The professional humanitarian and the
downsides of professionalisation
Eric James Co-Founder/Director, Field Ready, Moffett Field, California, United States
Criticisms lodged at humanitarian relief often include the belief that professionalisation is needed.
The problems associated with humanitarianism would end, it is assumed, if the delivery of aid,
and relief workers themselves, were more professional and ‘business like’. To explore this further,
the paper asks what comprises a profession, and offers four criteria: 1) specialisation of knowledge;
2) establishment of the profession as a livelihood; 3) organisation and institutionalisation; and
4) legitimacy and authority. A model for understanding professionalisation, as developed by the
author, is then presented. The analysis compares six other professions against the same criteria to
argue that the humanitarian community already constitutes a profession. Finally, three potential
downsides of professionalisation are offered: the distance of the relief worker from the beneficiary,
barriers to entry into the humanitarian sector, and adding to risk aversion and a decline in innova-
tion. Based on these findings, professionalisation should be approached with some caution.
Keywords: ethics, institutionalisation, humanitarianism, leadership, management,
organisational development, professionalisation
Introduction
In the days that followed the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, international humani-
tarians—paid full-timers, short-term volunteers, missionaries and newcomers—
arrived in the country to provide relief.1 Despite decades of international assistance,
Haiti was desperately ill prepared for a disaster of that magnitude.2 Indeed it was
the country’s acute vulnerability that directly contributed to the massive destruc-
tion. Yet the international community, including the long-standing UN Mission
(MINUSTAH), was also unprepared. Logistics were a challenge, coordination was
not efficient and responders were often overwhelmed. It was easy to say that some
of these aid workers were professional and others not but it is unclear if this simple
conclusion adequately holds.
Out of this situation, and others like it such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, come calls for the professionalisation of humanitar-
ian practice (Eriksson, 1996; Karan and Subbiah, 2011). There is a strong impulse
to do better in circumstances that are ‘no place for amateurs’ (Barnett, 2011, p. 217)
and there is currently headway being made across the sector.3 There is also a power-
ful assumption that professionalisation is a good and necessary endeavour. In the
literature and among many workers in the field, there is a belief that if the delivery
of aid, and if relief workers themselves, were more professional and ‘business-like’,
the problems associated with humanitarianism would be a thing of the past. Rather
doi:10.1111/disa.12140
Disasters, 2016, 40(2): 185−206. © 2016 The Author(s). Disasters © Overseas Development Institute, 2016
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
Eric James 186
than being a domain of any one field, excellence in management and performance exists
in all fields (Collins 2005) and humanitarian practice is no different. Professionalisation
is normally accompanied by efficiencies in the field, relative prestige and recognition,
and better compensation for its membership. Thus:
since at least the mid 1990s, the international humanitarian system has been heavily com-
mitted to improving its performance and to becoming more professional. There are numerous
initiatives associated with this—codes, standards, discussions about accreditation of aid
workers—to name just a few (HFP, 2009, p. 7).
While there is certainly a need to improve humanitarianism, the process of pro-
fessionalisation has downsides and a clear cost. To explore this further, this paper is
divided into several sections. First, the question of what comprises a profession is
asked. To answer it, four criteria are offered:
• specialisation of knowledge;
• establishment of the profession as a livelihood;
• organisation and institutionalisation; and
• legitimacy and authority.
Next, a model for understanding professionalisation, as developed by the author, is
presented. This analysis compares six other professions against the set of criteria.
The position taken in this paper is that the humanitarian community already con-
stitutes a profession. Finally, three potential downsides to a tightening of this process
including the distance of the relief worker from the beneficiary,4 barriers to entry
into the humanitarian sector and adding to risk aversion and a decline in innovation
amongst those in the field. Based on these findings, professionalisation should be
approached with some caution and not seen as a panacea for perceived ills.
Defining the characteristics of a profession
Definitions of professionalisation have been offered that are ‘an imprecise Protean
term which explains nothing’ (Morrell, 1990, p. 981) yet further analysis reveals an
intricate process that has worthwhile practical and policy implications. The term
‘profession’ is traced to the medieval Latin word professiōn, meaning to take vows to
a religious order. At a basic level, professionalisation is a social process that changes
structure and notions about an endeavour that come about as a result of specialisa-
tion and formalisation. There are some obvious elements of what sets a profession
apart from other domains and perception plays an important role. In many cases, a
profession has evolved to mean a class of livelihoods that have status, privileges and
responsibilities distinct from occupations. This progresses as key criteria are intro-
duced. In the modern era, Weber’s notion of bureaucratisation, with its associative
issues of power and rationality, is useful in understanding how this process has come
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 187
about (Weber, 2005). The tendency in organisations towards centralisation and for-
malisation (as opposed to organic and networked) have been consistent themes among
not just society at large but the humanitarian community in particular.5
Thus the concept of a profession has developed to distinguish different occupa-
tional classes. For instance, certain characteristics set the clergy, doctors and lawyers
apart from farmers, cooks and bricklayers. Particular fields such as law, medicine, the
Christian clergy, accounting, business management and the academy have distin-
guished themselves from others (this is looked at further in the next section). There
is also a separation of these fields from pursuits that people do voluntarily or for the
pleasure of the activity (the root of ‘amateur’ comes from the Middle French word
for ‘love’). The motivation for volunteers is often not for the pleasure of the activity,
but rather to serve an ethical or spiritual calling, sometimes even a norm. In medi-
cine, law and psychology, for example, a certain amount of public service is expected
as a part of the normal ethical behaviour within these professions.
Professions are heavily laden with notions of socio-economic class and assump-
tions about the characteristics of different professions—and who gets to occupy them—
do not always bear out. Historians of this subject have stripped bare the silos that
separated the professional and the amateur, ‘replacing it with dynamic social analysis
of how such categories were constructed and conceived’ (Lucier, 2009, p. 702).
Understood this way, discussions that lean on simple characteristics, such as the
requirement of having ‘qualifications’, fall short in explaining the process. Yet a distinct
set of criteria can be discerned that have heuristic value in illuminating what endeav-
ours constitute a profession. These are specialisation of knowledge, the establishment
of the profession as a livelihood, organisation and institutionalisation, and, finally,
legitimacy and authority. Each of these will be looked at here in greater depth.
Creation and use of specialised knowledge
In many cases, professionals seek to acquire and monopolise specialised knowledge.
There may be a variety of reasons for this such as the complexity of a particular field
and the sustainment of a market for professional services. Broman (1995), when ex-
amining medical history, sees the ability to join practice with theory as an important
part of professionalisation. This comes about when there is a complex body of knowl-
edge relating to the administration, methods, procedures and technical practices that
accumulates over time. The usual result is that it mystifies information and under-
standing for those who do not undergo extensive training and who lack the expe-
rience that is required for a profession.6 There are three ways in which professionals
concentrate the subject matter around their field.
First, there is thorough training for those entering the field and ongoing training
for those within it to stay current with the evolving standards and body of knowl-
edge of the profession. For a variety of fields, the establishment of professional schools
has been a critical development. The training of clergy members led to the founding
of the first universities, especially in the United States. Harvard University, for example,
was founded in 1636 to train Congregationalist and Unitarian clergy. In medicine,
Eric James 188
the founding of the first US medical school was at the University of Pennsylvania
in 1765, but the widespread presence of medical schools did not occur until the
process of professionalisation picked up pace more than a century later and with gov-
ernment subsidy.
For humanitarians this process is underway now. Until recently, efforts to improve
humanitarian practice have focused on increasing the capacity of organisations, not
necessarily individual aid workers (Hein, 2010). The current focus is therefore on
creating an association for these individuals and increasing the quantity and quality
of individual training (this is closely linked to organisation and institutionalisation
discussed later). While there has been a significant increase of training and educa-
tional programmes, the argument has been made that ‘much of the education and
training remains outdated’ (Burkle, 2010, p. 197). For example, both within a decade
of its founding and again in the past few years, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) made
the explicit decision to move away from its heavy use of volunteers and towards fully
qualified professional full-time staff (see, for example, Barnett, 2011).7 Similarly, in
adding a standard for aid worker ‘performance’ (Core Standard #6) to the revised
Sphere Standards of 2011, the Core Humanitarian Standards were formed in 2014.
There has been a significant growth of training and educational programmes in the
humanitarian sector. For example, the UK branch of RedR trained more than 7,000
aid workers in 2012. New groups, notably Leadership for Humanitarians, seek to
increase the competency of aid workers. University programmes have also expanded
significantly worldwide, from eight to more than 80 over the past decade (Walker
and Russ, 2010). What is important going forward is maintaining the quality of
these programmes.
Second, qualifications are awarded through a recognised process and documented
with a certification, diploma or degree. Occupations often, but in many cases do
not, require documented qualifications but all professions do and in fact some pro-
fessions require multiple prerequisites. Evidence of advanced qualifications, such as
an abbreviation after a person’s name, is a hallmark of most professions. This gener-
ally takes years to develop and often includes some form of entry-level experience
where mentorship takes place such as residencies, practicum and internships. This is
in contrast to occupations where the acquisition of skill generally requires much less
time. It is through this training and experience that ‘professional detachment’ is
acquired, which serves professionals in the field. This might be a strange attribute in
humanitarian practice where ambiguity is a defining factor and the fact that those
affected by disasters are often far more knowledgeable about their own context and
situation than those who are considered professional. Even with the acknowledge-
ment of technical expertise, there is tension between this professional detachment
and the idealism that is so much a part of the humanitarian profession (Hopgood,
2008). What is important in the discussion here is that there is a set of skills that are
developed and become a distinguishing feature of the field. These skills often centre
on analytical abilities and the processing and application of knowledge such as admin-
istration, management and programme technical areas.
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 189
Finally, the emergence of specialised journals and publications are a third feature
of specialised knowledge in the professionalisation process. In 1840, well before med-
ical practice was deemed reliable or scientific, the first publication of the Provincial
Medical and Surgical Journal—the forerunner of the British Medical Journal—marked a
key development in the professionalisation of medicine, at least in the United Kingdom
(Waddington, 1990). Humanitarianism benefits from its intellectual big sister, inter-
national development, with its body of literature stemming back to the era of decolo-
nisation. In publications, such as the Journal of Development Practice and Third World
Quarterly can be found contributions to the field of humanitarian assistance in its
different forms. Yet modern humanitarianism assistance is ultimately a response to the
failure of development, which has led to a growing number of publications discuss-
ing these issues including Disasters, the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance and Forced
Migration Review. Indeed some of these sources, such as the Overseas Development
Institute’s Humanitarian Practice Network, attempt to bridge policy, practice and theory
to better address perceived weaknesses in the field. Together, these publications pro-
vide a means for having a ‘process for evaluation and feedback to improve responses’
(Martin, 2001, p. 228) which is a key element of professionalism.
Establishment of the profession as a livelihood
Professions involve a paid livelihood whereby work is undertaken in exchange for
monetary compensation. However, particular levels of compensation (salary) or the
presence of labour movements in support of that profession are not necessary criteria.
As a result, there is also a competition for resources between entities (or companies)
and, in the case of humanitarianism, organisations (Cooley and Ron, 2002). This
competition is brought about by market forces that contain material incentives to do
well. The effort of professionalisation has paid off for those in the fields commonly
associated with professions such as medicine and law. This in turn has not only led
occupations to professionalise but also to grow in size and become increasingly global
in scope. Similar to the pattern of the commercial sector, this progression has occurred
in the humanitarian sector as well (Simeant, 2005). Examples include the global brand-
ing campaigns carried out by larger non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such
as MSF, Oxfam and Save the Children. In this process, professionals engage in a
collective hunt for resources, which brings about the establishment of standards, codes
and common practices (discussed further below).
In this discussion of the pursuit of monetary compensation, motivation is an
important consideration. International humanitarian aid workers are distinguished
by a high degree of motivation to serve. This is the ‘attitudinal’ element of profes-
sionalism that provides a ‘sense of calling’ among its membership (Hall, 1968). Yet
the reasons behind the motivation are often mixed to include a sense of adventure or
a particular ethical impulse (Donini, 2010). Thus the drive to achieve and maintain
a certain standard of living and a particular lifestyle is an important element of
professionalisation (Barakat and Kapisazoic, 2003). In recent years, with a focus on
Eric James 190
lifestyle, organisational imperatives and personal career trajectories, aid workers ‘are
motivated very differently from the humanitarians of old’ (Hopgood, 2008, p. 112).
As Barnett tells it: ‘For most of its history humanitarians acted as if showing up was
enough [. . .] those who ran these organizations enjoyed their seat-of-the-pants,
jerry-built lifestyle because it reflected their idea of what a voluntary organization
looks like. However, those days are history’ (Barnett, 2011, p. 234). This was a key
step in the process of professionalisation.
With the availability to gather and sustain resources over time, professions have
developed into careers with their own trajectories. Long periods of education and
training, acceptance into the field (not just recruitment but also orientation and
indoctrination), progression from worker to manager and then into retirement has
been the hallmark of professions. In contrast to occupations and voluntary work, in
which progression tends to be short in duration, professional career trajectories are
usually long term and often ‘for life’. The humanitarian sector has developed in a way
not unlike any other professional sector. The existence of more than 250,000 aid
workers worldwide (Walker and Russ, 2010), and now several generations who have
made their living this way, suggests that there is a full career trajectory and that those
engaged in humanitarianism have met the criteria of having a full profession.
The growth of NGOs in particular has driven aid workers to address many of
the problems that have become pronounced during the past two decades, including
poverty and complex emergencies. Their increased capacity has allowed them to
have an ability, albeit small, to influence international public policy on issues they
work on. Thus, as Simeant notes of French NGOs, professionalisation has ‘enhanced
their credibility and authority, and legitimised their “voice” at the global level [. . .]
It was this global expansion of NGOs that gave them the right to speak out from the
front ranks in international bodies’ (Simeant, 2005, p. 856). This is considered further
in the next criteria.
Organisation and institutionalisation
Once a sizeable group of trained and paid professionals is formed, a number of attrib-
utes appear that ensure a collective function between members of the group and
further solidify the process of professionalisation. This process brings members of
the profession closer together, usually through a mechanism that is outside routine
business and allows for cross-cutting concerns to be addressed, such as autonomy
and self-regulation, knowledge sharing and development, and mutual support. This
organisation, and the institutionalisation8 that binds professionals together, gives them
the ability to act independently and, at times, influence public policy (Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004). Independence is a central humanitarian principle and influence
is often actively sought through advocacy and the practice of resource mobilisation.
Organisations explicitly engage in high-level policy advocacy, as well as efforts made
at the grassroots level, in an attempt to influence decision makers in areas of col-
lective interest. But this ability does not emerge without considerable effort. As an
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 191
organisational area of activity, policy advocacy occurs when there is considerable
professionalism in place (Mosley, 2010). In other words, it is not something of which
those without a high degree of organisation (such as the occupations, volunteers or
hobbyists) have the capability. This is based on three developments.
First, individuals and organisations share information and network through con-
ferences and workshops. This practice often takes place while an occupation is pro-
fessionalising. This is linked to the first criteria (mentioned above) where professionals
develop and seek to monopolise specialised knowledge. Humanitarianism now has a
set of global conferences such as the International Humanitarian Summit, the World
Conference on Humanitarian Studies and the Dubai International Humanitarian
Aid and Development conference. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee also holds
conferences. The wide range of internet sites and social media supporting humani-
tarian efforts also attest to this development.
Second, organisations and the institutional networks that connect them are cre-
ated. The creation of a supra-organisation is common. In the field of medicine, the
British Medical Association and the American Medical Association were formed in
the 1830s–1840s and helped formalise medical practice into a profession. Along with
local laws, these organisations were instrumental in regulating the medical field in
their respective countries. Humanitarians are no different in this respect and have
already taken a number of steps in this direction. In the global North, there are
several organisations such as InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary
Agencies that have provided an institutional network. In the global South, many
countries have their own networks that help guide the humanitarian endeavour.
Two examples are the Afghan Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and, in Sri
Lanka, the Consortium for Humanitarian Action. Relatively new organisations with
an aim to further professionalise the humanitarian sector include the International
Humanitarian Studies Association, the Humanitarian Logistics Association and
Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection.
Finally, support mechanisms are established, particularly for issues arising before
(in recruitment), during (crisis counselling and networking) and at the end of a career
(including transition and retirement). These means of support are always present in
professions but not always with occupations, which may resort to unionisation and
forms of collective action such as strikes instead. Within the humanitarian sector,
there have been many efforts to address the inefficiencies of the enterprise such as the
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
(ALNAP), the Code of Conduct, Coordination SUD, Humanitarian Accountability
Project, Groupe URD, People in Aid and the Sphere Project.
Gaining of legitimacy and authority
The final criterion of professionalisation is the establishment of legitimacy and author-
ity. This is based on two factors: common perception and authoritative recognition.
Common perception originates from practice and custom and includes the creation
Eric James 192
of status symbols. Professionals in the West have cultivated an image that separates
them from those outside their field. They have long used symbols to do this. Since
their inception, the clergy and the military have had distinctive dress (uniforms),
used buildings of particular architecture and followed lifestyles that set them apart
from ordinary people. In medicine, the wearing of white lab coats by qualified
physicians started as an attempt to legitimise the medical profession through an asso-
ciation between medical practice and scientific processes (Dawson, 2008). Although
uniforms of themselves do not constitute a mark of professional class, they are important
signifiers of professionalism. Just as Western ‘business’ attire epitomises professional
appearance, distinct status symbols can be found, and often critiqued, in the white
vehicles and logo-emblazoned t-shirts that signify humanitarians as a distinct pro-
fessional class.9 When combined with the criteria of specialised knowledge and
organisation, along with the context in which humanitarians work, these symbols are
an important element in the creation of the perception of professionalism. Ramalingam
and Barnett (2010, p. 4) note how this distinguishes aid workers from those they
are trying to help: ‘The predominant model of disaster-affected communities is one
of “helpless victims”, elevating the authority and standing of external interveners’.
Authoritative recognition comes from the establishment of norms, codes and
standards. According to Wilensky (1964), moral norms and authority are necessary
and set professionals apart from other domains. A formal code helps weed out the
unqualified and provides a framework of principles in which professionals are meant
to act, even though it is not a mandatory element of professionalism. Often the
acknowledgement by outside bodies is needed to bestow legal legitimacy on these
norms, codes and standards. Several professions rely on loose associations in the form
of governing bodies such as law, medicine and accountancy. In the commercial sector,
in particular, recognition comes from success and not a governing body bestowing
recognition in areas such as management and entrepreneurship.
It might seem that authoritative recognition is connected with certification and
licensure. Clarification between certification and licensure is helpful here. Certification
is generally a voluntary decision made by individuals. It is based on reaching a set
of skills-based qualifications as determined by a non-governmental body. Because
certification is not mandatory, people may engage in the field without certification
while enjoying many of the benefits of those who have been recognised for their
qualifications.10 In contrast, licensure is involuntary in the sense that it is a required
step for those who wish to practice a professional field. A professional license is a
‘must have’ recognition of individuals regulated by a government body. Certifications
and licenses typically require periodic renewal and some may provide designations
after a person’s name. It is important to note that while it might seem necessary for
authoritative recognition to come through a formal licensing process, this is not
always the case. Licensing does not necessarily bestow the other attributes of a profes-
sion. For example, public notaries, cosmetologists and drivers have licensure but lack
a distinct set of moral codes and standards to constitute their occupations.
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 193
A useful way to examine this issue further is by considering the governing bodies,
sources of normative standards and consequences of malpractice of five recognised
professions in comparison to those who work in international humanitarian assis-
tance. As presented in Table 1, these professions are law, medicine, the Christian
clergy, accounting, business management and the academy. Looked at this way, relief
workers have more formal governing structures than business managers, older sources
Table 1. Professional legitimacy and authority
Governing/professional
body
Sources of normative
standards
Consequences of
malpractice
Law American Bar Association (ABA) ABA’s 1983 ‘Model Rules of
Professional Conduct’ based
on the 1969 ‘Model Code of
Professional Responsibility’
and the 1908 ‘Canons of
Professional Ethics’
‘Disbarment’ and possibly legal
action depending on the sever-
ity of the incident
Medicine American Medical Association
(AMA) and various boards (e.g.
American Medical Association,
American Board of Medical
Specialties, and the American
Academy of Emergency Medicine)
AMA’s 2001 ‘Code of Medical
Ethics’ based on routine revi-
sions (1903, 1957, 1980) of the
1847 code and traced back to
the Hippocratic Oath
Professional censure and pos-
sibly legal action (suit)
Clergy
(Christian)
Various depending on
denomination
Biblical canon particularly the
first five books (Pentateuch)
In certain cases, disciplinary
measures (such as transfer)
and /or legal action
Accounting American Institute of Certified
Public Accounts (AICPA)
AICPA’s 2007 ‘Code of
Professional Conduct’ based
on pamphlets going back to
1917, and various standards
(e.g. ‘audit and attest stand-
ards’ and ‘valuation services
standards’)
Revocation of Certified Public
Accounting license
Business
management
No single or group of bodies
exists
Usually developed by individual
companies
Disciplinary action by company,
peers and /or legal action
Academia American Association of
University Professors (AAUP)
AAUP’s 1966 ‘Statement of
Professional Ethics’. Other
codes are drafted by individual
colleges and university systems,
which often combine ethics,
codes of conduct and stand-
ards of professional practice
(e.g. research standards)
Tenured academic staff can
only lose their positions ‘for
cause’ (severe misconduct)
and /or legal action
International
Humanitarian
Assistance
Coordination and associative
bodies such as InterAction,
Sphere and the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee
‘Code of Conduct of the Inter-
national Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and NGOs
in Disaster Relief’ of 1992, which
draws lineage from the first
Geneva Convention of 1864
Disciplinary action by organisa-
tion, peers and /or legal action
by local country
Source: author.
Eric James 194
of normative standards than attorneys, and face the same or greater consequences
of malpractice as academics and the clergy. To help limit the expansiveness of this
discussion, the examples used here relate to professions in the United States. These
serve, however, as instructive examples because they typically parallel developments
in Europe and serve as models for professionalisation in other parts of the world.
Performance and accountability are sometimes seen as an essential part of gaining
legitimacy and authority. Writing specifically about aid work, Dempsey and Kyazze
(2010, p. 29) argue that in a professional system, a humanitarian worker would be
personally responsible for adherence to professional standards, as is the case with a
doctor or a lawyer, for example. This would mark a change from most existing sets
of standards, such as Sphere, which measure commitments from institutions but not
individuals. Although humanitarian workers already have a strong sense of personal
responsibility, professionalising the sector could significantly improve the quality of
humanitarian response by making it easier to hold individuals and agencies to account.
It will also allow activities that build resilience and include participation to be a greater
part of responses.
Certainly, humanitarian aid workers are not fully accountable to their peers and
do not have strict certifications or licensing imposed on them at this time. As of this
writing, there is active discussion underway to form a professional certificate in the
form of a ‘Humanitarian Passport’, which would come out of a series of competency
frameworks.11 Yet as Walker et al. (2010, p. 2228) have found, there is little if any sup-
port for what amounts to a ‘licensing system’. Not all professions have such systems
and some, such as business management, are not explicitly bound by ethics and only
need to operate under existing state laws and regulations. Generally speaking, mal-
practice does not depend solely on a ‘professionally-based’ code. Fraud and abuse,
for example, are bound by general law and only some professions (for example, the
clergy) have their own governing laws. Perhaps it is for this reason that there are
legions of examples, particularly from the business sector, that show that performance
and accountability are undermined through shortcutting and unethical behaviour
(Ordóñez et al., 2009). As Pink (2009) notes:
most of the scandals and misbehavior that have seemed endemic to modern life involve
shortcuts. Executives game their quarterly earnings so they can snag a performance bonus.
Secondary school counselors doctor student transcripts so their senior can get into college.
Athletes inject themselves with steroids to post better numbers and trigger lucrative per-
formance bonuses (Pink, 2009, p. 49).
One method for preventing these problems is peer review, but this is virtually
unknown in the commercial sector where oversight is provided through legal reg-
ulation and market mechanisms. For the academy, legitimacy and quality assurance
are bestowed through accreditation, which is done through councils and boards and
not law or governmental regulation.
For many, performance and accountability are conflated. Incompetence is a sep-
arate matter that is addressed by professional bodies and associations. Through their
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 195
mechanisms poor performance is generally handled via the process of recruitment,
referral, reputation and reprimand. In these ways, unqualified or poor performers are
prevented from entering an organisation and practicing in the field. There are exam-
ples from relief and reconstruction projects of poor performance, failure and fraud,
particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan (Waldman, 2008) but also in previous emer-
gencies (Maren, 2002). A country’s NGO registration process (even Somalia has one)
provides a means of checks and balances. Therefore, in terms of consequences of mal-
practice, humanitarians are roughly on a par with the other professions discussed here.
In sum, when looked at comparatively, we can make several observations about
the humanitarian sector gaining legitimacy and authority. In contrast to other fields,
which are largely domestic in scope, humanitarianism’s focus is global and so it is
behind other professions in terms of having a recognised governing body—though
this process is now underway. Humanitarians have a relatively well-developed nor-
mative framework with a track record roughly on par with other professions. This has
been built on a long history of establishing norms starting in the modern era with
the work of Henry Dunant and others including Clara Barton in the United States,
and the passing of the first Geneva Convention of 1864. The codification of these
norms in the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) stands in contrast to the wider
field of international development, which is not governed by a set of laws. IHL pro-
tects the humanitarian principles of those providing assistance and calls for the respect
of their distinctive symbol (the red cross—an inversion of the Swiss flag). The shift
that has not occurred in the humanitarian sector is the holding of responsibility of
individual aid workers for acts of malpractice. However, this is not a necessary ele-
ment of professionalism.
A framework for understanding humanitarian
professionalisation
Using the four main criteria described above, we can construct a framework for
understanding how the status of occupation, volunteerism and hobbyist differs
from that of profession. The dozen sub-criteria, described above and shown below
in Table 2, delineate the ways in which a profession is distinct from other domains.
To be comprehensive, the category of ‘hobby’ has also been added to the framework.
This covers people who engage solely in activities for recreation. When looked at
more closely, it is noted that being a hobbyist does not eliminate the need for spe-
cialised knowledge, organisation and certain codes or at least rules. Certifications
are less straightforward. Some hobbies require certifications to engage, especially those
involving transport, such as boating, flying and parachuting. Perhaps because of the
numerous volunteers engaged in the practice of humanitarianism, such as physicians
who take short-term field assignments with NGOs, the professionalism of the field is
at times difficult to distinguish from the volunteerism.
Eric James 196
Based on this framework, it is evident that the work of humanitarians has already
reached the stage of being a profession. Each set has seen at least some development
and in certain sets, especially ethics (norms, standards), humanitarians are ahead of
other professionals and have a rich history in developing these positions. When care-
fully analysed against clear criteria, the professional status of humanitarians becomes
evident. Using the evidence provided earlier in this article, examples from the humani-
tarian field are weighed against each sub-criteria in the framework. The results of
this are shown in Table 3.
As Martin noted a decade ago, ‘even during the twenty years that I have been
involved in the field of forced migration, there has been significant progress regarding
Table 2. Framework for understanding professionalisation
Sub-criteria Categories
Profession Occupation Volunteerism Hobbyist
Specialised knowledge
1 Training and
education
Required to a
high degree
Required in
some cases
Sometimes required,
sometimes not
Usually not required
2 Skill level Highly developed
Developed or
developing
Developed or
developing
Generally
developing
3 Qualifications Required Usually required Sometimes required Usually not required
4 Publications Widely available
Sometimes
available
Sometimes
available
Widely available
Livelihood
5 Monetary
compensation
Paid Paid Unpaid (perhaps
stipend provided)
Unpaid
6 Career trajectories Generally long term Short or long term Generally short term Either
7 Primary motivation Predominantly
lifestyle (can be
service oriented)
Money
Predominantly
enjoyment or
fulfillment
Predominantly
enjoyment or
fulfillment
Organisation and institutions
8 Associations Always available Sometimes available Sometimes available Almost always
available
9 Conferences and
workshops
Always available Sometimes available Rarely available
Often available
10 Support
mechanisms
Always available Sometimes available Rarely if ever
available
Often available
Legitimacy and authority
11 Status symbols Always present Sometimes present Not present Not present
12 Codes and
standards
Usually present Usually present Sometimes present Usually not present
Source: author.
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 197
professionalisation’ (2001, p. 242). De Waal (1997, p. 65) describes a ‘humanitarian
international’ that has developed over the past few decades, made up of the staff of
international relief agencies, academics, consultants, specialist journalists, lobbyists
and also, to an increasing extent, ‘conflict resolution’ specialists and human rights
workers. It is a sub-group of the larger aid and development industry. A generation
ago, this group did not exist: governments, UN agencies and NGOs were staffed
Table 3. Status of the humanitarian profession
Sub-criteria Categories
Specialised knowledge
1 Training and
education
A significant and growing ecology of training organisations and educational institutes
offering certificates and degrees at various levels
2 Skill level A wide range of skills need mastery before one is deemed proficient as weighed by
competency frameworks that are being developed and by organisational human resource
(HR) departments
3 Qualifications HR recruitment process seeks those with minimum levels of experience and other markers
of qualification such as advanced degrees
4 Publications Many are available such as Disasters, the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance and Forced
Migration Review
Livelihood
5 Monetary
compensation
Although many volunteer positions exist, salaried positions with standard benefit packages
are more common
6 Career trajectories While there is no set pathway, typical progression combines time spent in the field, at the
regional or headquarter level, and involvement in a host of related activities such as edu-
cation and think-tanks
7 Primary motivation Motivation varies between aid workers but lifestyle—including a combination of service
and intensive work periods followed by time off and travel—is a dominant factor
Organisation and institutions
8 Associations Various such as InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) as
well as many at the national level
9 Conferences and
workshops
Many available: examples include the International Humanitarian Summit, the World
Conference on Humanitarian Studies and those held by the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC)
10 Support
mechanisms
Many related to technical aspects of the work including the International Humanitarian
Studies Association (IHSA), the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) and Professionals
in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection (PHAP), but admittedly few, other than People
in Aid, look at decent work issues
Legitimacy and authority
11 Status symbols Varies by location but usually includes organisational logos and accessories associated
with particular positions
12 Codes and
standards
A growing list includes the Code of Conduct, Humanitarian Charter and Sphere Project
(standards)
Source: author.
Eric James 198
by different kinds of people who more often disputed each other’s practice than
shared common assumptions. Since 1980 there has been a marked convergence toward
a common culture.
At the same time, ‘business’ practices from the commercial field have been heav-
ily introduced into the practice of delivering humanitarian aid. This was noted by
Curti (1935) who wrote nearly eight decades ago that:
the influence of business enterprise is seen in the professionalisation of the workers in
humanitarian groups, in the use of elaborate card indexes, in the division of functions,
and in the general introduction of efficiency and organisation into the management of groups
(Curti, 1935, p. 65).
We have moved a long way from index cards, but using the tools of project manage-
ment—such as performance indicators and logical framework analysis—to simplify
complex tasks have now been in regular use for some time by humanitarians. Project
management tools have provided positive outcomes but there are also downsides.
The requirements to use these tools are often set by people, such as those representing
donor organisations, who will not be involved in the implementation of the project.
Donini (1995) has observed that there has been a process of:
‘homogenisation’ in the practices, management style and activities of NGOs. To a large
extent this results from donor pressure to conform to established norms and standards and
is functional to the needs of the expansion of the market and of laissez-faire economics:
NGOs have to fit into the mould that the system requires (Donini, 1995, np).
Given the complex situations in which humanitarians work, the use of project
management tools can be an attempt to put square pegs in round holes. In the field,
there is a familiar pattern where a disconnect exists between expectations and what
is realistically possible given the operational and resource constraints in which assis-
tance is provided.
The downsides of professionalisation: a cautionary note
With the growing pressure for further professionalisation of the humanitarian sector,
it is important to consider the potential downsides. This analysis reveals that when
different occupations have gone through a process of professionalisation there are
unintended negative consequences. In other words, professionalisation has a cost that
needs to be carefully considered. The professionalisation of medical practice provides
a helpful illustration. When medicine first required registration to practice, there
became a shortage of practitioners (Waddington, 1990). Insurance and the influence
of private industry (for example, pharmaceutical companies) has, to some extent,
resulted in a dearth of professionals, increased costs (even in an open market as in the
United States) and risk aversion. Thus, although medicine and its beneficiaries (patients)
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 199
have benefited from professionalisation, there have also been downsides. Similar pit-
falls could affect, and in some instances already have affected, humanitarians. At least
three distinct drawbacks to the professionalisation of humanitarians are evident.
Distance from beneficiaries
In the process of achieving the combined criteria described above, every profession
inevitably creates a gap between itself and the people for which it provides a ser-
vice. As Slim (2003) has noted, professionalism excludes as much as it includes. In
some ways, this is a useful dynamic. Physicians, for instance, who remain emotion-
ally aloof from their patients are thought to perform better. Clergy might scarcely
make it through a funeral service if they considered their strong personal tie with
the deceased. The same can be said for humanitarianism who must regularly deal
with catastrophe and human suffering. This is the upside of distance but there is also
a downside.
While there are values within different professional fields, there is typically a high
sense of entitlement. The status symbols, access to resources and lifestyle have already
been highlighted as distinguishing features of a profession. The language profes-
sional’s use often mystifies those outside their field. The creation of separate profes-
sional classes adds to the inherent distance between people and has been highlighted
in the field of humanitarian relief (Polman, 2010). A key result of professionalisation
is the demand for staff benefits including increased salary, which may be beyond the
standard rise in inflation. At the same time, there has been an emphasis on using
local resources, which creates an opportunity for hiring managers from countries neigh-
bouring those undergoing disasters. In the global South, large international NGOs
and the UN represent the equivalent of the best commercial firms and attract the
‘best and the brightest’ (and so there is often a draw toward these groups). The dis-
tance of humanitarian workers from beneficiaries can result in slow responses, out-
of-touch activities (as well as increased vulnerability to security threats due to low
community acceptance) and ultimately unaddressed suffering and death.
Humanitarian response does not permit the level of intimacy needed in certain
types of development and research work, but there are ways to reduce the distance
routinely felt between relief worker and beneficiary. The attempt to overcome this
distance has already been highlighted by the push for participatory methodologies12
in international development more broadly. While not without criticism (Cooke and
Kothari, 2001), the work of Chambers (1994) and others on the relationship between
‘outsiders’ (aid workers) and ‘insiders’ (beneficiaries), and on creating methodologies
for bridging this gap, have helped shaped the field.
Barriers to entry
Specialised knowledge and the establishment of the profession as a livelihood create
significant barriers to people who seek to join the profession. This is readily seen
amongst select Western universities where many humanitarian education programmes
Eric James 200
are being established. These universities produce people who belong to increasingly
privileged and elite groups.13 Once in the profession, some aid workers and organisa-
tions are able to work in close solidarity with beneficiaries while others do not (this
point is closely related to the first downside described above). As Slim (2003, p. 2)
notes this results in ‘putting some strange professional vanity above the needs’ of
people. Yet elitism can negatively affect workers who have not had the same pay or
education, or gained a similar level of disaster experiences and group memberships.
In other words, people who do not possess the ‘appropriate’ status symbols may be
seen as ‘not professional’. It can also extend to organisations when members of
global brands disparage those who work for or have histories with different or lesser
known organisations.
Some see the voluntary nature of humanitarianism as an important element of
lowering this barrier to entry. If strict entry criteria were used, their contribution
would not be possible. Certainly some fields lend themselves to volunteering more
than others. For example, within the information technology community, there is
a very strong and growing tradition of using volunteers, which shows the signs of
professionalisation discussed here. Pink (2009) highlights the power of volunteers.
If asked in the mid-1990s which group could develop an online encyclopedia—
Microsoft with its large budget and well-compensated staff or a group of tens of thou-
sands of people contributing their ideas and labour for free—most people would
have said Microsoft. But the fact is that Wikipedia is now widely known and few
people can remember Encarta. The same goes for Firefox, Linux and Apache—all
highly effective, efficient and successful examples of open-source computer software.
Closer to the concerns of humanitarianism, this open-source, peer-to-peer approach
is the model the Volunteer and Technical Community (V&TC) has used. Many
groups have now provided vital information this way, such as Ushahidi, Sahana,
GeoCommons and Rif by InSTEDD. While improvements are needed and adop-
tion is not yet widespread, communication advances represent an important oppor-
tunity for humanitarian organisations to use technologies to respond to disasters
(Coyle and Meier, 2009; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011; Zook et al., 2010).
This allows for the positive impact volunteers offer without needing to go through
the lengthy process of professionalisation.
There needs to be a firmer recognition of the value of volunteerism and how
best to harness its value. Maintaining large teams of professional staff is often very
difficult in the humanitarian field (Martin, 2001). Under normal circumstances, it
is relatively easy to recruit for short-term professional positions in popular or well-
known disasters, such as US health professionals to Haiti or French aid workers to
former African colonies. It is much more difficult to recruit a long-term position
with specific language requirements or a large number of staff to start a new project in
a less popular or well-known country. Consequently, the problem is how to form
and sustain a ‘surge capacity’ workforce when there are massive human catastrophes.
When an acute disaster strikes requiring greater international assistance, the global
cadre of full-time humanitarians remains insufficient. Reserve volunteers are one
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 201
possibility. Currently, organisations meet the need for responding to large-scale rapid-
onset disasters, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake
and in some cases conflicts, by tapping into their pre-established ‘emergency rosters’
of volunteer staff. These lists usually contain pre-screened applicants who are expressly
ready to volunteer with a moment’s notice.
Risk aversion and eventual decline in innovation
With the establishment of organisation and institutionalisation, and once a profes-
sion has established its legitimacy and authority, dual pitfalls surface of an aversion
to risk and failure to innovate as conditions change. In this process, a bureaucratic
permanence, described by Max Weber as an ‘iron cage’ (Grosack, 2006), sets in and
a type of inertia becomes evident whereby a profession never ‘dismantles itself ’. This
can result in a perpetuation of the status quo and people may lose the autonomy
they once felt working in an occupation or as a volunteer. As a result, professionals
become risk adverse and are often more concerned with sustaining their careers. In
other words, they ‘tend to become selective in their service to clients’ (Taylor and
Pellegrin, 1959, p. 112). Given the 150-year history of modern humanitarianism, it
is evident that the profession does not intend to be so effective in its work that it is
no longer required, and it is selective in its assistance to others. In many places there
is already a ‘tarmac’ approach where more aid goes to areas that are easy to access
(that is, along paved roads). In other places, there is a focus on the capital or ‘safe’
areas of a country. There is also a prestige factor and element of status identification
with humanitarians in many contexts.
The recent crisis in the Horn of Africa provides a good case in point. During the
famine of 2011, the locus of activity was on Somali refugees who fled the country
into relatively safe Kenya and Ethiopia. Many organisations based themselves in
Nairobi, Kenya, and a mode of remote management developed that was known
locally as ‘café latte relief ’ because of its emphasis on coordination activities and dis-
tance from ‘dangerous’ Somalia by working through Somali-based organisations.
For these reasons, the thrust of the international humanitarian effort missed the
epicentre of the crisis in Somalia itself. This has occurred for a variety of reasons,
including concerns about insecurity, but an additional factor for some US-based
organisations has been the imposition of anti-terrorism regulations by the US govern-
ment’s Office of Foreign Asset Control. These regulations stipulate various investiga-
tive and reporting requirements on the part of NGOs and suggest criminal prosecution
if they do not comply. As a consequence, it was easier to avoid the risk of providing aid
despite the first principle of humanity and the catastrophic need for help in Somalia.
Nevertheless, humanitarian responses are launched under extraordinary circum-
stances that professionals in other fields are never forced to face. Following an acute
crisis, a ‘fog of humanitarianism’ develops, which makes decision making difficult
to say the least (Weiss and Hoffman, 2007). Working in these conditions and with
inherent funding pressures, adherence to principles (such as independence) is not a
Eric James 202
result of low professionalisation (where poor training, ignorance and the like would
be to blame) but about reliance on a few donors who seek certain aspects of profes-
sionalisation such as the specialised knowledge needed for accountancy and advanced
planning. As Stein (2005) notes:
demands for efficiency ring somewhat hollow when the structure of the market is so
asymmetrical that it gives extraordinary power to one or two buyers in a permanent buyer’s
market. This kind of market reduces the independence of NGOs, limits their capacity
to negotiate mandates and responsibilities and, consequently, creates strong incentives for
agencies to exaggerate successes, minimise failures, and manipulate performance indicators
strategically (Stein, 2005, p. 742).
This is a danger of insisting on standards when the standards are not yet fully thought
through. A ‘cookie cutter’ approach, sometimes spelled out in donor and organisa-
tional requirements, is problematic in a field that is very dynamic and contextual.
Maturing professions that display an aversion to risk inevitably show a lack of
willingness to change course and innovate. Innovation is not necessarily composed
of paradigm shifts but is most often composed of small steps towards greater simplic-
ity. The lack of innovation in the field of humanitarianism has already been noted by
others (Ramalingam et al., 2009). On an optimistic note, there are efforts underway
to address this need, and it is receiving increasing attention. The recently established
Humanitarian Innovation Fund, a partnership between Enhancing Learning and
Research for Humanitarian Assistance and ALNAP, is one such example. NGOs
themselves have noted this gap and some, such as Oxfam, have established internal
mechanisms to encourage innovative practices and services. Even USAID’s Office of
US Foreign Disaster Assistance annual report highlighted this organisation’s contri-
bution to innovation (Perrin, 2010).
Conclusion
The issue of professionalism in the field of humanitarianism deals with the nature
of NGOs, notions of improvement and efficacy, and the essence of humanitarianism
itself (for instance, how people relate to power). The process of professionalisation is
not always clearly understood, which has important practical and policy implications.
This gives the impression that the field lacks accountability and high performance—
and thus the damning critiques continue (Gourevitch, 2010; Polman, 2010). While
there is still a long way to go, current efforts show a trend towards increased respon-
sibility and competence.
To counter the claim that humanitarianism is not yet a profession, this paper has
shown that the humanitarian is as much a professional as those found in other fields.
Four criteria have been offered as evidence: 1) specialisation of knowledge, where
a profession takes on more training and education, increased skill level, qualifications
The professional humanitarian and the downsides of professionalisation 203
and publications; 2) establishment of the profession as a livelihood with monetary
compensation, career trajectories and a primary motivation that differs from occu-
pations, volunteerism and hobbies; 3) organisation and institutionalisation, where
a group of professionals form associations, hold conferences and workshops, and
develop support mechanisms; and 4) legitimacy and authority based on status symbols
and codes and standards. Based on these criteria, a model for understanding profes-
sionalisation was provided and in each of these, humanitarians have been weighed
and found to be roughly on a par with at least six other professions.
Further, in an attempt to question the often powerful assumption that profession-
alisation is something good that the humanitarians must achieve, this paper examined
three potential downsides of professionalisation. These were the distance of the
relief worker from the beneficiary, barriers to entry into the humanitarian sector, and
adding to risk aversion and a decline in innovation amongst those in the field. The
pitfalls of professionalisation should be considered carefully as the process develops.
Acknowledging and taking steps to address these downsides is a key recommendation
here. This paper also discussed a number of steps that can be, and in some cases are
already, being taken to improve the shape of professionalisation. These include
improved quality of training and education, more common use of participatory
approaches that build resilience, and continued use of volunteers (such as the V&TC)
with the maintenance of ‘reserves’ to keep an active surge capacity. Perhaps most
importantly is the cultivation of a field-wide ethos that shuns arrogance and elitism
in favour of openness, learning and continual improvement.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Sarah Powell, Tony Hoffman, Enzo Bollettino and
Vince Sanfuentes for their help in reviewing early drafts of this paper. All views,
research and omissions belong to the author.
Correspondence
Eric James, Field Ready, 556 Edquiba Road, Moffett Field, CA 94043, United States.
Telephone: +1 707 260 5765; e-mail: eric@fieldready.org
Endnotes
1 The focus in this paper is generally on Western-led globalised humanitarianism. While recognising
that this brand of humanitarianism is hardly homogeneous and certainly not the totality of the
endeavour, it is dominant and mainstream.
2 The earthquake reached a magnitude of 7.0 yet the damage was catastrophic (estimates range between
100,000 and 200,000 deaths; and more than 200,000 buildings damaged) due to the high degree
of pre-existing vulnerability in the country (see, for example, ALNAP/DAC/UNEG 2010).
Eric James 204
3 To unpack all the reasons behind this headway is not the aim of this paper. However, it likely
stems from having time to work on it during the two decades since the Rwandan genocide (see,
for example, Eriksson, 1996) and to make developments in the dozen criteria for professionalisa-
tion described in detail later in this paper.
4 For some this distance subverts the basic ethics that form the foundations of humanitarianism
such as service, solidarity and bearing witness. The label of beneficiary is used here as it is commonly
used in the field, but other terms for beneficiary include ‘disaster affected’, ‘clients’, and ‘people’.
5 This approaches the interesting notion of post-bureaucracy (see, for example, Hopfl, 2006) but goes
beyond the scope of the discussion here.
6 The case of ‘experts’ and professionals being separate and sometimes at odds has led to a curious
debate. An expert is someone who has developed some mastery of a subject but, based on the
criteria outlined above, may not be a professional. Likewise, considering the same criteria, a profes-
sional may not be an expert. Based on these considerations, the distinction between the two are
not relevant to the discussion here.
7 The debate between volunteerism and professionalisation created an internal schism amongst MSF
senior management in 1979 leading to the departure, amongst others, of Bernard Kouchner and
the subsequent founding of Médecins du Monde.
8 This paper uses the definitions of organisation (groups) and institutionalisation (networks) found
in political science and sociology (March and Olsen, 1989).
9 Speaking in the documentary ‘Hunger Business’ (Channel 4, November, 2000), Philip Gourevitch
commented that during the 1994 response to the Goma refugee flow NGOs relied so heavily on
branding that their logos could be seen ‘from outer space’.
10 Accreditation is a separate process reserved for organisations. This generally follows the charac-
teristics described for certification in that it is a voluntary process and a set of standards must be
met that is usually judged by a group formed outside the state.
11 Examples of competency frameworks include those produced by the START Network (formerly
known as the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies) and Leadership for Humanitarians.
12 This represents a wide range of approaches and techniques; examples include ranking exercises,
mapping and role plays (see, for example, Pelling, 2007).
13 Language is understandably part of this as well. In the survey of professionalisation carried out by
Walker and Russ (2010), 4,000 English speakers were asked to participate while speakers of just
two other languages were add-ons (only 250 French speakers and 50 Spanish speakers were asked
to participate).
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Homeland Security & Emergency Management 2015; 12(4): 763–774
Claire B. Rubin*
Reflections on 40 Years in the Hazards and
Disasters Community
DOI 10.1515/jhsem-2015-0050
Abstract: This piece is based on the keynote address I delivered at the 40th
Annual Conference of the Hazards Center at the University of Colorado/Boulder
in July (www.colorado.edu/hazards). My charge from the Hazards Center was to
“provide your reflections on how our community (researchers and practitioners)
has evolved over the last four decades” and “feel free to get personal and to talk
about what the community has meant to you and your work.” Unlike the other
keynote talks at that conference, and unlike the other articles in this journal,
this is a personal history, based on my career experiences over the past 38 years.
As such, it includes many candid comments on things that have gone well and
things that have not over the past four decades.
Keywords: disaster community; reflections on 40 years.
1 By Way of Introduction
I have had a quite varied career path – as researcher, consultant, and practitioner,
educator – with a lot of part-time and consulting assignments. I have worked for
several government agencies, a few universities, about a dozen consulting firms,
my own company, and now for a local government office of emergency manage-
ment – and for at least two dozen employers. I like to think of myself as versatile
rather than as someone who cannot hold a job!
But this choppy employment history does raise some fundamental questions
about credentials. Considering the many jobs I have had, I am not sure if it is
my fault – because I do not have a PhD and could not be a tenured member of
a university research center – or if it indicates that the emergency management
(EM) field could not provide steady and sustained employment opportunities.
I enjoyed the great variety of projects and have had some cutting-edge assign-
ments, but it was a hard way to make a living, and I do not recommend it!
*Corresponding author: Claire B. Rubin, President, Claire B. Rubin and Associates, LLC,
Arlington, VA and cofounder of JHSEM, e-mail: cbrubin@yahoo.com
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2 The Hazards Conference as a Focal Point
The reason I gave the keynote talk is that I had attended more Hazard Confer-
ences than anyone else – at least 38 or 39 of them. I see the annual workshop as a
focal point. Beginning in 1975 and continuing to the present, it has been the place
where knowledge has been imparted, contacts have been made, friendships have
been formed, and projects have been created.
A very important factor is the people in the hazards/disaster/EM field. I con-
sider the pantheon of capable, dedicated professionals significant to my career
and truly appreciate all those who provided inspiration and guidance to me
through the years. The early notables were Gilbert White (Hazards Center), Henry
Quarantelli and Russell Dynes (Disaster Research Center), and Charlie Fritz
(National Academy of Sciences).
Others, such as Ugo Morelli [at the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)], Roy Popkin (Red Cross),
and Bill Anderson [at National Science Foundation (NSF)], were important to me
both as colleagues and friends. These men not only excelled as researchers, facili-
tators of research, or practitioners, but also were unusually willing and gracious
to newcomers in the field.
More recently, many prominent women researchers have emerged – Kathleen
Tierney, Joanne Nigg, Shirley Laska, and Susan Cutter, to name just a few.
For me, the value of the workshops comes from the unique emphasis on
bringing the academic and practitioner groups together to learn from and work
with each other. Through these opportunities, I not only formed lasting profes-
sional relationships but also made life-long friends. This center and the commu-
nities of attendees have been central to my work.
3 My Background
I am a social scientist with an emphasis on public administration and public
policy.
My involvement with the research community began in 1977, soon after
National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program was enacted and shortly before
FEMA was created (1979). (I have been in the disaster business longer than FEMA
has!)
Initial contact was when Ugo Morelli and Chuck Thiel (NSF), who were
working with Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office
of the president, dropped by my office at the International City Management
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Association (ICMA) and asked for help in organizing workshops with local public
officials regarding the implementation of National Earthquake Hazard Reduction
Act. That was when I got hooked on the interaction between public officials and
the scientific community with regard to hazards and disasters.
In the late 1970s, while I was working at the Academy for State and Local
Government, my first major project was with the National Governors Association
(NGA). The NGA was engaged in some essential research and produced several
ground-breaking documents on emergency management, one of which was titled
Comprehensive Emergency Management (1978). That NGA work provided a signifi-
cant baseline for the newly formed FEMA.
In the late 1990s I was an adjunct faculty member with the George Washing-
ton University, and that led to my developing teaching products and educational
materials (time line charts, history book), because there simply was not much out
there in the way of teaching materials and I could not find what I needed. During
that period, I developed the Disaster Time Line charts as a teaching tool for the
students in my classes.
In later years, I developed the Terrorism Time Line, the Century Time Line,
and several other time lines (all of which can be browsed at http://www.disas-
ter-timeline.com). A key feature apparent in all these time lines is how reactive
our national system of emergency management is. These and subsequent charts
show the causal relationships between events and outcomes, and it becomes
quite evident that major events drove changes in the national emergency man-
agement system.
Looking back, however, I see two essential elements that stand out in my
career: One is the hazards/disaster community and the second is being based in
Washington, DC.
3.1 Essential Element #1: The Hazards/Disaster/Emergency
Management Community
For many years I have participated in two annual events. The first is the Hazards
Conference; the second is the Higher Education in Emergency Management Sym-
posium, sponsored by FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute and now it its
17 year. There is some overlap of attendees, but roughly characterized, the first
group includes many of the major researchers and practitioners who create the
intellectual content for education and training, and the second group primarily
delivers education and training.
For those of us in the hazards/disaster/EM field, the Hazards Center offers
two major benefits. First, it fills the role of a professional association: it offers
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766 Claire B. Rubin
an annual workshop, maintains a library, has a newsletter or two, and supports
a community of people with common interests. But it does not collect dues, nor
does it have committees for members to serve on! Second, it provides serendipi-
tous connections with other attendees. For example:
– As a panelist in a session, I reported out some recent research findings on
the frequency and location of presidential disaster declarations. Ann Patton,
from city of Tulsa, was in the audience and learned from our data that Tulsa
had the greatest number of disaster declarations in a 20-year period. She
shared that data with the mayor of Tulsa, and the research report was a
tipping point for city’s taking action on flood mitigation.
– Plans for the history book, Emergency Management: The American Experi-
ence, 1900–2010, began in 2004 when Gerard Hoetmer, then head of the
Public Entity Risk Institute (PERI), and I discussed the need for a book on
the history of emergency management in the US, using the disaster time line
charts as a starting point. I agreed to be the editor of such a book, which is
now in its second edition and has outlived PERI by several years.
3.2 Essential Element #2: Washington, DC
Living and working in the Washington DC area has provided me with the unique
opportunity to interact with practitioners, particularly federal ones and their con-
tractors, and has been the source of many grants and contracts.
Being based in Washington, DC was important to my career in that I got in on
some foundational projects. Many were essential to capturing history, since do
much of emergency management history was never written down.
4 Some Specific Disaster Events and Outcomes
Over the Last 40 Years
Rather than go decade by decade, I will divide the last 40 years of hazards and
disaster activities into two time segments: the last quarter of the twentieth century
and the first 15 years of the twenty-first century.
In the last quarter of twentieth century, we saw the buildup of the EM field,
not only in terms of personnel numbers but also in the development of plans, poli-
cies, and tools; higher education programs; and increasing professionalization.
However, in the twenty-first century, and especially since 9/11, the EM
field has struggled and in some ways is stalled. New threats and hazards have
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emerged, and new federal systems, plans, and guidance are not quite ready for
new challenges.
I will cite some key focusing events, some important outcomes, and exam-
ples of my peripheral involvement.
4.1 Late Twentieth Century: Emergency Management as a New
Frontier, 1975–2000
During the last quarter of the previous century, there were six disasters that
qualify as defining or focusing events:
– Hurricane Hugo (1989)
– Loma Prieta (1989)
– Exxon Valdez (1989)
– Hurricane Andrew (1992)
– Great Midwest Floods (1993)
– Northridge Earthquake (1994)
These disasters resulted in the following major organizational/professional activ-
ities or actions:
– Work of the NGA; creation and implementation of Comprehensive Emergency
Management Project results
– Formation of FEMA on June 19, 1978, by executive order of the president
– Development of the Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake Plan,
which was the precursor to the National Response Plan and later the National
Response Framework
– First ICMA “Green Book” on emergency management (1991), a seminal text-
book (funded by FEMA!) that was used for about 15 years and contributed to
the growth of higher education in emergency management programs
– Creation of PERI (1997) with a private endowment. Its staff of risk takers
funded small projects and exerted their independence in support of worth-
while missions.
During this period, my contributions and products were as follows:
– Served as lead author of Community Recovery after a Major Disaster (1985), a
monograph published by Natural Hazards Research and Applications Infor-
mation Center (NHRAIC).
– Did Hurricane Hugo fieldwork with Roy Popkin, with a Quick Response grant
from NHRAIC, and coauthored a Quick Response Research Report for the
National Hazards Center (1989).
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768 Claire B. Rubin
– Prepared the chapter on recovery for first ICMA “Green Book” on emergency
management (1991).
– Did Hurricane Andrew fieldwork (1992) for both ICMA and as part of a team
at the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) that issued the
report, Coping with Catastrophe (1993).
Regarding the NAPA report, done 12 years into FEMA’s operation and about
halfway through its roughly 25 years as an independent agency, it was essentially
the first in-depth evaluation of the agency and was the result of serious failures
by FEMA after Hurricane Andrew. The report turned out to be a very significant
product, one that did in fact influence decision-makers and public policy makers.
For James Lee Witt, for example, who assumed his position as FEMA director just
as the report was being finished, it was instrumental in supporting his significant
efforts to bolster hazard mitigation, among other things.
5 Early Twenty-First Century: 2000–2015
During the first 15 years of this current century, there were five disasters that
qualify as defining or focusing events:
– Attacks on WTC and Pentagon (2001)
– Hurricanes Katrina/Rita/Wilma (2005)
– British Petroleum (BP) Oil Spill (2010)
– Megastorm Sandy (2012)
– Various catastrophic events worldwide, such as those in Haiti, Japan, and
Nepal.
All of these events were huge and can be considered “focusing events or game
changers.” They set a record for each of the three types of disasters: natural, man-
made accidental, and man-made intentional. Entire books have been written
about each of them, and probably more will come. This is not the time to elabo-
rate on all these events, but I would like to talk briefly about 9/11 and Hurricane
Sandy.
5.1 September 11, 2001
Among my professional contributions during this period were some post-9/11 reports
and preparation of the Terrorism Time Line (http://www.disaster-timeline.com),
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Reflections on 40 Years in the Hazards & Disasters Community 769
which provides a snapshot of the outpouring of laws, regulations, guidance, and
organizational changes that occurred between 2001 and 2008. In less than a decade,
there were
– Twenty-one major laws
– Thirty-six executive directives
– Thirty-eight national strategies, plans, or national-level exercises
– Fourteen other federal actions and organizational changes, including the for-
mation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
To my knowledge, it is the greatest outpouring of public policy actions to take
place in US history in less than one decade.
5.2 Hurricane Sandy
Regarding Hurricane Sandy, although the response was dramatic, for the most
part it went well. Both FEMA and the Red Cross had learned lessons from their
Hurricane Katrina experience, both did a lot of advance/anticipatory planning,
and both went flat out in their response efforts.
Currently, however, it is the recovery phase that is the crucial story. The
recovery phase entailed dealing with massive needs and demands, given the
high density and coastal exposure of New York and New Jersey. Additionally, the
number of housing units and the amount of major infrastructure affected was
unprecedented. And newly awakened awareness of global warming and sea level
rise are highlighting the need for greater mitigation and for greater attention to
resilience, which will mean an extended the time for recovery.
The unusual impacts, needs, and special demands led to new organiza-
tional arrangements after Sandy, with the president giving the lead for long-term
recovery to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). A special
federal task force was established by executive order, and HUD was charged with
overseeing its recommendations and implementation. Moreover, this was the
first use of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (issued in 2011) for a major
disaster event. In short, attention was given to the new concept of resilience,
which was incorporated into a situation with climate change, sea level rise, and
the need for a longer horizon given to mitigation and recovery.
Many new organizational arrangements were put in place to deal with the
recovery process after Sandy. It remains to be seen if the task force and new roles
for HUD are employed again for future disasters.
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5.3 The Past 15 Years in General
During this period, my contributions and products were as follows:
– Cofounder of the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
(2003) to help foster an understanding of how emergency management and
homeland security would be related and interact
– Continued development of time lines (Disaster Time Line, Homeland Security
Time Line, California Earthquake Time Line, Mine Safety Time Line, and the
Canadian Time Line)
– Editor of the first edition of Emergency Management: The American Experi-
ence (2007). (The second edition came out in 2012).
6 The Last 40 Years: What Worked and What
Didn’t
Once again, rather than go decade by decade, I will assess the last 40 years of
hazards and disaster activities in two time segments: the twentieth century and
the twenty-first century.
6.1 The Twentieth Century
In the last century, civil defense lessened as the focus, while natural and man-
made hazards and disasters increased. This led to the development of a modern
civil emergency management system. Laws were passed, regulations developed,
doctrine written, and policies implemented by federal agencies with emergency
management responsibilities under the laws and regulations.
The states and local governments looked to Washington DC for guidance,
information, and inspiration. So did other countries around the world. Although
FEMA gets the most attention, emergency management activities also involved
numerous other agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. For FEMA, however,
as well as for the health and welfare of the EM field, there were peaks and troughs.
The Giuffrida era (1981–1985) appears to have been the low point, and the James
Lee Witt administration (1993–2001) the high point. From 2001 on, FEMA initi-
ated the national-level frameworks.
The federal government has made a few attempts at collecting and sharing
“lessons learned” nationwide, but it has never quite succeeded. The most recent
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effort, the Lessons Learned Information Sharing program (LLIS.gov), failed in
2014.
In the research community, the field was small, and everyone knew the right
people to call for help and information. There were fewer academic research
centers. The Natural Hazards Center was formed and joined the Disaster Research
Center (already 10 years old) to help grow the field. Both were oriented to social
science.
Colleges and universities throughout the country started to offer certificates
and advanced degrees in emergency management.
6.2 The Twenty-First Century
In the current century, EM has become an ever-changing field, with new and
more complex and compound threats and hazards. Events are covering ever-
wider areas and need billions of dollars for recovery. Meanwhile, the population
is growing and moving to the most vulnerable geographic areas. Hence, there is
an increasingly greater need for frequent updates in enabling legislation, guid-
ance, programs, and education and training. In short, more capability and more
money are needed: easier said than done!
In fact, there is no shortage of rules, regulations, guidance, doctrine, and
requirements, but this plethora of dictates is increasing while the budgets and
staff for EM personnel at the state and local levels are static or decreasing. This
does not bode well for the future of public sector emergency management.
6.2.1 FEMA and the Federal Government
Currently, there are major issues with several types of workers – primarily, full-time
employees, FEMA reservists, and FEMA Corps. Low morale plagues the DHS full-
time staff as a whole. The FEMA Reservist system has been revamped, and many
in it are unhappy with new rules and requirements. Use of FEMA Corps personnel
with “lightly” trained young adults is increasing in order to save money. At a time
of bigger, more complex disasters, the workforce has become more complex.1
Reliance on FEMA as a reliable partner in EM – and on federal funding
support in general – has decreased. In fact, in 2014 the head of the Brookings
1 For details, see Government Accountability Office, Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Additional Planning and Data Collection Could Help Improve Workforce Management Efforts, GAO-
15-437 (Washington, DC, July 2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671276 .
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772 Claire B. Rubin
Institute delivered an op-ed piece on “How Washington Made Itself Irrelevant.”2
Among the key reasons are congressional actions (or lack thereof) on budgets;
sequestration; and threats of department shut downs.
In the research community, the gap between academics, researchers, and
practitioners has widened in the wake of more academic research centers, more
federal agencies, more personnel, and more consultants, especially at DHS. In
particular, the number of intermediaries between researchers and practitioners
has grown. In the old days, we often knew who was researching what and could
call on them; today, this is out of the question.
DHS created numerous university-based “Centers of Excellence” to focus on
single issues, such as terrorism and coastal hazards. I consider these large amal-
gamations of universities to be “research oligarchies,” and the costs/benefits of
supporting research in this way do not make sense. Researchers cannot easily
access key officials – whether to discuss potential research projects or to obtain
guidance on issues.
The federal government is not really flexible and agile, not secure in its
funding for more than 1 year at a time, and always struggling to catch up. We
cannot count on it to get out ahead of some of our current threats, let alone future
hazards and threats in this political environment. Among the areas lagging are
mitigation and recovery.
Yet there are two areas of positive change. First, despite the rise of climate
change deniers, including members of Congress and governors of disaster-prone
states, there have been tremendous improvements in science and technology.
Second, the growth of the Internet and the advent of social media have greatly
enhanced communications. Both responders and victims have benefited in many
ways.
6.2.2 Hazards/Disaster Science, Public Policy, and Education
There has been an increase in training and formal education within the EM com-
munity. We now have more than 250 institutions of higher education offering
courses in EM and homeland security. Many more books and other educational
materials have become available in past 20 years. Yet, for many reasons, disaster
science is not being applied by those who make policy and program decisions. A
2 Bruce Katz, “How Washington Made Itself Irrelevant,” Washington Post, December 4, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-washington-made-itself-irrelevant/2014/12/04/
d1a1fec0-74c2-11e4-9d9b-86d397daad27_story.html (Katz 2014).
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-washington-made-itself-irrelevant/2014/12/04/d1a1fec0-74c2-11e4-9d9b-86d397daad27_story.html
Reflections on 40 Years in the Hazards & Disasters Community 773
recent, editorial in Science magazine regarding disaster science centers and policy
makers commented on this widening gap between knowledge creators and public
policy makers.3 So while we have seen an increase in knowledge about many
aspects of hazards/disasters and emergency management, growth in knowledge
does not necessarily result in growth in competence and effectiveness.4
6.2.3 The State of Long-Term Recovery
There has been relatively little progress on Long-Term Recovery. Since the 1985
recovery monograph for which I was the lead author,5 I have been quite disap-
pointed in the failure of FEMA to develop an empirical knowledge base, develop
models, and improve understanding and capacity to do long-term recovery. And I
think FEMA should have employed NAPA or the National Academy of Sciences to
assist with its Recovery Framework efforts.
6.2.4 Funds and Flexibility
We need more nonfederal and flexible sources of funding available quickly for
worthwhile projects. We need a new version of PERI – a privately funded, inde-
pendent organization that will quickly and easily provide small grants for inno-
vative projects proposed by researchers or single organizations. We need more
private, nonprofit organizations. The Bill Anderson Fund is an excellent example
of a private, nonprofit organization that supports researchers and applied
research projects while furthering the inclusion of minorities in the EM field.
7 Closing Thought
Like all endeavors, our field has enjoyed a steady progression. There have been
many lurches forward as well as backward. “Punctuated equilibrium” is the term
public administration researchers have used.
3 Marcia McNutt, “Editorial: A Community for Disaster Science,” Science, April 2, 2015, p. 11.
4 See, for example, the excellent presentation by Susan Cutter, “Natural Hazards: Why More
Knowledge Is Not Reducing Losses,” from her Gilbert White Memorial Lecture, December 4, 2014,
available at http://dels.nas.edu/global/besr/GW-Lecture.
5 Claire B. Rubin, with Martin Saperstein and Daniel G. Barbee, Community Recovery after a
Major Natural Disaster, Monograph #41 (Boulder, Colo.: Hazards Research Center, 1985), http://
scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=fmhi_pub.
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774 Claire B. Rubin
In the coming years, we will face new threats and hazards, along with
advances in technology and science. We will have a vastly wider range of choices
and tools, but also a comparably large number of risks and responsibilities.
Are we up to the challenge?
References
Cutter, Susan (2014) “Natural Hazards: Why More Knowledge Is Not Reducing Losses.” Lecture
presented at the Gilbert F. White Lecture Series, Washington, DC, December 4, 2014,
Available at: http://dels.nas.edu/global/besr/GW-Lecture.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2015) “Former Administrators.” Last updated
January 31, 2015, Available at: https://www.fema.gov/former-administrators.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2015) Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Additional Planning and Data Collection Could Help Improve Workforce Management
Efforts, GAO-15-437. Washington, DC, July 2015, Available at: http://www.gao.gov/
assets/680/671276 .
Katz, Bruce. (2014) How Washington Made Itself Irrelevant. Washington Post, December 4,
2014, Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-washington-made-
itself-irrelevant/2014/12/04/d1a1fec0-74c2-11e4-9d9b-86d397daad27_story.html.
National Governors Association (NGA) (1978) Comprehensive Emergency Management Project.
Washington, DC: NGA, (out of print).
Rubin, Claire B., ed. (2012) Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010. 2nd
ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Rubin, Claire B., with Martin Saperstein and Daniel G. Barbee (1985) Community Recovery after
a Major Natural Disaster. Monograph #41. Boulder, CO: Hazards Research Center, Available
at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=fmhi_pub.
Article note: This paper is derived from the Keynote Talk given at the 40th Annual Conference of
the Natural Hazards Center of the University of Colorado/Boulder, Brookfield, CO, July 21, 2015.
The slide set prepared for this talk is on the http://www.RecoveryDiva.com website, posting
dated October 25, 2015.
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https://www.fema.gov/former-administrators
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671276
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671276
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-washington-made-itself-irrelevant/2014/12/04/d1a1fec0-74c2-11e4-9d9b-86d397daad27_story.html
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-washington-made-itself-irrelevant/2014/12/04/d1a1fec0-74c2-11e4-9d9b-86d397daad27_story.html
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=fmhi_pub
http://www.RecoveryDiva.com