1) You will choose one of six from the six articles describing the topic or trend and
2) You will reflect on how it could affect you in your future career in criminal justice.
This assignment must be written in APA format, which means you must have a title page, (no abstract needed), content page(s), and a reference page with at least three (3) reliable sources. You must write in 3rd person, do not use any contractions unless they are in a direct quote, and number your pages in the top right-hand corner. Also, you must cite your authors within the text (i.e., in-text citations). If you paraphrase ANYTHING, you must give the author(s) credit.
YOU MUST HAVE AT LEAST 2 to 3 PAGES OF CONTENT!
For this assignment, you must address the following prompts with evidence from your selected article, and three (3) reliable sources (your original article and two others):
- Describe the trend presented in your selected articles and how it affects the field of criminal justice,
- Explain how current criminal justice professionals are addressing the trend presented in your selected article, and
- Reflect on how you believe this trend will affect your future career in criminal justice taking into account your unique strengths and weaknesses.
Assignment directions
You will choose an article that meets the following requirements:
- Acceptable topics: Criminal justice or criminology topic covered in the textbook or related material (i.e., theories of criminology, criminal justice, etc.).
- Articles must come from reliable publishing sources (Blogs, Wikipedia, and online encyclopedia entries are not acceptable). If you are unsure if the source is reliable, contact me for clarification.
The additional reliable sources must be synthesized with the original article. This assignment must have two full pages of content written in the 3rd person. Make sure that your entire project and references are in APA format. The article or article link and write-up should be submitted using the Hot Topic Reflection Assignment Link located in Canvas.
Articles *Choose one article*
84 Torin Monahan
84 Social Justice Vol. 37, Nos. 2–3 (2010–2011)
The Future of Security?
Surveillance Operations at
Homeland Security Fusion Centers
Torin Monahan*
The U.S. “war on Terror” haS fUeled reMarkable developMenTS in STaTe surveillance. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the country witnessed a rise in domestic spying programs, including warrant-
less wiretaps of the communications of citizens, investigations into the borrowing
habits of library patrons, infiltration of peace-activist groups by government agents,
and the establishment of tip hotlines to encourage people to report suspicious
others (Monahan, 2010). Rather than interpret these and similar developments as
originating with the “war on terror,” scholars in the field of surveillance studies
have correctly noted that the events of September 11 provided an impetus for a
surge in many preexisting, but perhaps dormant, forms of state surveillance (Wood,
Konvitz, and Ball, 2003). Similarly, such domestic surveillance practices neither
began nor ended with the George W. Bush administration; instead, state surveil-
lance has grown and mutated in response to changing perceptions of the nature of
terrorist threats and the predilections of the Obama administration.
In particular, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has renewed its com-
mitment to creating a robust, nationwide network of “fusion centers” to share and
analyze data on citizens and others. As of 2010, at least 72 fusion centers existed at
the state and regional levels throughout the United States, with many of them listed
as “intelligence centers” or “information analysis centers.” Officially, such centers
prioritize counterterrorism activities, such as conducting “threat assessments” for
events and linking “suspicious activities reports” to other data to create profiles
of individuals or groups that might present terrorist risks. In this capacity, fusion
centers engage in a form of “intelligence-led policing” that targets individuals who
match certain profiles and singles them out for further monitoring or preemptive
intervention (Ratcliffe, 2003; Wilson and Weber, 2008).
* Torin Monahan is Associate Professor of Human and Organizational Development and Medicine
at Vanderbilt University (e-mail: torin.monahan@vanderbilt.edu). He is a member of the International
Surveillance Studies Network. Among his books are Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity (Rutgers
University Press, 2010), Schools under Surveillance: Cultures of Control in Public Education (Rutgers
University Press, 2010), Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday
Life (Routledge, 2006), and Globalization, Technological Change, and Public Education (Routledge,
2005).
Homeland Security Fusion Centers 85
Most fusion centers are located within state and local police departments.
Police, FBI, and DHS analysts, whose salaries are usually funded by their respec-
tive organizations, typically staff the centers. A common exception is when police
representatives are funded in part or completely by DHS grants for the centers.
In addition to conducting threat assessments and compiling suspicious-activities
reports, fusion center analysts routinely respond to requests for information from
state and local police, other fusion centers, or government agencies and organiza-
tions such as the FBI, DHS, the Secret Service, or the Department of Defense. When
seen as pertinent, fusion centers also share information with private companies,
such as those operating public utilities or managing other critical infrastructures
(Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008; Monahan, 2009).
Although the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Center, established
in 1996, is often credited as being the first fusion center (German and Stanley,
2008), most were formed after the release of the September 11 Commission Report
in 2004. The early fusion centers built upon and often incorporated the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s “Joint Terrorism Task Force” (JTTF) program, thereby
hardwiring FBI connections into fusion centers, but allowing for greater information
sharing than JTTFs afforded (German and Stanley, 2007). Since their inception,
the orientation of many fusion centers has expanded to include “all hazards” and
“all threats,” such as responding to environmental catastrophes or investigating
non-terrorist criminal gangs (Rollins, 2008). One likely reason for this expansion
is that the police departments housing fusion centers are trying to translate DHS
priorities and apply DHS funds to address local needs (Monahan and Palmer, 2009).
Fusion centers are rapidly becoming a hallmark of the Obama administration’s
domestic security apparatus. Since 2009, 14 more fusion centers have come on
line and the DHS and the Department of Justice have pledged more funding sup-
port for fusion centers (Burdeau, 2010; Geiger, 2009). On the surface, the increase
in financial and political support for fusion centers should not be that surprising
since DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano was a vocal advocate of the well-regarded
Arizona-based fusion center, which she helped to create when she was governor
of that state (Hylton, 2009). As DHS Secretary, Napolitano (2009) has reaffirmed
this support: “I believe that Fusion Centers will be the centerpiece of state, local,
federal intelligence-sharing for the future and that the Department of Homeland
Security will be working and aiming its programs to underlie Fusion Centers.”
Attorney General Eric Holder (2010) has also affirmed fusion centers as vital to
the ongoing “war on terror”: “We are at war. This is the reality in which we live.
And our fusion centers are on the frontlines of America’s best, and most effective,
efforts to fight back.”
On a deeper level, fusion centers are probably aligned better with the politics
of the Obama administration because its surveillance practices appear to be pas-
sive, disembodied, and objective. For instance, it has profoundly increased the use
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) internationally and domestically (Wall and
86 Torin Monahan
Monahan, 2011; Walters and Weber, 2010). Barring instances of obvious abuse,
the fusion and analysis of abstract forms of disparate data do not, in themselves,
seem particularly egregious. Indeed, the stated purposes of fusion centers, at least
in principle, sound innocuous and rational: “The [fusion] centers’ goals are to blend
law enforcement and intelligence information, and coordinate security measures
to reduce threats in local communities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2008). Analysts at fusion centers could be thought of as engaging in types of “soft
surveillance” (Marx, 2006) that are minimally invasive, at least for most people, and
therefore are not nearly as objectionable to the general public as the more invasive
articulations of police or state surveillance, such as physical searches, mandatory
DNA collection, or telecommunication wiretaps.
Although fusion centers were formed under the Bush administration, largely
in response to criticism from the September 11 Commission over intelligence
failures leading up to the September 11 attacks, politically speaking this finding
of failure was a sore point for President Bush and the relevant security agencies,
such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the National Security Agency. Moreover, whereas DHS was established rapidly in
2002, DHS-sponsored fusion centers did not substantially take off until 2005. A case
could be made that the supposedly objective, intelligence-led orientation of fusion
centers was actually in tension with the general timbre of aggressive, masculinist
intervention that characterized many aspects of the “war on terror” under the Bush
administration. In contradistinction, the patient police work done by analysts in
fusion centers could be viewed as being much smarter and more reflective, and
therefore somewhat feminized compared to other modalities of the “war on terror.”
DHS officials have explicitly referred to fusion centers as engaging in “thoughtful
analysis” (Riegle, 2009) and have implemented workshops and classes to teach
fusion center analysts “critical thinking, analytic tools, techniques, and writing”
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008: 16). These articulations are a far cry
from the action-oriented counterterrorism myths circulated by entertainment shows
like 24, which were embraced by former White House deputy chief of staff Karl
Rove and former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, among others (Monahan, 2010).
In this light, the operations and concept of fusion centers resonate better with the
crafted image of President Obama as a thoughtful, measured, and intelligent leader.
Surveillance of abstract data—or “dataveillance” (Clarke, 2001)—may be per-
ceived as being less intrusive and less threatening than are video cameras, wiretaps,
or other technologies that are traditionally associated with surveillance (Ericson
and Haggerty, 1997; Marx, 2006). Provided that the data do not involve informa-
tion considered sensitive, such as pharmacy or bank records, people definitely
do not find dataveillance to be as intrusive as physical searches of individuals or
individual property (Slobogin, 2008). Nonetheless, these viewpoints neglect the
extent to which personal data are constantly being generated, captured, and circu-
lated by the many information systems and technologies with which people come
Homeland Security Fusion Centers 87
in contact (e.g., cell phones, credit cards, the Internet). When “fused,” whether by
a marketing firm or a state entity, these data can paint a disturbingly fine-grained
representation of individuals, their associations, preferences, and risks. Anyone who
has access to such “data doubles” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2006) is in a position to
know and act on a great deal of information that might otherwise be considered
personal and private. It is perhaps much more personal and private than that which
could be gleaned from more traditional surveillance techniques. Even more dis-
concerting for individuals is the fact that although the data generated by our many
information systems are always partial and sometimes grossly inaccurate, they can
still negatively affect one’s life experiences and chances (e.g., through one’s credit
score or one’s terrorist-risk score).
Therefore, the phenomenon of fusion centers must be situated within the context
of surveillance societies. Broadly speaking, surveillance societies operate upon
imperatives of data gathering and data monitoring, often through technological
systems, for purposes of governance and control (Lyon, 2001; Monahan, 2010;
Murakami Wood et al., 2006). These particular logics of surveillance were not
invented by U.S. national security agencies in response to the September 11 at-
tacks. Instead, fusion centers and other surveillance-oriented security organizations
draw upon existing practices of voracious data collection and fluid information
exchange, as exemplified by social networking sites such as Facebook or private-
sector data aggregators such as Entersect, a company that actively partners with
fusion centers to share its purported “12 billion records on about 98 per cent of
Americans” (O’Harrow, Jr., 2008).
Thus, there is also a neoliberal dimension to fusion centers, in that they purchase
data from the private sector, sometimes hire private data analysts, and share infor-
mation with industry partners (Monahan, 2009). By forming information-sharing
partnerships, analysts at fusion centers seek to “connect the dots” to prevent future
terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, government officials are very interested in figuring
out ways in which DHS in general and fusion centers in particular can assist the
private sector, presumably by enabling and protecting the ability of companies to
profit financially (Monahan, 2010). As DHS Under Secretary Caryn Wagner stated
in her 2010 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
I&A [DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis] will continue to advocate
for sustained funding for the fusion centers as the linchpin of the evolving
homeland security enterprise. While I&A’s support to state, local and tribal
partners is steadily improving, there is still work to be done in how best
to support the private sector. We intend to explore ways to extend our
efforts in this area beyond the established relationships with the critical
infrastructure sectors (Wagner, 2010; emphasis added).
In some respects, fusion centers suffer from a mandate that is too open-ended
and from guidelines that are too ambiguous. The task of fusing data to produce
88 Torin Monahan
“intelligence” that can be used to prevent terrorist acts or respond to “all crimes”
or “all hazards” amounts to an invitation for individuals at these centers to engage
in almost any surveillance practices that make sense to them. As noted, this flex-
ibility could have the redeeming value of allowing police departments to use DHS
and other resources for needs that are perceived as being meaningful for particular
jurisdictions (Monahan and Palmer, 2009). However, evidence suggests that people
at some fusion centers are also exploiting the significant leeway granted to them to
engage in racial profiling, political profiling, illegal data mining, and illegal data
collection. The surveillance capabilities of fusion centers enable and invite “mis-
sion creep” or “function creep,” whereby analysts draw upon the resources at their
disposal to exceed the policies and laws that are intended to govern their activities
(Ibid.). Moreover, the guidelines for fusion centers are quite ambiguous and there
is a general absence of oversight regarding their activities (German and Stanley,
2007). In the following sections, I will review in detail a few cases of abuse by
fusion centers and discuss the issues raised by such examples.
Fusion Center Abuses
Given the secretive nature of fusion centers, including their resistance to freedom
of information requests (German and Stanley, 2008; Stokes, 2008), the primary
way in which the public has learned about their activities is through leaked or unin-
tentionally disseminated documents. For instance, a “terrorism threat assessment”
produced by Virginia’s fusion center surfaced in 2009 and sparked outrage because
it identified students at colleges and universities—especially at historically black
universities—as posing a potential terrorist threat (Sizemore, 2009). In the report,
universities were targeted because of their diversity, which is seen as threatening
because it might inspire “radicalization.” The report says: “Richmond’s history as
the capital city of the Confederacy, combined with the city’s current demographic
concentration of African-American residents, contributes to the continued presence
of race-based extremist groups…[and student groups] are recognized as a radicaliza-
tion node for almost every type of extremist group” (Virginia Fusion Center, 2009:
9). Although the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others have rightly
decried the racial-profiling implications of such biased claims being codified in an
official document, the report itself supports the interpretation that minority students
will be and probably have been targeted for surveillance. The report argues: “In
order to detect and deter terrorist attacks, it is essential that information regarding
suspected terrorists and suspicious activity in Virginia be closely monitored and
reported in a timely manner” (Ibid: 4). Other groups identified as potential threats
by the Virginia fusion center were environmentalists, militia members, and students
at Regent University, the Christian university founded by evangelical preacher Pat
Robertson (Sizemore, 2009).
Another threat-assessment report, compiled by the Missouri Information
Analysis Center (MIAC), found “the modern militia movement” to be worthy of
Homeland Security Fusion Centers 89
focused investigation. The 2009 report predicted a resurgence in right-wing mi-
litia activities because of high levels of unemployment and anger at the election
of the nation’s first black president, Barack Obama, who many right-wing militia
members might view as illegitimate and/or in favor of stronger gun-control laws
(Missouri Information Analysis Center, 2009). The greatest stir caused by the
report was its claim that “militia members most commonly associate with 3rd
party political groups…. These members are usually supporters of former Presi-
dential Candidate: Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin, and Bob Barr” (Ibid.: 7). When the
report circulated, many libertarians and “Tea Party” members took great offense,
thinking the document argued that supporters of third-party political groups were
more likely to be dangerous militia members or terrorists. In response, libertarian
activists formed a national network called “Operation Defuse,” which is devoted
to uncovering and criticizing the activities of fusion centers and is actively filing
open-records requests and attempting to conduct tours of fusion centers. Operation
Defuse could be construed as a “counter-surveillance” group (Monahan, 2006)
that arose largely because of outrage over the probability of political profiling by
state-surveillance agents.
Fusion centers have also been implicated in scandals involving covert infiltrations
of nonviolent groups, including peace-activist groups, anti-death penalty groups,
animal-rights groups, Green Party groups, and others. The most astonishing of the
known cases involved the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC).
In response to an ACLU freedom of information lawsuit, it came to light in 2008
that the Maryland State Police had conducted covert investigations of at least 53
peace activists and anti-death penalty activists for a period of 14 months. The
investigation proceeded despite admissions by the covert agent that she saw no
indication of violent activities or violent intentions on the part of group members
(Newkirk, 2010). Nonetheless, in the federal database used by the police and ac-
cessed by MCAC, activists were listed as being suspected of the “primary crime”
of “Terrorism—anti-government” (German and Stanley, 2008: 8). Although it is
unclear exactly what role the fusion center played in these activities, they were
most likely involved in and aware of the investigation. After all, as Mike German
and Jay Stanley (2008: 8) explain:
Fusion centers are clearly intended to be the central focal point for shar-
ing terrorism-related information. If the MCAC was not aware of the
information the state police collected over the 14 months of this supposed
terrorism investigation, this fact would call into question whether the
MCAC is accomplishing its mission.
Police spying of this sort, besides being illegal absent “reasonable suspicion”
of wrongdoing, could have a “chilling effect” on free speech and freedom of as-
sociation. The fact that individuals were wrongly labeled as terrorists in these
90 Torin Monahan
systems and may still be identified as such could also have negative ramifications
for them far into the future.
Another dimension of troubling partnerships between fusion centers and law
enforcement was revealed with the 2007 arrest of Kenneth Krayeske, a Green Party
member in Connecticut. On January 3, 2007, Krayeske was taking photographs of
Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell at her inaugural parade. He was not engaged in
protest at the time. While serving as the manager of the Green Party’s gubernatorial
candidate, he had publicly challenged Governor Rell over the issue of why she
would not debate his candidate (Levine, 2007). At the parade, police promptly
arrested Krayeske (after he took 23 photographs) and later charged him with “Breach
of Peace” and “Interfering with Police” (Ibid.). Connecticut’s fusion center, the
Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC), had conducted a threat assessment for the
event and had circulated photographs of Krayeske and others to police in advance
(Krayeske, 2007). The police report reads: “The Connecticut Intelligence Center and
the Connecticut State Police Central Intelligence Unit had briefed us [the police] on
possible threats to Governor Rell by political activist [sic], to include photographs
of the individuals. One of the photographs was of the accused Kenneth Krayeske”
(quoted in Levine, 2007). Evidently, part of the reason Krayeske was targeted was
that intelligence analysts, most likely at the fusion center, were monitoring blog
posts on the Internet and interpreted one of them as threatening: “Who is going to
protest the inaugural ball with me?… No need to make nice” (CNN.com, 2009).
According to a CNN report on the arrest, after finding that blog post, “police began
digging for information, mining public and commercial data bases. They learned
Krayeske had been a Green Party campaign director, had protested the gubernatorial
debate and had once been convicted for civil disobedience. He had no history of
violence” (Ibid.). The person who read Krayeske his Miranda rights and attempted
to interview him in custody was Andrew Weaver, a sergeant for the City of Hartford
Police Department who also works in the CTIC fusion center (Department of
Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 2008).
These few examples demonstrate some of the dangers and problems with fusion
centers. Fusion center threat assessments lend themselves to profiling along lines
of race, religion, and political affiliation. Their products are not impartial assess-
ments of terrorist threats, but rather betray biases against individuals or groups
who deviate from—or challenge—the status quo. According to a Washington Times
commentary that became a focal point for a congressional hearing on fusion centers,
as long as terrorism is defined as coercive or intimidating acts that are intended to
shape government policy, “any dissidence or political dissident is suspect to fusion
centers” (Fein, 2009). Evidence from the Maryland and Connecticut fusion center
cases suggests that their representatives are either involved in data-gathering and
investigative work, or are at least complicit in such activities, including illegal spying
operations (German and Stanley, 2008). The Connecticut case further shows that
individuals working at fusion centers are actively monitoring online sources and
Homeland Security Fusion Centers 91
interviewing suspects, a departure from the official Fusion Center Guidelines that
stress “exchange” and “analysis” of data, not data acquisition through investiga-
tions (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006).
One important issue here is that fusion centers occupy ambiguous organizational
positions. Many of them are located in police departments or are combined with
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, but their activities are supposed to be separate and
different from the routine activities of the police or the FBI. A related complication
is that fusion center employees often occupy multiple organizational roles (e.g.,
police officers or National Guard members and fusion center analysts), which can
lead to an understandable, but nonetheless problematic, blurring of professional
identities, rules of conduct, and systems of accountability. Whereas in 2010 DHS
and the Department of Justice responded to concerns about profiling by implement-
ing a civil liberties certification requirement for fusion centers, public oversight
and accountability of fusion centers are becoming even more difficult and unlikely
because of a concerted effort to exempt fusion centers from freedom of informa-
tion requests. For example, according to a police official, Virginia legislators were
coerced into passing a 2008 law that exempted its fusion center from the Freedom of
Information Act; in this instance, federal officials threatened to withhold classified
intelligence from the state’s fusion center and police if they did not pass such a law
(German and Stanley, 2008). Another tactic used by fusion center representatives
to thwart open-records requests is to claim that there is no “material product” for
them to turn over because they only “access,” rather than “retain,” information
(Hylton, 2009).
Although it may be tempting to view these cases of fusion center missteps and
infractions as isolated examples, they are probably just the tip of the iceberg. A
handful of other cases has surfaced recently in which fusion centers in California,
Colorado, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Georgia have recommended peace activists,
Muslim-rights groups, and/or environmentalists be profiled (German, 2009; Wolfe,
2009). The Texas example reveals the ways in which the flexibility of fusion
centers affords the incorporation of xenophobic and racist beliefs. In 2009, the
North Central Texas Fusion System produced a report that argued that the United
States is especially vulnerable to terrorist infiltration because the country is too
tolerant and accommodating of religious difference, especially of Islam. Through
several indicators, the report lists supposed signs that the country is gradually be-
ing invaded and transformed: “Muslim cab drivers in Minneapolis refuse to carry
passengers who have alcohol in their possession; the Indianapolis airport in 2007
installed footbaths to accommodate Muslim prayer; public schools schedule prayer
breaks to accommodate Muslim students; pork is banned in the workplace; etc.”
(North Central Texas Fusion System, 2009: 4). Because “the threats to Texas are
significant,” the fusion center advises keeping an eye out for Muslim civil liberties
groups and sympathetic individuals, organizations, or media that might carry their
92 Torin Monahan
message: hip-hop bands, social networking sites, online chat forums, blogs, and
even the U.S. Department of Treasury (Ibid.).
Recent infiltration of peace groups seems to reproduce some of the sordid history
of political surveillance of U.S. citizens, such as the FBI and CIA’s COINTELPRO
program, which targeted civil rights leaders and those peacefully protesting against
the Vietnam War, among others (Churchill and Vander Wall, 2002). A contempo-
rary case involves a U.S. Army agent who infiltrated a nonviolent, anti-war protest
group in Olympia, Washington, in 2007. A military agent spying on civilians likely
violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Moreover, this agent actively shared intelligence
with the Washington State Fusion Center, which shared it more broadly (Anderson,
2010). According to released documents, intelligence representatives from as far
away as New Jersey were kept apprised of the spying:
In a 2008 e-mail to an Olympia police officer, Thomas Glapion, Chief of
Investigations and Intelligence at New Jersey’s McGuire Air Force Base,
wrote: “You are now part of my Intel network. I’m still looking at possible
protests by the PMR SDS MDS and other left wing antiwar groups so any
Intel you have would be appreciated…. In return if you need anything from
the Armed Forces I will try to help you as well” (Ibid.: 4).
Given that political surveillance under COINTELPRO is widely considered
to be a dark period in U.S. intelligence history, the fact that fusion centers may be
contributing to similar practices today makes it all the more important to subject
them to public scrutiny and oversight.
Transgressive Data Collection
By now it should be apparent that fusion center personnel are neither objectively
assessing terrorist threats nor passively analyzing preexisting data. Fusion centers
may appear to be more impartial and rational than previous forms of state surveil-
lance. Yet they have incorporated previous surveillance modalities, including their
prejudicial beliefs and invasive techniques, and merged them with dataveillance
capabilities that amplify the potential for civil liberties violations and personal
harm. Even if fusion center activities were restricted to passive data analysis,
which they are not, they could still transgress existing laws that are intended to
protect people from unreasonable searches. Specifically, Title 28, Part 23 of the
Code of Federal Regulations states that law enforcement agencies “shall collect
and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual only if
there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct
or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity” (in
German and Stanley, 2008: 2). When fusion center analysts create profiles of risky
individuals and then engage in data mining to identify people who match those
Homeland Security Fusion Centers 93
profiles, they are effectively bypassing the “reasonable suspicion” requirement for
intelligence operations.
Aside from the known cases of abuse, in their official capacity fusion centers
are apparently exploiting a technicality in terms of what constitutes “collecting”
and “maintaining” criminal intelligence information. The implied reasoning is this:
provided that fusion centers merely analyze data stored in databases housed else-
where, they are not violating the “reasonable suspicion” stipulation even if they are
conducting “dragnet” or “fishing expedition” searches that would have been illegal
with previous generations of computing technology that did not depend entirely on
networks. This rationalization is especially specious when analysts can access police
records that are located in the same buildings as the fusion centers. Nonetheless,
DHS and Department of Justice guidelines explicitly encourage fusion centers to
access as much data as possible, extending “beyond criminal intelligence, to include
federal intelligence as well as public and private-sector data” (quoted in German
and Stanley, 2007: 7). In an unusually candid statement, Sheriff Kevin Rambosk,
who is associated with the Florida fusion center, justifies widespread data sharing
as a way to compete with criminals who similarly move across jurisdictional lines:
We know as law enforcement professionals that there are no jurisdictional
boundaries for criminals…. And we historically and intuitively know that
the more information that we can share with one another, the more cases
can be solved, the more crimes can be prevented, and the more informa-
tion each of our agencies will have to continue to make Collier County
one of the safest places in Florida to live (Mills, 2010).
The implication of this assertion is that there should not be any jurisdictional
or legal boundaries for law enforcement to collect and share data either, includ-
ing data from the private sector, which fusion centers in Florida access through a
system called “Florida Integrated Network for Data Exchange and Retrieval” or
“FINDER” (Ibid.).
Conclusion: Surveillance Iterations
Although criminals or terrorists may be crossing jurisdictional boundaries and
breaking the law, state agencies and agents do more harm than good when they
ignore existing legal constraints or seek out exemptions from public oversight. The
few problematic cases reviewed in this article illustrate that without due respect
for the “reasonable suspicion” provision on police intelligence-gathering activi-
ties, fusion center personnel engage in or endorse racial, political, and religious
profiling; they perceive challenges to the status quo as threatening and possibly
“terrorist”; they support the investigation and arrest of law-abiding individuals,
marking them as “terrorists” in official databases, perhaps in perpetuity; and they
94 Torin Monahan
exert a chilling effect on free speech in that activists and others are more likely to
temper their activities to avoid similar kinds of harmful scrutiny.
It is important to note that the politics of those being targeted by fusion centers
spans the spectrum from right-wing militia members to left-wing anti-war activists.
Some may be surprised that individuals supporting progressive causes would be
seen as threats during a Democratic presidency. Yet these cases underscore that the
politics of many environmentalists, anti-war activists, and other progressives are still
radical vis-à-vis the mainstream politics of contemporary Washington. Moreover,
law enforcement cultures are typically quite conservative (Greene, 2007; Reiner,
2010) and, similar to other organizations, slow to change (Zhao, He, and Lovrich,
1998). Thus, the outcomes of national elections are unlikely to produce discernable
near-term changes in the cultures of these organizations.
If today’s surveillance state were to fully embody Barack Obama’s campaign
rhetoric of respect for “the rule of law,” fusion centers would differ markedly. The
blurring or suspending of the law are supposedly practices that characterized the
“war on terror” under the Bush administration. Impatience with bureaucratic con-
straints upon counterterrorism efforts or frustration with the burden of protecting
civil liberties are similarly more readily associated with the masculinist orientation
of the previous administration. Fusion centers could strictly follow stipulations
on intelligence gathering; they could erect barriers between public and private
databases; they could embrace transparency and accountability by complying with,
rather than avoiding, freedom of information requests.
Instead of romanticizing the ideals that could have been achieved, or might
yet be achieved, I prefer to conclude by highlighting what can be learned from the
example of fusion centers. First, fusion centers show the ways in which the logics
of “surveillance societies” pervade all aspects of social life, including the opera-
tions of government organizations. Imperatives to collect, share, analyze, and act
on data increasingly shape the activities of public institutions, private companies,
and individuals. The capabilities of new media technologies simply augment this
particular drive, which is unchecked or under-regulated in most domains, and the
realm of national security is no different. If governments are reluctant to impose
serious restrictions on data sharing more generally, except perhaps for particularly
sensitive data such as those contained in medical records, one should not be sur-
prised that government agencies would avail themselves of similar data-sharing
functions (Regan, 2004). Second, the unstandardized composition and mission of
fusion centers may afford them ample flexibility, but it also allows particularistic
biases to shape their activities. When made public, such biases may embarrass
fusion center officials, but they are undoubtedly more damaging to the targets
of unwarranted surveillance and intervention. The latter must contend with legal
battles and fees, emotional stress, and perhaps even physical abuse associated with
being marked as terrorist suspects (Guzik, 2009). For surveillance states to be more
democratic, their police apparatuses should possess and follow clear guidelines
Homeland Security Fusion Centers 95
that respect the law, and subject their activities to routine public scrutiny. To do
otherwise is a recipe for abuse.
Acknowledgment: This material is based upon a research project being conducted by the
author and Priscilla Regan. The work is supported by the National Science Foundation under
grant number SES 0957283.
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Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference
T. M. K. Roeder, P. I. Frazier, R. Szechtman, E. Zhou, T. Huschka, and S.E. Chick, eds.
ACTIVE SHOOTER: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF UNARMED RESISTANCE
Thomas W. Briggs William G. Kennedy
Department of Computational and Data Sciences Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study
George Mason University
4400 University Drive
George Mason University
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 20030, USA Fairfax, VA 20030, USA
ABSTRACT
Mass shootings unfold quickly and are rarely foreseen by victims. Increasingly, training is provided to
increase chances of surviving active shooter scenarios, usually emphasizing “Run, Hide, Fight.” Evidence
from prior mass shootings suggests that casualties may be limited should the shooter encounter unarmed
resistance prior to the arrival of law enforcement officers (LEOs). An agent-based model (ABM) explored
the potential for limiting casualties should a small proportion of potential victims swarm a gunman, as
occurred on a train from Amsterdam to Paris in 2015. Results suggest that even with a miniscule
probability of overcoming a shooter, fighters may save lives but put themselves at increased risk. While
not intended to prescribe a course of action, the model suggests the potential for a reduction in casualties
in active shooter scenarios.
1 INTRODUCTION
Mass shootings unfold quickly and are rarely foreseen by victims. Mass shootings have occurred at a
variety of locations including military installations and government buildings, public spaces including
nightclubs (Orlando, FL), movie theaters (Aurora, CO), shopping malls, workplaces, religious facilities,
and educational campuses (Littleton, CO; Blacksburg, VA; Newtown, CT).
The difficulty of preventing mass shootings has led to increased active shooter training. Law
enforcement agencies have revised response tactics for active shooter situations following the Columbine
high school shooting (Police Executive Research Forum 2014) and employers and public safety
organizations have developed protocols including “Run, Hide, Fight” or “Avoid, Deny, Defend” for
individuals in an active shooter situation. The implementation of these tiered strategies may benefit the
individual who successfully flees or hides, but may subsequently put someone else at greater risk (e.g., by
monopolizing a secure hiding spot) and may not substantively reduce the overall number of casualties in a
mass shooting scenario.
In 2015, a presumed mass shooter on a Thalys train from Amsterdam to Paris was subdued by the
rapid action of several men who engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the gunman. Two of the men were
seriously injured—one shot, one severely cut—but both survived. No one was killed and the gunman was
captured, despite being armed with an AKM rifle, a Luger pistol, and a box cutter.
Researching mass shootings presents obvious methodological challenges: conducting an experiment
in which participants believe they are actually facing potential death from an active shooter is ethically
intractable and could lead to actual harm (e.g., attempts to subdue shooter). While tactical drills such as
those used by LEOs and military can simulate the mechanics of facing an active shooter, the explicit
knowledge that one is in a simulation likely dampens neurophysiological responses and would hopefully
preclude participants from improvising a lethal response against the individual acting as the mass shooter.
Examining historical mass shootings is a valuable research technique, but there are known limitations on
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eyewitness accounts and certainly no possibility of altering the historical scenario in an attempt to
influence outcomes. Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a logical choice to explore the potential impact of
intended targets’ behavior when encountering an active shooter since it harms no human subjects, can
explicitly encapsulate behavioral rules, and offers the possibility of running the model under altered
conditions to investigate outcomes. The present research uses ABM to investigate the degree to which the
rapid action of a few individuals who physically confront a shooter might potentially limit the casualties
in mass shooting scenarios.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Active Shooters and Mass Shootings
From 2000 to 2013, the U.S. FBI reported 160 active shooter incidents in which 486 were killed and 557
wounded, excluding the shooters (Blair and Schweit 2013). Any attempt to tabulate shooting incidents is
ultimately definition-dependent and definitions are debated. The FBI defines an active shooter as “an
individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area,” noting that
“implicit in this definition is the subject’s criminal actions [must] involve the use of firearms.” The
definition of a mass shooting is based on that of mass murder, defined as four or more individuals killed
during the same incident. An active shooter scenario may or may not qualify as a mass shooting, then, as
fatalities depend on both the lethality of victims’ wounds and relatively distal variables like the
availability of advanced trauma care following the shooting. A potential drawback of using the mass
murder definition is that it relies on quantified fatalities, so an active shooter incident in which many
people are shot but fewer than four perish does not meet the threshold of mass shooting.
The FBI notes that both law enforcement and citizens have the potential to affect the outcome of an
active shooter event (Blair and Schweit 2013). In the 104 active shooter incidents from 2000 to 2012, the
shooter was stopped by victims in 17 incidents, by police in 32 incidents, and in 55 incidents, stopped on
his own accord, committing suicide in 44 cases, surrendering in 6 cases, and leaving in 5 cases. (Blair,
Martaindale, and Nichols 2014). Of the 17 incidents in which victims stopped the gunman, in 3 cases the
active shooter was shot by armed victims.
2.2 Prior Agent-Based Models
Hayes and Hayes (2014) created several ABMs of mass shooting scenarios to test specific provisions of
Senator Dianne Feinstein’s proposed legislation to limit certain specific types of firearms. A model of the
Aurora, CO movie theater shooting in 2012 and a generalized indoor model found that only a reduction in
a firearm’s rate of fire would have likely reduced the number of casualties in the Aurora shooting (Hayes
and Hayes 2014). A school shooting model exploring the presence of armed school law enforcement
officers (LEOs) and staff carrying concealed firearms suggested that either intervention would likely
decrease response time in confronting the shooter and reduce casualties, though the model assumes that
the shooter would be instantly neutralized upon entering a room in which a single armed individual is
present (Anklam et al. 2015). This assumption may be overly optimistic in light of studies of shooting
performance of law enforcement officers (Lewinski et al. 2015; Vickers and Lewinski 2012). Anklam et
al. (2015) conclude that reducing the time-to-intercept of an active shooter will likely reduce casualties,
but their school shooting model considered intercept possible only by armed individuals, with no
distinction between LEOs and civilians.
No ABMs could be located that examined the potential role of unarmed resistance in an active
shooter scenario.
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3 METHOD
3.1 Agent-Based Model
Developed using NetLogo (Wilensky 1999), model implementation followed Wilensky and Rand’s
(2015) ABM design principle: start simply and build toward the question of interest. A crowd of agents is
distributed on an open landscape (e.g., a large outdoor concert or rally) with no possible cover or
concealment. Agents are unaware that a shooting is about to occur. A randomly-located shooter begins
firing on the closest targets. Once the shooting begins, most agents flee from the shooter at their running
speed. On reaching the outer perimeter of the simulation, fleeing agents are presumed safe and can no
longer be targeted. A small proportion of agents, if close enough, try to tackle and subdue the shooter.
The simulation ends if the shooter is subdued, when the shooter hits every possible target, and/or all
targets have escaped. For parsimony, a fired shot can hit only one victim, no victim can be hit twice, and
no lethality determination is made due to the many factors affecting outcomes of gunshot wounds.
3.2 Agents
Population. The agents in the current model possess a normally-distributed running speed sourced from
the Hayes and Hayes (2014) ABM of active shooter scenarios: the distribution has a mean of 3.9 m/s and
standard deviation 2.7 m/s. Agents are also assumed to have a cognitive delay required to recognize and
process that a shooting has begun, after which they immediately run away from the shooter. While actual
cognitive delay would likely differ for each individual, in the current model it is a constant such that the
entire population simultaneously realizes that a shooting has begun. This parameter is user-adjustable and
can be disabled if desired (i.e., set to 0 seconds).
Fighters vs Fleers. Some proportion of the agents are fighters. This proportion is set by the user and
is expected to be very small relative to the population. Instead of fleeing from the shooter these
individuals, like the individuals who subdued the gunman on the Thalys train, will attempt to tackle the
shooter if/when they are close enough. Whether these individuals have military or law enforcement
training or are simply extreme altruists is an open question beyond the scope of the current effort. The
model simply assumes that some number of people – however few – might choose to endanger
themselves in response to an active shooter. In this model, fighters run toward the active shooter, putting
themselves at greater risk by closing the distance and increasing the likelihood of being hit by a
consequently more accurate shot. The user sets the probability with which a fighter struggling with a
shooter is likely to overcome the shooter on each tick. This is a global parameter: if the user gives a
fighter a 1% chance of overcoming the shooter and three fighters struggle with a shooter, each fighter has
precisely a 1% chance per tick of overcoming the shooter. In other words, there is currently no additional
advantage when multiple fighters conduct a swarm attack and struggle with the shooter simultaneously,
though this will be explored in future model extensions.
Shooter. User-adjustable parameters can be set to account for armament (magazine capacity and
firearm effective range) and shooter ability (accuracy and field of view for targeting). For parsimony a
shooter always targets the closest agent in (1) firearm effective range and (2) field of view, and will fire
one round per second (tick). Firearm rate of fire is frequently debated. For parsimony, one round per
second is fired in the current model. This rate of fire likely overestimates most shooters’ ability to
accurately target and fire but could represent indiscriminate firing into a crowd.
Whether or not the target is hit is probabilistic and depends on three factors: distance between
shooter
and target, the user-adjustable accuracy parameter, and the firearm’s effective range. Firearm effective
range is implemented in the current model as the range at which a 100% accurate shooter hits a human-
sized target 50% of the time. This parameter allows users to approximate the type of firearm employed:
most shooters will be accurate at greater distances with rifles than pistols and range can be set
accordingly. The user-adjustable accuracy parameter allows the user to account for the human component
of shooting accuracy. At 1.0, the shooter is 100% accurate at point-blank range and 50% accurate at the
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firearm’s effective range. In actual firefights involving LEOs, many rounds miss their intended targets
even at relatively close ranges, so a 1.0 accuracy setting is likely highly unrealistic, but is nevertheless
available to the user (Lewinski et al. 2015). If a fired round misses the intended target, it continues
traveling and may hit another agent if that agent is in the round’s trajectory. In dense crowds, therefore,
even an inaccurate shooter is capable of inflicting substantial casualties. The shooter continues to target
and fire on each tick, either until subdued by fighters or until all potential targets have reached the
perimeter of the landscape. In the current version of the model, the shooter does not move to pursue
targets and remains in a single location for the duration of the simulation.
3.3 Initial Setup
The user adjusts the population size such that the desired physical crowd density is achieved. Density is
important because it affects (1) the number of possible targets in the shooter’s range and vision and (2)
the likelihood that a shot that misses the intended target will wound another agent in the round’s
trajectory. The user also sets model parameters described above.
3.4 Model Action
On the first model tick, the shooter “activates,” targeting the nearest individual in his field of view and
firing. (To conceptualize field of view, imagine sweeping a wide-beam flashlight from side to side –
everything in the cone made by the flashlight beam is in the field of view.) On each subsequent tick, the
shooter takes the same action: target, then fire. When the shooter targets, he turns to directly face the
targeted individual, changing his field of view. A shooter cannot see behind himself and can only see
what is in his field of view. After the shooting begins and the cognitive delay time has elapsed, most
agents will begin fleeing from the shooter. Fighters present will run toward the shooter and try to tackle
him if close enough to reach in less than one second, a distance that varies depending on a fighter’s
unique running speed.
When a fighter reaches a shooter, a struggle begins and the shooter shifts his attention to the fighter.
In reality, the likelihood of either a fighter overcoming a shooter or a shooter overcoming a fighter will
depend on a substantial number of variables such as prior combat training, physical strength, weaponry,
and assistance from others. As each of these can be vigorously debated, the user sets probabilities of
success for both the shooter and the fighter. Probabilities are implemented on a per-tick basis. Calibration
data for these probabilities could not be located, so it is suggested that the shooter should have a very high
probability of overcoming the fighter (perhaps because the shooter also carries weapons intended for
close-range combat, whether pistols or bladed weapons) and the fighter should have a low probability of
overcoming the fighter due to the relative disadvantage in armament. Fighters who fail become victims
(i.e., are wounded and incapacitated for the remainder of the simulation).
3.5 Model Output
In addition to a visual view of the unfolding scenario, the model tracks the number of rounds fired, the
number of rounds that strike individuals, and the number of fighters struggling with a shooter at each tick.
3.6 Model Calibration
Parameter sweeps using NetLogo BehaviorSpace examined model sensitivity and differences in outputs.
The parameters were varied as indicated in Table 1 and results are discussed in the next section.
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Table 1: Model parameters with bold values indicating final stable model defaults.
Parameter Values Notes
population 500 1000
5000 7500
Agent population
%-who-fight 0.001 0.003
0.005 0.010
Percentage of agent population
who are “fighters” rather than
“fleers”
chance-of-overcoming-
shooter
0.01 0.05
0.10
Per-tick probability of a fighter
overcoming the shooter in a
hand-
to-hand struggle
shooters 1 Number of shooters
shooter-magazine-
capacity
10 Rounds that can be fired before
a magazine reload (shooters
have unlimited magazines)
firearm-effective-range 30m 50m
70m
Range at which a 100%
accurate shooter will hit target
50% of the time; used in hit
probability
shot-accuracy 0.5 0.8 1.0 Human factor in accuracy;
combines with firearm-
effective-range to determine hit
probability of each shot
field-of-view 180 degrees shooter’s field of view (see
section 3.2)
shooter-chance-of-
overcoming-fighter
0.5 Per-tick probability of shooter
overcoming a fighter in a hand-
to-hand struggle
3.7 Verification and Validation
Verification and validation are particularly challenging for the current model and topic. Though mass
shootings occur, there is a dearth of detailed publicly available data and a large number of variables and
unknowns that affect ultimate outcomes. Hayes and Hayes (2014) validated their model of the 2012
Aurora, CO movie theater shooting by calibrating the model such that, on average, a model run
approximated the same number of casualties that actually occurred during the shooting. This is a laudable
strategy, but one that is not easily employed in a generalized active shooter model. A shooter’s targeting
strategy, weaponry, and accuracy are likely to have the greatest impact on casualties, followed by the
behavior of intended victims (e.g., do intended victims make themselves easier or more difficult targets?).
As mentioned in the introduction, conducting an experiment to test victim response to an active shooter is
not practicable; it would be ethically impossible to create a true life-or-death situation in which
individuals would respond with potentially lethal force. This model is inspired by the events on the
Thalys train and also what is believed to have occurred on United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001, but
these situations are extremely rare and ought not be considered representative. Each mass shooting is
different, and caution should be employed making generalizations from one mass shooting to another.
Subject-matter experts are invited to criticize the assumptions of the current model and suggestions are
welcomed. Other modelers are encouraged to replicate or extend the current model.
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The current ABM was subject to verification during the process of model construction using unit tests
written into model code to ensure that a particular procedure is behaving as intended and that code was
adequately debugged (Wilensky and Rand 2015).
Validation requires at least some correspondence between the model’s behavior and the behavior of
the target system (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005). At the present stage of this research effort, invoking the
oft-cited quote from George Box may prove helpful: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” The
validation question, then, rests on whether or not the current model can be useful as platform for
exploring the role of intended victims of an active shooter.
4 RESULTS
4.1 Overall
The current model suggests unarmed resistance to an active shooter may reduce overall casualties in an
active shooter incident.
With default model parameter settings (as shown in Table 1), the shooter is subdued in 67 percent of
experimental model runs and overall casualties are mean 30. This is a substantial reduction in casualties
from the no fighter control condition in which mean casualties are 57. In the remaining 33 percent of
model runs in which the shooter is not subdued, mean casualties are increased only slightly to 63, with a
greater share of fighters among the casualties as a result of putting themselves in harm’s way. Figure 1
plots casualties by simulation end time in 500 model runs in both the control and experimental conditions.
The number of casualties sustained in each incident is directly related to time since the shooter has a
sustained rate of fire of one round per second. In the experimental runs in which the shooter is subdued,
mean time elapsed is 100 seconds, far less than in the control condition in which the simulation typically
concludes at 255 seconds after which all remaining victims have escaped the perimeter.
Importantly, default model parameters were selected to be as conservative as possible, and the model
and code are available upon request from the author for any user who wishes to set the parameters less or
even more conservatively. In the absence of empirical data sources to calibrate the model, users are
encouraged to consult relevant subject matter experts in choosing parameter settings.
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Figure 1: Casualties by simulation end time in control and experimental conditions (plot displays a
random sample of 500 of 2000 model runs for ease of visibility).
4.2 Flee vs. Fight Proportion
Unsurprisingly, the greater the proportion of fighters in the population, the more likely the shooter will be
subdued. If too few fight, there is little chance of overcoming the shooter. Varying the proportion of the
population that fights changes the likelihood of overcoming the shooter. If only 0.1 percent fight, virtually
no model runs result in subduing the shooter; if 0.4 percent fight, the shooter is subdued in about half of
model runs, and if between 0.8 and 1 percent fight, the shooter is subdued in nearly all model runs.
4.3 Other Parameters
The current effort did not test rate of fire, since the Hayes and Hayes (2014) ABM demonstrated that
reducing rate of fire would likely reduce casualties in an active shooter scenario. No appreciable
difference in outcomes occurred by varying magazine capacity, since reload times of ~1 second (note that
such a rapid reload time is possible by using a technique known as a “speed reload”) do not substantially
reduce overall rounds fired. (Reloads may, however, present ideal opportunities to engage a shooter,
though this was not tested with the current model.)
Firearm effective range was varied between 30 m, 50 m, and 70 m to explore potential differences
between the use of pistols and rifles, the latter being more accurate at greater distances. Despite extensive
media coverage of the use of semiautomatic rifles in mass shootings, the majority of mass shooters to date
have used pistols. In runs in which the shooter is subdued, casualties are only slightly increased with the
use of more accurate firearms since the majority of casualties occur initially at close range. When the
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shooter is not subdued and can continue firing on fleeing victims, casualties increase almost linearly, as
might be expected.
4.4 Qualitative Observations
The greatest concentration of casualties will occur at the beginning of the simulation since victims only
begin fleeing after realizing what is happening. Shooters will almost always possess an informational
advantage over intended victims because only the shooter knows when and where he will open fire and
his targeting strategy (if anything other than random or based on proximity).
Viewing the model visualization in real time illustrates that individuals who attempt to attack the
shooter from a great distance are at a serious tactical disadvantage, particularly if they have a slow
approach speed. By reducing the distance between themselves and the shooter, they increase the
likelihood that they will be shot. This may suggest pursuing an avoid (run) or deny (hide) strategy unless
structural features of the environment can shield would-be fighters from the shooter’s sight and fire (e.g.,
rooms, corners, or other cover or concealment) and facilitate getting close enough for hand-to-hand
combat with the shooter. Another important interpretation of this result is that LEO entry teams, moving
slowly toward the shooter’s location, would potentially be at great risk should a shooter stage an ambush.
5 DISCUSSION
5.1 Fighters will likely save lives but put themselves at increased risk
Attention is a scarce commodity, and every second that an active shooter struggles with a fighter is a
second that he is not able to effectively target and fire upon another victim. The “Run” and “Hide”
prescriptions are intended to occupy the shooter’s time and attention: time spent by a shooter searching
for available victims is time for law enforcement to arrive on the scene, form an entry team, and sweep
for the shooter. Unfortunately, as suggested by incident reports for the Virginia Tech and Sandy Hook
shootings, active shooters encountering harder targets like barricaded rooms will simply move on to softer
targets. Further, when potential victims “hide” by huddling together in a room corner with little or no
cover or concealment – like most victims at Sandy Hook Elementary – it may be even easier for a shooter
to inflict maximal casualties with fewer rounds fired.
It is impossible to calculate precise odds of becoming a casualty in an active shooter scenario,
regardless of whether an individual chooses to run, hide, or fight. However, it is the case that there is at
least a nonzero probability of successfully overcoming a shooter, as demonstrated on the Thalys train and
in 17 of the 104 cases studied by the FBI (Blair, Martaindale, and Nichols 2014). The present model
suggests that even with a relatively low probability of success and no combined advantage from a
coordinated group attack, overall casualties might be reduced if a small number individuals close enough
to fight the shooter fight rather than flee.
5.2 Cautions and Guidelines for Interpretation
An important caveat of this work is that it is not intended to prescribe a course of action for individuals to
specifically put themselves in harm’s way. Most active shooter training emphasizes “Run, Hide, Fight” or
“Avoid, Deny, Defend,” and emphasis is placed on the order of those options. Trainees are told to “run if
you can,” “hide if you must,” “fight if you have to,” with the acknowledgement that each individual must
make his or her own decision and there are no guaranteed outcomes.
However, active shooter training also contradicts prior training for hostage situations and armed
robberies, which trained compliance with gunmen’s demands to prevent violence. In mass shooting
scenarios, calm cooperation may result in being shot.
The suggestion that untrained civilians engage armed attackers must be considered carefully. When
shooters have been subdued in prior incidents, individuals with some form of combat training—either law
3528
Briggs and Kennedy
enforcement or military—are typically involved. Two of the three Americans who subdued the gunman
on the Thalys train had military training and one had just returned from deployment in Afghanistan. But
even trained, armed LEOs responding to an active shooter can become victims, as was demonstrated
when a shooter armed with a semiautomatic rifle attacked a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado in
2015. Six of the responding LEOs were wounded and one, Officer Garrett Swasey, was killed. Whether
one or more average citizens without training might subdue a gunman requires additional research.
Though the principal and school psychologist at Sandy Hook were both killed by gunfire, the shooter was
very underweight at only 112 pounds (50.8 kg) despite being six feet (1.83 m) tall. It is certainly possible
that he could have been subdued in a hand-to-hand struggle had the staff been close enough to physically
reach and engage him.
5.3 Limitations
Numerous limitations exist in this preliminary modeling effort.
The model does not give any combined advantage to multiple fighters who swarm attack a shooter.
This likely underestimates the probability of success should multiple fighters engage the shooter as
occurred on the Thalys train. One fighter might, for example, attempt to control the direction of a
shooter’s weapon while another fighter attempts to take the shooter to the ground by tackling the
shooter’s legs. (This type of swarm attack is exactly the technique that is typically emphasized in the
“Fight” component of many active shooter trainings for civilians.)
The current model is low-fidelity in a number of respects. Both ballistics and hand-to-hand combat
are modeled as probabilities. Additionally, agents, whether fleeing or fighting, do not communicate or
interact with one another, nor do they have any cover or concealment in the open environment. Crowd
behavior is not accounted for in the current model: faster agents simply run through slower agents.
This model does not address the cognitive and behavioral processes underlying heroic acts or acts of
extreme altruism; the assumption is that at least some individuals are capable of such acts and will resist
when faced with an imminent threat as in the incident on the Thalys train. The user is free to set the
percentage of individuals likely to engage a gunman rather than flee.
Importantly, the current model does not represent ballistics with high fidelity. However, the model
approximates shot accuracy and permits rounds to continue to travel beyond their intended target,
possibly striking another person in the round’s trajectory. Fired rounds do not discriminate, and physics
ultimately determines when and where rounds will stop. (This is also relevant when considering armed
response to an active shooter: trained LEOs may hit their intended targets 50 percent of the time, so an
important aspect of modeling mass shooter scenarios is the potential collateral damage of various
potential responses, including casualties by friendly fire.)
The current model also does not represent hand-to-hand combat with any fidelity. Any struggle will
depend on the skills of the individuals involved and any weaponry available, either the shooter’s or
improvised by fighters.
A limitation of the current model is the lack of specific forensic information from prior mass
shootings with which to validate the model. Presumably, such information exists but is not accessible by
the general public. For example, precisely how close were the Americans to the gunman on the Thalys
train in 2015? How close were the principal and school psychologist to the gunman at Sandy Hook
Elementary when they confronted him in the hallway and were killed in the 2012 shooting? These are
important data for model validation, especially for a higher-fidelity simulation.
5.4 Future Research
The current model serves as a starting point for future research efforts, including testing additional
parameter combinations, variables, scenarios, and assumptions.
The notion of rapid collective action should be explored. Specifically, agents could be given the
ability to communicate—even rapidly, as reportedly happened on the Thalys train—in making the
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Briggs and Kennedy
decision to jointly attack a shooter. It may also be the case that there are only an infinitesimally small
number of individuals who would attack an active shooter, but that others would join once that individual
begins the struggle. In this sense, agents could be further divided into individuals who would attack,
regardless, and a greater number of individuals who attack only when others do, invoking a threshold like
Epstein’s (2002) model of civil violence or Granovetter’s (1978) model of collective behavior.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful to Kenneth Comer for inspiring this modeling effort through his seminar on
military agent-based modeling at George Mason University in 2015, to Dale Brearcliffe for comments
and discussions on drafts of this paper, and to three anonymous peer reviewers for their thoughtful
feedback and helpful suggestions.
REFERENCES
Anklam, C., A. Kirby, F. Sharevski, and J. E. Dietz. 2015. “Mitigating Active Shooter Impact: Analysis
for Policy Options Based on Agent/computer-Based Modeling.” Journal of Emergency
Management 13 (3): 201–16. doi:10.5055/jem.2015.0234.
Blair, J. P., M. Hunter Martaindale, and Terry Nichols. 2014. “Active Shooter Events from 2000 to
2012.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-
from-2000-to-2012.
Blair, J. P, and K. W. Schweit. 2013. “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000-2013.”
https://hazdoc.colorado.edu/handle/10590/2712.
Epstein, J. M. 2002. “Modeling Civil Violence: An Agent-Based Computational Approach.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (Supplement 3): 7243–50. doi:10.1073/pnas.092080199.
Gilbert, G. Nigel, and K. G. Troitzsch. 2005. Simulation for the Social Scientist. 2nd ed. Maidenhead,
England ; New York, NY: Open University Press.
Granovetter, M.. 1978. “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior.” American Journal of Sociology 83
(6): 1420–43.
Hayes, R., and R. Hayes. 2014. “Agent-Based Simulation of Mass Shootings: Determining How to Limit
the Scale of a Tragedy.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 17 (2): 5.
Lewinski, W. J., R. Avery, J. Dysterheft, N. D. Dicks, and J. Bushey. 2015. “The Real Risks during
Deadly Police Shootouts Accuracy of the Naïve Shooter.” International Journal of Police Science
& Management, 117–27.
Police Executive Research Forum. 2014. The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents.
Vickers, J. N., and W. Lewinski. 2012. “Performing under Pressure: Gaze Control, Decision Making and
Shooting Performance of Elite and Rookie Police Officers.” Human Movement Science 31 (1):
101–17. doi:10.1016/j.humov.2011.04.004.
Wilensky, U.. 1999. NetLogo. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo.
Wilensky, U., and W. Rand. 2015. Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling: Modeling Natural, Social, and
Engineered Complex Systems with NetLogo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
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Student
Highlight
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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
THOMAS W. BRIGGS is a Ph.D. student in Computational Social Science at George Mason University.
He holds a M.P.S. in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from the University of Maryland, Baltimore
County. His email address is wsc16tbriggs@gmu.edu.
WILLIAM G. KENNEDY is Research Assistant Professor at the Center for Social Complexity in the
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study at George Mason University. He holds a Ph.D. in information
technology from George Mason University. He is a retired Navy Captain with 30 years of service in
submarines and the Naval Reserve and also a retired civil servant with 25 years of service with the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Department of Energy. His research interests include:
integrating computational cognitive modeling and computational social science; cognitive plausibility;
and cognitive robotics. He is an IEEE Life Member. His email address is wsc16wkennedy@gmu.edu.
3531
Calhoun:The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-12
Active shooter response: defensive tactics
and tactical decision-making for elementary
school teachers and staff
Whitney, John A., IV
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/568
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THESIS
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS
AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF
by
John A. Whitney IV
December 2017
Thesis Co-Advisors:
Carolyn Halladay
Kathleen Kiernan
Second Reader: Lauren Wollman
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ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL
DECISION-MAKING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
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5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) John A. Whitney IV
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Naval Postgraduate School
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This study analyzes characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight and defensive tactics and tactical-based
decision-making tools that can be modified and applied to enhance depth and breadth of preparedness.
Specifically, the research focuses on law enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making
tools that could be taught to teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings. Research
sources include government operation manuals as well as literature from experts in the fields of defensive
tactics and
tactical decision-making.
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem intimidating to the non-military
or non-law-enforcement professional, they are not. The tactics provide basic guidance in mindset,
movement, and self-protection strategies that have the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of
students, faculty, and staff alike. Findings from the research are categorized as pre-action (mental
preparation and
situational awareness), action (defensive tactics and tactical decision-making techniques),
and re-action (ongoing situational awareness, action analysis and modification). Additionally, the findings
support the following recommendations: provide training to teachers and school staff on options-based
responses (including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making), empower teachers to protect students
by any means necessary,
and establish reconnection procedures in the event of an incident.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
active shooter, education, school, defense, tactics, elementary
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139
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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL
DECISION-MAKING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF
John A. Whitney IV
Division Chief, Scottsdale Fire Department, Scottsdale, Arizona
B.A., Arizona State University, 2002
M.S., Arizona State University, 2007
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2017
Approved by: Carolyn Halladay
Thesis Co-Advisor
Kathleen Kiernan
Thesis Co-Advisor
Lauren Wollman
Second Reader
Erik Dahl
Associate Chair for Instruction
Department of National Security Affairs
iv
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v
PREFACE
I am a dad. I am not a law enforcement officer. I am not a soldier. I am a dad who
was scared to death that his son would not be adequately protected in the event of an
active shooter. I asked the questions, surveyed the layout of the school, and spoke with
my son about his school’s lockdown practices. None of them made me feel any better.
Run, Hide, Fight provides a great foundation to build on, but I felt it needed more. I felt
people needed to know when to run. They needed to know where to hide. Moreover, they
needed to know how to fight. The fear I felt inspired me to conduct research on how to
prepare elementary school teachers better to respond to active-shooter events. Based on
this research, I feel that I have uncovered many simple practices that can be learned for
free and practiced on a daily basis.
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vii
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight and defensive tactics and
tactical-based decision-making tools that can be modified and applied to enhance depth
and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focuses on law enforcement and
military tactics and tactical decision-making tools that could be taught to teachers and
school staff for use in elementary school settings. Research sources include government
operation manuals as well as literature from experts in the fields of defensive tactics and
tactical decision-making.
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem
intimidating to the non-military or non-law-enforcement professional, they are not. The
tactics provide basic guidance in mindset, movement, and self-protection strategies that
have the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of students, faculty, and staff
alike. Findings from the research are categorized as pre-action (mental preparation and
situational awareness), action (defensive tactics and tactical decision-making techniques),
and re-action (ongoing situational awareness, action analysis and modification).
Additionally, the findings support the following recommendations: provide training to
teachers and school staff on options-based responses (including defensive tactics and
tactical decision-making), empower teachers to protect students by any means necessary,
and establish reconnection procedures in the event of
an incident.
viii
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ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………..1
A. RESEARCH QUESTION ……………………………………………………………….1
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT ……………………………………………………………..1
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ……………………………………………………………….7
1. After-Action Reports ……………………………………………………………9
2. Psychological Impact of Training ………………………………………..10
3. Mitigation Strategies …………………………………………………………..12
D. RESEARCH DESIGN …………………………………………………………………..14
II. RUN, HIDE, FIGHT ………………………………………………………………………………..17
A. HISTORY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS ………………………………………..17
B. NEED FOR CHANGE ………………………………………………………………….20
C. RUN AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY …………………………………………….23
1. Positives of Run ………………………………………………………………….24
2. Negatives of Run ………………………………………………………………..25
3. Best Practices of Run ………………………………………………………….28
4. Summary of Run as a Response Strategy …………………………….
30
D. HIDE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY …………………………………………..31
1. Positives of Hide …………………………………………………………………33
2. Negatives of Hide………………………………………………………………..34
3. Best Practices of Hide …………………………………………………………36
4. Summary of Hide as a Response Strategy ……………………………
39
E. FIGHT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY…………………………………………40
1. Positives of Fight ………………………………………………………………..
43
2. Negatives of Fight ……………………………………………………………….45
3. Best Practices of Fight ………………………………………………………..47
4. Summary of Fight as a Response Strategy …………………………..
48
III. MENTAL PREPARATION FOR DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND
TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING ……………………………………………………..51
A. WARRIOR MINDSET ………………………………………………………………….52
B. WILL TO SURVIVE …………………………………………………………………….58
C. SENSORY INTEGRATION ………………………………………………………….60
D. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP ………………………………………………………65
E. DEFEND YOUR SECTOR—AIR FORCE ……………………………………71
F. STRESS EXPOSURE TRAINING AND THE DIRT DIVE ……………72
G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS …………………………………………………….73
x
IV. DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING ……………77
A. COVER VERSUS CONCEALMENT ……………………………………………78
B. ANTI-SNIPER MOVEMENT ……………………………………………………….79
C. I’M UP, THEY SEE ME, I’M DOWN ……………………………………………80
D. KILL ZONES ……………………………………………………………………………….81
E. NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES …………………………………………………….83
F. DANGER AREAS …………………………………………………………………………85
G. BARRICADING …………………………………………………………………………..89
V. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY …………………………………………………………..91
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ………………………………………………………….92
B. PRE-ACTION ………………………………………………………………………………93
1. School Administrators Empowering Teachers to Find
Success by any Means Necessary …………………………………………93
2. Situational and Area Awareness …………………………………………94
3. Commit to Mission Success …………………………………………………94
C. ACTION……………………………………………………………………………………….95
1. Do Not Delay ………………………………………………………………………95
2. Be Decisive …………………………………………………………………………95
3. Move with a Purpose ………………………………………………………….96
4. Put Distance between Self and Threat …………………………………96
5. Cover over Concealment …………………………………………………….96
6. Quick Movements that Maintain Cover or Concealment
and Provide a Tactical Advantage ……………………………………….97
D. RE-ACTION …………………………………………………………………………………97
1. Stay Ahead of Threat Tempo by Doing the Least
Expected Action …………………………………………………………………97
2. Stay Flexible, Adapt and Overcome …………………………………….98
E. RECOMMENDATIONS ……………………………………………………………….98
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY ……………………….99
G. CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………..100
APPENDIX A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CHECKLIST ………………………….101
APPENDIX B. THE ACTIVE SHOOTER DIRT DIVE ……………………………………103
LIST OF REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………………….105
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ………………………………………………………………………113
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Teacher-Warrior Creed. (Modeled after the Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s
Creed.) …………………………………………………………………………………………….6
Figure 2. Active Shooter Incidents: Location Categories …………………………………..19
Figure 3. Active Shooter Incidents: Incidents Annually …………………………………….19
Figure 4. Number of People Shot and Killed at Virginia Tech ……………………………21
Figure 5. Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States (2000–
2010) …………………………………………………………………………………………….42
Figure 6. The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active
Shooter Events ……………………………………………………………………………….63
Figure 7. Boyd’s OODA Loop ……………………………………………………………………….66
Figure 8. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop ………………………………………66
Figure 9. Cover versus Concealment ………………………………………………………………79
Figure 10. Kill Zones………………………………………………………………………………………82
Figure 11. High Crawl versus Low Crawl …………………………………………………………84
Figure 12. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching
along the ‘Cross’ of the ‘T’” …………………………………………………………….86
Figure 13. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching
from the Base of the ‘T’” …………………………………………………………………87
Figure 14. Stairwell Clearing …………………………………………………………………………..88
Figure 15. The Active Shooter Dirt Dive …………………………………………………………104
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Comparison of Treatment Group’s Safety, Fear, and Resilience
Scores ……………………………………………………………………………………………12
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAR after-action report
ALICE alert lockdown inform counter evacuate
COA courses of action
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
EMS emergency medical services
EOP emergency operations plan
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GLOCK get out, lock out, knock out
IMT individual movement techniques
ISC Interagency Security Committee
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NYPD New York Police Department
OODA observe, orient, decide, act
SET stress exposure training
SPD Scottsdale Police Department
SSIC Safe School Initiative Committee
SWAT special weapons and tactics
TADMUS tactical decision making under stress
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
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xvii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Active shooter events are not a new threat to educational facilities.1 They remain
a consistent threat and have the potential for significant impact.2 Since the 1999
Columbine High School shootings, school-based active shooter events have remained in
the public’s awareness as a potential threat.3 Response strategies need to evolve beyond
the basics of lockdowns.4 Run, Hide, Fight provides a firm foundation for the expansion
of an options-based response strategy for school-based active shooter events.
The term lockdown refers to a conventional practice in which teachers isolate
students in their respective classrooms, lock the doors, and attempt to impede any
visibility into the rooms. Lockdowns were designed to address threats from the exterior
of the school grounds.5 In active shooter events, mitigation efforts focused on outside
threats become extremely problematic, as the shooter may have already accessed the
interior of the school. Another strategic limitation is that once committed to an area
perceived as secure, teachers and staff may have limited opportunities to re-evaluate
responses and change their actions.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored a policy for
responding to active shooter events called Run, Hide, Fight.6 The adaptive strategy,
1 Traci L. Wike and Mark W. Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” Aggression
and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 163, doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.005.
2 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States
between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice, 2014), 21, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-
2000-2013-1 .
3 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, September 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/those-terrible-first-few-minutes-
revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
4 Ibid.
5 Joseph A. Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to
Discover Where Lockdown Came from (Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d.), 7, accessed
November 17, 2016, http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown .
6 Ready Houston, “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English,” YouTube
video, 5:55, posted by the City of Houston, July 23, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2
D0.
xviii
funded by the DHS, was developed by the City of Houston.7 The public rollout of the
strategy came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.8 The
DHS policy of Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as
those in schools in response to active shooter events.9
The research evaluated the elements of Run, Hide (Lockdown), Fight as response
strategies to active shooter events in elementary schools. The objective of the study was
to analyze what characteristics of current active shooter mitigation strategies are
beneficial, what characteristics are not, and what other defensive tactics and tactical-
based decision-making tools can be modified and applied to current strategies to enhance
the overall depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focused on law
enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making that could be taught to
teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings.
Research found that commitment to a winning mindset could be a critical
component in the potential survival of a threatening event. A lot of research addresses
handling stressful situations and the impact of stress on decision-making. Teachers and
school staff, while not frequently faced with situations of this type, must engage actively
in practicing the principles of functioning in stressful environments. It does not cost
money to practice and perfect situational awareness, mindset preparation, and a
willingness to succeed. It is critical that school systems emphasize the importance of
preparedness and a desire to support readiness processes. With the appropriate mindset
practices in place, teachers and school staff can work to familiarize themselves with task-
level tactical practices.
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem
intimidating to the non-military or non–law-enforcement professional, they are not. The
7 Emily Anne Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on
How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting,” Mail Online, July 27, 2012,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-Homeland-Security-releases-public-service-video-to-safety-survive-
mass-shooting.html.
8 Ibid.
9 “Active Shooter Resources,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 23, 2016, https://
www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources.
xix
tactics, broken down to their simplest components, provide basic guidance in movement
and self-protection strategies that have the potential of furthering the likelihood of
survival. Once committed to the “will to survive” and a “warrior mindset,” the goal is for
teachers and school professionals to feel empowered in their ability to adapt to a
multitude of threatening environments.10
Findings from the research fall into three general categories: Pre-action, action,
and re-action. Pre-action refers to the steps leading up to an event that establish the
necessary mindset and confidence for survival, and create an awareness that carries over
into the action phase. Action refers to the actual response to a threat. The tactical
movements and techniques that potential victims implement increase survival. Action
also carries into re-action, and vice-versa, as a feedback loop. Re-action means the
reevaluation phase of the situation. It analyzes whether the actions taken are improving or
worsening the tactical advantage. That analysis determines the next action. Again, a
looped system takes seconds to process. Individually, the significant findings of the
research are the following.
A. PRE-ACTION
School administrators empowering teachers to find success by any means
necessary
Situational and area awareness
Commit to mission success
B. ACTION
Do not delay
Be decisive
Move with a purpose
10 “Active Shooter Resources”; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery:
Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery (Hampton, VA:
Department of Defense, 2007), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-50-3 .
xx
Put distance between self and threat
Cover over concealment
Quick movements that maintain cover or concealment and provide a
tactical advantage
C. RE-ACTION
Stay ahead of threat tempo by doing the least expected action
Stay flexible, adapt and overcome
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1—Provide training to teachers and school staff on
options-based response to active shooter preparedness and response
including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.
This research provides defensive tactics and tactical decision-making available to
school environments at little to no cost. The sources included provide further opportunity
to establish new approaches to response and decision-making.
Recommendation #2—Empower teachers through district policy to
protect the children in their care by any means necessary.
Teachers and school staff need to be empowered to implement their training.
Empowerment must be supported through policy to alleviate concerns over liability. If
teachers make a tactical real-time decision to take their students out the window and into
a nearby neighborhood to provide a safe haven from a shooter, they need to know that
their ability to decide is supported.
Recommendation #3—Establish reconnection procedures in the event of
an incident.
With an options-based approach, reconnection procedures need to be developed.
In the previous example when teachers implement steps to protect their children, a
xxi
process needs to be established for them to reconnect to the school administration to
provide
a student count or roster and arrange transportation to a family reunification area.
By recognizing options-based approaches as an acceptable strategy, school
systems have the potential of dramatically increasing the likelihood of survival.
Lockdown should be an option, not THE solution. This nation, as a society, entrusts
teachers with the daily protection of the children. Why not empower them with the tools
and opportunity to
evolve that protection in an ever-increasing threat environment?
References
Air Land Sea Application Center. Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.
Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/
fm3-50-3 .
Blair, J. Pete, and Katherine W. Schweit. A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000–
2013. Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of
Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014. https://www.fbi.
gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1 .
Buerger, Michael E., and Geoffrey E. Buerger. “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.” FBI
Law Enforcement Bulletin. September 2010. https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/
those-terrible-first-few-minutes-revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
Epstein, Emily Anne. “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service
Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting.” Mail Online. July
27, 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-
Homeland-Security-releases-public-service-video-to-safety-survive-mass-shoot
ing.html.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Active Shooter Resources.” Accessed September 23,
2016. https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/
active-shooter-resources.
Hendry Jr., Joseph A. The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s
Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from. Hartland, WI: ALICE Training
Institute, n.d. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploa
ds/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown .
Ready Houston. “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English.”
YouTube video. 5:55. Posted by the City of Houston. July 23, 2012. https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0.
xxii
United States Air Force. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active
Shooter (AS). Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012. http://static.
epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afttp3-4.6_as/afttp_3-4.6_
active_shooter_(20121114) .
Wike, Traci L., and Mark W. Fraser. “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless.”
Aggression and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 162–69. doi: 10.1016/j.
avb.2009.01.005.
xxiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to begin with a special thanks to my outstanding thesis committee.
The amount of energy the “Tres Amigas” put into this project is beyond appreciated!
Thanks to Dr. Carolyn Halladay for her precision and professionalism, to Dr.
Kathleen Kiernan for her support, encouragement, and vast subject matter expertise,
and, especially, to Dr. Lauren Wollman for the support, guidance, and “motivation” to
continue.
I would like to recognize and thank Dr. Anders Strindberg and Dr. David
Brannan. As faculty members in this program, they truly inspired me to change the way I
think and approach problems completely. Challenging my own biases, assumptions, and
recognizing different ways to approach problems, gave me a path to take on a project that
brought together vastly different disciplines. Thank you both!
I would also like to thank the City of Scottsdale for its support, and specifically,
Fire Chief Tom Shannon, Center for Homeland Defense and Security alumni, for the
motivation and inspiration to enter and complete the program. The entire Scottsdale Fire
Department family has been completely supportive and patient as I complete this
program. Thank you, Sir, and thank you all!
My extended family has been incredibly patient throughout this process, which I
greatly appreciate. I want to thank my parents, Rosanne and Jerry, who instilled my work
ethic and desire to always try to better myself and my surroundings, for their
love, support, and childcare! I greatly appreciate my dad, John, for his pride and
interest in my project. A special thanks to Grandma Barbara who always checked to
make sure I was home safe from the in-residence portions and told me how proud of
me she was every time. Thank you all!
I am especially thankful for my son, John, who inspired the subject matter of
this project and remains a constant motivator to apply my heart and soul into
something in which I truly believe. Thank you, buddy!
xxiv
me every step of the way and gave me the energy and inspiration to succeed. I truly could
not have done it without her. This accomplishment is just as much hers as it is mine.
Thank you, babe. I love you!
Most importantly, this thesis would have not been possible without the love,
support, and INCREDIBLE patience that my wife, Desi, has provided me. She was with
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH QUESTION
Which defensive tactics and tactical decision-making processes can be provided
to teachers and school staff to enhance preparedness for active shooter events?
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In “Active Shooters in Secondary Schools: The Unique Role of the Physical
Educator,” author Jason Winkle recognized the critical value that faculty play in dealing
with the situation immediately following acts of school violence.1 Beyond current
strategies, opportunities exist to train teachers and school administrators in basic
defensive tactical decision-making strategies. The goal of the training is to become more
comfortable in reacting to a potentially chaotic situation. Teachers and school
administrators are then able to make defensive tactical decisions that consider all
available information. With an options-based decision-making matrix, teachers can make
defensive tactical decisions regardless of the scenario they encounter. If they are not in
their classroom, not with their entire class, or any other myriad of possible circumstances,
they can make sound decisions based on the best information available. By educating
teachers to be familiar with defensive tactical decision-making, they have the potential to
be better equipped to react to active shooter events and better protect the students in their
care.
Active shooter events are not a new threat to educational facilities.2 They remain
a consistent threat and have the potential for significant impact.3 Since the 1999
1 George Matthew Snyder, “The Effects of Active Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College
Students’ Perceptions of Personal Safety” (PhD diss., Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA, 2014), 44; Jason
Winkle, “Active Shooters in Secondary Schools: The Unique Role of the Physical Educator,” Illinois
Journal for Health, Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 63 (April 2009).
2 Traci L. Wike and Mark W. Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” Aggression
and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 163, doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.005.
3 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States
between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation,
United States Department of Justice, 2014), 21, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-
2000-2013-1 .
2
Columbine High School shootings, school-based active shooter events have remained in
the public’s awareness as a potential threat.4 Response strategies need to evolve beyond
the basics of lockdowns.5 Run, Hide, Fight provides a firm foundation for the expansion
of an options-based response strategy for school-based active shooter events.
The occurrence of school shootings, while a significant percentage of all active
shooter events, is still very unlikely.6 Schools struggle with balancing cost and time
commitments with the potential risks associated with various threats potentially
impacting school-aged children.7 While balance is always necessary, the detrimental
impact of a school-based active shooter cannot be understated. Beyond the given risk of
injury and death, a potential psychological impact exists to all associated with the event.8
The fear of such events can spread far beyond the intended target. As a vulnerable
population, school-aged children require additional protection from external threats.
Options-based active shooter defensive tactical training for teachers and school
administrators may provide the help they need to remain safe.
Government organizations have worked to advance strategies for school shootings
since the Columbine High School shootings in 1999. The term active shooter came into
the public vernacular in the wake of this tragedy.9 Government-developed active shooter
strategies have historically focused on lockdowns as the primary defense for school
4 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, September 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/those-terrible-first-few-minutes-
revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.
5 Ibid.
6 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers,
Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills (Bethesda,
MD and Hoover, AL: National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School
Resource Officers, 2014), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Best-Practice-Active-Shooter-
Drills .
7 Ibid.
8 Cathy Kennedy-Paine and Franci Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents:
Implications for School Psychologists,” National Association of School Psychologists, Communique 43, no.
1 (2015): 22–23, http://
search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1785215596/abstract/98531B474D944CBPQ/31.
9 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
3
shootings.10 Aided by after-action reports (AARs) following the 2012 mass shooting at
the Sandy Hook Elementary School, which left 20 elementary students ages six and seven
dead, adaptive active shooter strategies have now become more prevalent in schools.11
The term lockdown refers to a conventional practice in which teachers isolate
students in their respective classrooms, lock the doors, and attempt to impede any
visibility into the rooms. Lockdowns were designed to address threats from the exterior
of the school grounds.12 In active shooter events, mitigation efforts focused on outside
threats become extremely problematic, as the shooter may have already accessed the
interior of the school. Another strategic limitation is that once committed to an area
perceived as secure, teachers and staff may have limited opportunities to re-evaluate
response and change their actions.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored a policy for
responding to active shooter events called Run, Hide, Fight.13 The adaptive strategy,
funded by the DHS, was developed by the City of Houston.14 The public rollout of the
strategy came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.15 The
10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Training First Responders and School Officials on Active
Shooter Situations (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), accessed November 15,
2016, https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-training-first-responders_0 .
11 Steve Vogel, Sori Horwitz, and David A. Fahrenthold, “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves
28 Dead, Law Enforcement Sources Say,” Washington Post, December 14, 2012,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
sandy-hook-elementary-school-shooting-leaves-students-staff-dead/2012/12/14/24334570-461e-11e2-
8e70-e19935
28222d_story.html.
12 Joseph A. Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to
Discover Where Lockdown Came from (Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d.), 7, accessed
November 17, 2016, http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown .
13 Ready Houston, “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English,” YouTube
video, 5:55, posted by the City of Houston, July 23, 2012,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0.
14 Emily Anne Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on
How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting,” Mail Online, July 27, 2012,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-Homeland-Security-releases-public-
service-video-to-safety-survive-mass-shooting.html.
15 Ibid.
4
DHS policy of Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as
those in schools in response to active shooter events.16
The first fundamental principle of the DHS active shooter policy is to evacuate
the affected area. If the first option becomes unavailable, hiding from sight is the next
step. The last option—fight—guides the threatened individuals to confront the shooter in
self-defense.17 Running, hiding and fighting are already natural instincts (akin to “fight or
flight”).18 For this reason, the adaptable and actionable characteristics of Run, Hide,
Fight
make it a potential strategy for implementation across a broad spectrum of situations.19
The components of Run, Hide, Fight have had successes and failures both before
and after the official rollout of the strategy. In the AARs of Columbine and Sandy Hook,
numerous examples illustrated these achievements and failures.20 Some who attempted to
escape were shot in the process, while others made it to safety. Of those who hid, some
avoided the shooter entirely while others were executed under their desks.21 Civilians
who directly confronted shooters also had varied outcomes. The 2014 Berrendo Middle
School (New Mexico) shooting concluded when a teacher ordered the shooter to put
16 “Active Shooter Resources,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 23, 2016,
https://www.
fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources.
17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 4,
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet .
18 Holt Clark, “Run. Hide. Fight.: Effective Public Policy for Individual Safety in Response to Active
Shooting Incidents,” McKenzie Institute, July 5, 2014, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/run-hide-fight-
effective-public-policy-individual-safety-response-active-shooting-incidents/.
19 Ibid.
20 William H. Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission
(Littleton, CO: Columbine Review Commission, 2001),
https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-%20Gover
nor’s%20Commission%20Report ; Stephen J. Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the
Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street,
Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012 (Danbury, CT: Office of the State’s Attorney, Judicial
District of Danbury: State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, 2013),
http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report.
pdf; Scott D. Jackson et al., Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission (Hartford, CT: Sandy
Hook Advisory Commission, 2015), http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_Report_3-6-2015 .
21 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 29–32.
5
down his weapon.22 On the other hand, one of the victims killed in the 2013 Sparks
Middle School (Nevada) shooting was a teacher who attempted to confront the shooter.23
Run, Hide, Fight has definite benefits that should remain in the creation of a new
model. It is easily remembered, adaptable, and in sync with natural instincts.
Unfortunately, it is so non-specific that someone not typically trained in high-stress
tactical scenarios—teachers and school staff, for example—might have difficulty
implementing the model when faced with multiple and changing variables. For example,
a panicked teacher unfamiliar with movement under fire may inadvertently stray or lead
students into a firing lane. No one-size-fits-all approach addresses the evolving
environment of an active shooter event.24 Additionally, no mechanism is available during
an event to assess the mental state of a shooter rapidly to decide the best course of action.
A mitigation strategy, bolstered by tactical decision-making tools, can provide an element
of structure to an unpredictable situation.
Sophisticated tactical decision-making models and principles can be adapted to
the educational environment to provide better depth and breadth of understanding by
teachers. For example, reciting “I’m up—They see me—I’m down” is a tool used by the
U.S. military to limit exposure time for personnel confronted with a shooting threat.25
The mnemonic can easily be attached to a lesson plan under the Run element to enhance
the capabilities of a civilian population further. “I’m up—They see me—I’m down” is
22 Katherine W. Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015
(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 2016), 6,
https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/active
shooterincidentsus_2014-2015 .
23 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
42.
24 Laura Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense” in ASIS International School Safety and
Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security
Council, 2016), 53,
https://kiernan.co/sites/default/files/ASIS%20School%20Safety%20%26%20Security%20Council%2C%20
Active_Shooter_Open%20%282015%29 .
25 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps,
2011), http://
www.usnavy.vt.edu/Marines/PLC_Junior/Fall_Semester/TACT3019_Intro_to_Fire&Movement_Student_Out
line .
6
just one example of the numerous tactical training methods that can be adapted to equip
teachers and school staff better.26
The research identified many similarities between military and law enforcement
personnel and teachers. Both serve with a level of pride and dedication unique to their
professions. Both commit to the service of others. Moreover, both find themselves
directly responsible for the safety of themselves and those they protect. Adapted from the
United States Department of the ’Army’s “Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed,” the following
Teacher-Warrior Creed illustrates the dedication and commitment that teachers and
school staff take responsibility for every day with the students in their charge.
I am a Teacher.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the community and my students.
I will always place my students first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I am disciplined, mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to defend my students against any threat.
I am a guardian of my students.
I am a teacher.
Figure 1. Teacher-Warrior Creed. (Modeled after the Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s
Creed.)27
26 Ibid.
27 Adapted from United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 1–10, http://armyrotc.msu.edu/resources/FM3-
21InfantryRifleSQPL .
7
With strong dedication, commitment to the safety of their students, and a
willingness to succeed, teachers and school staff can better prepare themselves to respond
to threatening events. The Teacher-Warrior Creed solidifies that commitment to success
and survival. Combined with other elements in the research, the Teacher-Warrior Creed
serves to celebrate the selfless service that teachers have provided throughout their entire
existence.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review focuses on how school personnel train and react during
active shooter events. Specifically, it concentrates on the psychological impact of
training, as well as the many versions of Run, Hide, Fight that have evolved from various
sources both governmental and private. It does not address law-enforcement response to
active shooter incidents or the psychology of the shooters. A review of the literature
represents three overarching categories: AARs, the psychological impact of training, and
mitigation strategies.
Immediately following the Sandy Hook report in November 2013, an increased
focus was placed upon school-shooter mitigation strategies.28 The New York Police
Department (NYPD) active shooter study was released shortly after the actual event but
only included events up to December 2012.29 The Blair and Schweit report does include
the Sandy Hook incident in their study.30 Although the Sandy Hook shooting appears in
recent studies, limited literature remains regarding an options-based approach to active
shooter responses and mitigation.
The second main area of consensus in the literature is the need to develop or
expand schools’ emergency operations plans (EOPs) to address active shooter
28 Sedensky, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at
Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.
29 Raymond W. Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation (New
York: New York City Police Department, 2012), iii,
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/Activeshooter .
30 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
7, 12, 15–17.
8
preparedness adequately.31 Experts agree that school response strategies need to be
expanded to include other options besides lockdown. In the 2010 Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) publication, Those Terrible First Few Minutes: Revisiting Active-
Shooter Protocols for Schools, authors Michael Buerger and Geoffrey Buerger discussed
the foundational benefits of lockdown but also described the many variables where
lockdown is not sufficient.32 The authors described one such variable as, “the most
glaring gap involves non-classroom locations and activities.”33 They went further to
discuss such problematic scenarios as students at recess, in transition from class to class,
and students getting off the bus who they stated may be better served by fleeing the scene
and reconvening at an alternate location versus attempting to lock themselves down.34
One of the takeaways of Sandy Hook is that lockdowns should not be the sole response to
shootings. Experts also agree that an options-based approach needs to be recognized and
applied based on the variables that differentiate one school from another.35 Again,
Buerger and Buerger stated, “An effective response requires school-specific planning and
coordination grounded in local conditions.”36
Ample literature and information provides a sound basis for the proposed topic. A
significant gap in the literature is the lack of specificity when it comes to the needed
types of changes to active shooter preparedness. The majority of the literature reviewed
seems to stop just short of providing that kind of guidance. Specifically, tactical planning
or training is hardly mentioned if at all. The next step of the research is to review what
guidance, if any, was provided to teachers and school administrators immediately
31 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (Washington, DC: United States
Department of Education, 2013), 57, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1922-25045-
3850/rems_k_12_guide .
32 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
33 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
34 Ibid.
35 Tracy L. Frazzano and G. Matthew Snyder, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional
‘Active Shooter’ Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs X, 2014,
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/
docview/1728289935/abstract/1CC4943198E144AEPQ/10.
36 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
9
following past events. Value and a need for furthering research into the specifics of
advancing defensive tactical decision-making training for teachers still exists.
1. After-Action Reports
The majority of the literature associated with past active-shooter events analyzes
the situations from a law-enforcement response perspective. However, studies show that
in the majority of cases, the shooter is no longer a threat before the arrival of law
enforcement. In a 2014 study on active shooter events in the United States from 2000 to
2013, Blair and Schweit reported that 66.9 percent of the cases they analyzed ended
before the arrival of law enforcement.37 This statistic is valuable in illustrating that the
expectation of law enforcement mitigating the shooter may not be reasonable.
Although few statistical studies regarding historical active shooter events exist,
the few studies that do show consistent statistics across time.38 Researchers from the
NYPD identified 230 quantifiable active shooter events occurring over 279 locations
between 1966 and 2012.39 Of the locations analyzed, 68 happened in schools, which
accounted for approximately 24 percent of the cases.40 The 2014 Blair and Schweit study
also showed that approximately 24 percent of events occurred in educational facilities.41
The total number of school-based shootings equates to 39 out of 160 events.42 Blair and
Schweit report that of 39 school-based events, 27 occurred at K-12 institutions.43 Blair
and Schweit’s findings regarding the percentage of school shootings are consistent with
37 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
9.
38 Joel A. Cappelan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active
Shooter Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 6 (2015): 397,
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/1057610X.2015.1008341.
39 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 4, 8.
40 Ibid., 8.
41 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
13.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
10
those of a 2012 NYPD report.44 Also, the Blair and Schweit study demonstrates an
overall increase in active shooter events from 2000 to 2013.45 In the first seven years of
the Blair and Schweit study, active shooter events averaged 6.4 per year.46 In the last
seven years of the study, that number increased to 16.4 events per year.47 Given the
statistics, it can be inferred that an increase in school-based shootings is very likely.
2. Psychological Impact of Training
Many school agencies have made changes to how they train their staff and
students to respond to active shooter events. These changes in programming have raised
numerous questions regarding the potential psychological impact of proposed training
styles. The FBI has focused on the role of school psychologists in both pre-event
mitigation and assistance in dealing with the impacts of training.48 The majority of the
literature on the topic agrees that both running and hiding are potentially beneficial
responses to active shooters and those facilities must approach implementation of these
steps strategically.
The research shows two distinct schools of thought regarding training to confront
the shooter physically. Critics of the practice contend it is an unrealistic expectation to
have school-age children confront active shooters.49 Also, they feel the training itself can
have a detrimental impact on the psyches of both teachers and students participating in
44 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation.
45 Ibid., 9.
46 Ibid., 6.
47 Ibid.
48 Kennedy-Paine and Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for
School Psychologists,” 22–23.
49 Steve Albrecht, “The Truth behind the Run-Hide-Fight Debate,” Psychology Today, August 25,
2014, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-act-violence/201408/the-truth-behind-the-run-hide-fight-
debate.
11
the training.50 The U.S. Department of Education offers that confronting the shooter may
be the only option remaining when all other possibilities have been exhausted.51
Carole Rider’s 2015 doctoral dissertation is a significant empirical study that
analyzes the relationship between training and perceived ability to react to an event.52
The study analyzes teachers in Mississippi and how prepared they felt for responding to
an active shooter based on which training they or policies their district had
implemented.53 The study shows that teachers who have a regular amount of active
shooter training feel far more prepared to respond to an event.54 Although isolated to a
particular region, Rider’s study correlates a positive perception of preparedness with
increased active shooter training.55
Matthew Snyder found results similar to Rider’s in “The Effects of Active
Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College Students’ Perceptions of Personal
Safety.” Snyder found, “the research suggest that active shooter awareness training
programs do positively influence students in a way that better prepares them to identify,
report, react to, and recover from an active shooter incident (see Table 1).”56
Snyder’s research (illustrated in Table 1) again shows an overall increase in the
perception of safety and resilience from active shooter training. While focused on college
students, a correlation can be made based on Snyder’s and Rider’s findings that adult
learners experience a greater sense of preparedness from training.
50 Romeo Vitelli, “Should Students Be Trained to Respond to School Shootings?” Psychology Today,
January 13, 2016, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/media-spotlight/201601/should-students-be-
trained-respond-school-shootings.
51 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65–66.
52 Carole Frances Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter
Incident” (PhD diss., University of Southern Mississippi, 2015), 1,
http://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&
context=dissertations.
53 Ibid., 9, 108.
54 Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident,” 142.
55 Ibid., 125.
56 Snyder, “The Effects of Active Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College Students’
Perceptions of Personal Safety,” 73.
12
Table 1. Comparison of Treatment Group’s Safety, Fear, and Resilience
Scores57
3. Mitigation Strategies
In 2012, the DHS sponsored a policy for responding to active shooter events
called Run, Hide, Fight. The adaptive strategy, developed with DHS funding by the City
of Houston, came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.58
The DHS’s Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as those in
schools in response to active shooter events.59 The most prevalent iterations of Run,
Hide, Fight are alert lockdown inform counter evacuate (ALICE), which was developed
by Greg Crane with the ALICE Training Institute, and get out, lockout, knockout
(GLOCK), which was prepared by Basim Abu-Hamid.60 Limited literature exists
regarding the evolution of these various mitigation strategies.
57 Source: Ibid.
58 Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to
Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting.”
59 “Active Shooter Resources.”
60 National School Safety and Security Services, “ALICE & Run-Hide-Fight Training: Teaching
Students to Attack Gunmen,” School Security, accessed September 23, 2016,
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/alice-training/; “Get Out, Lock Out, Knock Out,” Polk County
Itemizer-Observer, April 16, 2013, http://www.polkio.
com/news/2013/apr/16/get-out-lock-out-knock-out/; Cody Vance, “Active Shooter Training,” Alice
Training Institute, accessed December 8, 2016, https://www.alicetraining.com/about-us/; Brad Bakke,
“Surviving an Active Shooter Incident is a Matter of Get Out, Lock Out, Knock Out,” Chemeketa
Community College, January 30, 2013, http://blogs.chemeketa.edu/courier/2013/02/15/surviving-an-active-
shooter-incident-is-a-matter-of-get-out-lock-out-knock-out/.
Variable
DHS
(N=29)
CPPS
(N=38)
DHS & CPPS
(N=39)
Control Group
(N=30)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Safety 4.793 .4913 4.579 .5987 4.846 .3655 3.467 1.306
Fear 2.207 2.6643 3.026 2.4104 2.128 2.2616 2.0736 .3786
Resilience .6652 .14035 .7218 .11955 .7592 .13364 .6470 .1676
13
The scientific backing behind the development of the Run, Hide, Fight strategy
remains unclear. Despite the lack of available scientific evidence, it is apparent from the
literature review that proposed mitigation strategies are relatively consistent. Most, if not
all of the strategies researched were some form of Run, Hide, Fight. For example, the
United States Air Force (USAF) produced an active shooter guideline in 2012 that
highlighted its mitigation strategy as escape, barricade, or fight.61
ASIS, an international network of security professionals, published a white paper
in 2016 through its School Safety and Security Council. In the article, Laura Spadanuta
interviewed numerous subject matter experts in the field of school security. Of those
interviewed, not all agree on the details of best practices but do agree with the
overarching messages. Kenneth Trump, president of National School Safety and Security
Services, felt that trends in school active shooter strategy changes were too quick to
abandon proven techniques, such as lockdown.62 Amy Klinger, an educational
administration professor at Ashland University (Ohio), viewed the expansion of
mitigation strategies as an enhancement to current techniques.63 A point of continued
contention is the subject of whether to teach K-12 students to fight. Again, Trump
disagrees with the approach.64 Conversely, Linda Watson, a security consultant for
Whirlaway group LLC, supports the notion of when all else fails, it is essential to do
whatever it takes to survive.65
Literature that outlines specific changes for active shooter response in schools is
limited. In 2010, Buerger and Buerger called for further development of flexible
strategies related to school-based active shooter events.66 They contend that active
shooter strategies in schools do not consider the flexibility needed to avoid becoming a
61 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS) (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012), 6–1,
http://static.epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/
publication/afttp3-4.6_as/afttp_3-4.6_active_shooter_(20121114) .
62 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 55.
65 Ibid.
66 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
14
victim.67 Many experts have called for the need to advance active shooter strategies for
schools in the wake of the Sandy Hook shooting, but have failed to provide specific
details as to what those changes need to be. The majority of recommendations focus more
on the need for schools to develop thorough emergency-operation plans rather than
specifically detailing how active shooter responses should adjust.68
Literature exists regarding different sources of tactical decision-making tools and
strategies. Department of Defense (DOD) related standard operating procedures and
guidelines are available in an open-source format. For example, the United States Marine
Corps has information regarding tactical movement while under fire.69 Additionally, the
USAF discusses the “warrior mindset” to provide mental clarity in the face of stressful
situations.70 Documents of this type have many components of tactical decision-making.
D. RESEARCH DESIGN
The research evaluated the elements of Run, Hide (Lockdown), Fight as response
strategies to active-shooter events in elementary schools. The objective of the study was
to analyze what characteristics of current active-shooter mitigation strategies are
beneficial, what characteristics are not, and what other defensive tactics and tactical
based decision-making tools can be modified and applied to current strategies to enhance
the overall depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focused on law
enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making that could be taught to
teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings.
While all aspects surrounding elementary school response to active-shooter events
have significant value, it was important to limit the focus of research to maintain a
manageable scope that could be comprehensively evaluated. Public safety (law
enforcement/fire/emergency medical services (ems)) response was not evaluated, as those
67 Ibid.
68 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for
Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 56–58, 63–66.
69 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement.
70 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–1.
15
are separate from the actions taken by teachers and school staff. Additionally, these
factors were avoided to not create an inappropriate dependence on the thought that
someone else will solve the issue. Another limitation was the analysis of after-event
mitigation/recovery. The research did not study the reunification process or long-term
implications of an event. Based on the highly complex aspects of the psychology of
shooter/warning signs/indicators of potential threats, this area was excluded from the
research.
With the research being focused on elementary schools, additional limitations of
the research presented themselves. First, the research focused on the training and
preparation of teachers, school administrators, and staff. Training of the students was not
researched. Training elementary students in Run, Hide, Fight is a debated topic and
beyond the scope of the research. Higher education settings were not researched in depth,
based on student age and capability differences, other than to draw similarities and
takeaways that could be applied to lower grade levels. Also, what practices were in place
in individual schools was not researched, as that would create too large of a scope. Based
on the overall research it was assumed that elementary schools fall somewhere into the
broad categories of Run, Hide, Fight and lockdown.
The main information source for Run, Hide, Fight were the Department of
Homeland Security active-shooter documents. The Department of Education provided
Lockdown information. DOD training manuals, as well as law enforcement procedural
documents, provided tactics and tactical decision-making procedures. Literature-based
sources were AARs, such as the Sandy Hook Commission final report, and scholarly
research providing historical data and analysis. Specifically, this research included Blair
and Schweit’s studies of active-shooter events, as well as the 2012 NYPD review.
The type and mode of analysis followed for the research was “policy analysis”
based on Bardach and Patashnik’s Practical Guide to Policy Analysis.71 The specific
steps of the analysis were the following:
71 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to
More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 2015).
16
Determine the common characteristics of success or failure for current
mitigation strategies.
Research what defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools exist in
other disciplines with a focus on military and law enforcement.
Analyze what implementation would look like.
Analyze what barriers exist to implementation and what potential
problems it creates and then attempt to mitigate those issues in advance.
Create an output tool and recommended implementation plan.
The research output is a tangible training tool providing recommendations for
teachers and school staff to aid them in tactical-based decision-making, preparation, and
response to active-shooter events. Recommendations from the research provide for the
development of a self-guided online module that provides a continuing education style
mode of delivery for ease of access at minimal cost. The foundational education provides
a firm base from which conversations and interactions can occur with local public safety
agencies, such as police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency
management.
Based on the preliminary work conducted on the topic, it was determined that the
project was possible. Enough credible information was available on the topic to draw the
various conclusions and connections to relate the different disciplines (elementary school
teachers and the military). Many research projects have been conducted that analyzed the
myriad variable aspects of active shooter events. None of the studies located described, in
depth, the defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools to be applied specifically
to these situations by elementary school teachers and staff. The research summarizes the
benefits of Run, Hide, Fight, discusses the complications of the protocol, describes the
defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools available to assist in minimizing
potential risk, and applies these tools and tactics to the elementary school setting.
17
II. RUN, HIDE, FIGHT
Development of new self-protection strategies was necessary to adapt to the
increasing and changing environment of active shooter events.72 By providing a
memorable and adaptable approach to self-protection, the DHS has provided a potential
solution applicable to a variety of scenarios. Also, the policy provides a starting point
from which to build further programs and plans.73 Run, Hide, Fight is adaptable to a
multitude of situations and functions as a cost-effective foundation from which to
customize individual response and mitigation strategies. This chapter explores the need
for change, researches the three aspects of the protocol, discusses the benefits and
challenges of each practice, and summarizes their efficacy.
A. HISTORY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS
School shootings in the United States have occurred as far back as the Pontiac’s
Rebellion on July 26, 1764.74 Since then, the number and severity of events have varied
but remained a consistent threat. In 1999, school based active shooter events hit the main
stage of public awareness with the Columbine High School shootings.75 Since that time,
the mitigation and response strategies for such events have had a different focus and
discussion. Although few statistical studies are available regarding historical active
shooter events, those that do exist show consistent statistics from various eras in time.76
Researchers from the NYPD identified 230 quantifiable active shooter events occurring
over 279 locations between 1966 and 2012.77 Of the locations analyzed, 68 took place in
72 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
73 “Developing Emergency Operations Plans for Schools,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 56–58,
63–66, June 2013, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/rems-k-12-guide-508 /view.
74 “History of School Shootings in the United States,” K12 Academics, accessed November 23, 2016,
http://
www.k12academics.com/school-shootings/history-school-shootings-united-states#.WDXak3eZP-Y.
75 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
76 Cappelan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter
Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” 397.
77 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 4, 8.
18
schools, which accounted for approximately 24 percent of the cases.78 The 2014 Blair
and Schweit study also shows that approximately 24 percent of events occurred in
educational facilities.79 The total amount of school-based shootings equates to 39 out of
160 events.80 Blair and Schweit report that of the 39 school-based events, 27 occurred at
K-12 institutions.81 Blair and Schweit’s findings regarding the percentage of school
shootings are consistent with those of the 2012 NYPD report. The studies cited show a
consistent proportion of active shooter events occurring in educational settings (Figure
2).82 Also, the Blair and Schweit study demonstrates an overall increase in active shooter
events from 2000 to 2013 (Figure 3).83 In the first seven years of the Blair and Schweit
study, active shooter events averaged 6.4 per year.84 In the last seven years of the study,
that number increased to 16.4 events per year.85 Given the statistics, it can be inferred
that a continuing increase in school-based shootings is very likely.
78 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 8.
79 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,
13.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 9.
84 Ibid., 6.
85 Ibid.
19
Figure 2. Active Shooter Incidents: Location Categories86
Figure 3. Active Shooter Incidents: Incidents Annually87
86 Source: Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000
and 2013, 6.
87 Source: Ibid., 8.
20
While all school-based shootings are significant, a few have had a direct impact
on the evolution of mitigation strategies. The 1999 Columbine High School shooting
brought the term “active shooter” to the forefront of society’s vocabulary.88 Various
government agencies began discussions regarding what changes needed to be made in the
overall reaction strategy to school-based shootings after Columbine. The majority of
these reviews appeared to be centered on law enforcement’s actions as they relate to
overall response tactics.
B. NEED FOR CHANGE
The shooting at Virginia Tech is a dynamic example of the many elements of
active-shooter events the research evaluated. In April 2007, Seung Hui Cho killed 32
teachers and students.89 Students and staff, to lessen the impact of the situation,
implemented a variety of tactics. In room 211, the teacher saw the shooter in the hallway,
moved back to the classroom, and began to barricade the door with lightweight desks.90
Cho then entered the room, pushing past the desks and killing an Air Force cadet who
had attempted to rush him, and opened fire on the rest of the classroom.91 After leaving
the room and returning, Cho shot everyone in the classroom; those already dead, and
those attempting to play dead, and killed approximately two-thirds of the students in the
class.92
In room 205, students attempted to barricade the door with a large teacher’s
desk.93 Cho fired through the door and hit no one.94 In the end, Cho never gained access
to classroom 205, and no students were shot or killed.95 Abandoning his attempts at room
88 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”
89 “Massacre at Virginia Tech Leaves 32 Dead,” History, April 16, 2007, http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/massacre-at-virginia-tech-leaves-32-dead.
90 John P. Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor &
Francis
Group, 2013), 195.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 196.
93 Ibid., 195.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
21
205, Cho moved to room 204.96 In room 204, the teacher had placed himself against the
door in an attempt to barricade it and advised his students to exit through a window.97
When Cho attacked room 204, he shot through the door, hitting the teacher, then pushed
his way through the door and killed him.98 After gaining entry, Cho shot everyone who
had not escaped through the window.99 Blair et al. summarize the actions taken and
resulting impacts in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Number of People Shot and Killed at Virginia Tech100
The conditions are as follows:
“In room 206 where the potential victims took no defensive actions
other than freezing, 92 percent of the people were shot and more
than three-quarters of them died.
96 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis
Group, 2013), 195.
97 Ibid., 195–196.
98 Ibid., 196.
99 Ibid.
100 Source: Ibid.
22
In room 211, where the potential victims attempted unsuccessfully
to barricade the door and Cadet LaPorte attempted to attack the
shooter, everyone was shot and about two-thirds were killed.
In room 207, no initial defensive action was taken, but the
potential victims successfully barricaded the door to prevent the
shooter from reentering. Here, 85 percent of the people were shot
and 38 percent of those in the classroom died.
Room 204 performed a denial and then attempted to avoid the
shooter. While the denial was ultimately unsuccessful, it provided
most of the students with time to escape. In this room, 36 percent
of the occupants were shot and 14 percent of those in the
classroom were killed.
Room 205 successfully denied the shooter access to the room. The
shooter fired through the door, but no one was hit or killed.”101
Blair, a leading researcher in the field of active shooter events, deduced along
with his co-authors from the Virginia Tech research, “The data show a clear pattern that
those who took some form of defensive action at Virginia Tech fared much better than
those who did not. Freezing or playing dead were not good options.”102
Combining these findings with Blair and Martaindale’s previous research on
active shooter events from 2000–2010, the authors of Active Shooter Events and
Response found that “you are not helpless during these events” and “what you do
matters.”103 Blair et al. continued to find other valuable takeaways from the events
studied. Consistent with other professionals in the field, Blair et al. found that “people
need options other than lockdown.”104 Additionally, they found that many active shooter
101 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 196–197.
102 Ibid., 197.
103 Ibid.,
198.
104 Ibid.
23
policies were too lengthy and inappropriately attempted to be all encompassing.105 Based
on the extreme variability of these events, long and wordy policies and procedures are
ineffective at addressing every situation. Blair et al. note, “it is simply not possible to
write a policy that will address every possibility.”106 Again, Blair et al. reinforce the idea
that it is necessary to engage in options and be adaptable versus trying to define every
potential variable of every possible situation.
C. RUN AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY
Escaping danger is one of the most primal actions of the human brain. Fight or
flight is an automated neurologic response either to confront danger directly or flee the
area. The Run, Hide, Fight practice echoes this primal instinct. Many variations of run are
studied, discussed, and practiced: evacuate, evade, and avoid among them. The U.S.
Department of Education provides guidelines for evacuation in the Guide for Developing
High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans. Specifically, the annex speaks to:
“How to safely move students and visitors to designated assembly
areas from classrooms, outside areas, cafeterias, and other school
locations.
How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.
How to evacuate students who are not with a teacher or staff
member.
How to evacuate individuals with disabilities (along with service
animals and assistive devices, e.g., wheelchairs) and others with
access and functional needs, including language, transportation,
and medical needs.”107
105 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 198.
106 Ibid.
107 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 28–29.
24
Specifically, the 2013 guide prioritizes evacuation as the number one priority, as
safely available, to respond to an active shooter in schools. This direction was a departure
from the previously held stance that lockdowns were the preferred default reaction.108
1. Positives of Run
The research provides numerous examples of successful outcomes of Run
implementation. The tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary demonstrated the potential
success of evacuating. Of the survivors, nine of the children had escaped the attacked
rooms.109 AARs from Sandy Hook established that the nine students were able to take
advantage of an opportunity when the shooter stopped firing, while either reloading or
correcting a weapon malfunction, to make an options-based decision to escape.110 Many
of the other survivors were able to escape the school, find safe shelter, and notify
police.111
The 1999 Columbine massacre demonstrated the positive outcomes of running.
The Columbine AAR describes many surviving students who fled the school once the
shooting started. Specifically, many students, teachers, and staff were able to escape
through the cafeteria or upstairs to the second level of the school.112 When the students
witnessed the actions occurring outside, they began to hide under cafeteria tables.113
According to the AAR, teacher Dave Sanders advised students in the cafeteria to flee the
area, potentially saving many lives.114 As the shooting continued at Columbine, students
108 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 64.
109 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012, 10.
110 Jackson et al., Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 12.
111 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012, 11.
112 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, ii.
113 Ibid., 27.
114 Ibid., 27–28.
25
were able to escape as the shooters moved through different areas.115 Again, this example
demonstrated the natural inclination to options-based, nonlinear response strategies.
Another successful case example of evacuation is the 2009 Hampton University
shooting in Hampton, Virginia.116 The Harkness Hall shooting ended due to the quick
thinking of a dormitory manager, who activated the hall’s fire alarm, which in turn,
evacuated the building.117
Despite having limited direct examples of the positives of Run, it could be
concluded that anyone who escaped an active shooter situation was a success. While not
always documented or recorded, the sheer survivability reveals the value of this strategy.
The clear benefit and survivability support the value of evacuation being the number one
response plan.
2. Negatives of Run
Negative examples or characteristics of Run also appear in the research. The
USAF states that all employees should be trained in evacuation procedures and have the
routes pre-identified.118 Unfortunately, pre-existing evacuation plans, whether fire related
or not, can prove to be problematic under active shooter conditions. While training in
advance on these routes has great value for specific scenarios, escapees can find
themselves in a high-risk position if a shooter cuts off routes. In the 2015 document,
Planning and Response to an Active Shooter, the Interagency Security Committee
discusses how pre-established evacuation routes may be inaccessible in an active shooter
115 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 33.
116 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 31.
117 Ibid.
118 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 5–1.
26
scenario or put people in a higher risk position.119 By recognizing evacuation routes
having specific applicability, (i.e., fire, natural disaster event, etc.), teachers must focus
on the elements of the routes to be navigated versus the routes themselves. When faced
with an active shooter event, teachers and school staff should not lock themselves into a
specific route. They need to stay adaptable and take the route that provides the safest and
timeliest escape.
The AARs of Columbine discuss concern over the contradictions of the practice
of evacuating. Specifically, they discuss the possibility that the students shot while hiding
under tables might equally have met their fate while escaping in the hallway.120 After
directing students to evacuate the cafeteria, potentially saving many lives, Dave Sanders
was shot moving through the hallways attempting to warn others.121 The Columbine
AARs also describe scenarios where students were shot at and wounded as they
attempted to flee.122 Unfortunately, the what-if scenarios confirm the idea that no one
single answer exists to the question.
The Columbine AARs also discuss the plans originally set forth by the shooters,
Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris. In their initial plan, an explosion was intended to kill
those in the immediate vicinity, as well as trigger an evacuation.123 The shooters then
planned to shoot school staff and students as they escaped from the area of the
119 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency
Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide (Washington, DC: Interagency Security Committee,
2015), 20, https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov-
2015-508.
pdf.
120 Lawrence Fennelly, “Lessons Learned,” in ASIS International School Safety and Security Council,
ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 20,
https://
kiernan.co/sites/default/files/ASIS%20School%20Safety%20%26%20Security%20Council%2C%20Active
_Shooter_Open%20%282015%29 .
121 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 29.
122 Ibid., 27.
123 Ibid., 25.
27
explosion.124 Klebold and Harris also staged their vehicles to ensnare escapees in their
crossfire.125
In a white paper compiled by ASIS International, various subject-matter experts
discussed the positives and negatives of different active shooter response strategies.
Specifically, they examine the difficulties of keeping children controlled and quiet along
an evacuation route.126 Moving children becomes increasingly more complicated with the
potential of an active shooter being on the path of an escape route.127 Paul Timm,
president of RETA Security, contends that ample opportunities are available to lockdown
school children in secure locations and minimize the risk exposure of attempting
escape.128 Additionally, a 2014 report provided by the National Association of School
Psychologists, in conjunction with the National Association of School Resource Officers,
titled Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed
Assailant Drills describes other negative potentials of escaping an area. Again, it includes
running into a path of danger, but adds exposure to victims, and potentially trampling
each other in an attempt to evacuate.129
Described in Kelly’s 2012 NYPD report, two additional case studies demonstrate
potentially negative characteristics of escape. In August 2010, Thomas Cowan reportedly
asked for the location of the fire alarm at Sullivan Central High School in Blountville,
Tennessee.130 Cowan’s reported intent was to activate the fire alarm to lure students into
hallways as they evacuated to provide targets for him in the firing lanes.131 The second
case in Kelly’s report occurred at Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas.132 In
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 26.
126 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.
127 Ibid.
128 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.
129 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource
Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills, 5.
130 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 97.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 123.
28
March 1998, two students shot at classmates and teachers after luring them out of the
building by activating the fire alarm.133 These examples enumerate the risks associated
with moving from secure locations into potentially more vulnerable areas. While fire
alarms should not be assumed as false, the examples provided emphasize the value in
teachers and staff not making assumptions about situations. Although teachers will
implement standard evacuation procedures and take pre-determined routes in case of fire
alarm activation, they must maintain heightened situational awareness to avoid being
drawn into a shooting lane.
3. Best Practices of Run
Consistent characteristics in the research relate to the best practices of Run. ASIS
International, a recognized authority in the field of security, provides various collections
of best practices from experts in the active shooter field. The 2016 ASIS School Safety
and Security Council active shooter white paper describes the most recent best practice
compilations. Specifically, they list Run features as:
“Find a path and attempt to evacuate
Evacuate whether others agree or not
Leave your belongings
Help others Evacuate
Prevent others from entering
Call 911”134
The document continues to discuss the untethered approach that evacuation
should take. ASIS advises the need to escape in “any way possible” should the situation
133 Ibid.
134 Jason T. Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” in Active Shooter (Alexandria, VA:
ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 1.
29
allow it, preferably by running.135 The document’s subject matter experts discuss the
value of taking any means necessary, including breaking windows, to create student
escape routes.136 They also recognize the potential that a previously secured area can
become less safe and require the potential victim to escape.137 The Final Report of the
Sandy Hook Advisory Commission also described the potential use of windows for
escape.138 That report goes as far to recommend construction standards for new builds
and remodels.139
The 2012 NYPD report discusses recommendations for evacuating as well. While
the majority of the information is consistent with other sources, one area is contradictory
to the overall consensus of research. Presumably adapted from the 2008 version of DHS
Active Shooter: How to Respond, the NYPD report advises evacuees to “visualize their
entire escape route” before beginning to move.140 As seen in other areas of the research,
this approach becomes problematic if the route previously committed to or visualized
becomes inaccessible or puts the evacuee at a higher risk.
Again, the U.S. Department of Education guide provides thorough
recommendations for escape. Specifically, they list:
“Leave personal belongings behind;
Visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible
routes for students and staff with disabilities as well as persons
with access and functional needs;
Avoid escalators and elevators;
135 Ibid., 5.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 54.
139 Ibid.
140 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 4.
30
Take others with them, but not to stay behind because others will
not go;
Call 911 when safe to do so; and
Let a responsible adult know where they are.”141
Although the directions regarding visualizing routes may seem consistent between
the NYPD report and the Department of Education’s guide, slight variances are evident.
As opposed to the visualization of an entire path (NYPD), the Department of Education
prompts teachers and students to visualize possible escape routes, and emphasize the
importance of options. Additionally, they extend the direction to accommodate the
consideration of what routes are even physically possible based on the capabilities or
restrictions of the population attempting evacuation.142 This direction provides a perfect
balance between planning and reaction. By visualizing different routes, the escapees are
building a system of possibilities should they encounter any inputs requiring them to alter
their plans. The planning aspect also prevents evacuees from running off with no
direction or guidance. Additionally, the flexibility avoids the risk of delaying response
and the potential decrease of adaptive thinking.
4. Summary of Run as a Response Strategy
Statistically, Run is a challenging response strategy to assess. The data suggest
that people putting as much distance as possible between themselves and their attacker
when safely feasible has obvious benefits. From an after-action standpoint, examples of
both positive and negative outcomes resulted when Run was applied. The positives
appear to outweigh the negatives. Based on the information, the position that the U.S.
Department of Education took making evacuate the number one priority in active shooter
141 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
142 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
31
response makes sense.143 The key, as discussed in subsequent chapters, is to assess the
scenario strategically to determine the appropriate time and details of escaping.
The status quo direction of Run oversimplifies a complex situation. As seen in the
examples, evacuating can have both positive and negative outcomes. As discussed in
greater depth in the following chapters, different tactics and tactical decision-making
tools can be applied to running. It is critical to maintain situational awareness at all times
as teachers move through their school day. For example, teachers and school staff should
be constantly analyzing where the nearest two exits are. They should identify a primary
and secondary option. Additionally, teachers and school staff should work to familiarize
themselves on cover and concealment and should work to make noticing it second nature.
Purposeful, short burst movements, when faced with a nearby threat, can dramatically
decrease casualty rates. Additionally, when a threat is further away, a well-executed
escape can provide distance from the shooter that will likely increase potential survival.
Regardless of distance, if escape is an option, it should always be prioritized.
D. HIDE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY
Schools have historically implemented lockdowns as the primary response to
threatening situations.144 Many schools are now implementing more adaptive strategies,
such as Run, Hide, Fight.145 The Hide portion of the Run, Hide, Fight active shooter
response strategy is the most discussed and implemented. Packaged under terms, such as
lockdown, secure in place, and isolate, hiding is standard amongst many school systems
based on its simplicity, relative advantages, and a level of comfort associated with
familiar surroundings. Lockdown is the most commonly used terminology utilized in
schools related to the practice.146
143 Ibid., 64.
144 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource
Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills, 4.
145 Ibid., 1.
146 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 3.
32
Terminology makes a significant difference in defining expectations of action.
Hiding is the practice of using concealment to avoid detection by a threat. Lockdown, on
the other hand, describes a system in which physical barriers, locked doors, for example,
are utilized to prevent access from a threat. Secure-in-place, a commonly misused term,
represents a strategy of safely maintaining an area to avoid exposures from outside
threats, usually natural. Although they appear similar on the surface, secure-in-place is a
much more passive strategy intended to last for an extended period. Lockdown, on the
other hand, is a shorter-term strategy, and ideally both active and defensive. Hiding is
similar to lockdown with or without the aid of physical barrier mechanisms.
Lockdown is the most commonly seen active shooter response strategy for
elementary schools. The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency
Operations Plans, a collaborative government guidance document, describes the purpose
of lockdown as, “to quickly ensure all school staff, students, and visitors are secured in
the rooms away from immediate danger.”147 Despite offering lockdown as an option, the
guide recommends evacuation as the primary mitigation strategy.148
The origin of lockdown is unclear. Some experts trace it to the Los Angeles
Unified School District’s response to riots in the 1960s.149 Lockdown continued as an
appropriate strategy for that same area, which saw an increase in drive-by shootings and
violent threats outside school perimeters.150 It is apparent from the literature that
lockdowns were designed and developed to address threats from the exterior of the
school grounds.151 In active shooter events, it becomes extremely problematic, as the
shooter may have already accessed the interior of the school.
147 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 29.
148 Ibid., 64: Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to
Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 7.
149 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover
Where Lockdown Came from, 6.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., 7.
33
Modern mitigation strategies challenge the wisdom of lockdown as the primary
strategy in active shooter events.152 However, Kenneth Trump, president of National
School Safety and Security Services, argues that the emotional response following the
Sandy Hook shooting has caused those in the industry to want to move away from a
practice that has proven successful in past scenarios.153 While acknowledging the
benefits of evacuation, the potential safety of lockdown and recognizing that it may be
the only option, critics also demonstrate concern in leaving students defenseless while
simply hiding without the protection of security barriers.154
1. Positives of Hide
The Safe School Initiative Committee (SSIC) report following the Sandy Hook
shooting stated, “The testimony and other evidence presented to the Commission reveals
that there has
never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked
classroom door.”155 This statement demonstrates the significant value of lockdown when
done correctly and with the appropriate factors in place. Implementation of hiding and
lockdown has a litany of success stories. Numerous case studies and AARs describe the
achievements associated with implementing the strategy. For example, in one AAR from
Sandy Hook, staff hid under their desks in the front office of the school, near where the
shooter Adam Lanza first made entry.156 The shooter reportedly entered the office area,
apparently did not see anyone, and moved back into the hallway.157 Throughout the
school, many students successfully hid from the shooter. Students hid in school
restrooms, as well as other areas throughout the school.158
152 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 32.
156 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012, 2, 10, 12.
157 Ibid., 2.
158 Ibid., 10, 11.
34
Another positive result occurred in the 1999 shooting at Notus Junior-Senior High
School in Idaho.159 The AAR describes students barricading themselves in classrooms
when they heard shots.160 These actions attributed to the zero casualty count of this
incident.161
2. Negatives of Hide
Unfortunately, examples of hiding have also led to harmful outcomes. Both in
Sandy Hook and Columbine, two of the most significant active shooter events provide
examples of the disadvantages of hiding. In Sandy Hook, the shooter gained access to the
interior of the school.162 In two classrooms, 20 students were murdered (15 and five,
respectively).163 The majority of the victims were all located, hiding, in their
classroom.164 Of the nine students who ran from classroom, 10 survived the event while
the five students and two teachers who remained in the classroom died.165
In 1985, in the Portland, Connecticut shooting at the Portland Junior High School,
the perpetrator walked the halls looking for victims.166 After killing a custodian and
wounding two other staff members, Floyd Warmsley took a student hostage.167
Warmsley then reportedly wandered the halls with the student hostage for 30 minutes.168
159 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 122.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012.
163 Ibid.; Vogel, Horwitz, and Fahrenthold, “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law
Enforcement Sources Say.”
164 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012.
165 Ibid.
166 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 138.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
35
The now-infamous Columbine library was an additional example of problems
associated with hiding. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris entered the school library
approximately 15 minutes into their shooting spree.169 Students in the library had been
directed by staff to hide under the tables when the shooting started.170 In seven and a half
minutes, the two shooters worked through the library, killing 10 students out of the 60
total students and staff, and injuring many others.171 Witnesses reported that the two
shooters seemed to have no exact method as to whom they shot, which they left alone,
and what prompted them to discontinue the slaughter.172 In this case, it is unclear whether
having hidden in the library was overall a successful strategy. However, had students and
staff taken advantage of the 15-minute gap between the start of the shooting and when the
two shooters entered the library, many more might have survived. By applying an
options-based approach, students and staff could have either fled the area to safety or
confront the shooters in an attempt to overwhelm them. Professor Amy Klinger from
Ashland University in Ohio poses this (rhetorical) question: if you know that an event is
taking place at one end of a school, and you are at the other end of the school, why would
you wait to see if the threat reaches you rather than evacuating?173 To address this
scenario, Klinger advocates for options-based approaches to active shooter events in
schools. In the trainings she provides, the emphasis is placed on showing teachers that
multiple options exist to address these threats. The focus of the training is to illustrate that
no single “right way” of doing things exists. Instead, the value is placed on teachers
recognizing the different options available to them.
Structural design challenges to implementing lockdowns in schools do occur.
Experts in the field of school security discuss the issues associated with attempting to
lockdown a classroom that has glass in or around doors or locks if they are not easy to
169 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, ii.
170 Ibid., 29.
171 Ibid., iii.
172 Ibid., 30.
173 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.
36
use in an emergency.174 Depending on the configuration, glass can be broken to allow
access to the locking mechanism; teachers may have difficulty in engaging the lock
during stressful times.175 Another significant drawback to lockdown or other similar
linear response strategies is the familiarity of the practice to the shooter. Many times, the
shooter is familiar with the facility and can anticipate the practices associated with threat
response.176
Lockdowns have obvious strategic limitations. Once committed to an area
perceived as secure, opportunities may be limited to reevaluate a response strategy or
make new decisions. To put it bluntly, once a commitment to hiding is made, victims
become “sitting ducks,” at the mercy of chance. Structural integrity and design of the
building and classrooms become significant in their ability to protect occupants from
shooters.177
3. Best Practices of Hide
The SSIC report following Sandy Hook made two critical recommendations to
assist in the implementation of lockdown in K-12 schools. The recommendations are as
follows:
Recommendation No. 1: “The SSIC Report includes a standard
requiring classroom and other safe-haven areas to have doors that
can be locked from the inside. The Commission cannot emphasize
enough the importance of this recommendation. The testimony and
other evidence presented to the Commission reveals that there has
never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked
classroom door. Accordingly, the Commission reiterates its
174 Jim McLain, “Buying Time—Realistic Hardening of the Target at the Classroom Door,” in ASIS
International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS
International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 30.
175 Ibid.
176 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover
Where Lockdown Came from, 4.
177 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover
Where Lockdown Came from, 6.
37
recommendation that all classrooms in K-12 schools should be
equipped with locked doors that can be locked from the inside by
the classroom teacher or substitute.
Recommendation No. 2: The Commission also reiterates its
recommendation that all exterior doors in K-12 schools be
equipped with hardware capable of implementing a full perimeter
lockdown.”178
These recommendations provide relatively straightforward changes that
institutions can make to provide for better success in potential lockdown scenarios.
The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans also
provides a best practices list for implementing both lockdown and shelter-in-place. As
part of the planning process, the guide stipulates that the assessment team should
consider:
“How to lock all exterior doors, and when it may or may not be
safe to do so.
How particular classroom and building characteristics (i.e.,
windows, doors) impact possible lockdown courses of action
(COA).
What to do when a threat materializes inside the school.
When to use the different variations of a lockdown (e.g., when
outside activities are curtailed, doors are locked, and visitors are
closely monitored, but all other school activities continue as
normal).”179
178 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 32–33.
179 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 29.
38
Unique to the practice of hiding, the guide provides the following list of best
practices: “Students and staff should be trained to hide in a location where the walls
might be thicker and have fewer windows. In addition:
“Lock the doors;
Barricade the doors with heavy furniture;
Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows;
Turn off lights;
Silence all electronic devices;
Remain silent;
Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of the view from the
hallway (allowing for an ambush of the shooter and for possible
escape if the shooter enters the room);
Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders if
possible, for example, in rooms with exterior windows make signs
to silently signal law enforcement officers and emergency
responders to indicate the status of the room’s occupants; and
Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law
enforcement officers.”180
Other best practice considerations are to establish plans specifically designed for
those who cannot Hide or evacuate.181 Special populations require special planning
180 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
181 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
39
considerations. Additionally, plans should include variables, such as teachers not being in
their classroom when a lockdown order is given.182
4. Summary of Hide as a Response Strategy
It is unrealistic to assume or make the correlation that more victims could have
survived if they had approached the situation differently. The outcomes are highly
influenced based on many variables involved. A few of the many variables that impact a
potential victim’s response options and the likelihood of survival include time, distance
from the shooter, exits, and escape routes.
Again, the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations
Plans provides that evacuation should be the number one priority in response to an active
shooter threat when safely feasible.183 However, the guide also provides best practices
that can significantly increase the likelihood of survival if faced with hiding or locking
down. Takeaways from the research demonstrate that locking down can be successful
when done correctly and with the right supporting factors (door construction, locking
mechanisms, and classroom layouts for example). The key is to delineate the difference
between hiding, lockdown, and sheltering-in-place. Again, no one-size-fits-all approach
exists.
If Hide or Lockdown is determined to be the best option given the scenario, it is
critical that teachers and staff actively pursue self-protection. Practicing passive
lockdown procedures can lull teachers and school staff into a false sense of security.
Asking teachers to put themselves in the high-risk, high-stress mindset, and commit to
aggressive defensive tactics, will change the way staff approach hiding and locking
down. Subsequent chapters go into more depth regarding the tactics and tactical decision-
making tools that can be applied to the situation. Having students sit on the floor and
remain quiet is simply not enough when faced with a real threat. Doors need to be locked
and barricaded. Children need to be hidden. All access paths need to be made as
182 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover
Where Lockdown Came from, 7.
183 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans.
40
complicated as possible for the shooter to navigate. In addition, makeshift weapons
should be identified early for deployment as a last resort.
E. FIGHT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY
The Fight portion of Run, Hide, Fight is the most highly debated element of
mitigation strategy for schools. When dealing with elementary age children, many feel
that it is an unreasonable expectation to ask kids to Fight attackers. Some psychologists
and school administrators challenge the Fight aspect of Run, Hide, Fight,184 arguing that
it is unrealistic and inefficient to confront the shooter physically. Many reasons for this
critique have been stated, such as age, knowledge base, and physical capabilities of the
threatened party. Since all situations reveal themselves differently, and are full of
variables, these factors must be discussed when considering the last phase of the protocol.
Having school-aged children confront the shooter, for example, becomes more
problematic the lower the grade level.185 Additionally, access to weapons or objects
potentially used as weapons remains a factor for consideration. Critics also contend that
even the training can be traumatic to participants.186 Proponents of Fight believe, to the
contrary, that when no other option exists, kids may simply have to Fight.187
When discussing Fight, it is important to recognize that the term has many
variables. Fight is recognized as a primary component of the Fight or Flight
response.
This natural instinct prompts the threatened to attack the attacker physically. Another
version is to confront an attacker; approach and attempt to mitigate the situation without
physical engagement. Approaching an attacker has distinct risk factors associated with it
but has proved a successful strategy in some cases, as described in the positive examples
184 Albrecht, “The Truth behind the Run-Hide-Fight Debate.”
185 Kennedy-Paine and Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for
School Psychologists,” 22–23.
186 Dan Frosch, “‘Active Shooter’ Drills Spark Raft of Legal Complaints; Critics Say Simulation
Exercises Can Traumatize Those Taking Part,” Wall Street Journal, September 4, 2014,
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.
edu/docview/=1559961268/abstract/98531B474D944CBPQ/28.
187 Clark, “Run. Hide. Fight.: Effective Public Policy for Individual Safety in Response to Active
Shooting Incidents.”
41
of Fight in this chapter. The ability to adapt to the given situation to determine the
appropriate outcome lends itself to supporting the idea of options-based approaches.
According to a 2014 study reviewing active shooter events from 2000 to 2013,
66.9 percent of events end before police intervention.188 The shooters either were stopped
by a citizen, or otherwise discontinued their attack (fled, committed suicide, or killed by
someone on-scene).189 Breaking it down by school type, the report identified seven of 10
high school shooters being detained by school staff, three held by educators in middle
schools, and three apprehended at elementary schools. The decision to confront
an attacker, either verbally or physically, is extremely situational. Split-second
decisions need to be made that include only available facts at that time. For example,
could the shooter be easily overpowered, do they seem unsure of themselves, are they
reloading, or is a school staff member at a tactically advantageous position to
incapacitate the attacker? Statistically, the following case studies demonstrate that
potential victims can directly impact the outcome of the event (Figure 5).190 As Blair et
al. stated:
In 39% of the attacks that were stopped before the police arrived, the
victims took action to stop the shooter themselves either by physically
subduing the attacker (81%) or by shooting him with their own personal
weapons (19%). These data clearly show that it is possible to defend
yourself successfully in these events even if you are unarmed.191
188 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 9.
189 Ibid.
190 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 197.
191 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 197.
42
Figure 5. Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States (2000–
2010)192
More recently, a 2016 study by Schweit reviewing active shooter events in 2014
and 2015 identified six scenarios out of 40 in which citizen intervention ended the
situation.193 Of the six incidents Schweit describes as ending with citizen involvement,
two involved people restraining the shooters after citizens with permitted firearms fired
upon them.194 Two more incidents involved physically restraining shooters until the
arrival of law enforcement.195 The remaining two events were non-physical
confrontations where one shooter complied with an order from a teacher to put the gun
down.196 The other student shooter committed suicide after being confronted by a
teacher.197 The U.S. Department of Education’s Guide for Developing High-Quality
School Emergency Operations Plans describes 16 events, out of 41, in which victims
192 Source: Ibid., 62.
193 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 2.
194 Ibid., 3.
195 Ibid.
196 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 3.
197 Ibid.
43
physically halted an attack before law enforcement’s arrival.198 Of the 16 events
described, in 13 cases, the potential victims physically “subdued” the attacker.199 Blair
and Schweit’s 2014 report described 65 out of 160 incidents in which events ended due to
citizen involvement or suicide, and 21 concluded due to the intervention of unarmed
citizens.200 Specifically, 11 of the 21 events included the engagement of unarmed school
staff, teachers, and students.201
These statistics demonstrate the likelihood that events will end before the arrival
of law enforcement. The examples also point to the reality that many times,
confrontations (both physical and verbal) lead to the end of the threat. The U.S.
Department of Education’s guide admits that although the idea of confronting a shooter
may be difficult to explain and understand, early mitigation of an event may save many
lives.202 Although potentially beneficial, the research again demonstrates both positive
and negative examples of the implementation of Fight (or confrontation).
1. Positives of Fight
The 2004 Columbia High School (New York) shooting ended when school staff
restrained the shooter after he wounded one person.203 After killing one staff member and
wounding two others in 2005, Campbell County Comprehensive High School
(Tennessee) students and administrators subdued the shooter.204 A teacher restrained a
14-year-old shooter at Pine Middle School in Nevada after he wounded two people.205 In
198 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65–66.
199 Ibid., 66.
200 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 11.
201 Ibid.
202 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 66.
203 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 24.
204 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 26.
205 Ibid.
44
2006, at Weston High School (Wisconsin), staff restrained the shooter after he killed one
person.206 Another shooting in 2006 occurred at Memorial Middle School (Missouri)
where staff escorted the shooter out of the building after his rifle jammed.207 School staff
tackled and restrained an adult shooter in 2010 after he opened fire, wounding two, at
Deer Creek Middle School (Colorado).208 Showing high situational awareness,
construction workers near Kelly Elementary School (California) tackled a shooter when
he stopped to reload after he had wounded two in 2010.209 School staff restrained a 2012
Perry High School (Maryland) shooter after he wounded one classmate.210 In 2013, a 16-
year-old student began firing at Taft Union High School in California.211 He stopped
shooting, after wounding two people, when a staff member persuaded him to halt.212 A
non-physical confrontation concluded the 2014 Berrendo Middle School (New Mexico)
after the shooter was ordered to drop his gun by a school staff member.213 The shooter
had already wounded three people but complied with the order. In 1999, Fort Gibson
Middle School (Oklahoma) staff restrained a gunman after wounding four in 1999.214
Also in 1999, Heritage High School (Georgia) staff disarmed a high school shooter.215
Two Heath High School (Kentucky) students persuaded a shooter in 1997 to put down his
gun after he had killed three and wounded five others.216 After a student killed three,
wounded one, and held his class hostage for 10 minutes, a school staff member restrained
a Frontier Middle School (Washington) shooter.217
206 Ibid., 27.
207 Ibid.
208 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 95.
209 Ibid., 99.
210 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 39.
211 Ibid., 41.
212 Ibid.
213 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 6.
214 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 120.
215 Ibid.
216 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 124.
217 Ibid., 127.
45
2. Negatives of Fight
Negative examples of situations when shooters were confronted or fought are not
numerous. In 2013, Sparks Middle School (Nevada) was the scene of an active
shooter.218 According to the 2014 Blair and Schweit report, the 12-year-old student shot a
teacher when the teacher confronted the shooter.219 An international example occurred in
2003 at a school in Bavaria.220 The student shot a teacher who had tried to “wrestle” the
gun away.221 An example previously described as positive had negative outcomes as
well. In 2006 at Weston High School in Wisconsin, a 15-year-old student opened fire; the
gun was “wrestled” away from him by a custodial worker.222 The shooter then pulled out
a second gun and killed the school’s principal with it.223 The Blair and Schweit report
describe that school staff then detained the shooter while they awaited the police
department.224 This example demonstrates the fluidity of these events showing how
difficult they are to mitigate or control.
Critics maintain that teaching elementary age students to Fight is dangerous and
unnecessary both because of physical disadvantage (by age and size), and the potential
trauma of the training outweighing the likelihood of an attack.225 Most of the examples
indeed show teachers and school staff who confronted shooters; no known examples of
elementary school-age students facing down shooters are available. Kenneth Trump,
President of National School Safety and Security Services, thinks the inclusion of counter
or Fight in elementary school student training is a response to the fear induced by the
Sandy Hook Elementary student.226 Trump does not feel it is the “best way” to prepare
218 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 42.
219 Ibid.
220 Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident,” 88.
221 Ibid.
222 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 107.
223 Ibid.
224 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013,” 27.
225 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 3.
226 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53, 55.
46
students for an active shooter event.227 Paul Timm, RETA Security President, agrees that
teaching fighting or confrontation to elementary students “might not be the best
approach” especially if they have other options to them, such as secure classrooms they
can Hide in and lockdown.228 Amy Klinger from Ashland University (Ohio) takes a
different view of the potential setbacks of teaching elementary students to Fight.229 She
points out the enormous potential for pushback and negativity by parents, administrators,
and the community.230 Pushback was the case in Burleson, Texas when students were
trained to Fight would-be shooters.231 After the negative public reaction, the school board
reversed its position and removed that portion from its procedures.232 Klinger also
contends that when teaching Fight, the focus seems to center on that portion and other
options are overlooked.233
The complexities described in teaching elementary age children to Fight
emphasize the value in properly preparing teachers and school staff on defensive tactics
and tactical decision-making. Without the ability to count on the physical swarming of
students attempting to subdue an attacker, elementary school teachers must rely more on
avoidance and evasion. They will have to outsmart and outmaneuver an attacker
whenever possible. Again, when faced with no other option, they will simply have to
employ any tactics available. While physically fighting an attacker may not be a preferred
option, impeding progress by confronting an attacker from a distance may prove
valuable. By maintaining composure in a stressful environment, teachers can outfit and
direct their students to throw objects at attackers if they get through the door of a
227 Ibid., 55.
228 Ibid., 54–55.
229 Ibid., 55.
230 Ibid.
231 Wike and Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” 165; Mike Von Fremd,
“Texas School District Learning to Fight Back against School Gunmen,” ABC News, October 8, 2003,
http://abcnews.
go.com/GMA/story?id=2580664&page=1.
232 Wike and Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” 165; Associated Press,
“Burleson Changes Stance on Student Attack Training,” Dallas Morning News, October 25, 2006,
http://www.dallasnews.
com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/102606dnmetburleson.736f1085.html.
233 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.
47
classroom. Klinger supports this practice in stating that she does limited training on Fight
that mainly focuses on simple tactics, such as “throwing things and creating
diversions.”234 At that point of an event, anything helps.
3. Best Practices of Fight
The best practices seen through the literature are insufficient when it comes to
fighting. Based on the variables of the situation, combined with the unforeseen actions or
intent of the assailant, instructions are brief. Due to unknown abilities of potential
victims, the instructions also appear to be designed in a “do the best you can” approach.
Experts in the ASIS white paper provide general instructions when faced with an
active shooter. The literature states, “If you do not have the ability to hide, then the last
option is to:
Fight
Attempt to incapacitate the shooter
Act with physical aggression
Improvise weapons
Commit to your actions”235
As found in the Kelly NYPD report, the 2008 version of the DHS’s Active
Shooter: How to Respond guidance document directs that potential victims “should
attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter.”236 This guidance, however, is
provided only when escape or shelter is not available.237 Specifically, the guide mentions
“throwing objects, using aggressive force and yelling.”238
234 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.
235 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 2.
236 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 5.
237 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 5.
238 Ibid.
48
The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans
provides similar guidance. The U.S. Department of Education document states:
If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as a last resort when
confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger should consider
trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and
items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, and chairs.239
4. Summary of Fight as a Response Strategy
As previously stated, many disagree with teaching students the Fight portion of
Run, Hide, Fight. Others contend that when all else fails, it may be all they have left.
Most experts do agree that Fight is a potential necessity for teachers to know how to
defend themselves and their students appropriately. The benefit of the training leads to
the promotion of options-based approaches while still adhering to past proven practices.
Linda Watson, a Whirlaway Group LLC security consultant, states, “If you’re in a dire
situation, you need to go into survival mode and do whatever you have to do to have a
chance to live.”240 This message rings true in almost all the guiding documents on the
subject.
Despite Fight typically being labeled as the last option of mitigating an active
shooter event, it may end up being the first option depending on the variables of the
encounter. For example, if a teacher is at the front office when a shooter enters and
begins firing, physical confrontation may be the only option. As demonstrated in the
research, these events are non-linear, and do not yield to linear response strategies.
Situations have resulted in successful outcomes by someone simply attacking the shooter
at the onset of an event, but no formula really exists for the exact situations were attack is
warranted and prioritized. Typically, in these scenarios, instincts simply take over. It may
end well or poorly, but doing nothing never ends well.
As shown through the research, fighting or confronting an active shooter can have
mixed results. No doubt exists that the immediate mitigation of active shooter events by
239 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide
for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.
240 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.
49
school administrators and others have saved many lives. Other scenarios have shown that
the people attempting to confront the shooter became a victim themselves. It is hard to
assess what would have happened had they not tried to intervene. The mixed responses
when faced with a direct threat indeed speak to the fight or flight mentality that almost
seems to come naturally to the potential victims. Despite concern about teachers and
staff’s willingness to confront a shooter, the research shows that they are willing to face
an active shooter to protect their students. The desire to defend provides excellent support
for enhancing the tactical decision-making capabilities of those entrusted to protect the
youth.
As provided in the Run, Hide, Fight research findings, all three of the elements,
plus lockdown, have definite advantages. Unfortunately, numerous examples of the
protocol elements failing were also provided. Active shooter events are highly complex.
Based on the variability of the events, no one size fits all solution exists. Run, Hide, Fight
provides a solid foundation from which to build off of. The following chapters provide
specific tactics and tactical decision-making tools that can be applied to the foundation of
Run, Hide, Fight by elementary school teachers and staff. The goal of these findings is to
provide specificity to the different elements of Run, Hide, Fight. By linking the practices,
providing details about potential applicability, and training teachers and school staff on
implementation, the goal is to increase the likelihood of survival in these incredibly
challenging events.
50
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51
III. MENTAL PREPARATION FOR DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND
TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING
Run, Hide, Fight has definite advantages and disadvantages. It is evident from the
research that Run, Hide, Fight, and similar mechanisms, are not linear approaches.241 It is
necessary to be prepared to adapt on the fly and change strategies as different variables
present themselves. By modifying thought processes and overall preparedness, potential
victims have a potentially higher likelihood of survival. Mental preparation, both before
and during an event, is critical in establishing the mindset necessary for survival.
Statistically, the majority of active shooter events end before the arrival of law
enforcement.242 The importance of this statistic is the recognition that regular citizens
will have to make “life and death” decisions and be willing to adapt to all the possibilities
presented.243 In 11 out of 21 incidents described by Blair and Schweit in 2014, “unarmed
principals, teachers, other school staff, and students confronted the shooters to end the
threat.”244 In 2016, in a study of active-shooter incidents in 2014 and 2015, Katherine
Schweit reiterated:
The “active” aspect of the definition inherently implies that both law
enforcement personnel and citizens have the potential to affect the
outcome of the event based on their responses to the situation. The
consistency of these incidents supports the paramount need for training
and exercises for law enforcement, other first responders, and citizens
alike.245
This chapter analyzes tactical mental preparation techniques to assist teachers and
school staff on how to react when faced with an active shooter threat. Run, Hide, Fight is
considered a best practice for response to active shooter events. Unfortunately, it fails to
241 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53–56; Interagency Security Committee, Planning
and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide.
242 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013.
243 Ibid., 8.
244 Ibid., 21.
245 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 1.
52
recognize the mental preparedness and steps taken in advance of an event that may assist
in increasing the likelihood of survival. By leveraging the advantages available to
teachers and school staff, the goal is to win the challenge and survive. Having the
appropriate mental attitude before and during an event is critical. By reviewing best
practices of mental preparation used by law enforcement and the military, teachers and
school staff can work to create the appropriate mindset and internal defense mechanisms
to increase survival. Teachers and school staff must not prepare for or accept being a
victim. They must prepare themselves for success, survival and accept nothing else.
A. WARRIOR MINDSET
With military personnel, self-defense and protection of their fellow soldiers is
critical. Countless examples are available of heroic efforts made by soldiers to save their
fellow soldiers. Similarly, teachers have proven their willingness to go to extreme
measures to protect their students time and time again. History has shown that the
willingness to protect exists. By providing defensive tactical decision-making skills, the
intent of the research is to outfit teachers with mechanisms to make decisions to support
their willingness to protect. While a warrior mindset may seem foreign in an educational
environment, it is reflected in numerous cases in which teachers have paid the ultimate
sacrifice in attempting to protect their students.
One of the most thorough guidance documents is the USAF Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures manual on active-shooter response and preparedness. Described in the
introduction, the manual “is applicable to all theaters of operation.”246 Not only is it
designed to assist soldiers in war zones, it also works for domestic Air Force personnel
working in offices stateside. Based on this flexibility, it provides excellent guidance that
can be applied to teachers and school staff as well.
One of the first recommendations in the manual is the emphasis to develop a
“warrior mindset.”247 The warrior mindset is a mental state of mind that emphasizes
246 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), iii.
247 Ibid., 1–1.
53
survivability over a flawless procedure. By implementing this mentality, the goal is to
empower and inspire potential victims with the mindset that they WILL survive and will
not let anything get in their way. The Air Force manual describes the warrior mindset as:
1.2.1 Warrior Mindset. The warrior mindset is more important than
polished technique.
When faced with an attack, act immediately and escape. Do not let
anything get in your way of survival or mission accomplishment.
1.2.1.1 Toughness. The uninhibited mental resolution to aggressively react
to illegal violence with a fierce and violent defense.
1.2.1.2 Immediate Response. Respond immediately with the appropriate
level of force. Stop the attack and escape or press forward with the
mission. A warrior does not wait, as the advantage is the surprise of
instant and direct offense.
1.2.1.3 Focus. Stay focused on your goal of survival and mission
accomplishment. Be persistent and continue to respond if the first
response is not effective. Commit to your goal of survival and let nothing
get in your way.248
By training on, promoting, and implementing a warrior mindset, teachers and
school staff have the ability to develop an enhanced level of confidence and comfort in
the situation at hand.
The Air Force manual goes further to provide a multitude of recommendations.
The document describes the necessity that those threatened need to be immediately
focused and conscientious of not hesitating. The value of reacting and not waiting is
stated numerous times throughout the document, and suggests that it can lead to increased
survivability. One of the techniques described to assist in avoiding hesitation is to
overcome the thought that “this could never happen to me.”249 Teachers and school staff
should recognize that it is a possibility at any school in the world. While relative
consistencies in shooter profiles are prevalent to a degree, the factors concerning the
location of the event are extremely variable. These events occur in a broad-spectrum of
248 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–1.
249 Ibid., 1–2.
54
location, type, time and socio-economic status. Additionally, as an extension to avoid
hesitation, the manual describes the inappropriate belief potentially shared by airmen and
school staff that someone will respond and mitigate the situation on their behalf.250
Statistically, this belief is shown not to be the reality. Emergency response will occur, but
66.9 percent of events end before the arrival of law enforcement.251
A major component in being prepared to react appropriately in a stressful
situation is to understand what happens physiologically to the body when faced with a
threat. While every individual is different, basic known factors occur to the human body
when confronted with an immediate danger. Controlled by the autonomic nervous
system, the parasympathetic nervous system drives the human body’s “fight or flight”
response.252 This response is an internal self-defense mechanism to enhance survival.253
When the parasympathetic nervous system takes over, the body can take on many
recognizable changes. The Air Force describes these potential physical changes as:
“Pounding heart
Muscle tension
Trembling
Rapid, shallow breathing
Dizziness
Nausea
Gut wrenching knot
Sweating
250 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–2.
251 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and
2013, 9.
252 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–3.
253 Ibid.
55
Dry mouth
Goose bumps
Tingling sensation in limbs or face
Insensitive to pain” 254
In addition to physical changes in response to fear, individuals may potentially
experience changes in perception, as well as cognitive or behavioral changes.255 The Air
Force describes “perceptual changes” as, “tunnel vision, heightened visual clarity,
hearing distortion, and time distortion.”256 When faced with an event, teachers may
experience these changes. It is important to recognize their likelihood and work to
embrace their benefits. When faced with stressful events, teachers may find themselves
hyper-aware and attuned to the situation. To the contrary, while these changes can be
utilized in a beneficial fashion, they can also cause detrimental impacts if not recognized
or addressed.
The Air Force lists cognitive or behavioral changes as “automatic behavior.”257
The Air Force describes these changes as instincts taking over during traumatic events.
When applied to elementary school teachers, this change becomes critical. When faced
with traumatic or stressful events, those involved will many times instinctively resort to
whatever they have been thoroughly trained to do. Since teachers are not soldiers,
firefighters, or law enforcement, in training constantly to handle stressful situations, they
must take the initiative to do mental walkthroughs of these types of events. Repetition is
critical in establishing patterns to implement when automaticity takes over.
Resilience is a critical component to responding successfully to an active shooter
threat. The Air Force defines resilience as:
254 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–3—1–4.
255 Ibid., 1–4.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
56
The ability to respond, withstand, recover, and/or grow in the face of
stressors and changing demands. Resilience does not mean an absence of
stress or fear. Resilience during an active shooter incident is about a
process of performing under stress, resisting the effects it may have, and
then recovering and restoring as needed.258
Resilience recognizes that a potential victim will be scared when faced with a
threat of this type. It acknowledges that individuals’ bodies will react without their
complete control. More importantly, resilience recognizes that despite fear and
physiological changes, potential victims can overcome all these and be successful in their
response.
The Air Force continues to build upon the mental preparation aspect of active
shooter response and reaction. Tactical mental toughness skills are “designed to optimize
performance and enhance resilience.”259 Specifically, the Air Force divides tactical
mental toughness skills into two primary categories, composure and concentration.260
The importance of tactical breathing is emphasized to enhance composure and
concentration.261 Tactical breathing is “a technique employed to consciously control
breathing to overcome or prevent the physical effects of stress.”262 Tactical breathing is
accomplished by “Inhale(ing) through your nose to the count of four seconds, hold your
breath for four seconds, exhale(ing) through your mouth slowly for four seconds, and
hold your breath for four seconds.”263
The tactical breathing technique is also known as “box breathing,” and is common
in both military situations and anxiety mitigation practices.264 Tactical Breathing, the
Warrior Mindset, and Attention Management are the Air Force’s steps described as
258 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 2–1.
259 Ibid., 2–5.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Mark Divine, Unbeatable Mind: Forge Resiliency and Mental Toughness to Succeed at an Elite
Level, 3rd ed. (Scotts Valley, CA: Createspace Independent Publishing, 2015), 50–51.
57
necessary to develop tactical mental toughness skills.265 Attention management is a skill
designed to enhance “internal and external awareness.”266 Attention management is
accomplished by recognizing physiological stress responses and managing the body’s
physical mechanisms to help keep those factors in check, which can be done through
heart rate control, fear or rage response, and thought control.267 Tactical breathing can
assist in overall calming and heart rate reduction. Fear and anger are natural reactions
when threatened. The Air Force does not recommend focusing on eliminating fear or rage
but rather managing those responses to optimize survivability.268 Thought control is an
attempt in clearing “mental static” by pushing out negative thoughts of what could
potentially happen, the feeling of being unprepared, or the lack of recognition of the
situation.269 Instead, the focus should be on recognizing the situation for what it is, not
being in denial, focusing thoughts on what is necessary to survive, and engaging the
warrior mindset to set up for positive outcomes.
Many active shooter advisory documents refer to overall situational awareness to
aid individuals better in surviving an active shooter event. In Active Shooter: How to
Respond, the DHS advises to be cognizant of the surrounding environment and to stay
vigilant to any potential dangers.270 Additionally, the guiding document references the
value in predetermining exit routes in any building entered.271 Ready Marine, a United
States Marine Corps (USMC) website dedicated to personal emergency preparedness for
soldiers and their families, also advises individuals to be aware of their environment and
265 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 2–5.
266 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 2–5.
267 Ibid., 2–6.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
270 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 41.
271 Ibid.
58
pre-establish potential escape routes.272 Despite the inherent value of pre-determining
potential escape routes, potential victims must not lock themselves into any one specific
plan and should remain flexible in adapting to situations.
When the tactical mental toughness skills are combined, they work by recognizing
stressors and being attentive to keep those stressors in check. Utilizing techniques, such
as refocusing and tactical breathing, overall survivability is enhanced by focusing on
resilience and implementing the warrior mindset to let nothing stand in the way of
accomplishing the ultimate goal of survival.273 Teachers preparing themselves in
establishing a warrior mindset, and practicing those behaviors regularly, can greatly assist
in responding to active shooter events. By recognizing the physical indicators of stress,
teachers and school staff can focus on minimizing the impact of those physiological
changes. Once physical changes are controlled, clarity in attention can be applied to the
situation at hand. The more this approach is practiced, the better prepared the staff will be
when called to task.
B. WILL TO SURVIVE
Similar to the “warrior mindset,” the “will to survive” expands on the foundation
established. Teachers with the warrior mindset can implement the will to survive when
faced with threats. By combining these two mental approaches, teachers and school staff
can establish mental toughness and focus on doing whatever it takes to be successful in
protecting themselves and their students. In Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, the DOD
describes the components of “the will to survive” as:
“Know your capabilities and limitations.
Keep a positive attitude.
Develop a realistic plan.
272 United States Marine Corps, Ready Marine Corps: Active Shooter (Washington, DC: United
States Marine Corps, n.d.), accessed March 15, 2017,
http://www.ready.marines.mil/Portals/208/Docs/Factsheets/Terrorism/Active
%20Shooter_08272015 .
273 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 2–5.
59
Anticipate fears.
Combat psychological stress.
Recognize and anticipate existing stressors (injury, death, fatigue, illness,
environment, hunger, and isolation).
Attribute normal reactions to existing stressors (fear, anxiety, guilt,
boredom, depression, and anger).
Identify signals of distress created by stressors (indecision, withdrawal,
forgetfulness, carelessness, and propensity to make mistakes).”274
In a group setting, similar to those common in school shootings, the DOD
recommends that those involved consistently “reassure and encourage each other”
throughout the event to help promote the “will to survive.”275
The U.S. Department of the Army, in The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,
describes a similar approach known as “mental stamina.”276 The manual discusses mental
stamina by recognizing that an “individual’s awareness during combat is never complete”
and that “there is no such thing as perfect awareness or understanding of the situation.”277
Furthermore, the Department of the Army states:
Mental stamina is the quality Soldiers must have to combat this
uncertainty. Mental stamina provides the ability to assess the situation
based on whatever facts are at hand, to intuitively make reasonable
assumptions about what is not known, and to make logical decisions based
on that information.278
274 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery (Hampton, VA: Department of Defense,
2007), A–1, https://fas.org/
irp/doddir/army/fm3-50-3 .
275 Ibid., A–2.
276 United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–6.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
60
Teachers equipped with “mental stamina” will demonstrate the “will to survive”
through the warrior mindset,” especially well when coupled with the three things the
Department of the Army states that a leader needs:
“Purpose: the reason to accomplish the mission.
Direction: the means to accomplish the mission.
Motivation: the will to accomplish the mission.”279
C. SENSORY INTEGRATION
In Active Shooter Events and Response, Blair et al. identify that “the number one
sign of an active shooter event is gun fire.”280 Based on “normalcy bias,” the “brain will
try to describe unusual events as normal first,” which in many scenarios, is classifying the
sound like firecrackers.281 Blair et al. ask, “how many times have you heard firecrackers
at your place of employment or school?”282 For most, they found the answer is zero.283
Based on the infrequency of actual firecrackers on a school campus, Blair et al. challenge
that it is better to assume the worse, that it is gunfire, and accept potential embarrassment
if it is firecrackers but that lives can potentially be saves by reacting in a timely
fashion.284
In The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events,
author Mark Landahl provides recommendations regarding potentially advantageous
sensory response mechanisms. He concludes:
279 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 1–1; United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–24; Air Land
Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, A–1.
280 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 187.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
61
Finding 1. The survivor response to campus active shooter events is social
rather than asocial and includes helping behavior between survivors
consistent with research findings in other disaster event types.
Finding 2: Survivors of active shooter events will process environmental
cues, social cues, and engage in social interaction to define the situation,
gather information and implement and reassess protective behavior
choices within a framework that maintains and extends social and
organizational roles.
Finding 3: Survivors gather additional information and process
environmental cues, social observations, and social interactions to
determine protective action behaviors that include taking cover on the
floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, hiding, using available
resources to barricade themselves, locking door, turning off lights, and
barricading doors.
Finding 4. Survivors show group level interaction for confirmation of
environmental cues and processing of additional incident cues that lead to
implementation and reassessment of protective actions many times with a
division of tasks amongst the group. (Emergent Social Structure).”285
A key takeaway from the Landahl findings is the recognition of two senses that
need to be activated before personal action occurs. The value of the result becomes
critical in the time sensitivity of an active shooter event. If potential victims can
recognize, or assume the worst based on an initial sensory input, they have a much more
rapid recognition time and have a potentially higher likelihood of survival based on the
timesaving factor of not needing secondary sensory confirmation. The finding is
consistent with the Air Force’s emphasis on accepting the situation and not delaying
response.286
285 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 21–31; Mark R. Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral
Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events” (PhD diss., Oklahoma State University, 2015), v,
154–157.
286 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
62
Figure 6 illustrates Landahl’s research findings. Based on the illustration, the time
delay to seek secondary sensory confirmation is evident.287 As opposed to moving
directly to “protective actions,” potential victims move to “information gathering
activities.”288 By emphasizing immediate action and assumption of worst-case scenarios,
event mitigation activities can begin immediately with one sensory cue and be
advantageous to potential victims.
287 Mark Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events”
(presentation, The 9th Annual Homeland Security and Defense Education Summit, Evolving Homeland
Security to meet Future Threats/Hazards, September 26, 2015), 17,
https://www.chds.us/ed/resources/uploads/2015/12/Summit-2015-Landahl-Socio-Behavioral-Response-of-
Survivors-of-Active-Shootings .
288 Ibid.
63
Figure 6. The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active
Shooter Events289
Actual attacks bear out this fact. One Sandy Hook shooting report described two
school administrators who were killed when they went to investigate the sound of shots
fired, and a staff member who ran towards a “loud crashing noise.”290 After seeing bullet
holes and smelling gunpowder, the employee recognized the situation and retreated to an
area of safety to notify authorities.291 A Columbine review also describes a scenario in
289 Source: Ibid.; Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter
Events,” PhD diss., 155.
290 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012, 11.
291 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings
at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14,
2012, 11.
64
which a teacher responded to the sounds of a “commotion” outside the building.292 After
looking out an exterior opening, the staff member and student were injured by debris
resulting from a shot fired at the doors they were looking out.293
The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) also recommends not hesitating when
faced with potential danger. The ISC recognizes, “During an active shooter incident,
those present will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully-informed
decision about applying the Run, Hide, Fight options.”294
The ISC describes a 2005 report from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) that found that those individuals located closest to the floors
impacted by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks “waited longer” to respond to the
threat by evacuating than those further away from the immediate impact.295 It is unclear
exactly what factors drove the evacuation differences. The ISC also discusses the
differing levels of severity of the response of potential victims during the Virginia Tech
shooting.296 These examples once again demonstrate the consequences of a delayed
response to an immediate threat. To mitigate this threat, the ISC recommends that entities
“Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately. For example, train staff to
recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and
necessary action (e.g., ‘Gun! Get out!’).”297
The Active Shooter White Paper compiled by ASIS provides some basic
information outlining the necessity and feasibility of options-based approaches to active
shooter events in schools. One of the first messages is that no one-size-fits-all approach
292 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 28.
293 Ibid.
294 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency
Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 18.
295 Ibid.; National Institute of Standards and Technology, Final Report on the Collapse of the World
Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2005),
http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.
cfm?pub_id=909017159.
296 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency
Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 18.
297 Ibid., 19.
65
exists and that all of the current programs have value since their intent is to help save
lives.298 This approach is consistent with the something is better than nothing philosophy.
Additionally, the paper describes the nonlinear nature of Run, Hide, Fight.299 Based on
the incredible variability of active-shooter events, it is not possible to know which option
will be the best at a given time. The white paper also goes on to describe the benefits
teachers’ gain from being highly familiar with their surroundings.300 Since teachers have
the potential to spend more time in the buildings than a shooter may have, they have a
distinct advantage provided they pay attention to their surroundings before an incident.301
D. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP
In the late 1970s, John Boyd, a fighter jet pilot, invented a tactical decision-
making tool that would come to be known as Boyd’s OODA Loop.302 In Boyd: The
Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, author Robert Coram describes the Boyd
OODA cycle in detail. OODA stands for observe, orient, decide, act.303 In its original
form, Boyd’s OODA Loop is a highly complex feedback-based decision-making tool.
(Figure 7) The most recent version illustrated as a simplified feedback loop is directly
applicable to active-shooter responses. (Figure 8) In its simplified form, Coram describes
the loop as “seen as a simple one-dimensional cycle, where one observes what the enemy
is doing, becomes oriented to the enemy action, makes a decision and then takes an
action.”304
298 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 1.
299 Ibid., 2.
300 Ibid., 7.
301 Ibid.
302 Joe Firestone, “The OODA Loop and Double-Loop Learning,” All Life Is Problem Solving, June
16, 2008, http://kmci.org/alllifeisproblemsolving/archives/the-ooda-loop-and-double-loop-learning/.
303 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown,
2002).
304 Ibid., 334.
66
Figure 7. Boyd’s OODA Loop305
Figure 8. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop306
305 Source: Firestone, “The OODA Loop and Double-Loop Learning.”
306 Source: United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations (Washington, DC: United States
Marine Corps, 2003), 2–1, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcwp2-1 .
67
Boyd’s intent was to emphasize that fighter pilots must stay ahead of their enemy
and “must operate inside his adversary’s time scale.”307 Coram describes the value of the
Boyd OODA Loop as:
Generating a rapidly changing environment—that is, engaging in activity
that is so quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the
enemy—inhibits the adversary’s ability to adapt and causes confusion and
disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact.308
Applying this type of approach to an active shooter event in a school provides a
tactical advantage to teachers and school staff. Although teachers and school staff have
an inherent advantage of working in the threat environment regularly, they must assume
that potential attackers will have intimate knowledge of the school layout and active
shooter procedures. Attackers familiar with the school design and expected actions give
them a distinct advantage over their intended victims. If the staff can operate within their
attackers’ timeline and alter any expected actions, they sway the advantage their
direction.
The adversaries’ timescale can be described as the internal mental process
conducted by the enemy. For example, “I am going to shoot out the front door so I can
get past the locking devices. Then I am going to search the offices to find any staff or
students there. After that I will work my way down the main hallway checking all of the
doors, shooting anyone that I come across until someone stops me, but they won’t take
me alive.”
The event or attacker’s timeline, on the other hand, can be described as the
external viewpoint of the timing of the events. For example, the shooter entered the main
entry by shooting through the glass door. After that, the shooter shot everyone in the
entrance area. The shooter then moved to the administration offices. After that, the
shooter started into the hallways.
Combining timescale and timeline opportunities to establish tactical advantage
exist. Using the example previously described, a teacher can find areas to advance in the
307 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 327.
308 Ibid., 328.
68
timeline while operating in the adversaries’ timescale. In this case, teacher x hears what
sounds like gunshots. Teacher x stops teaching and peaks out of door to see what is
happening. Teacher x is now behind in the timeline, as the shooter has already killed
everyone in the main entry and is working toward the offices. Even worse, if teacher x
walks toward the main entry or chats with other teachers trying to determine what is
going on, they have now fallen further behind. Now, the shooter is moving into the main
hallway where the teacher is located and has implemented no defensive tactics. The
teacher never became immersed in the adversaries’ timescale and found opportunities to
get ahead in the attack timeline. Therefore, no tactical advantage was made.
Teacher y, on the other hand, became familiar with defensive tactics and tactical
decision-making tools. Teacher y has already identified the two nearest exits (one
primary, one secondary). Teacher y is already tied at the frontend of the timeline before
the attack occurs. (The only reason teacher y is not ahead is that the attackers know they
are about to attack). Teacher y now hears the same gunshots as teacher x.
Teacher y immediately isolates the direction of the shots as being toward
the main entry. (Gaining
advantage).
Primary exit is now out of play, secondary needs to be implemented.
(Losing advantage).
Without hesitating, teacher y orders the students to leave everything, go to
the window, and start going outside. (Gaining advantage).
Teacher y locks the door then follows the students out. (Gaining
advantage).
Teacher y has already become immersed in the adversaries’ timescale and is
assuming that if attackers are shooting in the front office, it is only a matter of time
before they come down the hallways. Thus, instead of delaying, teacher y works to
advance a timeline advantage. If teacher y is wrong, the students can always be brought
back in and breathe a sigh of relief, but they are alive. Teacher x is not. Nor are any of
those students.
69
In the military, applicability of the loop speed is the main takeaway from the
lesson.309 Coram emphasizes this point, and writes that having a full understanding of the
complexities of Boyd’s original matrix is not as valuable as recognizing, “the need to
execute the cycle in such a fashion as to get inside the mind and the decision cycle of an
adversary. The unpredictability is crucial to the success of the OODA Loop.”310
When teachers and staff encounter an active shooter event, it is critical that they
do not slow the OODA Loop once begun but rather accelerate it to keep the advantage
over their adversary.311 Boyd advises that to stay ahead of the enemy’s tempo potential,
victims must take the “least-expected action” versus the known or “most-effective
action.”312 A USMC intelligence manual describes tempo as “keep(ing) the enemy off
balance, thereby increasing his friction. Speed, initiative, and flexibility generate and
maintain a tempo that the enemy cannot match.”313
As previously discussed, if a perpetrator has knowledge of layouts or procedures,
they can predict the “most effective action” that teachers and staff may be inclined to
take.314 By implementing the “least expected action,” the decision maker can impact the
effectiveness of the attacker. Coram states:
To take the least-expected action disorients the enemy. It causes him to
pause, to wonder, to question. This means that as a commander
compresses his own time, he causes time to be stretched out for his
opponent. The enemy falls farther and farther behind in making relevant
decisions. It hastens the unraveling process.315
A relevant example of the expected is the recommendation of many active shooter
guidance documents to post emergency evacuation routes in all classrooms. While
applicable to fire scenarios, it may provide a higher-risk situation for those threatened by
309 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 334.
310 Ibid., 335.
311 Ibid., 338.
312 Ibid., 336.
313 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 1–2.
314 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 336.
315 Ibid.
70
an active shooter. If the attacker is familiar with the evacuation routes, this person is then
knowledgeable of the expected action. By following the posted evacuation route, teachers
and students may walk directly into the shooters’ firing lanes. According to the USMC
manual on intelligence operations, “The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict,
whether combatants are individuals or large military formations. When engaged in
conflict, participants—
Observe. Take in information about the environment, the friendly
status, and the threat.
Orient. Make estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments
about the situation to create a cohesive mental image.
Decide. Determine what needs to be done, whether it is an
immediate reaction or a deliberate plan.
Act. Put the decision into action.”316
In the previous example, numerous “expected” actions are possible. The most
likely action of the enemy is that of the shooter working through the entry and killing
while proceeding. People are placed at greater risk when left behind while the shooter
advances. The teacher’s “expected” actions would be to delay reaction. Peer into the
hallway or even walk toward the shooting to determine what is happening. If shooting is
determined, the next expected action is for the teacher to lock the classroom door, turn
off the lights, and have the students remain quiet. In this example, the shooter has time to
move forward and attempt to access the classrooms. Teacher y’s actions can be described
as least expected.
There was no delay (unexpected).
The door was locked (expected) but a rapidly deployed impediment for
shooter advancement.
316 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 2–1.
71
Then teacher y took the students out the window and away from the
school to a nearby neighborhood (unexpected).
If a teacher has the acumen to recognize the pattern of development of the
event at hand, through observation and orientation, it is then possible to stay ahead
of the attacker’s decisions and actions by implementing an action that is “least-
expected” versus “most-effective.”317 Additionally, teachers and staff can rapidly
estimate an “enemy most likely course of action.”318 By quickly determining what the
enemy most likely will do next, potential victims can stay ahead of the enemy’s tempo.
E. DEFEND YOUR SECTOR—AIR FORCE
The USAF embraces an active shooter response philosophy known as “Defend
Your Sector.”319 The phrase “simply implies the actions taken during the fight to protect
yourself and others in the area where you have barricaded.”320 If teacher and school staff
opt to fortify themselves and their students in a location, “Defend Your Sector” implies
that they use multiple mechanisms to protect themselves and others actively.
Actively attempting to barricade and impede the shooter’s advantage has the
potential of increasing survivability. Fortifying describes the action of securing the room
from entry to include such things as locking the door and pushing a large desk in front of
it. Impeding shooter advancement, on the other hand, may not prevent entry or
movement, but will slow or disorient the attacker. Examples of impediments include a
stack of chairs at the door or multiple small desks. If the decision is made to remain in the
classroom, teachers and students should Hide “in a place that reduces observation from
the shooter, but allows you to react if you must defend your sector.”321 If these efforts to
317 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 336.
318 United States Marine Corps, Rifle Squad Tactics B2F2837 Student Handout (Washington, DC:
United States Marine Corps, 2015), 13,
http://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2F2837%20Rifle%20
Squad%20Tactics ?ver=2015-05-27-100939-710.
319 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
320 Ibid., 6–3.
321 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 6–3.
72
fortify fail, the items put in the attacker’s way, combined with a strategic hiding location,
will provide the tactical advantage needed if fighting is a necessity.
F. STRESS EXPOSURE TRAINING AND THE DIRT DIVE
In 1998, Cannon-Bowers and Salas discovered the value of recognizing expected
stressors to prepare better to respond in times of stress. The resulting book reported the
findings of a research project conducted by the Office of Naval Research. The intent of
the TADMUS (tactical decision making under stress) project “was to develop training,
simulation, decision support, and display principles that would help to mitigate the
impact of stress on decision-making.”322 In Making Decisions under Stress: Implications
for Individual and Team Training, the authors found, “the following characteristics,
which can be defined as stressors, all appear to be present in the operational environment:
Multiple information sources
Incomplete, conflicting information
Rapidly changing, evolving scenarios
Requirement for team coordination
Adverse physical conditions
Performance pressure
Time pressure
High work/information load
Auditory overload/interference
322 Janis A. Cannon-Bowers and Eduardo Salas, Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for
Individual and Team Training (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1998),
http://www.apa.org/pubs/books/
4318761.aspx.
73
Threat” 323
Describing SET (Stress Exposure Training), Cannon-Bowers and Salas stated:
It rests on the notion that that when people have accurate expectations
regarding what to expect in the stress environment, have confidence in
their ability to cope with such stressors, and have an opportunity to
practice dealing with the stress so that appropriate skills can be developed,
maximal performance can be expected.324
While reality-based training has been both celebrated and criticized by subject
matter experts, stress-based training is possible without the implementation of an actual
drill. Although potentially not as effective, teachers and school staff can perform mental
exercises to prepare themselves for stress exposure better. By doing “dry run” mental
walkthroughs of “if-then” scenarios, teachers and staff can prepare themselves for the
multitude of variables that may be present during an active-shooter event. The Navy
Seals refer to this practice as a “dirt dive.”325 It is rehearsing a detailed mental “walk
through” of an intended mission. Former Navy Seal and author Mark Divine points out,
“When you visualize the mission your body and subconscious mind gain valuable, yet
subtle, physiological and psychological cues. These insights prove to be invaluable keys
for success when you act on your plan to accomplish the mission.”326
G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
The U.S. Coast Guard defines situational awareness as, “the ability to identify,
process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening to
the team with regards to the mission. More simply, it’s knowing what is going on around
you.”327
323 Cannon-Bowers and Salas, Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team
Training, 19.
324 Ibid., 30.
325 Mark Divine, “SEALFIT—4 Tactics for Success,” Navy SEALs, January 24, 2014,
https://navyseals.com/
3837/sealfit-4-tactics-success/.
326 Ibid.
327 United States Coast Guard, Team Coordination Training Student Guide (Washington, DC: United
States Coast Guard, 1998), 5–1, https://www.uscg.mil/auxiliary/training/tct/chap5 .
74
Situational awareness is one of the essential elements of human intelligence.
Intelligence has a direct and immediate relationship to operations or defensive decision-
making. The U.S. Marine Corps states, “Intelligence drives operations by shaping the
planning and execution of operations. It provides a menu of factors that the commander
considers when making a decision. Specifically, intelligence
Identifies potential advantages offered by the environment.
Describes limitations imposed by the environment.
Ascertains and assesses enemy strengths to be avoided.
Uncovers enemy critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
Recommends COAs based on factors of the battle space and threat.
Enables rapid decision-making and generating and maintaining tempo.”328
Situational awareness is a continuous process. It begins the moment teachers
wake up and are aware of personal well-being. As they pull into the school parking lot,
they are aware of things that look out of place. As they approach the school, and
subsequently, their classroom, they recognize areas of potential concern, areas of refuge,
and routes of safety. In class, they identify the nearest exits. They identify different items
for barricading the door of their classroom. They know how the doors lock. They know
the quickest way out of the building and multiple backup routes. They recognize tools for
diversions, decoys, and weapons. They also know their students. They know their
capabilities and know they will do everything in their power to protect them.
Former Navy Seal and SEAL Survival Guide author Cade Courtley states:
When you’re going to a mall or market, or even during your first days of
class at a new school, make a mental note of exits. Have at least three
options, preferably in three different directions. This could be as obvious
as a double-door entry or as desperate as a second-floor window with a
ten-foot drop onto pavement. Second, observe the whereabouts of any
large items or objects that seem sturdy enough to provide cover, if needed,
328 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 1–5.
75
and file this information. In some malls, for example, there may be a
lounge area with furniture, or sculptures, or columns that are placed at
regular intervals. In a school, are the desks bolted to the floor? Do the
windows open? Filled bookshelves in a library or the cooking and
dishwashing equipment in a cafeteria will provide very good cover.329
Cade’s soft target Situational Awareness Checklist states:
“Find your exits.
Locate places or objects that could serve as your nearest cover.
Observe individuals who are dressed strangely, acting abnormally,
or carrying something suspicious.
Trust your gut.”330
Put more succinctly, “situational awareness: exits, cover, people.”331 Teachers
and school staff have a constantly evaluative situational awareness cycle. As they move
throughout the school, and throughout their day, they should constantly be evaluating the
what if scenarios and determining potential “exits, cover, and people.”332
Commitment to a winning mindset can be a critical component in the potential
survival of a threatening event. A lot of research has been conducted on handling
stressful situations and the impact of stress on decision-making. Teachers and school
staff, while not frequently faced with situations of this type, must actively engage in
practicing the principles of functioning in stressful environments at regular intervals. It
does not cost money to practice and perfect situational awareness, mindset preparation,
and a willingness to succeed.
329 Cade Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook)
(New York: Gallery Books, 2012), Kindle edition, loc. 141–142, https://www.amazon.com/SEAL-
Survival-Guide-Shooter-Med
icine-ebook/dp/B01H0IOZKA/ref=sr_1_9?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1500398420&sr=1-
9&keywords=seal+
survival+active+shooter.
330 Ibid., loc. 154–157.
331 Ibid., loc. 141.
332 Ibid.
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IV. DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING
In the 2013 Active Shooter Events and Response, Blair et al. quantified the
casualty rate of active-shooter events as “Casualties = f(rate of suitable target
location*response time)”333 The research identified the casualty rate of the events as a
function of two things:
(1) the amount of time that the shooter has to perform the attack
(2) the rate at which the offender can find suitable targets to shoot334
More importantly, the research concluded, “that many times the attack stopped
because the potential victims took action to stop the shooter directly or made it difficult
for the shooter to find targets.”335 These findings are conducive to the research in
emphasizing that potential victims attempt to make themselves “hard targets” versus “soft
targets.” As simple as it may seem, being harder to hurt has dramatic increases in
survivability. Becoming a hard target begins with ongoing situational awareness and a
willingness to succeed as previously discussed. The following tactical techniques help to
maintain the protection as the situation develops.
Regardless of having the appropriate tactical mindset, if a teacher does not know
how to navigate a threatening environment physically, the likelihood of survival falls. By
combining the tactical mindset with task level tactical skills, teachers and school staff
give themselves a distinct tactical advantage when faced with threats. The following
chapter provides detailed tactical practices utilized by military and law enforcement
personnel. These practices are intended to decrease risk in a high-risk environment,
increase the likelihood of survivability, and provide a tactical advantage to those
threatened.
333 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 174.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
78
A. COVER VERSUS CONCEALMENT
A major military delineation describes the difference between cover and
concealment. When hiding from or attempting to escape from an active shooter threat, it
is important for those threatened to recognize the difference as well. According to the
USAF, “cover is an object that can protect against weapons fire.”336 Concealment, on
the other hand, is an object that “only provides [protection] against visual detection
from the enemy.”337 When teachers or school staff attempt to Hide or lead themselves
and students to a safe area, it is important to recognize the difference between cover
and concealment. As they move through a zone, concealment locations may need to
be a temporary solution if shooting is occurring. According to the ISC, ballistic
protection “cover” includes such things as:
“thick walls made of steel,
cinder block, or brick and mortar;
solid doors with locks;
and areas with minimal glass and interior windows”338
If cover is an option, it is preferred, as it provides both concealment and ballistic
protection.339 Granted, an option may not exist to choose between the two; if so, cover
should be prioritized (Figure 9). Courtley states, “Whatever you choose as cover or
concealment, avoid bunching up with too many people. In these circumstances, people
huddled together will create a larger and more attractive target; a single bullet can
penetrate several people.”340
336 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 5–2, 6–3.
337 Ibid.
338 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency
Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 7.
339 Ibid.
340 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 201.
79
Figure 9. Cover versus Concealment341
B. ANTI-SNIPER MOVEMENT
Following the July 7, 2016 sniper attack that killed five police officers in Dallas,
Texas, the Scottsdale Police Department (SPD) in Arizona provided anti-sniper
awareness to city staff.342 During the presentation, the SPD snipers provided lessons
learned from a variety of sniper attacks. A valuable takeaway from the training was the
value of individual movement. While most school-based active-shooter scenarios are not
sniper events, the lessons still provide value to anyone attacked. Personnel were advised
to move perpendicularly to the shooter; doing so increases the amount of ground covered
from left to right or right to left. Increasing the amount of distance covered in a shorter
amount of time decreases the shooter’s ability to acquire targets quickly. By running
straight away from a shooter (without concealment or cover) the shooter has straight line
target acquisition ability.343 Moving at an angle away from the shooter narrows the
amount of lateral distance covered and makes target acquisition easier.344 While value is
341 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook),
loc. 206.
342 Faith Karimi, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Ralph Ellis, “Dallas Shooting: 5 Officers Die, Suspect
ID’d,” CNN, July 9, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-alton-sterling-
protests/index.html.
343 Dan Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness (Scottsdale, AZ: Scottsdale Police Department, n.d.).
344 Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness.
80
obvious in providing the most distance possible between the potential victim and the
threat, it is important to provide as much tactical advantage to the threatened as possible.
Distance should be established as soon as possible when cover or concealment are
available. The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group provides direction for
combatants under enemy fire. Many of the suggestions can apply to any scenario when
gunfire is a threat. Regarding movement while under fire, the guide emphasizes the value
of not setting patterns. Similar to the OODA philosophy of doing the unexpected,
movement is trackable once patterns occur. The guide also highlights the use of shadows,
cover, and concealment.345 When unable to utilize cover and concealment to mask
movement, the guide recommends “keeping in constant motion,” and “moving in ‘S’ or
‘W’ paths.”346
In Survival, Evasion and Recovery, the DOD states the following when moving
through urban environments:
“Look for and move to ‘friendly’ controlled location or stronghold
point.
Head to concealment to break visual contact.
If seen, change direction radically.
Use caution when passing windows and doors; try to avoid.”347
C. I’M UP, THEY SEE ME, I’M DOWN
The mnemonic “I’m Up, They See Me, I’m Down” is the preferred USMC
schema for movement under fire.348 The time required to recite this mnemonic when
moving from cover or concealment to other cover or concealment matches the time
345 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips (Fort George
G. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2007), 1.
346 Ibid.
347 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, I–5.
348 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
81
needed for target acquisition by a sniper. The tactic starts upon deciding to move from
one area to another, in an active shooting lane. Upon moving, the next step is to recite,
“I’m up, they see me, I’m down” in a regular speech cadence.349 By the time the end of
“I’m down” is reached, people should be under new cover or concealment. Not only is a
tactical advantage provided by decreasing target acquisition time, but it also assists in
pre-planning movements by comparing the amount of time needed to move from one area
to another. While this detail can vary based on the type of weapon used (single shot
versus semi-automatic or automatic), the saying provides basic guidance again by
increasing the tactical advantage of those threatened.
D. KILL ZONES
According to author Cade Courtley, surviving the first 10 seconds of an attack can
greatly increase overall chances for survival.350 According to Courtley, the three typical
reactions to an immediate threat are to “fight, flight or freeze.”351 He suggests a
technique called “get off the X.”352 Courtley emphasizes that potential victims must not
freeze or “burrow in.”353 The “X” or “kill zone” refers to the shooter’s immediate
vicinity where most damage occurs (Figure 10).354 By immediately providing as much
distance as possible from the “kill zone” in the first few seconds of an attack, and angling
away from the shooter’s primary focus, the chances of survival increase dramatically.355
Courtley points out that a typical response from people to an immediate threat is to hit the
ground and cover their heads; while this action may be automatic for some, it places
potential victims at a higher risk if they do not continue to move.356 This advice is
consistent with the U.S. Army’s emphasis that potential victims “keep moving” since
349 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
350 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 173.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid., loc. 171.
353 Ibid., loc. 173.
354 Ibid., loc. 171.
355 Ibid., loc. 171–173.
356 Ibid., loc. 186.
82
attackers tend to fixate on the easiest targets.357 Courtley recommends seeking the
immediate cover possibly identified earlier, or if hitting the ground immediately to start
moving to suitable cover.358 Courtley’s guidance is consistent with the USMC guidance
to be a “hard target;” thus, making it harder to be attacked.359
Figure 10. Kill Zones360
357 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips, 1.
358 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 186.
359 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
360 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook),
loc. 171.
83
Once those threatened have gotten off the “X,” continued, purposeful movement
is key. It is important that as much distance as possible be put between the potential
victims and the shooter. Moving from cover to cover, when available, in small bursts (3–
5 seconds: I’m Up-They See Me, I’m Down) provides a safer escape and small mental
victories, which reinforced the warrior mindset and will to survive.361 After small
covered escapes have occurred, it is then possible to begin to make larger escape bursts
when a safe distance has been established. According to Courtley, “as you gain distance
from the shooter, you can increase the distance you travel between covers.”362 Courtley
also adds, “that the farther away from the shooter you are, the faster you can move, until
even sprinting if the situation warrants it.”363 Courtley reminds, “that if you can hear
gunfire, you can be shot” and to “continue to act with maximum purpose and calculated
caution.”364
E. NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES
The DOD emphasizes the fundamental importance of proper individual
movement techniques (IMT) in battle scenarios.365 The DOD defines the elements of
IMT as “high crawl, low crawl, and 3–5 second rush.”366 Courtley also references the
high and low crawl as potential movement techniques when faced with a potential threat
(Figure 11).367 In discussing techniques to navigate obstacles, the USMC describes high
crawl use conditions as “when you have some cover or concealment, but not enough to
stand.”368 High crawl is executed by “lifting your belly only inches from the floor and
361 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS); Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery; United States Marine Corps, Fire and
Movement; Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook).
362 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 208.
363 Ibid.
364 Ibid., loc. 208–213.
365 United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–7.
366 Ibid.
367 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194.
368 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
84
moving on your knees and elbows.”369 The USMC describes the high crawl as the
preferred method when speed is of the essence, running is not an option, and keeping a
low profile is still necessary.370 The USMC describes low crawl use conditions as “when
there is no cover or you are going through a low lying obstacle.”371 Low crawl is
executed by “pushing with your toes and pulling with your fingers, inch by inch if
necessary, keeping you flat to the floor and out of range.”372 This crawl is mostly utilized
when cover is needed over speed.373
Figure 11. High Crawl versus Low Crawl374
369 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194–
198.
370 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
371 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
372 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194.
373 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.
374 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook),
loc. 198.
85
F. DANGER AREAS
When moving between cover and concealment, those threatened may be faced
with a variety of open areas, hallway junctions, or otherwise compromised situations,
which are known as “danger crossings” or “danger areas.”375 In SWAT Leadership and
Tactical Planning author Tony Jones advises that movement should “circumvent” or
avoid crossing open areas whenever possible.376 If avoidance is not a possibility,
Courtley advises to:
Take a moment to discern a pattern in the shooting and try to move when
there is a pause in the gunfire. This will generally happen when the
weapon is being reloaded, and it will give you a few seconds to move
without taking fire. While preparing your body to make this move, use the
combat breathing technique we discussed earlier.377
Commonly found danger crossings in educational environments are doorways and
hallway intersections. These intersections are typically in a “T” fashion. Teachers
navigating a danger crossing can find themselves at the intersection of a “T” hallway
junction moving in both the direction of the long and short side of the “T.” Combined
with Courtley’s recommendation to recognize patterns in the firing, moving in a tactical
order across the danger crossings can increase potential survivability. Tactical order is
implemented by a teacher (Figures 12 and 13, position number 3) going to the corner of
the hallway, checking if it is clear and ordering students to cross. The teacher is
strategically navigating the danger crossing and increasing the likelihood of survival. The
following figures demonstrate tactical movement across both styles of “T” hallway
intersections. While these figures demonstrate a military building clearing technique
375 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 232;
United States Marine Corps, Marine Rifle Squad (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2002), 8–
25, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%203-
11.2%20Marine%20Rifle%20Squad ?ver=2012-10-11-1640
48-590.
376 Tony L. Jones, SWAT Leadership and Tactical Planning: The SWAT Operator’s Guide to Combat
Law Enforcement (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1996), 48, 83,
https://gooddebate.org/sin/mirror/library/security/Swat_
Leadership_And_Tactical_Planning_-_T_-_Tony_L._Jones .
377 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 233.
86
(Figures 12 and 13) they can also be applied when a teacher, possibly with the aid of a
teacher’s assistant, is guiding children through the hallways of their school.
Figure 12. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching
along the ‘Cross’ of the ‘T’”378
378 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–43–44.
87
Figure 13. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching
from the Base of the ‘T’”379
Another danger crossing commonly found in schools is stairwells. Navigating
stairwells can be complicated. Figure 14 demonstrates a stairwell clearing technique that
379 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–45–46.
88
can again be implemented by teachers and school staff when trying to escape potentially
hazardous areas.
Figure 14. Stairwell Clearing380
By taking the point position, teachers can move their students across the danger
crossings at intervals conducive with the situation and pause them when at excessive risk.
Although crossing danger areas should be avoided, sometimes they are unavoidable. By
moving with purpose, teachers are strategically navigating their environment and are
avoiding unsafe movement. When faced with danger crossings, teachers should navigate
their students through them as quickly as possible. Unless absolutely necessary, low or
high crawls or “S”/”W” patterned movement should be avoided for the sake of speed.
In conclusion to tactical movements, Courtley offers the following list to reiterate
the valuable steps in providing a safe distance when avoiding the active shooter threat:
“1. Get off the X. Remove yourself from immediate danger.
2. Regroup and regain focus.
3. Perform a self-assessment for injuries and resources.
4. Form your game plan. Make a decision, keep the group
cohesive, and assign individuals responsibility.
380 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–47.
89
5. Live or die. Pull the trigger! This is your mission!
6. Make sure you safely encounter law enforcement.”381
G. BARRICADING
Terminology regarding hiding varies across the research. Hiding can be different
from lockdown and is definitely different from “shelter-in-place,” which typically refers
to longer periods of time and usually from natural disaster events. As lockdown can be
passive or active, hiding implies an active approach to self-protection. The USAF takes a
step further and emphasizes the value of “barricading.”382 “Barricading is not merely
hiding. It is the active effort to hinder the shooter’s ability to enter the room or
facility.”383
The USAF recognizes barricading as: “A viable option if: (1) it is likely you are
not directly confronted with the shooter(s); or (2) it is likely your egress route is
obstructed and/or under the observation of the shooter(s).”384
Closing and locking the doors, finding an “improvised weapon,” preparing to
Fight, and using “heavy objects to barricade the door,” begin the barricading process.385
The USAF states:
If barricading the door with objects in the room is not possible, use objects
in the room as obstacles to slow down, fix, turn, or obscure the vision of
the shooter. Even though an obstacle will not prevent a shooter from
entering your area (i.e., sector), it will help you achieve a tactical
advantage to ‘Defend Your Sector.’”386
According to the USAF, once barricade is decided, the following assists in
attempting to gain a tactical advantage.
381 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 362–
364.
382 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 6–2.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid., 6–3.
90
“Turn off the lights.
Remain quiet and observe noise discipline (e.g., limit movement, talking,
whispering, and yelling).
Silence your cell phone and/or pager.
Turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios, televisions).
Develop a strategy to “Defend Your Sector” using fight in case you cannot
prevent the threat from entering the room.”387
While much of the tactical advice and techniques described in this chapter may
seem intimidating to the non-military or law enforcement professional, they are not. The
tactics, broken down to their simplest components, provide basic guidance in movement
and self-protection strategies that have the potential of furthering the likelihood of
survival. As described in the chapter on mental preparation, once committed to the “will
to survive” and a “warrior mindset,” the goal is for teachers and school professionals to
feel empowered in their ability to adapt to a multitude of threatening environments.388
With preparations combined, mental and tactical, teachers and school staff will have
more opportunity to implement Run, Hide, Fight practices efficiently.
387 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS), 6–3.
388 Ibid.; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.
91
V. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Training teachers and school staff on defensive tactical decision-making will
prepare them better to react to active shooter events. An options-based approach to active
shooter protection strategies creates an opportunity to advance the safety of school
children in the United States. By providing tactical decision-making processes, simplified
for civilian populations, active shooter protection strategies can evolve to become more
efficient. Despite regular iterations of advanced mitigation strategies dealing with the
handling of school shootings, elementary schools need to advance their active shooter
response strategy beyond the simple implementation of lockdowns.
Expecting teachers to protect in place is the simplest of all strategies and is
riddled with potential concerns. Not all faculty and students will be in their classrooms
when an event occurs. If trained in classroom lockdown drills alone, they will be
potentially more vulnerable. Government agencies agree that teachers need more options
beyond simple lockdowns. In The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One
Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came From, author Joe Hendry discussed a
recommendation based on an Ohio task force assembled by the State Attorney General to
look into school safety.389 The recommendation “encouraged a proactive, rather than
passive response to active shooter.”390 Taken even further, Hendry emphasizes, “Not
training everyone to respond as if their life depended on it is shortsighted, high-risk and
does not align with the realities of an active shooter event.”391
Many currently available opportunities can be provided to school staff to increase
their active shooter preparedness. Unfortunately, no clear-cut one-size fits all approaches.
During an active shooter event, lockdown may be the only option. However, any
advanced training provides more opportunities to school staff.
389 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover
Where Lockdown Came from, 8.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
92
This research has found many defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools
for elementary school settings. While found in military and law enforcement settings, the
findings demonstrate basic principles of self-defense and decision-making in stressful
environments. By training on and practicing the various components of the results,
teachers and school staff have the potential of increasing possible survivability of active
shooter events in elementary schools.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Findings from the research fall into three general categories: pre-action, action,
and re-action. Pre-action refers to the steps leading up to an event that establish the
necessary mindset and confidence for survival, and create an awareness that carries over
into the action phase. Action refers to the actual response to a threat. It is the tactical
movements and techniques that potential victims implement to increase survival. Action
also carries into re-action, and vice-versa as a feedback loop. Re-action means the
reevaluation phase of the situation. It analyzes whether the actions taken are improving or
worsening the tactical advantage. That analysis determines the next action. Again, a
looped system takes seconds to process. Individually, the significant findings of the
research are the following:
Pre-action
School administrators empowering teachers to find success by any
means necessary
Situational and area awareness
Commit to mission success
Action
Do not delay
Be decisive
Move with a purpose
Put distance between self and threat
Cover over concealment
93
Quick movements that maintain cover or concealment and provide
a tactical advantage
Re-action
Stay ahead of threat tempo by doing the least expected action
Stay flexible, adapt and overcome
B. PRE-ACTION
A major shortcoming of Run, Hide, Fight is the lack of mental preparation prior to
an event. While it is necessary to not overly plan an escape, based on changing factors,
mentally preparing for stressful situations has incredible advantages. Additionally,
familiarizing oneself with surroundings and ongoing situational changes can have a
dramatic impact on the likelihood of survival should an event occur.
1. School Administrators Empowering Teachers to Find Success by any
Means Necessary
One who lacks strategic planning and underestimates the enemy will be
captured.
~ Sun Tzu392
For many years, experts in the field of active shooters and school shootings have
called for more options-based approaches to active shooter events in schools.
Unfortunately, while advances have taken place, the full acceptance of varied approaches
has not occurred in school settings. Possibly due to budgetary restrictions, liability
concerns or the distraction of teaching young children to Fight, the necessary discussions
and actions have not occurred. Moving forward, school administrators need to recognize
the real threat of violence and empower their teachers to make good, situational-based
decisions. Due to the changing threat environment, schools must adapt to stay ahead of
the threat without causing a constant state of fear. Are parents more concerned that their
child survived, or that the teacher followed the policy?
392 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War—Original, Accurate, and Complete Translation of All 13 Chapters—
Translated by the Sonshi Group,” 12, Sonshi ☮, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.sonshi.com/original-
the-art-of-war-trans
lation-not-giles.html.
94
2. Situational and Area Awareness
One who is prepared and waits for the unprepared will be victorious.
~ Sun Tzu393
Situational awareness is a skill that once practiced and refined is ongoing. Many
teachers do so without even recognizing it. What is intuition saying? Why does
something not seem right? Teachers following their instinct and paying attention to what
is going can pay huge dividends. By identifying options available to them, the teacher
and school staff can mentally log and build a playbook for if-then scenarios. For example,
by recognizing the location of their classroom, their current position in the school, nearest
exits, cover and concealment escape routes, safety zones, etc., teachers can maintain a
running dialogue that is actionable in the face of a potential identified threat.
3. Commit to Mission Success
The important thing in doing battle is victory, not protracted warfare.
~ Sun Tzu394
Teachers and school administrators must commit to mission success.
Commitment is a formal mental process and state of mind. The research demonstrates the
incredible importance of this step in surviving stressful and threatening environments.
Teachers must not accept failure as an option and must have the utmost confidence in
their ability to survive and protect their children safe in the process. By adhering to the
Situational Awareness Checklist (Appendix A), and The Active Shooter Dirt Dive
(Appendix B) practices, teachers and school staff can better prepare themselves to have
the confidence in approaching these scenarios.
393 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 5.
394 Ibid., 4.
95
C. ACTION
Run, Hide, Fight is the recognized best practice when responding to the threat of
an active shooter. Unfortunately, the guidance lacks specificity. While it is important to
remember to Run, Hide, Fight, it is critical to recognize how to accomplish each one of
those responses. Implementing the steps inappropriately can actually lead those
threatened into a higher risk situation. By implementing the steps accurately, and with
supporting mental preparation and tactics, the chances of survival can be increased
significantly.
1. Do Not Delay
When doing battle, seek a quick victory. A long battle will blunt weapons
and diminish ferocity.
~ Sun Tzu395
Hesitation is the enemy of success. The research is consistent that teachers and
school staff must not delay taking action to mitigate or evade an active shooter event. Do
not assume that it is something other than the worst-case scenario. Do not delay action. Is
it better to feel foolish or be dead? Hear what seems like a gunshot, implement immediate
evasive action.
2. Be Decisive
The essential factor in warfare is speed.
~ Sun Tzu396
When analyzing, moving, or reacting to a scenario do not freeze. The research has
shown that hesitating or simply doing nothing is deadly. When faced with a threatening
environment, it is critical that teachers and school staff take action. Right or wrong,
research shows inaction is not successful.
395 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 3.
396 Ibid., 14.
96
3. Move with a Purpose
Move when advantageous, stop when not advantageous.
~ Sun Tzu397
In such an environment, all movement is critical. If a particular move does not
immediately improve or lead to increasing the teachers’ overall tactical advantage, it
should not occur unless absolutely no other option is available. While not hesitating, see
the move, analyze the advantage, make the move, and reanalyze.
4. Put Distance between Self and Threat
To march over a thousand kilometers without becoming distressed, march
over where the enemy is not present.
~ Sun Tzu398
Distance equals success. As found in the research, active shooter events in schools
are typically short in duration. By immediately providing distance from the threat,
potential victims dramatically increase their chances of survival. Every second counts.
5. Cover over Concealment
To be certain of safety when defending, defend where the enemy cannot
attack.
~ Sun Tzu399
The difference between cover and concealment is critical. Cover has to be the
priority over concealment. As implied by the term active shooter, the threat is bullets. If
potential victims are vulnerable to the penetration of gunfire, they are simply not safe.
Concealment is temporary. Cover may also be temporary depending on the situation, but
it is always better than concealment.
397 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 14.
398 Ibid., 7.
399 Ibid.
97
6. Quick Movements that Maintain Cover or Concealment and Provide
a Tactical Advantage
Calculate the situation, and then move. Those who know the principles of
the circuitous and direct will be victorious.
~ Sun Tzu400
Overall, actions in threatening environments need to be fast and result in an
improved tactical advantage. As opposed to envisioning an entire route, potential victims
should move from cover to cover quickly and concisely. These events come down to
seconds, which can impact potential survival. If those threatened can continue to move,
remain in cover, and provide distance from the threat, chances of survival increase.
D. RE-ACTION
With mental preparation engaged and tactically advantageous actions
implemented, it is critical to reevaluate the situation regularly. As a highly dynamic
event, active shooter environments are constantly changing. To maintain tactical
advantage, which increases the likelihood of survival, actions must be reevaluated
relative to the current and forecasted threat environment. By accomplishing this, those
threatened have the tactical advantage of staying ahead of their attacker.
1. Stay Ahead of Threat Tempo by Doing the Least Expected Action
Attack where your enemies are not prepared; go to where they do not
expect.
~ Sun Tzu401
These events are competitions of who will win. Winning is survival. The attackers
have the advantage of knowing what their plans are. Knowledge of intent puts those
threatened at an immediate disadvantage. To compensate for this disadvantage, in
addition to not delaying, being decisive and moving with a purpose, potential victims
must gain any tactical advantage available. Pre-established evacuation routes and
400 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 9.
401 Ibid., 2.
98
lockdown are the most likely action found in school systems. If the threat is familiar with
school policies and procedures, then all the proposed actions and the specific details of
each one may already be known to that threat. With an options-based approach, teachers
and school staff have the flexibility to get ahead of the threat’s operational tempo and
gain tactical advantage.
2. Stay Flexible, Adapt and Overcome
When moving troops and calculating plans, be formless.
~ Sun Tzu402
Active shooter events are constantly evolving and highly variable. The research
confirms that no one-size fits all approach exists in these situations. Initial plans may
change with routes or conditions. It is critical that teachers and school staff not lock into
any one solution. Instead, they should focus on remaining flexible, adapting to whatever
the situation provides, and overcoming any current, new, or unknown challenges. This
principle is the reason behind the recommendation by experts to establish options-based
approaches and not try to provide a procedural approach to an event. Instead, the
emphasis is to provide the tools for those involved to be successful and then give them
the ability to use the tools as needed.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
This research has shown that options-based approaches to active shooter events
are necessary for elementary school events. Active shooter events are not linear.
Preparation and response activities should not be linear either. Teachers and school staff
need to be prepared and supported to make changes to standard practice. Additionally,
teachers and school staff should be celebrated for their willingness to protect the students
in their charge. While the research demonstrates detailed actions and ideas, the resulting
recommendations summarize the steps necessary for schools to advance their
preparedness.
402 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 14.
99
Recommendation #1—Provide training to teachers and school staff on
options-based response to active shooter preparedness and response
including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.
This research provides defensive tactics and tactical decision-making available to
school environments at little to no cost. The sources included provide further opportunity
to establish new approaches to response and decision-making.
Recommendation #2—Empower teachers through district policy to
protect the children in their care by any means necessary.
Teachers and school staff need to be empowered to implement their training.
Empowerment must be supported through policy to alleviate concerns over liability. If
teachers make a tactical real time decision that taking their students out the window and
into a nearby neighborhood to provide a safe haven from a shooter, they need to know
that their ability to decide is supported.
Recommendation #3—Establish reconnection procedures in the event of
an incident.
With an options-based approach, reconnection procedures need to be developed.
In the previous example of when teachers implement steps to protect their children, a
process needs to be in place for them to reconnect to the school administration to provide
a student count or roster and arrange transportation to a family reunification area.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Opportunities exist for further research regarding active shooter events. Most
likely, the most complicated, and most significant, would be the psychological analysis as
to why an individual would commit such an act. Additionally, research regarding target
selection has inherent value. While school and workplace attacks are commonly
understood targets, random active shooter targets are not. Depending on the willingness
and reality of implementing the steps outlined in this document, research could evaluate
the hurdles keeping school systems from evolving their protection measures. Research on
100
that topic could potentially assess cultural obstacles, political influences, and social
ramifications. Regardless of the area of research, school-based active shooter events are a
valuable topic, as the protection of youth is a globally accepted social priority.
G. CONCLUSION
I am a dad. I am not a law enforcement officer. I am not a soldier. I am a dad who
is still scared, as I am sure all parents are, but whom now sees options to
increase success—survival—in active shooter events. Through the research, I found
many great resources that could easily be applied to a multitude of varied
environments to increase survivability. Unfortunately, bureaucratic hurdles always
seem to precede change. I feel confident that changes can and will be made based on
the ever-evolving threat environment that this nation’s schools face. The threat of
active shooters in schools has not waned and is statistically increasing. The impact of
these events in elementary schools is significant.
Many school systems have failed to adapt to the changing environment or have
adapted portions of the needed steps. Emergency operations plans have significant value
in overall school planning. Unfortunately, these plans often provide a false sense of
security. Focus on preventing these events and having an overall school threat
vulnerability analysis is critical. Identifying potential risks and intervening in advance is
a daily process and significant step to prevention. Unfortunately, not all events stop at
this stage. Individual schools not wanting to face the reality that it can happen and not
preparing for it is unacceptable. School systems need to recognize the possibility of the
threat, not dismiss the likelihood, be honest with their vulnerability, accept strengths and
weaknesses, and find a way to improve.
By recognizing options-based approaches as an acceptable strategy, school
systems have the potential dramatically increase the likelihood of survival. Lockdown
should be an option, not THE solution. As a society, this country entrusts teachers with
the daily protection of children. Why not empower them with the tools and opportunity to
evolve that protection in an ever-increasing threat environment?
101
APPENDIX A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CHECKLIST
o Am I in the proper “warrior mindset” today?403
o Do I have the “will to survive” and the will to protect my students?404
o Can I commit to mission success and refuse to accept defeat?
o Can I not delay, assume the worst and act decisively?
o Has anyone given me cause for concern recently?
o Students?
o Co-workers?
o Parents?
o Other adults?
o Did anything strike me as odd this morning while driving in or arriving on
campus?
o Unusual cars?
o Unusual people?
o What are the “weak points” of my school?
o Blind spots?
o Glass entrances?
o Fences?
Anything I can fix or recommend changing?
o How close am I typically to those “weak points?”
o What are the nearest exits to my classroom (or where I spend most of my day)?
o Primary
o Secondary (separate direction from primary)
o Tertiary (hopefully separate direction than both primary and secondary)
o What do my escape path options look like?
o Are they identified but not committed to?
o Do I have multiples?
o Can I adapt and overcome if paths become unsafe or inaccessible?
403 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
404 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.
102
o What type of cover or concealment is available while escaping or when
hiding?405
o What would hinder my and my student’s escape to safety?
o Physical abilities of self or others?
o Locked doors?
o Location in school? (i.e., second or third floor)
o How fortifiable is my classroom if I could not escape?
o Windows?
o Lockable doors?
o Large objects that could be moved to impede access?
o Smaller objects that could be placed to slow attacker movement?
o Areas large enough to accommodate hiding entire class?
o What in my class can be used as a weapon or distraction?
o Extinguisher?
o Staplers?
o Vases?
o Stacks of papers?
o Pencils?
o Erasers?
o Anything!!
o If moving between classes, or moving to another area of the school have I
reevaluated my surroundings?
o Newly available, or better, exits?
o Different escape paths?
o Different concern areas?
o Different fortification options?
o Am I willing to stay ahead of an attacker and do the least expected action
whenever necessary to gain the tactical advantage?406
405 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter
(AS).
406 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War.
103
APPENDIX B. THE ACTIVE SHOOTER DIRT DIVE
Adapted from the following and shown in Figure 15:
Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt
(Ebook)
“Get off the X”
“Low crawl/high crawl”
United States Marine Corp, Fire and Movement.
“I’m Up, They See Me, I’m Down”
United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS:
Active Shooter (AS)
“Avoid danger areas”
Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness; U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper
Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips.
“Cover & concealment”
“Defend your sector”
“Anti-sniper lateral & angled movement”
104
Figure 15. The Active Shooter Dirt Dive407
407Adapted from Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook); United States Marine Corps, Fire and
Movement; United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS); Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness;
U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips.
105
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A STUDY IN POLICE PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO ACTIVE
SHOOTER SITUATIONS TO PROVIDE A SAFER LEARNING
ENVIRONMENT IN THE SCHOOLS OF BERGEN COUNTY,
NEW JERSEY
JEFFREY T. DIN0
Dissertation Committee
Charles Achilles, Ed.D., Mentor
Daniel Gutmore, Ph.D
.
Reverend Christopher J. Hynes, D. Min
Daniel Simone Jr., Ed.D.
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education
Seton Hall University
SETON HALL
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AND HUMAN SERVICES
OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
APPROVAL FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE
Doctoral Candidate, Jeffery Dino, has successfully defended and made the required
modifications to the text of the doctoral dissertation for the Ed.D. during this Spring
Semester 2009.
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
(please sign and date beside your name)
Mentor:
Dr. Charles Achilles 5-l-
–
Committee Member:
Committee Member:
External Reader:
The mentor and any other committee members who wish to review revisions will sign
and date this document only when revisions have been completed. Please return this form
to the Oftice of Graduate Studies, where it will be placed in the candidate’s file and
submit a copy with your final dissertation to be bound as page number two.
O Copyright by Jeffrey T. Dino, 200
9
All Rights Reserved
ABSTRACT
The research in this study was conducted to explore the influence that the Bergen
County Prosecutor’s Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of
all
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is
mandatory for children to the age of 16 in New Jersey it becomes imperative that the
police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the
police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while
children
are in
attendance.
The survey used in the study was sent to all municipal police departments in
Bergen County, New Jersey (N = 68). Voluntary participation was requested from the
administrators of each police department.
This study can be described as cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental
research. There were three research questions which guided the study. The researcher
used descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two. To answer
guiding question three the researcher used Chi-Squared ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses. The
analyses were conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor
variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law
enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on
each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).
Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was
between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the
number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response
tactics.
The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total
operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount
of training being done in
active-shooter response
tactics.
The study has contributed to decision making in the area of police training in
active-shooter tactics and training.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following words are offered as my sincere thanks to all of the people that
made this effort possible for me to complete. Some contributed more than others but no
one’s advice, caring, knowledge and influence went unnoticed.
To Dr. Charles Achilles my mentor in this project, you have continuously made
my work better by your direction, enthusiasm for my topic, editing and command of the
written word. You took what I wrote and made it better each time you advised on it.
Thank you.
To Dr. Daniel Simone Jr., we started as classmates; you became my friend and
soon became a strong academic influence of mine. You have been there for me for a long
time and never got annoyed with my constant emails and questions, some of which were
in a panic. You always gave good advice, up to and including as a member of my
committee. I can not thank you enough.
To Dr. Daniel Gutmore, my committee member and student advisor, thank you,
and structure does influence behavior.
To Reverend Dr. Christopher Hynes, my committee member and friend, thank
you for always being there when I needed your help.
To Dr. John Collins, for your mastery of statistics and never ending assistance,
my eternal thanks.
To all of the people who provided constant encouragement and support, you all
know who you are; I would not have completed this project without the inspiration and
motivation I took from your words, thank you.
DEDICATION
The bloodiest battles are fought within
This work is dedicated to my wife Kendra and my children Rachel, Jake and
Christopher. I love you and thank you. Without your help, patience, and caring I would
never have been able to do this. No accomplishment really means anything unless it is
shared with those that love you.
Table of Contents
……………………………………………………………….. Acknowledgements
Dedication ………………………………………………………………..
List of Tables ………………………………………………………………..
………….. Chapter I INTRODUCTION. PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
Introduction …………………………………………………..
Background …………………………………………………..
Statement of the Problem …………………………………….
Purpose of the Study ………………………………………….
…………………………………………
Guiding Questions
…………………………………….
Significance of the Study
Delimitations of the Study ……………………………………
………………………………………
Limitations of the Study
………………………………………….
Definitions of Terms
Organization of the Study …………………………………….
Chapter I
I
Chapter 11
1
Chapter IV
REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE. RESEARCH
AND THEORY ……………………………………………..
Introduction ……………………………………………………
Background ……………………………………………………
………………………………..
Historical Summary of Events
Traditional Police Tactics …………………………………….
………………………………….
Legal Mandates for Change
…………………………………………..
New Police Tactics
………………………………
Problems with the New Tactics
School Resource Officer ……………………………………..
Research and Theory Related to Police Administrators ………
School Violence ………………………………………………
Theoretical Framework. ………………………………………
Summary ………………………………………………………
DESIGN AND METHODS ………………………………….
Purpose ……………………………………………………….
Design …………………………………………………………
Methods ………………………………………………………
Population ……………………………………………………
Instrumentation ………………………………………………
Conclusion ……………………………………………………
………
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Introduction ………………………………………………….
…………………………………………….
Collection of Data
…………………………………………… Data and Findings . . . .
Descr~ptwe Statlstlcs ……………………………………..
vii
Chapter V
References
Appendixes
Reliability Estimates ………………………………………
Answering Research Question 1 ……………………………..
Answering Research Question 2 ……………………………..
Answering Research Question 3 ……………………………..
Summary ………………………………………………………
INTRODUCTION. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.
DISCUSSION. CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES. AND FUTURE
STUDY ………………………………………………………
Introduction …………………………………………………..
Summary of Findings ………………………………………..
Discussion ……………………………………………………
Conclusions …………………………………………………..
Recommendations for Policies and Practices …………………
.Future Study ………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………
Appendix A
. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office Memo
(05-01) Active-Shooter Policy Initiative …………………….
Appendix B
-List of Municipal Police Departments in
Bergen County. New Jersey ………………………………….
Appendix C
-Approval Letters; Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. IRB Approval Form.
IRB Approval Letter ………………………………………….
Appendix D
– Survey Questionnaire …………………………
A ~ ~ e n d i x E – Solicitation Letter …………………………….. ..
Appendix F
. Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) Statistical Analyses …………. 119
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table
4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10
Table 11
Table 12
Table 13
Table 14
School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, – Requiring a Police Response
to a Private Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in
Progress or Intervene in the Implementation of a Planned Attack.. …..
Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table 1 (April
………………………………………….. 20, 1999 to February 2008).
Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to
Prosecutor’s Office Training Mandate of September 1,2005.. ………
Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that
have Mutual Aid Agreements for Joint Responses.. …………………
Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police
Jurisdictions in Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning.. …
Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of
………………………………………….. September 1, 2005 (N = 45)
Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police
Departments for Active-Shooter Training (N = 45) Multiple Choices
Possible.. ………………………………………………………………
Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-
…………………………………………………… Shooter Response..
Recoded Responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of
Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter
Response.. ……………………………………………………………..
Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police
……………………………………… Departments in Bergen County.
Recoded Responses: Amount of Required Training by Bergen County
Police Departments.. …………………………………………………..
(7a) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting BCPO
……………………………………………………… the Model Policy..
(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the
BCPO Model Policy.. ………………………………………………….
Number and Frequency of Police Officers in Municipal Police
Departments of Bergen County, NJ.. …………………………………
Table 15 Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police
Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County. NJ ……. 73
Table 16 Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police
Departments in Bergen County. NJ …………………………………… 74
Table 17 Recoded Responses: 2007 Forfeiture Program. Seized Funds as
Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ ……………… 75
Table 18 Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported by Police
Departments in Bergen County. NJ …………………………………… 76
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
Introduction
Police departments across the United States have made changes to the way they
will respond to critical-incidents that occur at schools located within their jurisdictions.
The attack at Columbine High School (April 20, 1999) has served as a catalyst for the
changes made by police agencies all over the country. In Bergen County, New Jersey
changes were mandated by a directive, Directive 05-01 Active-Shooter Policy Initiative,
from the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office in a memo dated April 11,2005 (see
Appendix A). The memo clearly states that as of its distribution, it will become the
policy of the county to have a unified and consistent active-shooter response policy. This
policy, entitled the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter
Situations, was developed by and a final version was agreed upon by the Chiefs of Police
at their February 24, 2005 Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association meeting, and
became mandatory training for all sworn police officers in the county. Also contained in
the directive was a completion of training date of September 1,2005 for all sworn police
officers in the county.
The basis for this type of county-wide response policy is in the understanding of
the Chiefs of Police and other members of the law enforcement community in Bergen
County that critical incidents are likely to produce multi-agency responses. Thls
understanding includes critical incidents that occur in jurisdictions of small to mid-sized
police departments throughout the county, and will most likely require the use of mutual-
aid from neighboring municipal, county, state, and federal agencies to bring the event[s]
to a resolution. Therefore, when police officers of different agencies are working
together toward the successful resolution of a critical incident, they need to be trained in
similar tactics. For police officers from multiple agencies to work safely and swiftly
together in a critical-incident response they need the same basic awareness of tactics.
Experts agree that violence in schools has become more of a problem since the
late 1990s (Peterson & O’Neal, 2002). Society is increasingly exposed to violence and
police officers must respond to more and different types of violent situations. One type
of situation that is sadly becoming more common is the active-shooter in
schools.
Routine-activities theory by Kautt and Roncek (2007) reveals schools as criminal
hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal
activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors (Kautt & Roncek,
2007). Active-shooters are not limited to education institutions; they are just as common
in the work place and in other venues. Police must develop policies and tactics fluid and
flexible enough that they may be employed in diverse locations.
As a first-responder to an active shooting in a school, police must quickly assess
and react to events taking place. To do this, police first-responders must have training in
making assessments and formulating plans to enter schools and save lives. After the
development of the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter
Situations by the Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association, and distribution of this
policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, police officers in Bergen County will
now respond to a critical incident like an active-shooter situation in a school setting in a
unified manner.
Although the terminology appears in the definition of terms section, it is fitting to
define this phrase now that has been coined by law-enforcement professionals and that is
used often in this analysis. The phrase is “Active-Shooter.” An active-shooter is defined
as a suspect[s] whose activity is immediately causing death and serious injury. The
activity is not contained and there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury to
potential victims (Borelli,
2005).
Background
Prior to the mid 1960s, police responded and resolved many types of potentially
violent situations. These situations created a need for change in police tactics. The
catalyst for this change was the deadly event at The University of Texas (August 1,
1966), where Charles Whitman killed 15 people and wounded 31 others from the top of a
clock tower. After this event, the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams were born
(Borelli, 2005). These new and specially trained groups of police officers responded to
critical incidents of active-shooters in the process of killing innocent people; suspects
barricading themselves into dangerous situations, and hostage takers holding innocent
people captive. The new teams were trained in tactics that allowed for the successful
resolution of these
situations.
Police officers not assigned to these specialized response teams were now being
trained to respond and secure the scene to allow time to pass when specialized teams
could respond. Time was considered the ally of the police to calm situations and allow
for the response of special teams and negotiators who came along.
Police departments everywhere again received a wake up call on April 20, 1999 in
Littleton, CO. The lesson that day was that the days of police responding to an incident
and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive were no longer acceptable when a violent actor was
already taking lives. The police tactic of buying time was not a viable strategy against an
actor[s] who had no intention of surrendering (Egan, 1999). A goal of the actors at
Columbine High School was not to get out alive, as is frequently the case with this kind
of event. In an active-shooter situation, suicide is often a part of the plan from the start
(Scanlon, 2001).
Police have now modified their assessment of what is expected by first-
responding police officers to a critical or violent incident at a school. The new ideas are
now taught in police academies all over the country that police are to respond, assess,
plan, and engage. Allowing time to pass is the opposite of what responding police
officers should do because violent events do not typically last more than 5 to 7 minutes
(Wood, 2001). Calculating the average number of people shot during these active-
shooting situations and the typical duration of the shooting, shows that once the shooting
starts, someone is shot every 15 seconds (Tactical Response, 2008). If responses are
divided into 15-second intervals, it is easy to see why police first-responders must not
wait to take action to stop the killing.
Statement of the Problem
Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy
and only now has begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available
on police training for active-shooter situations (O’Brien, 2008a). Although violent crime
in schools and in general has been on the decline since the early 1990’s (Kleck, 1999)
police agencies must adapt to changing societal trends where violent critical incidents are
becoming more common. In this adaptation, society should expect police officers to
respond to violent situations and resolve the issues they are confronted by. One such
issue is the active-shooter situation in a school, which is the
foundation of this study.
In this study the researcher attempts to determine if police officers in Bergen
County are adequately prepared to respond and resolve an active-shooter incident in a
school quickly.
Purpose of the Study
The researcher’s purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the
Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future
preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to
active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in
schools is mandatory for the children of New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police
departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police
officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children
are in attendance.
Guiding Questions
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to
active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?
Question 2 . Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model
policy?
Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being
done in police
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
Significance of the Study
Up to this point, the literature in this field has presented an incomplete view of
police response to shootings, active-shooters, and critical incidents in schools. Much of
the literature and most studies this researcher has located on the topic are from the
perspective of the school administrators’ response to these situations, attempts at
psychological profiles of the shooters and how the media interprets these events.
Therefore, what can be uncovered from a study of this kind can assist police
administrators in their preparation efforts to combat instances of dangerous and deadly
violent situations at schools to better maintain a safer learning environment in the schools
of
Bergen County, NJ.
As education administrators make the school facilities available
for police training, police become better prepared to respond to crisis situations in
schools.
Most police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey are similar in their
command structure. At the top, the chain of command has a Chief of Police or civilian
Police Director. Outside the internal command, each police department operates under
some direction by the county prosecutor’s office, as the county prosecutor is the chief
law-enforcement officer appointed by the governor for that county. Although staffing
and area distinguish one police department from one another they are alike in many ways.
How they differ in their preparedness to respond to an active-shooter situation is the
foundation of
this study.
Many different methods are available to train for critical-incident responses, and
experts in the field have not identified one method as better than any other. Each method
is similar in its make-up and basic goal – respond and save lives by confronting and
stopping the violent actor.
Delimitations of the Study
This study was designed to explore what police departments in one county
(Bergen) in New Jersey are doing to prepare themselves better for a critical-incident
response at a school after the distribution of, the Standardization of Patrol Based
Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s
Office. The delimitations of the study were: only the 68 municipal police agencies in
Bergen County, NJ listed on the Bergen County Prosecutors office website were included
in the population (N=68), information to answer the guiding questions was derived from
the survey instrument provided to the Chiefs of Police the Civilian Police Directors or
their designees, the agencies provided with the survey instrument were also asked to
return the completed instrument in three weeks.
Limitations of the Study
Limitations identify potential weaknesses in the study that derive from the design
and methods of a study. The scope of this study focuses on the 68 municipal police
departments in Bergen County, New Jersey. All 68 municipal police departments were
included on the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office website. Since all municipal police
departments in the county were included as participants, the research methodology can be
considered a census. The number of agencies that return the completed survey
instrument is a limitation of the study. The survey instrument used to solicit data was
modeled after the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. The survey instrument,
along with original questions related to active-shooter preparation prepared by the
researcher was reviewed by a jury of experts in the field.
Since this study is focused on one county in the state of New Jersey which has a
total of 21 counties, the results of the study may not be indicative of the level of
preparations by the police departments in the rest of the state. Therefore, any conclusions
drawn from the study to apply to other municipal departments in the other counties,
county or state police departments, are the responsibility of the reader.
Another limitation of this study is that it is primarily focused on police response
to active-shooter and critical incidents in primary, middle, and secondary schools.
Although some mention is made of events that occur[ed] on college campuses, the study
is limited to how police are responding to the school incidents. College and university
active-shooter and critical incidents are mentioned to establish for the reader some key
events that were either a catalyst for change or an especially violent incident where police
had responded in the same manner as they would have to a lower grade level school.
A section on higher education or college campus violence would not be practical
in this study, as it would need its own study to truly report valuable information. Higher
education institutions are not considered to be schools in terms of law enforcement,
because the student body is comprised of adults. In addition many colleges and
universities have their own police departments or security agencies and these agencies
report to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report differently than a police department within a
countylstate as per the Clery Act for reporting campus crime. The law enforcement
agencies of state and private institutions may fall under the jurisdiction of the state
attorney general’s office rather than the county prosecutor’s office. This too would
eliminate campuses from the scope of this project as the present study is focused on
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As a result it would not be
appropriate for the researcher to draw conclusions about the training and preparations of
campus police agencies when they work under different authority than those at the
foundation of this study.
Definitions of Terms
The following are definitions that are relevant to this study:
Active-shooter: “A suspect(s) activity is immediately causing death and serious
bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is a risk of death or serious bodily
injury to potential victims” (Borelli, 2005, p 2.).
Active-Shooter Team (AST): A team of three or four armed police officers tasked
with finding and stopping an active-shooter.
Critical incidents: terrorist activities, hostage taking, mass causality events, high-
risk repetitive crimes, riots, or bombings
Jurisdiction: The territorial range of authority or control.
Police Officer: Any sworn member of a state, county, citylmunicipal police
department empowered to uphold law and order with the power to arrest offenders for
crimes, misdemeanors, and infractions of law.
S. W.A.T. team: A team of police officers trained in Special Weapons And Tactics,
equipped to respond to a variety of dangerous situations.
Organization of the Study
Chapter I has presented an introduction of the problem behind the study, a
background, a statement of the problem, a purpose of the study, guiding questions,
significance of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, definitions
of terms, and a description of the organization of the study. Chapter 11 presents a review
of pertinent literature, research and theory whlch contains; an introduction, background, a
historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new
police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police
administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. In Chapter 111
the researcher describes the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose,
design, population, methods,
instrumentation, and a conclusion.
Chapter IV presents the
collected data and the analysis of the data collected by frequency distributions and Chi-
Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses. Chapter V includes a summary of findings, discussion,
and conclusions and recommendations for policy, practice and future research.
Chapter I1
REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE, RESEARCH AND THEORY
Introduction
The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in their jurisdictions. This chapter presents a review of necessary adaptations
police agencies, both in New Jersey and the United States have made to allow them to
respond to critical incidents in school settings effectively, tactically and efficiently.
These adaptations were based on the education the law enforcement community received
from studying the events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado as well as from studying other critical incidents around the country. Although
the shooting at Columbine was not the first time a United States school had been the
scene of a deadly attack by either a student or an adult, it did however, have a lasting
effect on the law enforcement community. The attack effectively showed law
enforcement professionals that they were not adequately prepared to respond to this type
of situation and to gain control quickly.
Until the Virginia Tech massacre (April 16,2007) where 33 people were killed
and another 30 were injured (Shapira & Jackman 2007), the Columbine High School
incident was the most deadly shooting to take place in a school setting in the United
States, with 15 fatalities (Egan, 1999). The Columbine High School incident forever
changed how the law enforcement community will plan for, train for, and react to a
critical incident. In light of such an eye opening for U.S. law enforcement, police tactics
have been revised and have been adapted to allow police to respond more appropriately
to a critical incident of this nature. These new tactics lend themselves for a response not
only in a school setting, but in the work place, a private home, a night club or other venue
that may come under attack by a would be killer.
In chapter I1 the researcher reviews the history of the formation of police tactics
and what event was instrumental to the establishment of these traditional tactics. The
analysis addresses school settings including the Columbine High School tragedy, which
served as the catalyst for changes in tactical responses by police departments all over the
country. Historical events are an important component of this review because they show
how traditional police tactics to respond to critical incidents began, how they changed
and how they were sometimes inadequate. An understanding of what police response
tactics were is vital to understand how and why they need to evolve to be more effective.
The researcher then provides a description of traditional police response tactics,
why they are in need of revision and what these revisions include. Developing an
understanding of what the traditional tactics of police response were helps the readers
gain insight into why they have become ineffective in many situations. The researcher
next discusses legal mandates for change at the local, state and federal levels. A
description of the new police tactics to respond to critical incidents demonstrates how
police react to critical situations, in a post-Columbine era. An indepth description of
these new tactics, some dubbed Active-Shooter Response or critical incident response,
suggest the path the law enforcement community has followed to update and make
responses more tactically sound to respond rapidly and save more lives. Columbine and
other school settings have shown the need for cooperation among agencies in critical
incidents. The school backdrop remains a main theme in the present study because tax
dollars are used to fund both police and educational institutions. Because children are
required to go to school they become potential targets at the very institutions where their
attendance is mandatory.
The review then turns toward training, with a focus on the benefits of training for
preparedness and providing police officers with the necessary skills to complete their
mission to save lives. The problems associated with training police officers with the new
critical incident response tactics are explored. Some of these difficulties are getting
police officers to act like tactical teams and focusing on what is most important; the
mission at hand.
Related research and theory as they relate to both police and school violence are
discussed. Numerous theories and studies are critiqued as they form the foundation of
police response and why school violence happens and if there are effective indicators as
to who is committing it.
The analysis contains a summary followed by a section in which the researcher
describes how the evolution of these new tactics should progress so that police can
continue to be effective and relevant to our rapidly changing and ever more violent
society. If police are going to be challenged with resolving these types of critical
incidents they need training, training and more training.
The effectiveness of these new response tactics is crucial for police to be able to
protect the lives of children who are mandated to attend school, and the safety of all
citizens in all types of venues. Therefore an analysis of where police tactics were and
where they are going to be in the future is important to maintain the safety of our society.
Without periodic reviews of how police are preparing for their jobs, in an ever changing
society, the police become stagnate and ineffective. A review of response plans,
strategies and tactics allows for changes to be made for police to become more proficient
in their job performance. As more police agencies are exposed to these situations the
more the law enforcement community has the opportunity to study how to resolve the
situations in the safest manner.
Research and theory are presented through the use of relevant articles, studies,
professional journals, legal mandates, periodicals and books, as well as first hand
knowledge of the researcher and others, to provide the basis for this analysis.
Background
Until the mid 1960s all situations that required a response within a police
department’s jurisdiction were handled by the department’s patrol-first responders. This
meant that the “ordinary police officer” on a beat was called to handle whatever
happened while the officer was on duty. All calls for police service, such as drunk and
disorderly people to domestic violence to robberies and shootings, were taken care of by
the patrol squad on the street.
This changed on August 1, 1966 in Austin, Texas. Events on this date served as a
catalyst for change in American policing practices at the time. On August 1, 1966,
Charles Whitman, trained to shoot by the United States Marine Corps, forced entry into a
clock tower building at the University of Texas. In tote with him were three rifles, two
handguns, a shotgun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Oddly enough he also
brought with him a five gallon bucket of drinking water and some sandwiches. He had
obviously planned to be there for some time (Borelli, 2005).
From the top of the clock tower, Whitman killed 15 people and wound 3 1 others,
some as far as two blocks away. Prior to his assault on the university he had also killed
his mother and wife. The first two responding police officers on the scene at the
university, who incidentally just happened to be on campus, teamed with other
responding police and a civilian and made a brave move to launch their own assault.
This ad hoc team advanced on the tower from an underground passage and made their
way inside to confront Whitman. Armed with handguns and a shotgun the team was able
to draw Whitman’s fire so he stopped shooting at innocent people on the campus. In the
gun battle that followed, the team killed Whitman and ended his killing spree (Borelli,
2005).
As with most critical or serious incidents that law enforcement professionals face,
there were both a debriefing and a subsequent study of the scene as well as the outcome.
Debriefings and studies of events are tools used to tweak tactics to make them more
effective in the future. This incident was no different. The University of Texas shooting
showed law enforcement personnel that there was a need for highly skilled professionals
to handle these types of situations in the future. The team of officers who came on scene
was courageous enough to take the battle to the killer, hut all situations like this may not
be handled in as brave a manner. Law enforcement professionals who reviewed the
incident concluded there was a need for tactically minded police officers to be specially
trained and equipped to handle a variety of situations. Born out of this incident were the
modem Special Weapons And Tactics teams, known as S.W.A.T. teams (Borelli, 2005).
Since the early 1970’s, S.W.A.T. teams and similar teams with their own
interesting and unique monikers like Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and Emergency
Response Team (ERT) began to he formed in police departments all over the country.
This was also a time when military veterans were returning from the Vietnam Conflict
and there was an abundance of tactically trained and battle tested young men to form
tactical teams (Borelli, 2005). The term “men” is used here because at the time policing
in the United States was a maledominated profession. In 1971 after the end Vietnam
Conflict, only 1.4% of all police officers in the United States were women (Home,
2006).
Decades later females became more of a factor in law
enforcement.
Females in policing
by 2006 made up about 13 – 14% of sworn law enforcement officers in the US (Home,
2006).
The newly formed professional teams were tasked with responding to various
types of critical incidents. Team members became the experts on responding and
handling situations, although not in every agency were these professionals assigned to
this task exclusively. Most team members were assigned full-time to other areas of
policing and to the special team on a part-time basis. From the 1970s to the 1990s special
teams were called upon to handle situations that were above and beyond the capabilities
of patrol-first responders.
In the decade, from 1996 to 2006 there have been at least 80 incidents where guns
were either brought to schools to take hostages, or kill students andlor teachers and
principals in the United States (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Until April
2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (more commonly known as
Virginia Tech or VT) in Blacksburg, VA, the most deadly assault on a school was at
Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Shapira & Jackrnan 2007). The
result of this incident was 12 students and one teacher dead, at least 24 wounded and two
killers who committed suicide (Borelli, 2005). The Columbine High School tragedy took
the breath away from the American public. Not because they had not seen school
violence before. They certainly had, in the 3 years prior to the Columbine tragedy there
were at least 16 school violence incidences, most of which ended with deadly
consequences (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). However, this incident
highlighted the vulnerability of schools and campuses around the country.
What America saw the day of the Columbine High School tragedy, live via the
news media on scene, were police agencies and their officers respond to the school
campus and secure a perimeter. Some estimates are that approximately 120 police
officers responded to the scene (Shepard, 2006). None of the responding police
immediately entered the building to confront and/or stop the killing of students and a
teacher. Why did some of the 120 armed police officers a enter a building where lives
were being taken by two high school students?
Was this what was expected of police agencies, to sit and wait for a safe situation
to enter? In fact it was. The S.W.A.T. era had brought new policies for police responses.
Police officers were no longer being taught to act on and take care of every situation as
they had in the past. At one point in time the police were the last line of defense, now the
police called on their S.W.A.T. teams to be their last line of defense.
Historical Summary of Events
According to the School Violence Resource Center (2007) and an Infoplease
(2008) internet document, the attacks described in Table 1, were carried out or were
planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at
Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response
to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to intervene in
the implementation of a planned attack. Table 2 is a compilation or frequency
distribution of occurrences listed in Table 1 by state.
Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost
obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research
has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the
boys’ own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence
specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). A review of Table 1 shows the absence of
absolutes in the events. It is important to note a quote from George Santayana, that
“those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana, 1905, p.
13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to he able to form a
complete picture of
what could happen at any time.
Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the event on
October 4,2002 in San Antonio, TX describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred
inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some
occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place
in urban, suburban, and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. When seen
through the lens of masculinity theory, the killings of girls who had rejected assailants
can be explained as an effort to reverse the feelings of subordination and inadequacy the
assailants experienced as a result of being rejected (Klein, 2005). Victims were teachers,
students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged
from children (6 years old) to adults.
Table 1
School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, – Requiring a Police Response to a Private
Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the
Implementarion of a Planned Attack
1. April 20, 1999: Littleton, CO. Two boys, ages 16 and 17, shoot 35 students and 1
teacher before committing suicide. Twelve students and 1 teacher die.
2. May 13, 1999: Port Huron, MI. Two 14 year-olds plotted to kill at least 154
people at school in an attempt to outdo the shooting at Columbine High School.
They were stopped when fellow students reported them.
3. May 20, 1999: Conyers GA. A 15 year old wounds six classmates.
4. October 28, 1999: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old and three 15 year olds planned
on killing mostly black students, then die in a shoot out with police. The plot was
reported by a parent.
5. November 19, 1999: Deming, NM. A 12 year old shoots a classmate in the head.
The victim died the following day.
6. December 6, 1999: Fort Gibson, OK. A 71h grade student brings a handgun to
school and opens fire. Four students are wounded.
7. January 29,2000: Cupertino, CA. A 19 year old planned to attack his high school
with guns and explosives. He took photos of himself and his arsenal of weapons.
When the photos were developed the drugstore clerk called the police.
8. February 29,2000: Mount Morris Township, MI. A 6 year old boy brings a .32
caliber semi auto handgun to school and kills a first grader.
9. March 10, 2000: Savannah, GA. Two students killed by a 19 year old student
while leaving a high school dance.
10. May 11,2000: Prairie Grove, AR. A 13 year old seventh grade student who left
the Prairie Grove Junior High in a fit of rage and a police officer were wounded
after shooting each other in a hay field north of the school.
11. May 18,2000: Millbrae, CA. A 17 year old with a history of threatening other
students with guns was reported to officials by fellow students when he threatened
to do a “Columhine” type shooting.
12. May 26,2000: Lake Worth, FL. A 13 year old sent home from school returned
with a handgun and kills a teacher.
13. September 26, 2000: New Orleans, LA. A student fought with another student,
went home, returned with a gun, and killed the student he fought with earlier.
14. October 24, 2000: Glendale, AZ. A teenager held a teacher and 32 students
hostage for an hour before surrendering.
15. January 10,2001: Oxnard, CA. A 17 year old entered school and took a girl
hostage in an attempt to commit “suicide by cop.” After S.W.A.T. arrived he was
shot dead.
16. January 17,2001: Baltimore, MD. A student was shot and killed in front of Lake
Clifton Eastern High School.
17. February 5,2001: Hoyt, KS. Three students, ages 16, 17, and 18 planned to do a
school shooting. An anonymous caller reported the boys to the police using a tip
line. When the homes of the three were searched police found guns, bombs and
white supremacist drawings.
18. February 7,2001: Fort Collins, CO. A 14 year old and two 15 year olds plot to
“redo Columbine.” Several classmates alerted the police after overhearing them
talking about it.
19. February 11,2001: Palm Harbor, FL. A 14 year built a bomb having a kill radius
of 15 feet. The parents of another student alerted police of the bomber’s plans.
20. February 14,2001: Elmira, NY. A high school student’s plans for a school
shooting were foiled after students brought the fact that he had weapons on him to
the attention of the teacher. He carried 14 pipe bombs, 3 smaller bombs, a
propane tank, a sawed off shotgun, and a .22 caliber pistol into the school by a
duffel bag and also a book bag full of ammunition.
21. March 5,2001: Santee, CA. A 15 year old opens fire from inside a school
bathroom shooting 15 and killing 2.
22. March 7,2001: Twentynine Palms, CA. Two 17 year old boys were arrested after
police were tipped off by another student about a planned attack of their high
school. A search of the boys’ homes revealed a gun in one home and a plan in the
other.
23. March 7,2001: Williamsport, PA. A 14 year old brings his father’s handgun to
school and shoots a classmate in the shoulder.
24. March 22,2001: El Cajon, CA. Three teens and two teachers were wounded at
Granite Hills High School by gunfire.
25. March 30,2001: Gary, IN. A student was shot in the head while waiting for class
to begin.
26. January 15,2002: New York, NY. A teenager wounded two students at Martin
Luther King Jr. High School.
27. October 4,2002: San Antonio, TX. A 13 year old female middle school student
fatally shot herself in the temple with a h a d g u n in the parking lot in front of a
group of friends.
28. November 19,2002: Hoover, AL. Two 17 year old males were reportedly
fighting in a hallway when one student pulled a knife and stabbed the other to
death.
29. November 22,2002: Dallas, TX. A 15 year old male student was shot as he and
fellow students try to wrestle a gun from another 14 year old student.
30. December 12, 2002: Seattle, WA. A 13 year old male fired a rifle in a middle
school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the gun to kill
himself.
31. December 16,2002: Chicago, IL. An 18 year old male high school student was
fatally shot outside of Englewood High School, while trying to protect his sister
from two other male students.
32. January 22,2003: Providence, RI. A 1 2 ‘ ~ grade student was arrested for firing a
.22 caliber gun inside the school’s cafeteria after an assistant principal broke up a
fight.
33. January 27,2003: Cresent, OK. Three eighth grade middle school students were
arrested for allegedly carrying pipe bombs into their school.
34. January 30,2003: St. Paul, MN. A 14 year old middle school student was stabbed
in the shoulder. Two teenage males were arrested for the incident.
35. January 30.2003: Jenks. OK. A 17 vear old male student armed with a 9 mm – .
handgun climbed onto the roof of the school’s gym and threatened suicide. The
student also had pointed the gun at an assistant principal.
36. February 5,2003: Westminster, CO. After several shots being fired in a high
school courtyard, a 14 year old student was taken into custody.
37. March 1 I, 2003: Gilbert, AZ. Six youths were identified by police as plotting to
do a “Columbine-style massacre” at their high school. Police and school officials
found notes and plans for bombs as well as other violent plans.
38. March 17,2003: Guttenberg, IA. A 17 year old walked into his high school
principal’s office to thank the principal for listening to his problems. The boy
then pulled a rifle out of his coat and shot himself in the stomach.
39. March 21,2003: Lawndale, CA. Two teenage high school males were arrested
after police learned of a list the two had with names of students and teachers who
were targets. An unfinished pipe bomb and directions to make the bomb
downloaded from the internet were found in one of their homes.
40. April 1,2003: Washington, DC. A 16 year old male high school student was shot
in the leg during a lunch time argument with another student.
41. April 16,2003: Addison, TX. A 12 year old student committed suicide by
shooting herself in a private school bathroom.
42. April 23,2003: Houston, TX. A 16 year old male student received a 7 inch slash
across the chest in a fight outside his high school during lunch period.
43. April 24,2003: Red Lion, PA. A 14 year old junior high student shot and killed
the principal inside a crowded cafeteria then killed himself with a second gun.
44. May 23,2003: Texas City, TX. A bomb was found in the home of a 16 year old
high school student who had plans to kill the school districts’ chief of police.
45. September 18,2003: Atlanta, GA. A 14 year old Lovejoy High School student
was arrested after police said he planned a “Columbine-style massacre” at his
school.
46. September 24,2003: Cold Spring, MN. One student dead and another injured
after a shooting in the high school. A teacher was able to talk the shooter into
surrendering.
47. August 14,2003: Columbus, GA. A 14 year old girl went back to her middle
school to visit old teachers. A fight broke out behind the school. As a crowd
gathered one of the boys fighting took out a gun and started to shoot. The girl
was killed.
48. August 30,2004: Maywood, IL. A 22 year old waiting to pick up his younger
brother was shot and killed in a high school parking lot in an apparent gang
related crime.
49. September 14,2004: Memphis, TN. A 15 year old male was killed in a gang
initiation “jump in” fight in a school bathroom that got out of hand.
50. October 7,2004: Newburyport, MA. A 15 year old male high school student shot
and killed himself outside of his high school. A result of an argument with a
female student.
51. November 17,2004: Hempstead, NY. A 17 year old was stabbed to death blocks
from school in a lunch time gang related fight.
52. November 22,2004: Philadelphia, PA. An 18 year old former student was shot
and killed as two others were injured in a shooting that occurred outside a high
school.
53. November 24,2004: Valparaiso, IN. A 15 year old wielding 2 knives stabbed 7
classmates. No one died.
54. December 10,2004: Nine Mile Falls, WA. A 16 year old student shoots himself
in the head in the entryway of h ~ s high school. He later died from his wound.
55. March 21, 2005: Red Lake, MN. A 16 year old kills his grandfather and
companion at home, then a teacher, a security guard, 5 other students and himself
at school for a total of 10 dead.
56. August 25, 2006: Essex, VT. A gunman looking for an old girlfriend bursts into
an elementary school and kills a teacher.
57. September 13,2006: Van Nuys, CA. A student is shot and killed in a crosswalk
in front of school in an apparent gang-related crime.
58. September 25, 2006: Las Vegas, NV. After getting off a school bus a student
opened fire at the bus. None of the 34 students on board was injured.
59. September 27, 2006: Bailey, CO. An adult male sexual predator enters a school,
assaults 6 female students, kills a girl trying to flee, then kills self as police make
entry to stop him.
60. September 29,2006: Cazenovia, WI. A 15 year old student, disciplined the day
before, enters school with multiple weapons and shoots the principal.
61. October 2,2006: Nickel Mines, PA. An adult male sexual predator enters a one
room Amish school and kills 6 female students and self.
62. October 9,2006: Joplin, MO. A Columbine copy-cat, a 13 year old male, fires
one round into the ceiling of the school as his gun jams. A teacher talked him into
leaving.
63. October 18,2006: Orlando, FL. In a fight that began in lunch period over a girl, a
15 year old student was stabbed multiple times with a serrated knife. The student
later died.
64. January 3,2007: Tacoma, WA. An 18 year old student shoots 17 students in
hallway of Henry Foss High School
65. October 10,2007: Clevelmd, OH. A 14 year old student at Cleveland High
School shot and injured two students and two teachers before shooting and killing
himself.
66. February 11,2008: Memphis, TN. In a gym class a 17 year old Mitchel High
School student shot and wounded another student.
67. February 12,2008: Oxnard, CA. A 14 year old boy shot a student at Green Junior
High School causing the victim to become brain dead.
(School Violence Resource Center, 2007; Infoplease, 2008)
The researcher assembled Table 1 to highlight what was (and is) happening at
schools all over the country. Cohen and Felson (1979) wrote that several conditions
need to be present for some types of predatory violations to occur. They claim that for a
predatory violation to be successful an offender must possess criminal inclinations and
have the ability to carry out those inclinations, there must be a suitable target, and the
absence of a guardian capable of prevention of the criminal act must also be present
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) continued to assert that the absence
of any one of the conditions described is normally sufficient to prevent predatory
violations. According to Small and Tetrick (2001) students are less likely to be victims
of serious violent and nonfatal crimes at schools than away from them. American
schools are relatively safe places for children to be. Beger (2003) contended that widely
publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have created the public
misconception that such behavior is commonplace. Although there are not deadly violent
acts at schools every day, these examples are an indication of the need for police to be
specially trained to respond to and handle serious assaults and killings on school campus’
around the country. Certain areas are more subject to crime because they have suitable
targets, and offenders subjectively perceive these areas as feasible locations for criminal
acts (Knautt & Roncek, 2007). Columbine became a wake up call for police who need
to be prepared for this type of incident (Associated Press,
1999).
Table 1 does not account for shootings on college campuses. College campuses are
likely to be patrolled by either campus police departments or campus security
departments. Although other police agencies would likely respond to a college campus
during a crisis in a mutual aid capacity, the focus of this research is the municipal police
departments’ preparation. Violent situations, active-shooters, or critical incidents on
college campuses would be an excellent topic of a future study or research project.
Table 2 was assembled to reiterate for the reader that there is no one state in the
United States that is more susceptible than another to host violent events in schools or
private residences. Table 2 shows that events are just as likely in rural, suburban, urban,
wealthy, middle-class, and poor areas of the country.
Table 2
Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table I (April 20, 1999 to
February 2008)
State Freauencv State Frequency State Frequency State Freauency
AL 1 AR 1 AZ 2 C A * 10
CO 4 D.C. **1 FL 3 GA 4
IA 1 IL 2 IN 2 KS 1
LA 1 MA 1 MD 1 MI 2
MN 3 MO 1 NM 1 NV 1
NY 3 ,OH 2 OK 3 PA 4
RI 1 TN 2 TX 5 WA 3
WI 1 VT 1
* The city of Oxnard, CA had two reported incidents
** Washington D.C.
Traditional Police Tactics
Prior to the birth of the S.W.A.T. concept, ordinary police officers handled every
situation. The teams would respond to an incident, gather intelligence, formulate a plan
of action and execute the plan. After the arrival of S.W.A.T., patrol officers were taught
they need not be as aggressive and assume the risk of encountering armed gunmen or
assailants: professionals would handle that type of situation (Borelli, 2005). This became
the new and what is referred to from this time on in this study as the “traditional
response,” in which the policing personnel were to respond and wait.
Police administrators began to advocate the training of patrol officers in a support
role for the specially trained teams. Police began to train for responding to critical
incidents, setting up perimeters and securing the area for the special response. Patrol’s
response edict became to isolate, contain, and negotiate. These methods were used as a
sort of clock-stopping mechanism to buy time for the “specials” to arrive (Baker, 2005).
Present for the Columbine School siege was a School Resource Officer or SRO, a
police officer who is stationed at the school to handle whatever problem that may arise on
campus. Normally, this is the police officer who knows the layout of the school the best
and is most familiar with the school and how to move around in it. While stationed at the
school, this officer should be continuously gathering intelligence about the school, the
teachers, staff, and the students. This intelligence may be used for purpose of detection
and prevention of problems before they arise and deterrence of violent attacks. However,
this officer remained behind cover, safe, while students were still being killed in the
building, rather than to enter and confront the shooters (Kopel, 2006).
The traditional practice of containment of the situation and waiting for S.W.A.T.
to arrive had been in practice since the 1970s. Hostage takers and barricaded suspects
were very adequately handled by securing an area and calling for negotiators to come and
try to resolve the matter. Some events can be controlled by buying extra time and
allowing for reasoning with the aggressor to take place (Scanlon, 2001).
S.W.A.T. tactics are normally slow and deliberate movements made to insure the
safety of the team members. Once a team has made entry into a building or other facility,
members move slowly as a cohesive unit. The team members clear every space they
occupy and pass by before moving on to the next possible threat. The time needed by a
single S.W.A.T. team to clear a building the size of Columbine High School methodically
could be hours. At Columbine, three teams were eventually inserted into the building.
However, if there is an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding andlor killing
people, the first responding officers need to make a rapid assessment of the incident and
make entry to stop the suspect[s] (Scanlon, 2001). The breakdown of the traditional-style
police response at Columbine was that the first arriving officers responded, but then held
and waited for S.W.A.T. The S.W.A.T. team arrived and began its assessment and
eventual entry into the building. This entry was criticized by some as being too slow and
methodical, which is, incidentally, what these teams are known for, slow and methodical
searches (Egan, 1999).
The shooting in Columbine High School was over in 16 minutes, more than
double the average amount of time these types of situations last, which by some estimates
is between 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). The first-entry team entered the building at
approximately 46 minutes after the shooting had begun, or 30 minutes after the killing
had stopped. A review of the incident and its many hazards including the multiple bombs
and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) can certainly justify the type of slow
methodical response that S.W.A.T. used (Marx & Mayhood, 2001). However, to
horrified parents or concerned citizens watching the media coverage, the thought
certainly was that the police should go into the school and save the kids inside.
This slow response by a tactical team would be warranted by the information
police were developing about the numerous explosions that had already gone off inside
the school. They were also receiving information about the location of other explosive
devices planted in and around the school and in cars located in the parking lots. Police
were being told by students who escaped the school that there were as many as eight
gunmen in the building, snipers on the roof and gunmen in the ceilings (Associated Press,
1999).
The rule of thumb in most police circles is that the police cannot help anyone if
they are injured themselves. Had the S.W.A.T. team just rushed into the building they
very well may have been the next set of victims in the massacre. Bombs squads had also
responded and begun to make their own evaluations of the scene.
Police, prior to 1999, had been trained to make assessments, gather information,
set up command posts and make the proper notifications. There was no textbook
response for a situation like this one because this was a relatively new type of incident
(Associated Press, 1999). In this case police were just reacting.
For police to begin to deal with this situation effectively other resources were
needed to be requested to handle various parts of the job. Responding units need updated
and timely information on which location is the safest to respond. Officers need to know
the location of the command post so they will know where to report in once on scene.
The one aspect of this response that was glaringly absent was a determination by
someone, a leader, a supervisor, a ranking officer to give the order to make entry to the
facility and confront the shooter[s] to stop the killing of innocent people. This way of
thinking only came as a result of the Columbine tragedy. In the aftermath, the incident
was reviewed and dissected, and in doing so law enforcement professionals realized that
something needed to happen. These traditional police response tactics had been shown to
be ineffective for the Columbine type of crisis. Tactics that police were using needed to
change, was the conclusion recognized on the federal, state and local levels of law
enforcement.
Legal Mandates for Change
Following highly publicized campus shootings law makers have had to make
school safety more of a priority (Beger, 2003). In the wake of Columbine, the United
States government response to the issue of critical incidents in schools and on college
campuses has been to make grant monies available so that school administrators could
work with law enforcement personnel to implement safety programs (Bethel, 2005).
These anti-violence campaigns are useful in prevention and in the education of students
and educators.
Through the many pages and documents this researcher has reviewed to collect
details for the literature review, most of the literature in professional journals on this
topic was found to be directed toward school preparation and response: The law
enforcement element of this topic was not as widely discussed or researched. There
seems to be a failure to address the issue of the successful resolution of a violent andlor
critical incident in a school or on a college campus. Since the Virginia Tech massacre the
federal government made additional monies available for the training and equipping of
campus police officers to respond to critical incidents on campuses.
In January of 2002 the State of New Jersey passed legislation which created a
School Violence Awareness Week. This legislation was intended to make it known that
it is in the public interest of the state to designate a week in October of each year as
“School Violence Awareness Week” to provide students, parents, school district and law
enforcement personnel with an opportunity to discuss methods to keep schools safe from
violence, to create school safety plans, and to recognize those students in need of help.
In Bergen County, New Jersey a directive (Directive 05-01) was distributed to all
Police Chiefs within the county mandating basic training for all active sworn law
enforcement officers employed therein in a uniform and consistent active-shooter
response. This training was required to be completed by September 1, 2005. Bergen
County distributed a model policy to police agencies, to adopt as their own or modify as
necessary to suit the needs of their respective jurisdiction.
Not until July, 2007, did the State of New Jersey follow suit by mandating that all
police departments have and maintain a policy and procedure for an active-shooter
response. This directive created mandatory training of all police recruits in the topic area
of active-shooter response while recruits are engaged in a police academy training
curriculum (NJ Attorney General Directive 2007-01).
In September, 2007, a report, “K-12 School Security Task Force Report” was
presented to New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine. This report discussed the topic of safer
schools throughout the state and concluded with recommendations for a distribution of
model policies on topic areas such as: active-shooter, bomb threats, lockdown, evacuation
and a public information officer (School Security Task Force, 2007). (As of late 2008,
the researcher has not located the model policies to have been distributed).
Progress is being made in school safety. A U.S. Department of Education survey
found that 96% of public schools required visitors to sign in before entering the school
building (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). According to Garcia (2003) the
good news is that school homicide and violence is down, however the bad news is that
the number of rare multiple victim school shootings had increased in the mid 1990s.
New Police Tactics
Environment is a powerful inhibitor or facilitator of crime and situational
prevention strategies can affect its likelihood of occurrence (Cohen & Felson, 1979;
Weisburd et al., 2006). American schools have had to alter how they do business and
how they protect their students (Harper, 2000).
Active-shooters typically work within a plan they have developed. These plans
arc normally tactically laid out and well developed. These plans typically will include
rmdomly shooting victims, as many as they can, before committing suicide. Not many
of these actors are motivated by “getting out alive” or eventually having their day in
court; suicide is usually a part of the plan (Scanlon, 2001). Time, which had always been
the ally of the responding specialized teams en route to the crisis, is now worlung against
them (Egan, 1999).
The first responding police to the scene of an active-shooter situation are now
responsible for making a rapid assessment of not only all of the previously mentioned
criteria, but now they must decide whether to form up into teams and launch an assault of
their own. This assault goes by many different names. In New Jersey it is called Active-
Shooter Response by law enforcement, in Ohio it is called QUAD or Quick Action
Deployment, in other areas of the country it is known as Immediate Action Rapid
Deployment (IARD). Regardless of the name of the deployment tactics, most are nearly
identical in practice. They all are based upon the first responding police officers to a
scene, equipping themselves and forming up into three or four-person teams. These
teams are sometimes known as ASTs, short for Active-Shooter Teams. The officers or
teams then make an entry into the structure or facility that is under attack and as quickly
as possible find the aggressor[s] and stop them.
These types of tactics are situation-dependant though. They are not the answer to
every situation. If the officers are responding to a hank robbery or to a hostage situation,
these tactics are not appropriate. Police rushing into these types of events may cause
more harm than good. Time has always proven to be an asset when dealing with an event
in the absence of gunfire or killing. That being said, if there is shooting going on or if
people are being assaulted or killed the police have a moral obligation to make entry to
try to save innocent lives (Lloyd, 2000).
The premise behind the new system of tactics is quite simple. After an initial
assessment is made and information is provided to the police that there is an active-
shooter in a building or facility, the police will enter to locate and stop the shooting. This
is done in a rapid but organized manner and with tactics that have been shown to be
effective. The officers will form into three or four-person teams, preferably the latter. If
they have special equipment, they equip themselves as such. Some special equipment
may include: breaching tools (tools used to open doors and windows forcibly), assault
type rifles /long guns, extra gear such as ballistic helmets and tactical vests that carry
extra handcuffs and magazines loaded with ammunition or first aid equipment.
The team leader – whoever in the group is the most tactically minded or the best
thinker under pressure, regardless of rank – will direct the team to the chosen entry point.
In this regard the mission has the greatest chance for success; ability is put before ego
(Giduck, 2005). Safety is always a concern but speed is important. The team will stack
(a single-file formation) prior to entry into the building and perform a quick gear check to
make sure all team members have what they need. The team then enters the site.
Team members each have specific responsibilities. Once inside a structure the
team spreads out into a diamond formation. The front or first person inside is responsible
for all threats that are ahead of the team. The second person or the right side in the
diamond-style formation covers threats to the right of the group. This is typically the
team leader position. The threats may include windows or doors the group will pass.
The left side or third person will cover all threats to the left. The last or fourth person is
responsible for the rear safety, essentially to protect the group from any threat from the
rear and everything the group has already passed. This position is very difficult for two
reasons; this operator is (a) wallung backward and trying to keep up with members of a
team walking forward at a rapid and stressful pace, and (b) is walking blind into battle
with total reliance on other team members to cover their assignments.
One major difference between this type of entry and a S.W.A.T.-type entry is the
rapid movement past un-cleared areas. S.W.A.T. operators are taught to pass areas
they have not checked and cleared. An AST will move past everything until they
encounter, confront, and stop the shooter because they are moving to the sound of the
gunfire, or attack.
What makes this group so effective is that they are constantly moving toward the
actor or shooter. The group is directed either by updated intelligence from the command
structure outside the building or by intelligence they have gathered on their own inside
the building. Intelligence inside the building comes from various sources, such as from
students or teachers or employees running away from the source of violence to save
themselves, or from their own eyes, ears, and observations. Either way, the group’s plan
is to move to the violent actor, confront him, contain him, stop him, arrest him, or engage
him in battle. There are basically three ways these situations end (a) suicide, (b)
surrender, or (c) termination (Borelli, 2005).
Problems with the New Tactics
These tactics may seem simple when explained in lay terms. The police respond,
assess the situation, and enter to stop the shooter. This sounds like an easy sell to police
officers. However, some parts of these tactics are very difficult to train for. The most
difficult aspect of this is to train the responding police officers that they must pass injured
victims and walking wounded: step over or around them if necessary to meet their
objective.
Yes, pass and leave the wounded: walk right past injured teachers and students
alike. The reason behind this unappealing and certainly unorthodox method of rescue is
to put an end to the shooting quickly. The primary way to reduce the number of potential
victims is to neutralize the shooter (Scanlon, 2001). One bright side to the new tactics is
that the team will communicate the location of the injured and any other available
information to the command post outside. The incident commander will decide to form a
rescue team specifically to retrieve the wounded.
If the inserted police officers who make up the ASTs get tied up with evacuation
efforts, with trying to treat and rescue the injured occupants of the building or by
searching rooms prior to passing, precious time is lost and the shooter is creating more
victims (Scanlon, 2001). A school or workplace could house hundreds of potential
victims. An effective use of the first responders is to install them into the area as
“hunters”: they must hunt the aggressor, pass by all others, and focus on their mission to
stop the killing of innocent victims.
Acting as hunters is a difficult concept to train to a group of people who have
sworn to protect the citizens they serve. Most of a municipal police officer’s job is
service-related. Police respond to more medical calls then they do to crimes in progress.
Police are accustomed to rendering first aid in a multitude of situations, from aid calls to
car accidents to slip and falls. Medical treatment would come more naturally to most
police officers than acting in a combat capacity.
The thouglit process behind this seemingly violent transition between police
officer and combatant is that people are dying waiting for you, the responding police
officer, to stop the person[s] doing the killing. To accomplish this, police must act more
like a military unit than a municipal police department. They must train to act fast and
with a maximum level of violence in order to take control of a bad situation therefore
saving lives (Giduck, 2005). Police have to be trained to think of these situations more as
a battle ground than a crime scene (Giduck, 2005). During the heat of battle, the focus
must be to stop the enemy by getting to and engaging the enemy quickly to end the
conflict.
The researcher acts as a trainer of these new tactics in a mid-sized municipal
police agency and along with a partner and co-trainer, identifies those police officers in
that agency who should never join the battle. Those that were identified should sooner be
sent to where nothing violent is occurring rather than risk their incompetence getting
brave police officers, willing to risk their own lives to save others, hurt or killed. These
police officers either lack the requisite skills to be a part of an ad hoc tactical team or just
cannot handle the stresses associated with this type of situation. Before the shooting
starts, is the time to take a realistic inventory of what human and material resources are
available to supervisors who will staff the command posts.
School Resource Officer
Many reports on the choice of a School Resource Officer (SRO) call for a
rigorous selection process for those who will be assigned to the schools. It just so
happens that these police officers are typically the first on scene at a school shooting
incident (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000). These police officers are stationed at area
schools and are positioned to be a vital part of a team inserted into a school. They should
have the best knowledge of the layout of the school and may also be able to identify the
actorlstudent doing the killing when only being provided with a name.
An SRO needs to be able to switch into a combat mode at the drop of the hat
because they have trained hard for this very type of situation. Let the teachers do the
teaching at the schools and have the police do the policing. The job of the SRO should
be to continuously be alert, prevent and react. In the absence of prevention they should
be able to switch gears and react to be the front line in the battle, bringing the battle to the
potential killer, whoever it may be (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).
To provide high quality protection for our children takes training and more
training. The training requires time in the schools practicing for these very types of
events. The training has to include planning for other aspects that go along with critical
incident response, such as setting up perimeters, evacuation routes, staging areas for other
responding services and the like. The agencies that fail to plan for this type of event to
occur in their jurisdictions will have the most difficulty dealing with violence when it
happens. And it could happen anywhere.
One difficulty in training police is that all police executives are not sold on the
costs and benefits of this training. Some police executives have been in policing for
many years. Therefore, it is highly likely that they came into police work with a different
mindset, one devoted to old-style policing where police responded and waited to secure
the area. Justification for spending money on new equipment and training for their police
departments when they had always relied on the local, regional or county S.W.A.T. team
to handle tough situations may be difficult for them. The rationale behind this sentiment
is that S.W.A.T. teams train for critical incidents, so let them handle it. It is their job.
The problem with this mentality is the time that is lost while S.W.A.T. is responding
cannot be reclaimed; as more time goes by more victims are likely to be injured or killed.
As stated in chapter 1, every 15 seconds another victim is shot during an event of this
kind (Tactical Response Staff, 2008) so time cannot be spent waiting.
Research and Theory Related to
Police Administrators
There is an assumption among organization leaders and theorists that structure
influences behavior (Ouchi, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979) action planning
specifies method and time frames for decisions and actions. Perrow (1986) described
rules that govern conditions of work and specify standard processes for carrying out
tasks, will help to ensure that similar situations are handled uniformly. Bolman and Deal
(2003) stated several of their assumptions of the structural frame; organizations: achieve
established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through
specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts
of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure.
Mintzberg’s (1979) theory of action planning is a clear fit for police preparedness
because it accounts for how the job is done rather than specifically relying on the
outcome of the operation. In the type of police operation at the foundation of this study,
there will not always be positive results. Innocent people will lose their lives as police
move to their target. The police may have to pass by injured people on their way to
achieve their action plan. This tactical decision to save more lives by stopping the
shooter rather than to save the lives of the already injured can be applied to the heart of
Mintzberg’s theory. The objective of success is more difficult to measure so it becomes
necessary to assess how the job is done. When innocent people die, it is difficult to call a
mission a success. However, using Mintzberg’s action planning theory as a gauge,
persons in a debriefing session could look at the result of the mission: If lives were saved
by stopping the shooting was the mission a success?
The theory of rules discussed by Perrow (1986) can also be applied to police
training. This theory again allows for interoperability of police departments that
normally do not work together. If all agencies are training in the same tactics then the
likelihood of an operation that is jointly undertaken (interoperability) will be successful
greatly increases.
The theories that are a part of the foundation of the structural frame as discussed
in Bolman and Deal (2003) lend themselves rather neatly to the field of policing. Police
officers work under very structured conditions that are rule oriented. In the field of
policing there is a very clear chain of command and the structure of police departments
and their level of preparation will determine the outcome of the situations they face.
The assumptions described by Bolman and Deal (2003) that people in
organizations achieve established goals and objectives can be applied to police training
because there must be a clear and concise plan established to determine what tactics will
be taught. The assumption concerning increased efficiency and enhanced performance
through specialization and division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2003) applies to police
training for critical-incident response in that specialization and division of labor allows
police to train for specific tasks and excel in their performance. The more successful the
police officer is at their assigned task the more likely the mission will result in success.
To date, most research on school shootings has been conducted by psychologists
who have focused on mental illnesses and problems of the offenders however; little
attention has been paid to the social and cultural contexts of these incidents (Fox &
Harding, 2005). Less attention has been paid to the law enforcement aspect of this
problem. This researcher has found no studies focused on the best method for law
enforcement officers to respond and deal with a school shooting.
School Violence
According to Currie (1985) many theories on juvenile violence were flawed because
they were somehow separate from social policies, inequality, racism, unemployment and
neglect. Currie called the failure to address these other issues the “fallacy of autonomy”
(Currie, 1985, p. 185).
In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stated that low self
control in the pursuit of self interest causes crime. Their assumption is based on
parenting deficiencies for those that are more likely to express themselves defiantly and
in criminality.
Organizational deviance occurs when events that are created by or in
organizations do not conform to an organization’s goals or expectations and produce
unanticipated and harmful outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p273). After a 2 year study,
O’Toole (1999) concluded that no research exists that has identified traits and
characteristics that can reliably distinguish school shooters from other students.
O’Toole’s (1999) study asserted that many studies of school shootings were based
predominantly upon media accounts of the events. These accounts would often be flawed
because the media did not enjoy access to confidential law enforcement and school files
(O’Toole, 1999). O’Toole (1999) identified personality and behavioral traits that many
school shooters possess; although O’Toole stressed that none of the traits should carry
more weight than the other. O’Toole concluded the report with the recommendation that
school and police administrators use threat assessment to thwart possible attacks. A
threat was defined as an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against some
one or something. The threat can be oral, written or symbolic (O’Toole, 1999).
The U.S. Secret Service (2002b) advocates responsible bystander behavior where
students with knowledge of events or threats should inform responsible adults. This
would allow for problems to be addressed before they end in potential school violence.
Coordination and control help to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and
units mesh (Bolman & Deal, 2003). This theory is the premise behind having a unified
response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of
s t ~ c t u r e , police officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively
together.
Fox and Harding (2005) studied organizational deviance as a factor of school
violence. According to Fox and Harding (2005) rampage school shootings fit Vaughan’s
definition of organizational deviance because the violence deviates from formal design
goals and normative standards or expectations.
Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) stated that using routine-activities theory and or a
lifestyle model to study juvenile exposure to violence is a useful tool. In their study, data
from a nationally representative sample demonstrates that routine-activity of lifestyles
that expose juveniles to violence serve as and important risk factor for juveniles
offending violently (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). However, Kurtz and Nofziger (2005)
pointed out that many studies of juvenile violence tend to focus on friends, family and
violent juveniles. The gap in the research appears to be that routine activities or lifestyle
create a situation where the juvenile may be an innocent bystander to violent crime
(Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). Juveniles become at risk because of the violence they witness
rather than the violence in which they are a participant.
According to Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Gottfredson and Payne (2005) recent
attempts to prevent serious violent crime in schools have been focused on identifying the
characteristics of the offenders. The study had been undertaken to try to successfully
identify potential shooters before they act (Gottfredson et al., 2005). A more accurate
way to track school violence is to identify the schools with elevated crime rates and
violent incidents (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The basis for this theory is that prior studies
on school characteristics as predictors of deviant or violent behavior have shown that
community characteristics, school structural characteristics along with variables outside
of the control of school administrators are effective predictors of the level of disorder in
schools (Gottfredson et al, 2005).
Optimistic bias (Chapin & Coleman, 2006; Weinstein, 1980) refers to the
perception that bad things happen to other people. Reduction of optimistic bias in regard
to school violence is an important step in creating an understanding in students’ personal
risks, getting them to take threats seriously and taking self-protective measures (Chapin
& Coleman, 2006). The Chapin and Coleman (2006) study was the first study of
optimistic bias in the context of school violence. Other studies have used optimistic bias
to study violence in the context of violence against women and child abuse (Chapin &
Coleman, 2006). The validity of direct application of results the study may be
questionable in that it was conducted on a small scale in one county in Pennsylvania.
Policy recommendation for both police and school administrators may require the study
to be replicated on a larger scale.
Routine-activities theory (Kautt & Roncek, 2007) revealed that schools can be
criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and
criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors.
Pies (2007) called for a “distant early warning” system of indicators to identify
troubled students. This can only be done when the full resources of doctors, parents,
schools, and communities are combined to reduce the plague of violence in our culture
(Pies, 2007).
This information is equally as important to school administrators as it is to police
administrators that are trying to understand violence in schools. School administrators
can work toward intervention strategies when armed with knowledge of what types of
students have the potential to he violent and from what set of circumstances they come
from. This is not a be all and end all. There is no crystal ball to predict the future acts of
school violence. School administrators can work toward putting measures in place when
they become aware of students that may be in crisis mode as defined by the numerous
theories previously discussed. The true benefit of a mutual knowledge shared by both
police and school administrators is that information can be shared in a symbiotic
relationship to ensure a safer learning environment for all students.
Theoretical Framework
To establish a strong relationship between the number of police officers trained to
provide active-shooter training to other police officers and the frequency of training
police are doing to be better prepared to respond to active-shooter situations in the
schools and the variables that may have an effect on the training, consideration should be
given to theory and research in the field of study. Theories of organizational structures,
goals, and planning are part of the theoretical framework for the present study.
Organizations are designed to achieve established goals and objectives; increase
efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and division of labor; and
coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the
use of structure (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Therefore, when police agencies establish a
structured environment where training, planning and goal setting are stressed the result is
better preparation for
critical incident response.
At the foundation of the present study is the Standardization of Patrol Based
Response to Active-Shooter Situations. In this standardization policy, the appropriate
response strategy involves immediate action and quick deployment by patrol forces to
stop deadly actions of criminal actor[s]. For police to delay deployment under these
circumstances may result in additional death or serious injuries (BCPO, 2005).
Summary
Parents and citizens are entitled to have their police agencies, at the municipal,
county, state and federal levels make adaptations to do more to enhance their quality of
life. To accomplish this, these agencies must work hard to prepare for events that have
become all too common in our society. School violence, work place shootings and
potential terrorist activity on US soil is now more than ever a reality.
School safety training and critical-incident drills have become mandated in New
Jersey and other states. As much as had been done to prevent fire deaths in schools,
needs to be done to prevent death at the hands of a violent adult or student in a school.
With fire sprinklers and alarms in every school, and fire drills and evacuation routes
preplanned, the likelihood of a student dying in a fire in a school in the US is minimal at
best. In fact, no child has died in a fire in the last 25 years in an American school.
However in the school year 2004/2005,48 people were killed at the hands of a violent
aggressor in schools (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).
Training and safety have a long way to go toward prevention of these types of
incidents. In the mean time there has to be more done for police to be able to effectively
minimize the causalities in our nation’s schools. School adrmnistrators are more alert and
aware of potential problem students. Schools are being equipped with surveillance
devices to protect the potential victims contained therein. More needs to be done to
prepare for the most likely threat that may come to those in the building. To prepare for
the violent people who are allowed access to the facility.
This has to come from the police and their stepped up efforts of training and
planning for potential attack. With the initiation of tactics such as active-shooter training
and all of its kind, there needs to be a follow through. This will come at the hands of
forward thinking police executives that realize that there is a need for getting their
officers into schools to become more familiar with the interior layouts of the buildings.
Executives that understand that the officers that are assigned to schools in the capacity of
the SRO, are truly the best qualified to thwart or fend off an attack on the school. Police
executives must understand that the time of setting up and waiting for S.W.A.T. is no
longer an option. They need to realize that all of their police officers must be tactically
trained to be able to make a difference. They need to act in spite of any lack of help by
school administrators.
In 2004, a Columbus, Ohio police officer had stopped a deadly attack at a night
club concert. A gunman had entered the club and killed a band member on stage while
he was performing. An alert police officer trained in QUAD, (the Ohio version of active-
shooter training) entered the night club, encountered the suspect and shot him dead,
stopping the shooter’s deadly assault before any more lives had been taken (Marx &
Mayhood).
In 2005 in Red Lake, Minnesota a 16 year old student killed a grandparent and the
grandparent’s companion. The student went to his high school and shot a teacher, a
security guard, and five other students before killing himself. The Red Lake Police
Department had prepared for an event like this and trained for it at the school. They
relied on their training and made immediate entry into the school (School Violence
Resource Center, 2007). Their response time and school entry was 2 minutes. The police
officers found, confronted, shot, and wounded the violent student who then retreated into
a classroom and killed himself (Freed, 2005). Their training had paid off. Although
innocent lives had been lost, many more people could have been killed without the
immediate response by the police.
These two incidents have shown that rapid police response to a scene and
immediate police action will save lives. Violence can happen anywhere and if the police
have not prepared for it there is the potential for many lives to be lost.
This researcher believes plans need to be developed now for all facets of these
critical incidents. Road closure plans, staging areas, triage locations, debriefing sites,
contact lists and the like. During the mayhem of these encounters there is too much to do
to just wing it. Responses may need to be to a degree scripted to get as much essential
work done with a minimum level of thinking about the various contacts that may need to
be made. If a response plan exists some things on scene can become automatic and more
attention can be focused on other areas of concern that may need more attention.
Chapter I1 has presented a review of pertinent literature, research and theory
which contained; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional
police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new
tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical
framework, and a summary. Chapter 111 will include a description of the design and
methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods,
instrumentation, and a conclusion.
Chapter I11
DESIGN AND METHODS
Purpose
This chapter provides an overview of purpose, design, methods, population,
instrumentation, and conclusion. The purpose for this study was to explore the influence
that the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and
future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response
to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in
schools is mandatory for the children of Bergen County, New Jersey it becomes
imperative that the municipal police departments of the county are able to provide a safe
learning environment while children are in attendance. Bergen County has 68 municipal
police departments that were included as participants in the study. The researcher
obtained a complete list of municipal police departments in Bergen County on the Bergen
County Prosecutor’s Office website, www.bcpo.net, then added the number of police
officers employed by each municipality with information derived from the FBI’s 2006
Uniform Crime Report, New Jersey full-time law enforcement employees (see Appendix
B).
The researcher was guided by the following questions:
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County b rose cut or’s
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)
How have police departments augmented response
capabilities on the topic?
Question
2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model
policy?
Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
Because there is relatively little research in the field of police tactics and only
some theory, most of which is concerned with the psychological characteristics of the
actor[s], the researcher relied heavily on related literature and the descriptions of prior
events. The study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and
only now has begun to be seriously studied and therefore, there is a lack of information
available on police training (O’Brien, 2008a). The importance of this study is based in
the knowledge of “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”
(Santayana, 1905, p. 13).
Design
A survey instrument was assembled to gather information in several topic areas:
descriptive information, personnel, operations, specialized units, emergency preparedness
for Active-Shooter 1 Critical Incident response, equipment, and policies and procedures.
Six of the eight sections of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey
were borrowed with permission (see Appendix C). The survey instrument then
comprised of 58 questions which were assembled to gather descriptive information. A
total of 51 questions were borrowed from the LEMAS survey instrument and 7 original
questions designed by the researcher. Permission was granted via telephonic and email
contact with Dr. Brian Reaves, the lead statistical administrator of the survey for the
Bureau of Justice Statistics. Specifically, Dr. Reaves stated in an email correspondence
that permission was granted to use certain questions from the original LEMAS survey
tool. The original survey instrument was not a copy-written document and was therefore
public domain. However, a request was made from Dr. Reaves that the Bureau of
Justice Statistics not be mentioned in the new survey instrument: a request which was
honored by the researcher.
A pilot study was then conducted to determine face validity of the survey
instrument. Some comments received from the respondents of the pilot study included
that the survey was lengthy and time consuming. See the instrumentation section of this
chapter for more information on the results of the pilot study and specific comments
made by the participants for the revision of the survey instrument.
As a result of the feedback generously provided by the participants of the pilot
study of this project, a total of four questions were used from the original LEMAS survey
instrument. Questions originally designed to gather information about the number of
full time police officers working for a law enforcement agency, total dollar amount in
operating budget of the agency, total dollar amount in seized funds made by the agency,
and total calls for service responded to by the agency. All questions were based on the
2007 calendar year, the last complete year of operation of the agency prior to this study
taking place. After further review of the research tool, the researcher realized the survey
tool distributed in the pilot study gathered a large amount of information that shared little
relevance to this research project. Several of the topic areas previously mentioned were
deleted to comply with the suggestions of the participants of the pilot study.
The remaining eight questions included in the revised survey instrument for this
research project were developed by the researcher in conjunction with a jury of experts.
The final survey instrument used in this study comprised of 11 questions (see Appendix
D). These questions were specifically tailored to provide answers to the guiding
questions of this research project.
The present study is a type 2 design, that Johnson (2001) calls a cross-sectional,
descriptive study. It is cross-sectional because the data are collected from participants at
a single point in time. According to Johnson (2001), if the researcher is describing
phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of phenomenon then the study is
descriptive non-experimental research. The data directly apply to each case at a single
time and comparisons are made across the variables of interest (Johnson, 2001, p. 9).
The present study sought to answer the following questions:
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.
Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of
Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What
factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
This study can be described as a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental
research by the use of the Johnson (2001) descriptions. According to Witte and Witte
(2004) the present study collected qualitative data because when a single observation is a
word or a code that is representative of a class or category, the data are qualitative. Witte
and Witte (2004) also suggest that descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs and
averages can be used to organize and summarize information about a collection of
observations. The researcher proposed to use descriptive statistical methods to address
guiding questions one and two of this project. Through the use of frequency distributions
the researcher addressed the data gathered from the survey instrument to answer the
guiding questions.
To answer guiding question 3 the researcher used the Chi-Squared (@) statistical
method. Analyses were then conducted to determine what relationship the independent
or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn
law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007)
had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to
train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).
Methods
This study relied solely on self reported data by agents of police departments.
According to Kerlinger (1986) “It can even be said that non-experimental research is
more important than experimental research.. .” (p. 359). Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996)
stated causal -comparative methods are the easiest quantitative approach to looking into
cause and effect relationships between phenomena. One of the objectives of this study
was to find which of the independent variables discovered in the survey instrument had
the most effect on the type and frequency of training being done in municipal police
departments of Bergen County. Because all of the 68 municipal police departments in
the county were included in the study it was considered a census. The researcher
proposed to have all 68 of the municipal police departments existing in Bergen County,
NJ participate in the study. A letter asking for permission to send each of the police
agencies a survey was sent to the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. The researcher
received a letter from the prosecutor’s office granting permission to send the survey to
the municipal police agencies (see Appendix C). In the permission letter was a request
for the researcher to share the findings of this project with the prosecutor’s office.
Furthermore, in a follow up phone conversation the researcher had with First Assistant
Prosecutor William Galda, it was made known that this research project stimulated
interest in a topic that had been put aside for a period while other important topics were
being handled. The project sewed as a catalyst for the prosecutor’s office to look into all
the policies that municipal police agencies had submitted since the distribution of the
training memo at the foundation of this study. This leads the researcher to conclude that
prior to any data collection this research project has been a useful tool in reigniting
interest in an area that may have been forgotten.
The rationale for soliciting participation from each of the municipal police
departments in the county is in the similarities and differences of the police departments.
Responses to the survey instrument from police departments of varying staffing levels,
economic prowess, and setting (urban 1 suburban) will paint a more accurate picture of
what training is occurring within the county in the realm of active-shooter response. The
primary objective of this study was to determine what influence the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all
sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in their jurisdictions. Each identified municipal police department in the
county was sent a survey instrument (N=68) along with completion instructions and a
cover letter requesting the Chief of Police, civilian Police Director or their designee
complete and return the survey to the researcher.
The final survey instrument comprised of 11 fact based questions was sent to a
jury of experts in the field. The experts agreed that the survey was easy to understand,
easy to complete, and took very little time to locate the information to answer the
questions. The original questions borrowed from the LEMAS survey come with a
reported 90% reliability estimate as provided by the lead statistician for the survey, Dr.
Reaves of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The LEMAS survey is distributed to police
agencies across the United States every three years and has been determined to be both a
valid and reliable tool.
All information being requested by the survey is accessible to the researcher
through the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), however it is the contention of the
researcher that in the form of a survey instrument the most current and accurate data will
be collected which will make the resulting information more timely and relevant. If the
researcher were to request all information being sought in this study through OPRA the
information gathered may not be the most current as record updating is not a daily
occurrence in governmental agencies, and this process would add a significant amount of
time to the project as well.
Once the voluntary participant police agencies return the surveys to the researcher
a Cronbach’s Alpha test will be conducted to determine a reliability coefficient.
Cronbach’s Alpha is a test reliability technique to provide a unique estimate of the
reliability for a given test (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). This will be reported in more detail in
chapter IV.
Prior to mailing the surveys, they will be coded with a control number known
only to the researcher to track the responses as they are returned. No questions will be
asked to specifically identify any agency based on the responses provided by the
participants. No personal or identifying information will be asked of the person or
representative of the police agency that has completed the survey. This is another layer
of anonymity built in to the present study. All surveys as they are returned to the
researcher will be stored in a locked fire resistant safe in the home of the researcher to
maintain the security of the data. This information will be maintained for a period of no
less than three years. The survey is also completely voluntary in nature. The study was
approved by the Seton Hall University Institutional Review board on
December 17,2008
(see Appendix C).
Population
All of the police agencies used in this study are located in Bergen County, NJ, and
each falls under the direction of the Bergen County Prosecutor’s office jurisdiction.
There are a total of 68 municipal police departments included in the study. Some of the
distinctions of the police agencies are: number of sworn officers, square mileage
patrolled by the agency, equipment, and specialized services available by the agency.
Police departments were approved to participate in this study through a permission letter
approved by the Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli. Police departments were
then sent a cover letter with an explanation of the study and survey instrument to
complete and return to the researcher.
Instrumentation
The LEMAS survey instrument was adapted to the specific needs of this research
project. Wording of selected questions was changed to reflect the timeframe under study.
Section V community policing and section VI emergency preparedness which is specific
to terrorist activity were not used. A new section V with original questions formulated by
the researcher along with a jury of experts in the field of policing, emergency
management, and tactics was substituted to help the researcher answer the guiding
questions of this research project. The researcher developed questions which replaced
the original section V of the study and sent them electronically to Dr. David Klinger of
the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of The University of Missouri – St.
Louis; Dr. Stephen Hoptay, Lieutenant with the New Jersey State Police, Office of
Emergency Management, Special Operations Section; Dr. Daniel Simone, Captain with
the Hohoken (NJ) Police Department; Sergeant David Champerlain of the Modesto (CA)
Police Department, Special Victims Unit; and John Gnagey, Executive Director of the
National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) for feedback. With feedback and expert
advice from the aforementioned experts in the field, questions were developed and
accepted for use in the study.
A pilot study was then conducted on August 1,2008 with the survey instrument in
three municipalities in New Jersey that are in neighhoring counties to Bergen; Morris and
Passaic. In Passaic County the researcher contacted Chief Joseph Borell of the
Bloomingdale Police Department, and Lt. Paul Dring of the Wayne Police Department.
In Morris County the researcher contacted Chief Brian Spring of the Pequannock Police
Department. The aforementioned police departments were selected for the pilot study for
two reasons; (a) they are in neighhoring counties to Bergen, (b) they are a representative
sample of the number of police officers in municipal police departments in Bergen
County. The Bloomingdale Police Department has 16 full-time police officers,
Pequannock has 30, and Wayne has 116. These numbers are very similar to the Bergen
County staffing levels for small, medium and larger sized agencies listed in the 2006 FBI
Uniform Crime Report (FBI, 2006).
Each of these police administrators was provided with the survey instrument and
asked to complete it using the attached directions. They were then asked to contact the
researcher via email as soon as it was completed to provide constructive feedback and
make any necessary revisions or recommendations to make the survey instrument
stronger. The pilot study was conducted from August 1,2008 to August 6,2008.
Chief Borell suggested that the overall appearance of the survey seemed a bit
cluttered and lengthy. Once the Chief began to work on the study, the cluttered feeling
disappeared and the ease of the survey questions became apparent. A comment was
forwarded that the survey seemed a bit too long, with 58 total questions. The Chief stated
the survey instrument was well written and it was clear to the reader what was being
asked. Chief Borell stated the survey took an estimated 45 to 50 minutes to complete.
Chief Borell suggested shortening the survey to include only the information that was
most necessary for the study. With a completion time estimated at approximately 60
minutes, the survey taker may lose interest. Chief Borell made one last comment that was
especially important; the survey should be completed by an agency head. The necessity
of this was born out the type of information being sought, that is budget items, training
hours, and salaries.
Lt. Dring also suggested the survey be completed by a member of the police
department’s administrative staff, in the Lieutenant’s words, “upper command staff’.
The Lieutenant cited some of same the reasons Chief Borell did for this need. Lt. Dring
stated the survey took approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete which was even
longer than the time taken by Chief Borell. This estimation was closer to the latter due to
malung several in-house phone calls to gather information that was not immediately
available to the Lieutenant. Lt. Dring also recommended the survey be shortened to
maintain the interest of the participant.
Chief Spring estimated the completion time for the survey at about 90 minutes.
This was consistent with the prior two responses. Chief Spring did not feel as though any
one question was too difficult to answer, and that they were all very clear in what they
were asking. Chief Spring’s final comment about the questionnaire was that no revisions
were necessary and all of the questions were clear, concise and relevant but the survey
took a substantial amount of time to complete.
The time to complete the survey was estimated at approximately 60 to 90 minutes
by each of the pilot study participants. This was a duration which seemed to be too long
for each of the participants. Each participant in the pilot study did recommend that an
upper level or command staff member such as the Chief or top administrator complete the
survey as they would have the easiest access to the information requested. The result of
the pilot test was that significant revisions were made.
The survey was pared down from 58 questions to 11 in total. The 11 total
questions were those that would specifically be used to answer the guiding questions of
this research project. The new survey instrument was then sent to four new participants
that agreed to answer the survey and provide feedback. The information gathered from
the new participants, all administrative level police officers; was that the survey was well
written, the questions were clear and concise, the survey took about 10 to 15 minutes to
complete, and the survey should not be an imposition on a police administrator to
participate in the study due to the ease of the completion of the survey instrument.
The final survey instrument coded with a control number was mailed along with a
cover letter of explanation, and a self addressed stamped envelope to facilitate a more
likely return mailing of the completed survey to the researcher. The researcher mailed
the surveys on December 18,2008 and asked the participants to return the 1 1 question
survey by January 7,2009. The researcher allowed a third week for any late mailings
before beginning any statistical processes.
By using frequency distributions the researcher will demonstrate to the reader;
how many police departments in Bergen County, NJ had an active-shooter response plan
in effect prior the training mandate established by the county prosecutor’s office, how
many agencies share radio interoperability with neighboring and bordering jurisdictions
since the training mandate, which kinds of equipment purchases were made by police
departments to facilitate forced entry into structures since the mandate, what kind of
training is being done to practice for a future active-shooter event, how many officers
have been trained to instruct other police officers in this type of response tactics, how
often police are training for these kinds of events, how many police departments have
adopted the model policy distributed by the county prosecutor’s office or created their
own policy and why. Then the information collected on the number of sworn police
officers, total budget, total in seized funds, and number of calls for service will be used as
variables in a Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis to see which has the most influence on
the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the
frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in
schools in Bergen County, NJ.
Conclusion
In Chapter 111 the researcher described the design and methods of the study by
discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, and instrumentation. Chapter IV will
present the collected data along with an analysis of the data collected by using frequency
distributions and Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses to determine which variables have
the most influence on Active-Shooter preparation being done by police departments in
Bergen County, NJ.
Chapter IV
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Introduction
The researchers’ purpose for conducting thls non-experimental study was to
investigate the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office Directive 05-01 had
on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County,
New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions.
The investigation was narrowly focused on answering the following guiding questions:
Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding
to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s
Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? @)
How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.
Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of
Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What
factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train
others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police
departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
Collection of Data
Table 1 provides a list of events complied by the researcher that were carried out
or planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack
at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police
response to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to
intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. A review of Table 1 shows the
absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note that “those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore,
similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of
what could happen at any time.
Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the example
which occurred on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX, describes a female actor. Most
attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms;
however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The
events took place in urban, suburban and rural settings across all socio-economic strata.
Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors
in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults.
For this study, a survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of
experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous
flow of back and forth dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts until a
final version was selected. This process was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 111.
This final survey instrument, consisting of 11 questions, was then distributed as a
pilot study for feedback. After the determination that the final 1 1 question survey was to
be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed with permission from the
Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen
County, NJ. The mailings took place on December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of
solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the
researcher by January 7,2009 (see Appendix E). The researcher then allowed for another
7 days for returns to account for the large volume of mail during the holiday season.
In total 68 surveys were mailed on December 18,2008, one to each of the 68
municipal police departments in Bergen County as listed on the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office website, www.bcpo.net. On the January 14,2009 cut off date for
returned surveys, 46 surveys were returned to the researcher resulting in a return rate of
68%. Of the 46 returned surveys, 1 was returned with all of the questions crossed out and
no responses selected with a notation added which read “This causes me concerns on
security issues.” Therefore, all descriptive statistics and analyses are based on 45 returns
(N = 45).
Data and Findings
Descriptive Statistics
Survey question l a was designed to learn if, prior to the September 1,2005
mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office for active-shooter response
training, police agencies had a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event
of an active-shooter in a school. Table 3 indicates that slightly more than half of the
responding police agencies did not have a written plan which specified response actions
to an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a mandate to
either develop their own plan or adopt the response plan as distributed was a step in the
right direction toward getting police departments in the country to plan for this type of
critical incident response.
Table 3
Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor’s Office
Training Mandate of September 1,2005
Response n %
Yes 21 46.7
No 24 53.3
Total 45 (N) 100.
Survey question i b provided information on the number of police departments
(21) that indicated they did have a written response plan, and had a mutual aid or
cooperative agreement between neighboring and or geographically bordering
jurisdictions. Table 4 shows that of the 21 police departments that indicated they already
had a response plan prior to the prosecutor’s office mandate, 18 had an agreement with
neighboring police departments for mutual aid responses. These results showed that
administrators in police departments that did develop a response plan saw the need to
work cooperatively with neighboring departments.
Table 4
Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid
Agreements for Joint Responses
Response n %
Yes 18 86.
No 3 14.
Total 2 1 100.
–
Survey question 2 was developed to find out if respondents had, after the
September 1,2005 training mandate, radio communications interoperability with
geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 5 shows that of the 43 responses to
question number 2,40 police departments did have radio communication interoperability
with geographically bordering jurisdictions. This is another success of the distributed
response model policy. The response model policy created awareness for radio
communications interoperability between agencies that will respond to a crisis together.
Table 5
Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in
Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning
Response n 9%
Yes 40 93.
No 3 7.
Total 43 100.
Survey question 3 was created to find out what types of tactical response gear the
police departments of Bergen County either purchased or acquired since the September 1,
2005 mandate. Table 6 indicates the types of response gear and the number of police
departments reporting they acquired the respective items. The table shows that ballistic
shields and carbine or patrol rifles were acquired more than other response gear items.
Table 6
Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of September 1, 2005 (N = 45)
Gear Item Police Departments that Acquired Gear
n %
Ballistic Helmets 34 76.
Ballistic Shields 42 93.
Battering Rams 19 42.
Bolt Cutters 29 64.
Carbine or Patrol Rifles 36 80.
Hallagan or Pry Bars 32 71.
Sledge Hammers 24 53.
Survey question 4 provided information on the types of training activities the
respondent police departments participated in to prepare their officers better to respond to
an active-shooter event in a school in their jurisdiction. Table 7 displays which types of
training exercises and the number of agencies that participated in those exercises. The
table includes percentages of Bergen County municipal police departments that
participated at least once in each training category (multiple choices were possible). Of
the various types of training listed, 39 police departments (87%) participated in active-
shooter training in empty schools. This training is helpful for familiarization with
response tactics and acclimation to the interior of schools. When police officers become
familiar with the areas they may need to respond to in a crisis situation they may perform
better under stressful conditions in those settings. The number of responses shows that,
on average, responding police departments participated in 2.8 types of training.
Table 7
Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active-
Shooter Training ( N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible.
Type of Training Number of Police Departments
n %
Table TOD 15 33.
~ u l t i – ~ e ‘ p t . Table Top 9
Training in Empty School 39
Training in School wl Actors 24
Multi-Dept. Training in Empty School 26
Multi-Dept. Training in School w/ Actors 15
Survey question 5 was created to learn from the responding police department
administrators, the number of police officers in their agencies who were trained to train
other police officers in active-shooter response. Table 8 reports the frequency
distribution of responses. Question 5 responses were then statistically collapsed into
logical groupings for later statistical analysis. The collapse was done using natural and
logical break
points.
Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response
Number of Officers Trained n %
0 2 4.4
1 1
2.3
2 16 35
.5
3 13 28.8
4 8 17.7
5 2 4.4
6 1 2.3
7 1 2.3
20 1 2.3
Totals 45 (N) 100.
Table 9 displays the recoded data from survey question 5. Data recoding was
done to logically develop the groupings into a low number of officers trained (0-2
officers), a medium number of officers trained (3 officers), and a high number of officers
trained (more than 3 officers) to train other police officers in active-shooter response.
– —
Table 9
Recoded responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to
Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response
Officers Trained n %
Low Number of Officers Trained
(0-2 Officers) 19 42.
Medium Number of Officers Trained
(3 Officers)
Hi& Number of Officers Trained 13 29.
Total 45 (N) 100.
Table 8 shows one outlier police agency that reported 20 police officers trained to
train other police officers, otherwise the scale of responses ranged from 0-7. Of the
45
police department administrators who responded to this question 29 (or 64%) reported
that their agencies had either 2 or 3 officers trained to train other police officers in the
active-shooter response tactics.
Survey question 6 was created to learn how often police administrators, since the
September 1,2005 training mandate, required their police officers to participate in
training for active-shooter response whether it was practice scenarios, table-top exercises
or roll-call discussions. These responses too were reported as frequencies then recoded
and re-reported in statistically collapsed groups for later statistical analyses. These
groups were also created using natural and logical break off points. Table 10 shows the
frequency distribution of responses to the amount of training that is being done for
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As indicated in Table 10, of the 45
police department administrators that answered this survey question, 29 answered that
they required their officers to participate in training either bi-annually or yearly.
Table 10
Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police Departments in Bergen County
Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) %
Monthly
Quarterly
Bi-annually
Yearly
Never
Total 45 (N) 100.
Shown below, Table
1 I
reports the recoded responses from survey question 6
reported in Table 10. These responses were later used for statistical analyses.
Table 1 1.
Recoded responses, Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments
Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) %
Once a Quarter or Monthly
Bi-annually
Once a Year or Never
Total
Survey question 7a provided information on whether or not police departments
had adopted the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) Standardization of Patrol
Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy and the reasons which led to
the adoption. Table 12 lists the responses provided by agencies that did adopt the model
policy.
Reoccurring themes developed from the responses provided for why agencies did
adopt the model policy were either standardization, or having all police officers in the
county being trained in the same tactics. Table 13 displays (question 7h responses) the
reasons police administrators indicated why they did nor elect to implement the BCPO
policy as written.
Table 12
( 7 a ) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting the BCPO Model Policy
R e s ~ o n s e s n
Response checked but no comment added
Added agency specific material
Adopted their policies and created additional policies
All
All officers on same page
Allowed numerous agencies to utilize the response procedures with generic
roles for each officer
Already studied and used
Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) policy was sufficient for our needs
Consistency through out area agencies
Everyone then operates the same
Felt BCPO policy worked best for our agency
Good S.O.P.
Helped develop the plan
It was deemed sufficient and appropriate
It was our intent to remain consistent with the agencies in Bergen County
It was very similar to our original policy and would prevent conflict
Policy fit our needs and was crafted by Bergen County Police Chiefs Association
Policy was a good fit for our department
Presumably much time and effort and input was acquired to make the policy one
of the best possible
Standard through the county
Standardization
Standardization with other agencies we would expect to work with
Standardized policy with contiguous police departments
The model policy allows us to be on same page as surrounding departments
The policy fit our requirements with minor modifications
To best conform with BCPO
To conform to standardized countywide training, realizing mutual aid would be
necessary
To maintain uniformity with surrounding jurisdictions and county police
Took model and modified it to meet needs of our jurisdiction
We have the same training and procedures of the other agencies responding
We will provide the minimum mandated training to comply with the BCPO
directives
Total 32
Table 13
(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy
Responses n
Response checked but no comment listed
BCPO policy allows for 3 person teams, we mandate minimum of 4 person teams
BCPO policy and added National Tactical Officers Assoc. (NTOA) techniques
Created from other agencies models but similar to BCPO policy
Formulated to borough schools, used several parts of BCPO policy
Had a similar policy in place
Had standard NTOA policy in effect prior to BCPO policy
In effect prior to BCPO mandate, covers all relevant training equipment etc.. .
To better our own immediate needs
To conform to the department size and availability
Total 10
Although the responses in Table 13 were provided as reasons why agencies did not adopt
the model policy, most respondents indicated their original policy was as least similar to
the BCPO model policy or they used parts of the model policy to form their own.
Survey question 8 was developed to learn the number of sworn, full-time police
officers in the police departments of Bergen County, NJ. Table 14 shows the number of
sworn police officers and the frequency of agencies reporting that number of personnel.
Table 14
Number and Frequency of Police Oflcers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen
County, NJ.
Police Officers n %
12 2 4.5
13 4 8
.9
15 3 6.7
16 1 2
.2
17 1 2.2
18 5 11.1
20 4 8.9
21 1 2.2
22 5 11.1
24 1 2.2
26 1 2.2
28 1 2.2
3 1 3 6.7
32 2 4.5
37 2 4.5
43 1 2.2
44 1 2.2
45 1 2.2
46 1 2.2
48 1 2.2
50 1 2.2
63 1 2.2
65 1 2.2
109 1 2.2
Total 45 (N) 100.
Table 15 shows the responses listed in Table 14 which were derived from survey
question 8 that have been recoded for statistical analyses. Recoding was done using a
statistical collapse with natural and logical break points to create a grouping system of a
small number of police officers (1-20), medium number (21-30) and large number (31 or
more). Recoded responses were used for later statistical analyses.
Table 15
Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal
Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ.
Number of Police n %
-Number
(1-20 Full-time Police Officers)
Medium Number
(21-30 Full-time Police Officers)
Large Number
(3 1 or More Full-time Police Officers)
Total 45 (N) 100.
Survey question 9 provided information on the (2007) operating budgets in U S
dollars of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. Given that each of the
police departments surveyed listed a different dollar amount, only the recoded data were
reported in the current study. Original data were collapsed into low total operating
budget ($0.00 – $250,000.00), medium total ($250,000.00 – $3,000,000.00), and high
total ($3,000,00 1.00 or more).
Of the 45 responding police administrators 40 (89%) answered survey question 9.
Of the 40 responses, 31 (78%) of the operating budgets were in the low and medium
ranges. This represents almost 78 % of the responses. Only nine of the agencies reported
having a budget in the high range of $3,000,001 .OO or more, representing approximately
22.5 % of the responses. Table 16 shows the recoded data from survey question 9.
Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen
Total Operating Budget
($0.00 to $250,000.00)
Medium Total Operating Budget
($250,001.00 to $3,000,000.00)
H&& Total Operating Budget
($3,000,001.00 or more)
Total 40 100.
* no response n = 5
Survey question 10 was designed to learn the amounts in U.S. dollars that each
municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ reported in asset forfeiture funds in
the year 2007. The year 2007 was selected because it was the last complete year prior to
this study being conducted. Agency administrator who responded to this survey question
listed varying amounts that were specific to their agencies only. For that reason, the
responses were collapsed into manageable categories using natural and logical break
points.
The categories used were low forfeiture program ($0.00 – $200.00), medium
forfeiture program.($201 .OO – $10,000.00) and high forfeiture program ($10,000.00 or
more). Table 17 shows the response to survey question 10. Of the 45 responding
agencies, 4 4 (98%) provided data.
Table 17
Recoded Resuonses: 2007 Forfeiture Proaram. Seized Funds as Reuorted bv Police – ,
Departments in Bergen County, NJ
Forfeiture Category n %
Low Forfeiture Program –
($0.00 – $200.00)
Medium Forfeiture Program
($201.00 – $10,000.00)
H~J& Forfeiture Program
($10,001.00 or more)
Total
Survey question 11 was created to determine the number of calls for service that
each municipal police agency reported they had received or responded to in 2007. For
reporting purposes each of the agencies reported a different total of calls for service.
These numbers were broken into workable categories, again using a statistical collapse
based on natural and logical break off points. These new categories were low annual
service calls (0-10,000), medium annual service calls (10,001-15,000) and high annual
service calls (15,001 or more). Table 18 shows the recoded data only for responses to
survey question 1 1.
Table 18
Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported bv Police Departments in
Service Calls n %
Low Annual Service Calls –
(0- 10,000)
Medium Annual Service Calls
(10,001-15,000)
Annual Service Calls
(15,001 or more)
Total 45 (N) 100.
Reliability Estimates
After the completed surveys were returned to the researcher and the descriptive
statistics were derived from them, a Cronbach’s Alpha test was used to determine a
reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8,9, 10 and 11. The questions
were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem
(2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach’s Alpha
was .75. Cronbacb’s alpha reliability estimate normally ranges between 0 and 1.
Although there actually is no lower limit to the coefficient, the closer Cronbach’s Alpha
coefficient is to 1 .O, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem &
Gliem, 2003).
George and Mallery (2003) provided the following rules of thumb in reference to
Cronbacb’s Alpha scores: “- > .9 -Excellent, – > .8 – Good, – > .7 – Acceptable, – >
.6
– Questionable, – > .5 -Poor, and < .5 -Unacceptable" (p. 231). Thus, for the current
work, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.
Answering Research Question 1
Research question 1 asked how have training efforts changed for police
preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer
learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued
by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers
to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response
capabilities on the topic?
Descriptive statistics reported earlier in this chapter have shown that training
efforts have changed for police preparedness to respond to active-shooter situations in
schools to create safer learning environments since the September 1,2005 training
mandate, in the amount of training required by police department administrators. Of the
45 surveys returned to the researcher with survey question 6 answered, 43 (96%)
indicated that the police agency required training in active-shooter response either
monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or yearly. Only 2 of the 45 reporting agencies responded
that it was never required to train in these response tactics.
Research question l(a) asked how training efforts are exposing officers to realistic
environments. This was answered by survey question 4. Of the 45 responding police
department administrators 39 (87%) indicated that their officers had participated in
training in empty schools. This type of training is realistic as it is places officers into a
real setting and creates familiarity for the police officers for responses during emergency
conditions.
Question l(b) asked how police departments have augmented response
capabilities. Survey question 3 was designed to answer this question. It was learned that
42 of the 45 responding police department administrators indicated that their agency had
purchased ballistic shields to augment their officers’ response to a critical incident of this
sort. Thirty six of the 45 responding agencies reported their agencies had purchased
carbine or patrol rifles to further enhance response capabilities. At a reduced percentage
agencies reported purchasing other equipment items such as; ballistic helmets, battering ,
rams, bolt cutters, Hallagan or pry bars, and sledge hammers.
Answering Research Question 2
Research question 2 was also answered using descriptive statistics. The question
asked why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization
of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? This question was
answered by responses to survey question 7. Reoccurring themes developed from the
responses showed why agencies adopted the model policy: (a) standardization or (b)
having all police officers trained in the same tactics. It is apparent that police department
administrators are aware of the importance of having standard practices that all officers
can be taught. The reality of a critical incident is that neighboring jurisdictions will also
respond to supplement the response capability of the municipality suffering the crisis.
The additional responding officers need to know the same fundamental tactics the
officers in the jurisdiction in crisis know. In this respect police officers from various
municipalities can form ad hoc teams to respond to the crisis appropriately.
Reasons stated for not adopting the model policy as distributed were that police
departments already had a similar policy in place prior to the distribution of the model
policy. Other agencies created similar policies that were more specifically tailored to the
need of their specific jurisdiction. And lastly others stated they used parts of the model
policy to develop their own policy.
Answering Research Question 3
To answer research question 3 the researcher used Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical
analyses to determine which factors account for the variability in the number of police
officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training
being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools (see Appendix
F) .
After recoding all data in the responses to survey questions 8,9, 10, and 11 into
three categories, those responses were independent variables for Chi-square ( ~ 2 )
statistical analyses. The responses to survey questions 5 and 6 were also recoded to
provide the researcher with dependant variables for analysis. According to Witte and
Witte (2004) an independent variable is manipulated by the investigator, and a dependant
variable is measured, counted, or recorded by the investigator.
In the first statistical analysis completed, the number of sworn full time police
officers was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to
train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-square (;O)
statistical analysis results indicated a value of 2.47 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.)
,650
(no statistical significance). In other words, the number of full-time sworn police officers
in a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect
on the number of police officers in the agency that are trained to train other police
officers in active-shooter response tactics.
In the second statistical analysis completed, the total operating budget of a police
department was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained
to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. A Chi-square ( ~ 2 )
statistical analysis indicated a value of 2.72 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,604 (no
statistical significance). Results show that the total operating budget of a municipal
police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number
of police officers trained to train other police
officers in active-shooter response tactics.
In the third statistical analysis completed, the number in U.S. dollars in forfeiture
funds reported from municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ for the year
2007 was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to
train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant
variable. The Chi-square (@) statistical analysis results were statistically significant,
unlike the other two analyses. Results indicated a value of 17.68 (df = 4) and a p value of
(sig.) ,001. In much social science research, statistical significance is indicated at p I .05,
so .001 indicates statistical significance (Witte & Witte, 2004).
It appears that the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset
forfeiture influences the number of police officers the agency has trained to train other
police in active-shooter response tactics: This seized money seems to be used for
additional police training. As is normally the case in asset forfeiture at the municipal
police level, seized money is maintained in an account by the county prosecutor’s office
for approved usage by the municipal police department. This money can be approved by
the county prosecutor’s office to be allocated for items and expenditures outside the
normal operating budget of the agency. Training typically falls under this realm. Based
on this finding one can assume that training in municipal police departments may he paid
for by seized forfeiture funds.
In the fourth statistical analysis completed, the number of annual service calls for
the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the number of police officers
trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a
dependant variable. Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis results indicated a value of ,868
(df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,929 (no statistical significance). The number of calls for
service in 2007 had no effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police
officers in active-shooter response tactics.
In the fifth statistical analysis, the number of sworn full-time police officers was
used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter
tactics was used as the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis
indicated a value of 7.38 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,117 (no statistical significance).
The p value indicated a lack of statistical significance. The number of full-time sworn
police officers had no effect on the amount of required training in active-shooter response
tactics.
In the sixth statistical analysis, the total operating budget of a police department
was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter
tactics was used for the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis
indicated a value of 11.95 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,018 which was statistically
significant. Again, the result of the statistical analysis is showing a relationship between
available money and training. There appears to be a relationship between the total
operating budget and the amount of training being done by police officers in active-
shooter response tactics in Bergen County, NJ.
In the seventh statistical analysis, the amount of dollars reported by the police
agencies in asset forfeiture was used as the independent variable and the amount of
required training in active-shooter tactics used for the dependent variable. The Chi-
Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis indicated a value of 5.36 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,252
(no statistical significance). The statistical analysis showed that there is no relationship
between the amount of dollars in forfeiture funds reported and the amount of required
training in active-shooter response tactics.
In the eighth and final statistical analysis, the number of calls for service reported
for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the amount of required
training in active-shooter response tactics was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-
Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis indicated a value of 8.93 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,063
(no statistical significance). However, the p value being within ,013 of an indication of
statistical significance does warrant some explanation. It appeared that although there is
not a statistically significant relationship between the number of calls for service reported
by police officers and the amount of active-shooter tactics training being required it does
seem that a relationship on some level does exist. The number of calls for service does
seem to have a relationship at some level to the amount of training being done. Busier
police departments are going to be less available to do as much training as those that are
not as busy. If the number of calls for service is greater in one agency, their officers are
needed to respond to calls for service and would be unable to become unavailable to
participate in training.
Summary
In Chapter IV, the researcher used several sections such as an introduction,
collection of data, data and findings, descriptive statistics, reliability, answering research
question 1, answering research question 2, answering research question 3 to present
information. The reported descriptive statistics learned from the survey instrument that
had been distributed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ
presented an interesting look at the types of equipment purchases, training being done
and policy changes made as a result of the distribution of the model policy discussed
throughout.
The researcher also reported on the Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses done to
determine any relationships between the indicated dependant and independent variables
of this study. Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first
was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments
and
the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter
response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the
total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the
amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.
Chapter V will include an introduction, summary of findings, discussion,
conclusions, recommendations for policies and practices, and future study.
Chapter V
INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY O F FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND FUTURE STUDY
Introduction
This study was developed from the personal interest of the researcher in police
tactics to respond to active-shooter situations. In beginning the study, the researcher
determined that the focus would be on municipal police departments of Bergen County,
NJ. In 2008 the researcher was a police supervisor in a municipal police department in
Bergen County and in this capacity was responsible to train other police officers in these
tactics.
The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County
Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations
of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter
situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is
mandatory for the children to age 16 in Bergen County, New Jersey the municipal police
departments of the county must provide a safe learning environment while children are in
attendance.
The researcher sought a suitable survey instrument designed to gather appropriate
information to answer the research questions at the foundation of the study. These
research questions were:
1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to
active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children
since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s
Office (BCPO)? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments?
(b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?
2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy?
3 . What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers
designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being
done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?
The researcher located the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics (USDOJ), Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS) survey instrument. With permission from the USDOJ, the LEMAS survey
instrument was amended and the questions specifically tailored for the needs of the
current study. A revised survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of
experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous
flow of dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts. The survey instrument
consisted of 11 questions and was redistributed as a pilot study for feedback, as was
reported in chapter 111 in greater detail. After the determination that the final 11 question
survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed to all of the
municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailing took place on
December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the
voluntary participants return the survey to the researcher by January 7,2009. Through
the use of the survey the guiding questions were then answered in chapter IV.
Summary of Findings
The descriptive statistics from the present study developed a picture of what has
been done by police agencies in Bergen County to prepare for an active-shooter event in
a school. Prior to the distribution of the model policy more than 50% of the police
departments in Bergen County did not have any type of plan in effect for dealing with
this type of crisis in a school. This policy then forced the remaining police agencies to
either adopt the distributed model policy or develop their own plan for implementation.
Through this study it was also learned that 86% of the agencies that already had
response plans prior to the distribution of the model policy, had also included a mutual
aid plan to get assistance from neighboring jurisdictions when the crisis occurred. This is
a clear example of forward thinking on the part of the administrators.
In addition, the respondent police agencies also understood the importance of
radio communications interoperability with the neighboring jurisdictions. This was
evidenced by 93% of the police departments creating radio communications
interoperability with neighboring agencies as a result of the distributed model policy.
This allows for multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another on the same radio
frequency to provide for faster and more direct radio communications.
This study shed light on the types of equipment police departments made as a
result of the model policy distribution. It was indicated that 93% of the agencies that
responded reported purchasing ballistic shields, 80% purchased carbine or patrol rifles,
and 76% reported purchasing ballistic helmets.
As for training, 87% of the police departments reported training in empty schools
in their jurisdictions. This creates familiarization with the interior and exterior of the
schools which could make the difference of saving a life during a crisis situation.
Sadly, only 20% of the police departments reported training as being mandatory
on a quarterly basis, 22.2% on a bi-annual basis, and still only 42% required training on a
yearly basis. This is simply not enough to get good at tactics. At best once or twice a
year can only help to refresh your tactics. It is hardly enough to make improvements and
become skilled in what is being taught and trained.
A Cronbach’s Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for
responses to survey questions 8 , 9 , 10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform
the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item
reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach’s Alpha was .75. For the
current study, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.
The following relationships were determined to be lacking statistical significance:
(a) the number of sworn full time police officers as an independent variable and the
number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,
(b) the total operating budget of a police department as an independent variable and the
number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,
(c) the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 as the independent variable and
the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter
response tactics as a dependant variable, (d) the number of sworn full-time police
officers as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter
tactics as the dependent variable, (e) the amount of dollars reported by the police
agencies in asset forfeiture as the independent variable and the amount of required
training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, and (f) the number of calls for
service reported for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the amount of required
training in active-shooter response tactics as the dependant variable.
The present study also determined two statistically significant findings. The first
of these findings was the relationship between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by
municipal police departments in 2007 and the number of police officers trained to train
other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Based on results from this
research, the more seizure funds available to police department administrators the more
police officers in their agencies are being trained to train the other police officers in their
respective police departments in active-shooter response tactics.
The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total
operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount
of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. Both findings indicate that there
is a direct relationship between available finances and training of police officers in
active-shooter response tactics. Simply put, police departments with larger budgets and
more available money are training more often than agencies with smaller budgets and
less money available. Therefore the assumption can be made that the more money
allocated toward training will better prepare police officers to be able to respond to and
effectively deal with an active-shooter situation in a school.
Discussion
If Ouchi (1977) is correct in the assumption that structure influences behavior, the
conclusion can be made that more training designed to train police officers to respond to
active-shooter situations will create better prepared police. Mintzberg’s (1979) theory of
action planning accounts for how a job is done rather than specifically relying on the
outcome of the operation. With this theory in mind the assertion can be made that when
more police officers are designated to train others in essential response tactics then the
responding police should be more likely to he successful in the completion of their
mission, which is to save lives.
Scanlon (2001) described the premise of an active-shooter, who is seriously
wounding andlor killing people, and the need for the first responding officers to make a
rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s]. This ability to
rapidly assess and form an ad hoc team is essential to properly ending these types of
crisis situations. However, police departments in Bergen County are not devoting enough
time, energy and resources to training toward this end and if the time comes when the
tactics are needed there will be a break down in their capability to bring the situation to a
quick resolution. There needs to be more frequent training.
Giduck (2005) recommended that police try to change their rnindset from police
officer dealing with a crime scene to a military unit dealing with a battlefield. If 42% of
police departments are training but once a year in the necessary skills and tactics it would
likely be an impossible task to effectively train to appropriately handle these situations as
they may arise. Training once a year serves the officers more as a reminder of tactics
rather than a training of learned skills. Training is a repetitive process where skills are
ingrained through repetition, practice, critique, and correction. Once a year is simply not
enough for officers to become efficient in the necessary skills they will need to possess to
work safely and swiftly to bring a conflict of this nature to an end.
Lloyd (2000) called it a moral obligation for police to make entry and intervene in
an ongoing active-shooter situation. The purchases described in this study of tactical and
entry equipment displays the commitment of Bergen County Police Departments toward
this end. The entry equipment purchased offers the police the ability to make a forced
entry to breach any location to quickly gain access and begin their mission. The tactical
equipment is a testament to properly equipping the officers that will most certainly be
placed in harms way to complete their mission. Although there is no specific
recommendation on equipment purchases the more tools at the disposal of the police
officers the easier it will be to do their job.
Coordination and control as presented by Bolman and Deal (2003) helps to ensure
that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh. This theory is the premise behind
having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents.
Through the use of structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work
safely and effectively together. This goal is met by the establishment of the
Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy
distributed by the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office. It seemed to be a priority of the
police administrators when they indicated reasons why they adopted the model policy,
that all police officers are aware of the same basic tactics. The reality is that multiple
jurisdictions will respond to the same scene to assist in bringing the crisis to a resolution.
This can be done by training all police officers who may respond in the same tactics so
each can work with any other.
Conclusions
It seems clear to the researcher that the police administrators that provided
answers to the distributed survey questionnaire at the foundation of this study are quite
aware of what needs to be done in the event of an active-shooter situation in a school of
their jurisdiction. What seems to be lost is that these tactics when initially trained are
perishable skills, and like anything else that is taught, it will go away when not properly
reinforced. What is lacking in Bergen County is the correct measure of reinforcement of
the tactics. Police officers are simply not training enough to become really prepared and
efficient at the necessary skill sets to tackle the situations which have formed the basis of
this study.
Numerous documents have been written based on research conducted on who
commits these violent acts in our nation’s schools. Klein (2005) asserted that popular
discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role
gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was
ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys’ own stated reasons for this
violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein,
2005). This researcher has found that aside from a rare exception or two, predominately
young white males from the ages 11 – 18 years old, mostly loners and with relatively
easy access to firearms are the perpetrators (Scanlon, 2001). With the type of
information collected by agencies like the FBI in their July, 1999 paper entitled “The
school shooter: a threat assessment perspective” (O’Toole, 1999) and the International
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in their “Guide for Preventing and Responding to
School Violence” retrieved from the IACP website in February 2007 (Kramen, Massey,
& Timm, 1999), school officials have been preparing for violent students, with the
assistance of their law enforcement partners. Identification of the potential offenders is
the first step toward limiting this kind of behavior in the future. Prevention can come
from close partnerships between law enforcement and schools in early detection of
potential assaults as well as in sharing information about those identified as having the
potential to be involved in this behavior. Sending better prepared police to respond to
these crisis situations in the schools is a direct result of the amount of money that is being
allotted for training. ‘
For law enforcement personnel to take their tactics to the next level, they must
begin now to prepare for future acts of school violence and/or terrorism. As a result of
this research project the researcher now knows that the amount of funds allocated toward
training is going to make the difference in sending better prepared police officers into a
potential battle. No one thought it would have been possible for the acts of September
11,2001 to have been perpetrated against the US, on US soil. After the events of
911 112001 occurred, the law enforcement community was left with the realization that the
US was no longer immune from the acts of violence the rest of the world has had to
endure for centuries. Future acts of active shooting in schools and terrorism are a reality
and police officers must be prepared to face them.
Just as the law enforcement community has learned lessons from the Columbine
High School tragedy, so too have the next wave of potential attackers and terrorists been
planning their next attack. Through after action investigations, it is known that school
attackers and terrorists study police responses and know all about tactics the likes of
active-shooter, QUAD, and IARD that have been discussed herein. US law enforcement
must begin now to prepare for potential attacks by active-shooters and terrorists on our
most precious targets, our children (Giduck, 2005). What could make American citizens
feel more vulnerable than an attack at a school? Persons in other countries have been
dealing with this reality for years and are prepared to handle situations like this at a
school. Countries like Israel have placed armed guards on every school bus and in every
school. School buses are armored to minimize potential injuries from an attack. School
campuses are fortified territory (Giduck, 2005). Short of having armed guards on
armored school buses and inside schools, more must be done to train police in response
tactics. To accomplish this goal more money must be directed toward the training of
tactics like those proposed in the Standardization of Patrol Based Response for Active-
Shooter Situations.
Law enforcement policy makers need also to begin cooperative efforts with
military units for training in handling battlefield type conflict, much like they would be
facing in a terrorist attack on a school. Terrorism experts like Giduck who authored
“Terror at Beslan” (2005) conclude that the terrorists will attack the US again. It is also
likely that a potential target will be an unsuspecting school. The terrorists are not at all
like the loner child who brings a gun to school. They come with tested and rehearsed
battle plans, reinforcements, surveillance and counter surveillance measures in place
(Giduck, 2005).
The terrorist’s goal is not to he arrested or contained; it is to kill as many victims
and police responders as possible to gain notoriety for their cause (Giduck, 2005). Our
future is now: Policing in the US must adapt now for the threats of the future which will
most certainly be at the hands of terrorists who will, like they have in the past, attack
when and where we are least expecting them to. That certainly could be a school. Law
enforcement personnel need to make more adaptations to their training now to be able to
respond to an event they will face (Giduck, 2005). With one hurdle cleared the next one
is right in front of us.
Recommendations for Policies and Practices
Since police officers may face the need to respond to a critical incident (active-
shooter situation) in the schools of their jurisdictions, the responsibility for training in
response tactics becomes increasingly paramount. In that respect all responding police
officers to an active-shooter situation, must at least be aware of the same tactics. In
Bergen County, NJ this topic was addressed in 2005 when the prosecutor’s office
distributed a memo requiring a unified and consistent active-shooter response.
However, this researcher believes that more needs to be done than just blanket
familiarization with a response policy. As was discovered in this research there is
disparity in the amount and type of training being done. Not enough training is taking
place to respond effectively to an active-shooter situation. More training needs to
become the rule rather than the exception. If not enough training is being conducted, the
training and interest will not be sustained. When times get really tough, in a critical
situation the natural tendency is to revert to the original process of how things were done
in the past (Palazzolo, 2009). Here, how thing3 were done in the past simply will not be
enough to save lives effectively.
Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy
and some situations only now have begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of
information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O’Brien, 2008a).
The researcher located no research to determine what the best tactics are to respond to
active-shooters in schools and the science of the study police tactics. Since no data are
available to study to make a truly scientific determination to apply to policy the advice of
the experts like Giduck must be followed. More training is certainly necessary to provide
the community with a prepared and capable police department.
Based on the findings of this study more money and effort needs to be directed
toward training budgets. Police departments with more funds available are doing more
training. Since the critical incidents that may present themselves are not specific to
jurisdictions with sufficient training budgets, funds must come from somewhere to
prepare police to respond to crisis situations. If police departments are unable to fund
their own training, a county-wide or state-wide training program should be available to
police departments for continuous training.
The Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office should establish and maintain a county-
wide training division. One responsibility for this training division should be providing
standard and mandatory continuing training to the police in the county in mutual aid and
critical incident responses. The training should be provided at not cost to the local police
departments of the county to ensure cost to the agency is not preventing officers from
being trained in the most current tactics available.
Future Study
Numerous research projects and studies have been conducted on the topic of
school violence prevention. But what happens when it happens? What about when the
prevention efforts are not effective to stop the violence before it happens? There needs to
be research on the best practices of police response tactics to school shooter situations.
Special attention needs to be paid to the evolution of tactics and how they are changing
based on prior responses and the successfulness of the police operations in those
incidents. To accomplish this S.W.A.T. tactics should be studied to determine which, is
the best fit to adapt to train to patrol officers.
More research needs to be done in the topic area of police training and the amount
of funds required for that training to be successful. A comprehensive study needs to be
conducted to determine the dollar amount that needs to be allocated per police officer to
allow for similarly trained police in effective tactics. An in depth study should be
focused on tactical equipment and which pieces are best for police to use during crisis
situations.
There should be future studies done to determine what police officers in other
counties in New Jersey are doing to prepare for these types of situations they may face in
schools. There should also be a study done to compare what is being done from state to
state and as a result try to determine which training is the most cost effective, the most
beneficial and which fits best for patrol officers.
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Appendix A
BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE
To: All Bergen Cwnty ChiPC(
From: Prostcuror Joha L. Mobad
SmbJe: Dirarthr W01 Active Shooter PnEey ln*irtive
n k DLccrivr shall .)so serve to acknowledge tbe b u d work and effort tk3Lumll
Aid and Special Opaadorfl Committee, Tralnlng and Education C m m h c of tat Be-
Coruty P o k e Chiefs’ AoralmUaa, wboae work w*a iwfrumcntrf in t h ~ fam~xlatloa of rhfr
polin;
cc: CblCf M k b U l MWdrgt
Btm Aasirtant Prw~rsculor Wllhm J. Gads
ExccatCve AI~irtaot Prouccuior Frank Pucdo
Appendix B
List of 68 Bergen County Municipal Police Departments
Agency Number of officers Agency Number of officers
Allendale
Alpine
Bergenfield
Bogota
Carlstadt
Cliffside Park
Closter
Cresskill
Demarest
Dumont
East Rutherford
Edgewater
Elmwood Park
Emerson
Englewood
Englewood Cliffs
Fair Lawn
Fairview
Fort Lee
Franklin Lakes
Garfield
Glen Rock
Hackensack
Harrington Park
Hasbrouck Heights
Haworth
Hillsdale
Ho-Ho-Kus
Leonia
Little Ferry
Lodi
Lyndhurst
Mahwah
Maywood
Midland Park
~ o n t v i l e
Moonachie
New Milford
North Arlington
Northvale
Nonvood
Oakland
Old Tappan
Oradell
Palisades Park
Paramus
Park Ridge
Ramsey
Ridgefield
Ridgefield Park
Ridgewood
River Edge
River Vale
Rochelle Park
Rutherford
Saddle Brook
Saddle River
South Hackensack
Teaneck
Tenafly
Upper Saddle River
Waldwick
Wallington
Washington Township
Westwood
Wood-Ridge
Woodcliff Lake
Wyckoff
Appendix C
Jell’Ditm
1 ! 7 Knolls Road
Dear Mr. Dino:
‘The purpose of this letter is to p n t you p m i s s i o n to use o limited numbcr of questk
from the BJS Law Enforcement Maaagement and Administrative Slatistics (I FMAS)
survey qwauonuairr firr your study of policc dcpenments in Bcrgsn County. Ncw Jer
This pwnissinn is yranlcd fnr the purposcs of rile R q e n Cuunty data collectiuu only
and any future &la cullecrions basal un thz I.EMAS survcy instnrrnenl will also requ
a request to BJS for permission lo use the I.EMAS questions. If any l i i h c r infnrmali
is needed reganling this letter ol’prtuiasion, please contact me by email at
.-%tiru~.reave%Nsdqj.~;-or by phone at 202-616-3287.
1 EMAS Program hfanagcr
Bureau of histice Statislics
I1.S. Damanem of Jumice
September l5.20U8
John L. Molinelli. Prnsecutor
k r y e n County P m s ~ u t o r ‘ s O l l i ~
10 Main Skeet
Ilackensack, SJ 07601
Dear Prosecutor Molinelli.
My name i s Jeiftcy D i m I mn a 1 ; year veteran Police w e a n 1 with thc
Mahwah Police Deportment. I .m alsn a &xlciral d d a t c a1 Seton H ~ l l IInivmiQ’. 1
nm paporing my dissertation on police p ~ p a n u l n c s s to rcspond to active shooter
situntions in schwls 01’Uergen County, N. Thc dissertation is focl~wd on how thc
municipl pulice duparuncnts of Hergen County are preparing to respond lo an activc
shouler situation siucc tlw distribution of your directive marked 05-01 Actiw Shootcr
Policy Initintive.
The p w p c of this ietkr is lo rqucsl your pcnnission for me tn send each of the
68 municipal police agcncics of Bergen County n copy of a survey qurstio& lo ask
hem lo complclc and rcturn tn me. The s w e y contains q w l i o n u borrowed hm the
L.sw Enfnrcemcnt Management and ~Uminislrruivr Statistics survey and qucstion~ thmt
were prepared with the a s s i s t w e of a jury ol’cxprts in the fields of policing police
tactics. and emergency mamgemenl.
I’hiu rlscarch study has k e n approved by Seton I I d University. All information
gatherd will be kept strictly confidential and no identifying characteristics of any ngency
will be asked for or d i s s e m i ~ t c d .
I ~vould like lo lake 1h1s opportunity to thank you for my and dl considwdliun
you give this request. If h r c arc any questions I can he c n n k k d mytine at 973650-
IlZh5.
L M O I I N ~ U I
Cuvnh Promulor Office of the County Prosecutor
County of Bergen
HACKENSACK. NEW JERSEY 07601 Jolw L. Hmwh UI
(201) 646-1300 Tnsl L h ~ t
Joseph Macellam
Chmt orlktallvn
October 8.2008
Mr. J e f h y Din0
1 17 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403
Re: Active Shooter Preparedness Survey
Dear Mr. Dino,
In regard to your request to send a questionnaire to the municipal police departments in
Bergen County to assess how the departments are prepared to respond to an active shooter
situation. that request, and the form proposed by you are approved. It is my understanding that
you are sending out this questionnaire in furtherance of your doctoral degree at Seton Hall
University. This office approves of the questionnaire that you wish to use, and also is interested
in the results that will flow from the responses that you receive. Please provide this office with a
summary of your tindings, if possible. I commend you on yow choice of topic, and wish you
much success in your efforts to achieve your doctoral degree. If at any time I, or this office, can
be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me at 201 -226-5104.
William J. Galda
First Assistant Prosecutor
REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH, DEMONSTRATION OR
RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
PROJECT TITLE: A ShdV in Police hemredness to Resoond to Active Shooter Situations to
Provide a Safer Lea& Environment in tbe Schools of Bernen Countv. New Jmev.
Dr. C n a b millerr f h G ,Lh& L 1011W
RESEARCHER’S ADVISOR ORDEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR DATE
1Please pint or type out name below -lurê
DIRECTOR. 0
SETON W UNlVERSlN INSTINTICt+U
R M E W BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH
Jefiky Dino
117 Knolls Road
Bloomingdale, NJ 07403
December 17,2008
Dear Mr. Dino,
The Seton Hall University lnstitutional Review Board has reviewed the information you
have submitted addressing the concerns for your proposal entitled “A Study in Police
Preparedness to Report to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning
Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey”. Your research protocol is
hereby approved as revlsed thmugh expedited review. The 1RB reserves the right to
recall the proposal at any time for full review.
Enclosed for your records are the signed Request for Approval form, and the stamped
Letter of Solicitation. Make copies only of this stamped letter.
The Institutional Review Board approval of your research is valid for a one-year period
from the date of this letter. Durina this time. any changes to the research ~rotocol must
be reviewed and a~oroved hv the IRB ~ r i o r to their imdementation.
Accodmg to federal regulations, continuing review of already approved research is
mandated to take place at least 12 months after this initial approval. You will receive
communication from the TRB Office for this several months before the anniversary date
of your initial approval.
Thank you for your cooperation.
I n harmony with federal regulations. none of the investigators or research stoffinvolved
in the study rookpurr in thejinol decision
Sincerely,
~rciessor
Director, Institutional Review Board
cc: Dr. Charles Achilles
Appendix D
3. S h c c 11. S r p ~ m k r 1. am I n i m i . ~ m w h t e . did your a p c y
pu.rh.St a, .quire .my d,k 101kri.g lym dtm*.l rownw gar?
Man ,.la11 l h a t q p l )
– Raills<,r hclmca
: H d h c ,hicids
I I. Emer the tof.1 mmmkr a l r d b far umkr rccciwd by your
sgemcy duri.8 XW7. lrdsls arc not nrallshlr. prorldc an ~sllmalr
nnd mark ,. I *r. mr huhu
Appendix E
SETON HALL
I . B .
UNIVERSITY
December 18,2CfJ8
Dear Chief,
MY name is Jefiev Dino and I am a Sergeant of Police with the Mahwah Police
~ e p a r t m e i t . I am also a doctoral candidate a dissertation at Seton Hall
University. My study is on Active Shooter preparedness by municipal police
denanments in Bemen Countv. NJ. The ournose of this letter is to ask for Your assistance – . . . .
with this project.
My request is for you to please spare a few minutes out of your day to complete
the attached survey and mail it back to me by January 7,2008. The survey contains 11
questions that should not take very much of your time. I can assure you that no part of
this survev will be seen bv anvone other than me and mv dissertation committee.
~ i c r the dam 1s c o ~ ~ ~ ~ c d from all panwpantr & I 68 munlctpal police
depanmcnts in Bcrgen Counlyl. the surveys wlll be stored in a locked fire res~slant box in
my home for three years as iscustomary in doctoral research. Further, all surveys will be
coded with a control number and your agency name will not appear anywhere on the
survey. These layers of security are to ensure your anonmitv and reassure vou that vour . .
answers to the questions in the survey will be kept private and confidential.
After you complete the survey, please mail it back to me using the self addressed
stamped envelope provided with the survey.
.
This shldy has been approved by Seton Hall University’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB) and bv the Berren CountvProsecutors Office. If vou have anv auestions – . .
about the survey or about any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at
973-650-0565 or my mentor Dr. Charles Achilles 973-761-9668. If you have any
questions about subject’s rights in this research please contact Dr. ~ ” z i c k a at the-RB at
973-313-6314.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation in my academic endeavor.
Respectfully
A, 11
Jeffrey T. Dino
Seton Hall UnhremHy
InsliMional Review Board
3EC 17 2008 M Date
OEC 17 mrJ
Approval Date
Appendix F
Crosstabs
Crosstab
Case Processing Summary
Medium
Low Number Number of
of Trained Trained
Officers in Officers in
Active Shooter Active Shooter
Q8R ‘
Q5R
Q9R ” Q5R
Q10R Q5R
Q l l R ‘ Q 5 R
Response (0 – Response (3
2 Officers) Officers)
28R Small Organization (1 – Count I 9 1 5
20 ~ull-time Authorized ~ ~ ~ t ~ d count I 5.8 Positions) % of Total 20.0% 11.1%
Cases
Std. Residual I .2 ( -3
Medium Oraanization Count I 5 1 3 –
(21-30 Full-time Expected Count 3.8 2.6
Authorized Positions) % of Total 11.1% 6.7%
Std. Residual .6 .2 ~ ~ ~-
Large Organization Count 5 5
(More than 30 Full-time ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ d count 6.8 4.6
Authorized Positions)
% of Total
11.1% 11.1%
Total Valid
Std. Residual -.7 .2
rota1 Count 19 13
Expected Count 19.0 13.0
9h of Total 42.2%
28.9%
Missing
N
68
68
68
68
N
45
40
44
45
High Number
of Trained
Officers in
4ct1ve Shooter
Response
(More than 3
Officers)
6
5.8
13.3%
.1
1
2.6
2.2%
-1.0
6
4.6
13.3%
.6
13
13.0
28.9%
N
23
28
24
23
Percent
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Percent
66.2%
58.8%
64.7%
66.2%
Total
20
20.0
44.4%
9
9.0
20.0%
16
16.0
35.6%
45
45.0
100.0%
Percent
33.8%
41.2%
35.3%
33.8%
I N of Valid Cases I 45 1 1
Chi-square Tests
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.60.
Low Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse 10 –
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
,650
,600
,490
Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
2 Office;)
29R Low Total Operating Count 11
Budget ($0 – $250,000) Expected Count 8.6
% of Total 2
7.5%
Std. Residual I .8
MediumTotal O~erating Count I 4
Value
2.473a
2.753
,475
Budget (5250bol – Expected Count 5.4
$3,000,000) % of Total 10.0%
Std. Residual -.6
High Total Operating Count 3
Budget (More than Expected Count 4.1
$3,000,000) % of Total
7.5%
df
4
4
1
Std. Residual
rota1 Count
Expected Count 18.0
% of Total 45.0%
Medium
Number of
Trained
Officers in
Wive Shooter
Response (3
Officers)
5
5.7
12.5%
-.3
4
3.6
10.0%
.2
3
2.7
7.5%
.2
12
12.0
30.0%
High Number
of Trained
Officers in
4C1ive Shooter
Response
(More than 3
Officers)
3
4.8
7.5%
-.8
4
3.0
10.0%
.6
3
2.3
7.5%
.5
10
10.0
25.0%
Total
19
19.0
47.5%
12
12.0
30.0%
9
9.0
22.5%
40
40.0
100.0%
Chi-square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
,604
Likelihood Ratio I 2.777 Linear-by-Linear Association 2.086
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.25.
df
4 ‘ Pearson Chi-square
N of Valid Cases I 40
Value
2.729″
4
1
I
. I 4 9
596 I
Crosstab
Q5R
%if Total I 22.7% 1 4.5% 1 11.4%
Low Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse 10 –
I 2 officers) I &cers) I officers)
Medium
Number of
Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse (3
210R Low Forfeiture Program – Count
2007 ($0 – $200) Expected Count
Std. Residual 1 .O
High Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Response
(More than 3
2
5.0
10
7.3
Program – 2007 ($201 – Expected Count
$10,000) %of Total
Std. Residual
High Forfeiture Program – Count
2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count
% of Total
Expected Count I 19’0 I 12.0 %of Total 43.2% 29.5% 27.3%
5
4.6
Medium Forfeiture count I 4 1 9 1 0
-1.3
Std. Residual -.4 -1 .I
Total
17
17.0
38.6%
–
13
13.0
29.5%
–
14
14.0
31 .8%
–
44
44.0
100.0% –
.2
5.6
9.1%
– .7
5
6.0
11.4%
1.6
rotai count I 19 1 13 1 12
3.8
20.5%
2.6
2
4.1
4.5%
3.5
.O%
–
1.9
7
3.8
15.9%
Chi-square Tests
I I I ~ s y m p . Sig. I
I value I df I (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-square 1 17.685a 1 4 ( ,001
Likelihood Ratio 1 19.551 1 4 1 ,001 I
Linear-by-Linear
Association ( 1 . 1 1 1 5 9 1
Q11R * QSR
N of Valid Cases I 44
Crosstab
I
I
Low Number
of Trained
Officers in
Active Shooter
Res~onse 10 –
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 3.55.
1 2 office&)
31 I R Low Annual Service count 10
Calls – 2007 ( 0 – 10,000) Ex~ected Count 8.9
%of Total I
22.2%
Std. Residual
Medium Annual Service Count
Calls – 2007 (10,001 – Expected Count
15,000) % of Total 8.9%
Std. Residual 1 -5
Hiah Annual Service count I 5
~ a i i s – 2007 ( More than Eqected Count I 5.1 15,000) % of Total 11.1%
Std. Residual
rota1 count
Expected Count
% of Total 42.2%
Number of of Trained
Trained Officers in
Officers Officers
Total
21
21 .o
46.7%
12
12.0
26.7%
12
12.0
26.7%
45
45.0
100.0%
Chi-square Tests
1 Likelihood Ratio 1 ,883 1 4 1 ,927
Value
I Linear-by-Linear Association I 3 5 1 1 I 5 i 2
N of Valid Cases I 45
Pearson Chi-square I .86ea ( 4 ( ,929
–
df
a. 4 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 3.47.
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary
Q8R ” Q6R
Q9R * Q6R
Q1OR ” Q6R
Q l l R ‘ Q 6 R
Cases
Valid
N
45
40
44
45
Percent
66.2%
58.8%
64.7%
66.2%
Missing
N
23
28
24
23
Total
Percent
33.8%
41.2%
35.3%
33.8%
N
68
68
68
68
Percent
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Crosstab
I Q6R I Once a I
Quarter or
Monthly Bi-annually
Q8R Small Organization (1 – Count 5 8
20 Full-time Authorized Expected count 6.2 4.4
Positions) % of Total 11.1% 17.8%
Std. Residual -.5 1.7
Medium Organization Count I 4 1 1
(21-30 Full-time Expected Count 2.0
Authorized Positions) Total I 8 . 1 2.2%
Std. Residual .7 -.7
Large Organization Count I 5 1 1
(More than 30 Full-time Expected Count 3.6
Authorized Positions) % of Total
Std. Residual .O
-1.4
rota1 Count 14 10
Expected Count 14.0 10.0
% of Total 31.1% 22.2%
Chi-square Tests
I I I I ~ s y m p . Sip. I
1 value 1 df I (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-square 1 7.38Ba 1 4 I .I17
I Likelihood ~ a t i o ( 7.617 1 4 1 ,107 1
Once a year
or Never
7
9.3
15.6%
-.8
4
4.2
8.9%
-.l
10
7.5
22.2%
.9
21
21.0
46.7%
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
Total
20
20.0
44.4%
9
9.0
20.0%
16
16.0
35.6%
45
45.0
100.0%
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.00.
.478
45
1 I
Crosstab
Quarter or
I ( Monthly 1 Bi-annually
1 Q9R Low Total Operating Count I 8 1 2
I
Budget ($0 – $250,000) Expected Count 5.7 3.8
% of Total 20.0% 5.0%
Std. Residual 1 .O -.9
MediumTotal Operating Count 2 6
Budget ($250,001 – Expected Count 3.6 2.4
$3,000,000) % of Total 5.0% 15.0%
Std. Residual -3 2.3
High Total Operating Count 2 0
Budget (More than Expected Count 2.7 1.8
$3,000,000) % of Total
5.0% .O%
Std. Residual -.4 -1.3
Total Count 12 8
Expected Count 12.0 8.0
% of Total 30.0% 20.0%
Linear-by-Linear
Association
I 1.811 ( 1 I 1 7 8 I
Chi-square Tests
Once a year
or Never
9
9.5
22.5%
-.2
Total
19
19.0
47.5%
12
12.0
30.0%
9
9.0
22.5%
40
40.0
100.0%
Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
N of Valid Cases I 40 I
a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 1.80.
Value
11 .955a
12.269
df
4
4
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.018
,015
Crosstab
Quarter or Once a vear
1 Monthly I Bi-annually I or ~ e b e r 1 Total
QlOR Low Forfeiture Program – Count I 7 1 4 1 6 1 17 –
2007 ($0 – $200) Expected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual
Medium Forfeiture Count
Program – 2007 ($201 – Expected count
$10,000) % of Total
Chi-square Tests
Std. Residual
High Forfeiture Program – Count
2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count
% of Total
Std. Residual
Total Count
Expected Count
% of Total
5.4
15.9%
.7
3
4.1
6.8%
-.6
4
4.5
9.1%
-2
14
14.0
31.6%
Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.95.
3.9
9.1%
.1
5
3.0
11.4%
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
1
.2
1
3 2
2.3%
-1.2
10
10.0
22.7%
Value
5.362a
5.578
7.7
13.6%
–
.6
5
5.9
11.4%
1.729
44
17.0
38.6%
13
13.0
29.5%
-.4
9
6.4
20.5%
1 .O
20
20.0
45.5%
df
4
4
14
14.0
31.8%
44
44.0
100.0%
Asymp. Sig.
(Psided)
,252
,233
1 .I89
Crosstab
I Q6R
%if Total 1 17.8% 1 13.3%
Q11 R Low Annual Service Count
Calls – 2007 ( 0 – 10,000) Ex~eCted Count
Monthly
8
6.5
Std. Residual
Medium Annual Service Count
Calls – 2007 (10.001 – Expected Count
15,000) % of Total
Std. Residual
High Annual Service Count
Calls – 2007 ( More than Expected Count
15.000) % of Total
Std. Residual
Total Count
Expected Count
% of Total
Once a year
or Never
7
9.8
15.6%
-.9
4
5.6
8.9%
-.7
10
5.6
22.2%
1.9
21
21.0
46.7%
Bi-annually
6
4.7
Chi-square Tests
Total
21
21 .o
46.7%
12
12.0
26.7%
12
12.0
26.7%
45
45.0
100.0%
.6
5
3.7
11.1%
.7
1
3.7
2.2%
-1.4
14
14.0
31.1%
.6
3
2.7
6.7%
.2
1
2.7
2.2%
-1.0
10
10.0
22.2%
Pearson Chi-square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases
a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is 2.87.
df
4
4
1
Value
8.93ga
9.482
5.405
45
Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.063
,050
.020
- Seton Hall University
- A Study in Police Preparedness to Respond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey
- tmp.1392915452 .ao0Vg
eRepository @ Seton Hall
2009
Jeffrey T. Dino
Recommended Citation
University
of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses Graduate School
5-2015
Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis
Management, Preparedness, and Response: The
Case of the Active Shooter
Jared Allen Grimsley
University of Tennessee – Knoxville, jgrimsl1@vols.utk.edu
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at
. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information,
please contact trace@utk.edu.
Recommended Citation
Grimsley, Jared Allen, “Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response: The Case of the Active
Shooter. ” Master’s Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2015.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/3366
http://trace.tennessee.edu
http://trace.tennessee.edu
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk-grad
mailto:trace@utk.edu
To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Jared Allen Grimsley entitled “Student Perceptions of
Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response: The Case of the Active Shooter.” I have
examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in College
Student Personnel.
J. Patrick Biddix, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Dorian L. McCoy, Karen D. Boyd, Martha C. Dagenhart
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response:
The Case of the
Active Shooter
A Thesis Presented for the
Master of Science
Degree
The
Jared Allen Grimsley
May 2015
ii
Acknowledgements
To Dr. J. Patrick Biddix, for chairing my thesis committee and being with me every step
of the way. You had faith this was something I could accomplish and you never backed down. I
look forward to the opportunity to continue learning from you
.
To Dr. Dorian L. McCoy, Dr. Karen D. Boyd, and Dr. Martha C. Dagenhart, for
continuing to support me on my committee as well. You all have such unique educational
perspectives that allowed me to produce my best quality work.
To Brandon, for pushing me and encouraging me to write when I may not have otherwise
wanted to. You always checked in to see the progress I was making and have been continuously
supportive over the past year.
iii
Abstract
Institutional crisis management is becoming more relevant with every passing tragedy
and crisis event. This study utilized a modified existing survey to collect quantitative data from
students attending a large four-year public research institution located in the Southeastern region
of the United States. A stratified random sample of commuter students and non-commuter
students was analyzed to compare statistical similarities and differences between the groups.
The largest group of student respondents were full-time, freshmen, female, involved, and
currently live on campus. Students perceived their institutions to be moderately prepared to
respond to both general crises and active shooting situations, although a majority of students did
not know if written institutional plans were in place. Students perceived active shooter protocol
communication as less effective than communication of general crisis management protocol.
Students are generally satisfied with the text messages and emails used to notify students during
a crisis situation, but there are other communication mediums they also believed would be
effective. Analyzing data on students’ perceptions of their respective institutional crisis
management, preparedness, and response helps establish sound practices for extending protection
to the campus community from immediate threats during a campus crisis. While there are
numerous campus crises and forms of preparedness, this study focused on active shootings as the
crisis and emergency notification systems (ENS) as the response.
iv
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..1
Background/Context ………………………………………………………………………………………………1
Statement of the Problem ………………………………………………………………………………………..2
Purpose of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………………………3
Significance of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………………..3
Research Questions ………………………………………………………………………………………………..4
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework ………………………………………………………………………….4
Definitions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5
Organization of Study …………………………………………………………………………………………….6
Chapter 2: Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………………………………..7
Crisis Management Plans ………………………………………………………………………………………..7
Perceptions of Preparedness ………………………………………………………………………………….10
Pre-Crisis Safety Strategies……………………………………………………………………………………12
Emergency Notification Systems ……………………………………………………………………………14
Emergency Notification System Participation ……………………………………………….14
Text Messaging and Cell Phone Usage ………………………………………………………..17
Social Media …………………………………………………………………………………………….18
Redundancy versus Urgency ……………………………………………………………………….18
Summary, Limitations, and Considerations for Future Research ………………………………..19
Chapter 3: Methodology ………………………………………………………………………………………………….23
Overview and Research Questions …………………………………………………………………………23
Research Design…………………………………………………………………………………………………..24
v
Research Methods ………………………………………………………………………………………………..25
Site Selection ……………………………………………………………………………………………25
Participant Selection ………………………………………………………………………………….25
Instrumentation …………………………………………………………………………………………26
Modifications to the CCMQ …………………………………………………………….27
Procedure ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………29
Data Collection …………………………………………………………………………………………29
Data Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………………………30
Limitations and Delimitations ………………………………………………………………………………..30
Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….31
Chapter 4: Results …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..33
Perceptions of Preparedness ………………………………………………………………………………….35
Institutional Preparedness to Respond ………………………………………………………….35
Self-Preparedness to Protect ……………………………………………………………………….37
Communication of Crisis Management and Active Shooter Protocol ………………………….40
Effective Protocol Communication………………………………………………………………40
Protocol Communication Mediums ……………………………………………………………..42
Emergency Notification Satisfaction ………………………………………………………………………45
UT Alert System ……………………………………………………………………………………….45
Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages …………………………………………46
Effective Communication Strategies ………………………………………………………………………47
Effective Pre-Crisis Communication Mediums ……………………………………………47
Notification During Crisis …………………………………………………………………………49
vi
Effective Notification During Crisis …………………………………………………………..51
Additional Results ………………………………………………………………………………………………..54
Chapter 5: Summary, Discussion, and Recommendations ……………………………………………………55
Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….55
Purpose of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………….55
Review of the Procedures …………………………………………………………………………..55
Summary of the Findings ……………………………………………………………………………56
Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………………………………………59
Discussion …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..60
Recommendations and Implications for Practice ……………………………………………………..61
Directions for Further Research ……………………………………………………………………………..64
References ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..66
Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….72
Appendix A: Original Zdziarski (2001) CCMQ Survey Packet ………………………………….73
Appendix B: CCMQ-S (Survey Modified from CCMQ) …………………………………………..80
Appendix C: Online Informed Consent for CCMQ-S ……………………………………………….87
Appendix D: Recruitment Email ……………………………………………………………………………90
Appendix E: Additional Demographic Data …………………………………………………………….92
Appendix F: Additional Raw Data …………………………………………………………………………94
Appendix G: Demographic Analyses, Mean Responses, and Significance…………………104
Vita ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..109
vii
List of Tables
Table 4.1: Collegiate Residency of Student Respondents …………………………………………………….34
Table 4.2: Self-Protection Based on Location of Active Shooter …………………………………………..38
Table 4.2.1: Self-Protection, Non-Commuter versus Commuter …………………………………………..38
Table 4.3: Crisis Management and Active Shooter Preparedness Communication Mediums ……43
Table 4.3.1: Crisis Management Plan Communication, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……..44
Table 4.3.2: Active Shooter Preparedness Communication, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ..44
Table 4.4: Student Satisfaction with UT Alert System …………………………………………………………46
Table 4.4.1: Student Satisfaction with UT Alert System, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……46
Table 4.5: Perceptions of Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages ………………………….47
Table 4.5.1:
Perceptions of Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages,
Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……………………………………………………………….47
Table 4.6: Perceptions of Effective Pre-Crisis Communication Mediums ………………………………48
Table 4.6.1: Perceptions of Effective Pre-Crisis Communication,
Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……………………………………………………………….49
Table 4.7: Student Notification of a Campus Crisis or Emergency ………………………………………..50
Table 4.7.1: Student Notification of Crisis, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ………………………51
Table 4.8: Perceptions of Effective Notification during Active Shooting ……………………………….52
Table 4.8.1: Perceptions of Effective Notification during Acting Shooting,
Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……………………………………………………………….53
Table E1: Additional Demographic Data …………………………………………………………………………..93
Table F1: Self-Protection from Active Shooter (Open-Ended Responses) ……………………………..95
Table F2: Reasons for Not Signing up for UT Alert ………………………………………………………….103
viii
Table G1: Demographic Analyses by Gender …………………………………………………………………..105
Table G2: Demographic Analyses by Class ……………………………………………………………………..106
Table G3: Demographic Analyses by Involvement ……………………………………………………………107
Table G4: Demographic Analyses by Transfer Status ………………………………………………………..108
ix
List of Figures
Figure 4.1: Perceptions of Institutional Preparedness for Campus Crises ……………………………….36
Figure 4.2:
Perceptions of Institutional Preparedness for Active Shooters
……………………………..36
Figure 4.3: Perceptions of Institutional Communication of Crisis Management Protocol …………41
Figure 4.4: Perceptions of Institutional Communication of Active Shooter Protocol ……………….41
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Background/Context
Postsecondary leaders have had to deal with the topics of campus crisis and post-crisis
management for many years, and especially in the past two decades. The tragic events of
September 11, 2001 were a driving force for leading administrators to think more about the
critical events that potentially could happen on their respective campuses (Catullo, Walker, &
Floyd, 2009). More recently, the most prolific campus crisis has been the active shooter. The
ability to prevent a single active shooter crisis similar to the incident at Virginia Tech in 2007
saves multiple lives in the face of an ever-increasing national trend in student population growth
(Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011).
Crisis management has grown rapidly in recent years, yet the topic of campus crisis is
largely ignored (Coombs, 1995). Numerous college campuses across the country have
experienced active shootings in the past few years, and institutional leaders have responded
differently to each situation. Fortunately, an exponentially greater number of universities have
not experienced the same crisis (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010), and even though active shooting
events are rare, a low—but significant—percentage of students potentially could be in danger or
experience distress associated with the event (Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011).
One of the biggest criticisms from the handling of the Virginia Tech tragedy was the
institution’s use of emergency notification systems (ENS) and their failure to immediately warn
the campus community (Johnson, 2012; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Schneider, 2010). Due to
the potential for an active shooter on campus, many institutions are looking to improve policies,
promote campus safety, and effectively handle emergency situations more efficiently. These
2
changes include the implementation of mass ENS (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). It is critical the
immediate community be notified in the early minutes after a crisis or emergency (Johnson,
2012).
National legislation requires institutions immediately to notify students and employees
when an emergency happens on campus (H.R. 5806; Emergency Notification Deployment Act,
2008). Researchers found the two biggest issues driving ENS implementation at institutions
were recent incidents on other campuses and general public safety (Gulum & Murray, 2009;
Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010; Staman, Katsouros, & Hach, 2009).
Statement of the Problem
Administrators, faculty, staff, but more importantly, students and their families, expect
that reasonable and effective measures be in place to respond more efficiently to a campus crisis,
minimizing student risk (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009). Students’ expectations for
college matter; their expectations form a groundwork that begins to set the relationship students
have with their institution (Miller, Kuh, Paine, & Associates, 2006).
Perceptions and expectations are different, but they have the ability to inform each other.
A positive or negative expectation can lead to a positive or negative perception, which ultimately
forms their collegiate experience. Heilbrun and colleagues (2009) note that as changes in
policies and practices surrounding crisis management occur, it is important that these changes be
perceived as effective and responsive. Understanding perceptions is critical. The more informed
the campus community is with regards to emergency preparedness and effective response, the
more efficiently an institution can respond to campus crises, including active
shootings.
3
Purpose of the Study
Postsecondary leaders report generally feeling prepared to handle a campus crisis
(Catullo et al., 2009), but there is a lack of similar data specific to active shootings and of general
student perceptions of campus safety. The purpose of this study was to consider student
perceptions of institutional active shooter preparedness and of the effectiveness of ENS used in
the event of an active shooter on campus.
Significance of the Study
Asking a random student what he or she would do if involved in an active shooting would
likely render a silent response, with an ultimate admission towards uncertainty. There has been
an increased occurrence of active shootings on college campuses in recent years, but a lack of
research about student’s fears of being a potential victim of any campus crime (Kaminski,
Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010). Students make meaning of active shootings before,
during, and after the event, and terror management theory (TMT) looks at how it affects the
student’s perception of their institution (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). If
institutions are unaware of how students would act and respond pre-crisis, the lack of
understanding can affect the way an institution responds pre-crisis, mid-crisis, and post-crisis.
This can be applied toward any campus crisis with the potential for student death, not just active
shootings.
Emergency messages are in competition with a high volume of other messages—Twitter
messages, Facebook posts, text messages, general institutional and academic emails, etc.—to
break through the crowded communication medium that exists in student’s lives (Stephens,
Barrett, & Mahometa, 2013). Institutions must implement ENS systems in ways that maximize
4
understanding and compliance to ensure effective responses to horrific events such as school
shootings (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010; Gulum & Murray, 2009).
Research Questions
This study was designed to explore the following research questions specific to students,
rather than
institutional or higher education administrators:
1) What are students perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness
and effectiveness of ENS?
2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active
shooter
preparedness) being communicated effectively?
3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’
levels of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a
campus crisis or active shooting?
4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the
event of an emergency or active shooting?
This knowledge hopefully can inform practices related to the implementation of pre- and
post-crisis management, preparedness, and response strategies that may or may not already exist.
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
Regardless if universities have policies and procedures in place, a student’s perception of
the institution is his or her reality. TMT, specifically the extension of the theory presented by
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999), serves as an additional framework that may help
explain a potential factor in student’s intentional or unintentional disregard to institutional active
shooter and campus crisis preparedness.
5
The research on TMT focuses on two basic hypotheses—the anxiety-buffer and mortality
salience (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). The anxiety-buffer hypothesis posits that self-esteem
provides protection against anxiety, thus, strengthening self-esteem makes one less susceptible to
anxiety-related behavior. The mortality salience hypothesis involves the intangible,
psychological structure that protects individuals against anxiety, and states that reminding people
of the cause of their anxiety increases the need for that structure. Individuals will have more
positive reactions to things that support structure and more negative reactions to things that
threaten it.
Students consciously and unconsciously avoid certain topics that might invoke anxiety or
the notion of death; the suppression of such thoughts allows them to leave death as something
that will happen in the distant future and allows them to live in the present, free of anxiety. TMT
helps makes sense of how certain crisis management, preparedness, and trainings may influence
a student’s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions as compared to a previous time.
Definitions
A campus crisis is defined as “an event that disrupts the orderly operation of the
institution or its educational mission, and threatens the well-being of personnel, property,
financial resources, or reputation of the institution” (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 5).
Crisis management refers to “the plans, protocols, procedures, and processes used by
institutions to manage a campus crisis” (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 5).
This study concerns three distinct phases of a crisis, defined as follows:
Pre-crisis—actions taken prior to the onset of a crisis (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 6).
Crisis—actions taken during a crisis event (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 6).
Post-crisis—actions taken after the occurrence of a crisis (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 6).
6
While there are numerous campus crises and forms of preparedness, this study focused on
active shootings as the crisis and ENS as the response.
An active shooter, as defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008), “is
an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated
area; in most cases, active shooters use firearm(s) and there is no pattern or method to their
selection of victims” (p. 2).
An Emergency Notification System (ENS) refers to a system organized for the primary
purpose of expediting the efficient one-way distribution or broadcast of messages during a time
of crisis. These messages are distributed through a variety of communication mediums.
Regarding the sample population and student demographic, the researcher created
definitions regarding residency to stratify distinct categories of
students:
Non-commuter student—a student currently living in university-owned housing
(does not include fraternity and sorority houses).
Commuter student—a student not currently living in university-owned housing
and commutes to campus (includes fraternity and sorority houses).
Organization of the Study
This study is reported in five distinct chapters. Chapter One provided an introduction to
the topic of institutional crisis management, a purpose statement, a statement of the problem,
significance of the study, and the research questions posed. Chapter Two offers a literature
review on issues related to crisis management, with consideration of limitations in the research.
Chapter Three discusses the research design, research method and procedures for conducting the
study. Chapter Four presents the findings from the original research. Chapter Five discusses the
study and conclusions, along with
implications for future practice and research.
7
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Crisis Management Plans
Two major events heightened the focus of campus safety and security to different levels:
the terrorist attacks on
September 11
th
, 2001,
(Catullo et al., 2009) and the mass shootings at
Virginia Tech on April 16
th
, 2007 (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). Both events had lasting
impacts on the way postsecondary leaders view and prepare for crises that happen on their
campuses (Catullo et al., 2009). The two periods of time analyzed— post-September 11
th
(2001)
and post-Virginia Tech (2007)—show varying levels of awareness and institutional preparedness
for campus crises not specific to just active shootings.
From 2005-2007, approximately 98% of colleges and universities reported having no
homicides (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010). The Virginia Tech massacre in 2007 created a ripple
effect that was felt throughout the higher education community. Of 331 institutions surveyed by
the Midwestern Higher Education Compact (MHEC), 87% responded that their institution
conducted a review of holistic campus safety and security (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). Of
this 87%, almost 90% indicated that positive change was implemented.
Handling institutional crisis situations was not something new that began happening post-
September 11
th
, but the events on that day accelerated the need to be more prepared than ever
(Catullo et al., 2009). In the Zdziarski (2001) study, 129 (88.4% of) participating institutions
reported having some sort of written crisis management plan. Of these institutions, 123 (85.4%)
reported having a specific plan for the university and 77 (53.1%) reported having a separate
student affairs plan. Covington (2013) conducted a study of smaller campuses (with less than
5,000 students) and found a completely different picture: about 93% had a university-specific
8
crisis management plan and only 27% had a crisis management plan specific to the division of
student affairs. Heiselt and Burrell (2012) found that among the responding Christian-affiliated
institutions of higher education (CIHE), 92% had some type of crisis management plan and 95%
reported reviewing these plans annually.
Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpalsan (2006) stated that crisis management does not simply
mean the existence of an emergency preparedness plan. It involves thinking about the types of
crises that may occur and planning for what happens next. Catullo et al. (2007), also modeled
after the Zdziarski (2001) study, show the differences in contingency plans that institutions have
in place from 2001 to 2007. Plans for campus and building evacuations, chemical leaks, loss of
computer data or utilities, terrorist threats, and infectious diseases were prepared at a statistically
significant higher rate than other campus crises (Catullo et al., 2009).
In 2001, the five crises most institutions reporting have plans for were fire, student death,
sexual assault, suicide, and campus disturbance and demonstration (Zdziarski, 2001). There
were no significant changes from 2001 to 2007 in contingency plans for homicide, student and
faculty death or injury, or campus disturbances (Catullo et al., 2009). Active shooting scenarios
are not specifically represented in either Zdziarki (2001) or Catullo et al. (2009) study, but
student deaths and campus disturbances are. According to the same survey, there were
additional statistically significant increases of various forms from 2001 to 2007. These increases
included the addressing of the pre-crisis phase, the existence of written crisis management plans,
and the accessibility of those plans on the internet.
Administrators tend to be reactive, instead of proactive, when dealing with crisis
management (Zdziarski, 2001). This is supported by the research that suggests that the pre-crisis
phase was not addressed nearly the same amount as the crisis and post-crisis phases, yet needed
9
to be (Catullo et al., 2009). Of the 129 reporting institutions in the Zdziarski (2001) study that
had written crisis management plans, only 82 (63.6%) indicated addressing the pre-crisis phase.
Covington (2013) found slightly increased percentages on campuses address the pre-crisis phase
on smaller campuses: 65.5% and 73.4% for the first and second administrations of the survey,
respectively. Heiselt and Burrell (2012) found that 90% of CIHEs with a crisis management plan
addressed the pre-crisis phase, which shows increased percentages from the previously
mentioned studies.
There were certain crises in which more institutions addressed the pre-crisis phase: fire,
sexual assault, sexual harassment, suicide, and evacuation of buildings (Zdziarski, 2001). Again,
active shootings have no specific category, but neither student deaths nor campus disturbances
were at the top of the list of institutional crises that addressed the pre-crisis phase. Catullo et al.
(2009) posed the following question: how does an educational institution prepare for the
unimaginable? Research indicates that while institutional administrators typically focus on crisis
events that are more likely to occur, they need to start looking for unexpected crisis with lower
probabilities of happening (i.e. active shootings). Mitroff et al. (2006) identified criminal acts
(i.e. murders and use of guns) as one of the potential crises that institutions might face.
The literature revealed several references to the crucial need for appropriate crisis
management teams (Mitroff et al., 2006; Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007; Zdziarski, 2006). With
solid leadership and clearly defined operational plans, crisis management teams are seen as
effective tools in the crisis management process (Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007); however,
Millet-Willet (2010) believes that many leaders on crisis management teams have not thought
much nor reflected about how their roles would change from daily institutional operations to
periods of crisis.
10
Zdziarski (2001), Catullo et al. (2009), and Covington (2013) suggested that crisis
management protocols—to be effective—must include plans within various divisions that
address different types of crises and ultimately relate back to the plan of the institution. Diligent
care must be taken to not strengthen misperceptions (Fox & Savage, 2009).
Perceptions of Preparedness
Differences in institution types may result in differences in perceptions of preparedness.
In 2001, of the 140 institutions that responded to the question of perceived preparedness, the
overall mean was 7.79 (out of 10) which indicates a high level of perceived preparedness to
respond to campus crisis (Zdziarski, 2001). Catullo et al. (2009) reported that public colleges
rated their level of preparedness somewhat lower than private colleges, and this also held true for
Zdziarski; in 2001, private institutions had a mean rating of 8.71 as opposed to a 7.63 for public
institutions.
The notion that private institutions perceived their campuses to be more prepared than
public institutions was supported by Covington (2013). Perceived preparedness from both types
of institutions increased from 2001 to 2007, but it was not statistically significant. In a different
survey, Rasmussen and Johnson (2008) found that larger universities were more likely to have
conducted a review of campus safety than smaller universities. Burkell (2009) looked at
perceived preparedness at CIHEs, and found that the presidents of participating CIHEs were
prepared to respond to crisis, overall. On the same scale from 1 to 10, 19.5% of CIHEs scored
their institution at 7/10, 35.1% at 8/10, 27.3% at 9/10, and 2.6% at 10/10. Research finds that
regardless of size or type of institution, most perceive their institutions to be prepared (Zdziarski,
2001; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Catullo et al., 2009; Covington, 2013).
11
Similarities still exist in crisis preparedness and management between the two time
periods—2001 to 2007. Although responding institutions still perceive their divisions to be
prepared, Catullo et al. (2009) found no statistical difference in institutional perceptions of
preparedness from 2001 to 2007. Covington (2013) studied smaller institutions—one study in
early 2010 and the other in late 2012—and found that these smaller institutions showed about the
same level of perceived preparedness as the responding institutions in the Zdziarski (2001) and
Catullo et al. (2009) studies. Researchers suggest a need for studies on crisis preparedness to
focus on ways in which smaller, specialized postsecondary institutions are able to prepare for
crises (Catullo, 2008; Hartzog, 1981; Zdziarski, 2001). While researchers have examined
administrator, faculty, and staff perceptions of preparedness, little to no research has been
conducted to study student perceptions of preparedness.
Creation of crisis management plans and continuing to address the pre-crisis phase help
institutions alter public perceptions. Facilitation of different crisis situations can potentially
combat negative perceptions and ensure organizational leaders can positively influence how
outsiders perceive their organization after a crisis has occurred. Preventative policies designed to
protect students on campus and programs created to educate about crime on campus “should be
based on empirical realities rather than (mis)perceptions of risk” (Kaminski et al., 2010, p. 96).
The changes should not only be taking place, but also need to be perceived as being effective and
operational by those the changes are meant to protect (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009).
These preventative policies to increase campus safety are one avenue institutions implement to
increase the overall levels of crisis management. Pre-crisis safety should not stop at simple
prevention.
12
Pre-Crisis Safety Strategies
Violence on campus is likely to be the defining moment when the life of that institution is
changed forever (LaBanc, Krepel, Johnson, & Hermann, 2010). The countless changes to
campus safety and crisis management demonstrate the effect that the events of Virginia Tech had
on campus culture and operations across the country.
The mass shootings of Virginia Tech began to shift the focus of campus crises to include
a slight emphasis on active shooter preparedness, instead of just general campus crises, as
previously described throughout this review. A big change in safety protocol implemented post-
Virginia Tech was text message emergency notification systems, especially since emergency
notification was an area for which Virginia Tech officials were criticized (Rasmussen &
Johnson, 2008). Almost 75% of respondents of the MHEC survey who reported not having such
systems stated their universities were in the process of obtaining some sort of similar system.
Postsecondary leaders and administrators began to implement (or considering
implementing) various initiatives that did not exist at their institutions prior to the Virginia Tech
tragedy. Approximately 14% of respondents to the MHEC survey reported that
campus
buildings did not have all-call systems, but 1/3 of those institutions planned to change that
(Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). Additionally, only 51% of institutions reported having
emergency telephones and panic buttons and only 38% reported having security cameras spread
throughout outdoor areas of campus prior to Virginia Tech. Twenty two percent of campuses
that did not have the capacity to lockdown classroom buildings were either planning to acquire
such a system or had already done so (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008), although Fox and Savage
(2009) believe there is a significant disadvantage to locking down campus buildings during an
13
active shooting. Students, faculty and staff in sealed buildings are safe, but those left stranded
outside may be potential victims.
Zdziarski (2001) looked at how institutions communicate crisis management plans to the
campus community, with no specificity toward active shootings. Only 31% of institutions
communicated through the use of drills and exercises and 15.5% reported their crisis
management plans were not communicated. Twenty six (20.2%) institutions utilized optional
crisis management training sessions and only 21 (16.3%) utilized required crisis management
training sessions. Members of the campus community may view these pre-crisis trainings as a
suggestion of increased levels and threat of violent behavior (Fox & Savage, 2009).
Most surprising, only 36% of responding institutions to the MHEC survey in 2008 had
staged incidents to test their crisis management and emergency response systems in the event of
an active shooting, with larger institutions being more likely to have done so (Rasmussen &
Johnson, 2008). Most institutions of higher education have exercises for evacuations, fire drills,
and tornado and severe weather situations; however, far fewer practice similar exercises for
active shooters (Department of U.S. Education, Office and Elementary and Secondary
Education, & Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013).
This low statistic is supported by an extension of TMT, which states that students do
what they can to not think about death or dying (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Fox and Savage
(2009) would agree with universities who choose not to conduct active shooter drills for that
very reason—to prevent placing students in a simulation where death is a potential outcome.
While the intent is there, staged scenarios have the potential to make students much more
anxious about feeling like walking targets; thus, only involving campus police and other
authorities is a more reasonable approach for some institutions.
14
Emergency Notification Systems
Institutions implement crisis management plans with perceived levels of preparedness
from administrators and institutional leaders. Included in some crisis management plans is the
addressing of the crisis before it happens. A large part of addressing the pre-crisis phase is the
institutional use of ENS. According to Staman et al. (2009), the most popular emergency
notification mediums among responding institutions were e-mail, text messages, and websites
(100%), landline phones (80%), cell phones (76%), televisions and video in residence halls
(56%), external sirens and speakers (44%), fire panel alarms with voice enunciation and digital
signage (28%), building public address systems (24%), and social media (20%). Prior to the
mass shootings at Virginia Tech, less than 10% of responding institutions utilized external
speakers, social networking sites, instant messaging, or text messaging as a part of their ENS
systems, according to the Midwestern Higher Education Compact (2008).
A study conducted at the University of Windsor in Southern Ontario, Canada, gauged
student, staff, and faculty perceptions of the use of various ENS technologies (Butler &
Lafreniere, 2010). An overwhelming majority of the participants reported checking their
university email account on a daily basis (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010); about 25% of responders
think campus police can encourage those on campus to regularly check their email by explaining
how important it is, and by advertising appropriately.
Emergency Notification System Participation. The main concern expressed by
students, faculty, and staff involves a need for privacy. A small sample from the University of
Windsor study would approve of such a system only if their privacy was guaranteed (Butler &
Lafreniere, 2010). A classification of emergencies that the ENS systems would be used for was
something students want before opting in. According to the Staman et al. (2009) survey, an
15
average of 40% of students opt-in to the system if given the option, but 92% of students remain a
part of the system if enrollment is required but are given the option to opt-out. Opt-out
systems
retain more student participation than opt-in systems; Florida State University has an opt-out
system with 85% participation, whereas the University of California, Los Angeles has an opt-in
system with only 35% participation (Schneider, 2010).
Staman et al. (2009) states that subscription rates to notification services are not
consistently high. Forty percent (40%) of responders indicated high participation (>75% of
students), 12% had medium participation (from 50-75% of students), and an overwhelming 48%
had poor participation (<50% of students). A similar study of 500 campuses found that, on
average, only 40% of students had registered for the ENS system at their institution (Kaminski et
al., 2010).
The National Association of College and University Business Officers (2009)
administered a survey that found 70% of responding institutions offered opt-in ENS systems
where students have the choice to register; unfortunately, the response rate from students is still
unsatisfactory. Even Virginia Tech only had 56% of students registered for their ENS system in
the semester following the shooting (Davies, 2008).
The Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management suggests that a
successful marketing program is one avenue to address the issue of low student participation and
response; however, first-year students do not perceive a need to register for an emergency
notification system, so this approach may be problematic (Johnson, 2012). It is critical to know
how to encourage and motivate students to register because of the low concern for personal
safety that many students have.
16
A few participants wanted to ensure being a part of the system would not cost them any
money, would only be used for emergencies, and wanted to have input in the types of
technologies used to reach them in the event of an emergency (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). The
concerns can all be successfully addressed if campus police increase their presence on campus
and develop stronger relationships with the community. Over 95% of participants in the
University of Windsor study favored the implementation of an ENS system, with improving
campus safety being one of the main reasons why (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). Johnson’s (2012)
study found various themes that emerged as to why students did or did not register for the
system—attentiveness to information provided by their institution, personal motivation to
register, preferred methods of notification, and ease of registration.
To increase visibility of the ENS system, one regional southeastern public university
began presenting at first-year student orientation sessions in 2010 and printed information about
the emergency notification system on the hangtag parking permits (Johnson, 2012). The increase
of students who registered for the emergency notification system that year was statistically
significant (p < .05), but the total number of new system participants only represented 11% of
that year’s incoming class. While this study represents only one institution, others are likely
having the same struggles.
Missouri University of Science & Technology (Missouri S&T) ran a test of their ENS
system in 2008 with only a 51% confirmation rate (Gulum &Murray, 2009). The system is well-
designed, but still faces problems inevitable to an ENS system at any institution. Students may
ignore the messages, provide inaccurate information, or simply not be aware of the services
available. The low confirmation numbers from Missouri S&T—and likely from other
17
institutions—is considered unsafe. Low confirmation and participation rates can be attributed to
the issues surrounding text messages and cell phone usage.
Text Messaging and Cell Phone Usage. The infrastructure created for text messaging
was never intended to be used for widespread real-time notification for emergencies, but
realistically only for low-volume person-to-person communication (Latimer, 2008). Although
text message delivery is traditionally fast, delivery cannot be guaranteed; if some messages are
longer than 160 characters, the original messages may be broken up into multiple parts that may
arrive out of order or not at all (Latimer, 2008).
Many faculty members require students to turn off or silence their cell phones in class, so
the effectiveness of these ENS systems during peak academic periods comes into question (Fox
& Savage, 2009). Even if faculty have more liberal in-class cell phone policies, there are some
classrooms in the basements of buildings where cell phone reception is poor or nonexistent; this
lessens the effectiveness of the system if students are not receiving messages in a timely fashion
(Schneider, 2010).
Only 39.4% of students participating in the University of Windsor study indicated they
would be willing to provide their phone number to campus police for emergency
notification
purposes and 42.8% of students were explicit in their unwillingness to do so (Butler &
Lafreniere, 2010). About 50% of unwilling participants indicated privacy as the reason, and 8%
said no for monetary reasons. Many students choose not to voluntarily subscribe to these
services, depriving them of essential information in the event of an emergency (Johnson, 2012).
If students choose not to enroll in their institutions ENS system, there is another technological
medium institutions can use to reach their students in times of crisis: social media.
18
Social Media. Social media has expanded access to resources with increased speeds at
which information can be sent and received (Hughes & Palen, 2012). Informal sources such as
social media accelerate the speed at which information is disseminated. This is essential in
urgent situations; however, these messages could spread out of control, creating panic,
contradicting official sources (unintentionally), and threatening the effectiveness of emergency
communication (Hughes & Palen, 2012; Stephens et al., 2013).
For social media to reach students during an emergency, students must have access to the
internet and know how to check the sites and which sites to check. The usage of general
university websites is widely implemented, but the sites can overload and offenders may be able
to see the warnings being broadcast against them (Schneider, 2010).
The public is much more involved with emergency notification and response and plays a
much more important role than ever before (Hughes & Palen, 2012). Individuals who may be
the first to witness a crisis may also be the first to break the news, prior to university officials
having the chance to respond. Since social media can reach larger audiences at faster rates, there
are new demands and expectations by the public as to how institutions respond to emergencies in
the future.
Researchers show that public information officers (PIOs) are still uncertain how to adapt
fully the use of social media outlets into the emergency notification response process (Hughes &
Palen, 2012). Zdziarski (2001) equates PIOs with those working in university relations.
Regardless of which institutional stakeholders have control over outgoing messages, issues of
redundancy and urgency must be taken into consideration.
Redundancy versus Urgency. Repetition of messages is a common way to convey
urgency (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990). “Without a sense of urgency, the awareness itself is not
19
enough” (Gulum & Murray, 2009, p. 1469). If institutions cannot find appropriate ways to send
emergency messages, people might create their own message filters, sending those
messages
straight to the trash (Stephens et al., 2013).
While redundancy is inevitable, people begin to feel frustrated if the emergency messages
are overkill; however, if people receive these messages through various channels, they should be
more persuaded to examine the message and should experience less frustration (Stephens et al.,
2013). Stephens and colleagues found that if students receive three notifications, then the
communication channel no longer matters and students will begin to pay attention. This finding
is unique to campus crisis management literature, as no other similar findings have surfaced.
The overuse of drills and informational and test messages may affect the impact that
actual emergency notifications have; it is possible people will start to perceive the emergency
messages to be simply another drill (Schneider, 2010; Stephens et al., 2013). Human
communication as opposed to electronic communication would increase perceptions of urgency
(Staman et al., 2009; Stephens et al., 2013). A better understanding of student reactions to
redundant communication helps institutions more effectively capture student attention; it is
imperative to activate their sense of urgency as quickly as possible (Stephens et al., 2013).
Summary, Limitations, and Considerations for Future Research
There is long history of campus violence in this country (Smith, 1989), including the
shootings at the University of Texas (1966), South Carolina State University (1968), Kent State
University (1970), University of South Carolina (1978), Cornell University (1983), University of
Iowa (1991), Franciscan University (1999), and Arizona State University (2002) (Ferraro and
McHugh, 2010). The events of September 11
th
, 2001, however, coupled with the mass shootings
at Virginia Tech in 2007, ushered in major changes toward campus safety that had long-term
20
effects on institutions everywhere (LaBanc et al., 2010). A majority of responding institutions to
the surveys reviewed in this paper have written crisis management plans, some with a separate
specific student affairs plan that is different from the overall plan of the institution (Covington,
2013; Zdziarski, 2001).
Institutional perceived preparedness has shown no significant statistical increase over the
years, even though postsecondary leaders still perceive their institutions to be prepared to handle
campus crises, with private institutions generally feeling more prepared than public institutions
(Covington, 2013; Zdziarski, 2001). Research shows more institutions need to start addressing
the pre-crisis phase in addition to the crisis and post-crisis phases most are already addressing in
their written crisis management plans (Catullo et al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Zdziarski, 2001).
Pre-crisis preparation trends show the increased use of staged exercises, training sessions,
building all-call systems, emergency notification systems, and security cameras, especially after
the mass shooting at Virginia Tech (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008).
The most commonly used mediums for emergency notification are e-mail, text messages,
and institutional websites, with an increased use of social media in recent years. Institutions are
struggling with getting high voluntary student participation rates in their ENS systems. The
systems that automatically include all enrolled students retain more students than those who must
opt-in for participation. Institutions continue struggling with understanding why students choose
not to participate in their respective ENS systems, but different tactics—including marketing the
system at orientation—are currently being used to combat student apathy.
Knowing the communication mediums students, faculty, and staff are frequently utilizing
and prefer, as well as knowing their concerns, can aid in the development and implementation of
efficient ENS systems (Butler & Lafreniere, 2012). Effective and successful communication is
21
more than simply inundating an audience with messages (Stephens et al., 2013). Effective
emergency notification is a process, and is not simply the act of buying the best ENS systems
(Gulum & Murray, 2009).
Limitations exist of the various studies included throughout this review. Zdziarski (2001)
focuses mainly on larger institutions (greater than 8,000 students) and only NASPA member
institutions. Covington (2013) focuses on smaller institutions (less than 5,000 students) and
again, only NASPA member institutions. Catullo et al. (2009) analyzes the status of crisis
management at NASPA institutions, exclusively, as well. These studies isolate those institutions
that are not affiliated with the national organization. Heiselt and Burrell (2012) and Burrell
(2009) looked only at institutions of higher education that are Christian-affiliated and the
Midwestern Higher Education Compact (2008) survey was more comprehensive in terms of
institutional size, but neither used NASPA affiliation as a factor. Important themes tend to
emerge from the research; however, the respondents may not be representative of all institutions
across the country due to the response rates across the various surveys and research conducted.
Researchers looked at institutional crisis management and crisis readiness from the
perspective of postsecondary leaders and administrators (Rasmussen et al., 2008; Zdziarski,
2001). However, little research on emergency notification exists within research on crisis
management; there is typically no overlap between the two topical areas.
Studies that analyze the use of ENS systems, cell phone usage, and social media are very
limited in their scope and generalizability, due to the lack of response and limited number of
institutions included. Future research on ENS should examine more institutions and broader
student perceptions and opinions to understand fully the emergency notification culture.
22
The literature on crisis preparedness at postsecondary institutions in the United States
needs continued expansion (Akers, 2007; Catullo, 2008; Hartzog, 1981; Mitroff et al., 2006;
Wilson, 1992; Zdziarski, 2001). Future research regarding overall crisis management should
focus on answering the following question: What are student’s perceptions toward their
institutions crisis management and active shooter preparedness? Perceptions are often reality,
thus, insight into student perception can be an additional resource institutions of higher education
can use to continue to increase crisis management and preparedness strategies to protect further
those in their immediate community.
23
Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview and Research Questions
This study aimed to gain a better understanding and knowledge of student perceptions of
crisis management at their institutions. Various researchers have studied perceptions of
preparedness among institutional leaders, administrators, and presidents (Burrell, 2009; Catullo
et al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Heiselt & Burrell, 2012; Zdziarski, 2001); however, little research
exists regarding student perceptions of preparedness, and little research on crisis management
addresses the use of emergency notification. Therefore, the following research questions were
posed:
1) What are students perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness
and effectiveness of ENS?
2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active shooter
preparedness) being communicated effectively?
3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’
levels of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a
campus crisis or active shooting?
4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the
event of an emergency or active shooting?
This chapter describes the study’s research design and methodology. Additional topics
include site selection, participant selection, and sample population; instrumentation with original
survey instrument and modifications of original instrument to be used; procedures including data
collection and data analysis; and limitations and delimitations of the study.
24
Research Design
The research design is a descriptive study using survey research methodology. The
purpose of survey research is to generalize from a smaller sample to a larger population as a
means to infer about that population a specific characteristic, attitude, or behavior (Babbie,
1990). The current study employed the survey method to allow students to self-report their
responses on a modified data collection instrument; however, the reliability and value of
collected data depends on the truthfulness of respondents (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister, & Jeanne,
2011). Respondents may feel pressured to respond according to upheld societal beliefs (also
known as social desirability), but responses are accepted as truthful unless given reason to
believe otherwise (Shaughnessy et al., 2011).
Implementing a survey has many advantages. Surveys are well-suited to descriptive
studies, but are used also to explore different sides of a situation, or to explain and offer data for
testing potential hypotheses (Kelley, Clark, Brown, & Sitzia, 2003). As with most quantitative
methods, the turnaround for data collection is fast (Creswell, 2009), as compared with qualitative
methods. Surveys produce large amounts of data in limited amounts of time without incurring
much cost, if any (Kelley et al., 2003).
The nature of this survey is cross-sectional, with data collected at one single point in time
and only studied once (Shaughnessy et al., 2011). The present study could be performed
longitudinally, but currently is implemented as a cross-section of student perceptions at a
singular moment, and not a comparison at different points in time. Ultimately, the survey is the
preferred method of data collection because numerous institutional crisis management studies
have employed this method as well (Burrell, 2009; Catullo et al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Heiselt
& Burrell, 2012; Zdziarski, 2001).
25
Research Methods
Site Selection. The study was conducted at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville
(UTK), a large public four-year research institution. UTK is a land-grant institution and is the
flagship institution of the State of Tennessee. Undergraduate student enrollment is 20,916 and
there are 11 on-campus residence halls with a total capacity of approximately 7,400 students.
Selection of this institution was due to accessibility and current location of the researcher.
Participant Selection. The study enlisted a stratified random sample of undergraduate
students. The study targets both commuters and non-commuters, with a focused analysis to
compare students from those two groups. Commuters and non-commuters may differ on varying
levels: the amount of time spent on campus, exposure to campus crises, and motivation to
subscribe to an ENS, which may ultimately affect their perceptions. An equal random sample of
1000 commuter students and 1000 non-commuter students were selected for inclusion in the
study (for a total of 2000 students). Each student who fell into one of those groups had equal
access to the survey instrument. A small incentive—ten awards of $20 each—was advertised
and offered to students to help increase the number of responses. By Tennessee law, the
incentive has to be offered to all students receiving the recruitment email, even those who choose
not to complete the
survey.
The sample size was calculated using a formula involving population size, desired
confidence level, and degree of accuracy (otherwise known as margin of error) (Krejcie &
Morgan, 1970). The approximate number of undergraduate students currently enrolled at UTK
for the fall 2014 semester is 21,000. The researcher chose a confidence level of 85%, with a
margin of error of 5%. According to the formula, the recommended sample size for a population
of 21,000, a confidence level of 85%, and a margin of error of 5% is 205. This represents the
26
total number of responses needed to adequately represent the undergraduate population; the
stratified samples of commuter and non-commuter students are present within the 205.
Instrumentation. The specific data collection instrument was an electronically self-
administered questionnaire modified from a previous study. Zdziarski (2001) designed the
Campus Crisis Management Questionnaire (CCMQ) to highlight critical indicators of
institutional crisis management: types of crises, phases of a crisis, crisis management plans, and
stakeholders. Zdziarski sent the CCMQ to administrators and colleagues at participating
NASPA institutions to assess the preparedness of their student affairs divisions. The current
study modified the CCMQ to account for student perceptions, and to include supplementary
questions with the intent of filling additional gaps in the literature (related to ENS).
The original CCMQ was divided into three parts (Zdziarski, 2001). Part 1 consisted of
14 questions (see Appendix A). Question 1 solicits a perceived perception rating on a scale of
one (unprepared) to ten (well-prepared), while the remaining 13 questions prompt responses
about crisis management plans. Part 2 assesses the existence and involvement of various
stakeholders. Respondents are asked to indicate on a four-point scale the involvement of 22
internal stakeholders and 20 external stakeholders; however; the modified survey for the present
study does not solicit information on crisis management stakeholders.
Part 3 of the CCMQ assesses types of crises for which institutions are prepared and
whether crisis management plans for those types are addressed with each phase of the crisis—
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis (Zdziarski, 2001). Portions of Part 3 are used in the modified
survey, with questions related to emergency notification added to address each of the three
phases of crisis.
27
Fraenkel and Wallen (2003) stated that an instrument is considered valid if and when the
instrument measures what it was created to measure. To evaluate the CCMQ instrument,
Zdziarski (2001) used content and face validity. Content validity judges on the appropriateness
of content, whereas face validity judges based on face value of the facts (Fraenkel & Wallen,
2003). The CCMQ was validated in several ways:
1) Zdziarski (2001) used comprehensive research of literature to create survey items.
2) A panel of experts reviewed the instrument after items were developed.
3) A pilot study allowed the researcher to make modifications to the instrument.
4) It was posited that the crisis types (human, criminal, facility, and natural crises)
accurately reflects higher education crisis management planning (Catullo, 2008;
Zdziarski, 2001).
The CCMQ was developed and validated from various research and literature on crisis
management. Zdziarski’s (2001) doctoral committee helped to create a first draft of the
instrument before a small panel of experts reviewed its questions for validity and clarity. The
experts offered several changes to the original CCMQ. The questionnaire was then pilot-tested
at select four-year Texas colleges with enrollments less than 8,000 students.
Eight out of ten pilot participants responded to the CCMQ (Zdziarski, 2009). In addition
to the pertinent questions, participants were asked to provide feedback on clarity, organization,
and time it took to complete the survey. Based on responses from the pilot study participants,
various sections of the entire survey packet (questions, cover letter, and instruction sheet) were
revised and refined.
Modifications to the CCMQ. The Campus Crisis Management Questionnaire (Zdziarski,
2001) is the best tool to use as a basis for this research given that responses would provide a
28
transparent view into perceptions of institutional crisis management, preparedness, and response;
however, slight revisions were made to shift the focus of perceptions from institutional leaders to
students. The researcher used Zdziarski’s study and CCMQ solely for scholarship and research,
which, under copyright laws, constitutes fair use, so permission from the author was not needed.
The new survey instrument was given the name CCMQ-S, the Campus
Crisis Management
Questionnaire for Students.
The first question of Part 1 of the CCMQ asked respondents to indicate how prepared
their student affairs divisions were to respond to campus crisis. The wording was revised to ask
about institutional preparedness, whereas the general student would perceive the student affairs
division and institution as the same, or might not understand what the student affairs division
includes. This change is visible throughout the entire modified CCMQ-S instrument.
The questions regarding institutional stakeholders from Part 3 of the CCMQ were
omitted, because the present study is not gauging student knowledge or perceptions of
stakeholders. As identified with previous research, there is a lack of synthesis between crisis
management research with that of emergency notification research, so similar questions were
duplicated from the CCMQ with “emergency notification system” replacing “crisis management
plan”.
Part 4 of the CCMQ asks for contingency plans that exist for five types of natural
disasters, seven types of facility crises, 10 types of criminal crises, and 11 types of human crises.
The CCMQ-S focuses on crises where students have the potential to be directly involved, with an
extreme focus on active shooters and active shooting situations. Overall, any portions of the
original CCMQ which are not pertinent to the present study and not relevant to students were not
included in the CCMQ-S.
29
Procedure
Prior to beginning the study, the modified survey instrument was retested for validity and
reliability, since original validity and reliability from the CCMQ may not hold true. The survey
was pilot-tested with a group of 25 Leadership and Service Ambassadors and a class of
40
Orientation Leaders at the University of Tennessee; the chair of the researcher’s thesis
committee also aided in the revision process. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UTK
granted approval for the study on February 5
th
, 2015 (expedited review; UTK IRB-14-01900
XP). The electronic survey instrument was hosted through Campus Labs, a higher education
assessment service provider utilized by over 650 higher education institutions.
Data Collection. The study was conducted February 10
th
through February 24
th
, 2015.
Links to the electronic survey were sent to the email addresses collected from Strategic
Enrollment Reporting and Analysis (SERA) at UTK. This study targeted undergraduate
students, but a stratification of commuter versus non-commuter students was analyzed for
potential statistical significant similarities and
differences.
The informed consent form, a text-version of the modified CCMQ-S as well a link to the
electronic version, and a recruitment email regarding the nature of the study encouraging
participation are included in the Appendix. The recruitment email explains the nature of the
research and the significance of the study, and was included in the body of the email sent to
student participants. The first email to students went out February 10
th
, with a reminder email
sent on February 17
th
indicating that the survey would close on February 24
th
.
258 students started the survey, for an overall response rate of 12.9%. Of these
respondents, only 204 completed the survey in its entirety (through the demographic questions),
30
for an adjusted completed response rate of 10.2%. The largest group of student respondents
were full-time freshmen females who are involved and live on campus.
Data Analysis. Zdziarski (2001) originally collected 146 usable questionnaires.
Responses were coded, entered in a spreadsheet, and imported in SPSS Version 10 for analysis.
Descriptive statistical analyses were performed throughout the population study, including
“frequency tables, cross tabulations, and comparisons of the means of different groupings”
(2001). The present study employed the same descriptive statistical analyses, including chi-
squared significance-testing for the quantitative data, and constant comparative coding for the
qualitative data.
Limitations and Delimitations
Similar to limitations from the literature, data collected may not be generalizable due to
the limited scope of the institutional demographics—only one Southeastern institution is
included in the study. In particular, the state where the study took place is considered politically
more conservative and because gun policy is a contentious issue, active shooter preparedness
may be approached differently than in other states and willingness to openly discuss the topic
may vary. Responses from students at smaller or private institutions, or institutions that have
experienced previous campus crises—like a natural disaster, campus disturbance, or active
shooter—may differ significantly. Any data collected may not be generalizable to the
perceptions of students at other institutions across the country.
Delivery of the survey instrument must be carefully implemented to limit issues of
misinterpretation. If participants are unsure of the meaning of a specific question, the nature of a
survey does not allow for communication with the researcher to clarify the question, potentially
resulting in an untrue and questionable response. Another limitation may be encountered if the
31
rates of survey participant return are low, which is a likely outcome if the survey is lengthy or if
students do not feel compelled by the subject matter, and decide not to complete the survey, or
complete it without giving careful thought.
Efficiency is the primary reason behind the selection of self-reported electronic surveys
as the instrument. They are cost-effective and easily implemented to large samples across a
variety of institutions not in the local vicinity. The conscious choice to use this instrument
comes with known disadvantages, including exaggeration of answers, social bias, and the
potential to represent only a person’s feelings at the time they completed the self-reported
survey.
The survey (CCMQ-S) was distributed to a stratified random sample of undergraduate
students at UTK, with analysis done to compare perceptions of commuter and non-commuter
students. Specific students may have had unique experiences with campus crises and unique
exposure to emergency notification atypical of other students, and similar to the selection of only
one university in one region of the United States, these students do not accurately represent the
entire student body at their respective institution.
The specific type of crisis in the present study was limited to active shootings, with other
crises lumped together as general campus crises. As students are answering questions regarding
preparedness and communication about campus crises, students may not be thinking about the
same types of crises. Care needs to be taken when generalizing student responses to specific
crises not related to active shooting situations since responses were generalized to all campus
crises. Therefore, results are limited to the interpretations and perceptions of the specific
individuals who completed the survey, which is not the institutional reality.
32
Summary
The study used a quantitative research design to gain insight into students’ perceptions of
institutional crisis management, preparedness, and response, specifically in regards to active
shooter preparedness. The research design is a descriptive study. The data collection instrument
was an electronically self-administered questionnaire modified from a previous study to gauge
the perceptions of students as opposed to institutional leaders. The study was conducted at UTK
and targets all undergraduate students, with an additional focus on the similarities and
differences between perceptions of commuter versus non-commuter students. Chapters 4 and 5
present the findings from the original research and discuss the study and conclusions, along with
implications for future practice and research.
33
Chapter 4
Results
The purpose of this study was to consider student perceptions of institutional crisis
management, preparedness, and response. More specifically, the study sought to examine
student perceptions of active shooter preparedness and of the effectiveness of ENS used in the
event of an active shooter on campus. An existing survey instrument was modified and sent to
2,000 students at UTK. Pairs of questions were developed to ascertain perceptions of
management and preparedness for both general crises and active shooting situations to analyze
differences.
Zdziarski (2001), in the original study with which this study is modified, focused on the
existence and type of written crisis management plan—either institutional, student affairs
specific, both, or neither—as a basis for analysis and comparison. The focus of the present study
was of overall student perceptions, including perceptions of the existence of those plans, instead
of existence as institutional reality. Because the study only took place at one institution, a
different quantifier delineates students and their responses. The data in the study were analyzed
based on student residency—on or off-campus—in addition to other demographic factors
(located in Appendix G), as well as an overall analysis of the general student respondent.
The survey asked respondents where they currently reside, on-campus (in a university-
owned residence hall) or off-campus, as well as the number of semesters lived on and off-
campus. Of the 204 students who completed the survey through the demographic questions, 121
(59.31%) currently lived on-campus (non-commuters) and 83 (40.69%) currently lived off-
campus (commuters). Table 4.1 provides additional residency information reported for student’s
34
entire undergraduate collegiate tenure, while additional demographic information is located in
various tables in Appendix E.
Table 4.1
Collegiate Residency of Student Respondents
On-campus (residence hall)
Off-campus
# of Semesters Count % # of Semesters
Count %
0 32 15.69 0 115 56.37
1 21 10.29 1 16 7.84
2 93 45.59 2 32 15.69
3 2 0.98 3 7 3.43
4 37 18.14 4 13 6.37
5 3 1.47 5 3 1.47
6 12 5.88 6 12 5.88
7 1 0.49 7 2 0.98
8 3 1.47 8 3 1.47
12 1 0.49
Chapter 4 reports the analysis of the responses to the survey and is organized into five
sections. The first four sections are based on the research questions that directed this study:
1) What are students perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness
and effectiveness of ENS?
2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active shooter
preparedness) being communicated effectively?
3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’
levels of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a
campus crisis or active shooting?
35
4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the
event of an emergency or active shooting?
The final section discusses results from additional analyses that do not necessarily fit into
one of the previous sections from the initial research questions.
Perceptions of Preparedness
Institutional preparedness to respond. Students were asked to indicate their
perceptions of how prepared their institution is to respond to both general campus crises and
active shooters on a scale from 1 (unprepared) to 10 (well-prepared), as well as asking if their
institution has a written plan addressing both campuses crises and active shooters, specifically.
All 258 students responded to this section of questions.
As reported in Figure 4.1 regarding perceptions of institutional preparedness to respond
to campus crises, 50 students (19.38%) indicated a perceived preparedness level of 8/10,
53
(20.54%) indicated a 7/10, 51 (19.77%) indicated a 6/10, and 31 (12.02%) indicated a 5/10. The
mean response (μ) was 6.38 (σ = 1.99). Eighty-five students (32.95%) reported that their
institution had a written plan addressing campus crises, while 166 (64.34%) indicated they did
not know.
As reported in Figure 4.2 regarding perceptions of institutional preparedness to respond
to active shooters, 37 students (14.34%) indicated a preparedness level of 8/10, 52 (20.16%)
indicated 7/10, 37 (14.37%) indicated a 6/10, and 32 (12.4%) indicated a 5/10. The mean
response (μ) was 5.80 (σ = 2.32). Fifty-eight students (22.48%) reported that their institution had
a written plan addressing active shooters, while 197 (76.36%) indicated they did not know.
36
Figure 4.1
Perceptions of Institutional Preparedness for Campus Crises
Figure 4.2
Perceptions of Institutional Preparedness for Active Shooters
37
The distribution of responses between campus crises (μ = 6.34) and active shooters (μ =
5.80), respectively, indicated that students perceive their institution as being moderately prepared
to respond to both general campus crises and active shooters, even though an overwhelming
majority did not know if there are written crisis management plans in place for either general
campus crises or active shooters.
Specifically, non-commuters perceived their institution as being slightly more prepared to
respond to campus crises (μ = 6.54) and active shooters (μ = 5.96) than did commuter students
(campus crises, μ = 6.19; active shooters, μ = 5.53). There was no statistically significant
relationship between current residency and perceptions of institutional preparedness to respond
to either campus crises (p = 0.717) or active shooters (p = 0.823).
Self-preparedness to protect. As a shift from examining institutional preparedness and
moving specifically to active shooting situations, students were then prompted to respond to a set
of questions regarding perceived levels of preparedness to protect themselves in an active
shooting situation depending on the location of the active shooter—in their hometown, in the
areas surrounding campus, on the main campus (outdoors), in a campus building nearby (not
where you are), in the building where you are located, and in your classroom. The
hometown
option, while not considered part of the institution, was used as a control to put proximity into
perspective. A total of 214 students responded to this set of questions.
Students reported feeling most prepared to protect themselves if the shooter is in their
hometown (μ = 7.32), and less prepared to protect themselves if the shooter is in their
classroom
(μ = 3.72). Responses varied depending on proximity to the shooter, as shown in Table 4.2.
As reported in Table 4.2.1, non-commuters reported feeling more prepared than
commuters to protect themselves if the active shooter was on-campus; commuters reported
38
feeling more prepared than non-commuters to protect themselves if the active shooter was off-
campus. There was no statistically significant relationship between current residency and
preparedness to be able to protect yourself based on the location of the active shooter.
Table 4.2
Self-Protection Based on
Location of Active Shooter
In your
hometown
Areas
surrounding
campus
Main
campus,
outdoors
Different
campus
building
In your
building on
campus
In your
classroom
# % # % # %
# % # % # %
1 (unprepared) 9 4.2 26 12.1 26 12.1 17 7.9 45 21.0 81 37.9
2 2 0.9 10 4.7 11 5.1 9 4.2 14 6.5 13 6.1
3 3 1.4 14 6.5 16 7.5 13 6.1 12 5.6 19 8.9
4 20 9.3 25 11.7 31 14.5 28 13.1 24 11.2 22 10.3
5 18 8.4 32 15.0 31 14.5 26 12.1 30 14.0 19 8.9
6 16 7.5 28 13.1 26 12.1 21 9.8 18 8.4 22 10.3
7 26 12.1 28 13.1 24 11.2 35 16.4 26 12.1 13 6.1
8 38 17.8 25 11.7 26 12.1 29 13.6 16 7.5 8 3.7
9 27 12.6 12 5.6 15 7.0 16 7.5 13 6.1 8 3.7
10 (well prepared) 55 25.7 14 6.5 8 3.7 20 9.3 16 7.5 9 4.2
Mean 7.32 5.42 5.24 5.90 4.90 3.72
Standard Deviation 2.48 2.61 2.58 2.60 2.90 2.79
Table 4.2.1
Self-Protection, Non-Commuter versus
Commuter
Location of Active Shooter
Significance
(p)
Non-commuter
Mean (μ)
Commuter
Mean (μ)
Overall
Mean (μ)
Hometown 0.203 7.11 7.63 7.32
Areas surrounding campus 0.157 5.33 5.61 5.42
Main campus, outdoors 0.328 5.37 4.99 5.24
Nearby campus building 0.242 6.06 5.55 5.90
Campus building where you are 0.100 5.22 4.41 4.91
Classroom 0.240 3.81 3.55 3.72
39
Additionally, students were given the opportunity to explain their level of preparedness to
protect themselves, given the previous situations, in an open-ended format. A total of 214
students provided an explanation and responses varied. After coding all valid responses, distinct
themes emerged from both sides of the preparedness spectrum. Twelve responses were
unusable, leaving 202 valid
responses.
For the 22 students who provided a response indicating a positive level of preparedness,
many had previously thought about what to do if an active shooting situation were to occur.
They had some experience with training and past drills. They indicated being resourceful, aware
of their surroundings, and knowing where to run and hide if they needed to.
For the 168 students who provided a response indicating a more negative level of
preparedness, many simply did not know how to protect themselves. Students think they would
panic and be terrified if confronted, especially since they did not think there was anywhere to
hide. Twenty-four students reported not being able to carry weapons as their reason for feeling
unprepared, leading to them and others to now know how to protect themselves. A few students
perceived a lack of police presence, a lack of timely and valid alert messages, and an “unsafe”
campus as their reasoning. The largest emergent theme from this question, as indicated by
61
students, was a response that not enough information was given to students about what to do in
an active shooting situation; they indicated they have not been trained, do not know protocol, and
that it was not communicated.
Responses from 12 students indicated a mixed level of preparedness. These students
reported that proximity of the shooter to the student was another emergent theme that dictated
self-perceived levels of preparedness and how safe they would feel. Students reported feeling
more prepared if the shooter was farther away, but less prepared if the shooter was in their
40
classroom or out in public where they might be at the time, which aligned with the quantitative
data from the previous questions regarding self-protection. The comprehensive list of open-
ended responses to this question is located in Table F1 in Appendix F.
Communication of Crisis Management and Active Shooter Protocol
Effective protocol communication. Students were asked to indicate their perceptions of
how effective both crisis management and active shooter protocol were communicated to
students on a scale from 1 (not effective) to 10 (very effective). Similarly, they were asked how
crisis management and active shooter preparedness plans were actually communicated to
students. A total of 239 students responded to this section of questions.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of responses to the question regarding perceptions of
effective communication of crisis management protocol. While the top responses were 4/10 (36
students; 15.06%), 5/10 (31 students; 12.97%), 6/10 (29 students; 12.13%), and 7/10 (29
students; 12.13%), there were similar frequency counts that spanned the effectiveness spectrum,
suggesting that there was no clear consensus or majority of student perceptions (μ = 5.58; σ =
2.61).
Figure 4.4 continues to illustrate the distribution of responses to the question regarding
perceptions of effective communication, but of active shooter protocol, specifically. The top
responses were 1/10 (40 students; 16.74%), 4/10 (35 students; 14.64%), and 7/10 (33 students;
13.81%). There were also similar frequency counts throughout the range; however, the
distributions show that students perceived active shooter protocol (μ = 4.90; σ = 2.71) as
communicated less than general crisis management protocol.
41
Figure 4.3
Perceptions of Institutional Communication of Crisis Management Protocol
Figure 4.4
Perceptions of Institutional Communication of Active Shooter Protocol
42
Non-commuters perceived crisis management protocol (μ = 5.67) and active shooter
protocol (μ = 4.84) as communicated just as effectively as commuter students (campus
management protocol, μ = 5.51; active shooter preparedness plans, μ = 4.76). There was no
statistically significant relationship between current residency and perceptions of either effective
communication of crisis management protocol (p = 0.793) or active shooter protocol (p = 0.737).
Protocol communication mediums. In combination with the previous questions,
students were asked to indicate how they believed both crisis management and active shooter
preparedness plans are communicated to students. Ten communication mediums were listed, as
well as an option for “not communicated” and an “other” option allowing students to input their
own responses. A total of 239 students responded to these questions, most with multiple
responses.
As reported in Table 4.3, the communication mediums for crisis management plans with
the highest frequencies for which students reported their institution using were: email sent to all
students (162 students; 67.78%); plan accessible on UTK website (103 students; 43.1%); new
student orientation (78 students; 32.64%); and copy of plan available upon request (66 students;
27.62%). A total of 651 total responses were recorded. Table 4.3.1 illustrates the differences
between non-commuters and commuters in terms of communication of crisis management plans.
A higher percentage of non-commuter students believed crisis management plans were
communicated through drills, exercises, and simulations as compared to commuter students.
Higher percentages of commuter students believed crisis management plans were communicated
through new student orientation and social media as compared to non-commuter students.
For communication mediums of active shooter preparedness plans, also reported in Table
4.3, the responses with the highest frequencies were: email sent to all students (116 students;
43
48.54%); not communicated (84 students; 35.15%); plan accessible on UTK website (65
students; 27.20%); and copy of plan available upon request (43 students; 17.99%). A total of
473 total responses were recorded, as compared to 651 for crisis management plans, indicating
that students believed active shooter preparedness plans were communicated less than general
crisis management plans. Table 4.3.2 illustrates the differences between non-commuters and
commuters in terms of communication of active shooter preparedness plans. Higher percentages
of commuter students believed active shooter preparedness plans were communicated through
social media and “a copy available upon request” than non-commuter students.
Table 4.3
Crisis Management and Active Shooter Preparedness Communication Mediums
Crisis Management
Plans
Active Shooter
Preparedness Plans
Count % Count %
Not communicated 43 17.99 84 35.15
Copy of plan available upon request 66 27.62 43 17.99
Plan accessible on UTK website 103 43.10 65 27.20
Annual notification 42 17.57 19 7.95
New employee orientation 21 8.79 12 5.02
New student orientation 78 32.64 37 15.48
Optional crisis management training sessions 16 6.69 20 8.37
Required crisis management training sessions 4 1.67 7 2.93
Drills, exercises, and simulations 61 25.52 20 8.37
Email sent to all students 162 67.78 116 48.54
Social media 42 17.57 33 13.81
Other (please specify) 13 5.44 17 7.11
Total Responses 651 473
Total Respondents 239
239
44
Table 4.3.1
Crisis Management Plan Communication,
Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Non-Commuter Commuter
Count % Count %
Not communicated 23 19.01 13 15.66
Copy of plan available upon request 27 22.31 25 30.12
Plan accessible on UTK website 51 42.15 36 43.37
Annual notification 19 15.70 15 18.07
New employee orientation 3 2.48 13 15.66
New student orientation 36 29.75 30 36.14
Optional crisis management training sessions 6 4.96 6 7.23
Required crisis management training sessions 1 0.83 2 2.41
Drills, exercises, and simulations 38 31.40 13 15.66
Email sent to all students 79 65.29 59 71.08
Social media 16 13.22 20 24.10
Other (please specify) 6 4.96 5 6.02
Total Responses 305 237
Total Respondents 121 83
Table 4.3.2
Active Shooter Preparedness Communication, Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Non-Commuter Commuter
Count % Count %
Not communicated 43 35.54 30 36.14
Copy of plan available upon request 18 14.88 18 21.69
Plan accessible on UTK website 34 28.10 20 24.10
Annual notification 5 4.13 7 8.43
New employee orientation 2 1.65 5 6.02
New student orientation 16 13.22 13 15.66
Optional crisis management training sessions 4 3.31 8 9.64
Required crisis management training sessions 2 1.65 2 2.41
Drills, exercises, and simulations 7 5.79 7 8.43
Email sent to all students 58 47.93 40 48.19
Social media 12 9.92 14 16.87
Other (please specify) 6 4.96 7 8.43
Total Responses 207 171
Total Respondents 121
83
45
Emergency Notification Satisfaction
UT Alert system. Of 213 students, 198 (92.96%) reported being registered for the UT
Alert system, and there were a variety of reasons for signing up. A total of 177 (83.10%)
registered for the system because they wanted to know when something happens on campus;
98
(46.01%) indicated safety as their main concern; 76 (35.68%) reported that somebody told them
to register; and 37 (17.37%) thought registration for the UT Alert system was required. Those
students who were not signed up were able to indicate their reasons for not doing so.
If the UTK automatically signed up every student for the UT Alert system but gave
students the option to remain signed-up or remove themselves from the system, an overwhelming
201 of 206 students (97.57%) indicated they would remain a part of the system.
Students were asked to respond with levels of satisfaction toward various components of
the UT Alert system. Table 4.4 demonstrates the frequencies and percentages with which
students are satisfied or very satisfied with: text message alerts (156 students; 74.29%); email
notifications (156 students; 74.29%); and the overall UT Alert system (147 students; 70.68%).
Table 4.4.1 reports student satisfaction with the UT Alert system in terms of residency.
The differences in means between non-commuters and commuters over all three areas of
satisfaction were relatively minimal, indicating that all students were equally satisfied with the
UT Alert system. There was no statistically significant relationship between residency and
student satisfaction with the UT Alert system.
46
Table 4.4
Student Satisfaction with UT Alert System
Text message alerts
Email notifications
Overall UT Alert
system
# % # % # %
Very Satisfied (5) 77 36.67 72 34.29 62 29.81
Satisfied (4) 79 37.62 84 40.00 85 40.87
Neutral (3) 28 13.33 34 16.19 42 20.19
Unsatisfied (2) 18 8.57 19 9.05 15 7.21
Very Unsatisfied (1) 8 3.81 1 0.48 4 1.92
Mean 3.9476 3.9857 3.8942
Standard Deviation 1.09024 .95586 .97721
Table 4.4.1
Student Satisfaction with UT Alert System, Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Significance (p)
Non-commuter
Mean (μ)
Commuter
Mean (μ)
Overall
Mean (μ)
Text message alerts 0.369 3.95 3.94 3.95
Email notification 0.453 4.01 3.95 3.99
Overall UT Alert system 0.512 3.85 3.9 3.89
Quantity and timeliness of emergency messages. Students were then asked to rate their
levels of agreement of six statements regarding quantity and timeliness of emergency messages.
A total of 213 students responded to this matrix of questions, and the results are located below in
Table 4.5. Eighty-four students (39.44%) strongly disagreed that their institution sends out too
many emergency messages and 116 students (54.46%) agreed and strongly agreed that their
institution sends out emergency messages in a timely manner. When given the statement “my
institution does not send out emergency messages,” 173 students (81.22%) strongly disagreed.
Table 4.5.1 demonstrates that the reported means for non-commuters and commuters in
terms of quantity and timeliness of messages are aligned very closely with each other, and with
47
the overall mean for the overall student sample. There was no statistically significant
relationship between residency and perceptions of quantity and timeliness of messages.
Table 4.5
Perceptions of Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages
Too
many
Right
amount
Not
enough
Timely Not
timely
No
messages
# % # %
# % # % # % # %
5 (Strongly agree) 11 5.16 60 28.17 19 8.92 42 19.72 22 10.33 2 0.94
4 21 9.86 71 33.33 17 7.98 74 34.74 29 13.62 4 1.88
3 37 17.37 48 22.54 45 21.13 52 24.41 26 12.21 15 7.04
2 60 28.17 20 9.39 64 30.05 27 12.68 72 33.80 19 8.92
1 (Strongly disagree) 84 39.44 14 6.57 68 31.92 18 8.45 64 30.05 173 81.22
Mean 2.1315 3.6714 2.3192 3.4460 2.4038 1.3239
Standard Deviation 1.19021 1.17159 1.24819 1.18686 1.31980 .76679
Table 4.5.1
Perceptions of Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages,
Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Significance (p)
Non-commuter
Mean (μ)
Commuter
Mean (μ)
Overall
Mean (μ)
Too many messages 0.938 2.17 2.06 2.13
Right amount of messages 0.874 3.69 3.66 3.67
Not enough messages 0.234 2.34 2.27 2.32
Messages are timely 0.161 3.52 3.37 3.45
Messages are not timely 0.278 2.38 2.42 2.4
No messages are sent 0.917 1.32 1.31 1.32
Effective Communication Strategies
Effective pre-crisis communication mediums. Similar to previous questions regarding
perceptions of communication mediums actually used, this set of questions asked students to
48
select the same communication mediums they believed would be effective to communicate crisis
management and active shooter preparedness plans (pre-crisis), regardless of the existence of
those mediums at their institution. The same ten communication mediums were listed, as well as
“other” for students to input their own responses. A total of 239 students responded with 1078
total responses.
As reported in Table 4.6, the mediums indicated as being most effective for
communicating crisis management and active shooter preparedness plans were: email sent to all
students (192 students; 80.33%); new student orientation (133 students; 55.65%); plan accessible
on UTK website (125 students; 52.30%); drills, exercises, and simulations (107 students;
44.77%); and social media (104 students; 43.51%). The communication mediums students
perceived as being most effective were some of the same ones indicated as already being in place
at their institution, with the exception of drills, exercises, and simulations.
Table 4.6
Perceptions of Effective Pre-Crisis Communication Mediums
Count %
Copy of plan available upon request 88 36.82
Plan accessible on UTK website 125 52.30
Annual notification 100 41.84
New employee orientation 83 34.73
New student orientation 133 55.65
Optional crisis management training sessions 82 34.31
Required crisis management training sessions 51 21.34
Drills, exercises, and simulations 107 44.77
Email sent to all students 192 80.33
Social media 104 43.51
Other (please specify) 13 5.44
Total Responses 1078
Total Respondents 239
49
Table 4.6.1 indicates the differences between non-commuters and commuters in terms of
which pre-crisis communication mediums they perceive would be most effective. Non-
commuters perceived a “plan accessible on UTK website” to be more effective than commuters
do. Commuters perceived new student orientation, new employee orientation, required crisis
management training sessions, and social media to be more effective than non-commuters do.
Table 4.6.1
Perceptions of Effective Pre-Crisis Communication, Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Non-Commuter Commuter
Count % Count %
Copy of plan available upon request 42 34.71 31 37.35
Plan accessible on UTK website 69 57.02 42 50.60
Annual notification 50 41.32 35 42.17
New employee orientation 33 27.27 37 44.58
New student orientation 63 52.07 54 65.06
Optional crisis management training sessions 41 33.88 27 32.53
Required crisis management training sessions 18 14.88 23 27.71
Drills, exercises, and simulations 52 42.98 41 49.40
Email sent to all students 96 79.34 70 84.34
Social media 48 39.67 42 50.60
Other (please specify) 6 4.96 5 6.02
Total Responses 518 407
Total Respondents 121 83
Notification during crisis. The focus of the questions on the instrument shifted from a
pre-crisis preparedness communication towards notification during a live crisis or emergency
situation. Eleven means of communication were listed as options, as well as “none of the
above”, “I don’t know”, and “other.” When asked how students are notified of a campus crisis
or emergency, the top responses, as shown in Table 4.7, were text message alerts (196 students;
50
95.15%), email notification (195 students; 94.66%), social media (69 students; 33.50%), fire
panel alarms with voice enunciation (22 students; 10.68%), and posting on the homepage of the
institutional website (21 students; 10.19%). A total of 206 students responded with 558 total
responses.
Table 4.7.1 indicates the differences between non-commuters and commuters in terms of
how they believe students are notified during a campus crisis or emergency. The reported
percentages for non-commuters and commuters were aligned very closely with each other, and
with the overall percentages of the overall student sample.
Table 4.7
Student Notification of Campus Crisis or Emergency
Count %
Text message alerts 196 95.15
Email notification 195 94.66
Automated phone calls 3 1.46
Posting on the homepage of the institutional website 21 10.19
Social media 69 33.50
Outdoor sirens 14 6.80
Outdoor-broadcast messages 3 1.46
Radio-broadcast messages 5 2.43
Fire panel alarms with voice enunciation 22 10.68
Digital signage 3 1.46
Indoor building public address systems 12 5.83
None of the above. 1 0.49
I don’t know. 13 6.31
Other (please specify) 1 0.49
Total Responses 558
Total Respondents 206
51
Table 4.7.1
Student Notification of Crisis, Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Non-commuter Commuter
Count % Count %
Text message alerts 113 93.39 82 98.80
Email notification 114 94.21 79 95.18
Automated phone calls 1 0.83 1 1.20
Posting on the homepage of the institutional website 10 8.26 11 13.25
Social media 41 33.88 27 32.53
Outdoor sirens 5 4.13 9 10.84
Outdoor-broadcast messages 0 0.00 3 3.61
Radio-broadcast messages 1 0.83 4 4.82
Fire panel alarms with voice enunciation 15 12.40 7 8.43
Digital signage 1 0.83 1 1.20
Indoor building public address systems 9 7.44 3 3.61
None of the above. 1 0.83 0 0.00
I don’t know. 4 3.31 9 10.84
Other (please specify) 0 0.00 1 1.20
Total Responses 315 237
Total Respondents 121 83
Effective notification during crisis. The final matrix of questions on the instrument
prompted students to rate each of the previous 11 means of communication in terms of possible
effectiveness in the event of an emergency, but only in the specific event of an active shooting
situation. Table 4.8 shows that students perceived the most effective means to be text message
alerts (μ = 9.04), outdoor sirens (μ = 8.09), and outdoor-broadcast messages (μ = 7.58); students
perceived posting on the homepage of the institutional website (μ = 4.44) and radio-
broadcast
messages (μ = 4.91) to be the least effective means to notify students during an active shooting.
Table 4.8.1 demonstrates that the reported means for non-commuters and commuters in
terms of perceptions of effective notification during an active shooting were aligned very closely
with each other, and with the mean for the overall student sample. There was no statistically
52
significant relationship between residency and perceptions of quantity and timeliness of
emergency messages.
Table 4.8
Perceptions of Effective Notification during Active Shooting
Text message
alerts
notification
Automated
phone calls
Posting on
institutional
homepage
# % # % # % # %
10 (very effective) 124 60.19 53 25.73 36 17.48 16 7.77
9 30 14.56 26 12.62 17 8.25 12 5.83
8 31 15.05 32 15.53 25 12.14 16 7.77
7 7 3.40 20 9.71 28 13.59 10 4.85
6 2 0.97 19 9.22 14 6.80 25 12.14
5 5 2.43 22 10.68 16 7.77 14 6.80
4 2 0.97 10 4.85 15 7.28 17 8.25
3 3 1.46 9 4.37 15 7.28 21 10.19
2 0 0.00 4 1.94 8 3.88 22 10.68
1 (not effective) 2 0.97 11 5.34 32 15.53 53 25.73
Mean 9.04 7.13 5.95 4.44
Standard Deviation 1.66 2.66 3.12 3.03
Social media
Outdoor sirens
Outdoor-
broadcast
messages
Radio-broadcast
messages
# % # % # % # %
10 (very effective) 53 25.73 81 39.32 70 33.98 15 7.28
9 22 10.68 39 18.93 29 14.08 12 5.83
8 34 16.50 29 14.08 30 14.56 19 9.22
7 20 9.71 20 9.71 25 12.14 20 9.71
6 7 3.40 9 4.37 10 4.85 24 11.65
5 25 12.14 9 4.37 11 5.34 24 11.65
4 10 4.85 3 1.46 7 3.40 15 7.28
3 7 3.40 2 0.97 8 3.88 24 11.65
2 6 2.91 2 0.97 3 1.46 13 6.31
1 (not effective) 22 10.68 12 5.83 13 6.31 40 19.42
Mean 6.80 8.09 7.58 4.91
Standard Deviation 3.00 2.48 2.70 2.89
53
Table 4.8 (continued)
Fire panel alarms
with voice
enunciation
Digital signage
Indoor building
public address
systems
# % # % # %
10 (very effective) 65 31.55 29 14.08 61 29.61
9 32 15.53 16 7.77 29 14.08
8 35 16.99 22 10.68 41 19.90
7 19 9.22 30 14.56 20 9.71
6 14 6.80 19 9.22 15 7.28
5 11 5.34 28 13.59 14 6.80
4 7 3.40 14 6.80 1 0.49
3 5 2.43 14 6.80 6 2.91
2 4 1.94 2 0.97 4 1.94
1 (not effective) 14 6.80 32 15.53 15 7.28
Mean 7.55 5.86 7.50
Standard Deviation 2.70 2.93 2.70
Table 4.8.1
Perceptions of Effective Notification during Active Shooting,
Non-Commuter versus Commuter
Significance (p)
Non-commuter
Mean (μ)
Commuter
Mean (μ)
Overall
Mean (μ)
Text message alerts 0.381 9.02 9.07 9.04
Email notification 0.223 7.06 7.28 7.14
Automated phone calls 0.819 5.97 5.94 5.95
Posting on the homepage of the
institutional website 0.522 4.07 4.99 4.44
Social media 0.195 6.56 7.12 6.81
Outdoor sirens 0.985 8.11 8.01 8.09
Outdoor-broadcast messages 0.393 7.64 7.46 7.58
Radio-broadcast messages 0.941 4.73 5.1 4.91
Fire panel alarms with voice
enunciation 0.829 7.52 7.54 7.55
Digital signage 0.745 5.69 6.05 5.86
Indoor building
public address systems 0188 7.37 7.65 7.50
54
Additional Results
In addition to gauging student perceptions about crisis management, preparedness, and
response, students were asked if being informed about the previous information was important.
Fifty-eight students (27.1%) agreed and 141 students (65.89%) strongly agreed that being
informed about how to protect themselves during campus crises was important to them.
Similarly and more specifically, 41 students (19.16%) agreed and 157 students (73.36%)
strongly agreed that being informed about how to protect themselves during active shooting
situations was important.
55
Chapter 5
Summary, Discussion, and Recommendations
This chapter provides a brief summary of the purpose, procedures and major findings,
conclusions and discussion, limitations of the study, implications for practice, and directions for
further research.
Summary
Purpose of the Study. The purpose of this study was to consider student perceptions of
institutional crisis management, preparedness, and response. More specifically, the study sought
to examine student perceptions of active shooter preparedness and of the effectiveness of
emergency notification systems (ENS) used in the event of an active shooter on campus. This
study was designed to explore the following research questions specific to students, rather than
institutional or higher education administrators:
1) What are students perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness
and effectiveness of ENS?
2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active shooter
preparedness) being communicated effectively?
3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’
levels of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a
campus crisis or active shooting?
4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the
event of an emergency or active shooting?
Review of the Procedures. The research design was a descriptive study using survey
research methodology. The nature of this survey was cross-sectional, with data collected at one
56
single point in time and only studied once (Shaughnessy et al., 2011). The study was conducted
at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK), a large public four-year research institution,
and enlisted a stratified random sample of undergraduate students—an equal random sample of
1000 commuter students and 1000 non-commuter students were selected for inclusion in the
study (for a total of 2000 students). This study targeted undergraduate students, but a
stratification of commuter versus non-commuter students was analyzed for potential statistical
significant similarities and differences using the chi-squared significance test.
The specific data collection instrument was an electronically self-administered
questionnaire modified from a previous study (Zdziarski, 2001) to fit the needs of the present
study. After pilot-testing with two groups of students at UTK, the instrument was sent to the
2,000 undergraduate students in the sample on February 10
th
, 2015. A total of 258 students
began the survey, for an overall response rate of 12.9%. Of these responses, only 204 completed
the survey in its entirety (through the demographic questions), for an adjusted completed
response rate of 10.2%.
Summary of the Findings.
1) What are student’s perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness and
effectiveness of ENS?
For campus crises, UTK students perceived their institution to be moderately prepared to
respond to general campus crises, even though an overwhelming majority did not know if there
was a written plan in place. For active shooting situations, the same results held—perceptions of
moderate institutional preparedness, even though the majority of students did not know if a
written plan was in place.
57
Students reported feeling more prepared to protect themselves against an active shooter
as the distance between them and the active shooter increased. When asked to explain their level
of preparedness to protect themselves, responses varied on both ends of the preparedness
spectrum. The majority of students provided a response indicating a negative level of
preparedness. The most common responses attributing to feeling unprepared were simply
students not knowing what they would do, not being able to have a gun on campus, and protocol
not being communicated.
2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active shooter
preparedness) being communicated effectively?
There was no clear consensus of student perceptions regarding effective institutional
communication of crisis management protocol (μ = 5.58; σ = 2.61) or active shooter protocol (μ
= 4.90; σ = 2.71). This suggested that students perceived active shooter protocol communication
as less effective than communication of general crisis management protocol; however, the
distribution of responses and standard deviations were excessively high, bringing the validity of
the results from this section, as well as other sections with high standard deviations, into
question.
Analyses of data showed that the mediums used most to communicate crisis management
plans were: email sent to all students, plan accessible on UTK website, new student orientation,
and drills, exercises, and simulations. For communication of active shooter preparedness plans,
the most used mediums according to the data were: email sent to all students, “not
communicated,” plan accessible on UTK website, and copy of plan available upon request. It
follows that students believe active shooter preparedness plans were communicated less than
general crisis management plans.
58
3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’ levels
of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a campus crisis or
active shooting?
Students reported signing up for the UT Alert system for a variety of reasons: because
they wanted to know when something happened on campus; safety is a main concern; somebody
told them to register; and many thought it was required to register. Overall, students were
satisfied with the text message alerts (μ = 3.95), email notification (μ = 3.99), and the overall UT
Alert system (μ = 3.89).
The majority of students: strongly disagreed that their institution sends out too many
emergency messages; agreed that their institution sends out emergency messages in a timely
manner; and strongly disagreed to the statement “my institution does not send out emergency
messages.”
4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the event of
an emergency or active shooting?
The most effective communication mediums, as reported by students, for communicating
crisis management and active shooter preparedness plans (pre-crisis) were: email sent to all
students; new student orientation; plan accessible on UTK website; drills, exercises, and
simulations; and annual notification. These were some of the same ones students indicated as
actually being in place.
Students indicated that, during an emergency on campus, they were notified most often
by text message alerts, emails, social media, and fire panel alarms with voice enunciation. The
final question asked students which means of communication would be most effective to notify
students of an active shooting during the incident. The responses listed as most effective were
59
text message alerts, outdoor sirens, and outdoor-broadcast messages, while the least effective
were posting on the homepage of the institutional website and radio-broadcast messages.
In addition, students generally agreed that being informed about how to protect
themselves during general campus crises and during active shooting situations was important to
them.
Overall, there was no statistically significant relationship between where a student
currently resides (on-campus or off-campus) and any of the perception, preparedness,
communication, or response variables presented in the study.
Conclusions
1. Students at UTK generally believe their institutions are prepared to respond to active
shooters (although less than general campus crises), even though the students do not feel as
prepared to protect themselves.
2. Regardless if crisis management or active shooter preparedness plans are
communicated to students, students do not usually know if these plans exist. They believe that
drills, exercises, and simulations are one method that would be effective to communicate active
shooter protocol that they do not perceive to currently be in place.
3. Text messages and emails are used most frequently to notify students of a campus
crisis or emergency, but there are additional ways students perceive to be effective means to
communicate emergency messages including outdoor sirens and outdoor broadcast messages.
4. Students want to be informed about how to protect themselves during campus crises,
specifically, active shooting situations. Many of these students have never previously thought
about the possibility of being involved in this sort of incident, and similarly, have never thought
about the existence of written institutional protocol.
60
5. There is no relationship between where a student resides and their perceptions of
institutional crisis management, preparedness, and response, even though there were some slight
differences in average responses with this specific sample population.
Discussion
The results of this study suggest students had moderate to high perceptions of
institutional preparedness, which closely aligns with previous research (Burrell, 2009; Catullo et
al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Heiselt & Burrell, 2012; Zdziarski, 2001) regarding perceptions of
administrators and leaders of postsecondary institutions.
Viewing the results through the Terror Management Theory (TMT) framework begins to
explain the incongruence between the first set of questions answered—if students perceived their
institutions to be prepared to respond to campus crises and active shooters, and if written crises
management and active shooter preparedness plans exist. Students generally perceived their
institutions to be prepared, but an overwhelming percentage of students did not know if written
plans are in place. According to TMT, there are two hypotheses—the anxiety-buffer hypothesis
posits that self-esteem protects individuals against anxiety, thus strengthening self-esteem makes
one less susceptible to anxiety-related behavior; and the mortality salience hypothesis relates to
the psychological structure that intangibly protects individuals against anxiety, thus, reminding
people of the cause of their anxiety increases the need for that structure (Pyszczynski et al., 1999).
To increase their levels of self-esteem and lessen their anxiety, students may report positive
perceptions of institutional preparedness; the alternative of believing the institution is unprepared
may invoke anxiety and the thoughts of what may happen during campus crises should the institution
not respond appropriately. When asked questions regarding emergency notification, the
communication mediums reported as being in place to notify students were the same communication
mediums reported as having the potential to be most effective, should a campus crisis or active
61
shooting occur. The TMT framework would suggest that having these positive perceptions of
effectiveness allows students to have positive reactions that support the psychological structure that,
again, lessens anxiety and dispels any notions of feeling unsafe.
Students, overall, did not know if there was written protocol to respond to campus crises
or active shooters is in place, which aligns with the extent of open-ended responses indicating
that students did not know protocol because it is not communicated to them. Because students
generally perceived their institutions to be prepared, they may have never had to consider nor
think about the actual plans the institution has in place to activate during these situations; thus,
when prompted with the question, the overwhelming realization was one of uncertainty, with a
handful of students reporting open-endedly that they now want to know the protocol. A link to
institutional protocol was included at the end of the survey. Exposure to the survey and study
prompted some students to begin to think more about this topic and the possibility of a similar
incident happening.
Non-commuter students and commuter-students had similar responses and distributions
across the entire survey instrument. The initial sample was stratified (1000 non-commuters and
1000 commuters) to analyze if there were significant differences between the two populations,
but descriptive statistics and chi-squared significance-testing posit that a significant relationship
did not exist.
Recommendations and Implications for Practice
This study represented an initial effort to identify student perceptions regarding crisis
management, active shooter preparedness, and emergency notification. The following are
recommendations and implications for practice based on student responses.
First, institutions should be intentional about communicating crisis management plans—
specifically active shooter preparedness plans—to students. An overwhelming majority of
62
students—64.34% for campus crises and 76.36% for active shooters—did not know if a written
plan exists within the institution, so ensuring students have easy access to and are aware of these
plans would shift student perceptions of preparedness and communication of preparedness plans
in a more positive and effective direction. Crisis management plans that administrators and
postsecondary leaders note as being effective and in place (Zdziarski, 2001) are less effective if
students are not aware of their existence.
Second, institutions should begin to use additional mediums to communicate crisis
management and active shooter preparedness plans in the pre-crisis stage. Students were asked
two different questions regarding pre-crisis communication: which communication mediums
were used and which they perceived would be effective to use. Aside from those with high
frequencies from both perspectives—email, plan accessible on UTK website, and copy available
upon request—students reported at a much higher frequency additional communication mediums
that would be effective even though less students reported those specific communication
mediums actually being in place. Those mediums include social media, new student orientation,
optional training sessions, and drills, exercises, and simulations.
Third, institutions should consider implementing an active shooter training session that
additionally serves as both a drill and a simulation. When asked how active shooter
preparedness plans were communicated to students pre-crisis, only 20 students (8.37%) indicated
optional training sessions and only 20 students (8.37%) indicated drills, exercises, and
simulations, even though UTK did not currently offer those resources to students. However,
when asked which communication mediums students perceived would be effective to
communicate active shooter preparedness plans, 82 students (34.31%) indicated optional training
sessions and 107 students (44.77%) indicated drills, exercises, and simulations. This has the
63
potential to address the low reported levels of students feeling prepared to protect themselves and
may start combating the “I don’t know” culture regarding what to do during an active shooting
situation.
Fourth, institutions should begin to use additional communication mediums to notify
students during an active shooting situation. Students were asked two different questions
regarding active shooter emergency notification: which communication mediums were used and
which they perceived would be effective to use. Aside from those with high frequencies from
both effective and existence perspectives—text message alerts, email notification, and social
media—students reported additional communication mediums being effective at a much higher
frequency as compared to mere existence. Those mediums included outdoor sirens, outdoor-
broadcast messages, fire panel alarms with voice enunciation, and indoor building public address
systems. In addition, consider evaluating the content of messages and how much information
should be given.
Finally, all students should automatically be enrolled and registered for the UT Alert
system. Once students are initially registered for the UT Alert system, they should be given
options either to remain registered or unsubscribe (opt-out) if they choose. When asked the
question regarding the option students would choose in that scenario, 97.57% of students
indicated that they would remain registered. This recommendation is supported by previous
research at different institutions that implemented a similar policy, where an average of 92% of
students remained a part of the system if enrollment was required, given the option to opt-out
after the mandatory registration (Staman et al., 2009). Although students reported not wanting to
offer up their cell phone number, privacy as a concern, and living off-campus as the main
64
reasons for not wanting to sign up, the UT Alert system is most effective when the messages
reach as many students as possible.
Directions for Further Research
This study was proposed as preliminary research into student perceptions of crisis
management, active shooter preparedness, and emergency notification. Several directions for
future research were apparent, taking results and limitations into consideration.
First, this study should be replicated longitudinally to track changes in perceptions over
time, including before and after potential events that may alter student perceptions. This study
analyzed student perceptions at one institution at one moment in time. A longitudinal study
could begin to validate results, particularly if students from multiple institutions were involved.
Some design changes should be considered in the survey, including reducing the length to insure
that as many students complete it as possible.
Second, other demographic questions should be asked to allow for further statistical
analysis and cross-tabulation of results. This study used residency (on-campus versus off-
campus) as a factor to compare perceptions (with additional demographic analyses located in
Appendix G), but other factors could be useful to understand the culture of student perceptions.
Some of these factors to be considered for use in future research include adding both graduate
student and international student status as options with which to self-identify and asking for
levels of past experience or exposure to specific crises. In addition, consider asking students for
both general residency, but also proximity to campus, as some residence halls are farther away
from campus than are sorority and fraternity houses and off-campus apartments.
Third, care needs to be taken to avoid leading questions and redundancy in the instrument
used. Wordy and leading questions can lead students to feel the need to respond in a specific
65
way. Redundant questions may confuse students and can skew results if their answers between
similar questions are not consistent. With the nature of the topic, student responses may indicate
false misguided hope as opposed to realistic perception.
Fourth, increasing the sample size will expectedly increase the total number of responses,
which could continue to increase the statistical significance of results. Broadening the scope to
include all students—graduate, doctoral, non-degree seeking, law school, medical school, etc.—
while increasing the total number of students who receive your survey will continue to validate
the results.
Fifth, specific types of crisis should be delineated instead of asking about perceptions of
general campus crises. Different types of crises are more common and others vary in severity.
As students are answering questions regarding preparedness and communication about campus
crises, students may not be thinking about the same types of crises. Focusing future studies on
specific crises, including active shootings, may improve accuracy where crisis generalization is
lacking. If the intent is to solely understand perceptions of active shootings, utilizing other crises
in unnecessary; however, including too many crises as means for comparison can be
overwhelming and confusing.
Lastly, this study focused on student perceptions. To assess institutional preparedness
accurately, future studies should include all constituencies, including faculty, staff, and
administrators, while also focusing on both perceptions and expectations. Previous studies solely
focus on perceptions of administrators and postsecondary leaders, but combining perspectives
may begin to give insight and understanding into the overall culture and perceptions of campus
safety and crisis management.
66
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Appendices
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Appendix A:
Original Zdziarski (2001) CCMQ Survey Packet
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75
76
77
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79
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Appendix B:
CCMQ-S (Survey Modified from CCMQ)
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CCMQ-S (Survey Modified from CCMQ)