Many analysts regard the current humanitarian crisis in Syria as an example of what can occur when environmental disaster and violent conflict intersect and interact. Given predictions that drought and flood are likely to become more frequent and more intense in the years ahead, we can expect more cases of “double exposure.”
Read the analysis (Links to an external site.)
of the impact of drought on the crisis in Syria from Scientific American, and then suggest concrete actions that the US or the United Nations might take to protect the world’s most vulnerable communities from “double exposure.” In developing your recommendations, please refer to insights gained from other modules.
50 Scientifi c American, March 201650 Scientifi c American, March 2016 Photographs by John Wendle
SYRIAN MAN SYRIAN MAN comforts his wife after comforts his wife after
a treacherous, 16-kilometer ocean a treacherous, 16-kilometer ocean
crossing in an overcrowded raft from crossing in an overcrowded raft from
Turkey to Greece, an escape route for Turkey to Greece, an escape route for
many people leaving war-torn Syria.many people leaving war-torn Syria.
SYRIAN MAN comforts his wife after
a treacherous, 16-kilometer ocean crossing
in an overcrowded raft from Turkey to
Greece, an escape route for many people
leaving war-torn Syria.
sad0316Wend3p.indd 50 1/13/16 6:05 PM
March 2016, Scientific American 51
Farmers who have escaped the embattled nation explain how drought
and government abuse have driven social violence By John Wendle
Syria’s
Climate
Refugees
S U S TA I N A B I L I T Y
sad0316Wend3p.indd 51 1/13/16 6:05 PM
52 Scientifi c American, March 2016
Ali had a problem. “Before the drought I would
have to dig 60 or 70 meters to fi nd water,” he re –
calls. “Then I had to dig 100 to 200 meters. Then,
when the drought hit very strongly, I had to dig
500 meters. The deepest I ever had to dig was 700
meters. The water kept dropping and dropping.”
From that winter through 2010, Syria su� ered its
most devastating drought on record. Ali’s busi-
ness disappeared. He tried to fi nd work but could
not. Social uprisings in the country began to esca-
late. He was almost killed by cross fi re. Now Ali
sits in a wheelchair at a camp for wounded and ill
refugees on the Greek island of Lesbos.
Climatologists say Syria is a grim preview of
what could be in store for the larger Middle East,
the Mediterranean and other parts of the world.
The drought, they maintain, was exacerbated by
climate change. The Fertile Crescent—the birth-
place of agriculture some 12,000 years ago—is dry-
ing out. Syria’s drought has destroyed crops, killed
livestock and displaced as many as 1.5 million
Syrian farmers. In the process, it touched o� the
social turmoil that burst into civil war, according to a study pub-
lished in March in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences USA. A dozen farmers and former business owners like
Ali with whom I recently spoke at camps for Syrian refugees say
that’s exactly what happened.
The camp where I meet Ali in November, called Pikpa, is a
gateway to Europe for asylum seekers who survive the perilous
sea crossing from Turkey. He and his family, along with thou-
sands of other fugitives from Syria’s devastated farmlands, rep-
resent what threatens to become a worldwide crush of refugees
KEMAL ALI ran a successful well-digging business for farmers in
northern Syria for 30 years. He had everything he needed for the job: a
heavy driver to pound pipe into the ground, a battered but reliable
truck to carry his machinery, a willing crew of young men to do the
grunt work. More than that, he had a sharp sense of where to dig, as
well as trusted contacts in local government on whom he could count
to look the other way if he bent the rules. Then things changed. In the
winter of 2006–2007, the water table began sinking like never before.
John Wendle is a freelance writer, photographer and videographer
who has covered unrest in the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan
since 2005. He is now examining the confl ict between humans
and the environment. You can see more of his work at
http://johnwendle.com and https://instagram.com/johnwendle
I N B R I E F
Drought, which is being exacerbated by
climate change and bad government pol-
icies, has forced more than a million Syri-
an farmers to move to overcrowded cities.
Water shortages, ruined land and corrup-
tion, they say, fomented revolution.
Lack of work, along with ensuing vio-
lence, has prompted many Syrians to
fl ee to Turkey and then cross the ocean
to Greece. Hundreds of adults and chil-
dren have drowned along the way.
Climate scientists say Syrian droughts
will become more frequent and se-
vere, a trend that could expand across
the Middle East and the Mediterra-
nean region.
sad0316Wend3p.indd 52 1/13/16 6:05 PM
March 2016, Scientific American 53
from countries where unstable and repressive governments col
lapse under pressure from a toxic mix of climate change, un
sustainable farming practices and water mismanagement.
40 YEARS OF FURY
Syria’S water criSiS is largely of its own making. Back in the
1970s, the military regime led by President Hafez alAssad
launched an illconceived drive for agricultural selfsufficiency.
No one seemed to consider whether Syria had sufficient ground
water and rainfall to raise those crops. Farmers made up for
water shortages by drilling wells to tap the country’s under
ground water reserves. When water tables retreated, people dug
deeper. In 2005 the regime of Assad’s son and successor, Presi
dent Bashar alAssad, made it illegal to dig new wells without a
license issued personally, for a fee, by an official—but it was
mostly ignored, out of necessity. “What’s happening globally—
and particularly in the Middle East—is that groundwater is
going down at an alarming rate,” says Colin Kelley of the Univer
sity of California, Santa Barbara, the PNAS study’s lead author.
“It’s almost as if we’re driving as fast as we can toward a cliff.”
Syria raced straight over that precipice. “The war and the
drought, they are the same thing,” says Mustafa Abdul Hamid,
a 30yearold farmer from Azaz, near Aleppo. He talks with me
on a warm afternoon at Kara Tepe, the main camp for Syrians
on Lesbos. Next to an outdoor spigot, an olive tree is draped
with drying baby clothes. Two boys run among the rows of
tents and temporary shelters as they play a game of war, with
sticks for imaginary guns. “The start of the revolution was
water and land,” Hamid says.
Life was good before the drought, Hamid recalls. Back
home in Syria, he and his family farmed three hectares of top
soil so rich it was the color of henna. They grew wheat, fava
beans, to matoes and potatoes. Hamid says he used to harvest
three quarters of a metric ton of wheat per hectare in the years
REFUGEES WHO SURVIVE the seas are often overwhelmed with
relief on reaching the Greek island of Lesbos ( far left and above ).
Kemal Ali, 54, rests at the Pikpa refugee camp there ( left ). He dug
wells for farmers until drought caused the water to sink too far
underground, then lost use of his legs when a bus he was riding
in Syria was hit by cross fire.
sad0316Wend3p.indd 53 1/13/16 6:05 PM
before the drought. Then the rains
failed, and his yields plunged to barely
half that amount. “All I needed was
water,” he says. “And I didn’t have water.
So things got very bad. The government
wouldn’t allow us to drill for water. You’d
go to prison.”
For a while, Ali was luckier than
Ha mid: he had connections. As long as he
had a sack full of cash, he could go on dig-
ging with no interference. “If you bring
the money, you get the permissions you
need fast,” he explains. “If you don’t have
the money, you can wait three to five
months. You have to have friends.” He
manages a smile, weakened by his condi-
tion. His story raises another long-stand-
ing grievance that contributed to Syria’s
downfall: pervasive official corruption.
Syrians generally viewed thieving civil
servants as an inevitable part of life. After
more than four decades under the two
Assad family totalitarian regimes, people
were resigned to all kinds of hardship.
But a critical mass was developing. In re –
cent years Iraqi war refugees and dis-
placed Syrian farmers have inundated Syria’s cities, where the
urban population ballooned from 8.9 million in 2002, just before
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, to 13.8 million in 2010, toward the end
of the drought. What it meant for the country as a whole was
summarized in the PNAS study: “The rapidly growing urban
peripheries of Syria, marked by illegal settlements, overcrowd-
ing, poor infrastructure, unemployment and crime, were neglect-
ed by the Assad government and became the heart of the devel-
oping unrest.”
By 2011 the water crisis had pushed those frustrations to the
limit. “Farmers could survive one year, maybe two years, but
after three years their resources were exhausted,” says Richard
Seager, one of the PNAS study’s co-authors and a professor at
Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. “They
had no ability to do anything other than leave their lands.”
Hamid agrees: “The drought lasted for years, and no one
said anything against the government. Then, in 2011, we had
had enough. There was a revolution.” That February the Arab
Spring uprisings swept the Middle East. In Syria, protests grew,
crackdowns escalated and the country erupted with 40 years of
pent-up fury.
NO FARMING, NO FUTURE
This year Hamid had to abandon his family’s farm. The violence
had become too much for him. “I left Syria because of the war
and because there was no work,” he says.
Ali likewise tried to stick it out, but few of his former cus-
tomers could afford to drill as deep as the water had sunk. And
the war made ordinary activities practically impossible. His
home village was only a short distance from the wreckage of
Ko bane on the Turkish border. That town was in ruins by the
time the Kurds succeeded in recapturing it from ISIS, the mili-
tant group that has been terrorizing the region. Last July he
headed for Syria’s capital, Damascus, hoping to find work and a
place where his family could be safe. He was on his way there
by bus when a rocket struck the vehicle. He awoke in a Damas-
cus hospital, paralyzed from the waist down. The blast had
peppered his spine with shrapnel. Somehow his family man-
aged to get him back north, and together they made their way
across Turkey to the shores of the Aegean.
Desperate strangers of all ages gather along the Turkish
coast every day, not only from Syria but from all over the Mid-
dle East. They crowd onboard big rafts and set out for the
roughly 16-kilometer crossing to Lesbos. The boats are routine-
ly overloaded, and in rough seas they are easily swamped. Most
cannot swim, and 20 percent are children. Drownings happen
all the time.
Many do reach Lesbos alive, and they move on as quickly as
possible. On the island’s northern beaches the first rays of sun-
rise illuminate discarded orange life vests and broken boats as
far as the eye can see. Last November alone more than 100,000
foreign migrants passed through Greece, according to the
International Organization for Migration. (A stunning 776,376
migrants had arrived in Greece since January 2015.) A bobbing
orange dot on the horizon foretells the imminent arrival of yet
another boat from Turkey. Nearing shore, one man stands up
among the huddled passengers and raises his arms in triumph,
flashing V-for-victory peace signs with both hands.
Louy al-Sharani, a 25-year-old from Damascus, splashes ashore
with his older brother. They set off at a fast pace, carrying their
bags up the steep coastal road. They both want to reach Norway
as soon as possible. The brother is in a hurry to find work so he
can bring his wife over before summer, when the couple’s first
child is due. Al-Sharani says he is eager to start earning his sec-
ond master’s degree. “I was born to use my mind,” he says. “I
wasn’t born to hold a machine gun and shoot people.”
MANY ESCAPEES from Syria cross into Turkey and travel to the western coast, where
they crowd onto rafts destined for Lesbos ( map ). While at the Kara Tepe transit camp,
refugees pray, bide their time and try to stay warm as they wait to go to Mytilene, the
main port and capital of Lesbos ( photographs ). Once there they can buy ferry tickets to
Athens and continue their journey through mainland Europe.
For a slide show and video of Syrian refugees, see ScientificAmerican.com/mar2016/wendleSCIENTIFIC AMERICAN ONLINE
sad0316Wend3p.indd 54 1/13/16 6:05 PM
March 2016, Scientifi c American 55
Their mother sold all her jewelry, including her wedding
ring, to give them $6,000 for the trip. They’ve already spent
$2,400 to get this far, al-Sharani says. Still, what choice do they
have? Before the war, Sharani earned a master’s in agricultural
economics, but now he sees no future in Syria for himself or for
the country’s farmers. As if the long-term drought wasn’t bad
enough, ISIS has made the country’s prospects even more hope-
less. He claims that warring factions are now stealing wheat
re serves, in e� ect using food as a weapon to control popula-
tions. “A farmer today can’t fi nd water to irrigate, can’t fi nd gov-
ernment support, and always the rebels or the Syrian army
is putting pressure on him. There are a million ways to die in
Syria, and you can’t imagine how ugly they are,” he says. “After
10 years, what I see, unfortunately, is a new Afghanistan.”
(IN)FERTILE CRESCENT
COLUMBIA’S SEAGER isn’t quite so pessimistic. The refugee crisis
will eventually subside, he assumes, and the war in Syria will run
its course. Nevertheless, he says, the region’s droughts will be
more frequent and more severe for the foreseeable future. After
closely studying dozens of climate models, he and Kelley and
their colleagues are convinced that continued greenhouse gas
emissions will widen the Hadley cell, the band of air that envel-
ops the earth’s tropics in a way that could further desiccate the
lands of the eastern Mediterranean.
In fact, Seager says, the Fertile Crescent could lose its current
shape and might cease to exist entirely by the end of this century
because of severely curtailed water fl ow in the Euphrates and
Jordan rivers. “There’s not a lot of precipitation there, and when
it does shift, it makes a di� erence,” he warns. “There’s something
specifi c about the Mediterranean that is making it hydrologically
very sensitive to rising greenhouse gases.”
Having gotten out, Ali and his family are trying to somehow
get him to Germany, where they hope surgeons will be able to
restore his ability to walk. Outdoors in his chair to get a few min-
utes of sun, Ali is thinking of the friends he left behind in Syria.
“The life of a farmer has always been hard,” he says. “Their big-
gest problem was water—period. Because water is life.”
His son wheels him indoors for a rest. Weak winter sunlight
partially illuminates a big room lined with a couple of dozen
beds. Plastic sacks and cheap du� e bags are heaped everywhere,
holding their owners’ few remaining possessions. As Ali’s chil-
dren lift him into bed, his face crumples in pain and exhaustion.
Fardous, his 19-year-old daughter, tucks his colostomy bag
against his body and arranges the donated blankets to cover
him. “It is written in the Quran,” Ali repeats. “Water is life.”
Map by Mapping Specialists
Aleppo
KobaneAzaz
Daraa
Damascus
Ankara
Athens
Pikpa refugee camp
Kara Tepe
refugee camp
Lesbos
T U R K E Y
SY R I A
GREECE
M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a
B l a c k S e a
Euphrates River
Khabur
River
M O R E T O E X P L O R E
First Super-High-Resolution Model Projections That the Ancient “Fertile
Crescent” Will Disappear in This Century. Aklo Kitoh et al. in Hydrological
Research Letters, Vol. 2, pages 1–4; 2008.
Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian
Drought. Collin Kelley et al. in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA,
Vol. 112, No. 11, pages 3241–3246; March 17, 2015.
F R O M O U R A R C H I V E S
Casualties of Climate Change. Alex de Sherbinin, Koko Warner and Charles Ehrhart;
January 2011.
s c i e n t i f i c a m e r i c a n . c o m /m a g a z i n e /s a
sad0316Wend3p.indd 55 1/13/16 6:16 PM
Disasters and
conflict
RECOMMENDATIONS
The successor to the HFA should explicitly recognise
the need and value of building disaster risk
management institutions as a means to support
governance strengthening.
• For contexts where formal Government structures are in place,
disaster management should be seen as a means through which
to strengthen policy formulation processes, national fiscal and
budgetary arrangements, and institution building.
• For vulnerable populations living in areas where the state and/or
governance structures are lacking, or where those in power are party
to a conflict, international support should be provided to enhance
disaster management through local action, governance arrangements
at the sub-national level and through informal institutions.
The successor should include action and indicators on:
Complexity of risk
To include the relationship between natural hazards, climate change,
conflict and fragility in risk and vulnerability assessments.
Dual benfits
Seek opportunities for co-benefits for peacebuilding and state
building as well as development progress. And as a bare minimum,
adopt climate and conflict-sensitive approaches to disaster
risk management.
Inclusive governanc
e
Adopt inclusive decision making processes, with appropriate
mechanisms in participation, accountability and transparency.
Disasters in challenging contexts account for some of the largest on record
disasters associated with natural hazards
were in contexts affected by complex
political emergencies. But the gaps in
evidence are immense- true numbers are
likely to be much higher.
haiti
earthquake 2010
Killed 222,570
Affected 3,700,000
chad
drought 2009
Affected 2,400,000
drought 2012
Affected 1,600,000
pakistan
flooding 2005
Affected 7,000,450
flooding 2010
Affected 20,359,496
pakistan
earthquake 2005
Killed 73,338
Affected 5,128,000
myanmar
cyclone 2008
Killed 138,366
Affected 2,240,000
Future projections show
that climate related disaster
vulnerability will be felt
most in fragile and conflict
affected states
Recorded data shows that
between 1999 and 2004
The necessary elements of disaster risk management are
development levels, political conditions and risk governance
The top twenty ranked countries most at risk of combined
high levels of fragility, disaster, poverty and climate change
vulnerability, combined
140
KEY MESSAGE
Fragile and conflict
affected states
experience shocks and
stresses related to natural
hazards simultaneously
to the challenges of
conflict and fragility. Much
can be done to reduce,
manage and prepare
for natural disasters
in more appropriate –
or in some cases more
interconnected – ways.
The successor to the
HFA must do more to
support effective disaster
risk reduction in these
complex contexts by being
explicit about the need
to support governance
strengthening as a
starting point to building
disaster resilience.
Many disasters occur in
fragile states and conflict
affected, accounting for a
high proportion of disaster-
affected populations
each year.
The latest IPCC report tells us that:
Location of people affected by natural
disasters
From 2005–2009, more than 50% of
people impacted by natural hazard
related disasters lived in fragile and
conflict affected states.
Our future will almost certainly
feature an increase in climate-
related disasters.
Countries experiencing violent
conflict or difficulties in
governance are least likely to be
able to support communities to
deal with vulnerability to climate
impacts, or be able to adapt to
climate change.
Contact Katie Peters at ODI for further information, including the background evidence for this set of graphics. k.peters@odi.org
Poorly designed risk reduction,
adaptation and mitigation
strategies can increase the risk
of conflict.
In some years the figure is more
than 80%.
Non-conflict affected (excl. China)
Conflict affected
50
%
1 2 3 4
80%
2005
%
2006 2007 2008 2009
10
0
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
high levels
of human
development,
political stability
and democracy:
includes New Zealand,
the Netherlands, Australia,
Finland, Norway, Japan,
Slovenia, Sweden, the
UK, Denmark, Canada,
Iceland, Hungary, Korea,
Germany and the US.
so
m
al
ia
af
gh
a
n
is
ta
n
n
i
ge
r
g
u
in
ea
-b
is
sa
u
bu
ru
nd
i
ch
ad
su
da
n
co
ng
o
de
m
oc
ra
ti
c
re
pu
bl
ic
gu
in
ea
ha
it
i
zi
m
ba
bw
e
et
hi
op
ia
ce
nt
ra
l a
fr
ic
an
r
ep
ub
li
c
ba
ng
la
de
sh
li
be
ri
a
si
er
ra
le
on
e
ti
m
or
-l
es
te
bu
rk
in
o
fa
so
bu
rm
a /
m
ya
nm
ar
rw
an
da
fragile states and
low levels of human
development:
Two-thirds of countries from
Africa, including Sudan,
Togo, Burundi, Uganda, Côte
d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Central African
Republic, Afghanistan,
Myanmar, Chad, Zimbabwe
and Guinea-Bissau.
high levels
of human
development,
medium stability:
A third of these
countries are Latin
American/Caribbean
(30.9%), including
Argentina, Mexico,
Colombia, Panama, Cuba,
Peru, Brazil and China.
medium levels
of development
and stability:
A third of countres
(31.7%) from Africa and
nearly a quarter from Asia
(22%), including Morocco,
Kenya, Senegal, Bolivia,
Honduras, Vietnam,
India, Bhutan and the
Philippines.
When disasters
and conflicts
collide
Impro
v
ing links between
disaster resilience and
conflict prevention
Katie Harris, David Keen
and Tom Mitchell
February
2
01
3
Overseas Development Institute
203 Blackfriars Road | London SE1 8NJ | UK
Tel: +
4
4 (0)20
7
9
22 0300
Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0
39
9
www.odi.org.uk
The views presented in this paper are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily represent
the views of ODI or our partners.
This material has been
funded by UK aid from
the UK Government,
however the views
expressed do not
necessarily reflect
the UK Government’s
official policies.
When disasters
and conflicts
collide
Improving links between
disaster resilience and
conflict prevention
Katie Harris, David Keen
and Tom Mitchell
February 20
13
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Nick Harvey and Joanna Macrae at DFID for their support and guidance.
Thanks go to ODI Research Fellows, Simon Levine, Lilianne Fan, Emily Wilkinson and Jan Kellett, and
to Sarah Bailey (independent, formerly ODI), John Twigg (University College London), and Emma Lovell
(ODI). Significant contributions were also made by independent researchers Shirley Matheson, Rachel
Flynn, Katina Aitken-Laird and Paula Silva Villanueva.
Thanks go to the interviewees who contributed their honest reflections and insights on the topic, and
in many instances provided examples of their work: Joel Hafvenstein, Sudarshan Reddy Kodooru
and Oenone Chadburn (Tearfund), Andrew Mitchell (independent, formerly of Action Against Hunger),
Simone Field (Christian Aid), Ilan Kelman (CICERO), Terry Cannon (Institute of Development Studies),
Janani Vivekananda (International Alert), Ivan Campbell and Hannah Wright (Saferworld), Kate Crowley
(CAFOD), Marcus Oxley (Global Network for Disaster Reduction), Jack Campbell (Global Facility for
Disaster Reduction and Recovery), Kathryn Chelminski, David Jensen, Dennis Hamro-Drotz and Marisol
Estrella (UNEP), Sasja Kamil (CORDAID), Maggie Ibrahim and Tim Midgley (World Vision), Lydia Poole,
Georgina Brereton and Dan Sparks (Development Initiatives), Kelly Hawyrlyshyn (Plan UK), Erik Rottier
(CARE Nederland), and Ayesha Siddiqi (Kings College London).
Design: www.stevendickie.com/design
Contents
Executive summary vi
The scale of the challenge
vii
The impact of natural disasters on conflict vii
The impact of conflict and fragility on ‘natural’ disasters v
iii
Lessons from current efforts to strengthen resilience viii
Towards a conceptual framework
ix
Recommendations x
1 Introduction 1
2 The challenge 3
3 The impact of natural disasters on conflict 10
3.1 Grievances 12
Natural resource and environmental scarcity 12
Resource allocation pre- and post-disaster 13
3.2 Opportunities 14
Economic opportunities 14
Political opportunities 14
3.3 Feasibility 1
5
4 The impact of conflict on natural disasters 1
6
4.1 Impact of conflict on the causes of disasters 18
4.2 Impact of conflict on disaster response
23
4.3 Impact of disasters on individual coping strategies 23
5 Integrated approaches to managing conflict and natural disaster risk 25
5.1 Managing natural disasters and conflict in silos
27
5.2 Holistic approaches to resilience: integrated risk management 28
Building disaster resilience in fragile and conflict-affcted states 28
Resilience to the effects of conflict
31
The role of the state 32
5.3 Forging stronger links between disaster and conflict specialists 32
6 Conceptualising the linkages 36
6.1 Unintended consequences
37
6.2 From ‘collision’ to collaboration 37
Entry point one: conflict prevention and statebuilding 39
Entry point two: natural disasters and risk management 40
7 Recommendations 42
International policy
43
Programming and finance 43
Research and evidence 44
References
45
Annex 1: Quality of the evidence 48
Annex 2: Background explanation: grievances, opportunities and feasibility of conflict
51
Annex 3: Climate change and conditions of conflict 52
iii
Figures, Boxes and Tables
Figures
1: Cases supporting the relationship between ‘natural’ disasters and conflict ix
2: Fragile and conflict-affected states, an aggregated list 7
3: Global Distribution of Drought Risk – Mortality 7
4: Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2013 8
5: Global distribution of multiple hazards mortality risk 8
6: Continuum of intent: disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention 28
7: Characterisation of the relationship between actions to address natural disasters and conflict 38
8: Schematic to show how conceptual frameworks for natural disasters and conflict could evolve 38
9: ‘Building peace states and societies’ framework 39
10: Adapted version of DFID’s ‘Building peaceful states and societies’ framework illustrating the ‘natural disaster’ 40
components of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda
11
: Operationalising conflict sensitivity 40
12: Situating conflict within an adapted Pressure and Release Model
41
Boxes
1: Selected recent ‘natural’ disasters in fragile and conflict-affected states 5
2: Future trends shaping the conflict-natural disaster interface 5
3: Building resilience in Chad 18
4: Policy architecture for dealing with disaster risk 27
5: Building resilience in the Sahel region
29
6: The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium – practical funding for resilience 29
7: Tearfund’s DRR work in Kandahar, Afghanistan 30
8: Disaster-conflict linkages and community based DRR in Karamoja 31
9: Reducing disaster risk in a fragile state – Nepal
33
10: Misconceptions among actors working to reduce risk to conflict and natural disasters 34
11: Assessing protection and livelihoods 34
Tables
1: Ranked list of countries demonstrating high levels of fragility, disaster risk, poverty and climate 9
change vulnerability
2: The practical implications of undertaking disaster risk management in fragile and conflict-affected states 20
iv when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Acronyms
DFID Department for International Development
DRR Disaster risk reduction
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
HFA Hyogo Framework for Action
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affai
rs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNISDR UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
v
Executive summary
teun voeten / panos
In 2011, drought, and food and political insecurity
in East Africa contributed to a full-scale
humanitarian crisis. A combination of natural
hazards, conflict and fragility provided a recipe
for human suffering. From 2005-2009, more than
50% of people affected by ‘natural’ disasters lived
in fragile and conflict-affected states (Kellett and
Sparks, 2012: 31).1
This convergence poses particular challenges
for governments and agencies working to secure
development progress and puts great strain on
the international humanitarian system.2 With
poverty expected to be highly concentrated in
fragile and conflict-affected states by 2025 (Kharas
and Rogerson, 2012) and with many fragile and
conflict-affected states still some way off meeting
any of the Millennium Development Goals, the
impetus for tackling conflict and disaster risk
coherently in such settings is becoming a priority
for both the development and humanitarian
communities. Without sufficient attention, hard-won
development and security gains will be undone.
This study assesses the evidence base for how
natural disasters3 affect conflict, how conflict
affects natural disasters, and how people living
in complex environments are affected by multiple
risks. We also consider what can be learned from
current practices to improve conflict prevention,
statebuilding and disaster risk management in
ways that help build resilience. The evidence
base challenging: it is fragmented and contested,
with a number of studies highlighting directly
opposing lines of arguments. This suggests that
the complexity of conflict and disaster dynamics
can only be understood when grounded in
specific contexts.
This report focuses on the links between
conditions of vulnerability and risks associated
with the nexus of natural disasters, conflict and
fragility. However, it is recognised that any given
context will be mired in an even more complex
array of intersecting risks. Thus while there is
a tendency to consider how one risk impacts
another, our overarching focus is on advancing
an understanding of how multiple vulnerabilities
stack up for populations. ‘How disasters and
conflict collide’ is an entry point to understanding
how vulnerability is dynamic and shaped by
interconnected shocks and stresses, and how it
must be addressed as such.
The scale of the challenge
A number of high profile disasters in fragile and
conflict-affected states have increased attention on
the concurrence of disasters and conflict, and there is
an expectation that disasters and conflict will coincide
more in the future. Climate change, continued
urbanisation, food price fluctuations, financial shocks
and other stresses may all shape – and complicate –
future trends in the disaster–conflict interface.
Based on a rudimentary analysis, there appears to
be a close association between the risk of mortality
from drought, state fragility and climate change
vulnerability. However, the intersection between
mortality risk from other natural hazards (such as
cyclones and earthquakes) and state fragility appears
to be much less pronounced, though still significant.
Somalia, Afghanistan and Niger are ranked high in a
composite list of countries considered to be fragile and/
or conflict affected, with high disaster risk, high levels
of poverty and high vulnerability to climate change.
The impact of natural disasters on conflict
Though the picture is far from clear, the balance of
evidence suggests that natural disasters exacerbate
pre-existing conflicts. There are only a limited number
of cases where natural disasters have supported
peacebuilding and led to the resolution of conflicts,
such as Aceh.4 In every complex situation, numerous
interactions exist, where natural disasters reduce
some conflict drivers while exacerbating others.
1. These figures refer specifically to definitions and sources from
Development Initiatives’ work on conflict and the EM-DAT Centre
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ work on disaster-
affected persons.
2. Between 2007 and 2010 the UN consolidated appeals more than
doubled, reaching $11.3 billion. In the context of growing protracted
crises, global food crisis, economic crisis and increasing humanitarian
needs, there was a reduction in the volume of needs met (Poole and
Walmsley, 2012: 59). For example, a 58.3% increase in needs between
2007 and 2009 in Sudan, 88.7% increase in Occupied Palestinian
Territories in 2009 due to the Gaza crisis, and 1
21
.9% increase in
Somalia in 2009 owing to drought, flooding and increase insecurity
(Poole and Walmsley, 2012: 59).
3. It is widely recognised that disasters are not ‘natural’ but a product of a
set of interactions between natural hazards, conditions of vulnerability,
and socio-political-economic conditions. Although uncomfortable for the
authors, the term is used here to differentiate natural-hazard related
disasters from the conflict and fragility components of a ‘disaster’. For
more on the paradigm shift towards recognising disasters not as a
technical issue but as inherently ‘unnatural’, with vulnerability at the
centre of the conceptual frame, see Wisner et al., 2004.
4. A celebrated though much debated case.
vii
Grievances can be deepened by natural disasters
that increase resource scarcity or cause more acute
imbalances between areas of scarcity and abundance.
Grievances can also increase with the unequal
distribution of ex-post humanitarian aid or ex-ante
preventative/protective measures by governments
or other agencies. Weak government responses to
natural disasters can also contribute to conflict.
The disruption caused by natural disasters can
present economic opportunities for criminal
activity, while their impact on livelihoods can lead
individuals to join armed groups. In some cases,
though, good access to reconstruction aid can
increase the opportunity cost of conflict.
This study also finds that political opportunities for
engaging in conflict can arise when disasters create
a smokescreen for advancing political or military
objectives (such as increasing military spending,
deploying troops to sensitive areas, or manipulating
aid to some groups over others).
The feasibility of conflict can also be changed
by natural disasters, either by strengthening or
weakening one side in a conflict directly or through
the appropriation of aid.
The impact of conflict and fragility on
‘natural’
disasters
There is strong evidence that conflict and fragility
increase the impact of natural disasters, notably by
increasing vulnerability to natural hazards. Conflict
increases disaster risk by displacing people into
areas more exposed to hazards and through the
impacts it has on physical and psychological health,
basic service provision and the security of liveli-
hoods. Conflict can drive individuals to sell assets,
which increases disaster risk. In a limited number
of cases, individuals and groups can gain from con-
flicts (through the so called ‘war economy’) in ways
that increase their resilience to disasters.
This study finds that conflict can undermine the
capacity of governmental and non-governmental
actors to plan for and protect people against
hazards – for example, by inhibiting the ability to
provide basic early warning systems and to devise
and enforce building codes.
Governments can also exacerbate post-disaster suf-
fering by inhibiting aid on security grounds or appro-
priating humanitarian aid to support conflict objectives.
Some countries refuse, delay or complicate interna-
tional help, fearing it will undermine sovereignty.
It is valuable to draw a distinction between fragile
and conflict-affected states that are willing but
unable, and those that are unwilling and unable to
reduce the vulnerability of populations to disaster
risks and impacts. Disaster risk management tends
to assume a positive state-society ‘social contract’5
exists where the state adopts the management of
risk as a public good. In some states this may be
the case, but in others it is not. Figure 1 highlights
the relationship between conflicts and natural
disasters. The weight of evidence suggests a
stronger leaning to the left quadrants of the circle.
Lessons from current efforts to
strengthen resilience
In both policy and practice, conflict prevention and
disaster risk management are treated as discrete
issues, with limited crossover of expertise or joint
working. Misconceptions, different ‘languages’, and
low levels of coordinated analysis and programming
inhibit the potential for stronger collaboration.
The resilience agenda is helping to improve links
between humanitarian and development action and
fostering stronger integration of risk management.
While there are few well-documented examples of
interventions that actively seek to integrate natural
disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention,
there does appear to be a growing realisation that
managing disaster risk in fragile and conflict-affected
states cannot be a matter of business-as-usual.
Hard won peace dividends may be undermined
unless natural disaster risk is taken seriously.
The 2011 World Development Report warns not to
expect too much too soon of national institutions:
action to transform governance needs long-term
investment and sustained support. Yet less than 4%
of humanitarian aid and less than 1% of development
assistance is spent on ex-ante disaster prevention,
preparedness and risk reduction (Poole and Walmsley,
2012: 2). This severely constrains the potential for
integrated risk management in fragile and conflict-
affected states. While there are good reasons for not
investing in ex-ante risk reduction in fragile situations
5. A dynamic agreement between the state and society on their
mutual roles and responsibilities (Chandran and Jones, 2008:
17
,
in Harvey, 2009).
viii when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
(e.g. corruption, lack of capacity and political will), not
doing so makes little sense in the long term.
Towards a conceptual framework
Interventions aimed at reducing natural disaster
risk can have positive or negative effects on the
dynamics of conflict; conversely, interventions aimed at
preventing conflict can have positive or negative effects
on the likelihood and impact of natural disasters. The
ideal scenario is to have interventions that reduce the
likelihood of natural disasters and conflict. Disaster risk
management should be integrated more systematically
into peacebuilding and statebuilding frameworks.
The reverse should also happen. Integrating conflict
and fragility into natural disaster frameworks can
help elucidate the links between natural disasters
and conflict. Greater cross-integration of frameworks
will help encourage a transition from collision to
collaboration between the two communities.
Over time it will be necessary to devise integrated
approaches to natural disaster and conflict risk
through a conceptual framework. The joint framework
should encourage accountability, learning, evidence-
gathering, cross-organisational exchanges and
should draw on conflict sensitivity and political
economy analysis. It should aspire to understand
the factors that produce vulnerability to disasters
and conflict, as well as trade-offs and points of
convergence where there is the most to gain.
Figure 1: Cases supporting the relationship between ‘natural’
disasters and conflict
• Prolonged drought in Balkh province, Afghanistan in 2006-2007 resulted in youth being forced to join armed
groups (Heijman et al., 2009).
• Recurrent drought and food insecurity in post-war Burundi through the mid-2000s contributed to increased
levels of migration and tensions with host communities (Heijman et al., 2009).
• The 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka has seen military expansion justified through its proposed role in reconstruction and
growing rebel capacity through increased financial independence (Keen, 2009; Mampilly, 2009).
• Flooding and overflow from the Koshi River, Terai region of Nepal in 2008, resulted in large-scale
resettlement resulting in increased tension with host communities. These tensions were exacerbated by
political groups who used flood victims’ dissatisfaction over lack of clean water and shelter to feed anti-
government sentiments (Vivikananda, 2001).
• Migrants fleeing from
19
97 El Nino floods (together with other migrants) into the southern Somali region of Lower
Juba has attracted clan raiding and land-grabs from relatively well-armed and powerful clans and sub-clans as well
as fighting between these more dominant groups (Keen, 1994; Narbeth and McLean, 2003).
• The 1970 cyclone in former East Pakistan, and inadequate relief response from West Pakistan,
gave major impetus to civil war and eventually to the establishment of Bangladesh (Olson and
Gawronski, 2003).
• The 1972 earthquake in Managua, Nicaragua, led to massive government corruption in
relief and reconstruction, allowing Sandinista rebels to capitalise politically and open a
military campaign in 1975 (Olson and Gawronski, 2003).
• Slow onset disasters, changing natural resource availability and environmental
scarcity have contributed to an ongoing complex crisis in Darfur, Sudan (Flint
and de Waal, 2005).
• 2004 tsunami in Ache,
Indonesia is regarded as
contributing to the peace
process (Waizenegger, 2010).
• The drought in Mozambique
in the early 1990s weakened
the already struggling Renamo
rebels and helped end the war
(Keen and Wilson, 1994).
• During war between Pakistan and
India in 1965, a cyclone struck,
a ceasefire was negotiated to
allow a response in Kashmir, and
both Pakistani and Indian troops
pulled out; but the conflict
resumed a few
months later
(Nelson,
2010).
• For a small minority of
individuals, gains from a
war economy can be used
to reduce the risk of natural
disasters and their negative
impacts.
• In Chad, state fragility and corruption have undermined equitable gover-
nance and the ability to facilitate international aid and development in sup-
port of livelihood security, disaster risk reduction and risk management. For
instance, during the 2010 food crisis the National Office for Food Security
lacked the logistical resources to transport food from major towns to the most
severely affected rural areas (Grubbels, 2011).
• In Sudan, Darfur’s the ongoing crisis have inhibited mechanisms for natural resource
management, exacerbating slow onset disasters and environmental scarcity (Flint and
de Waal, 2005).
• Strategies designed to deal with drought and livelihoods more broadly have been hampered in
Kenya’s Turkana and Kitui districts, by (often violent) livestock raiding (Eriksen and Lind, 2009).
• In 2008, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar saw substantial delays in disaster response as the government limited
humanitarian access. Of the agencies that were permitted entry many were subject to restricted movement,
limiting their ability to provide adequate relief (Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2008).
• In flood-prone La Mojana, Colombia, the lack of government control, the presence of an active rebel group and
communities’ weak political voice has seen a lack of investment in risk reduction measures (Williams, 2011).
• Moreover, whether the affected state labels a ‘crisis’ as such is not merely a technical matter; the labelling of
a situation has strong political dimensions. Examples include failing to declare a disaster to avoid appearing
weak or undermining national pride (Cuba 1998 drought) and refusing international help, even when national
capabilities have been outstripped (Mozambique 2007 flooding) (Harvey, 2009).
Natural
disasters can
increase the
risk of conflict
Natural
disasters can
decrease the
risk of conflict
Conditions of
conflict can
increase the
risk of natural
disasters
Conditions of
conflict can
decrease the
risk of natural
disasters
ix
Recommendations
International policy
In order to raise the profile of the conflict–
disaster nexus in fragile and conflict-affected
states, UN member states and international
agencies should:
● Ensure that managing risk in fragile and
conflict-affected states is a key feature of the
post-20
15
agreement on disaster risk reduction
(Hyogo Framework 2) and that there are clear
institutional mandates set to tackle this. The
World Bank 2014 World Development Report
on risk, uncertainty and crisis should link back
to the 2011 World Development Report on
Conflict, Security and Development and set a
new agenda for managing risks in fragile and
conflict-affected states.
● Resilience, vulnerability, disaster and conflict
should be featured themes of post-2015
development goals.
● The Political Champions for Disaster
Resilience Group should promote inter-agency
co-ordination to build resilience in fragile and
conflict-affected states, developing regional
and national approaches to ex-ante risk
management in such settings.
Programming and finance
● The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction
and Recovery (GFDRR) should scale-up
programming in fragile and conflict-affected states
and forge closer links with the conflict prevention
work of the World Bank, such as the Global
Centre on Conflict, Justice and Development.
● Bilateral donors and UN agencies should:
● Constitute joint risk taskforces in key fragile
and conflict-affected states to integrate
conflict, natural disaster and climate change
practitioners, plans and programmes.
● Explore new partnerships and new ways
of working and build the evidence base
about how to better invest in ex-ante risk
management measures in fragile and
conflict-affected states.
● Donors must be prepared to risk greater
levels of up-stream investment in fragile and
conflict-affected states.
● Donors and other financing bodies should work
to ensure that short-term funding restrictions
do not inhibit opportunities to build resilience.
Where possible, multi-year funding should be
the norm and the UN should look to expand the
use of multi-year consolidated appeals.
● Civil society organisations and donors alike
should invest in the capacities of programme
staff in fragile and conflict-affected states to
better link approaches to conflict, disasters
and climate change. This may require training
and new ways of formulating strategies and
designing programmes. Donors, NGOs and
other implementing agencies should develop
integrated monitoring and evaluation
frameworks for assessing needs, results, value
for money and outcomes in fragile and conflict-
affected states.
Research and evidence
We do not currently know how to measure
the scale and nature of risk facing fragile and
conflict-affected countries, nor do we know which
interventions are likely to be most effective in
managing risk and building resilience in these
environments. Priorities for investment include to:
● Develop a multidimensional risk index which
integrates existing data on conflict and fragility,
natural hazards, vulnerability, poverty and
climate change. Ideally this should be detailed
enough to consider sub-national areas and
should include a process for weighting risk
factors depending on the focus of different
agencies. Monitoring changes to this index over
time will help to highlight the co-dependency
between different aspects of risk and
vulnerability and allow progress to be tracked
and analysed.
● Develop and test conceptual frameworks
and analytical tools. This should include
modifying existing analytical tools (such
as conflict sensitivity frameworks and
statebuilding and peacebuilding frameworks)
to reflect disaster risk and vice versa. This
process could provide the model for more
integrated risk modelling.
● Build the evidence base about what works in
increasing resilience to multiple shocks and
stresses in fragile and conflict-affected states.
x when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Introduction1
espen rasmussen / panos
In 2011, drought, food and political insecurity
in East Africa contributed to a full-scale
humanitarian crisis. Like many other recent
high profile disasters, a combination of natural
hazards, insecurity, conflict and fragility provided
a recipe for human suffering. From 2005-2009,
more than 50% of people impacted by ‘natural’
disasters lived in fragile and conflict-affected
states (Kellett and Sparks, 2012: 31).6 This
convergence poses particular challenges for
agencies working to secure development progress
in such environments and puts great strain on
the international humanitarian system.7 While it is
widely acknowledged that more needs to be done
to tackle the risk posed by disasters and conflict
(e.g. World Bank, 2010), in practice as little
as 1% of official development assistance was
invested in reducing disaster risks between 2000
and 2010 (Kellett and Sparks, 2012: 10).
Fortunately, the link between natural disasters8
and conflict is receiving growing attention from
researchers and development agencies (e.g.
UNDP, 2011; Mitchell and Smith, 2011; Walch,
2010; DFID 2011b).9 These studies acknowledge
that the convergence of disasters and conflict
significantly compounds their impacts, impairs
recovery, and increases the risk of future crises.
They call for action that addresses the impacts of
disasters in a way that supports a country’s social
and institutional fabric and its transition out of
violence (Kostner and Meutia, 2011).
The problem is that the evidence for how conflict
and disasters interrelate is fractured, highly
context-specific and poorly understood (see
Annex 1 for an assessment of the evidence
base). Do conflicts necessarily predispose
countries to vulnerability to natural disasters?
And if so, how? Do natural disasters exacerbate
or ameliorate conflicts? What evidence exists
about efforts to tackle the causes of natural
disasters and conflicts jointly? What does the
evidence mean for the way stakeholders seek to
achieve progress towards peace, stability and
development in such contexts? This study seeks
to answer these questions through a detailed
review of the available evidence. In doing so,
it summarises lessons, highlights complexity
where it emerges, and details recommendations
for strengthening resilience.
The study is structured as follows: Section 2
reviews the scale of the challenge by examining
the extent to which conflict and natural disasters
overlap and which countries are of most concern
now and in the future. Section 3 looks at the
evidence for how natural disasters affect conflict
and fragility, before Section 4 examines the
complementary question of how conflict and
fragility affect resilience to natural disasters.
Section 5 explores how the disaster–conflict
interface might be understood conceptually
and how the relationship between disaster risk
management and conflict prevention might
be strengthened. Section 6 reviews current
practices and includes a set of case studies,
and section 7 outlines recommendations for
strengthening international policy, programming
and finance and the current evidence base.
6. These figures refer specifically to definitions and sources from
Development Initiatives’ work on conflict and the EM-DAT Centre
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ work on disaster-
affected persons.
7. Between 2007 and 2010 the UN consolidated appeals more
than doubled, reaching $11.3 billion. In the context of growing
protracted crises, global food crisis, economic crisis and increasing
humanitarian needs, there was a reduction in the volume of needs
met (Poole and Walmsley, 2012: 59). For example, a 58.3% increase
in needs between 2007 and 2009 in Sudan, 88.7% increase in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2009 due to the Gaza crisis, and
121.9% increase in Somalia in 2009 owing to drought, flooding and
increase insecurity (Poole and Walmsley, 2012: 59).
8. It is worth noting that the ‘natural’ part of natural disasters is a
misnomer. Experts link the cause of disasters to vulnerable people
living in locations exposed to natural hazards. Yet the ‘natural’ label
remains in disasters discourse hence we have chosen to include the
‘natural’ element here so as to clarify the distinction between disasters
associated with natural hazards and disasters associated with conflict.
9. Even the UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (DFID, FCO
& MoD, 2011) includes a reference to the relationship between
conflicts and disasters stating that conflict-affected environments
are more affected by natural disasters.
2 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
The challenge
This section examines the scale of the challenge by
reviewing the evidence about the extent to which
natural disasters, fragility and conflict overlap.
espen rasmussen / panos
2
A number of high-profile disasters from the last
five years are widely understood to have been
shaped by conflict, fragility and insecurity (Box 1).
Between 1999 and 2004, 140 disasters associated
with natural hazards were in contexts affected by
complex political emergencies (Buchanan-Smith
and Christoplos, 2004). And as noted above,
the number of people affected by disasters in
fragile and conflict-affected states appears to be
disproportionately high.10
This phenomenon of intersecting disaster-conflicts
has already received increased policy attention.
The 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response
Review highlighted how multiple risks are driving
ever-increasing demands on humanitarian
capacity, arguing that current approaches to
managing emergencies are unsustainable (DFID,
2011a). The 2011 World Development Report
included ‘natural disaster deaths’ as a key indicator
of overall security concerns. Analyses like these
are driving the demand for a better understanding
of future trends in the conflict–natural disaster
interface (see Box 2).
The hard data currently available on the co-
location of disasters and conflict is limited in
quantity and somewhat contested. This is partly
to do with the quality of the available datasets,
the way environmental stresses are analysed,
and the challenges of reporting and accurately
recording situations where natural disasters and
conflict intersect. For example, disentangling the
hydro-meteorological, conflict, vulnerability and
capacity-related causes of famine or flooding
is notoriously difficult and there is certainly no
consistency in reporting.
A few studies have reviewed the correlation
between conflict and disasters. With a small
sample over a short time period, Drury and
Olson (1997, 1998) find a significant relationship
between natural disasters and political unrest,
identifying the key variables as insufficient and
inequitable government responses and the
Summary
A number of high profile disasters in fragile and conflict-affected states have
increased the attention being paid to how disasters and conflict collide, though
systematic analysis is limited and sometimes contested. The evidence that does exist
points to disasters and conflict coinciding more in the future. Climate change, urbanisation,
food price fluctuations, financial shocks and other stresses may all shape – and complicate
– future trends in the disaster–conflict interface.
A rudimentary analysis of indicies suggests a concurrence between drought
mortality risk, state fragility and climate change vulnerability. However, the
intersection between mortality risk from other natural hazards (such as earthquakes and
cyclones) and state fragility appears to be much less pronounced, though still significant in
certain locations.
Somalia, Afghanistan and Niger are ranked high in a composite list developed
for this report of countries considered to be fragile and/or conflict-affected, with
high disaster risk, high levels of poverty and high levels of vulnerability to climate
change. Such rankings, it must be noted, can only provide indicative guidance owing to the
difficulty of combining data sets and the shortcomings those data sets contain.
10. See the figures cited earlier for 2005-2009 (Kellett and Sparks,
2012: 31).
4 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Box 1: Selected recent
‘natural’ disasters in fragile
and conflict-affected states
● The relief effort following the 2004 tsunami
that hit Aceh, Indonesia is widely
documented as an example of ‘disaster
diplomacy’, where the disaster created
space for negotiation and assisted the
peace process.
● Cyclone Nargis which hit Burma in 2008,
illustrated the challenges of humanitarian
response being delayed by restricted
access, which was complicated by the
concerns of international actors about
cooperating with the Burmese leadership on
account of their human rights violations.
● The 2010 Haiti earthquake raised
questions about the lack of disaster
preparedness in contexts mired by sexual
violence, poverty, weak institutions and
poor governance.
● Widespread flooding across Pakistan in
2010-2011 raised international concerns
about the role of non-state actors,
insurgents and the (political) security
implications of disaster relief.
● In 2011, predicted drought and food
insecurity in East Africa developed into a
full-scale humanitarian crisis accentuated
by political insecurity.
Box 2: Future trends
shaping the conflict-natural
disaster interface
What will drive changes in the relationship
between conflict and natural disasters in the
future? While there is a growing interest in
the way climate change will shape conflict
(see Annex C) and have an impact on natural
disasters, the combination of all three factors
is rarely discussed. Similarly, differing
analyses of where the poor will be located in
the coming decades (Sumner, 2012; Kharas
and Rogerson, 2012) have not fully considered
the co-location of conflict and natural
disasters. We know that the conflict–natural
disasters interface will not remain static: we
can be sure that changing settlement patterns,
migration, urbanisation and changes to socio-
economic conditions will all affect underlying
exposure and vulnerability (IPCC, 2012: 5).
Moreover, the World Development Report 2011
(World Bank, 2011: 17) finds that ‘multiple
stresses raise the risks of violence’ and a
combination of economic, political and security
actors – both internal and external to the given
context – have a role to play. These stresses,
and the future trends associated with them,
often paint a bleak picture: climate change,
financial shocks (particularly in relation to
food price fluctuations), youth unemployment,
inequity and injustice, criminal networks, rapid
urbanisation and the growth of megacities,
informal settlements and inadequate land
management (World Bank, 2011; IPCC, 2012).
Migration is likely to be an important factor
shaping future trends. In 2010, 42 million
people were displaced by natural hazards, up
from 17 million in 2009 (Foresight, 2011: 6).
One particular area of concern in this regard is
the existence of ‘trapped populations’ unable
to move from vulnerable locations the IPCC
(2012) deems potentially unfit to live and work
in in the future. Somalia is one such example:
pastoralists are unable to follow traditional or
alternative migratory routes to escape drought
due to armed conflict, and humanitarian
access is severely restricted.
5
severity of the disaster. Miguel, Stayanath, and
Sergenti’s statistical analysis (2004) concludes
that droughts increase civil war in Africa. Berebi
and Ostwald’s study of 167 countries (2011) finds
that natural disasters create vulnerabilities in
state-society relationships that can be exploited
by rebel groups. Nel and Righarts (2008) find that
natural disasters significantly increase the risk of
violent civil conflict in the short and medium term
in low and middle income countries that have
high inequality and sluggish economic growth.11
In contrast to other studies, however, they found
that the severity of the disaster was relatively
unimportant in terms of the impact on security.
This has been contested by Slettebak (2012) on
the ground of technical inaccuracies. Slettebak
concludes that the analysis should show that
countries experiencing disasters in the same
or the previous year are less likely to have an
outbreak of civil conflict; he therefore cautions
international agencies and other actors against
automatically prioritising security concerns in the
post-disaster period.
There is another wave of research looking at
sub-national patterns of conflict and disasters
(see Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Buhaug
and Rød, 2006; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007).
While these present a more nuanced picture
than national level studies, they have been
criticised for assuming that the effect of local
environmental conditions are limited to the
immediate area, whereas migration muddies
this picture (Hendrix and Salehya, 2012).
Hendrix and Salehya (2012:
35
) find that very
high and very low rainfall years are associated
positively with violent events such as cross-
border and inter-communal violence.
2.1 Combining indices
To demonstrate the way risks intersect, figures
2-5 il lustrate the global picture of different
types of risk. Figure 2 highlights the distribution
of failed states, as indicated by Foreign Policy’s
(2012) Failed States Index 2012. Figure 3 is
the World Bank’s (2005) map of global drought
mortality risk. Figure 4 is Maplecroft’s (2012)
Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2013.
Figure 5 is UNISDR’s (2009) map of global
mortality risk from earthquakes, cyclones,
floods and landslides. These maps appear to
show a high level of concurrence of fragility,
climate change vulnerability and drought
mortality risk. There is less concurrence,
however, when considering mortality risk
associated with other natural hazards. This
observation is cautioned with a number of
caveats, including the fact that mortality risk
does not represent impacts on livelihoods or
morbidity, that some of the indicators used
to create the indices are repeated, and that
the indices themselves are highly contested.
More work is needed to statistically analyse
the geographic relationship between disaster,
conflict and climate change risks.
While acknowledging these caveats, indices can
be overlaid to create a list of countries that are
considered fragile, vulnerable to climate change,
have high levels of poverty, and are at high risk
of natural disasters. Table 1 uses the Failed
States Index 2012 (Foreign Policy, 2012), the
UNU-EHS World Risk Report 2011 (UNU-EHS,
2011), the OPHI Multidimensional Poverty Index
2011 (OPHI, 2011) and the CGD Climate Change
Vulnerability Index 2011 (CGD, 2011). Data for
some countries is missing, which skews the
outcome to some degree (for example, there is
not enough data to include South Sudan).
11. Based on analysis of 187 political units with populations larger
than 150,000.
6 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Figure 3: Global Distribution of Drought Risk – Mortality
source: world bank, 2005
1st – 4th
Risk deciles
Drought mortality
5th – 7th
8th – 10th
Figure 2: Fragile and conflict-affected states, an aggregated list
source: original map based on source material from oecd, 2010 in sumner, 2010
Indicates countries that appear
in one or two (but not all three)
of the lists outlined above.
Indicates countries that appear in the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the
Developing World, Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project, and
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments List (in Sumner, 2010).
7
Figure 4: Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2013
source: maplecroft, 2012
Figure 5: Global distribution of multiple hazards mortality risk
source: unisdr, 2009
Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau
Bangladesh
Philippines
Cambodia
Zimbabwe
Madagascar
DR Congo
Ethiopia
Haiti
Low risk Extreme risk
Rank Country Category
1 Haiti Extreme
2 Bangladesh Extreme
3 Zimbabwe Extreme
4 Sierra Leone Extreme
5 Philippines Extreme
6 Cambodia Extreme
7 Madagascar Extreme
8 DR Congo Extreme
9 Ethiopia Extreme
10 Guinea-Bissau Extreme
10 High
Tropical cyclones,
floods, earthquakes,
landslides
Multi-risk
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1 Low
0 Unknown exposure
8 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
The OCHA Global Focus Model12 is another
useful il lustration, systematically analysing
natural hazard and conflict risks. Yet as Lawry-
White (2012: 15) highlights, while other models
of risk exist, the tendency to focus on natural
disaster risk and leave out ‘conflict’ means
the results often bear little comparison. For
example, while the UNU World Risk Index
criteria may not sound markedly different to
OCHA’s Global Focus Model, only one country
appears in the top 20 of both lists; similarly, of
the World Bank GFDRR’s 31 focus countries
only 4 appear in the top 20 of the Global Focus
Model. It is interesting to note that of the 20
countries listed in Table 1, all except Timor-
Leste appear in the top 50 countries of OCHA’s
Global Focus Model.
Table 1: Ranked list of countries
demonstrating high levels of fragility,
disaster risk, poverty and climate
change vulnerability13
1 Somalia 11 Zimbabwe
2 Afghanistan 12 Ethiopia
3 Niger 13 Central African
Republic
4 Guinea-Bissau 14 Bangladesh
5 Burundi 15 Liberia
6 Chad 16 Sierra Leone
7 Sudan 17 Timor-Leste
8 Congo, Dem. Rep. 18 Burkina Faso
9 Guinea 19 Burma/Myanmar
10 Haiti 20 Rwanda
12. For OCHA, data is analysed in four areas: hazards, vulnerability,
capacity and demand for humanitarian coordination support.
13. The ranking has been produced by combining data from the
Failed States Index 2012, the UNU-EHS World Risk Report 2011,
the OHPI Multidimensional Poverty Index 2011 and the CGD
Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2011. The Failed States
Index was given additional weighting, so represented 2/5 of the
outcome, to adjust for the fragile and conflict-affected states
focus of this analysis and to balance the other three indices (of
which the CGD index also includes extreme event vulnerability).
The indices were chosen on the basis of data accessibility
and the fact that The World Risk Report includes drought as a
measure – many others do not.
9
The impact of
natural disasters
on conflict
This section examines the evidence for how natural disasters
affect conflict and fragility. The evidence is organised around
three drivers of conflict – grievances, opportunities and
feasibility – commonly used in peacebuilding and statebuilding
frameworks (DFID, 2010). Further details of the analytical
framework employed here are found in Annex 2.
espen rasmussen / panos
3
Summary
On balance, the evidence suggests that natural disasters exacerbate pre-existing
conflicts by contributing to grievances, opportunities and feasibility. There are
a limited number of cases where natural disasters have supported peacebuilding and
led to the resolution of conflicts. More often, natural disasters reduce some conflict
drivers while exacerbating others. Detailed empirical analysis is required in each case
to understand the net impact.
Grievances can be deepened by natural disasters causing greater resource
scarcity or more acute imbalances between areas of scarcity and abundance.
However, areas with longstanding experience of droughts and floods have shown that
local institutions can mediate effectively and reduce tensions when periodic resource
scarcity occurs.
Grievances can also increase in intensity through the unequal distribution of ex-
post humanitarian aid or ex-ante protective assets by governments, international
agencies or non-state actors. Weak government responses can also contribute to
conflict. In a few cases, a combination of factors have led to ‘disaster diplomacy’,
where disasters have created opportunities for dialogue between opposing parties –
Aceh in 2004-2005 is a celebrated (and much debated) case.
The disruption caused by natural disasters can present economic opportunities
for criminal activity or lead individuals to join armed groups. In some cases,
however, a lack of post-disaster economic opportunities can reduce violence, and
access to reconstruction aid can increase the opportunity cost of conflict.
Disasters can create opportunities for advancing military objectives. Military
spending might be increased or troops might be deployed to sensitive areas in the
name of disaster management. International responses to disaster may also create
political opportunities for increased conflict when humanitarian aid is manipulated.
On the other hand there are cases where military activity is deemed politically
inappropriate when natural disasters have adversely affected rival groups.
The feasibility of conflict can be affected by natural disasters, either because
one side in a conflict is weakened or strengthened or because aid is being
appropriated. New balances of power may imply either a reduction or exacerbation
of conflict, depending on the circumstances. Moreover, labelling complex political
emergencies as natural disasters may help to draw attention away from underlying
conflict-related causes of humanitarian crisis and provide cover for human rights abuses.
11
3.1 Grievances
There is a substantial body of evidence
suggesting that natural disasters ignite or
exacerbate conflict by deepening grievances.
More limited evidence highlights that natural
disasters can also affect grievances in ways that
help to ameliorate conflict. Most of the evidence
relates to resource scarcity and to formal
responses to shocks and stresses.
Natural resource and environmental
scarcity
Some research suggests that environmental
changes associated with natural disasters can
fuel armed conflict by increasing migration and
undermining the economy (notably agriculture) by
fuelling tensions within and between communities,
and by weakening institutions (particularly state
institutions charged with promoting security,
health and education) (Homer-Dixon & Blitt,
1998; Kahl, 2006). It has also been argued that
environmental scarcity exacerbates the likelihood
of civil conflict through increased competition
over scarce natural resources (Homer-Dixon,
1991, 1999; Kahl, 2006; Peluso and Watts,
2001). Natural disasters associated with drought
are often singled out. Conditions of drought can
increase tensions over natural resources, leading
to confrontation between different land users
(i.e. farmers and pastoralists). Such tensions are
often exploited or exacerbated by governments
seeking to gain political advantages (Flint and
de Waal, 2005). Groups or individuals who have
experienced a major ‘squeeze’ on their livelihoods
(e.g. as a result of climatic change, discrimination
or violence) are more likely to be recruited into
violent processes, which can further jeopardise
the livelihoods of others (Keen, 1994; Young
et al., 2009). In post-war Burundi, recurrent
drought and food insecurity, coupled with uneven
food distribution, have led to violence between
migrants and host communities over access to
land (Heijman et al., 2009).
The notion that natural disasters generate conflict
by making resources scarce has intuitive appeal.
Yet a number of studies have portrayed a more
complex reality (de Soysa, 2002a, 2002b; Urdal,
2005). Hendrix and Saleyha (2012) suggest
that where grievances and resource competition
do lead to conflict, this is likely to be relatively
disorganised violence that does not tend to
involve the state. Another study found that
in poor countries a shortage of land, pasture
and renewable (non-mineral) resources was
associated with lower levels of armed conflict
(de Soysa, 2002a, 2002b) – one rationale being
that, under these conditions, local institutions
have adapted to effectively deal with issues of
scarcity. Research in the West African Sahel
has suggested that resource conflicts may be
kept in check by traditional conflict resolution
institutions that have evolved over generations
(Nyong et al., 2006). Lind has noted that local-
level ‘arrangements to share control and use
of resources in some contexts can serve as
the foundation for a broader peace between
competing groups’ (2003: 317).
Other evidence suggests it is not simply
resource scarcity that drives conflict, but some
combination of scarcity and abundance. Fertile
and resource-rich areas may attract conflict,
raiding or quasi-legal attempts at expropriation
from outsiders, including groups that occupy less
well-endowed areas but perhaps have superior
access to arms or political power (Keen, 1994).
Such dynamics may be accentuated by a natural
disaster that creates an even greater imbalance
between areas of scarcity and abundance
(Keen, 1994). Southern Somalia, for example,
has persistently been subject to famine despite
having many fertile areas – in part because these
areas attract interest from violent groups who
often inhabit less fertile areas. The southern
Somali region of Lower Juba has not only
attracted large numbers of migrants (including
those fleeing the 1997 El Nino floods) due to
its relative fertility, but has also attracted clan
raiding, land grabs and skirmishes between
relatively well-armed and powerful clans and sub-
clans (Keen, 1994; Narbeth and McLean, 2003).
In some cases governments have initiated
forced resettlement schemes on the basis of
questionable claims that areas are ‘ecologically
unsustainable’ or too exposed to natural hazards.
Keen (1994) highlighted this in the 1980s in
Ethiopia, where people were moved from Eritrea
and Tigray, sowing the seeds of new grievances.
Eriksen and Lind’s work on the Turkana region
of Kenya found that conflict is far from inevitable
in ‘marginal’ areas: carefully managed borehole
access can reduce conflict over water and
grazing resources (2009: 28). Where conflict did
12 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
occur in Turkana, there appeared to be complex
patronage by powerful government officials
rather than more straightforward inter-communal
violence over scarce resources (ibid.).
Resource allocation pre- and
post-disaster
The impact natural disasters have on conflict and
stability can depend on the way a government
responds (Olson and Gawronski, 2003), or how
it has invested in disaster preparedness or
prevention (Cohen and Werker, 2008; Oliver-Smith,
1996). Grievances have increased when natural
disasters have been met with a weak or corrupt
government response (Olson and Gawronski,
2003; Olson and Drury, 1997). For example, a
cyclone in East Pakistan in 1970 was met with a
poor relief response from West Pakistan and half a
million people died, giving a major impetus to civil
war (Olson and Gawronski, 2003).
In Nicaragua, there was massive government
corruption in relief and reconstruction following
the earthquake of 1972 (Olson and Gawronski,
2003). This allowed the Sandinista rebels
to capitalise politically and begin a military
campaign in 1975 (ibid.). After the 2005 Pakistan
earthquake, a slow government response
opened space for independent Islamic aid
agencies to provide relief and criticise the
government for its failings (ibid.). Walsh found
that areas receiving this relief saw a growth in
anti-governmental Pakistani nationalism (2005,
in Nelson, 2010: 162).
Natural disasters can often exacerbate existing
inequalities in access to government services
(Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Cuny, 1983) or further
accentuate such inequalities in ways that help
to spur political change (Cuny, 1983; Birkmann
et al., 2010). Political commentators such
as Klein (2007) have also noted that natural
disasters have been used as an opportunity
for governments to seize valuable land for
reconstruction, removing the disaster affected
population and appropriating their assets.
Evidence also suggests that government action
following natural disasters can sometimes
create a climate of empathy that helps to
resolve conflict (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1976;
Kelman 2012; Brancati, 2007; Nelson, 2010;
Slettebak, 2012). The most celebrated – and
debated – of such cases is the impact of the
2004 South Asia tsunami on the conflict in Aceh,
Indonesia. Waizenegger and Hyndman (2010:
795) note that in the immediate aftermath of
the tsunami Aceh’s secessionist Free Aceh
Movement committed to a unilateral ceasefire
and the Indonesian military was instructed to
exercise restraint while relief operations were
being carried out. Waizenegger and Hyndman
(2010: 794) also suggest that the relief and
reconstruction processes opened the region
up to international audiences, ending the
government-imposed isolation and invisibility
(ibid.: 794). The majority of their informants
maintained that, without the tsunami, conflict
would have gone on for years. Other studies,
though, play down the relative importance of
the tsunami for bringing about peace, arguing
dialogue between the conflict parties pre-dated
the tsunami (as did the drafting of a peace
agreement) and that a change in government in
Jakarta was more significant (Fan, forthcoming).
While there are a handful of ‘disaster diplomacy’
cases, reconciliation following a disaster can easily
be thrown off course. Akcinaroglu et al. (2011) find
that disasters can catalyse peacemaking between
rival states in the short term, but that this is easily
derailed by inter-communal violence and low level
cross-border conflict (see also Evin, 2004; Nelson,
2010: 167-168).
International aid responses can also exacerbate
grievances, where actors in the conflict perceive
that there is unequal distribution of resources
(e.g. Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004;
Waizenegger and Hyndman, 2010). Significant
steps have been taken however, to increase the
use of conflict sensitivity tools in humanitarian
responses in complex political settings
(Zicherman et al., 2011). Most agencies adhere
to humanitarian codes and guidelines and value
broad inclusion in all stages of disaster risk
reduction (DRR) (Sphere, 2004).
13
3.2 Opportunities
Natural disasters play a role in creating and
shaping economic and political opportunities
which, if seized, can lead to violence.
Economic opportunities
Natural disasters can affect the distribution
of economic resources, encourage the
appropriation of resources by some groups,
and present opportunities for criminal activities
which can lead to violence. For example, in
2006-2007, drought in Afghanistan’s northern
Balkh region forced downstream villagers to
look for new livelihood opportunities, which
for some young men meant joining armed
groups (Heijman et al., 2009). The conditions
of drought were exacerbated by the unequal
distribution of water rights by elites following the
fall of the Taliban rule in 2001 (Heijman et al.,
2009: 34). Furthermore, diminished economic
opportunities during a natural disaster can
lead to a state relying on violence to sustain
itself.14 In Sudan, a combination of drought,
economic crisis and rising international debt
from the 1980s onwards arguably encouraged
the government in Khartoum to support militia
raiding against the south that was designed,
in large part, to secure access to its oil (Keen,
1994). In other examples, increased resource
flows into a country for reconstruction can
incentivise different forms of violence. For
example, Waizenegger and Hyndman (2010:
800) note that in Aceh ‘an abundance of tsunami
aid is easy prey for many former combatants
in an environment with low legal enforcement’.
Moreover, local tensions have been raised by
the perception that more has been done for
tsunami ‘survivors’ than for ex-rebels and their
families, while in reality many people have been
left with little or nothing (ibid.).
Conversely, the economic opportunities
associated with violence may actually be reduced
when a natural hazard means that there is less
to steal – as when crops wither or the death
of livestock reduces the quantity of livestock
that can be raided.15 Equally, a substantial
reconstruction effort after a disaster (whether
natural or not) may increase the ‘opportunity cost’
of going to war (Collier, 2003).
Political opportunities
A natural disaster, and the international response to that
disaster, can create political opportunities which may
lead to increased conflict. In Sri Lanka, a perceived
threat to sovereignty from tsunami relief operations
created significant political opportunities for nationalist
parties and helped Mahinda Rajapaksa win the
presidency (Kleinfeld, 2007; Le Billon and Waizenegger,
2007). International aid agencies faced considerable
difficulty and outright Sri Lankan government
intimidation when they tried to report on the extent of
the humanitarian crisis, especially during the military
‘end game’ against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 (Keen, 2009). The rather chaotic
international response to the tsunami16 contributed to
tense relations between aid agencies and Colombo,
adding to the difficulties of responding to conflict-related
emergencies thereafter.17 In some contexts, the state’s
role in addressing disasters and reconstruction might
legitimise sustaining a large military.18 In Sri Lanka, the
military has justified its expansion after the war through
its proposed role in reconstruction.19
Disaster relief can be seized as a political
opportunity to exercise power and ‘can easily be
used as a political tool by manipulating distribution
and redirecting relief in ways that reward supporters
and punish opponents’ (Williams, 2011: 17).
Francken et al. (2008) argue this was the case in
Madagascar where communities supportive of the
president in the 2001 elections were 65% more likely
to receive relief following Cyclone Gafilo in 2004.
A more extensively documented case is the
repeated manipulation of food aid by the Sudanese
government (Keen, 1994; Flint and de Waal, 2005).
On the other hand, natural disasters might reduce
the political opportunities arising from conflict.
For example, a wave of public sympathy for the
victims of a disaster might make it politically
disadvantageous to wage war on them (Kelman,
2012). There seems to have been an element of
this in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami.20
14. David Keen, independent analysis for this report.
15. Ibid.
16. See, for example, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 2007.
17. David Keen, independent analysis for this report.
18. Internationally, humanitarian missions arguably became part of the
justification for maintaining high military spending in the West after
the Cold War (David Keen, independent analysis for this report.).
19. David Keen, independent analysis for this report.
20. Ibid.
14 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
3.3 Feasibility
As with grievances and opportunities, the feasibility
of violence is shaped by natural disasters in
different ways.
Natural disasters may make insurrection easier
by weakening or distracting the government
apparatus or strengthening the legitimacy of
rebel groups. As Nel and Righarts (2008: 162)
have noted, ‘natural disasters can weaken state
capacity and legitimacy, creating opportunities for
the disgruntled to engage in violent resistance’.
In the aftermath of floods in Pakistan in 2010,
militant groups reportedly used the disruption to
carry out attacks (Abbas, 2010; Waraich, 2010).
Mampilly’s study of Sri Lanka’s LTTE rebels
suggested: ‘Following the [2004 tsunami] disaster,
the LTTE’s expansion of its governance capacity
brought it greater international respect and
financial resources, convincing rebel leaders that
operationally, de facto secession was viable. … In
essence, what the tsunami did was to break the
delicate financial dependency of the insurgents
on the Sri Lankan state’ (2009: 316).
Studies suggest that during the famine of 1984-1985
the Ethiopian government was able to use relief
aid to fund the war (Keller, 1992). Relief supplies
were used to pay soldiers and militia and to lure
people into locations where they were recruited into
the military or subjected to forcible resettlement
(Keller, 1992; Africa Watch, 1991). When national
and international actors labelled the complex crisis
a ‘drought’, this contributed to the impunity of
the government forces who were at once actively
fuelling conflict and humanitarian disaster.21
In Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s, drought similarly
served as cover for government-sponsored violence,
and again the label ‘drought-induced famine’ was
sometimes accepted internationally. In 1994,
international assistance in response to the Rwandan
genocide was focused primarily on the relief of
hunger and a cholera epidemic among those who
fled to eastern Zaire; again, there was a tendency
to treat a man-made disaster as if it were a natural
disaster, and the human rights abuses underpinning
the crisis went largely unaddressed (Eriksson et
al., 1996). In 2011-2012, the tendency to label the
humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa a ‘drought’
distracted attention from some of the underlying
processes of violence that were creating famine,
particularly in Somalia (Keen, 2012).
Enia (2008) suggests that evidence for how
natural disasters change the feasibility of conflict
is ambiguous. Insurgents and governments
can use natural disasters to strengthen their
own position and this can lead to an escalation
of violence or to its diminution and cessation
(Enia, 2008). For example, natural disasters
can speed up or slow down a war depending on
the overarching trajectory of conflict (ibid.). If
rebels are losing and are further weakened by
a natural disaster, then the war is likely to be
shortened (Keen and Wilson, 1994). The drought
in Mozambique in the early 1990s, for instance,
appears to have weakened the already struggling
Renamo rebels and helped to end the war (Keen
and Wilson, 1994).
This section has underlined the need to
conceptualise vulnerability as a dynamic process
and understand how different vulnerabilities
intersect. In contrast to conventional approaches
to measuring vulnerability to natural hazards,
which tend to focus on a single hazard over a
discrete period of time, more research is needed
to understand how vulnerability changes before,
during and after disaster events (Birkmann,
2008). Vulnerability assessments which
account for such changes would help inform our
understanding of the role of natural hazards in
dynamics of violence, conflict and fragility.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
15
The impact
of conflict on
natural disasters
This section considers the evidence about how conflict
and fragility affect people’s resilience to natural hazards,
and explores the question: Does conflict make people
more or less exposed and vulnerable to natural hazards?
espen rasmussen / panos
4
Summary
There is strong evidence to suggest that conflict and fragility increase the
impact of natural disasters. Conflict can increase disaster risk by displacing people
into areas more exposed to hazards, such as to informal settlements in exposed
locations. Conflict also increases vulnerability to natural disasters through the impact
it has on physical and psychological health, basic service provision and secure
livelihoods. Conflict can drive individuals to sell assets or to use valuable natural
capital, which in turn increases disaster risk.
Conflict can undermine the capacity of government and non-government
actors to provide adequate protection from natural hazards. Fragile and conflict-
affected states, even if willing, often have difficulty implementing basic early warning
systems, devising and implementing building codes, and gaining access to high
quality data on risks.
Governments can exacerbate post-disaster suffering by inhibiting aid on
security grounds or (mis)appropriating humanitarian aid to support political
objectives. Some countries also refuse international help, delay communicating
their need for relief, make ambiguous statements about the severity of their
situation, or have difficult relationships with international actors.
It is useful to draw a distinction between fragile and conflict-affected states
that are willing but unable, and those that are unwilling and unable to reduce
the vulnerability of populations to disaster risks and impacts. Disaster risk
management tends to assume a positive state-society ‘social contract’ exists where
the state adopts the management of risk as a public good. But in some states
disaster risk management is treated as a benefit available to political supporters.
Intervention strategies (discussed in section 5) therefore need to be tailored to
suit the context.
17
4.1 Impact of conflict on the
causes of disasters
Disasters result from populations being subject to
combinations of vulnerabilities and exposure to
natural hazards. Vulnerability and exposure are
shaped by household, local and national capacity
to manage risk in the context of sets of structural
causes like poverty, land access and socio-cultural
status. Conflict and fragility affect vulnerability to
disasters, and measures to manage disaster risk
are more difficult to operationalise in fragile and
conflict-affected states.
Violence, conflict and insecurity destroy the
livelihoods, infrastructure and basic services
that make a population resilient. The role
conflict plays in undermining disaster resilience
is well noted by Kelman (2012: 1): ‘A war-
weary population with reduced physical and
psychological health is more susceptible to
a pandemic. A government focusing on war
might neglect promulgation, monitoring, and
enforcement of earthquake-related building
codes. Conflict frequently interferes with or cuts
essential supplies such as food, medicine, and
building materials, making it more difficult for
people to keep their homes and communities
prepared for floods or storms’.
Longer-term disaster resilience is undermined
when states fail to provide a set of core
functions necessary to prevent and manage
natural disasters and conflict. These functions
may include effectively managing revenues and
building the capacity for accountable and fair
social service delivery – inherently linked with
‘good governance’ (DFID, 2010). Conventional
disaster literature assumes that an effective
‘social contract’ exists between the state and its
citizens, or that those governments have a duty
of care towards their citizens to create the right
conditions for effective disaster resilience (HFA,
2005; Wisner et al., 2004). Clearly, this may not
be the case in areas affected by armed conflict
and fragility (see Box 3).
Box 3: Building resilience in Chad
The Sahel Working Group, an informal inter-agency network, recognises that fragile states pose particular
challenges to humanitarian and development cooperation.
In Chad, for example, state fragility and corruption affect governance and the ability to facilitate
international aid and development. Chadian politics is characterised by frequently shifting alliances: to
maintain a broad coalition of support, leaders of armed groups are included in government and political
structures. As alliances and support for these leaders shift, so too do the coalitions. This has resulted
in a lack of continuity in government policy. As acknowledged by the government’s own National Growth
and Poverty Reduction Strategy, corruption remains a major problem. This has posed challenges for
government spending, notably with regard to revenues from oil reserves.
Challenges to strengthening disaster risk management in Chad include:
● A failure to institutionalise early warning systems (EWS): The Chadian government does not consider
EWS to be a priority in its strategy for prevention and management of the food crises. This led to
donors withdrawing funding for the development of effective EWS, which had been in development
since 1986, after the project evaluation highlighted a critical lack of national ownership.
● Poorly developed systems for food security and crisis management: This includes poor structures for
collecting information and consequently unreliable and incomplete data. Moreover, the government’s
narrow focus on food availability over and above more nuanced conceptualisations of food security
means international food aid has often been considered the most appropriate response to address
food crises. During the 2010 food crisis, for instance, the National Office for Food Security lacked the
logistical resources to transport food from major towns to the most severely affected rural areas.
source: gubbels, 2011
18 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
A particular facet of this problem is conflict-
induced displacement. In Colombia, insecurity
has forced people to migrate to informal urban
settlements located on flood plains and unstable
slopes (Williams, 2011: 24).
Fragility as well as violent conflict or war can
make disasters more likely. Institutions and
governance structures may have limited capacity
to mitigate, prevent, prepare and respond to
natural shocks and stresses (Kostner and Meutia,
2011; World Bank, 2011). States may not be
willing or able to enact early warning systems,
mitigate risks or launch effective response.
In Haiti successive unstable governments have
failed to provide either adequate regulation or
economic opportunities to those living in chronic
poverty. In rural areas ‘distress coping’ behaviour
has caused unmanaged deforestation and
soil erosion, heightening the risk of landslides
and flash flooding (UNDP, 2011: 16). The
concentration of poor and vulnerable communities
in low-lying urban areas increases their exposure
to the risk of flooding and storm damage (ibid.).
This is coupled with an environment of criminality
in areas prone to storms and hurricanes
which deters individuals from responding to
evacuation warnings for fear of looting and theft
in their absence (UNDP, 2011: 22-36). In both
examples, the weak political voice of those in
informal settlements and the absence of political
incentives to spend money on disaster risk
reduction (DRR) have perpetuated high levels of
exposure to natural hazards.
In some situations, the government may be party
to a conflict, inherently politicising its decision-
making about how it manages disaster risk (de
Waal, 1997). In certain contexts, governments
neglect particular regions or ethnic groups,
making them more vulnerable to the effects of a
disaster (ibid.).
Where states have shown the willingness and
capability to protect people from a variety
of risks, the ‘relatively protected’ part of the
population is likely to be those deemed more
politically influential. Individuals or communities
who are well connected (politically or through the
private sector), have greater economic assets,
or are connected to urban centres are likely
to solicit more risk-reduction measures than
those who are politically weak or marginalised,
voiceless, poor and often rural. In Indonesia,
higher DRR investment occurs in well-
connected, high population density areas such
as Western Sumatra and Central Java (Williams,
2011). In Colombia, seismic DRR in major
urban areas such as Bogota contrasts starkly
with underinvestment in flood-prone La Mojana
(ibid.). Williams (2011) argues this illustrates
that residents in Bogota have more access to,
and influence over, decision-makers than the
poorer and more remote fishing communities of
La Mojana (ibid.). Conflict dynamics also play a
role: the lack of government control in La Mojana
due to an active rebel group and communities’
weak political voice possibly explain a lack
of investment.
Table 2 considers the challenges conflict and
fragility present to building disaster resilience
to natural hazards through the practical
implementation of risk management measures.
19
Table 2: The practical implications of undertaking disaster risk management in fragile
and conflict-affected states
Risk
management
component
Role in building
resilience to natural
hazards
Challenges of fragile and
conflict-affected states
Example
Hazard profile A crucial component of
reducing disaster risk is
monitoring and analysing
natural hazard-related
information to inform
priorities for action and
early warning (Priority two
HFA, 2005; Twigg, 2004).
This requires technical,
scientific and institutional
capabilities, investment in
data collection and skilled
technical staff.
Contexts of armed conflict
present significant barriers to
understanding the natural hazard
profile of an area. There may
be a lack of investment in data
collection, destruction of data,
inaccessibility of local monitoring
stations, lack of financial support
or suspicion over the use and
collection of information.
In contexts where investment
and capability is present,
data about the risks of natural
hazards may be embedded
within the security apparatus and
thus not used for DRR.
For hazards that can be forecast, such
as hurricanes or volcanic eruptions,
there are strong political incentives
for ensuring early warning exists and
informs preparedness measures. The
‘failure to ensure adequate preparedness
against such predictable risks would
indicate obvious negligence on the part
of government, expose leaders to heavy
criticism and thus create a very high
political cost’ (Williams, 2011: 23).
Dissemination
of information
Dissemination of
information plays a vital
role in enabling disaster
resilience, enabling
individuals and groups to
prepare for a hazard and
enact disaster plans.
In highly sensitive, fragile and
conflict-affected contexts the
mode, style and content of
messages associated with
disaster risks must be treated
with caution to avoid becoming
manipulated or politicised.
Action taken on the basis of
information disseminated is
not straightforward as disaster
risks are weighed-up in relation
to other risks associated with
conflict and insecurity.
There is evidence of governments
withholding information about the extent
of the impacts of a disaster from the
international community for various
reasons. In Burma the government failed
to provide neither warning of Cyclone
Nargis nor the humanitarian crisis that
followed (South et al., 2012: 10). The
situation was further exacerbated by
many communities being denied access
to humanitarian aid by international
agencies due to government restrictions
on entry to the country.
Infrastructure
and building
codes
Effective DRR
requires enforcement
of infrastructure and
building codes, quality
construction, enforced
sustainable land use
practices, and penalties
for non-compliance
(Wilkinson and Mitchell,
2012). Governments and
state infrastructure are, or
should be, regulators of
these standards. Where
conflicting priorities are not
monitored or regulated,
disaster risk can be
inadvertently exacerbated.
In contexts with poor
regulatory systems and lack
of enforcement, particularly
with regard to the private
sector, construction industry
and land management, the
infrastructural standards and
incentive structures required to
enforce DRR may be lacking.
Wilkinson and Mitchell (2012: 4)
note how political disincentives
exist where powerful interest
groups are likely to oppose
the regulation of private sector
activity, even where this may
be in the interest of reducing
disaster risk.
Drawing on case studies from
Afghanistan, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Nepal and South Sudan,
international support to infrastructure
in fragile and conflict-affected states
experiences ‘an intensified form of the
problems of underinvestment, lack of
maintenance and weak institutional
and policy framework that apply across
most low income countries’ (Jones and
Howarth, 2012: 2).
23. Basic development infrastructure includes access routes, water
and sanitation, health facilities and a functioning banking system.
Structures specifically designed to manage risk include hazard-
related building codes and regulations, emergency response
equipment and facilities, insurance and reinsurance, and early
warning systems for monitoring and dissemination of information.
20 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Risk
management
component
Role in building
resilience to natural
hazards
Challenges of fragile and
conflict-affected states
Example
Environmental
protection
UNEP (2009) has
documented a range
of case studies
demonstrating how
widespread unsustainable
environmental practices
and weak enforcement of
environmental protection
come at the expense of
environmental preservation
and the exacerbation of
disaster risk (UNEP, 2009).
The role of (politically) powerful
individuals and their association
with private companies means that,
in some contexts, ‘lobbying power,
political donations and position
in patronage networks create
conditions to enable damaging
environmental practices to continue
to the financial advantage of a
small group of elites’ (Williams,
2011: 19). Confronting powerful
private industry is perceived to
be beyond the ability (or in some
cases will) of some governments.
Insecurity can inhibit effective environmental
protection, which in turn increases
exposure. In Atrato Media, Colombia
unchecked exploitation of forests on slopes
increases the risk of floods and landslides
(Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004).
The authorities’ inability to access the area
owing to insecurity means that clearance
and maintenance of river blockages was not
possible, exacerbating the risk of flooding.
As a result of armed conflict, the area also
lacked institutional capacity to enforce
regulations and political incentives to protect
citizens from increased risk.
Diversion of
resources
In societies affected by
armed conflict the diversion
of resources to conflict-
related activities can be
at the expense of broader
infrastructural development.
The fact that no fragile and
conflict-affected state has
achieved a single Millennium
Development Goal is
testament to this (World
Bank, 2011). Effective risk
reduction for natural hazards
takes basic development
infrastructure as its starting
point (with the addition of
special provisions related
to the hazard profile of a
given area).23
Violence, conflict and insecurity
destroy livelihoods, infrastructure
and basic service provision. The
role this plays in undermining
disaster resilience is well noted:
‘A war-weary population with
reduced physical and psychological
health is more susceptible to a
pandemic. A government focusing
on war might neglect promulgation,
monitoring, and enforcement of
earthquake-related building codes.
Conflict frequently interferes with
or cuts essential supplies such
as food, medicine, and building
materials, making it more difficult
for people to keep their homes and
communities prepared for floods or
storms’ (Kelman, 2012: 1).
The prolonged complex political crisis
in Darfur, Sudan has hindered the
development of long-term investment in
livelihoods, services, infrastructure and
capacity. Despite a substantial amount
of humanitarian (and some development)
spending in the region, development
progress has been severely stunted by
the on-going conflict, and its associated
challenges.
Revenue
collection,
taxes and
corruption
Revenue collection and
taxes are crucial to funding
services which support
communal DRR. However,
revenue collection and
taxes can also contribute
to a lack of enforced
building regulations as
‘prohibiting development in
hazard-prone areas means
losing revenues from
development charges and
property taxes – two vital
sources of funding for local
governments’ (Henstra and
McBean, 2005: 111).
Lucrative financial gains can
be made through corruption
in public construction, which
undermines the enforcement
of building codes, quality and
control of materials and design,
and building management (World
Bank, 2010). Corruption further
undermines risk reduction efforts
and has been witnessed across
governmental scales, from local
politicians to large-scale national
projects (Williams, 2011).
The relationship between corruption
and disaster mortality has been studied
using a range of econometric indicators.
Corruption and avoidance of safety and
building codes are believed to be major
factors undermining DRR (Escaleras et al.,
2007). Where there are weak incentives
for government to provide public goods, it
is often questioned whether the less visible
risk reduction activities actually take place
at all, such as inspections, high-quality risk
assessment and environmental protection
(Williams, 2011: 18).
Corruption and perceptions of corruption
also influence the way international agencies
deliver aid to a country. Concerns over
government corruption led donors to deliver
Malawi’s 2001-2002 disaster response
through international organisations (Darcy
and Hofmann, 2003, in Harvey, 2009).
Table 2: The practical implications of undertaking disaster risk management in fragile
and conflict-affected states (continued)
21
Risk
management
component
Role in building
resilience to natural
hazards
Challenges of fragile and
conflict-affected states
Example
Contracting
systems
Fair and transparent
contracting systems are
required to ensure safety
is not compromised on
the basis of cost saving,
bribery or corruption.
Longer-term disaster resilience
is undermined by weaknesses
in the contracting system for
construction projects. In situations
where transparency is lacking and
a black market or bribery occurs,
the enforcement of practices such
as DRR which require additional
resources is found wanting.
In Aceh, Indonesia, procurement rules
were undermined in post-tsunami
reconstruction. The pressure to mobilise
relief and reconstruction reportedly
to lead to a ‘relaxing’ of the normal
procurement rules and existence of
negligent practices including the inflation
of contract values and bribery (see
Williams, 2011: 18).
Coordination The coordination of
sectors, programmes and
policies across a range
of issues is essential to
developing a coherent and
consistent environment
for building disaster
resilience. The state has a
crucial role in coordinating
internal and external
assistance to ensure
comprehensive approaches
to preparedness and
response.
Where states do not have the
capacity and ability to act, the
coordination of different actors
may be severely limited, resulting
in the duplication of efforts or
the exclusion of some recipient
groups over others.
Guatemala passed a law in 1996 obliging
all private and state bodies to cooperate
with the national disaster management
system (Picard, 2007, in Harvey, 2009).
In practice this faces many challenges.
Coordination problems remain including
the bypassing of national coordination
structures.
Legalisation
and
regulation
Disaster risk policies and
practice require support
and guidance through
an effective legislative
and regulatory system.
In practice, efforts to
establish or improve
the legal framework for
disasters occurs ex-post.
For example, Pakistan
established the National
Disaster Management
Authority after the 2005
earthquake.
The legal and regulatory system
of a country can help or hinder
the ability of international actors
to work in a disaster context and
determine (or at least influence)
their engagement with state
structures.
In Pakistan the 2005 earthquake
prompted the establishment of the
National Disaster Management Authority.
Similarly, after the 2004 tsunami, Sri
Lanka enacted new disaster management
legislation (Harvey 2009: 7).
Security and
physical
presence of
international
actors
Enabling DRR requires
effective and sustained
presence of agencies
with the ability to support
capacity development in
DRR, across a range of
scales and geographical
areas.
Insecurity can put staff severely
at risk, limiting the ability
of agencies to undertake
risk reduction programmes.
Inaccessible communities are
often the worst affected, where
conflict and insecurity inhibits all
aspects of risk reduction.
The expulsion of 13 international NGOs
from Sudan following the indictment of
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir by
the International Criminal Court is an
example of international agencies’ ability
to work in fragile and conflict-affected
states being challenged by the influence
of external events.
Table 2: The practical implications of undertaking disaster risk management in fragile
and conflict-affected states (continued)
22 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
4.2 Impact of conflict on
disaster response
Powerful groups in fragile and conflict-
affected states (which can include government)
sometimes make it difficult for national and
international actors to work with populations
vulnerable to natural disasters. The most typical
examples concern the impact of conflict on
disaster response, where humanitarian space is
restricted.
Following Cyclone Nargis in 2008 the Burmese
government allowed only limited humanitarian
access, and only after substantial delays.
Some agencies were denied access and those
that were permitted entry were subject to
restricted movement (Asia-Pacific Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2008: 2). The delay
was exacerbated following a defensive military
deployment of army units to affected areas in
response to warnings by foreign governments and
activists that aid would be imposed unilaterally,
and attempts to mobilise the ‘responsibility to
protect’ doctrine (South et al., 2012: 10). Thus
‘the already stretched resources of the state were
deployed on a security setting, rather than in relief
and recovery efforts’ (ibid.). The army deployment
discouraged relief to some vulnerable, cyclone-
affected communities as international agencies
avoided working with the army out of concern for
their human rights records. In the end the external
response was framed as ‘international assistance
with a regional character’ in an attempt to ensure
the Burmese leaders felt less threatened by the
influx of international actors (Belanger and Horsey,
2008 in Harvey, 2009).
Disaster response is not always a simple by-
product of a state’s capacity to deal with the impact
of a natural hazard, but reflective of a number of
strategic choices. The labelling of a situation as a
‘crisis’ has strong political dimensions. Nelson (in
Kelman, 2012: 110) found ‘states that had recently
undergone a major governance transition, such as
gaining independence, were more likely to decline
aid, claiming to demonstrate internal capacity in
dealing with a disaster… whether or not that aid
was needed’. For those offering assistance, Harvey
(2009: 15) notes that, this is more than a technical
matter: ‘making such an assessment is an
inherently political act, and political considerations
often weigh heavily as donor governments decide
whether and how to intervene’.
Other ways power-holders may restrict relief
are by:
● refusing international help, even when national
capabilities have been outstripped (Mozambique
flooding in 2007, Pakistan following 2007 floods
– IASC, 2007 in Harvey, 2009)
● mistrusting the motivations behind international
assistance and delaying or failing to
communicate the need for international relief
(Myanmar cyclone in 2008 – South et al., 2012)
● making ambiguous or conflicting statements
about the severity of the situation (IFRC, 2007:
89, in Harvey, 2009: 6)
● failing to declare a disaster to avoid appearing
weak or undermining national pride (Cuba 1998
drought – Kelman, 2012).
4.3 Impact of disasters on
individual coping strategies
There is insufficient evidence about how people
prioritise disaster risk in conditions of fragility
and conflict. Drawing on the experiences of
individuals in Darfur, the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, Chechnya and Sri Lanka, Jaspars
and O’Callaghan argue that during conflict,
‘people’s options become more limited and the
strategies pursued frequently involve extreme
risk to people’s security. In most cases, the
strategies adopted are not voluntary or based
on any real choice’ (2010: 173). Individuals have
to make tough choices to minimise threats to
their safety, often at the expense of livelihood
assets or security; short-term security gains can
come at the price of longer-term risks to their
livelihoods (Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2010: 2).
Individual coping or risk management strategies
may therefore become difficult or impossible
during armed conflict, increasing the need for
assistance, including emergency relief.
Amaryta Sen’s (1981) work on the dynamics of
famine makes it clear that famines occur not as
a result of scarcity of food, but as a result of the
collapse of entitlements. In an important paper,
Alex de Waal (1991) analyses how violence
affects famine dynamics. De Waal argues that
when environmental and economic factors
combine with violence, then the nature and scale
23
of vulnerability shifts fundamentally. Specifically,
he argues that those perpetrating political
violence actively seek to undermine precisely the
strategies that people would normally use to cope
with fluctuations in environmental and economic
conditions. Yet in the case of Dinka pastoralists,
emergency needs were often assessed on the
basis that individuals had their own strategies and
resources to draw on (Keen, 1994). In Kenya’s
Turkana district and Kitui districts, livestock
raiding has hampered livelihood strategies
(including those designed to cope with drought)
and served to increase vulnerability to drought
(Eriksen and Lind, 2009). Insecurity has inhibited
access to wild foods, trading with neighbouring
groups, and use of distant border grazing. It
is necessary therefore to consider under what
conditions people are resilient24 rather than
simply ‘surviving’.
This section has shown how violence, conflict
and fragility exacerbate vulnerability to natural
disasters and impede efforts to reduce disaster
risk. It has underlined how efforts to address
disaster risk in fragile and conflict-affected
states must pay attention to political barriers and
levers. It has shown how risks intersect, and how
efforts to reduce some risks may have positive
or negative impacts on others. More holistic and
innovative ways of approaching risk are required,
supporting statebuilding where appropriate, or
working in spite of state systems where states are
unwilling to protect their citizens. More research
into the successes of DRR in fragile and conflict-
affected states would help to inform and support
this undertaking.
24. And resilient in a holistic sense, as DFID’s conception of ‘disaster
resilience’ illustrates with the inclusion of natural disasters, conflict
and other conditions of vulnerability and risk (DFID, 2011b).
24 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Integrated
approaches to
managing conflict
and natural
disaster risk
The previous two sections have set out the relationship between
conflict and natural disasters. They found the links to be complicated
and the evidence mixed, although on balance the analysis suggests
that conflicts exacerbate natural disaster impacts and natural disasters
can trigger or aggravate conflict. This section examines current
approaches to jointly managing conflict and disaster risk, whether
through prevention and risk reduction or through emergency response.
christian als / panos
5
Summary
Conflict prevention and DRR are largely treated as discrete issues in policy and
practice; yet on the ground natural disasters and conflict coincide. Misconceptions
among actors working to reduce conflict and natural disaster risk can inhibit the potential
for stronger collaboration. Some disagree that the actions required for conflict and DRR
should be more closely linked at all. Opportunities to redress this disconnect include
making the concurrence of natural disasters, conflict and fragility an explicit feature of
the post-2015 agenda.
The concept of ‘resilience’ can be used to leverage better links between
humanitarian and development action and encourage joint working. However, this
will require agencies to agree on a conception of resilience that bridges their mandates –
moving beyond the current situation where agencies are vying for position in relation to the
‘resilience agenda’. It will be necessary to continue finding ways to balance the desire to
maintain humanitarian space against the need to work collaboratively with governments to
build their capacity to reduce and manage risks.
Innovative practices are beginning to emerge where governments and donors are
working more collaboratively. By promoting a package of measures and more joined up
funding, donors have encouraged political support for tackling risks in a more holistic manner.
Non-governmental organisations are beginning to implement DRR projects in
fragile and conflict-affected states, yet there are few examples of integrated
approaches to conflict and disaster risk in practice. Interventions tend to span a
continuum: at one end, DRR is used as leverage for conflict prevention; at the other,
conflict is simply the context in which DRR is implemented. There appears to be growing
realisation that disaster risk in fragile and conflict-affected states cannot be addressed
as business-as-usual.
Caution needs to be exercised in devising risk-related interventions because
reducing one risk can elevate others. For example, in some contexts livelihood
diversification can help people survive natural disasters but increases their risk of being
targeted in conflicts. Experts on conflict and natural disasters should engage more in
each other’s contextual analysis to mitigate negative impacts and ensure interventions
are more sensitive to the variety of risks and vulnerabilities faced by communities.
While there are good reasons for not investing in ex-ante risk reduction in fragile
and conflict-affected states, not doing so makes little sense in the long term.
Shunning ex-ante investment only entrenches humanitarian assistance, which can itself
exacerbate conflict.
26 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
5.1 Managing natural disasters
and conflict in silos
In practice, efforts to address the risks or
vulnerability resulting from natural hazards,
fragility and conflict are operationalised
separately. Donors, UN agencies and NGOs
typically have separate departments and
processes to deal with disaster and conflict risk,
which translates to siloed policy and practice.
Where good practice does exist, it is primarily
documented in grey literature, and has rarely
received adequate attention from independent
researchers. Thus the small but emerging body
of work that takes a more holistic view of risk,
incorporating natural disaster and conflict risk
with other shocks and stresses, is found in policy
and strategy documents which present an agenda
for action. For example, the UK Government’s
new humanitarian policy (DFID, 2012) puts
conflict prevention and DRR at the heart of its
work on resilience. NGOs such as Cordaid have
developed a holistic approach for disaster risk
across all sectors including conflict, but still
manage programmes related to DRR and conflict
transformation through separate departments.25
There remains little consensus on how to
address the disaster–conflict nexus in practice.
At the national level, disaster risk management
has largely been framed around the Hyogo
Framework for Action (see Box 4). Building
a more holistic approach to prevention and
preparedness would require an equivalent
investment in action for conflict prevention
(Kellett and Sparks, 2012).26 The post-2015
development goals could provide an opportunity
to consider more integrated approaches.
Box 4: Policy architecture for dealing with disaster risk
At the national level, government structures, institutional frameworks and the policy environment
for building disaster resilience vary widely between states. For example, government departments
responsible for natural disasters can function as stand-alone units reporting directly to the head of state
or can be embedded within another ministry. Recently, there has been a move away from isolated units
towards a more integrated approach where action across a range of departments, sectors and ministries
is required (UN, 2007, in Harvey, 2009). Moreover, in response to high impact disaster events over the
past five years, a number of governments, particularly in Asia, have advanced their regulatory, legislative
and institutional capacity for managing disasters: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Indonesia have all
established or progressed their national disaster management authorities (ibid.).
At the international level, UNISDR’s Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) provides a normative
framework specifying a set of actions, approaches and interventions intended to reduce risk. In most
countries, state-level action is complemented by community level action (see Global Network of Civil
Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction, 2012). The engagement of fragile and conflict-affected
states in Hyogo is variable. UNISDR is limited in the extent to which it can support states affected by
armed conflict and fragility to promote DRR; commitment and progress towards the Hyogo framework is
voluntary and UNISDR’s mandate is limited by the constraints of the UN system.
25. Cordaid interview undertaken for this study.
26. Conflict prevention and statebuilding largely derives from individual
peace agreements, negotiated settlements or targeted programmes.
27
5.2 Holistic approaches to
resilience: integrated risk
management
Building disaster resilience in fragile
and conflict-affected states
An assessment of current practice reveals that
interventions often seek to build the resilience of
communities to different combinations of risks; but
rarely do these explicitly take into consideration
natural disaster and conflict risks together, and
even less so ex-ante. While the term ‘resilience’
has been applied to a range of policies and
programmes, as an operational concept it is
still at an incipient stage. Most often, resilience
interventions include some aspect of enhancing
livelihoods in combination with either a focus
on a specific hazard, or some form of conflict
prevention. The Sahel Working Group’s findings
provide a useful example, effectively linking
different initiatives to address a range of risks
(see Box 5). Even here, though, it is focused on
preparedness for natural disaster and more could
be done to link this with preparedness for conflict.
Specific resilience-related initiatives by bilateral
and multilateral donors are beginning to emerge.
These include the European Commission’s
(EC) Supporting the Horn of African Resilience
(SHARE) programme,27 the EC Alliance Globale
pour I’Initiative Resilience-Sahel (AGIR),28 the
USAID-led Global Alliance for Action for Drought
Resilience and Growth,29 and DFID’s Global
Resilience Action Programme (see Harris, 2013).30
It is anticipated that these funding streams will help
contribute towards managing conflict and natural
disaster risks and impacts holistically (see Box 6).
However, these are recent developments and it is
too early to tell if outcomes have been improved or
whether these provide any genuine advances over
business-as-usual approaches to crises.
Where disaster risk management and conflict
prevention have been explicitly linked, this tends
to involve NGOs adapting existing disaster risk
management practice to fragile and conflict-affected
states. The focus is often on local community-based
initiatives; for example, Tearfund are working in
Afghanistan (see Box 7) and Christian Aid in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. There are few examples of NGOs
trying to build institutional capacity for national-
level disaster risk management. Tearfund’s work in
Afghanistan is a rare example. Agencies differ in
how they proactively engage with conflict prevention
in their DRR work. This can be thought of as a
‘continuum of intent’ (see Figure 6). At one end of
the continuum DRR is seen as a vehicle for enacting
conflict prevention objectives; at the other end,
agencies work ‘around’ conflict dynamics, but often
adopt ‘Do No Harm’ principles. What can be achieved
through DRR in fragile and conflict-affected states is
partly about intent, but also about the appropriateness
of disaster risk management strategies for particular
contexts given the complexity and uncertainty that
conflict and fragility pose (Road to Resilience, 2011).
27. This is a joint humanitarian and development priority framework,
with short-term funding for humanitarian recovery and
agricultural production and long-term support to working with the
Intergovernmental Authourity on Development and on coordination.
At the moment, it is unclear what the longer-term priorities will be
(2014-2020 to be announced) and how this presents more than a
business-as-usual approach to managing major crises.
28. This focuses on early warning, market access, and linking
emergency to development. A regional plan for resilience is being
prepared for December 2012. Again it is unclear how this moves
beyond a business-as-usual approach.
29. See http://transition.usaid.gov/press/releases/2012/pr120404.html
30. The G-RAP aims to (1) Improve the capability, skills and the
professionalism of developing world partners, (2) develop the
capability, skills and professionalism of UK-based international
NGOs and the private sector and support effective ‘cross-sectoral’
initiatives, (3) support collaboration and partnership between the
private sector and NGOs or civil sector organisations at international
and local levels.
Figure 6: Continuum of intent:
disaster risk reduction and
conflict prevention
DRR as conflict
prevention:
actively seeking
to use measures
to reduce risk to
natural hazards to
promote dialogue,
negotiations and
prevent conflict.
DRR amidst
conflict and
fragility: working
‘around’ conflict
and fragility,
seeking to do
no harm but not
actively addressing
conflict dynamics.
28 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Box 5: Building resilience in the Sahel
region
Since 2005, donors, the UN and international NGOs have renewed
efforts to link emergency relief and development in a bid to address
the chronic vulnerabilities in the Sahel region. For example:
● DFID has supported a number of DRR programmes including
the West African Humanitarian Relief Fund.
● The European Commission’s Sahel Strategy (EC, 2011) outlines
actions for security and development including DRR support to
address chronic food and nutrition security.
● The UN formed a Central Emergency Response Fund to rapidly
assist those affected by natural and/or man-made disasters.
● Various international NGOs are engaged in research
(including household economy analysis), capacity building
(such as promoting agro-ecological techniques), DRR and
climate change adaption mainstreaming, and the design and
implementation of EWS.
Despite these activities, it remains a struggle to develop a long-
term approach for effective aid in the context of chronic food crisis
in the Sahel. In 2010 more than ten million people in the Sahel
suffered from an acute food crisis. Escaping the Hunger Cycle:
pathways to resilience in the Sahel (Gubbels, 2011) documents
the action needed to prevent recurring humanitarian crises. The
recommendations centre on avoiding a separation of crisis and
normality, recognising the links between chronic hunger and poverty.
A number of underlying challenges to development in the Sahel
were identified, including: deficits in the institutional capacity of
governments and partners for scaling up initiatives; difficulties in
addressing the root causes of crises through humanitarian and
development aid; the lack of government support or interest in
investing in social protection; scarce natural resources; and the
failure of markets to distribute food effectively.
Focusing on lessons from 5 years’ experience in Chad, Niger,
Burkina Faso and Mali, the Sahel Working Group identified the
following priorities for immediate action to support resilience:
● Strengthen preparedness and early response.
● Design and implement national programmes and policies for
social protection that meet the needs of the most vulnerable.
● Strengthen rural livelihoods through sustainable intensification
of food production in marginal areas, and through support for
animal production and marketing in pastoral areas.
● Develop and apply a regional strategy for DRR.
● Support coordinated, multi-sector investments to achieve
sustainable reduction in child malnutrition.
source: gubbels, 2011
Box 6: The Nepal Risk
Reduction Consortium
– practical funding for
resilience
The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium
was launched by the Government of
Nepal in 2009 and is supported by a
wide group of international institutions
and donors. The consortium has five
flagship areas with a coordinating
institution assigned to each. It has
a proposed budget of $146.8 million
over three years. The flagships are:
school and hospital safety (Asian
Development Bank/World Health
Organisation); emergency preparedness
and response capacity (UN OCHA);
flood management in Koshi River
Basin (World Bank); community-based
DRR and disaster risk management
(International Federation of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies);
and policy and institutional support for
disaster risk management (UNDP).
By August 2012 funding for the
consortium had reached $65.2 million,
suggesting the NRRC is a successful
model for collaborative funding
for tackling risk. It also employs
many features often regarded as
characteristic of resilience in practice:
● Joined up funding: multiple
stakeholders are brought together
under an agreed framework,
including government, UN agencies,
NGOs, international financial
institutions and communities.
● Based on all risks: preventing and
preparing for risks are brought
together under the same umbrella
programme.
● A package of measures: the
humanitarian–development divide
is bridged through a shared
agenda, with short- and long-term
interventions, and multiple funding
sources for the same activities.
● Political support across sectors:
development actors directly tackling
risk are supported by political
leadership from international and
national actors.
29
Box 7: Tearfund’s DRR work in Kandahar, Afghanistan
The cumulative impact of decades of armed conflict and natural disasters has left a legacy
of precarious human development, high vulnerability and complex humanitarian needs in
Afghanistan. Recognising the challenges faced by rapid onset floods and earthquakes, as well
as slow onset land degradation and desertification, Tearfund has made DRR a priority within
their humanitarian operations.
Tearfund’s DRR approach combines community-based DRR and statebuilding activities. The
former includes assessing community vulnerability to hazards, formulating and implementing
community-owned disaster action plans, and integrating plans into government disaster
planning and resource allocations. The latter consists of training the Afghanistan National
Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) in DRR, familiarising government staff with
provincial disaster plans, and strengthening disaster response capacity.
The programme’s successes include strengthening provincial capacities to enable ANDMA
to assume full responsibility for the Kandahar Provincial Disaster Management Committee
secretariat (serving as chair and coordinator). In other provinces (Kapisa and Jawzjan),
state-society relations were also strengthened as communities shared their disaster plans
with local government and vice versa. In isolated cases, this has developed into an on-going
relationship between villages and the provincial agriculture department.
Successes were dwarfed, however, by the problems created or exacerbated by armed
conflict: a weak state, lack of technical skills, and mistrust between state and civil society.
The on-going conflict pushes DRR further down the government’s list of spending priorities
and hampers existing institutional capacity. It also poses a number of practical challenges as
government and NGO staff are restricted from visiting disaster-affected areas.
Tearfund staff had mixed opinions on whether government capacity building has represented
the best use of time and resources. Many emphasise the successes, which came about
despite all the contextual challenges and unreliable funding. The same staff also emphasise
the irreplaceable role of local government in effective DRR. Others suggest that building
government capacity is difficult at the best of times, and that the additional barriers posed by
conflict (such as reduced incentives to prioritise DRR, difficulty in retaining trained staff and
weak processes of institutionalisation) make sustained success extremely challenging.
Opportunities for integrating DRR and conflict programming
Tearfund staff identified specific programming activities to help build resilience to conflict as well as to
natural hazards:
● Help communities develop participatory natural resource management systems.
● Introduce technologies and/or techniques that reduce pressure on contested resources, and
support appropriate income diversification.
● Advocate more equitable, participatory policy-making through the proper involvement of key
stakeholders and full participation of people on issues of land rights, ownership, water access
and pasture land.
Staff also proposed the following ‘next steps’ for continued DRR and statebuilding, which would
continue the incremental progress achieved in key provinces so far:
● Develop a coordinated information database mapping out capacity and vulnerability in
Afghanistan’s disaster-prone areas, with an inventory of the DRR or emergency response
projects implemented so far.
● Provide the government Emergency Operations Centre with the resources it needs to function.
● Develop rapid assessments and need assessments using formats agreed and used by all
actors (governments, UN agencies and NGOs).
source: tearfund, 2012
30 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Caution must be exercised over claims that
actions to reduce natural disaster risk can
also prevent conflict or build peace. There are
examples of DRR programmes adopting conflict
sensitive principles and increasing short-term
security, but there is no substantive evidence
that the drivers of conflict have been addressed
through DRR measures (Woodrow and Chigas,
2009). Tearfund recognised this challenge through
its DRR work in Afghanistan. It found that the
water scheme did not prevent conflict between
internally displaced persons and the state in
Kandahar, but partially (and probably temporarily)
mitigated some aspects of conflict through the
enactment of the community disaster plan.
Resilience to the effects of conflict
When considering resilience in relation to conflict, it
would seem helpful to distinguish between conflict
prevention on the one hand, and resilience to the
effects of conflict on the other. Many aspects of
promoting disaster resilience adhere to mitigating the
effects of conflict. As a coping strategy, splitting herds
is a practical example: not only can it reduce exposure
to drought, but it can also increase the chances of
recovery from raiding (since only one part of a herd
may be attacked and stolen) (Eriksen and Lind, 2009;
Christoplos et al., 2004). But it should not be assumed
that the best livelihood strategies for combating natural
hazards are always the best strategies for reducing (or
mitigating the effects of) conflict (see Box 8).
Box 8: Disaster-conflict linkages and community based DRR in Karamoja
In the Karamoja region, north-eastern Uganda, inconsistent rainfall has contributed to crop failure, livestock losses,
disease and displacement and left some groups dependent on relief aid for survival (Cordaid and IIRR, 2011).
Competition over water, livestock and pasture can exacerbate inter-clan tensions and result in greater migration,
sometimes to restricted areas, in search of grazing. Traditional mechanisms for negotiating and mediating the
management of natural resources have been undermined by a range of external influences. These include
the presence of new power dynamics related to cross-border movement, the role of the government, external
interventions and the presence of small arms. Natural disasters and conditions of vulnerability have contributed to
conflict and instability by exacerbating inter-clan conflict, cattle raiding, small arms violence and criminal activity.
Disarmament versus livelihood security
Ugandan government responses to these complex problems have often exacerbated the vulnerability of some
groups (Powell, 2010; Molenaar, 2011). Considering pastoralism a non-viable and ecologically damaging livelihood
option, the government has favoured policies and interventions for sedentary and agricultural populations (Molenaar,
2011: 13). A series of disarmament programmes have also been undertaken, but the interplay of natural resource
scarcity, natural hazards, insecurity, inter-clan conflict and contested governance has continuously undermined
such programmes. For example, after participating in the disarmament programme in 2001-2002, one group was
subjected to more frequent raiding from neighbouring groups (who retained their arms) (Powell, 2010: 11).
Cordaid has worked with a variety of local institutions over time to promote community-managed DRR. It undertook
an assessment which revealed that strengthening livelihood security could reduce the risk of natural disasters.
Subsequently the organisation sought to strengthen the local resilience of some groups through a range of
activities: a grain banking business; constructing water diversion systems; reducing animal losses to disease by
training animal health workers; and supporting diversified livelihood opportunities to increase household security.
Cordaid’s approach was designed to indirectly reduce the likelihood of violent confrontation over scarce resources,
yet it was not without its challenges; there is ‘a substantial difference in skills and capacity amongst public officials
and NGO staff, weak community organisations and gaps in national policy and legislative frameworks not least their
translation into practice for the benefit of vulnerable groups’ (Cordaid and IIRR, 2011: 7).
Lessons for linking disaster and conflict prevention
The Karamoja context is incredibly complex. Local people are confronted with a range of risks on a daily basis and
their priorities for action reflect differentiated – and often competing – demands on local natural resources, services
and livelihood opportunities. Attempts to implement programmes in ways that better recognise the dynamics of
disasters and conflict concurrently are more likely to reflect this complex reality; but questions must be asked
about the value of interventions which cannot or do not address the broader underlying causes of vulnerability. If
resilience is to be built, effective community-based initiatives need to link with activities across scale that seek to
address the challenges related to the potential compatibility of different livelihood and governance systems.
31
Livelihood diversification has long been highlighted
as a way of dealing with natural hazards, but it
may sometimes increase vulnerability during a war.
Luka Biong Deng (2008) notes that in Sudan many
Dinka pastoralists, having previously diversified
into farming, moved away from farming during the
second civil war to maintain maximum mobility in the
face of repeated raiding.
In tailoring livelihood strategies it is important to
understand how local people prioritise risks and
whether risk management strategies respond to
single or multiple risks.
The role of the state
In line with UN resolution 46/182, governments
have a responsibility to help protect their
population and reduce the risk of natural
disasters. Thus, Harvey writes: ‘For good or
ill the central role of governments in disaster
response cannot be avoided. Substitution
for the state may sometimes be appropriate,
particularly in conflict, and in both conflicts and
natural disasters there will always be a need for
independent and neutral humanitarian action.
However, one of the goals of international
humanitarian actors should always be to
encourage and support states to fulfil their
responsibilities to assist and protect their own
citizens in times of disaster ’ (Harvey, 2009: 41).
He notes that ‘where states are weak but have
some willingness to meet needs, a combination
of substitution and capacity-building will
probably be appropriate’ (2009: 16).
Kostner and Meutia (2011: 12) suggest ways
to address these challenges, including:
working through a range of institutions and
approaches; using independent monitoring
agents, external financial management and
procurement agencies; building the confidence
and capacity of national institutions in parallel
with externally-led initiatives; and handing over
to national institutions over time. Where the
authority and legitimacy of a state and its leaders
are contested, an alternative is to try to work
with inclusive (or ‘inclusive-enough’) coalitions
encompassing representatives from a cross-
section of society (Kostner and Meutia, 2011).
This may present an opportunity to help build
the legitimacy of the state and strengthen state-
society relations. It may also be feasible to build
into these coalitions mechanisms to address both
ex-post responses and the underlying drivers
of violence. There can of course be significant
political benefits gained from relief, including
opportunities to provide visible assistance to
those in need, often supported by positive news
coverage (Williams, 2011: 17). Colombia provides
an example where the central government uses
public and media attention to increase their
visibility after a disaster (ibid.). Here, funding
is largely directed at relief and post-disaster
rehabilitation, creating a system that promotes
direct support during emergencies at the expense
of longer-term investment in prevention and
preparedness (Williams, 2011: 17).
While many fragile and conflict-affected states
have disaster risk management policies,
infrastructure and mechanisms in place (see Box
9), many of these are significantly underfunded
and external support is often limited (Kellett and
Sparks, 2012).
5.3 Forging stronger links
between disaster and conflict
specialists
For those working on disasters and conflict, more
constructive cooperation depends on breaking
down mutual misunderstandings (see Box 10).
Cooperation will also require more explicit
recognition of the different risks faced by recipient
individuals and communities, and the way action
to address one risk may or may not be compatible
with reducing other risks (see as an example Box
11 on protection and livelihoods).
Simply identifying a coping strategy during
conflict does not necessarily imply that it should
be supported. Some researchers have noted the
importance of civilians establishing relationships
with local armed groups – groups that may
themselves be interested in limiting violence and
exploitation in the interests of ‘winning hearts and
minds’ (Slim, 2007; Atkinson, 2011; Justino, 2011).
Such unofficial arrangements have included those
between local communities and armed groups in
Burma or unofficial markets linking areas of rebel
strength to government-controlled areas in the Nuba
Mountains in Sudan (South et al., 2012). There may
be ways of supporting these, but outside assistance
might sometimes draw attention to arrangements
that work best when they are hidden.
32 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Box 9: Reducing disaster risk in a fragile state – Nepal
Six years after the peace agreement between the Nepalese government and the Maoists, Nepal is
widely regarded as a fragile state: weak governance and rule of law make the population vulnerable
to natural hazards while also contributing to political conflict and tensions (Vivekananda, 2011:
8). Yet the policy framework for DRR in Nepal is well developed, with the Natural Calamity Relief
Act of 1982 accompanied by a Disaster Management Act currently under development (IFRC,
2011: 55). The 1982 law focuses on a limited range of DRR activities within the scope of disaster
response and relief while new legislation hopes to create a broader approach to facilitate long-term
natural disaster reduction. In parallel, the development community is taking steps to engage in
conflict sensitive approaches to development through the World Bank’s ‘peace filter’ and the UN’s
mainstreaming of the Do No Harm approach (Pandley, 2011: 5).
While there is a strong political foundation for disaster risk management in Nepal, the country’s
complicated rule of law creates challenges for implementation. For example, political reform and
local governance for DRR has been undermined by the broader political crisis reflected in the slow
progress of the new Disaster Management Act (IFRC, 2011: 27). At the state level, environmental
conservation is not integrated into the disaster management framework and national legislation
is limited in its scope by autonomous local administrations. Furthermore, prolonged conflict and
instability has left a number of communities without councils or committees, which limits their ability
to address conflicts over natural resources or vulnerability to natural hazards. In some instances
this has led to ill-informed interventions from central or district governments (IFRC, 2011: 28;
Vivekananda, 2011: 9).
As an example, Vivekananda (2011: 9-10) documents how Raamechhap district’s mountain villages
faced severe water shortages following three consecutive failed monsoons. The community
requested assistance from the district government, which provided a one-off cash hand-out just
before the local elections. The community was given no further guidance and subsequently chose
to invest in a tap to pump up groundwater – without the knowledge that groundwater levels were
depleting and uncontrolled surface water extraction would intensify water scarcity. The water ran
dry, exacerbating local frustration at the lack of government support for the community’s basic
requirement for clean water.
In other cases, local frustrations have led to violence and unrest (Vivekananda, 2011: 8). For
instance, flooding and overflow from the Koshi River in the Terai region in 2008 resulted in the
resettlement of 60,000 residents in surrounding communities. The increased stress on the natural
resources within these communities translated into increased tension, further escalated by political
groups who used flood victims’ dissatisfaction over lack of clean water and shelter to feed anti-
government sentiments. When this became violent, 200 policemen were sent to maintain order in
the camps (ibid.).
33
Box 10: Misconceptions among actors working to reduce
risk to conflict and natural disasters
Misunderstandings are rife. Academics, policy makers and practitioners can have strong
perceptions about what it is others actually ‘do’ in reducing risk or addressing vulnerabilities to
conflict and natural disasters. These perceptions are not always accurate. For example, there is
a common perception that those working on natural hazards adopt a technical approach to risk
reduction and neglect analysis of the politics of vulnerability, while those working on conflict fail
to take seriously the impact of natural hazards on conditions of vulnerability (for related concerns
see Buchanan-Smith and Christoplos, 2004; Molenaar, 2011). Honest reflections from Cordaid offer
a unique example: ‘While people from the Conflict Transformation Team thought that community-
based DRR is only focused on community level and on reducing the risks of natural hazards,
people from the Disaster Risk Reduction Team had the idea that conflict transformation pays very
little attention to people’s capacities’ (Molenaar, 2011: 25). An exchange of knowledge, ideas and
approaches would help rectify these misconceptions and identify commonalities in approaches
(Molenaar, 2011: 25).
There is also a lack of understanding of how concepts relate to one another across communities of
practice, how they overlap and/or differ. Within each field there are on-going debates over how to
define and operationalise concepts such as ‘resilience’. Definitions of concepts can be somewhat
arbitrary in practice where the boundaries between natural disasters and conflict – and other forms
of shocks and stresses – are often blurred.
Box 11: Assessing protection and livelihoods
Building resilience means taking account of the trade-offs that occur when individuals make
choices which may increase their security or protection (even if only temporarily) at the expense
of livelihood security. Yet assessments for livelihoods and protection are largely segregated for a
variety of reasons: the difficulty of establishing multifunctional teams; time restrictions; or because
the detail required for such analysis may be beyond the capability or scope of a programme
(Jaspars and O’Callaghan, 2010: 3). Where threats to livelihoods and protection coincide (such
as a rural population at risk of displacement), joint working may be more achievable. But where
protection concerns outweigh livelihood threats, support to protection can ‘run counter to the
principle of impartiality’ (ibid.).
Livelihoods specialists, Jaspars and O’Callaghan find, ‘often view advocacy as too politically
sensitive, and advocacy is often only prioritised when an agency has protection capacity’ (2010:
4). Thus we have to ask, what are the limits on livelihood work without protection? Jaspars and
O’Callaghan (2012: 4) argue that combining livelihoods and protection is not only more effective but
more likely to reduce the risk that interventions will ‘exacerbate unequal power relations or further
endanger communities’. Yet agency mandates, scale, capacity and funding inhibit more joined up
protection-livelihoods interventions More action is needed in this regard, including for example,
community-oriented protection interventions.
34 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Furthermore, disaster relief efforts may
sometimes generate new risks instead of
facilitating the conditions required for longer-
term resilience. Kostner and Meutia (2011:
4) argue that the parallel mechanisms
established to respond to natural disasters in
the absence of state measures ‘facilitate short-
run accomplishment by bypassing national
organisations and institutions [which] can
undermine national institution-building in the
longer term’.31
In some respects the lack of attention given to the
complex links between disaster risk and conflict
reflects the underlying belief still held by some
beyond the DRR community that natural hazards
lie at the root of ‘natural’ disasters and thus
their causes are largely outside human control.
The paradigm shift that placed vulnerability
and issues of governance, inequality, poverty
and exclusion at the centre of ‘disasters theory’
has taken time to propagate into non-DRR
communities of practice. So for some, addressing
disaster risk is still a predominantly technical
exercise associated with natural sciences and
advancements in technology and physical
construction. The evidence suggests otherwise:
efforts to strengthen disaster resilience require a
detailed understanding of the socio-economic and
political factors that cause people to be at risk
(IPCC, 2012; Wisner et al., 2004).
While new approaches to managing disaster risk
in fragile and conflict-affected states are emerging,
there is little evidence of truly integrated approaches
to disaster and conflict prevention. We still lack
evidence on whether multiple gains can be made
by developing integrated risk programming and
how barriers can be overcome. ‘Resilience’ raises
new and old questions about the status of the
humanitarian and development divide. In the context
of fragility and conflict, balancing the objectives
of country ownership, statebuilding, capacity
building, and the independence of humanitarian
action continues to be a difficult challenge (Harvey,
2009: 22). Where the state is unwilling or unable to
provide adequate support, more innovative ways of
building resilience may be required which engage
new actors beyond the state – regional level actors
or more informal actors at sub-national level, for
example. Learning from experience on conflict
prevention and statebuilding, it is highly unlikely that
business-as-usual disaster risk management will
work in such settings.
Some are starting to take innovative action
which can inform more integrated approaches
to risk – notably NGOs at the community level
for whom the interrelated nature of risks is
apparent. Yet more needs to be done. Options
are available: ‘first, assistance during a
transition process needs to pay more attention
to risk management and reduction efforts and
related capacity building. Second, to achieve
effective results, disaster risk management
efforts cannot afford to ignore investing in
conflict prevention and aiding the transition
process’ (Kostner and Meutia, 2011: 8-9).
Simply put, if conflict is a factor in increasing
natural disaster risk and vice versa, then we need
to see much more crossover and integration.
First, as a minimum, it is necessary to make sure
that interventions in one field do not exacerbate
risks in another. Conflict sensitive approaches
to humanitarian and development action could
have a role to play here. Second, opportunities
for conflict prevention and disaster resilience
programmes to contribute to alleviating each
other’s risks should be explored – for example
by contributing to joint analyses, regional
approaches, and broad-based risk assessments.
A third step would be to ensure that managing
risk in fragile and conflict-affected states is a
key feature of the post-2015 agreement on DRR
(Hyogo Framework 2) and that there are clear
institutional mandates set to tackle this.
There is space for critical agencies to lead
the agenda in this regard. As an example, the
forthcoming World Development Report (2014) on
risk, crisis and uncertainty should link explicitly
to the findings of the 2011 World Development
Report on Conflict, Security and Development.
In doing so, better links could be made between
conflict prevention and disaster preparedness in
the context of other risks that exist in any given
context (Kostner and Meutia, 2011).
31. Moreover it is argued that the involvement of local communities and
community groups in the delivery of relief aid continues to be viewed
as a hindrance (see Tripartite Core Group and World Bank and
ASEAN discussion note, in Kostner and Meutia, 2011: 4).
35
Conceptualising
the linkages
The previous sections reviewed the evidence on the
links between conflict and natural disasters and
highlighted existing approaches to managing conflict
and disasters simultaneously. This section considers
how changes to existing conceptual frameworks can be
adapted to foster greater integration.
christian als / panos
6
6.1 Unintended consequences
It should now be clear that interventions
designed to build peace or to mitigate, prepare
and respond to natural disasters may have
unintended consequences. It may also be the
case that an intervention has neither a positive
or negative effect on other aspects of a given
situations – either intentionally (through the
application of approaches such as Do No Harm) or
unintentionally (see Figure 7).
The ideal scenario is to undertake interventions
that contribute helpfully in each of four ways:
preventing conflict, mitigating conflict’s effects,
preventing natural hazards, and mitigating natural
hazards’ effects. In reality, a particular intervention
could contribute positively in some ways and yet
still contribute negatively in respect to others.
6.2 From ‘collision’ to
collaboration
If natural disasters can exacerbate or trigger
conflicts, then they should be considered within
conflict and statebuilding frameworks and
conflict analysis tools. If conflict and fragility
increase vulnerability and exposure to natural
disasters, then they should be considered in
disaster risk assessments and natural disaster
frameworks. As time progresses, conceptual
frameworks for natural disasters and conflict
could coalesce to support integrated risk
management approaches and resilience.
Figure 8 shows how this process might evolve.
Summary
Interventions aimed at reducing natural disaster risk can have positive or negative
effects on conflict dynamics; conversely, interventions aimed at preventing
conflict can have positive or negative effects on the likelihood and impact of
natural disasters. The ideal scenario is to have interventions that reduce the likelihood
and effects of both natural disasters and conflict.
Disaster risk management should be integrated more systematically into
peacebuilding and statebuilding frameworks and should employ conflict
sensitive approaches. The reverse should also happen. Integrating conflict and
fragility into natural disaster frameworks (as in the case with the Pressure and Release
Model), can help elucidate the links between natural disasters and conflict. Greater
cross-integration of frameworks will help move from collision to collaboration between
the two communities.
Over time, it may be necessary to move beyond adapting existing tools and
approaches to devising integrated approaches to natural disaster and conflict
risk through a conceptual framework based on field-testing. The joint framework
should encourage accountability, learning, evidence-gathering, cross-organisational
exchanges and draw on conflict sensitivity and political economy analysis. It should
aspire to understand the factors that produce vulnerability to disasters and conflict
and highlight the points of convergence between interventions where there is the
most to gain.
37
Figure 7: Characterisation of the relationship between actions
to address natural disasters and conflict
Focus of disaster
risk reduction actions
Least desirable
Most desirable
Focus of conflict
prevention actions
N
at
ur
al
d
is
as
te
rs
Exacerbate likelihood
of natural disasters and
their negative effects
Reduce likelihood of
natural disasters and
their negative effects
Neutral (do no harm)
Figure 8: Schematic to show how conceptual frameworks for
natural disasters and conflict could evolve
Entry point one: Conflict and state-building
frameworks (integrate risks and vulnerability
associated with natural hazards).
Develop a conceptual framework with appropriate tools and methods
to promote an integrated approach to risk including but not confined to
risks associated with natural disasters, conflict and fragility. Moreover,
depending on the context, other forms of risk may be used as the entry
point for promoting more integrated approaches to risk.
Field based testing of conceptual framework –
followed by use in practice.
Entry point two: natural hazard related disasters
(integrate considerations of statebuilding, and
risks and vulnerability associated with conflict,
fragility and violence).
Dynamics of conflict
Exacerbate likelihood
of conflict and its
negative effects
Neutral (do no harm) Reduce likelihood
of conflict and its
negative effects
38 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
Entry point one: conflict prevention and
statebuilding
Conflict prevention and statebuilding initiatives
have expanded in recent years. A diverse range of
externally driven activities now occur in fragile and
conflict-affected states, including institution building,
developing state functions, addressing the causes
and effects of conflict, and supporting inclusive
political settlements and processes. Understanding
and responding to public expectations has also
become a critical consideration (see for example
DFID’s statebuilding and peacebuilding framework,
represented in Figure 9).
The evidence presented in this report
demonstrates that each of the components in
this framework can affect and be affected by
natural disasters. DRR therefore has a role
to play in developing effective approaches to
conflict prevention and statebuilding, and in
ensuring the gains made towards developing
peaceful states and societies are not undermined
by natural disasters. Figure 10 presents an
adapted version of DFID’s peacebuilding and
statebuilding framework to show how DRR and
management activities are relevant to each of
the framework’s components.
As another illustration, natural disasters can be
integrated into conflict analysis (see Figure 11)
in the following ways:
● The vulnerability of different groups to natural
disasters should be considered as structural and
proximate causes of conflict.
● Natural hazards – and the responses to them
– should be considered as potential triggers
for conflict.
● Contextual analysis should include a hazard
profile (which incorporates uncertainty associated
with changing climate extremes).
● Formal and informal disaster risk management
mechanisms should be included within the
profile of a context, including an assessment of
their effectiveness in previous natural hazard-
related disasters.
● Actor mapping should include formal and
informal disaster risk management agencies,
departments and critical individuals, and the
distribution and equity of the risk reduction
measures they support.
● The dynamics component should include
consideration of the impact of the disaster–conflict
interface on conditions of peace and conflict.
Figure 9: ‘Building peaceful states and societies’ framework
source: dfid, 2010
Support
inclusive political
settlements
Respond to public
expectations
Develop core
state functions
Address causes
& effects of
conflict and
fragility
Strong
state-society
relations
39
Entry point two: natural disasters and
risk management
There is extensive evidence on the relationship
between vulnerability and hazards (see Wisner et
al., 2004; Cannon, 2008) and between vulnerability
and armed conflict and fragility (World Bank, 2011).
Vulnerability refers to ‘the characteristics of a
person or group and their situation that influence
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and
recover from the impact of a natural hazard’ (Wisner
et al., 2004: 11). Thus vulnerability is a crucial
concept for understanding the socio-economic and
political dimensions of disasters. This basic idea
is represented in the Pressure and Release model
(Wisner et al., 2004) which is widely used in the
disaster risk management community. An adapted
version of the model (see Figure 12) provides more
explicit consideration of the way violence, conflict
and fragility increase vulnerabilities, including
Figure 10: Adapted version of DFID’s ‘Building peaceful states and
societies’ framework illustrating the ‘natural’ disaster components
of the peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda
Strong
state-society
relations
Support inclusive
political settlements
Equitable distribution
of resources for disaster
risk reduction (financial
and technical).
Equal representation in
desicion-making
structures related to
disaster risk, e.g.
planning, land
use and land
rights.
Respond to public expectations
Protect citizens against natural hazards.
Establishing Early Warning Systems.
Provide effective response and
reconstruction.
Develop core
state functions
Establish national
Disaster Risk Manage-
ment agency, with the
means to undertake
national hazard mapping.
Provide sufficient funding
to enable risk reduction,
preparedness and
response.
Provide options
for risk transfer,
e.g. insurance.
Address causes & effects
of conflict and fragility
Recognise the role of natural hazards in
igniting and exacerbating conflict.
Invest in natural disaster mitigation
and prevention as a form of upstream
conflict prevention.
Address the impacts of natural
disasters as part of conflict
prevention and peace-
building initiatives.
Figure 11: Operationalising
conflict sensitivity
source: rresource pack, 2004: 2
dy
na
mi
cs dynamics
dyna mics
profile
planning
implementation
monitoring &
evaluation
CONTEXT
INTERVENTION
actors causes
40 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
vulnerability to disaster. Climate change has been
added to reflect the impact of climate extremes on
the prevalence of natural hazards, and a feedback
loop has been introduced to emphasise how
disasters themselves can increase vulnerabilities.
Conflict sensitive approaches have much to offer
natural disaster practitioners working in fragile and
conflict settings. However, while most agencies have
conflict sensitive approaches on paper, they tend to
be used solely by advisors or departments dealing
explicitly with issues of violence, fragility and conflict
(see Zicherman et al., 2011). These approaches must
be applied to DRR, especially where DRR interventions
designed for relatively stable societies are (re)applied
to contexts mired by violent conflict and fragility.
The added value of conflict-sensitive DRR could be:
● a better understanding of the conflict context
and more appropriately tailored interventions
● reducing the negative unintended impacts of
interventions
● increasing cross-departmental learning through
knowledge exchange on the application of
conflict sensitive approaches.
Addressing the disaster–conflict interface requires
an understanding of (1) the interconnected nature
of risks faced by individuals and communities
in conditions of vulnerability, and (2) the most
appropriate entry points for external interventions.
This should be based on sound contextual analysis
informed by a political economy approach.
Linking the conceptual frameworks of conflict
prevention and disaster resilience should not be
principally about management approaches, but
more about understanding the processes that
produce vulnerability and the way individuals and
communities make choices about risks. It will be
important to include scientific analysis – for example
on the changing nature of climate extremes – while
also recognising that external interventions will be
mediated through a complex combination of assets,
power and institutions. Such a framework has to
be able to answer the questions: ‘what needs to
happen to reduce vulnerability to disasters and
conflict?’ and ‘how do we avoid undoing hard won
peace and development dividends?’
It is possible some preliminary principles to guide
a shared approach, namely:
● include natural and man-made shocks and stresses
● span the humanitarian-development continuum
● be shaped by conflict sensitivity analysis
● include political economy approaches as an aid to
designing interventions
● define what preparedness means for both conflict
and natural disasters
● bolster the evidence base of the intended and
unintended impacts of interventions on resilience
● encourage learning, accountability and greater
cooperation and collaboration between actors
● highlight the points of convergence for maximum
gain and the trade-offs for action.
Figure 12: Situating conflict within an adapted Pressure and
Release Model
The global,
national and
local political
economy, and
the interface
between scales
Conditions of conflict, fragility and insecurity impact on – and
co-construct – all stages of the progression of vulnerability
Social structures,
political systems
and governance
mechanisms
PROGRESSION OF VULVERABILITY
Conditions of
vulnerability,
including
livelihood
opportunities
DISASTER
(with varying
prevalence and
longevity)
Hazards:
geological,
atmospheric,
climatic,
biological and
technological
Climate change
and climate
extremes
41
Recommendations
teun voeten / panos
7
The co-location of natural disasters and conflict
undermines peaceful development. The impact
of climate change, both on conflict and the
severity and frequency of natural hazards is likely
to intensify this situation as the majority of the
world’s poor will be living in fragile and conflict-
affected states by 2025 (Kharas and Rogerson,
2012). The relationship between natural disasters
and conflict is complex, the evidence mixed and
interventions fraught with trade-offs and possible
unintended consequences. Nonetheless, the
weight of evidence and the overlap between
drought, conflict, poverty and climate vulnerability
provide an indication of where and how efforts
should be prioritised.
Achieving statebuilding, humanitarian and
development goals will require changes
to the way the disasters–conflict nexus is
conceptualised. Avoiding oversimplification is
critical. Natural disaster risk reduction must be
included in statebuilding and conflict prevention
frameworks and vice versa. Given the way that
multiple risks intersect in fragile and conflict-
affected states, it makes sense for conflict and
natural disaster experts to join forces to help
strengthen resilience.
The ‘natural’ disaster–conflict nexus is explored
here as an illustration of how shocks and
stresses that occur concurrently in reality can
be compartmentalised in the operationalisation
of humanitarian and development action. It is
important to understand, however, that in reality
conditions of vulnerability and risk stack up for
populations; issues related to disasters and
conflict are situated in a wider set of dynamics.
Thus the key to making progress for communities
confronted with ‘natural disasters’, conflict
and fragility is to understand more about how
vulnerability is shaped by interconnected shocks
and stresses.
DFID has already started doing this by committing
to integrate disasters, conflict and climate in
country-based resilience programming by 2015.
The cross-agency ‘Political Champions for
Disaster Resilience’ group is also making steps
in the right direction. This momentum needs to be
sustained. The post-2015 development agenda
sets the stage for defining a new global approach
to addressing poverty and vulnerability. Natural
disasters, conflict prevention and statebuilding
must be a critical part of this.
International policy
In order to raise the profile of the conflict–disaster
nexus in fragile and conflict-affected states, UN
member states and international agencies should:
● Ensure that managing risk in fragile and conflict-
affected states is a key feature of the post-2015
agreement on DRR (Hyogo Framework 2) and that
there are clear institutional mandates set to tackle
this. The World Bank 2014 World Development
Report on risk, uncertainty and crisis should link
back to the 2011 World Development Report:
Conflict, Security and Development and set a new
agenda for managing risks in fragile and conflict-
affected states.
● Resilience, vulnerability, disaster and conflict
should be featured themes of post-2015
development goals.
● The Political Champions for Disaster Resilience
Group should promote inter-agency co-ordination to
build resilience in fragile and conflict-affected states,
developing regional and national approaches to ex-
ante risk management in such settings.
Programming and finance
● The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction
and Recovery (GFDRR) should scale-up
programming in fragile and conflict-affected states,
and forge closer links with the conflict prevention
work of the World Bank, such as the Global
Centre on Conflict, Justice and Development.
● Bilateral donors and UN agencies should:
● Constitute joint risk taskforces in key fragile
and conflict-affected states to integrate
conflict, natural disaster and climate change
practitioners, plans and programmes.
● Explore new partnerships and new ways of
working and build the evidence base about how
to better invest in ex-ante risk management
measures in fragile and conflict-affected states.
● Donors must be prepared to risk greater levels
of up-stream investment in fragile and conflict-
affected states.
● Donors and other financing bodies should work
to ensure that short-term funding restrictions do
not inhibit resilience building opportunities. Where
possible, multi-year funding should be the norm
and the UN should look to expand the use of
multi-year consolidated appeals.
43
● Civil society organisations and donors alike
should invest in the capacities of programme
staff in fragile and conflict-affected states to
better link approaches to conflict, disasters
and climate change. This may require training
and new ways of formulating strategies and
designing programmes. Donors, NGOs and
other implementing agencies should develop
integrated monitoring and evaluation
frameworks for assessing needs, results,
value for money and outcomes in fragile and
conflict-affected states.
Research and evidence
We do not currently know how to measure
the scale and nature of risk facing fragile
and conflict-affected countries, nor which
interventions are likely to be most effective in
managing risk and building resilience in these
environments. Priorities for investment in
improved evidence include to:
● Develop a multidimensional risk index
which integrates existing data on conflict
and fragility, natural hazards, vulnerability,
poverty and climate change. Ideally this
should be sufficiently high resolution to
consider sub-national areas and should
include a process for weighting risk factors
depending on the focus of different agencies.
Monitoring changes to this index over time
will help to highlight the co-dependency
between different aspects of risk and
vulnerability and allow progress to be tracked
and subsequently analysed.
● Develop and test conceptual frameworks
and analytical tools. This should include
modifying existing analytical tools (such
as conflict sensitivity frameworks and
statebuilding and peacebuilding frameworks)
to reflect disaster risk and vice versa. This
process could provide the model for more
integrated risk modelling.
● Increase the evidence base of what works in
increasing resilience to multiple shocks and
stresses in fragile and conflict-affected states.
44 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
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47
Annex 1: Quality of the
evidence
As a relatively new concept, ‘disaster resilience’32
is only just beginning to gain prominence in
research. Attempts have been made in recent
years to advance the quality and quantity of
available evidence examining the relationship
between natural disasters, conflict and fragility.
A significant body of qualitative, case study
based evidence has been complemented with
an increasing number of quantitative studies
examining the relationship between conflict and
natural disasters across countries and at sub-
national levels. There remain, however, important
limitations to existing evidence and significant
areas have not been adequately researched.
In particular, it is clear that further research is
needed to understand the interactive dynamics
of vulnerabilities to conflict, fragility and natural
disaster risk, and to elaborate the concept of
disaster resilience and its relationship to concepts
associated with vulnerability, disaster risk, and
different types of conflict and state fragility.
Overview of available evidence
Natural disasters and conflict have been studied
across various fields, including political science,
economics, geography, social psychology and
disaster studies since the 1900s, but they have
tended to be compartmentalised and treated as
separate issues. Today, an emerging body of
literature examines the relationship between disasters
associated with natural hazards and the incidence
or escalation of conflict.33 Significantly less attention,
however, has been given to the impact of conflict and
fragility on ex-ante DRR, such as disaster prevention,
preparedness and mitigation. What literature does
exist in this area has focused primarily on the
challenges that conflict and insecurity present to
humanitarian relief.
The findings in this report are based on a sample
of literature drawn from over 300 articles,
published both in peer-reviewed journals and as
grey literature by multinational organisations,
government agencies and NGOs.
There is an evolving literature base on the
question of how natural hazards and conditions of
conflict relate to and impact upon one another, set
in the context of broader shocks and stresses. This
includes both peer-reviewed research and a large
body of grey literature produced by humanitarian
organisations, think tanks and government
agencies. Links between conflict and slow onset
disasters, and the occurrence of several high
profile rapid-onset disasters over the last 5 years
have contributed to a focus within the recent
literature on a limited selection of cases in the
Horn of Africa and South Asia. Arguably there has
been an overconcentration of research in the same
few selected cases. The relationship between
climate change and conflict, including the impact
of increased climate extremes, has also emerged
as a new area of research, with the focus primarily
on slow onset disasters related to poor natural
resource management, contentious trans-boundary
water sources and ‘climate induced’ migration.
In recent years, a number of comparative
empirical studies have set out to identify the
relationship between natural hazards and intra-
and inter-state conflict. These studies have
32. As defined by DFID (2011b), which takes a broad range of shocks and
stresses, including those related to natural disaster, fragility and conflict.
33. This is particularly the case with regard to famine, complex political
emergencies, natural resource scarcity and recurrent crises. This
literature is greatly aided by the conceptualisation of disasters as
‘unnatural’, meaning it is the societal conditions that determine
whether, how and to what extent a natural hazard event may result
in a ‘disaster’ (Wisner et al., 2004).
48 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
mostly undertaken cross-country comparisons,
including datasets with entries for over 150
countries, with a few studies examining the
relationships at sub-national levels (e.g. Slettebak
and Theisen, 2011). Few studies have undertaken
to combine large N quantitative studies with in-
depth qualitative research findings.
Limitations of the available evidence
The limited evidence available means appropriate
caution should be exercised when drawing
conclusions and policy recommendations. Among
these are organisational bias, particularly in much
of the grey literature, and definitional challenges
linked to the ways in which terms, including
‘conflict’ and ‘disasters’ are used to refer to
different and often quite contrasting phenomena.
For example, ‘conflict’ can include a range
of violence (physical, psychological, sexual,
structural) through to armed conflict and civil
war. ‘Disaster’ can be used to mean both natural
and man-made risks, from floods, earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions through to nuclear explosions,
industrial accidents and conflict.
Inadequate contextual analysis and the inability
of cross-country quantitative studies to allow for
contextual variations limit both the reliability of
particular studies and the value of comparisons
across the literature. Both quantitative and
qualitative research tends to treat natural hazard
related disasters as unique events isolated from
other phenomena or processes (Hewitt, 1983).
Quantitative studies often include only a token
contextual analysis that is largely delinked from
the analysis that follows. Qualitative studies
of specific hazards, meanwhile, largely fail to
engage meaningfully with the historic processes
that have led to conflict vulnerability, exposure
and insecurity, and are limited in their ability
to extrapolate findings that can usefully inform
policy. The paucity of contextual considerations is
compounded in recent cross-country quantitative
studies which draw comparisons between
contexts without adequately acknowledging
variations between different countries.
Constraints involved in conducting research on
natural disasters in conflict-affected contexts
also significantly limit the ability of researchers
to collect and assess appropriate data. Analysis
is often conducted with a small sample size, in
regions less severely affected, or within short
timeframes for events that have long-term
effects. As a result, such research risks under-
representing the poorest and worst-affected
populations, failing to consider how local
conditions have impacts beyond the local level, or
failing to assess how natural hazards may impact
on longer-term disaster resilience.
Finally, a number of methodological criticisms
have been raised against the quantitative
research produced on the disaster–conflict nexus.
These include: the need to identify more nuanced
indicators of conflict than civil war, which is rare and
whose standard of measure is blunt and subject
to significant criticism; the subjective or arbitrary
omission or weighting of variables, whose inclusion
or different weighting often changes studies’
conclusions and throws into question researchers’
claims of causal links; and the failure of modelling
techniques to describe the specific mechanisms
driving proposed causal relationships between
conflict and disaster.
Gaps in the available literature
In addition to these limitations, there remain
significant relationships, concepts and questions
related to the conflict-disaster nexus that have
not received adequate attention. Within both
qualitative and quantitative research on the
conflict-disaster nexus, very little evidence
exists that explicitly examines ‘disaster
resilience’ and its relationship to conflict
prevention and transformation. Indeed, the
focus on ‘resilience’, though linked to concepts
such as vulnerability, adaptive capacity and
‘coping strategies’, is still emerging. Where
the term is used in the literature,34 it is framed
primarily as disaster management, resulting in a
rather narrow focus on the technical aspects of
reducing, transferring or managing risk.
In part, the failure to examine questions of
resilience and conflict is linked to the tendency in
the literature to focus on risk factors as opposed
to ‘protective’ factors. Researchers tend to
gravitate toward studying problem areas, while
humanitarian organisations are not present in
areas where hazards do not become disasters.
34. Of the few examples that exist many were published prior to DFID’s
approach paper (DFID, 2011b).
49
So evidence of the factors or characteristics that
enable disaster resilience is much scarcer than
that of fragility or vulnerability. More theory and
evidence is needed to help identify conditions
under which conflict or peace are likely to emerge
in areas where natural hazards are prominent.
Much of the literature takes a dysfunctional view
of conflict as its point of departure and examines
resilience as a characteristic of a community or
society as a whole, rather than a more politicised
experience in which some groups are more resilient
than others (Harris, 2011). Thus, few research
projects have explored the possibility that some
resilience strategies may have identifiable victims
(Duffield, 2001) or that the result of boosting
resilience may restore or even reinforce exploitative
systems (Leach, 2008). Only recently have
researchers begun to employ political economy
analysis to understand the various incentives,
power relations and politics that determine how
(and whose) experiences of disaster and conflict
influence levels of risk and vulnerability.
Finally, there remains a significant evidence gap
in understanding the tensions and trade-offs
arising from the different timeframes associated
with humanitarian responses, the long-term
investment required for disaster resilience,
cycles of peace and conflict, and donor funding
and political cycles. Exploring the way these
timeframes intersect could yield a better
understanding of the costs and opportunities of
building disaster resilience.
In sum, important progress has been made in
developing an emerging empirical evidence
base for the conflict-disaster nexus. But far
more attention needs to be given to the impact
of conflict, fragility and natural hazards on
disaster resilience in order to elaborate the
conceptual framework around disaster resilience.
The introduction of political economy analysis,
which combines quantitative and qualitative
studies and is grounded in comprehensive
contextual analysis, would be an encouraging
development. Moving forward, this analysis will
need to be bolstered by far more robust methods
of triangulation, and work on the inter-linkages
between disasters and conflict in order to identify
the social, political and economic drivers of
vulnerability. Moreover, efforts are needed to
increase the long-term evidence base from which
meaningful comparisons can be drawn across
the literature – thereby forming a more rigorous
empirical basis from which to inform policy.
50 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
While the grievances-opportunities-feasibility
framework has been developed primarily to
relate to internal war, it would also seem to be
helpful in analysing motivations for international
conflicts (where the importance of government
actors is self-evident) (DFID, 2010).
Grievances are widely seen as contributing
to conflict. Relevant grievances are likely to
include ‘horizontal inequalities’ between groups
in a society (Stewart, 2008), which may be
economic inequalities or inequalities in access
to political power. Grievances may be fuelled by
government actions and inactions – exploitation,
neglect, corruption and so on. Grievances may
exist among state and non-state actors.
Opportunities include both economic and political
opportunities. Many people make money from
conflict. Political opportunities may include
gaining electoral advantage from a war or using
war as an opportunity to suppress or delegitimise
dissent. Economic opportunities may include
looting, protection rackets, illegal mining, and
trading drugs. Armed conflict may also present
opportunities for more ‘psychological’ benefits
– for example, in restoring a sense of power
or achieving a measure of ‘respect’ through
violence. A given set of opportunities from conflict
may look more attractive where the alternatives
are meagre: for example, where there are large
numbers of unemployed young men. Thus, high
unemployment may feed into armed conflict not
just by stoking grievances but also by making the
opportunities arising from conflict more attractive.
Feasibility centres on the ability of various groups
to conduct violence. For example, where central
government and its security forces are relatively
weak, the feasibility of rebellion is likely to be
greater (DFID, 2010: 14). Feasibility is also
relevant when it comes to government violence.
For example, where rebels are relatively weak,
violence against these rebels may be more
feasible. Where governments enjoy a degree of
international support (for example, because they
are confronting a reviled rebel or terrorist group),
then the feasibility of violence by government
actors is likely to be increased.
All of these causes of violence (grievances,
opportunities, feasibility) may be subject to
change, impacting on the likelihood of peace.
Natural disasters may have a significant impact on
each of these possible causes of violence, and this
in turn may encourage armed conflict or peace.
Annex 2: Background:
grievances, opportunities
and feasibility of conflict
51
There is an emerging body of literature on the
impact of climate change on dynamics of peace
and security (see Journal of Peace Research
2012, Special Issue), and with this a number of
competing perspectives on the topic (see Lind,
Ibrahim and Harris, 2010).
The role of state functions in mitigating the risk
of violent conflict suggests that where state
functions fail, the risk of violent conflict may be
higher (Goodhand, 2003; Keen, 2000; Barnet
and Adger, 2007). Yet climate change may
exacerbate the conditions under which states fail
to provide basic services, meet the expectations
of society and enact its basic functions (Smith
and Vivekananda, 2007: 20). Thus the direct and
indirect impacts of climate change – including
climate extremes – have been attributed to
an increased risk of violent conflict in some
circumstances (Barnett and Adger, 2007). Smith
and Vivekananda (2007: 3) identify 46 countries
at higher risk of violent conflict because of
the compounding impact of climate change,
and 56 countries where the failure of the state
to manage climate change impacts creates a
high risk of political instability. Poverty, poor
governance and a historical context mired by
violent conflict means the impacts of climate
change will put additional pressure on fragile
social and political systems, creating a cycle of
violent conflict, failed adaptation and instability
(Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 9).
Like disasters related to natural hazards and
conflict, the impacts of climate change cannot
be understood in isolation of broader socio-
economic-political and governance context.
Climatic and environmental changes will
impact on individuals and societies in a variety
of ways, largely determined by the extent to
which state and society have the capacity to
manage these changes, reduce vulnerability and
exposure, build adaptive capacity and increase
resilience. In Timor-Leste, for example, the
overdependence on agriculture and subsistence
livelihoods with no state system of income
support means that climate-sensitive livelihoods
act as an exogenous trigger for underlying social
problems (Barnett and Adger, 2007: 641).
If the impacts of climate extremes are framed as
a security issues, the responses may be more
likely to involve military and security apparatus,
focused on protection and defence (Harris, 2012;
Barnett, 2003). A shift in understanding the
impact of climate change as a security concern,
rather than an environmental or developmental
concern, has led to increased attention (and
proposed solutions) from the defence arena,
which includes an increased role for the military
in humanitarian response – a contentious
proposition for many contexts affected by
disasters and conflict and/or fragility.
In many countries, ‘the government is going to be
either unwilling or unable – or both – to take on
the task of adaptation and peacebuilding. In many
of the countries most at risk, the government –
and more than that, the system of governance
– is part of the problem’ (Smith and Vivekananda,
2007: 23). Thus in order to support adaptation
in contexts of violent conflict and fragility, more
attention needs to be paid to what fragile states
‘can do’ rather than what they ‘must do’. This is
Annex 3: Climate
change and conditions
of conflict
52 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
a critique often directed at the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change and the focus on
state-led initiatives (Barnett and Adger 2007:
18). Adaptation is inherently political, but like
DRR, is often framed as an apolitical challenge
requiring a technical ‘fix’. Lind, Ibrahim and Harris
(2010: 3) find that adaptation is often conceived
as a means to promote peace, yet ‘it is an error
to consider adaptation as a panacea that will
prevent conflict relating to climate variations and
stress, since adaptation is a political process
involving its own struggles and negotiations
between various actors and groups’.
Only recently have efforts been directed at
considering the role of intermediary factors
in understanding the relationship between
conditions of peace and conflict, and changing
climatic and environmental conditions.
Intermediary factors include disaster risk
reduction, natural resource management and
effective and equitable governance mechanisms
(see Harris, 2012).
53
54 when disasters and conflict collide: improving links between disaster resilience and conflict prevention
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