more c
one: the close access which the crest of the levee offers
which has created it, the sole source of water both for ir
purposes in a semi-arid country with intensely hot sum
sons, it is no surprise to find that watercourses and their le
tuted the major axes along which human settlement in
takes place.
The advantages, as Adams is careful to point out, are relative, for
topography and the unstable regimes of the twin rivers, the Tigris and
the Euphrates, were also constant features of this harsh environment.
The Sawid ranged in extrems from swamp to desert. The alluvial
plain was flat, unbroken and tended to be below the level of the
aggrading steams traversing it. Devastating floods were possible and
not uncommon1o). The annual flood discharge was also unpredictable
and a low water season could bring draught in its wake11). Moreover,
the flood season of the Tigris-Euphrates, unlike that of the Nile, did
not correspond beneficially to the crop growing season. As Robert
Fernea has put it, “no great distance exists between the headwaters of
the Tigris and Euphrates and the alluvial plain. Thus the flood follows
quickly upon the winter rains, the April peak coming too late for the
winter crops and too early for the summer planting”’12). Another feature
of some historical importance was the occasional shift in the rivers’
course as the Tigris or Euphrates scoured a new bed in the plain with
obvious consequences for cultivation. At some point in the 3rd/9th
century an entire canton of the Sawid was turned into swamp either
as a result of a shift in the Euphrates or from widespread flooding13).
A more enduring problem for cultivators of the Sawid was soil
Io) The historians are not given to recording every occurence of a natural disaster.
Rather, they seem to mention only those “acts of God” which wrought especially
severe destruction; for example, the extensive flooding of lower Iraq in 291/903
when fields and homes were washed away and hundreds of people killed. (Al-Tabari,
Kitdb Akhbar al-Rusul wa’l-Mulik, Ed. by M. J. de Goeje et al., Leiden (I879-1901),
III, 2248).
i i) In 284/897, again in lower Iraq, canals and wells dried up, water prices soared
and people from all over came to Baghdad to pray for rain (Ibid., III, 2 82).
I 2) Robert Fernea, Shaqykh ana Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority among the
al-Shabana of Southern Iraq, Cambridge, Mass., (1970), 8.
S3) Qudima, Kitab al-Khardj, 236.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
290
D.
WAINES
salination.
ground
that
would
as
salt
become
percent
by
Over-irrigation
could
much
as
was
brough
difficult
reduce
fifty
o
an
yields
percent14
The worst dangers of sali
topography of lower Iraq
area1s). The bed of the Eup
and through this region f
flowed
from
distributed
the
ddlya
indicate
west
to
water
and
east.
to
Fro
the
ne
shddi~f6).
instances
of
land
H
re
period) 17) a system of drai
system does not seem to ha
over,
that
was
the
in
lower
the
cancelled
The
problem
Iraq
case,
of
irrigation
variables
of
salina
the
for
most
of
water
example,
the
natura
system
man’s
was
environm
character, the system wa
experiencing sudden acts o
deterioration could quickly
flow
14)
dwindled
Howard
and
Nelson,
ceased
“An
al
abandon
I8 (I962), 70.
i5) Iraq and the Persian Gulf,
Division, London (1944), 433.
16)
An
excellent
contemporary
G
d
Kitib ‘Aji’ib al-Aqdlim al-Sabac
Leipzig (1930).
17) Qudima, Kitib al-Khardj, 2
Ed. by S. al-Munajjid, Cairo (19
I8) Thorkild Jacobsen, “Summ
Project, June 1957-June 1958”,
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 291
existed to rectify such conditions and the
option but to leave the land and seek alter
4. Agriculture: decline of production. In th
above we possess the results of an extensiv
Diyila basin completed in 1957-58. Comb
reconnaissance and the data of primary Ara
a most promising argument which, it m
given the attention from historians that i
The Diyvla plain is the north-eastern ‘qu
courses traverse it, the Diyvla River itself
feeder canal constructed during the reign
Aniishirwin (531-579 A.D.). The Nahra
growing problem of water shortage and t
the Diyvla by drawing off the waters of t
and the network of myriad gravity-flow b
them produced, during late Sissanian tim
cultural expansion reaching the limit
technology.
This agricultural and engineering establishment witnessed, in the
seventh century, the crisis of collapsing Sgssanian power and the
transition to a new regime under Arab Muslim conquerors. The consequences for the region are expressed by Adams:19)
Within the Diyila basin itself it would appear that the cultivated area had
shrunk from around Soo8000 sqare kilometers toward the end of the Sissanian
period to perhaps 6000ooo sqare kilometers in the mid-ninth century. Moreover,
this had occured in spite of appreciable extension of irrigation and settlement
in certain districts.
The Umayyad and early ‘Abbisid governments, therefore, had been
unable to restore the rural economy to Sissanian levels. Adams’ study
further shows that, on the archeological evidence, from the mid-ninth
century the decline of cultivation and settlement was not reversed but
rather accelerated. “By the end of the Samarrin period (or, more
probably, the early years of the tenth century) 62 percent of all re19) Adams, Baghdad, ioz.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
292
D.
WAINES
corded settlement
areas of the Diyila
appear
to
have
abruptly,
the
outsid
basin,
withstood
m
Nahrawin
ca
al-umard’ Ibn RP’iq in 326
cultivation for two decades
prices21). Flood damage w
damage resulted from salin
checked with difficulty an
event, already by the begin
the Diyvla basin had decrea
Leaving aside for the mo
one
a
factor
may
be
role.
The
tax
barley
and
dirhem
within
of
the
Diyila
barley: in
77,25
barley,
it
may
be
roll
mention
of
Ibn
K
compone
plain
show
metric tons t
tons23). Sinc
2
infered
from
the
f
Nahraw.in Canal, salination
abandonment of the land in
For
the
rest
archeological
duction
the
and
of
the
20)
21)
rural
survey.
state
primary
supports
of
the
Iraq
If
t
we
revenue
Arabic
a
u
sources
substance
of
A
Sawid26).
Ibid., Io3.
Miskawaih,
Tajirib,
I,
394;
22) Adams, Baghdad, ioi (Table 2
of villages in the region declined
23) One kurr of wheat = 2925 k
(W.
Hinz,
Islamische
Masse
and
G
24) Adams, Baghdad, 85.
25) Adams himself acknowledg
essentially
similar
to
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
those
in
th
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 293
The tax rolls of Ibn Khurdi~dhbeh and ‘A
about half a century. In the interim changes
number of cantons had occured and hence the
compared with one another. However, suffici
for a broad profile of the Sawed to be obtain
in the following table.
Table III
Percentage decline in tax revenue during second half of third centu
ten comparable cantons of the Sawdd
Canton Ibn Khurdddhbeh ‘All b. ‘Isd % Dec
(231-260/845-873) (303/915)
1, 2, BidariyP & 4,695,000 d a) 42,499 D b) 8
Bnkuskyi
3, 4, 5, Bgdfirayi 6,200,000 d 166,283 d C) 97.3
Kalwidhi
Nahr Bin
6, 7, Kiitha 4,400,000 d 25,00ooo D 9I1.5
Nahr Durqit
8, 9, I0. Lower Fillfija 3,250,000 d 13,585 D 93.5
Nahrain
‘Ain al-Tamr
d = dirhems; D = Dinars
Notes
a) These totals combine the wheat and barley figures converted to dirhem values
plus the dirhem cash component.
b) These totals are for cash only. In order to compute the percentage decline in
revenue the Dinar figures were first converted to dirhems at the ratio of i: .
c) Expressed in dirhems in the original.
The geographical distribution of these cantons ranges from the west
(6, 7, 8, 9, io) to the east (i, 2) of the Sawid. Bidfrayi (3) was an important canton lying to the west and south of Baghdad and hence its
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
294
D.
WAINES
inclusion
(4, 5) as
close to
of
the
of
here;
Diyla
revenue
production
during
dangers
in
of
lower
too,
the
hand,
situation
and
most
didhbeh
Iraq
that
distressed
the
tax
salination
noted,
saq7
list
ma
to
pr
this
peasantry
of
seems
productive
as
the
cantons
Khurdi~dhbeh’s
was
‘IsC
Implied
particular
conditions
it
basin.
decline
these
Ibn
b.
a group although th
the NahrawIn Canal
agricultural
for
‘Ali
r
regio
al-Furdt
wa
expressed in metric tons are
for wheat. Next, if Ibn Khu
of the Sawid is compared w
Sibi for the early fourth ce
metric
draw
tons
the
have
an
valuable
increasing
332,000
inference
production
more
to
soil
brought
that
increase
wheat
metr
in
ba
crop
salination.
about
u
this
an
Sev
si
abandonment of the land.
To recapitulate, the argument so far has shown that throughout the
period of declining ‘Abbisid power, the caliphate was confronted by a
decreasing inflow of revenue to the central treasury. Two main reasons
were adduced: the rise of autonomous dynastics within the empire and
the decline of agricultural production in the very heartland of ‘Abbisid
domains. In the long run, it was suggested, the latter process was as
26) Hill al-Sibi, KitaSb al- Wauara’, 209.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 295
critical to the fate of the caliphate inasmuch as
relatively greater from the very source of rev
strategically more important in the wider polit
losses occured in the second half of the third
anticipate the following discussion, the nature
(brought about by a fall in agricultural prod
to and viewed within the context of develop
population of Iraq during this period.
Part Two
I. Introduction. The causes underlying the decli
tion in the Sawid are to be found within a br
between the ‘Abbisid ruling apparatus and t
sector, primarily the labour force of the agri
large measure the indirect effects of ‘Abbisid
the more direct effects of their administra
fortunes. When the rural population finally t
stellation of pressures, it had only recently f
disorder resulting from conflict within the
destruction to rural life wrought by this conf
by the conflict of large segments of the rura
ruling order. The damage to the irrigation ba
caused by several decades of unrest was pr
reflected in the figures of ‘Ali b. ‘Isi’s tax rol
One factor implicit in the emergence of the
abstractly in terms of the ‘Abbisid view of th
differed in a significant respect from that of t
were the inheritors rather than the creators of t
which supported human life and cultivation in
the core of empire had been a network of art
town and country; for the ‘Abbisids, the em
highroads linking the metropolis with urban m
domains”2). Thus, orders of priority were dif
27) This seems to be reflected in the titles of third and
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
296 D. WAINES
the irrigation system was a con
certain renovations and expansio
to the long run stability of the s
its depreciation. It is possible, too
in the Sawid with a benign indif
the treasury from other sources
for extravagence and to suppo
demanding military.
Illustrative of these points is a m
that is, the extraordinary advan
urban growth to a scale and co
earlier times. First Baghdad and t
-each built by royal fiat- were
contemporary world outside of
area five times that of tenth cen
the former Sissanian capital of C
‘Abbisid agro-cities were of an o
they undoubtedly placed a heavy
supply of foodstuffs. Writes Ad
tion prior to modern times came
intensity of land usage but as
settlement, irrigation and agr
(writing about 276/889) report
works by Ibn Khurdidhbeh, al-Istakhri
book Kitdb al-Masalik wa’l-Mamilik; A
similar vein, called their works Kitdb al
28) Two recent survey essays on th
be found in The Islamic City, Edited
S. A. El-‘Ali, “The Foundation of Bag
A study in medieval town planning”, I1
alongside the study by Wolfram Eberh
city in the pre-industrial period”, Econo
1956), 253-268.
29) Jacob Lassner, The Topography of
(I3970), .8.
30) Adams, Bagbda, 99.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 297
Baghdad and SimarrH from the Jazira, Syria
agricultural base was being weakened by the
urban sector.
Muslim jurists, it is true, acknowledged the state’s major share of
responsibility for the maintenance of the irrigation system; specifically,
the construction, dredging and clearing of the large feeder canals. The
lesser branch canals were the responsibility of the water users and
estate holders adjacent to them32). The stability of the system demanded
close cooperation between various levels of management, that is, the
government, the estate holder and the peasant cultivator. There is
evidence to suggest that the state did not consistently fulfill its role and
the result was frequently waste of human and financial resources33),
flood damage from canals breached owing to lack of maintenance34)
and, heavier expenses incurred by the peasant35).
Pressure upon the peasantry accumulated also from the nature of the
tax system in the Sawid. Research has begun to unravel some of its
complexities and it is not the present intention to delve furthers3). The
point worth underlining here is not how poor the peasantry must have
been, but rather how precarious was their subsistence and how easily,
3’) Al-Ya’qibi, Kitdb al-Buldin, Ed. by M. J. de Goeje, Leiden (1892), 25o, 263.
Al-Muqaddasi, who wrote about 375/985, states that the Jazira supplied most of
Iraq with foodstuffs, Ahsan al-Taqdsimfi Ma ‘rifat al-Aqtlim, Ed. by M. J. de Goeje,
Leiden (1877), 136. E. Ashtor, in his study on medieval prices and salaries, concludes
that the importation of grain must refer to al-Muqaddasi’s own time. Al-Yacqibi’s
reference, which is the earliest we have been able to trace on this matter, clearly
shows that imports began more than a century earlier, if not before.
32) A. Ben Shemesh, Taxation in Islam, Vol. II, Leiden (1960), 60-62.
33) Tabari, III, 1438.
34) Ibid., III, 2 xo 5.
35) Ibid., III, 2x5S3.
36) For this and related problems the following works may be consulted. Daniel
Dennett, Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam, Cambridge, Mass., (1i95o), Chapter
2; Ferde Loekkegaard, Islamic Taxation in the Classic Period, Copenhagen (195o)
and Claude Cahen’s review in Arabica, i(i954), 346-353; A. K. S. Lambton, Landlord
and Peasant in Persia, London (195 3), Chapters 2 and 3; Claude Cahen, “L’6volution
de l’Iqta du IXe au XIIle sidcle”, Annales, E.S.C., 8(1953), 25-52; Paul Forand,
“The status of the land and inhabitants of the Sawad during the first two centuries
of Islam”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 14 (1971) 25-37.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
298 D. WAINES
within the normative order, the
denied.
Two methods of tax assessment
employed in the Sawid during th
one, known as misdha, was a f
paid in cash or kind. The seco
portional share of the crop p
imperial treasury was protected
possible ‘deficits’ arising therefr
would be forced to pay their ta
them while in favorable times
except the most meagre portion
peasant response to these conditi
in the Jazira during the late e
exactions of the tax collector. Du
system was supposedly replaced
from the pessantry. In Cahen’s j
applied to the Sawed of Baghdad
pletely abandoned even there39)
systems were equally oppressive
be able to maximize or stabiliz
fluctuation continued to be bor
The peasant lives by a kind of
he prefers to minimize the ch
rather than attempting to maxim
that roughly from the beginnin
margin of safety was slowly be
true, do not provide hard eviden
leaving the land. Possibly some
salination of the soil owing to
37) Abn Yfisuf, Kitdb al-Kharidj, Cai
38) Claude Cahen, “Fiscalit6, propri
potamie au temps des premiers ‘Ab
39) Miskawaih, Tajdrib, I, 30 (Year
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 299
reducing its productive capacity. The severest b
at this time, however, came about as a direct
weakened position of the caliphal government
succumbed to the interventions, intrigues and r
mercenary guard. The destruction of rural distr
the ‘civil war’ and siege of Baghdad in 251/865
that the government’s reciprocal function o
honoured. These events clearly triggered the pr
over the next decades. The peasants’ ‘safety firs
reduced to and then directed toward the channe
2. Political disorder and the rural economy. In the y
al-Musta’in fled to Baghdad to escape the tyranny
of the Turkish commanders in Samarr. The Turk
set up a rival caliph in the person of al-Mu’tazz, t
In his name they marched upon Baghdad which f
went tribulations matched only by those of the
civil war between al-Amin and al-Ma’min in
second siege ended in the capture of Baghdad
Musta’in and his assassination later in the same
widespread destruction, especially its western qu
recovered from the attackers’ onslaught. The
notable, too, for the devastation of many rural
both sides of the struggle for power.
Al-Tabari, who may have witnessed these e
reports that during the early fighting in Muha
March, 865), many villages between Baghdad
north of the metropolis and on the west bank o
waste while the inhabitants fleeing the carnag
the road. Estates were destroyed, fields and oth
Cavalry and infantry of one side or the other p
across the districts of Nahrawin41). Qatrabbul w
40) Tabari, III, I 56.
41) Ibid., III, Ix 6-I562.
42) Ibid., III, 1 564, 159o-1591.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
300oo D. WAINES
Pitched battles occurred in sev
Bandanijin (May, 865) and in nea
865)48), at al-Madi’in (April, 86
tember-October, 86 )456) always w
erty. In some cases peasants we
crops plundered’d).
The district of al-Anbir was quit
(April-June,
865). The one
T.hirid
supporter
of of
al-Musta’in,
Muhammad b.
‘Abdallah, had despatched
Nujilba
to the town
al-Anbir with
orders to hold it against the enemy. On hearing the approach of an
opposing Turkish contingent, Nujiiba flooded the trench around alAnbir with water from the Euphrates. This defensive tactic, however,
caused extensive flooding between al-Anbir and al-S~ilihain on the outskirts of Baghdad while the environs of al-Anbir itself became “a single
swamp”’47). (Muhammad the Tahirid had earlier blocked the roads
from SimarrH to Baghdad by cutting the dykes and canals above Baghdad with equally pernicious effects upon the surrounding countryside)*8).
As al-Anbir was also situated strategically on the Euphrates it was
easy for al-Mu’tazz’s supporters to intercept the passage of foodstuffs
from Raqqa to Baghdad”9), one cause of the high prices and hunger
experienced in the city that year50).
This season of hostilities coincided unfortunately with the harvest
season of winter crops. In the areas hardest hit by marauding troops
or by the floodwaters from breached canals, the crop losses and damage
to the land must have brought heavy suffering to the peasantry. Over
the next forty years or so following this, the second battle for Baghdad,
lower Iraq was, but for brief intervals, given over to widespread rural
43) Ibid., III, 1598, 1615.
44) Ibid., III, 599, i62o0.
45) Ibid., III, 1616, 1624.
46)
47) Ibid.,
Ibid., III,
III, 1613.
I6oo.
48) Guy le Strange, Baghdad During the ‘Abbisid Caliphate, London (1924), 312.
49) Tabari, III, 1604, 1608.
5o) Ibid., III, 1628-1629.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 30I
unrest connected with the uprisings of the Zanj and
historical outlines of these movements have been recounted else-
where51); for the purpose of the present argument it will only be
neccesary to demonstrate their impact upon the rural economy of Iraq.
3. The Zanj rebellion, 2y5-27o0/ 86-883. The future leader of the Zanj,
‘Ali b. Muhammad, was a man of somewhat obscure origins52). H
was, however, in Simarrd in 249/863 and saw for himself the prevailin
state of political instability. During civil disorders that year in S~marrP
and Baghdad ‘Ali left for Bahrain to prepare the ground for rebellion.
Until 255/868, when he openly declared himself and brought the east-
African Zanj slaves to his banner, ‘Ali appears to have hoped for
support from certain petty bourgeois53) elements in Hajar, al-AhsP
and Basra gaining some success in the former and none in the latter.
After a sojourn among desert tribes near Basra and a brief visit to
Baghdad, ‘Ali returned to Basra with a handful of adherents and began
to approach various groups ofghilmdn and then the Zanj slaves”4).
The Zanj and other rural peasantry55) were exploited to clear the salt
flats in the region of the Shatt al-‘Arab uncovering the rich undersoil
and preparing it for cultivation of crops like the lucrative sugar cane*)
Their conditions of life and labour were harsh in the extreme. They
worked in large gangs and were quartered in villages scattered through-
out the flats. Each village was owned by a wealthy entrepreneur and
SI) See the still useful essays on the Zanj by T. Noeldeke, “A servile war in the
east”, in his Sketches from Eastern History, London (1892), 146-175, and the
monograph on the Qaramita by M. J. de Goeje, Memoire sur les Carmathes du Bafrain
et les Fdtimi&s, Leiden (1866). Studies in Arabic include on the Zanj, Faisal al-Simir,
Thawrat al-Zanj, Baghdad (i945) and, on the Qaramita, A. Timir, al-Qarami.ta,
Beirut (n.d.), M. A. ‘Aly&n, Qarami.tat al-‘Iriqfi’l-Qarn al-Thlith wa’l-Rdbi’, Cairo
(1970). Recently Al. Popovitch.
S2) Tabari, III, 1742-1743.
5 3) Ibid., III, 1744. Among ‘Ali b. Muhammad’s first followers were a kayay
qassib,
darrib.
from and
al-AhsH’
and a tijir from Hajar; other followers included an ‘a.tir, .haijm,
54) Ibid., III, 1747, I748.
55) Ibid., III, v757, where the word is al-furatiyya.
56) Nelson, “An abandoned irrigation system” (above, footnote 14).
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
302
D.
WAINES
al-Tabari notes that severa
members of the Hishimite
Pointing to their wretched
through
and
of
him
make
the
God
them
in
rebellion
ghilmdn
were
would
turn
it
save
maste
was
located
tho
that
w
notables or the agents of ab
‘Ali b. Muhammad’s army
the
peasantry
the
government
while
For
still
others
nearly
several
appeared
two
divid
forces,
were
years
government
oth
simply
the
Za
expedit
among his own followers61)
and support over most of th
264/877
army
with
the
movement
penetrated
an
attack
as
far
along
rea
nort
the
eas
Dair al-‘Aqil by the warrior
For some months the south
completely
quired
outside
before
During
the
governm
caliphal
fifteen
authorit
years
o
spectacular and savage destr
centers like Basra, al-Ahw5
paigns,
however,
were
57) .Tabari, III, 1753, 1754, 1762.
58) Ibid., III, i749-I75o, i75I.
59) Ibid., mI, 1752, 1753, ‘754, 1755, 1762, 1786-I787 (Year 255 AH).
6o) Ibid., III, 1759-1760; the numbers of his army grew rapidly in the first weeks
from one to three thousand men.
61) Ibid., III, 1759 (forbids drinking), 1763 (executes looters).
62) Ibid., III, I93 1917.
63) Ibid., III, I893-1894, 1908-1911.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
for
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 303
weakness of the Zanj was their lack of
and provisioning their armies on a contin
tactics of fighting were best suited to the
had expanded beyond these confines their
apparent.
The rebellion was, in Cahen’s apt phrase “un episode de type
spartakiste” and Massignon has refered to it as a “social war”‘4). Its
significance is to be viewed within the context of spiraling rural violence
in the Sawid and the accompanying damage to the land and other
property, crop losses and destruction to the irrigation facilities. Some
of the peasantry must have been dislocated in the process; through
flight to nearby towns for protection, joining forces with the rebels
and, as conditions worsened, reversion to a nomadic form of stock
breedings6). The rebellion, although itself finally crushed, paved the
way for further unrest in the Sawed which emerged with the Qarimita
movement.
4. The Qardmi.ta, 260-297/873-9 o7. The fortunes of the
curiously linked with those of the Zanj. Massignon has dra
to the presence of a group of Qaramita in the ranks of ‘A
mad’s troops and a certain Rgshid al-Qurmati is als
assisting the Zanj leader*). Around the year 26o/873 IHam
(with his brother-in-law ‘Abdin), a waggoner by trad
64) Claude Cahen, “L’Cvolution sociale du monde musulman
sidcle face a celle du monde chrdtien”, Cahiers de Civilisation Me
456-457; Louis Massignon, “Zandj”, Endydcopaedia of Islam, First
1213.
65) Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi, 26, “Sheep breeding has been common in Iraq
from time immemorial and presumably an increase in pastoralism accompanied
each decline in the size of areas under cultivation.” For observations on a similar
process in Iran see E. Sunderland, “Pastoralism and Nomadism”, Cambridge History
of Iran, Vol. I, The Land of Iran, Ed. by W. B. Fisher, Cambridge (1968), 623, 641;
Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia, Boston (1961), II8, “in times of economic
stress and chaos…villagers and even whole sedentary communities may assume
nomadic life.”
66) Louis Massignon, “IKarmatians”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, First edition, Vol. 2,
767-768; Tabari, III, I757.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
304
D.
WAINES
organize
actually
a
movement
met
preoccupied
for
the
with
the
with
spread
of
in
the
his
th
Zanj
Zanj
propag
tribes of the Sawid.
In comparison with the Zanj, the Qardmita movement marked a
considerable advance in terms of organization, extent of influence and,
in the longer run, political success. Unlike the Zanj, the first outbreaks
of violence were preceded by many years of careful preparation.
Certain taxes were levied on adherents to the movements) who in
return were provided with a place of refuge and assistance to the most
needy among them; a common share in the general wealth seems to
have been practiced”6). Far from being based solely on campaigns of
plunder, the Qarimita secured the loyalty of their followers through
demands of material sacrifices (i.e. the taxes) coupled with promises of
protection and assistance which the government itself was either unable
or unwilling to offer.
It may be no mere coincidence that the movement commenced in the
sawid al-Ki~fa where, as we have seen, the decline in agricultural produc-
tion appears to have been marginally more severs than in the Diyvla
plain10). It was in this region that revolts were put down in 288/900 by
Badr, afurther
ghuldm
of Ahmad
b. Sawid
Muhammad
who
then
“fearing
destruction
to the
since the al-T.’i,
rebels were
peasants
withdrew
and tillers””). The revolt continued into the next year when another
force had to be despatched to deal with it. At the same time the
Qar~imita were spreading farther afield, to the Yemen, Bahrain, the
border lands between Syria and Iraq, the Jazira and into the heart of
67) Tabari, III, 213o; Thibit b. Sinin, Ta’rikh Akhbir al-Qarmi.ta, Ed. by S.
ZakkIr, Beirut (I97r), i2.
68) Thibit b. Sin~in, al-.Qarmi.ta, 9; al-Dawidiri, Kanz al-Durar waJimi’ al-Ghurar,
Ed. by S. al-Munajjid, Part VI, Cairo (1961), 48; de Goeje, Les Carmathes, 28-29.
Vol.
123.Madelung, “.Hamdin .Karmat”, Entyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition,
69)3,W.
70) Supra, Table III, districts 6, 7, 8, 9, io.
71) Tabari, III, 2198, 220o2.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
l
CRISIS OF THE ABBASIDS 3O0
Syria72). Merchant caravans were robbed of their
collaboration of Beduin tribes73).
Meanwhile, the struggles in the Sawid between t
government forces intensified. We read of certain m
the movement who were natives of the region7′). O
pagandists was a ploughman, al-Qlsim b. ‘Ali b.
gathered followers from among the “Arabs, mawd
others” and who were, as al-Tabari asserts, really ath
Intending thereby to disparage the Qadrmita succe
advertently reveals its real attraction for the peasant
abroad his messengers among the people of the Sawid
save those upon whom misery and distress had fallen
five hundred men with their woman and children”‘”)
to the Qarimita the peasants were in effect witholdin
the government; by joining the movement out of mi
they were in fact witholding acknowledgment of t
the caliph’s rule.
Owing partly to the government’s attempts to repre
and in part to a schism within it, the Qarimita passed
the political scene after 295/90777). In the same y
became the twentieth sovereign of the ‘Abbisid dyna
of al-Muqtadir. He was undoubtedly grateful for t
immediate concern with rural unrest and his inherita
with i5 million Dinars must have made the imperial b
sound. Yet there was nothing that could mask the act
the Sawid, the consequence of imprudent policies brin
72) Ibid., III, 2256, 2217-2220o, 22zzz22, 2225, 2249, 2235.
73) Ibid., III, 2183, where in the year 285/898, one caravan
million Dinars was robbed; also 2269-2274 (Year 294/906).
74) Ibid., III, 2256, CAbdallah b. Sacid of al-Fillaja and Dh
of Janbili, 2261.
75) Ibid., III, 2265.
76) Ibid., III, 2265, lines 11-13.
77) Miskawaih, Tajdrib, I, 104-10o5, where, in 311/923 a large co
Qar~inita entered Basra and pillaged it for ten days.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
306 D. WAINES
widespread rural disorder whi
disruption of agricultural life
pressures in the imperial heartla
judice to other considerations,
third century.
This content downloaded from
130.166.3.5 on Mon, 04 Apr 2022 04:14:31 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jahiz of Basra to Al-Fath Ibn Khaqan on the “Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the
Khalifate in General”
Author(s): C. T. Harley Walker
Source: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, (Oct., 1915), pp.
631-697
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25189369 .
Accessed: 19/02/2015 13:00
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Cambridge University Press and Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland are collaborating with
JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and
Ireland.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.166.129.90 on Thu, 19 Feb 2015 13:00:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
JOURNAL
OF
ROYAL
THK
ASIATIC
SOCIETY
1915
XXIII
JAHIZ OF BA3RA TO AL-FATH IBN XHAdANl ON
THE ” EXPLOITS OF THE TURKS AND THE
ARMT OF THE KHALIFATE IN GENERAL”
By C. T. HARLEY WALKER
PREFACE
HHHE
treatise
of Jahiz,
in the
1903
following
The
by Brill.
before
completing
of which
pages,
editor
was
was
a translation
is given
in
at
Leyden
published
Van
But
he
Vloten.
and
the work;
it was continued
sent to the press by de Goeje.
Since then another
edition
”
”
at Cairo from the
has appeared
Matba’a
al-Taqaddum
I have
Effendi
al-Sasy
by Muhammad
al-Maghriby.
In the
the Cairene
used
edition
for my
translation.
died
edition
there
are
two
other
(rasail)
opuscula
those entitled
here, namely
over White”
Boast
“The
of Black
and “The
People
and
In
of
Circles
“.
the
edition
Cairene
forming
Squares
rasail
in all, including
there are eleven
the three of the
Leyden
besides
1
the
one
translated
to Mutawakkil,
A Turk,
wazir
with
together
He was
of the poet Buhtary.
the patron
to literature
For his devotion
in the Dictionary
Men
of Learned
Y&qut
him to Jahi? himself
b. Ishaq.
and to Isma’il
compares
JRA8. 1915.
41
Al-Fath
whom
he was
b. Khaqan.
assassinated.
This content downloaded from 130.166.129.90 on Thu, 19 Feb 2015 13:00:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
632
JAHIZ on
Leyden
edition,
the
OF THE TURKS
exploits
the
the
of
titles
remainder
as
being
😕
follows
Man and the Object of his Envy.
of Speech to Silence.
Superiority
and the Blame of the Work
Praise of Merchants
The Envious
The
The
of
Government.
and
Love
Women.
Promise.
One’s
Keoping
of
the “Faction”.
the Practices of
of the Competent.
Exposition
Gradations
in Yaqut’s
long account of Jahiz appears
Dictioonao’y
edited
by Professor Margoliouth
recently
of Learned Men,
in the series of the Gibb Memorial
His
Committee.
full
A
name
He
was
was
‘Amr b. Bahr
Abu
b. Mahbub
in 150 and
born
died
‘Uthman
A.H.
in 255
terms of his attainments,
in the highest
a number
to show how eminent
of stories
must
have
He
been.
once
records,
for
ranking
opinion
expressed
of Basra
Pious Khalif
and Hasan
Jahiz
as
Yaqut
speaks
and
relates
a person
he
that
instance,
an
al-Jahiz.
a non-Arab
with
‘Umar
the
the
three greatest
each in virtue of his own special
the Arabs,
among
a sufficiently
high compliment.
qualities,
to literature
He was devoted
deal with
; and his works
men
a
wride
Several
of the topics
range of subjects.
in the following
further
handled
pages were
on
those
in separate
the
claims
treatises,
e.g.
on
the
and
of
Arab
‘Adnan,
equalization
very
discussed
by Jahiz
of Qahtan
and non-Arab,
and
on
a section
refers
to
on polo
(