Written memos should be 2-3 single-spaced pages, 12-point font. Your memo should discuss topics or questions arising from the week’s reading. You might pull out specific passages to comment on or pull out what you see as a key concept, idea, or argument from the reading. These are thought pieces – they should be coherent, but they are not polished papers. You should end your memo by proposing at least one question for contemplation/discussion.*
Legitimate domination & bureaucracy
- Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1 [1921]Part I, Ch 1 “The Definition of Sociology and Social Action”: pp. 3-12, 22-36 https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.conten…Part I, Ch 3 “The Types of Legitimate Domination”: pp. 212-254 https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.conten…
- Economy and Society, Volume 2 [1921]Ch 9 “Class, Status, Party”: pp. 926-939 https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.conten…Ch 10 “Bureaucracy”: pp. 956-968, 990-998, 1002-1003 https://learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.conten…
Max Weber
ECONOMY
AND
SOCIETY
AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
Edited by Guenther Roth
and Claus Wittich
University of California Press
Berkeley • Los Angeles • London
UniTcrsity of Califonua Press, Berkeley and Los Angdes, Califomia
Umveisity of Califomia Press, Ltd., Lradon, Eng^d
This printing Copyn^t ® 1978 hy The R^ents of the Untveisity of Galifomia
ist printing Copyright © 1968 by Uedminster Press Luxnporated, New Yoric.
All ri^ts reserved. No part of this hook may be reproduced or transmitted in any form
or by any
electnaic or mechanical, i^uding {rfiotocopying, recording or vf any
information stor^e and retrieval system, whhout permission in writing frmn the puUishers.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 74-81443
ISBN: 0-520-03500-3 (alk. paper)
Printed in the United States of America
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Economy and Society is a translation of Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
Cntrtdriss der verstenenden Soziologie, based on the 4th German edition, Johannes
Winckelmann C^.}, Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paid Siebeck), 1956, pp. 1-550,
559-822, as revised in the 1964 paperback edition (Kdln-Berlm: Kiepenheuei &
Witsch), with appendices firom Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 2nd rev. edition, Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), Tubingen: J. C. B.
Mohx (Paul Siebeck), 1951, pp. 441-467 (selected passages), and Max Weber,
Gesammelte politische Schriften, 2nd expanded edition, Johannes Winckelmaim (ed.),
Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958, pp. 294-394.
The eirclusive license to make this Engh’sh edition has been wanted to the University
of Califomia Press by the Gemtan hdder of rights, J. C. 0. Mohr (Paul Siebeck),
Tubingen.
The English text includes (with revisions and with addition of notes) material
previously published and copyrighted by these publishers:
Beacon Press:
Ephraim Fischoff, trans.. The Sociohgy of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963),
pp. 1-274. Copyright © 1963 by Beacon Press. Reprinted by arrangement with
B^con Press.
Oxford Universitv Press:
Hans Gerth ana C. Wright Mills, trans, and eds.. From Max Weher: Essays in
Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 159-244, 253-262. Copy
right 1946 by Oxford University Press, Inc. British ^mmonw^th rights by Roudeage
and Kegan Paul Ltd. Reprinted by permission.
The Free Press of Glencoe:
Ferdinand Kolegar, trans., “Tlie Household Community” and “Ethnic Groups,” in
Talcott Parsons et al., eds., Theories of Society (New Vorx: The Free Press of Qencoe,
1961), vol. 1, pp. 296-298, 302-309. Copyright ® 1961 by The Free Press of Glencoe.
Reprinted by permission.
Talcott Parsons, ed. (A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons, trans.). The Theory of Social
and Ecortomic Organization (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964; originally
published by Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 87-423. Copyri^t 1947 by The
Free Press of Glencoe. Reprinted by permission.
Harvard Unhersity Press:
Max Rheinstein, ed. (Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, trans.). Max Weber on Law
in Economy and Society (20th Century Legal Philoso^y Series, Vol. VI; Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi^ Press, 1954), pp. it-340. Copyri^t, 1954 by the
President and Fellows of Harvani CoU^.
permisston.
Correspondence about these sections of the En^ish translation should be directed to the
above publishers. See edimts’ prefooe for details abotU theix locaticm in this edition.
SUMMARY CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
xxv
VOLUME I
PREFACE TO THE 1978 RE-ISSUE xxix
PREFACE xxxi
INTRODUCTION hy Guenther Roth xxxiii
PART ONE: CONCEPTUAL EXPOSITION
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Basic Sociological Terms 3
Sociological Categories of Economic Action 63
The Types of Legitimate Domination 212
Status Groups and Classes 302
PART TWO: THE ECONOMY AND THE ARENA OF
NORMATIVE AND DE FACTO POWERS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
The Economy and Social Norms 311
The Economic Relationships of Organized Groups 339
Household, Neighborhood and Kin Group 356
Household, Enterprise and Oifeos 370
Ethnic Groups 385
Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion) 399
The Market: Its Impersonality and Ethic (Fragment) 635
VOLUME 2
VIII.
IX.
X.
XI.
Economy and Law (The Sociology of Law) 641
Political Communities 901
Domination and Legitimacy 941
Bureaucracy 956
[v]
VI
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
SUMMARY CONTENTS
Patriarchalistn and Patrimonialism 1006
Feudalism,
and Patrimonialism 1070
Charisma and Its Transformation 1111
Political and Hierocratic Domination 1158
The City (Non-Legitimate Domination) 1212
APPENDICES
I. Types of Social Action and Groups 1375
II. Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany
INDEX
Scholars iii
Historical Names v
Subjects xi
1381
CHAPTER
I
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL
TERMS
Prefatory Note
An introductory discussion of concepts can hardly be dispensed with,
in spite of the fact that it is unavoidably abstract and hence gives the
impression of remoteness from reality. The method employed makes no
claim to any kind of novelty. On the contrary it attempts only to formu
late what all empirical sociology really means when it deals with the
same problems, in what it is hoped is a more convenient and somewhat
more exact terminology, even though on that account it may seem
pedantic. This is true even where terms are used which are apparendy
new or unfamiliar. As compared to the author’s essay in Logos,^ the
terminology has been simplified as far as possible and hence considerably
changed in order to render it more easily understandable. The most
precise formulation cannot always be reconciled with a form which can
readily be popularized. In such cases the latter aim has had to be
sacrificed.
On the concept of “understanding”^ compare the Allgemeine Psychopathologie of Karl Jaspers, also a few observations by Heinrich Rickeit
in the second edition of the Grenzen der natunnssensckaftlichen Begriffshildung and particularly some of Simmel’s discussions in the
Prohleme der Ceschtchtsphilosophie. For certain methodological con
siderations the reader may here be referred, as often before in the
author’s writing, to the procedure of Friedrich Gotd in his work Die
hferrschaft des Worfes; this book, to be sure, is written in a somewhat
difficult style and its argument does not appear everywhere to have been
thoroughly thought through. As regards content, reference may be made
[3I
4
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS
[ Ck. 1
especially to the fine work of Ferdinand Tonnies, Gemeinschaft und
Gesellsckaft, and also to the gravely misleading book of Rudolf Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht nock der materialisHschen Geschicktsauffassung, which may be compared with my criticism in the Archiv fiir
Sozialwissenschaft Cvol. 14, 1907, [GAzW, 291-359]). This critical
essay contains many of the fundamental ideas of the following exposi
tion. The present work departs from Simmel’s method (in his Soziologie
and his Philosophic des Geldes’) in drawing a sharp distinction between
subjectively intended and objectively valid “meanings”; two different
things which Simmel not only fails to distinguish but often deliberately
treats as belonging together.
I. The Definition of Sociology and of Social Action
Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used
here) is a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding
of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and
consequences. We shall speak of “action” insofar as the acting individual
attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior—be it overt or covert,
omission or acquiescence. Action is “sociaF’insofar as its subjective mean
ing takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its
course.’
A. METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS*
1. “Meaning” may be of two kinds. The term may refer first to the
actual existing meaning in the given concrete case of a particular actor,
or to the average or approximate meaning attributable to a given plurality
of actors; or secondly to the theoretically conceived pure type” of subjec
tive meaning attributed to the hypothetical actor or actors in a given
type of action. In no case does it refer to an objectively “correct” mean
ing or one which is “true” in some metaphysical sense. It is this which
distinguishes the empirical sciences of action, such as sociology and
history, from the dogmatic disciplines in that area, such as jurisprudence,
logic, ethics, and esdietics, which seek to ascertain the “true” and “valid”
meanings associated with the objects of their investigation.
2. The line between meaningful action and merely reactive behavior
to which no subjective meaning is attached, cannot be sharply drawn
empirically. A very considerable part of all sociologically relevant be
havior, especially purely traditional behavior, is marginal between the
1]
Definitions of Sociology and of Social Action
5
two. In the case of some psychophysical processes, meaningful, i.e., sub
jectively understandable, action is not to be found at all; in others it is
discernible only by the psychologist. Many mystical experiences which
cannot be adequately communicated in words are, for a person who is
not susceptible to such experiences, not fully understandable. At the
same time the ability to perform a similar action is not a necessary pre
requisite to understanding; “one need not have been Caesar in order to
understand Caesar.” “Recapturing an experience” is important for ac
curate understanding, but not an absolute precondition for its interpreta
tion. Understandable and non-understandable components of a process
are often intermingled and bound up together.
3. All interpretation of meaning, like all scientific observations,
strives for clarity and verifiable accuracy of insight and comprehension
CEvidenz^.* The basis for certainty in understanding can be either
rational, which can be further subdivided into logical and mathematical,
or it can be of an emotionally empathic or artistically appreciative qual
ity. Action is rationally evident chiefly when we attain a completely clear
intellectual grasp of the action-elements in their intended context of
meaning. Empathic or appreciative accuracy is attained when, through
sympathetic participation, we can adequately grasp the emotional context
in which the action took place. The highest degree of rational under
standing is attained in cases involving the meanings of logically or
mathematically related propositions; their meaning may be immediately
and unambiguously intelligible. We have a perfectly clear understanding
of what it means when somebody employs the proposition 2 X 2 = 4 or
the Pythagorean theorem in reasoning or argument, or when someone
correctly carries out a logical train of reasoning according to our accepted
modes of thinking. In the same way we also understand what a person
is doing when he tries to achieve certain ends by choosing appropriate
means on the basis of the facts of the situation, as experience has accus
tomed us to interpret them. The interpretation of such rationally pur
poseful action possesses, for the understanding of the choice of means,
the highest degree of verifiable certainty. With a lower degree of
certainty, which is, however, adequate for most purposes of explanation,
we are able to understand errors, including confusion of problems of the
sort that we ourselves are liable to, or the origin of which we can detect
by sympathetic self-analysis.
On the other hand, many ultimate ends or values toward which
experience shows that human action may be oriented, often cannot be
understood completely, though sometimes we are able to grasp them
intellectually. The more radically they differ from our own ultimate
values, however, the more difficult it is for us to understand them em-
6
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS
[ Ch. I
pathically. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case we
must be content either with a purely intellectual understanding of such
values or when even that fails, sometimes we must simply accept them
as given data. Then we can try to understand the action motivated by
them on the basis of whatever opportunities for approximate emotional
and intellectual interpretation seem to be available at different points in
its course. These difficulties confront, for instance, people not susceptible
to unusual acts of religious and charitable zeal, or persons who abhor
extreme rationalist fanaticism (such as the fanatic advocacy of the
“rights of man”).
The more we ourselves are susceptible to such emotional reactions as
anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, love, enthusiasm, pride, vengefulness, loyalty, devotion, and appetites of all sorts, and to the “irrational”
conduct which grows out of them, the more readily can we empathize
with them. Even when such emotions are found in a degree of intensity
of which the observer himself is completely incapable, he can still have
a significant degree of emotional understanding of their meaning and
can interpret intellectually their influence on the course of action and the
selection of means.
For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to
treat all irrational, affectually determined elements of behavior as factors
of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action. For ex
ample a panic on the stock exchange can be most conveniendy analysed
by attempting to determine first what the course of action would have
been if it had not been influenced by irrational affects; it is then possible
to introduce the irrational components as accounting for the observed
deviations from this hypothetical course. Similarly, in analysing a polit
ical or military campaign it is convenient to determine in the first place
what would have been a rational course, given the ends of the partici
pants and adequate knowledge of all the circumstances. Only in this
way is it possible to assess the causal significance of irrational factors as
accounting for the deviations from this type. The construction of a
purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as
a type (ideal type) which has the merit of clear understandability and
lack of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is possible to understand
the ways in which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all
sorts, such as affects and errors, in that they account for the deviation
from the line of conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis
that the action were purely rational.
Only in this respect and for these reasons of methodological conven
ience is the method of sociology “rationalistic.” It is naturally not Inti
mate to interpret this procedure as involving a rationalistic bias of
1]
Defnitions of Sociology and of Social Action
7
sociology, but only as a methodological device. It certainly does not in
volve a belief in the actual predominance of rational elements in human
life, for on the question of how far this predominance does or does not
exist, nothing whatever has been said. That there is, however, a danger
of rationalistic interpretations where they are out of place cannot be
denied. All experience unfortunately confirms the existence of this
danger.
4. In all the sciences of human action, account must be taken of
processes and phenomena which are devoid of subjective meaning, in the
role of stimuli, results, favoring or hindering circumstances. To be
devoid of meaning is not identical with being lifeless or non-human;
every artifact, such as for example a machine, can be understood only
in terms of the meaning which its production and use have had or were
intended to have; a meaning which may derive from a relation to exceed
ingly various purposes. Without reference to this meaning such an
object remains wholly unintelligible. That which is intelligible or under
standable about it is thus its relation to human action in the role either
of means or of end; a relation of which the actor or actors can be said to
have been aware and to which their action has been oriented. Only in
terms of such categories is it possible to “understand” objects of this kind.
On the other hand processes or conditions, whether they are animate or
inanimate, human or non-human, are in the present sense devoid of
meaning in so far as they cannot be related to an intended purpose. That
is to say they are devoid of meaning if they cannot be related to action
in the role of means or ends but constitute only the stimulus, the favor
ing or hindering circumstances. It may be that the flooding of the
Doliart [at the mouth of the Ems river near the Dutch-German border]
in 1277 had historical significance as a stimulus to the beginning of
certain migrations of considerable importance. Human mortality, indeed
the organic life cycle from the helplessness of infancy to that of old age,
is naturally of the very greatest sociological importance through the
various ways in which human action has been oriented to these facts.
To still another category of facts devoid of meaning belong certain
psychic or psychophysical phenomena such as fatigue, habituation,
memory, etc.; also certain typical states of euphoria under some condi
tions of ascetic mortification; finally, typical variations in the reactions of
individuals according to reaction-time, precision, and other modes. But
in the last analysis the same principle applies to these as to other
phenomena which are devoid of meaning. Both the actor and the soci
ologist must accept them as data to be taken into account.
It is possible that future research may be able to discover noninterpretable uniformities underlying what has appeared to be specif-
8
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS
[ Ch. I
ically meaningful action, though little has been accomplished in this
direction thus far. Thus, for example, differences in hereditary biological
constitution, as of “races,” would have to be treated by sociology as given
data in the same way as the physiological facts of the need of nutrition
or the effect of senescence on action. This would be the case if, and in
sofar as, we had statistically conclusive proof of their influence on socio
logically relevant behavior. The recognition of the causal significance
of such factors would not in the least alter the specific task of sociological
analysis or of that of the other sciences of action, which is the interpreta
tion of action in terms of its subjective meaning. The effect would be
only to introduce certain non-interpretable data of the same order as
others which are already present, into the complex of subjectively under
standable motivation at certain points. (Thus it may come to be known
that there are typical relations between the frequency of certain types of
teleological orientation of action or of the degree of certain kinds of
rationality and the cephalic index or skin color or any other bioli^cally
inherited characteristic.)
5. Understanding may be of two kinds: the first is the direct observa
tional understanding’ of the subjective meaning of a given act as such,
including verbal utterances. We thus understand by direct observation,
in this case, the meaning of the proposition 2X2 = 4 when we hear
or read it. This is a case of the direct rational understanding of ideas.
We also understand an outbreak of anger as manifested by facial expres
sion, exclamations or irrational movements. This is direct observational
understanding of irrational emotional reactions. We can understand in
a similar observational way the action of a woodcutter or of somebody
who reaches for the knob to shut a door or who aims a gun at an animal.
This is rational observational understanding of actions.
Understanding may, however, be of another sort, namely explanatory
understanding. Thus we understand in terms of motive the meaning an
actor attaches to the proposition twice two equals four, when he states
it or writes it down, in that we understand what makes him do this at
precisely this moment and in these circumstances. Understanding in this
sense is attained if we know that he is engaged in balancing a ledger or
in making a scientific demonstration, or is engaged in some other task
of which this particular act would be an appropriate part. This is ra
tional understanding of motivation, which consists in placing the act in
an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning.* Thus we under
stand the chopping of wood or aiming of a gun in terms of motive in
addition to direct observation if we know that the woodchopper is work
ing for a wage or is chopping a supply of firewood for his own use or
possibly is doing it for recreation. But he might also be working off a
I]
Definitions of Sociology and of Social Action
9
fit of rage, an irrational case. Similarly we understand the motive of a
person aiming a gun if we know that he has been commanded to shoot
as a member of a firing squad, that he is fighting against an enemy, or
that he is doing it for revenge. The last is affectually determined and
dius in a certain sense irrational. Finally we have a motivational under
standing of the outburst of anger if we know that it has been provoked
by jealousy, injured pride, or an insult. The last examples are all affec
tually determined and hence derived from irrational motives. In all the
above cases the particular act has been placed in an understandable
sequence of motivation, the understanding of which can be treated as an
explanation of the actual course of behavior. Thus for a science which
is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires
a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual course of under
standable action thus interpreted belongs. In all such cases, even where
the processes are largely affectual, the subjective meaning of the action,
including that also of the relevant meaning complexes, will be called the
intended meaning.® (This involves a departure from ordinary usage,
which speaks of intention in this sense only in the case of rationally pur
posive action.)
6. In all these cases understanding involves the interpretive grasp of
the meaning present in one of the following contexts: (a) as in the his
torical approach, the actually intended meaning for concrete individual
action; or (b) as in cases of sociological mass phenomena, the average of,
or an approximation to, the actually intended meaning; or (c) the mean
ing appropriate to a scientifically formulated pure type (an ideal type)
of a common phenomenon. The concepts and “laws” of pure economic
theory are examples of this kind of ideal type. They stale what course a
given type of human action would take if it were strictly rational, un
affected by errors or emotional factors and if, furthermore, it were com
pletely and unequivocally directed to a single end, the maximization of
economic advantage. In reality, action takes exactly this course only in
unusual cases, as sometimes on the stock exchange; and even then there
is usually only an approximation to the ideal type. (On the purpose of
such constructions, see my essay in AfS, 19 [cf. n. 5] and point 11 below.)
Every interpretation attempts to attain clarity and certainty, but no
matter how clear an interpretation as such appears to be from the point
of view of meaning, it cannot on this account claim to be the causally
valid interpretation. On this level it must remain only a peculiarly
plausible hypothesis. In the first place the “conscious motives” may well,
even to the actor himself, conceal the various “motives” and “repressions”
which constitute the real driving force of his action. Thus in such cases
even subjectively honest self-analysis has only a relative value. Then it
I o
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS
[ Ch. I
is the task of the sociologist to be aware of this motivational situation
and to describe and analyse it, even though it has not actually been con
cretely part of the conscious intention of the actor; possibly not at all,
at least not fully. This is a borderline case of the interpretation of mean
ing. Secondly, processes of action which seem to an observer to be the
same or similar may fit into exceedingly various complexes of motive in
the case of the actual actor. Then even though the situations appear
superficially to be very similar we must actually understand them or
interpret them as very different, perhaps, in terms of meaning, directly
opposed. (Simmel, in his Prohleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, gives a
number of examples.) Third, the actors in any given situation are often
subject to opposing and conflicting impulses, all of which we are able to
understand. In a large number of cases we know from experience it is
not possible to arrive at even an approximate estimate of the relative
strength of conflicting motives and very often we cannot be certain of
our interpretation. Only the actual outcome of the conflict gives a solid
basis of judgment.
More generally, verification of subjective interpretation by compari
son with the concrete course of events is, as in the case of all hypotheses,
indispensable. Unfortunately this type of verification is feasible with
relative accuracy only in the few very special cases susceptible of
psychological experimentation. In very different degrees of approximation,
such verification is also feasible in the limited number of cases of mass
phenomena which can be statistically described and unambiguously
interpreted. For the rest there remains only tlie possibility of comparing
the largest possible number of historical or contemporary processes
which, while otherwise similar, differ in the one decisive point of their
relation to the particular motive or factor the role of which is being
investigated. This is a fundamental task of comparative sociology.
Often, unfortunately, there is available only the uncertain procedure
of the “imaginary experiment” which consists in thinking away certain
elements of a chain of motivation and working out the course of action
which would then probably ensue, thus arriving at a causal judgment.”
For example, the generalization called Gresham’s Law is a rationally
clear interpretation of human action under certain conditions and under
the assumption that it will follow a purely rational course. How far any
actual course of action corresponds to this can be verified only by the
available statistical evidence for the actual disappearance of under-valued
monetary units from circulation. In this case our information serves to
demonstrate a high degree of accuracy. The facts of experience were
known before the generalization, which was formulated afterwards;
but without this successful interpretation our need for causal understand-
I3
Definitions of Sociology and of Social Action
ii
ing would evidently be left unsatisfied. On the other hand, without the
demonstration that what can here be assumed to be a theoretically ade
quate interpretation also is in some degree relevant to an actual course
of action, a “law,” no matter how fully demonstrated theoretically, would
be worthless for the understanding of action in the real world. In this
case the correspondence between the theoretical interpretation of motiva
tion and its empirical verification is entirely satisfactory and the cases are
numerous enough so that verification can be considered established. But
to take another example, Eduard Meyer has ad\’anced an ingenious
theory of the causal significance of the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and
Platea for the development of the cultural peculiarities of Greek, and
hence, more generally, Western, civilization.” This is derived from a
meaningful interpretation of certain symptomatic facts having to do
with the attitudes of the Greek oracles and prophets towards the Per
sians. It can only be directly verified by reference to the examples of the
conduct of the Persians in cases where they were victorious, as in
Jerusalem, Egypt, and Asia Minor, and even this verification must neces
sarily remain unsatisfactory in certain respects. The striking rational
plausibility of the hypothesis must here necessarily be relied on as a sup
port. In very many cases of historical interpretation which seem highly
plausible, however, there is not even a possibility of the order of verifica
tion which was feasible in this case. Where this is true the interpretation
must necessarily remain a hypothesis.
7. A motive is a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the
actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in
question. The interpretation of a coherent course of conduct is “sub
jectively adequate” (or “adequate on the level of meaning”), insofar as,
according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling, its component
parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to constitute a
“typical” complex of meaning.” It is more common to say “correct.” The
interpretation of a sequence of events will on the other hand be called
causally adequate insofar as, according to established generalizations
from experience, there is a probability that it will always actually occur
in the same way. An example of adequacy on the level of meaning
in this sense is what is, according to our current norms of calculation or
thinking, the correct solution of an arithmetical problem. On the other
hand, a causally adequate interpretation of the same phenomenon would
concern the statistical probability that, according to verified generaliza
tions from experience, there would be a correct or an erroneous solution
of the same problem. This also refers to currently accepted norms but
includes taking account of typical errors or of typical confusions. Thus
causal explanation depends on being able to determine that there is a
I 2
BASIC SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS
[ Ch. 1
probability, which in the rare ideal case can be numerically stated, but is
always in some sense calculable, that a given observable event (overt or
subjective) will be followed or accompanied by another event.
A correct causal interpretation of a concrete course of action is arrived
at when the overt action and the motives have both been correcdy appre
hended and at the same time their relation has become meaningfully
comprehensible. A correct causal interpretation of typical action means
that the process which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both ade
quately grasped on the level of meaning and at the same time the inter
pretation is to some degree causally adequate. If adequacy in respect to
meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity
and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it is
still an incomprehensible statistical probability, whether we deal with
overt or subjective processes. On the other hand, even the most perfect
adequacy on the level of meaning has causal significance from a socio
logical point of view only insofar as there is some kind of proof for the
existence of a probability’^ that action in fact normally takes the course
which has been held to be meaningful. For this there must be some
degree of determinable frequency of approximation to an average or a
pure type.
Statistical uniformities constitute understandable types of action, and
thus constitute sociological generalizations, only when they can be
regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning
a course of social action. Conversely, formulations of a rational course
of subjectively understandable action constitute sociological types of
empirical process only when they can be empirically observed with a
significant degree of approximation. By no means is the actual likelihood
of the occurrence of a given course of overt action always directly pro
portional to the clarity of subjective interpretation. Only actual experi
ence can prove whether this is so in a given case. There are statistics of
processes devoid of subjective meaning, such as death rates, phenomena
of fatigue, the production rate of machines, the amount of rainfall, in
exactly the same sense as there are statistics of meaningful phenomena.
But only when the phenomena are meaningful do we speak of socio
logical statistics. Examples are such cases as crime rates, occupational
distributions, price statistics, and statistics of crop acreage. Naturally
there are many cases where both components are involv^, as in crop
statistics.
8. Processes and uniformities which it has here seemed convenient
not to designate as sociological phenomena or uniformities because they
are not “understandable,” are naturally not on that account any the less
important. This is true even for sociology in our sense which is restricted
I]
Definitions of Sociology and of Social Action
i3
to subjectively understandable phenomena—a usage which there is no
intention of attempting to impose on anyone else. Such phenomena,
however important, are simply treated by a different method from the
others; they become conditions, stimuli, furthering or hindering circum
stances of action.
9. Action in the sense of subjectively understandable orientation of
behavior exists only as the behavior of one or more individual human
beings. For other cognitive purposes it may be useful or necessary to
consider the individual, for instance, as a collection of cells, as a complex
of bio