Read the articles, “Conceptualising State Collapse: An Institutionalist Approach,” by Lambach and Johais (2015), and “Globalization, Terrorism and the State” by Demir and Varlik (2015), which are required reading for this week. Respond to the following:

20180316212617globalization._terrorism_and_the_state 20180316212616conceptualising_state_collapse._an_institutionalist_approach
 

Read the articles, “

Conceptualising State Collapse: An Institutionalist Approach

,” by Lambach and Johais (2015), and “

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

” by Demir and Varlik (2015), which are required reading for this week. Respond to the following:

• What is the connection between failed (now referred to as fragile) states and terrorism and other forms of political violence?
• Provide an example of a failed/fragile state that is associated with terrorism.
• In addition to terrorism and other forms of political violence, what other problems are generally associated with failed/fragile states?
• What can, or should, the international community do to address this issue?

Minimum 250 Words

Minimum 2 sources

APA Guidelines

ALTERNATIVESTURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Sertif Demir

-Ali Bilgin Varlık



Abstract: The main discussion point of this article is to explore the cause-effect relation between the
weakening of nation state and the intensification of global terrorism by the influence of

globalization. The main thesis of the article is that the malign effects of globalization have

considerably weakened nation states or dragged them into a situation in which the security

and stability would no longer be sustained as desired. Global terrorism can stem from the

adverse effects of globalization, imbalance of power, disparity of players, and power

vacuum. Failed states, separatist minorities and radicals use terrorism as warfare in order

to counterbalance the power gap or to consolidate their authority. In order to verify/nullify

the main thesis, we sought answers for three main issues: consequences of globalization;

influence of globalization on terrorism; and lessons learned from terrorism. Our study has

come to a conclusion that the most reliable way to cope with the challenges of the new

form of terrorism is to strengthen the nation state concept in democratic, laic, social and

legal terms.

Key Words: Globalization, nation state, terrorism, global

terrorism.


Associated Professor, The University of İzmir, the Department of International Relations,

sertif.demir@izmir.edu.tr


Assistant Professor, The University of Esenyurt, the Department of Politics Science and International

Relations. He is also strategist at the Institute of 21st Century Turkey, bilginvarlik@gmail.com|

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık

ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 37

Introduction

Hardly few other concepts have been argued or associated with each other as globalization and

terrorism. And hardly few factors other than globalization and terrorism have eroded the

states.

During the last two decades and particularly after September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorism turned into

‘global terrorism’ and emerged as a new form of threat for both national and international security.

Now we have quite a satisfactory literature, which broadens views but helps little to

overcome the issue. This article does not propose any miracle solution to overcome terrorism, which

is not argued before, but makes analyses in order to depict basic principles for handling the issue.

The main thesis of the article is that the malign effects of globalization has considerably

weakened nation states or dragged them into a situation in which the security and stability would no

longer be sustained as desired while promoting terrorism to a global strength. The first

complementary thesis is that there appears to be an interrelated and intermingled structure between

globalization, terrorism and the state. The second complementary thesis is that the nation state, which

was the strongest means to counter global terrorism, is severely influenced by globalization. In other

words, global world cannot overcome global terrorism, while underpinning the nation state. The

spread of globalization considerably weakened nation states. The third complementary thesis is that

terrorism has gained extraordinary power than previously experienced in the contemporary globalized

world. So the main discussion point of this study is to explore the correlation between the weakening

of nation state and the intensification of global terrorism that might result from the spread of

globalization.

In order to verify or nullify the acceptance of the thesis, we tried to answer the following

three questions:

– What are the consequences of globalization from security perspective?

– How did terrorism diversify by the influence of globalization?

– What did we learn from the experience of global terrorism?

Theoretical Framework

Before starting, in order to draw the parameters of level of analysis one needs to underline the

approaches and methodologies, which explain the concept of globalization. The easiest but the worst

is to make an analysis based upon the results of a phenomenon. This approach, while giving the

opportunity to reach direct and practical conclusions, hides the causes and the sources feeding the

problem, which enables to reach true diagnosis for defining the issue. So there is no way to answer

the question except for arguing the concept of

globalization.

Theorizing Difficulty

Difficulty of theorizing the concept of globalization steams from two reasons. The first is the trouble

of access to reliable information; the second is the complex nature of the concept.

Concerning with the access to reliable information about globalization, there occur four basic

issues. These are: lack of scientific impartiality, limitation on comprehensiveness, lack of historical

background, and difficulty to make synthesis on a live concept.

Firstly, the information created is not objective and polarized between globalists and

skeptics.
1
Both of these approaches are mostly based on results or reflections of globalization rather

than the causes. So their analysis turns to a cons and pros struggle which helps little for a dialectical

quality of survey.

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 38

Secondly, some surveys which put more emphasis on some aspects of globalization while

underestimating the others turn the analysis to “the blind man’s definition of elephant”
2
.

Thirdly, globalization has been imposed as a de facto notion which explains all today’s and

tomorrow’s world but has hardly few about the past.
3
This approach also conceptualizes the fact on a

shallow basis so the real value cannot be assessed properly.

Finally, on the formation of the concept, still additional arguments emerge while some basic

thesis has already collapsed. This prevents analyzers to make sound decisions on the subject.

As a conclusion, except for determinist approaches which explain globalization with linear

relations, a great majority of analysis agrees with the fact that globalization is multi-dimensional and

complex in nature. Unless each ingredient of the concept is assessed and the interrelationship between

the factors is defined, it will be very challenging to expound the globalization. At this point we will

be content with the affirmation that there is no other complex political system than globalization.
4

Approaches to Globalization

Globalization, in general, can be defined as the free movement of capital, goods, knowledge,

manpower and services among countries due to the increased technological and scientific

improvements and diminished state-centric power. Globalization is the process of integration of

cultures. It comes out of the interaction of people from different cultures and societies. Globalization

is inherently an economic-originated notion. However, currently it has gained a meaning embracing a

political, economical, cultural, sociological and technological formation, which has led to a more

integrated world. Ideologically, it was defined as a new phase of capitalism and interrelated with post-

modernism.

Having considered this amalgam structure and complex and contentious differences, our aim

is to explore the impact of globalization on terror incidents; whether globalization is a catalyzing

factor for the increase of terrorism or not. Thus, we have to focus on delineating this interrelation with

a theoretical support. In this context, approaches on theorizing globalization could be classified

mainly under four titles: 1) novelty, 2) flashback, 3) permanency and 4) transformation.
5

The Novelty approach

Mostly suggested by the neo-liberals, the novelty approach asserts that globalization has a

unique characteristic as a result of innovative forms of technology, global economy, and

communication infrastructure emerged in recent history. Postmodernists also confirm the novelty

approach with their motto that has left reality and modern conceptions behind, as well as the world of

modernity
6
. According to advocates of the novelty approach, with the demise of Cold War era we

experienced the end of history and a new world order. This new world order ignites political,

economical and cultural changes, which have never occurred before. The globalization is the end

point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the

final form of human government.
7
Besides Fukuyama, extremists of this approach consider

globalization as the first form of global civilization.
8

The novelty approach lacks historical consistency and it does not explain the globalization

which takes place in different parts of the world, except for the West. Additionally it does not

even

cover the globalization experienced in the social layers of the western world. Furthermore, its

prominent thesis that the world economy had never internationalized before is quite open to

discussion since not verified by historical and economical data.
9
Thus we consider it too deterministic

to explain the hybrid structure of globalization.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_democracy

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 39

The Flashback approach

Generally supported by radical leftists and some conservatives, the flashback approach

suggests that today’s globalization overlaps with the world order prior to World War I. The collapse

of bipolar international environment has rotated the flow of capital and trade to the level before the

World War I. According to supporters of this approach the world has flashed back to the era of the

ferocious imperialistic competitions, and the contemporary situation under the leadership of US is a

new form of the 18
th
and 19

th
centuries’ globalization which took place in the lead of UK.

1

0

The flashback approach repeats the novelty approach’s shortfall on historical consistency, by

disregarding the fact that no social formation could be reiterated. Particularly, conservatives’ attempt

to impose the globalization as a moral value rather than historical phenomena is a major contradiction

with the reality and is too subjective to be scientific. Thus, we consider it too holistic to explain

differences of contemporary globalization.

The Permanency approach

The permanency approach affirms that there have never been sudden drastic changes in the

mankind history, neither has globalization . Globalization is not an unexpected legendary event as

globalists present but, is an operation of nonbelligerent logic of capitalism and geo-economic

imperialism. According to backers of the approach, globalization is the subjective volitional

ideological project of transnational corporations and international finance organizations rather than an

objective reality.
11

Capitalism is a hegemonic global system in nature and sees the world as a whole

economic structure since its evolution.
12

Generally supported by skeptics, the approach suggests that

today’s globalization is not different than the globalization in 1850 and 1910 and limited

geographically with the north hemisphere and functionally with financial markets.
13

Although the permanency approach uses an acceptable historical methodology, and defines

successfully the limits of contemporary globalization, it neither estimates the dramatic and systematic

shift after the big bang of 1970’s and 1980’s globalization nor appropriately reads the importance and

distinctive roles of technology and communication. The approach could also be criticized by being

economically centric.

The transformation approach

The transformation approach mostly supported by social scientists accepts that a historical

shift has been experienced. Transformationists do not reject the notion that historical changes result

from a series of previous events. Accordingly, the globalization process, started at the beginning of

19
th
century and stalled by the world wars and the Cold War, has revived as from 1970’s, has been

accelerating and turning to a permanent structure. According to the transformation approach

advocates, world economies and communication systems have established a structure in which

peoples, cultures and states have intermingled throughout the modern times; and recent developments

have shifted us to a new qualitative dimension. In several ways globalization is a new and dramatic

progress as well as being part of a historical process. At the last phase of globalization a new global

way of cooperation has superseded previous center-periphery relationship while an anachronism has

been exacerbating.
14

An Assessment of the Approaches to Globalization from Security Perspective

Contrary to the novelty approach, the transformation approach advocates reject that the nation state

has ended, but maintain that the relationship between the stakeholders of the authority has been

reorganized according to the new world order. They reject the flashback approach’s hypothesis of

“nothing has changed”, but deem globalization as a derivative of the Illumination Age of the Western

World. According to that, globalization is the new realization of modernity concept on social,

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 40

economical, cultural and philosophical dimensions throughout the world. Different than the

permanency approach, they believe that globalization is not only a temporary dictation of the

capitalists but an unavoidable structure which shapes -to some extent commands- today’s world. So,

some measures to be taken could mitigate malign effects while creating opportunities to benefit from

the globalization. On the other hand, as being less holistic than the flashback approach, the

permanency approach provides some useful data for comprehensive assessments on security

perspective of globalization.

After these comparisons, we reach to the conclusion that the comprehensive and the

transformation approaches give relatively more appropriate data to analyze the consequences of

globalization from security perspective than the

other too deterministic and more holistic approaches.

Implication of Globalization from Security Perspective

Globalization has a complex and amalgam structure, and has economical, technological, historical,

political, social and other dimensions, and numerous effects on security. Contrary to its advantages,

chances and positive influences, one can hardly comment optimistically on its effects on security,

because of two reasons: The first is its deteriorating influence on nation state’s power; and the second

is its relationship with terrorism.

Deteriorating Influence of Globalization on Nation State’s Power

Consequences of globalization could be summarized basically on two folds; the first is the chaos of

the new world order, which provokes instability; the second is the erosion observed in the nation state

due to globalization. The former is concerned with historical, social, economical, technological,

military and other imbalances moved by the globalization. The latter is a matter of structural,

institutional and processional transformation of the anarchic international environment as well as the

security atmosphere in which dramatic power shifts occurred against monopoly of the state. In other

words, as stated by Keohane and Nye
15

, globalization and economic interdependence has changed

basic parameters of conventional [Westphalian] system of states” to an anarchic environment in

which multiple channels of interdependence between new international actors added to the states.

These two groups of consequences of globalization are related with each other and establish a

complex and hybrid structure.

The Chaos of the New World Order

From historical perspective, globalization has always been a power-based process of the

hegemonic states and capitalism to shape and rule the world. Historically, this power had always been

projected by the West: The first wave of globalization started with the “Exploration of the New

World” and was institutionalized as colonialism during the period of 1480-1750. The second phase

started just before the “Industry Revolution” and was institutionalized as imperialism or new

colonialism during 1750-1914 era. The third phase started 1914, even though hampered by world

wars and their aftermaths; continued with the impulse of multinational corporations’ championship

that started in 1970’s; climbed with the “Communication Revolution” in 1980’s; and reached its peak

with the “New World Order” after Western World’s victory over the East in 1990’s.
16

Social ataxias of globalization include historically rooted philosophical, psychological and

cultural features. Social observations also vary depending on where you are, where you are looking

and the period of time you are observing. From this context, any evaluation made by those who are

not from the leading side of globalization (“unglobalized” and “non-leading globalizers”), the

“struggle of the West with the rest” would be a better term than the “clash of civilizations”.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Westphalia

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
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| 41

Globalization has been imposed as the highest level of civilization and morality by those who are

leading globalization (globalizers) but from unglobalized and non-leading globalizers’ perspective,

that does not drop the tension and bilateral phobias between the cultures and the religions, fostered by

globalization.

From economic perspective, although economically it helps to increase gross global product,

the amount of direct international investments, the role of transnational corporations, liquidity of

capital and global finance, it worsens the gap between rich and poor, and weakens states’ defensive

apparatus to protect national economy and to localize labor force within the national boundaries.

Wealthy nations while preserving their quotas, economic subventions and incentives for their

homeland segments and conducting economic rescue operations for failed allies, belligerently apply

“bitter prescriptions” or “shock therapies” for a “free market economy” on the “liberated” states
17

. So

globalization neither means equality in chances and opportunities nor just and even distribution of

wealth.

Differentiation on production and service, information and military technologies has shifted

social layers, and reduced competitiveness of developing economies. Countries other than those

which are located at the core, are to suffice a peripheric or semi-peripheric location with low profit

and inadequate efficiency at the best or to be ousted from the economic race.

From technological perspective, there is no doubt that globalization promoted humankind to

reach post-industrial layer of technology which is called “Information Age”. The good news that

globalization brought along “democracy of information” is still debatable since information and

knowledge portals are still in the monopoly of some centers, but spoiled information is everywhere.

“Global Village” thesis forwarded by Marshall McLuhan in 1962, still needs to be proved against the

numerous data attesting that basic health, communication, and education technologies are still luxury

in most regions of the world.

Developments in the military technologies, while creating huge gaps between the

conventional forces of the Western World and their potential rivals, have increased desire for

weapons of mass destruction, for using terrorism militarily and for other asymmetric warfare

methods, which violate international law and poses fatal threats to the security of the anti-Western

states.

The Erosion Observed in the Nation State due to Globalization

As noted above, historically globalization has followed three phases. During the first and the

second phases, central authorities always hampered or at least canalized the free trade market flow,

and dominant powers did not want to lose their authority. In the third phase, particularly after the

collapse of bipolar world system, liquidation of capital, financial operations, interventions of

international financial organizations in national economies have either hampered or softened central

authorities’ dictations on economy. The third phase has promoted a less bloodshed type of free trade,

which is backed by organizations, systems and procedures rather than hegemonic states’ hard power.

It is generally accepted that globalization has reduced nation state power. During the last

phase of globalization, it was discussed that nation states would eventually disappear from political

life and new form of power centers will replace them. However, recent developments have not

sufficient evidence to prove that nation state fades as supporters of globalization expected. Instead, it

is argued that the nation state is ‘neither retaining its primacy nor disappearing but becoming

transformed and absorbed into a TNS (Trans-National State)
18

. The emerging TNS is composed of

international institutions like World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Bank of

International Settlements (BIS), European Union (EU), World Trade Organization (WTO) and North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Nation states continue to carry out important functions,

but these have been increasingly transnationalized, as macroeconomic policy becomes increasingly

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

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| 42

focused on appropriate fiscal, monetary, trade and investment policies that allow for the

intensification of transnationalization. Thus, welfare and developmental states have been transformed

into neo-liberal states.
19

More than any of its impact, the complex structure of globalization not only has inflated

disparities and contrarieties but also created paradoxical shifts on the parameters of the world system

that we knew. Globalization, while promoting standardization, global affinity, unity and intermingled

interdependency on the one hand, provokes localization, disparity, definition of identities on a smaller

level than nation on the other hand.
20

Influences of globalization have not been unified because of historical, social and economic

diversities throughout the world. For example, while shaping the Western World particularly Europe

as unified not only on value base but in economic and political dimension, globalization had

fragmented some nation states into ethnic and religious factions in the rest of the world. The last wave

of globalization concurrent with the collapse of Iron Curtain helped masses to question not only the

boundaries of state authority and legitimacy of the ruling regimes throughout the world, but also

citizen, women and minority rights. Diffusion of multi-ethnic national states left the ground to ethnic

and religious unities mostly after fierce fightings, atrocities and genocides.

Policies and strategies like “preventive strike”, “crusade”, “just war” and “humanitarian

intervention”, which created polarization among cultures, have not only made arguable the classical

use of force concept accepted by the international law, but also set new processes and procedures

which eroded nation states’ hegemonic power.

New players like anti-globalist or counter-state civil society organizations, NGOs and

GONGOs (Government Oriented/Backed NGOs) loosened previously established firm ties of the

states on the society and shifted anarchic political arena to a more chaotic atmosphere than ever.

Emerging as a new sector of big capitals, the media fastened its position as the forth power -after

legislation, execution, and judiciary- and turned out to be a means of information warfare.

In addition to the negative influences of globalization, almost all positive impacts of

globalization have also deteriorated nation states’ control over society. The erosion within local

cultures and traditional social bonds has underpinned nation state’s authority, while diminishing

mental boundaries and increasing transparency of physical international borders and the importance

of individualism.

So, regardless of being good or bad, globalization has eroded nation sate’s power, and

transformed the international environment into a multi-dimensional and multi-cultural atmosphere in

which nation states are no longer the main determinant actors. Now, we are experiencing a world in

which power could no longer be identified as a linear, hierarchic, state-oriented and state-controlled

phenomenon. This dramatic change on concept of power has transformed the role of the nation state

during the last phase of globalization.

As a result of this assessment we concluded that the new world order in the last phase of

globalization, and its consequences have dramatically changed and weakened nation state’s power

and its control on internal and external policy.
21

The Relationship between Terrorism and Globalization

The linkage between increased terrorist activities and globalization can hardly be proven due to some

difficulties. First, it is difficult to state that globalization is the only driven-factor behind the

outnumbered terrorism. Second, violent methods aiming at political aspirations have existed before

global process. There is no clear-cut finding that delineates or justifies this thesis. However, it can be

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& Ali Bilgin Varlık
ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 43

argued that globalism has created some conditions that can trigger the use of violence in order to

realize political aims. As globalization is deemed the culprit of the uneven distribution of wealth,

growth of poverty, de-emphasis of nation states, and regional impoverishment, the violence or use of

power against the globalism can be applied and these acts can be assessed as terror by global factors.

In this case, human security is offered by Alan Miller
22

as a protection against those marginalized by

globalization:

“Security from terror can only be assured if human security is provided for

those marginalized by globalization, and development can only be sustained

if those in the most need are empowered to claim their right to development

and the satisfaction of their rights to an adequate standard of living.”

There are many views regarding the connection between globalism and terrorism. Nassar
23

dissects globalization through the concepts of interdependence, liberalization, universalization,

westernization, and capitalism. He shows the relationship of globalization with violence and advances

a coherent definition of terrorism (that includes actions by governments) based on material reality.

Terrorism is perceived “in a complex political context”. Central to the theme is the thesis of “the

migration of dreams” as a consequence of cultural and technological globalization and “the migration

of nightmares” as a consequence of global violence and terrorism. Here, violence is understood in

broad terms: colonialism, transnational corporate exploitation, and the US imperial project are all

faces of violence and terror. The author looks at the root causes of terror and considers that

globalization has increased the gap between rich and poor, which, in turn, has enhanced the prospects

of violent responses. State-sponsored terrorism also has enhanced those prospects.

As the conclusion, globalization is a matter of historical development, which establishes

Western values, institutions, interests, and security conditions while spreading out the capitalist

economic, social and political order with the help of monetary, technological, and military power.

Globalization is a fact and a historical process with its pluses and minuses but terrorism is a moral

defect and a crime against humanity. Any organization uses terrorist acts cannot be justified for any

reason. Nothing legitimizes terrorism; it cannot be a compelling excuse neither to civilize savages nor

to fight against superior powers. Simply murder of innocent people is not excusable.
24

For sure

terrorism is older than globalization so there is no direct relation between them.

Based on the knowledge we have received up to this point, we reach to the conclusion that

there is a cause-effect relationship between globalization and instability. This stems from the adverse

effects of globalization, the imbalance of power, disparity of players; and power vacuum. All these

three factors have created a fragile environment for stability as well as a favorable ground for

terrorism. Globalization, while breaking the walls of the nation state and supporting disparities in the

societies on the one hand, has alienated those who are not part of it and provoked the tendency of

violence. For sure globalization has created security concerns more than the stability it produced.

Failed states, minorities and separatists used terrorism to counterbalance the power gap or to solidify

their authority. Collapse of bipolar security environment and impoverishment of the nation-state as a

consequence of globalization have exacerbated instability. As one of the most severe element of

instability, terrorist organizations gain ground by exploiting consequences of globalization and pose

threat by using advantages of globalization. Therefore there is an indirect relation between

globalization and terrorism.

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 44

How Did Terrorism Turn Into Global Terrorism?

The concept of terrorism is one of the most disputed terms in social sciences. A definition that will be

widely accepted is still lacking. The problem of defining the term ‘terrorism’ is well known and has

been examined extensively. Apart from the problem of distinguishing it from guerrilla warfare, crime

or mad serial killers, the well-known phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’, is

often used to highlight the problem of implying a moral judgment when classifying the term

‘terrorism’.
25

If one identifies with the victim of the attack, then it is considered terrorism, but if one

can identify with the perpetrator it is not.
26

There are many diverse definitions about terrorism. However, terror is often defined as a

threat or actual use of violence by a non-state actor against civilians in pursuit of political goals.

Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler
27

examine 73 definitions of terrorism

from 55 articles in three leading academic journals on the topic, and come to the conclusion that

“[t]errorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which

the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.”
28

Local, regional or any kind of terrorism prefers to use the advantages of globalization and

exploits its vulnerabilities somehow. These acts could not be named as global terrorism unless they

create global affects. Devastating economic imbalances have always contributed to terrorism. What

made it globally critical is states’ impoverished capabilities to intervene in economy in order to

reduce the gap between rich and poor.

Tremendous technological developments that have a great impact on tactics of terrorists

cannot be underestimated but this is not new as perceived. However, states’ broken monopoly over

security technologies after the Cold War and particularly on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

and information technologies in 1990’s has created risks prone to global instability.

Contrary to some analysts, global terrorism is not terrorist acts against global powers.

Terrorism, which uses advantages and exploits vulnerabilities of globalization and creates global

effects is called global terrorism. So global terrorism is not a new phenomenon but contemporary

terrorist acts have more global effects than ever, since the last phase of globalization distinctively

exceeds borders, shrink unities, hampers the apparatus to prevent non-state actor source of violence

more than previous versions of globalization. So we cannot live with the assumption that we can

overcome contemporary global terrorism with the old-fashioned counter-terrorism methods of 1960’s.

Returning back to the approaches to globalization we can examine their consistency with the

concept of global terrorism. The novelty approach fails since global terrorism is not a matter of today

as globalism itself is not, either. The Flashback Approach fails since today’s global terrorism is not

same as the one in the 18
th
and 19

th
centuries. The Permanency Approach’s assumption that

contemporary globalization is the continuation of previous waves and no big shift is possible fails to

read the extraordinary flow of global terrorism. Compared to other approaches the transformation

approach seems the least erronious, because terrorism has been diversified in the way this approach

defines globalization.

Contemporary terrorism is global in nature since it uses advantages and exploits

vulnerabilities of globalization and creates global effects. As we have mentioned above there is an

indirect relationship between globalization and global terrorism. So without defining its complex and

amalgam structure, and economical, technological, historical, political, social dimensions, one could

neither be able to assess global terrorism nor have the chance to overcome it.

For efficiently fighting against global terrorism any strategy should follow three phases. The

first is to consider all components of globalization and their impacts on stability as well as terrorist

organization(s). The second is to assess the security environment. The third is to analyze the

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
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| 45

apparatus and the system required to prevent global terrorism. This affirmation is a version of

constants of strategy since Sun Tzu; known as “enemy, terrain and friendly forces”.
29

These three

factors could also be used to develop a strategy for fighting against terrorist organizations. Here the

authors will not make an analytical survey on each of these factors but try to explain the nodule, with

which all causes and results are directly connected.

The common denominator of the reason for the transformation of terrorism into a global

context and the way of fighting against global terrorism lay in the changing role and weight of the

state. Globalists consider nation states as an obstacle for globalization and suggest that life cycle of

nation state ended and “market state”
30

emerged as the main actor to counter today’s and tomorrow’s

expectations.

Market state’s prominence is another subject of discussion. Here we will be contented with

reminding that market state is not a new phenomenon but a 21
st
century version of Holland’s

merchant state model, which was established to enable global spread to maximize profits of VOC

(Vereinigte Oost-İndische Compagnie) in the second half of the 16
th
century. Holland’s merchant

state model was an upgraded version of Italian city-states of 15
th
century with an exception of being

backed by military power.
31

In spite of its benefits for a series of firms, exchange market and

Amsterdam Bank, Holland’s merchant state was not long lasting because of its defects not matching

with a nation state. Additionally starting from the Reagan administration, the near past has shown us

that free market economy does not regulate the security conditions.

Probabilities of Globalization-Nation State-Terrorism Trivet from The Security Perspective

There are two basic, one complementary possibilities which explain the interrelation between

globalization, nation state and terrorism from the security perspective: The imbalance of power

between terrorism and nation state could result from either a dramatic impoverishment of the nation

state or an extra ordinary power gain of terrorism to an extent which differentiated its regular form.

The complementary possibility is the situation in which both occurred simultaneously.

So these affirmations give us a three-layer model, which has a vicious circle characteristic in

nature:

– In the first layer, failed states and crime organizations use terrorism as warfare; nation-states

cannot localize and/or mitigate and/or overcome terrorism; terrorism exploits advantages of

globalization and creates global influence. So, terrorism mutated.

– In the second layer, globalization directly underpins nation-state; nation-state fails; and

terrorism pervades globally. So, globalization weakens nation-state.

– In the third layer, globalization causes instability; instability weakens the nation-state;

nation-state cannot overcome internal terrorism; and terrorism strengthens globally. So, terrorism

mutated and nation-state weakened.

Empiric Clues between Intensified Terrorism and Globalization

The data obtained from RAND provides some clues about the relation between the globalization and

terrorist activities. The number of international terrorist activities covers the data between 1968 and

2009 which coincide with the third globalization period in which the nation states started to lose their

power due to increasing globalization impact. The main thesis is that the global terror has increased as

nation states can hardly sustain stability and security as their powers started to decline. The data

indicates that global terrorism follows an increasing trend starting from the late 1990s where

globalization has reached its peak. The correlation between terrorist incidents and globalization

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 46

provides an evidence to justify our thesis. It is a viable data that can prove the correspondence

between increased terrorism and globalization. Of course, there are several motives behind the

increasing global terrorism as explained in previous paragraphs. Social, political, cultural, religious

extremist, ethnical and psychological factors are some driven-factors that trigger the terrorism to

reach any goal. However, the correlation among the weakening of nation-state, the spread of

globalization and the intensification of global terror all have coincided at the end of 1990s. This

overlapping can, in any case, support the hypothesis as globalization considerably weakened nation

states or transformed them in a shape by which the security and stabilization would not be sustained

as desired.
32

Data given on Table-1 clearly indicates that there is a growing trend in terrorism incidents

starting from 1998. When we compare the average of events during the period of 1968-1997

(Av.Incid.1968-1997=267) with the period of 1998-2009 (Av.Incid.1998-2009=2677), we reach to the

conclusion that there is a 10-fold increase in terrorism events. (RAND’s permission has been taken

through electronic mail to publish those numbers)

This dramatic change may be interpreted in various ways, however the most probable reasons

for such a picture coincide with the hypothesis of this article. Such an extreme increase could be a

strong indication of:

 Either a drastic decline in the power of nation state – as confirmed by historical
developments and theoretical framework mentioned above as well as empiric data shown on Table-1.

 Or a conceptual dramatic change in the use of terrorism.

Lessons learned from the recent experience of terrorism give us clues on the transformation of

terrorism.

What we Learned From the Experience Of Global Terrorism

No shape of international architecture could be more secure than the one with prosperous nation

states. Although the direct strategy seems to be reinforcement of the nation state for fighting against

global terrorism, this would be hardly possible while globalization underpins the central authorities.

Considering the conflicting interests of nation state and globalization and cause-effect relationship

between globalization and terrorism, there occurs a decision point
33

for globalization. Here, the matter

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

Table-1: Terrorism Incidents (1968-2009)

1968 1978

22298

1988

369

1998

1286

2008

2846

2006

6660

Source: “RAND Databse of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents”
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php, (15, Feb 2012)

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 47

is to accept to which extent power should be shared with the nation state or terrorism should be

tolerated. From the perspective of imperialistic logic of capitalism, terrorism is acceptable unless it

threatens profits. Additionally terrorist acts could be helpful for dominant powers to enlarge their

global presence. From realistic perspective globalization is unavoidable and indispensable and

terrorism is uncontrollable as long as it can see fertile ground in the soil of weakened states. We claim

that 9/11 terrorist attacks would not be so effective if the state apparatus in the area where al-Qaeda

stationed were strong enough at least to detect the planning phase of the terrorist assault.

As in his speech on September 27, 2001, President Bush noted that 9/11 terrorist attacks were

not only an event but also an experience of the new form of terrorism.
3435

“This is not a conventional war that we’re waging. Ours is a campaign that

will have to reflect the new enemy. There’s no longer islands to conquer of

beachheads to storm. We face a brand of evil, the likes of which we haven’t

seen in a long time in the world. These are people who strike and hide;

people who know no borders…”

So 9/11 terrorist attacks have to be handled as a decision point to fight against terrorist

networks rather than engaging in a retaliatory operation which violates international law.
36

9/11 terrorist attacks explicitly showed three aspects:

 The first is that the threshold either to isolate or to limit terrorism has been exceeded
and terrorism can hit any target any time anywhere. We are not at a point to localize terrorism. So we

need to shape the security environment in such a way which globalization and the nation state could

live together.

 The second is that terrorism is not anymore limited with only symbolic targets and
has the capacity to use all advantages of high technologies. Terrorism has transformed into a new

warfare in which all forms of non-conventional war tactics, techniques and procedures are used. So

we need to develop new strategies against global terrorism.

 The third and the most dangerous is that terrorist organizations are supported by the
masses or countries

37
which perceive themselves as the victims of globalization by religious, ethnic or

other motivations. Thus, contemporary global world is more vulnerable than ever. So we need to

prevent clash of civilizations.

The first two aspects are the ones that could be overcome by protective measures. These

measures require an internationally coordinated seamless robust military concept. In order to counter

the first aspect of terrorism the concept should downgrade the military power of terrorism by

eliminating its capabilities of exploiting globalization. In order to counter the second aspect of

terrorism, the concept should also cover the fact that terrorism has transformed to a new form of

warfare slipping off its traditional limited and symbolic characteristic.

The third is the main area of concern for politics, ethic and social-psychology together with

security measures, military operations and international cooperation since contemporary terrorism can

sustain its public support despite its attacks on innocent civilians and terrorist organizations have left

their regular chain of command structure.

Laqueur
38

argues that modern terrorists are more ruthless than their historical counterparts

were. He says modern terrorism has been typified by indiscriminate violence and the international

targeting of the civilian population. Modern terrorists strike at governments by killing their citizens.

For the contemporary terrorists, starting from the mid of 1990’s, as long as they do not lose support

from their population, more innocent victims mean more tears for the sake of their power. The

increasing trend in religiously inspired terrorist organizations
39

and the support or at least sympathy

they have gained indicate that the new form of terrorism is fertilized by religious animosity.

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 48

The dispersion of terrorist organizations has created new form of terrorism.
40

In this new

form, terrorist organizations are decentralized in conduct of operation, so decision makers of terrorist

organizations say what to do, local cells plans and execute terrorist attacks regardless of any

organizational linkage.

Unless terrorism is ousted politically, ethically and psychologically, military measures could

have slim chance of success. So struggle against terrorism should concentrate on cutting the support

to terrorism to the utmost.

Developments after 9/11 terrorist attacks taught us three lessons:

 The first is that humanity’s stance against terrorism should be in consent; moreover
acts against terrorism should be unilateral rather than multilateral.

41
In other words, “yours are the

freedom fighters, mines are terrorist” sayings only embolden criminals against humanity and increase

the innocent losses; so this approach is complicity of the crime. National and international institutions

should go after terrorists and those who harbor or support terrorism, and terrorist networks with the

appropriate legal, financial, judicial, and political instruments.
42

 The second is that neither negotiating with terrorists nor behaving the way they
understand does help to solve the problem. Because murder is inexcusable and we cannot detach

ethics form the policies and the experience of terrorism
43

and the way terrorists’ interpreted Jihad

could not be nourished better than the Crusader approach.

 The third is that there is no way but winning hearts and minds of the people
44

even

prone to but not involved in terrorist acts. Isolations, exclusions and labeling masses as terrorist do

not help us but the enemy. Compassion and respect will let terrorism armless. So there has always

been a way to separate the “fish” from “water”.
45

According to Spencer
46

, after 9/11 new terrorism concept has widely been accepted. He

believes that there is something inherently new about the terrorism of today. This includes a fanatical

religious motivation, excessive indiscriminate violence together with the possible use of WMDs, an

increasing independence from state sponsors as well as a new network structure helped by

communications technology and new amateur terrorists who only come together in ad hoc groupings.

Considering the essential strategy against global terrorism mentioned above, we clearly see

that this new form of terrorism first and foremost should be isolated from its integral parts like; public

support, financial power, abilities to exploit globalization etc.
47

From the strategic point of view the

center of gravity
48

on fighting against global terrorism is to cannibalize it by using the asymmetric

powers of nation state. The point terrorism reached counters many of our military capabilities but the

values that nation-state has.

What we did not take as a lesson from global terrorism experience is that we have no other

chance than reinventing value of modern nation state identity, which has social responsibility, laic

stance, democratic nature and absolute law. These four pillars should work together otherwise

polarization or fragmentation would be inevitable for both the states and the international

environment. Here the main point is not only that you have these values but also how you interoperate

these values as part of an apparatus against terrorism.

Since social responsibilities of the states have been hampered by contemporary versions of

laissez-faire/“free market” conservatism, we are not to skip the chances and opportunities to drainage

the swap of terrorism. Social policies would limit areas of operation of terrorism, as well as mass

support to their ideologies. Therefore, as Ward
49

noted we are to identify the fact that terrorists are not

borne but shaped by the circumstances.

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 49

Laicism, as one of the greatest inventions of modernity, has not been applicable with all its

aspects yet. Neither the leading Western countries, nor the rest of the world are free of religious

influence. Additionally, there covertly retains religious animosity deeply related with social wide

phobias, so secularism could be an intermediate way for solution. Although laicism seems as the

ultimate solution to overcome (so called) “religiously” inspired terrorism, social experience since the

Illumination Age shows that laicism is not as easily applicable as secularism. Considering the

dramatic differences between these two concepts, secularism could help to overcome “religion”

motivated terrorism to some extent when properly applied.
50

Because of its institutions, nation state

seems to be the only organization that could apply secularism properly.

Democracy, when applied to societies which couldn’t develop the merit of citizenship and

couldn’t rise the individual but members of a group smaller than nation, may easily turn to a race of

holding the majority to eliminate opposition. Yet, it is the only way to cut public support to terrorist

organizations. Democracy cannot be sustainable and cannot help masses to express their demands and

choices in a liberal atmosphere embodied with consent unless values like respect, tolerance, morale,

ethic and citizenship flourish. Those values are neither nation nor state oriented, but cannot be best

grown in any form of socio-political organization other than nation state. This brings us to the point

that nation-state fertilizes the ground for democracy which would diminish public support for

violence and sympathetic approaches to terrorism.

By absolute law we mean morality, ethic and justice. In this context low provides a base for

all who are against terrorism. We cannot detach ethics from the politics and the experience of

terrorism. 9/11 is an experience which demands that we comprehend the deeper ethical questions.
51

The moral injunction is joined by Michael Ignatieff.
52

“In the age of terrorism, the temptations of ruthlessness can be overwhelming.

But we are pulled in the other direction, too, by the anxiety that a violent

response to violence makes us morally indistinguishable from our enemies”

“All battles between terrorists and the state are battles for opinion, and in this

struggle ethical justifications are critical, to maintain the morale of one’s own

side, to hold the loyalty of populations who might otherwise align with terrorists,

and to maintain political support among allies.”

As an indispensable part of the sovereignty tripod, judiciary is essential for fight against

terrorism. But judiciary which is not empowered by absolute law would not help to cut the support for

terrorism, since it is related with the results not the reasons.

Fighting against terrorism in an environment embodied with laic stance, democratic nature

and absolute law may give an impression that we fight with one hand tied behind our backs; this is

illusive. One can easily wipe out terrorists by using counter-terrorist warfare but not the ideas behind

it; that is, he cannot cut the “jugular vein” of terrorism. At this point, we come to the conclusion that

the morality composed by social responsibility, democracy, freedom of belief and absolute law is the

only effective tool to fight against terrorism in the long run, if the ingredients of this morality are

applied effectively, seamlessly and efficiently in an interoperable way. These values could be best

applied only by nation state.

Conclusion

The main discussion point of this paper is to illustrate the correlation among boosted globalization,

weakened nation- states and globalized terrorism.

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 50

In order to draw the parameters of level of analysis, one needs to underline the approaches

and methodologies which explain the concept of globalization. But there are difficulties on theorizing

the globalization concept, which stems from the problem of obtaining reliable information and the

complexity of the concept. However approaches to globalization can be classified basically under

four titles: 1) The Novelty Approach 2) The Flashback approach 3) The Permanency approach 4) The

transformation approach. Comparing the specifications of these approaches we reach to the

conclusion that the comprehensive and the transformation approaches give relatively more

appropriate data to analyze the consequences of globalization from security perspective, than the

other too deterministic and more holistic approaches.

Globalization, while setting its complex and amalgam structure, institutions and processes,

has provoked instability by eroding the power of nation state and its capabilities to sustain tight

control over means, resources, people and institutions that preserve security. Indeed, while

globalization promotes standardization, global affinity, unity and intermingled interdependency on

the one hand, it provokes localization, disparity and definition of identities on a smaller level than

nation on the other hand. These aspects of the globalization also add to instability as well as decline in

the power of nation state.

Global terrorism can spread due to the malign effects of globalization; the imbalance and

vacuum of power; and disparity of players. All these three factors have created fragile environment

for stability as well as fertile ground for terrorism. Failed states, minorities and separatists used

terrorism to counterbalance the power gap or to consolidate their authority. Collapse of bipolar

security environment and impoverishment of the nation-state as a consequence of globalization have

exacerbated instability.

Terrorism with global influence is called global terrorism. Contemporary terrorism is global

in nature since it uses advantages and exploits vulnerabilities of globalization and creates global

effects. While the term global terrorism is not a new phenomenon, contemporary global terrorism

requires new concept to fight against.

Any strategy against terrorism should consider all ingredients of globalization, assess the

security environment and analyze the devices and processes to prevent global terrorism.

The imbalance of power between terrorism and nation state could result from either a

dramatic impoverishment of the nation state or an extraordinary power gain of terrorism to an extent

which differentiated its regular form. The complementary possibility is the situation in which both

occurred simultaneously. The ascending trend of terrorism incidents verifies that as a consequence of

globalization, nation state weakened and terrorism mutated to a more warfare kind.

9/11 terrorist attacks should be considered as the decision point to identify this new form of

terrorism, which has no time and geographic limit and means and which is also backed by the masses.

Developments after 9/11 terrorist attacks have taught us that we cannot overcome global terrorism by

either using the way they understand or by negotiating with criminals against humanity (core

elements of terrorist organizations), but separating “fish” from “water”.

Terrorism first and foremost should be isolated from its integral parts, such as public support,

financial power, abilities to exploit globalization etc. The most reliable force to properly respond to

global terrorism is social, democratic, laic and lawful nation states. Basic identities of nation state

could be used in such a way to impoverish global terrorism.

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 51

Notes

1
David Held and Anthony McGrew, “The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction”, in The Global

Transformations Reader, D.Held and A.McGrew (Eds) (Malden USA: Polity Press, 2000), 1-45.
2
For example, supporters of globalization consider it as the ultimate reach of civilization while the opponents

define globalization as the new form of capitalism and imperialism. Some put more emphasis on information

flow and define emergent global economy and culture as a “network society” grounded in new communications

and information technology (See, Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010).

Some frames globalization with its economic, cultural and political dimensions (See, Stanley Hoffmann, “The

Clash of Globalizations”, Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2002), 107). Some put more values on scientific and

technological characteristics of globalization. Some see globalization merely as universalization of

consumerism (See, Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2001)

while others stress on “the clash of civilizations” (See, Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the

Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996).
3
As one of the most famous writers of this approach, (Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree

(USA: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), 1-27) proposes that globalization is an international system, which

replaced the old Cold War system, but he says hardly few about historical development of globalization.

Although he has developed his theory and added historical background in his study “The World is Flat” (The

World is Flat: A Brief History of The Twenty-First Century (USA: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005), 19), this

helped little to his conceptual framework and less persuasion for severe criticism on his theory.
4
Hardt and Negri (Empire, (London: Rvard University Press, 2000) present globalization as a complex process

that involves a multidimensional mixture of expansions of the global economy and capitalist market system,

new technologies and media, expanded judicial and legal modes of governance, and emergent modes of power,

sovereignty, and resistance (Quoted from Douglas Kellner, Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy: 9/11 and

its Aftermath, (2002), 10. accessed: March 05, 2012),

http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/globalizationterroraftermath .
5
Ali Bilgin Varlık, Küreselleşme ve Küreselleşmenin Orta Doğu’ya Etkileri (Globalization and Its Effects on

the Middle East) (Ankara University, Faculty of Political Sciences, Unissued Phd Thesis, 2009), 19.

Although classification of ideas contains all forms of inefficiencies of being holistic, it makes easy to

understand. For this reason the classification we suggested here is broader than the commonly used “against –

for” type. The classification made by Held and McGrew (The Global Transformations Reader (Malden USA:

Polity Press, 2000), 1-45.) is also acceptable but not satisfactory enough to conceptualize the subject. The

classification could be summarized as follows: 1) The Hyperglobalists 2) Skeptics 3) Transformationalist.
6
Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death (London: Sage, 2006), 1-3.

7
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), xx-xxi.

8
See, Duncan Bell S.A., “History and Globalization: Reflections on Temporality”, International Affairs 79/4

(2003): 801.
9
According to Hirst and Thompson (Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the

Possibilities of Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 9), during the 1870-1914 Belle Époque economic

era the world economy was almost totally globalized. Today we are just about to reach the level of those days’

economic openness. For example, current French economy has not reached yet to the economic openness level

of 1913 which had the ratio of 35.4 %. The situation is the same for today’s huge economies like Germany and

Japan. Starting from 1970, although world economy has enormously grown, there has occurred a considerable

gap between GDP’s and the trade level.
10

Furkan Y. Şen, Globalleşme Sürecinde Milliyetçilik Trendleri ve Ulus-Devlet (Ankara: Yargı Yayınevi,

2004), 181.
11

See, Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, Times of the Technoculture (London and New York: Routledge,

1999), 4, 5.
12

See, Immanuel Wallerstein, The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Also see, Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis:

An Introduction (USA, Duke University Press 2005).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Farrar,_Straus_and_Giroux

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Minnesota_Press

Globalization, Terrorism and the State

Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall 2015

| 52

13

N.Kenneth Waltz, “Globalization and American Power”, The National Interest, (Spring 2000), 47-49,

accessed Jan 10, 2011 (as of April 01, 2012 no longer available). http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim2751/

is2000Spring/ai61299041.
14

David Held, McGrew Anthony, Goldblatt David and Perraton Jonathan “Rethinking Globalization”, in

Global Transformations Reader, D.Held and A.McGrew (eds.) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 54-61.
15

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,

The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 15/4 (1973): 160.
16

Varlık, “Küreselleşme”, 121.
17

E. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (USA W.W: Norton & Company, 2002), 9.
18

William I. Robinson, Capitalist Globalization and the Transnationalisation of the State, Historical

Materialism and Globalization in M. Rupert&H. Smith (Eds), (London: Routledge, 2002), 210; Ray Kiely,

“The Changing Face of Anti-Globalization Politics: Two (and a Half) Tales of Globalization and Anti-

Globalization”, Globalizations II/ 1 (May 2005): 135.
19

William I. Robinson, “Social Theory and Globalization: The Rise of the Transnational State”, Theory and

Society 30 (2001): 182–191; Ray Kiely, “The Changing Face of Anti-Globalization Politics: Two (and a Half)

Tales of Globalization and Anti-Globalization”, Globalizations II/1 (2005): 135.
20

Jerry Kloby, Inequality, Power, and Development: Issues in Political Sociology (New York: Humanity

Books, 2004), 165.
21

Moving from the idea that globalization has weakened the nation state, Samir Amin (Capitalism in the Age of

Globalization: The Management of Contemporary Society, (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997), 15) has

defined globalization as “Imperial of Chaos”.
22

Alan Miller, “Globalization, Terror, and Ethics: A Human Rights Perspective?”, Globalizations VI/1 (2009):

149.
23

Jamal R. Nassar, Globalization and Terror: The Migration of Dreams and Nightmares, (Lanham: MD,

Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 18.
24

Michael Waizer, Arguing About War, (USA:Yale University Press, 2004), 134.
25

Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New

Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 4.
26

Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism”, Peace Conflict & Development, VIII/1

(2006), 1-33, www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk
27

Leonard Weinberg, Pedahzur Ami and Hirsch-Hoefler Sivan, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”

Terrorism and Political Violence XVI/4 (2004), 786.
28

Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism”, 3 quoted from Leonard Weinberg et. al.,

“The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism”, 786.
29

See, Roger T. Ames, Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare, Robert G. Henricks (ed.), (New York: Ballantione Books,

1993). and Samuel B. Griffith, Sun-Tzu: The Art of War ( London and New York: Oxford University, 1971).
30

The term “Market State” implies that the nation-state cannot successfully cope with contemporary challenges

so we are entering the transition from one constitutional order to another –from nation state to the market state

(Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century (New York: Anchor Books, 2009),

86.
31

Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (London and New York: Verso, 1994), 70-79.
32

The similar research was conducted by Alexander Spencer op. cit. using the same source (with unlike data)

but reaching different conclusion. He clearly mentioned that when examining the data on international terrorism

incidents, one finds that although the number of terrorist incidents has generally declined from the mid-1980s,

the number of fatalities per incident has increased since the 1980s. Considering that ‘new terrorism’ supposed

to have started in the 1990s, this increase of fatalities might not be directly linked to the phenomenon of ‘new

terrorism’ (Isabelle Duyvesteyn, “How New Is the New Terrorism?”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism XVII/5

(2004):447-448).

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim2751/

Sertif Demir

& Ali Bilgin Varlık
ALTERNATIVES TURKISH JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS www.alternetivesjournal.net

| 53

33

Decision point: A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that

the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action (APP-6: NATO Glossary of Terms

and Definitions, Bruselles, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), (2010): 2-d-2).
34

The first sign of the new form of terrorism was Alfres P.Murrah’s Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma

City on April 19, 1995. With its 168 victims, this was by far the deadliest terrorist attack in American history

until September 11, 2001 [Arnaud Blin, “The United States Confronting Terrorism”, in The History of

Terrorism: From Antiquity to AL Qaeda, Gerad Chaliand and Arnaud Blind (edts.) (Berkeley, Los Angeles,

London: University of California Press, 2007), 407].

35
Stuart Elden, Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty (USA, University of Minnesota Press,

2009), Xvii.
36

Ibid, 2.
37

O’Neill classifies public support as active and passive, and external support as moral, political, material, and

sanctuary. (Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, (Washington D.C.:

Potomac Books, 2005), 94, 142).
38

Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 91.
39

Religiously motivated terrorist organizations are becoming more common. According to the RAND-St

Andrews University Chronology of International Terrorism, in 1968 none of the identified international terrorist

organizations could be classified as ‘religious’; in 1980, in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, there were

two (out of sixty-four), and that number had expanded to twenty-five (out of fifty-eight) by 1995 (Richard

Whelan, Al-Qaedaism: the Threat to Islam, the Threat to the World (Dublin: Ashfield Press, 2005), 23.
40

Jonathan R. White, Terrorism and Homeland Security. (Australia, Brazil, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Singapore,

Spain, United Kingdom, United States: Wadsworth Press, 2009), 275.
41

Kellner, “Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy”, 16.
42

Ibid, 23.
43

Ian Ward, Law, Text, Terror (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid: Cambridge University Press,

2009), 175.
44

JP 3-24: Counter Insurgency Operations, USA, Joint Chief of Staff (2009), III-12.
45

It is attributed that the term “fish out of water” as a strategy on counter-insurgency was first used by Mao

Zedong (or Tse-tung), who resembles fish to guerrilla and water to the people, in his study on guerrilla warfare

“On the Protracted War”.
46

Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism”, 1-33.
47

In order to end terrorism, Audrey Kurth Cronin (How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and

Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, (U.K: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9) suggest broader strategy which

covers six measures: 1) Capture or killing the group’s leader 2) Entry of the group into a legitimate political

process 3) Achievement of the group’s aims 4) Implosion or loss of the group’s public support 5) Defeat and

elimination by brute force 6) Transition from terrorism into other forms of violence. Other studies on defeating

terrorism include similar strategies. The common denominator of these strategies is cutting public support to

terrorism.
48

Center of Gravity: Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force

or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight (APP-6, 2-c-3)
49

Ward, “Law, Text, Terror”, 179.
50

Many varieties and forms of secularization have set in motion predominantly because of different historical

processes (Elizabeth Shakman HURD, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2008), 15).
51

Ward, “Law, Text, Terror”, 175.
52

Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton

University Press, 2004), 1-9.

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Conceptualising state collapse: an
institutionalist approach
Daniel Lambach*, Eva Johais and Markus Bayer
Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

This paper proposes a theoretically grounded and methodologically
rigorous conceptualisation of state collapse. It seeks to overcome sev-
eral key deficits of research into fragile, failed and collapsed states,
which is often criticised as normatively problematic and methodologi-
cally deficient. We argue that this is a worthwhile topic to study but
that scholarly inquiry needs to become more systematic and focus on
extreme cases of state collapse. Following a Weberian institutionalist
tradition, we disaggregate statehood into three dimensions of state
capacity: making and enforcing binding rules, monopolising the
means of violence and collecting taxes. We then propose a set of
indicators as well as a mode of aggregation based on necessary and
sufficient conditions. Our framework identifies 17 cases of state
collapse in the postcolonial era.

Keywords: state collapse; concept formation; fragile states

Introduction
The state is back. After being out of fashion for decades, the institution of the
state is now perceived as a source of peace and well-being. Consequently ‘state
fragility’ and ‘state collapse’ are thought to be a challenge to security and
development in the global South. However, more work needs to be done to
improve the analytical viability of these buzzwords.

This paper takes two recent critiques as points of departure. The first is that
looking at state fragility in the broadest sense makes the concept too difficult to
operationalise and lumps together very different phenomena underneath the
same umbrella. Authors like Call and Ulfelder have therefore advocated a focus
on more extreme and clear-cut cases, tightening the scope of inquiry from frag-
ile states to collapsed states.1 A second critique holds that current approaches
are insufficiently theorised.2

To rectify these problems, this paper proposes a conceptualisation of state
collapse that is theoretically grounded and methodologically rigorous. We argue
that ‘state fragility’ is a worthwhile topic to study but that scholarly inquiry
needs to become more systematic. To this end, we develop a concept of state

*Corresponding author. Email: daniel.lambach@uni-due.de

© 2015 UNU-WIDER. Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

Third World Quarterly, 2015
Vol. 36, No. 7, 1299–1315, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1038338

mailto:daniel.lambach@uni-due.de

http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/files/twq_appendix_brief_description_state_collapse_cases

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1038338

collapse that is anchored in a Weberian institutionalist understanding of
statehood. We use Goertz’s method of concept building to derive a notion of
state collapse that is disaggregated into three essential dimensions of state capac-
ity: making and enforcing binding rules, monopolising the means of violence
and collecting taxes.3 We then employ this concept to identify 17 cases of state
collapse in the postcolonial era (1960–2007).

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we give a brief survey of
current debates in the research field. Thereafter we present our concept of state
collapse by first elaborating a Weberian theory of the state and deriving a mul-
tidimensional operationalisation from it. Next we use our concept of collapse
and present results from an empirical survey of the postcolonial world. The con-
cluding part summarises our argument about the merits and limitations of our
approach and lays out some directions for future research.

Sorting the field of fragile states research
Ever since the emergence of the research field there have been struggles over
how to define, delineate, measure and rank ‘fragile’, ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed
states’. Bueger and Bethke identify four stages in the development of the field:

Only loosely mentioned in academia of the late 1980s (phase one), the concept
was extended to numerous disciplines and foreign policy makers in the 1990s
(phase two), it was securitised and globalised in the early 2000s (phase three),
and in a contemporary phase (phase four) there has been a double trend of
homogenisation through quantification and heterogenisation through criticism.4

This article engages with the debates in the fourth phase: we first present
attempts to quantify and measure state fragility and collapse. As for the hetero-
genisation dynamic, we present two strands of critique – one analytical, one
normative.

Quantification
There are several projects that strive to quantify state fragility. On the academic
side the best-known ones include the Fragile States Index (FSI, previously
called the Failed States Index), the Index of State Fragility (ISF), the State
Fragility Index (SFI) and the Index of State Weakness (ISW).5 These indices
typically employ aggregate data gathered by other researchers. All four indices
take a very broad approach to state fragility, using indicators like infant
mortality, the rate of deforestation and GDP to assess the capacity of the state.6

The problems with these ‘kitchen sink’ approaches are twofold. First, they
overstretch the notion of fragility by lumping a diffuse set of crisis indicators
together in the same conceptual basket. Second, they curtail opportunities for
causal analysis since most potential explanatory variables are already part of the
definition. Furthermore, none of the four projects explicitly deals with issues of
weighting. Some are also biased towards democracies.7 The most important
shortcoming is the lack of validity: by subsuming several different sub-indica-
tors within the concept of state fragility, these approaches measure a random
amalgamation of conflict potential, level of development and good governance.

1300 D. Lambach et al.

In spite of these methodological deficiencies, these indices – particularly the FSI
– have received political and public attention and have also been employed in
other research.

Critique
In a separate development the entire research field has been subject to two major
strands of critique. The first comes from a critical, normative perspective that
challenges the discourse as such. The second is more analytical and strives for a
re-conceptualisation of state fragility and state collapse.

Critical IR literature problematises the effects of the ‘state-building’ para-
digm in international interventions in non-Western states. Some contributions
discuss how the dynamics of statehood are globalised by international interven-
tions.8 Wilén condenses the paradox of these contemporary interventions: while
aiming at ‘state building’ they encroach on state sovereignty.9 With regard to its
ontological implications the ‘failed states’ discourse is thought to depoliticise
the non-Western state by picturing it as a pathological case, by the ‘creolization
of the African world’.10 The effect of this depoliticisation is the legitimisation
of intervention, either by international agencies or by Western states.

A more radical position highlights the normative conception that underlies
the research domain of fragile statehood: states are measured with reference to a
Weberian, liberal idea of modern statehood. However, this ideal was developed
in a very particular political setting in Late Middle Age to Early Modern Eur-
ope, whereas power relations in contemporary non-Western states are condi-
tioned by different endogenous and exogenous structures. On the global level
the state is the dominant political idea, but it has to compete with other modes
of governance on the level of societies.11 The argument is brought up in particu-
lar by postcolonial studies, area studies on non-Western regions and ‘functional-
ist approaches’ that try to grasp the alternatives to ‘modern statehood’ with
concepts such as ‘twilight institutions’ or ‘social orders’.12 The notion of hybrid
political orders catches the simultaneity of the formal – modern state institutions
– and the informal – traditional, customary, social institutions.13 Schlichte even
claims that ‘state failure’ is no more than a discursive product without a
corresponding empirical phenomenon.14

Recently sociological and anthropological views on the state have also joined
the debate. Sociological notions point to the embeddedness of ongoing state-
building projects in long-term struggles over the institutionalisation of power
relations.15 The anthropology of the state adds an ideational level to the institu-
tionalist and functionalist dimensions of statehood and looks at individuals’
images of the state or state practices.16

These critiques highlight important shortcomings in our understanding of
fragile states, eg regarding the relation between ideals and institutions of the for-
mal state with social orders, informal institutions and societal norms. However,
we believe that state fragility and state collapse are still worthwhile subjects of
study, as politically loaded as these terms may be. The cases we identify below
are examples of periods of political, social and economic crises that are
characterised by excessive intra-societal violence. Similar to Putzel and Di
John’s notion of ‘crisis states’,17 we believe that the reasons for resilience and

Third World Quarterly 1301

catastrophe can be located in the institution of the state. Furthermore, while an
institutionalist understanding of the state can be criticised on many grounds, it
represents the dominant global ideal of political organisation. Citizens and politi-
cal elites around the world subscribe to it. Approaching the issue in these widely
understood terms has merit for comparative research in particular.

Re-conceptualisation
A second strand of critique does not seek to overturn the entire academic
discourse about fragile states, but rather to improve it. Partly motivated by the
failure to develop a good index measure of state fragility, several authors have
started to rethink the conceptual foundations of the field. Most responses follow
two different approaches: the first argues for a significant tightening of the
concept to focus on extreme cases of state collapse, the second argues in favour
of disaggregating fragility into more specific subtypes. We shall discuss these
arguments in turn.

In the first approach Call and Ulfelder argue that concepts of state failure
and state fragility should be abandoned entirely, arguing that these are too broad
and too vague.18 This conceptual overstretch is said to produce two problems:
first, the line between failed/fragile and non-failed/non-fragile states is impossi-
ble to define; and, second, cases within the group of failed/fragile states are too
different, making comparison almost impossible. Hence, they argue, scientists
should focus on the extreme instances of failure, which they call ‘state
collapse’.19

For Call, state collapse refers to the all-encompassing failure of state institu-
tions to provide any meaningful output:

It refers to countries whose state apparatus ceases to exist for a period of several
months. The concept here does not refer to the inability of some ministries to pro-
vide services, or to a state under siege in warfare, nor to an absence of the state
in some regions, but to a complete collapse of a national state. Here citizens do
not know where to go to obtain a recognised passport, and all services normally
provided by the state are provided by sub-state or non-state actors.20

By contrast Ulfelder focuses on one particular issue as an indicator of collapse:

A state collapse occurs when a sovereign state fails to provide public order in at
least one-half of its territory or in its capital city for at least 30 consecutive days.
A sovereign state is regarded as failing to provide public order in a particular area
when a) an organised challenger, usually a rebel group or regional government,
effectively controls that area; b) lawlessness pervades in that area; or c) both.21

The second approach takes a different way to cope with the empirical diversity
of ‘fragile states’. In contrast to the first, it does not suggest a re-conceptualisa-
tion, but tries to identify the groups of states that make up this amorphous total-
ity. Such an approach can draw on many different attempts to disentangle the
constituent parts of (fragile) statehood. Patrick makes a fundamental distinction
between the inability and the unwillingness of a state to fulfil its functions.22

Ghani et al emphasise the need for effectiveness and legitimacy in state

1302 D. Lambach et al.

building.23 Still others, like the Commission for Weak States and US National
Security, identify gaps in the ‘three functions that effective governments must
be able to perform: ensuring security, meeting the basic needs of citizens, and
maintaining legitimacy’.24 Call furthers this approach by disaggregating state
failure into a capacity gap, a legitimacy gap and a security gap.25 Building upon
these earlier contributions, Grävingholt et al disaggregate functional statehood
into the components of authority, capacity and legitimacy and develop an
empirical typology that identifies seven major clusters of states.26

In practice the differences between the first and the second approach should
not be overstated. It is easily possible to use the more fine-grained methodolo-
gies of the second approach to identify cases of state collapse, as advocated by
the first approach. For instance, Carment and Samy mention that countries with
gaps in all three dimensions, like ‘Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, DRC and Chad
might all be characterised as either failed or collapsed’.27

The conceptual debate has infused the research field with a new vitality.
However, we see a serious weakness in that key contributions seem to have no
underlying theory of the state. While all provide definitions of state fragility or
collapse, and many duly refer to the work of Max Weber, the link between their
theoretical foundation and their concept of state fragility remains unclear. For
example, Grävingholt et al do not discuss why differentiating statehood into the
dimensions of authority, legitimacy and capacity is the best and most logical
choice.28 Without a theory of the state, these choices are arbitrary.

We draw two conclusions from this debate. First, statehood needs to be
understood as a multidimensional, multi-causal concept. Second, drawing a dis-
tinction between fragile and non-fragile states is challenging. Focusing on
extreme cases would reduce the uncertainty somewhat, even though we still
need some sort of threshold-based definition. A clear theory of the state is
necessary to provide guideposts that help us derive and justify such a threshold.

Conceptualising state collapse
A definition of state collapse has to proceed from a theory of the state. Hay and
Lister offer a genealogy of the concept of the state that places a Weberian
understanding at the centre of a heterogeneous mainstream of institutionalist,
pluralist, Marxist/Gramscian and public choice theories.29 In recent decades this
mainstream has been challenged by feminist and post-structuralist (Foucauldian
and discourse analysis) approaches. The latter posit that the state does not exist
per se but should be understood as an effect of power relations; they criticise
the reification of the state as an actor in mainstream theories.30

We follow Barrow’s claim that the state is an essentially contested concept
and that ‘specific concepts of the state are linked to particular methodological
assumptions’.31 In line with a positivist epistemological position we base our
choice of theory on two pragmatic considerations. First, since our main objec-
tive is to improve the empirical analysis of state collapse, we need a concept of
the state that is amenable to comparative research. To facilitate dialogue, we
also prefer concepts that are already being used in research on fragile and col-
lapsed states. Thus we opt for an ideal-type definition of state, which is the
(sometimes implicit) standard in the literature on fragile states. Methodologically

Third World Quarterly 1303

this means that cases are measured in terms of their distance from the ideal-type.
The contrasting approach would be to identify ‘real-types’ from a comparison of
cases. We opt for the more deductive ideal-type approach because of the wealth
of theories about the state and state collapse. This does not preclude developing
typologies or taxonomies of state collapse after empirical analysis.

According to Eriksen, the literature on fragile states is dominated by two
different understandings of the state.32 The first presents the state as a service
provider. In this perspective a state’s primary purpose is to provide public goods
like security, the protection of property rights, justice or public health.
Depending on the exact definition, welfare issues like access to education, basic
social services, opportunities for participation and the rule of law can also be
considered part of the state’s core functions.

The second approach views the state in terms of territorial control and the
monopoly of violence. This is clearly inspired by Max Weber’s definition of the
state, which focuses on the instruments of the state. The Weberian state has a
legitimate monopoly over the means of physical coercion, which it employs to
implement policies of its political leadership and the bureaucracy within a given
territory. Weber strongly objected to a definition that uses aims to distinguish
states from other forms of polities:

It is not possible to define a political organisation, including the state, in terms of
the end to which its action is devoted. All the way from provision for subsistence
to the patronage of art, there is no conceivable end which some political
association has not at some point of time pursued.33

Eriksen rightly points out that the first, output-oriented approach has several
drawbacks. First, this approach takes a normative position about which tasks a
state should engage in. As a result, the definition of a state is very closely tied
to the ‘OECD model’ of statehood, which is even more remote from realities in
the global South than is a Weberian conception. Moreover, states that do not
provide certain public goods out of a conscious political choice will be classified
as weak or failing. Conversely, states where non-state actors compensate for the
state’s incapacity by providing crucial public goods look more capable than they
really are. Finally, these approaches usually exhibit a strong democracy bias by
including the rule of law or participation among the definitional elements of
statehood. For these reasons we prefer to follow the Weberian tradition and
focus on the institutional capacity of the state.34

An institutionalist theory of the state
Weber famously defined the state as follows: ‘A compulsory political organisa-
tion with continuous operations [politischer Anstaltsbetrieb] will be called a
“state” insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its
order’.35 The crucial element that distinguishes a state from other kinds of poli-
ties is its ability to make a legitimate claim on the monopoly over the means of
violence and to assert and defend its sovereignty within a given territory.
Additionally, it shares several characteristics with other forms of political

1304 D. Lambach et al.

organisation, like a hierarchical governance structure, an administrative
apparatus and social relations based on domination and rule (Herrschaft).

Weber’s approach lends itself to an understanding that looks at statehood as
a variable: ‘Even in cases of such social organisation as a state […] the social
relationship consists exclusively in the fact that there has existed, exists, or will
exist a probability of action in some definite way appropriate to this meaning’.36

This means that, within Weber’s framework, all institutions and all forms of
social relations exist only to the degree that people act in accordance with their
orders. The corollary is that if the state only exists as a particular likelihood of
certain forms of social action, then there must logically be different degrees of
statehood. Weber himself asserts:

The fact that, in the same social group, a plurality of contradictory systems of
order may all be recognised as valid, is not a source of difficulty for the sociologi-
cal approach. Indeed, it is even possible for the same individual to orient his
action to contradictory systems of order…Thus for sociological purposes there does
not exist…a rigid alternative between the validity and lack of validity of a given
order. On the contrary, there is a gradual transition between the two extremes; and
[it is] also possible, as it has been pointed out, for contradictory systems of order
to exist at the same time. In that case each is ‘valid’ precisely to the extent that
there is a probability that action will in fact be oriented to it.37

However, the role of legitimacy in Weber’s concept of the state needs to be
critically examined. Weber has an empirical understanding of legitimacy that
focuses on the impact of legitimacy beliefs on actors’ behaviour. In his view
legitimacy consists of two components: (1) obedience towards an order given by
some authority; and (2) the intellectual or emotional affirmation of this authority
and its orders as rightful and justified.38 This second component is crucial if
conformist behaviour resulting from coercion or out of pure self-interest is not
to be mistaken for an act of legitimation.

We prefer to exclude legitimacy from our definition of the state. First of all,
legitimacy is very difficult to measure, making any assessment vulnerable to
post hoc rationalisation. By excluding it from the definition we are freed from
the burden of having to operationalise and measure it as a component of state-
hood. Second, Weber’s understanding of legitimacy sets a very high bar for a
state to be considered legitimate. If we take his two components of legitimacy
seriously, a majority of what are generally considered ‘states’ in the contempo-
rary world would be hard pressed to meet the second criterion in particular. This
is greatly at odds with the everyday use of the word ‘state’ – there are many
instances of states with little to no popular legitimacy that nonetheless persist.

Therefore we define the ideal-type of the state as an institution characterised
by monopolies on rule making, violence and taxation within a defined territory
and among the population living therein. This institution finds its organisational
expression in an administrative apparatus, political organs and bodies for collec-
tive decision making. It is represented by symbols and social practices that
remind citizens of the existence of the political order.

The monopoly of rule-making is inherent in the concept of the state as that
institution which makes binding decisions about the allocation of values, to
borrow a phrase from Easton.39 This monopoly is the core element of state

Third World Quarterly 1305

sovereignty. A state’s claim to the monopoly of rule-making includes the
corollary that no one else is entitled to make binding decisions for another citi-
zen unless he or she has been specifically delegated this authority by the state.

The monopoly of violence follows logically from the monopoly of rule-mak-
ing and is inextricably tied to it. To make its binding decisions stick, a state has
to be able to implement them even in the face of resistance. The state might
need to employ violence to get its way but, more importantly, it can never toler-
ate means of violence in the hands of those who would defy it. Nevertheless,
some private means of violence are still acceptable but only insofar as the state
explicitly authorises this.

The monopoly of taxation derives from historical experience rather than the-
ory: to finance the means of violence centralised under its control, the state in
Early Modern Europe started to monopolise the collection of taxes and duties.
Elias has noted that the resources that became available to the state supported
the monopoly of violence, and that the means of violence supported the mono-
poly of taxation.40 As with the other two, the private collection of binding taxes
is outlawed except with the assent of the state.

As discussed above, the state’s ability to achieve, enforce and defend this
‘holy trinity’ of monopolies can vary. This means that states can be fragile in
different ways, eg with little capacity to collect taxes but effective security
forces that guarantee internal and external stability. We can represent variation
in statehood as a three-dimensional space (Figure 1). Theoretically a state can
inhabit any point within this space, although some of the extremes are highly
unlikely to exist. We would hypothesise that deficiencies in one dimension
strongly correlate with deficiencies in the other two – but that is ultimately an
empirical question.

Operationalising state collapse
We now derive a concept of state collapse from our definition of the ideal state
given in the previous section. We focus on state collapse instead of broader

Figure 1. Dimensions of statehood.

1306 D. Lambach et al.

notions of state fragility for the same two reasons mentioned earlier. First,
setting a threshold is easier when focusing on extreme cases. In the space
depicted in Figure 1 we focus on the (0, 0, 0) corner of the diagram and its
immediate surroundings. Second, even though cases of state collapse differ from
each other, they still recognisably belong to the same class of object. We thus
avoid the problem of grouping wildly different phenomena under a single,
broadly defined header.

We use Goertz’s three-level method of concept formation for the operational-
isation of state collapse.41 The basic level contains the phenomenon itself, eg
‘democracy’. This concept needs a definition and it has to be distinguishable
from its opposite (‘non-democracy’). The second level contains the dimensions
that make up the basic phenomenon. For instance, democracy can – depending
on its definition – include second-level dimensions like ‘competitive elections’,
‘participation’, ‘civil rights’ and others. These dimensions represent the core
aspects of the underlying concept. On the third level dimensions are opera-
tionalised through indicators. These provide criteria that answer the question:
how do we recognise a certain dimension when we see it?

This multidimensional approach to concept formation is a very useful way of
breaking down complex concepts. However, to answer the fundamental ques-
tion, ‘is object A a member of set Y?’ (eg ‘is Russia a democracy?’), we need a
way to aggregate the information from the lower levels. For this Goertz pro-
poses two prototypical logics: The essentialist two-valued logic of sufficient and
necessary conditions; and the family resemblance logic.42 The first of these
assumes that all instances of a particular concept are alike in their fundamental
aspects. In our example an essentialist understanding of democracy would mean
that certain dimensions of democracy (like competitive elections) are considered
to be so crucial that political systems without these features would not be classi-
fied as democratic. This requires a clear specification of which dimension, or
combination of dimensions, are necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a par-
ticular concept to be present. The second logic assumes a continuum of cases
that are closely related but do not necessarily share a core set of characteristics.
A common way of formalising family resemblance is by setting a threshold on
how many dimensions of the basic phenomenon have to be present for an object
to be an instance of this concept (eg ‘a political system is democratic if it meets
any three of the following four criteria’).

For our purposes the basic level phenomenon is ‘state collapse’ as the polar
opposite of the ideal-type of the state (see the section on institutionalist theory
above), which we define as the situation where the state has no meaningful
capacities in its three core dimensions of rule-making, violence control and taxa-
tion. We then follow an essentialist two-valued logic and define sufficient and
necessary conditions of state collapse. This means that we have to establish a
threshold between collapsed and non-collapsed states. While this dichotomy
might seem to be in conflict with our continuum of statehood (see Figure 1),
this is actually not a problem, since our objective is merely to theorise about
collapsed states, not about statehood in a more general sense.

Drawing on the three core dimensions of statehood, we define the second-
level dimensions of state collapse as:

Third World Quarterly 1307

(1) no meaningful capacity to make rules;
(2) no meaningful control over the means of violence;
(3) no meaningful capacity to extract taxes.

These three dimensions jointly create the necessary and sufficient conditions for
state collapse, if they occur continuously over a time span of at least six
months.43

At the indicator level we use a combination of both logics (Table 1). Every
dimension of state collapse – rule making, means of violence and taxation – has
primary and secondary indicators. Primary indicators are unambiguous signs of
state collapse, eg when the government leaves the capital or when security
forces cannot even control the entire capital. These indicators were formulated
to be as specific as possible to maximise their objectivity and reliability. The
presence of any primary indicator is sufficient for a particular dimension to be
coded as collapsed.

Because these events only occur infrequently, even during state collapse, we
added a group of three secondary indicators to each dimension.44 These sec-
ondary indicators share two features: (1) they do not only indicate state collapse
but can also occur in other phenomena, ie they are not particularly specific; and
(2) they do not occur in all instances of collapse, much like the first-level
indicators, ie they are not necessary conditions of the outcome. Therefore we
use a family resemblance logic: if two out of three of the secondary indicators
are present, the dimension is also coded as collapsed.45 For example, in the
‘means of violence’ dimension, if non-state actors command large parts of the
country and if the state’s security forces are de facto private militias, this is
sufficient to diagnose a lack of meaningful control over the means of violence.

Instances of state collapse
To demonstrate its implications for empirical research, we used the framework
elaborated above to identify cases of state collapse in the international system.

Table 1. The concept of state collapse.

Rule making Means of violence Taxation

First-level indicators

• Cessation of the work of the
High Court

• No formal legislation
• Government or parliament

leaves the capital

• De jure dissolution of the security
forces

• Security forces do not control the
whole capital

• No official government
budget is declared

• Central bank ceases work

Secondary indicators

• Massive corruption
• Laws are only rarely

enforced
• Widespread legal pluralism

• Security forces become de facto private
militias

• Security forces control only small parts
of the country

• Private non-state actors control large
portions of the country

• No organised fiscal
administration

• Taxation by non-state
actors

• Tax ratio below 8%

1308 D. Lambach et al.

Since there has been no prior systematic collection of data for most of our
indicators, we had to assess potential cases through qualitative case studies. To
limit the number of case studies, we culled the number of ‘candidate cases’ in a
series of steps.

Our first aim was to identify all cases where the state had potentially col-
lapsed. We cast a very wide net so as not to miss any ‘false negatives’ – of
course, this came at the price of increasing the number of ‘false positive’ cases
in the initial sample. To come up with this first sample, we identified all
country-years from 1946 onwards that fulfilled one or more of the following
conditions:

• Polity IV:
◦ Indicator 1.7 (Polity Fragmentation) = 3 (‘serious fragmentation’);
◦ Standardised Authority Code = -66 (Interruption) or -77 (Interregnum),

or -88 (Transition) for three concurrent years;
◦ Indicator 4.10 (Total Change in POLITYvalue) = 96 (‘state disintegration’);
◦ Indicator 4.12 (State Failure) = 1;

• Index of State Weakness 2008 score < 2; • Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2008): Indicator Q1.1 (Territorial Extent of State Monopoly of Violence) ≤ 3;

• State Failure Task Force: ‘Near-total Failures of State Authority’;
• Categorisation as ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed state’ by Rotberg;
• Personal assessment by researchers.46

This resulted in a list of 87 countries that had potentially experienced state col-
lapse at some point after 1946. Many countries fulfilled multiple of the above
criteria, often for overlapping time periods. These were then consolidated into
continuous periods.

This initial list still contained a lot of cases that were obviously not cases of
state collapse in our understanding. These included the dissolution of states under
international law (eg East Germany 1989), foreign invasion (eg Kuwait 1990) or
regime change (Greece 1974; Portugal 1974–75, Spain 1975–77). Most cases
from the immediate post-World War II period were qualitatively different from our
understanding of state collapse (eg Czechoslovakia 1947, West Germany 1946–
48, East Germany 1946–48, Hungary 1946–47, Japan 1946–51, and Romania
1946–47). While these cases could also be considered instances of state collapse,
the historical context suggested that the causal structure of such collapse was very
different from state collapse in the postcolonial period. Because of the comparabil-
ity issues, we decided to shorten our period of observation to 1960–2007.

This narrowed our list to 48 potential country-periods of state collapse. We
then conducted desk studies of these candidates and identified 17 cases of state
collapse (Table 2).47 Five cases met all the criteria but only for a period of less
than six months (Albania 1997, Central African Republic 2001, Ethiopia 1991,
Iran 1978, Rwanda 1994). Another five cases had collapsed in two of the three
dimensions (Burundi 1993, Cambodia 1975, Côte d’Ivoire 2004, Nicaragua
1979, and Solomon Islands 2000). Finally, another four cases exhibited symp-
toms of collapse in one of the three dimensions (Colombia 2000, El Salvador
1979, Ghana 1979, Nigeria 1966).48

Third World Quarterly 1309

The majority of instances of ‘state collapse’ involved cases in sub-Saharan
Africa, where, usually, armed rebellions challenged state authority and shattered
projects of centralised control (Angola 1992, Chad 1979, Guinea-Bissau 1998,
Liberia 1990, Somalia 1991, Sierra Leone 1998, Uganda 1985, Zaire 1996). An
exception was Congo-Kinshasa in 1960, where decolonisation from Belgian rule
resulted in rival claims to power and political order and stripped the state of its
governing apparatus. Similarly the situation of institutional uncertainty in the
wake of the disintegration of the USSR, and the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, respectively, led to a state of collapse in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(1992), Georgia (1991) and Tajikistan (1992). The Laotian state collapsed after
an American-backed attack on the capital of Vientiane in 1960 that left the
country partitioned into spheres of influence of neutralist, communist and
pro-Western forces. In Lebanon an incident in April 1975 linked to the highly
controversial armed presence of the PLO triggered a full-scale civil war that
paralysed the otherwise comparatively well-functioning state institutions. In
Afghanistan state authority had never been institutionalised to a significant
extent, but the insurgency against the communist regime, further propelled by
Soviet intervention in December 1979, led to an effective loss of state control
that was extreme even for the Afghan case.49

It is not coincidental that these instances of state collapse also occasioned
civil wars and other forms of widespread intra-state violence. In some ways this
is inevitable given our coding scheme, where territorial control by government
forces plays an important role. However, we wish to note that our concept of
state collapse is more than a fancy name for situations of pervasive violence.
Our concept asks whether the state is capable of functioning as a provider of
governance but also as an actor in conflict. State capacity is a crucial precondi-
tion for counterinsurgency, as a multitude of cases, eg in Latin America, readily
shows. By contrast, conflicts in the countries in Table 2 were characterised by a
predominance of non-state actors of violence. This is why many of our more
recent cases, like Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia, have been discussed in
terms of ‘warlordism’.

To borrow a distinction from research into civil wars, all our cases are
instances of a particular kind of ‘governmental conflict’, ie an incompatibility
concerning the type of political system or the composition of government. In
contrast, ‘territorial conflicts’ about secession or regional autonomy (as in the
Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan or Senegal) are not found in our final list of

Table 2. cases of state collapse.

Cases of state collapse

Afghanistan 1979 Iraq 2003
Afghanistan 2001 Laos 1960
Angola 1992 Lebanon 1975
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992 Liberia 1990
Chad 1979 Sierra Leone 1998
Congo-Kinshasa 1960 Somalia 1991
Congo-Kinshasa 1996 Tajikistan 1992
Georgia 1991 Uganda 1985
Guinea-Bissau 1998

1310 D. Lambach et al.

cases (with the exception of Congo 1960). This is consistent with Buhaug, who
found that rebellion in institutionally capable states would more frequently occur
as secessionist conflict, whereas weaker states were more likely to experience
governmental conflicts.50

Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated an approach to the conceptualisation and
operationalisation of state collapse. We have asserted that current attempts to
measure state collapse (as well as the broader concept of state fragility) suffer
from key weaknesses that limit their analytical value. Therefore we sought to
develop a concept that represents an improvement in two crucial aspects. First,
our approach has a firm theoretical grounding. It is based on a view of the state
derived from a modification of Weberian institutionalism. Second, our approach
is methodologically rigorous. We employed Goertz’s method of concept
formation and provided a multidimensional disaggregation of the concept of
state collapse, as well as the logic for the aggregation of the data. Using this
framework, we identified 17 cases of state collapse in the postcolonial era.

This concept is designed to be employed in comparative research. Classify-
ing states as ‘collapsed’ or ‘not collapsed’ would be little more than l’art pour
l’art, especially as we reject normative and teleological claims about the sort of
politics that take place in collapsed states. Our approach works much better in
providing a common reference point to compare disparate countries, especially
in cross-regional research. In other, small-N research designs sociological
approaches are more appropriate as they paint a richer picture of individual
cases.

Our conceptualisation of state collapse opens up several avenues of research.
In our own research we use it to analyse the causes of collapse.51 In particular,
we are interested in whether there are structural differences between collapsed
states and those that are fragile but that did not collapse, or whether collapse is
a result of particular political dynamics. Another possibility would be to use it
in research on the dynamics of violence and deprivation in collapsed states, or
to improve early warning systems. This approach can also lay the foundation
for research that looks at how political and social order is constructed in the
absence of formal statehood. There is substantial research on governance in
areas of limited statehood which could be enriched by a focus on those cases
where the state completely ceases to be a meaningful institution.52 Its usability
for comparative research also makes our conception of state collapse a potential
tool for bringing together disparate fields of enquiry, such as conflict research,
humanitarian aid, development studies and comparative politics. Finally, our
approach can also be used to improve attempts at quantification. While data col-
lection for our indicators was labour-intensive, this process could be automated
for most primary indicators by using machine coding of event data.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this paper was presented at the eighth Pan-European Conference on International
Relations, Warsaw, 18–21 September 2013. We thank Achim Görres, Jörg Faust, Rachel Gisselquist and two
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. We are also indebted to Christian
Tischmeyer, Laura Blomenkemper and Simon von Dahlen for their research assistance.

Third World Quarterly 1311

Funding

This work was supported by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG)
[grant LA 1847/8-1]

Notes

on contributors
Daniel Lambach is a Visiting Professor in International Relations and principal
investigator of the project ‘Why do States Collapse?’ at the Institute of Political
Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. He holds a PhD in Political Science
from the University of Cologne. His current research interests are state fragility
and collapse, territoriality in the international system, non-violent resistance and
agency in the global South.

Eva Johais works as a research fellow on the project ‘Why do States Collapse?’
at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. She holds a
Diploma in Political Science from the Philipps University in Marburg. Her cur-
rent research focuses on the practice of electoral assistance in Côte d’Ivoire,
expert knowledge, politics of interventions and dynamics of statehood.

Markus Bayer is a research fellow on the project ‘Why do States Collapse?’ at
the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. He holds an
MA in Political Science, Sociology and Peace and Conflict Studies from the
Philipps University in Marburg. His research interests are the causes of state col-
lapse and strategic choices of non-state actors in (non)violent struggles against
authoritarian regimes.

Notes
1. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’”; and Ulfelder, “‘State Failure’ has Failed.”
2. Eriksen, “‘State Failure’ in Theory and Practice.”
3. Goertz, Social Science Concepts.
4. Bueger and Bethke, “Actor-networking the ‘Failed State’.”
5. Baker, The Conflict Assessment System Tool; Fund for Peace, “The Failed State Index”; Carment et al.,

“State Fragility and Implications for Aid Allocation”; Marshall and Cole, “Global Report on Conflict”;
and Rice and Patrick, Index of State Weakness.

6. In addition to these frequently updated indices, there are several country lists and classificatory heuristics
from development agencies, such as the World Bank’s “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations”, where
the classification as a fragile state is based on a threshold for the Country Policy and Institutional
Assessment (CPIA) country rating. See World Bank, “Information Note.” See also Weinstein et al., On
the Brink; and DFID, Why We Need to Work More Effectively, for other methodologies.

7. Bethke, “Zuverlässig Invalide.” The State Failure Task Force (renamed the Political Instability Task
Force in 2003) was an important precursor of these projects. Established in 1994, its original aim had
been to identify the root causes of state failure. However, after preliminary research produced only 18
cases of state failure, it broadened its definition of state failure to include contentious regime transitions,
genocides, revolutions and ethnic conflict. By including these different phenomena in the same category
the State Failure Task Force suffered from the same methodological shortcomings as its predecessors.
For a more detailed critique, see Lambach and Gamberger, “A Temporal Analysis of Political
Instability.”

8. See, for example, Hill, “Challenging the Failed State Thesis”; and Veit, “Social Movements.”
9. Wilén, Justifying Intervention in Africa.
10. Hameiri, “Failed States or Failed Paradigm?”; Manjikian,”Diagnosis, Intervention, and Cure”; and

Sidaway, “Sovereign Excesses,” 172.
11. Migdal, State in Society.
12. DiJohn, “The Concept, Causes and Consequences of Failed States”; Lund, Twilight Institutions; and

Mielke et al., Dimensions of Social Order.
13. Boege et al., “Hybrid Political Orders.”

1312 D. Lambach et al.

14. Schlichte, “Gibt es überhaupt ‘Staatszerfall’?”
15. Cf. Bilgin and Morton, “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States?”; Hagmann and Péclard, “Negotiating

Statehood”; and Wai, “Neo-patrimonialism.”
16. Cf. Hansen and Stepputat, States of Imagination.
17. Putzel and DiJohn, Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States.
18. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’”; and Ulfelder, “‘State Failure’ has Failed.”
19. Borrowing the term from Zartman, Collapsed States.
20. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’,” 1501.
21. Ulfelder, “‘State Failure’ has Failed.”
22. Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats.”
23. Ghani et al., “An Agenda for State-building.”
24. Weinstein et al., On the Brink, 13.
25. Call, “The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’,” 1501.
26. Grävingholt et al., “State Fragility.”
27. Carment and Samy, “State Fragility,” 107. For similar approaches, see Weinstein et al., On the Brink,

13f; and Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’,” 310.
28. Grävingholt et al., State Fragility.
29. Hay and Lister, “Introduction.”
30. See, for instance, Mitchell, “The Limits of the State”; Bevir and Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice;

Lemke, “An Indigestible Meal?”, and Passoth and Rowland, “Actor-network State.”
31. Barrow, Critical Theories of the State, 11.
32. Eriksen, “‘State Failure’ in Theory and Practice.”
33. Weber, Economy and Society, 55, emphasis in the original.
34. Recently, Putzel and DiJohn, Meeting the Challenges of Crisis States, 1, have pointed out the relevance

of political settlements and elite bargains for the stability of the state. While we do not share their
actor-centred perspective, we nonetheless follow their point that institutions are not usually the product
of conscious design but more a reflection of power relationships.

35. Weber, Economy and Society, 54.
36. Ibid., 27. We agree with Hay and Lister, “Introduction,” 14, that the differences between discursive and

Weberian approaches to the state are often overstated.
37. Weber, Economy and Society, 32.
38. Ibid., 31.
39. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, 21.
40. Elias, Über den Prozess der Zivilisation, 142. See also Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
41. Goertz, Social Science Concepts.
42. Ibid., 35.
43. We used six months as a threshold to distinguish short-term political instability, for instance, during

regime change or the final months of civil war, to distinguish the complete failure of state institutions
from other forms of disorder.

44. Using three indicators each is a pragmatic choice, in that explaining the set of secondary indicators
would have increased the amount of data to be collected without improving the measurement accuracy.

45. Using a threshold of ‘two out of three’ is the result of a calibration process. With a higher threshold we
would have too many ‘false negatives’, ie cases of collapse falsely classified as non-collapsed; with a
lower threshold there would be too many ‘false positives’, ie cases of non-collapse falsely classified as
collapsed.

46. Sources are Marshall et al., “Polity IV Project”; Rice and Patrick, Index of State Weakness; and BTI Pro-
ject, “Bertelsmann Transformation Index.” The assessments by the State Failure Task Force are published
in Esty et al., “The State Failure Project,” 38; whereas Rotberg’s data can be found in Rotberg, “The
Failure and Collapse of Nation-states,” 46–49.

47. We excluded Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003 from our analysis. We consider these two cases to be
outliers because of the strong impact of foreign military intervention on the stability of the state.

48. The remaining cases, which had not collapsed in at least one dimension, were Argentina 1976,
Bangladesh 1975, Cambodia 1988–92, Comoros 1997–98, Cuba 1958, Cyprus 1963, Czechoslovakia
1968, Dominican Republic 1965, Ethiopia 1974, Haiti 1985, Haiti 1994, Lesotho 1998, Nigeria 1993,
Pakistan 1969, Yugoslavia 1991, USSR 1991, and Sudan 2003.

49. Brief descriptions of individual cases are available at http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/files/twq_ap
pendix_brief_description_state_collapse_cases .

50. Buhaug, “Relative Capability and Rebel Objective.”
51. Lambach and Bethke, “Ursachen von Staatskollaps”; and Lambach et al., “The Causes of State

Collapse.” For further information, see also http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/39-0-DFG-Projekt-Staatskollaps.
html.

52. For example, Risse, “Governance Configurations in Areas of Limited Statehood.”

Third World Quarterly 1313

http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/files/twq_appendix_brief_description_state_collapse_cases

http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/files/twq_appendix_brief_description_state_collapse_cases

http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/39-0-DFG-Projekt-Staatskollaps.html

http://www.lehrstuhl-ibep.de/39-0-DFG-Projekt-Staatskollaps.html

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individual use.

• Abstract
• Introduction
• Sorting the field of fragile states research

Quantification
Critique
Re-conceptualisation

• Conceptualising state collapse

An institutionalist theory of the state
Operationalising state collapse

• Instances of state collapse
• Conclusion

Acknowledgements
Funding

• Notes on con�trib�u�tors

Notes
Bibliography