The essay is a brief intro to one of the topics below. You can choose whichever you want, I will provide 3 sources according to your choice of topic.
TOPICS TO CHOOSE FROM;
Joseph McCarthy and Anti-Communism Popular Music of the 1950s Television in the 1950s Gender in the 1950s Music of the1960s Richard Nixon Culture Wars of the 1980s Immigration in the 1990s The War on Terrorism The Rise of Social Media Attack on America
The First War of the 21st Century
David J. Shaughnessy
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Cowan, U.S. Army
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 rocked the nation in ways that will reverberate for years.
The authors discuss how these attacks signal shifts in the modus operandi of international terrorism—shifts in purpose, organization, weapons, and capability.
Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very
freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and
deadly terrorist acts.
—President George W. Bush in his address
to the nation, 11 September 2001
or asynchronous acts carried out by an adaptive
and thinking opponent who continually studies the
strengths and weaknesses of his perceived enemy and
adapts his operations accordingly. These attacks were
not without a larger purpose. They are part of an ongoing campaign that is likely to continue and expand.
A
The Nature of the Act
s the sole superpower in a world increasingly
defined by global markets, economic institutions, and societal norms, the United States is
involved in world affairs to a degree unprecedented in its
history. Its national success and prolific engagement, enacted within a framework of personal freedom, human
rights, and Christian morals, have created resentment
among other nations as well as religious, ethnic, and
political factions in the world. Its national strengths—
strategic location, economic strength, and military power—have served to protect it from conventional attacks
resulting from these hostile views. However, its national
character—democratic principles, individual freedom,
and human rights—serve to increase its vulnerability
to asymmetric, unconventional, or indirect actions. It
remains clear that any campaign conducted against the
United States, today or in the foreseeable future, will be a
mix of asymmetric, adaptive, and conventional operations against the nation’s vulnerabilities.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the 2000
attack on the USS Cole are examples of asymmetric
194
Terrorism is a tactical action that is designed to
generate an operational or strategic effect. It is the
creation of an event that has broader consequences than that created by the event alone. By its very
nature, terrorism is asymmetric. It seeks to employ a
capability that affords no defense or effective counteraction. This makes terrorism a viable means for less
capable organizations to attack more capable opponents. At its very root, terrorism strikes at the will of
the people, the credibility of the government, and the
effectiveness of national security.
Terrorist acts can be linked together in the form
of a campaign but will be more effective when employed as part of a strategy employing other elements
of power in a more conventional framework. This
permits consistent operations that are continuous
and complementary. The application of other elements of power need not be overt and in fact might
be more effective when employed covertly. They could
involve information operations, diplomacy, or economic leverage as well as more conventional military
November-December 2001
MILITARY REVIEW 100 YEARS
ATTACK ON AMERICA
T
errorist tactics are normally
employed in an asynchronous
framework. It is their asynchronous
character that gains the initiative for
the terrorist. … Because these events
are asynchronous, however, does
not mean that they are not part of a
larger, more synchronized effort. In
fact, it is becoming increasingly more
likely that future terrorist tactics will
be employed in a more synchronous
operational framework.
operations. For example, a state or organization that
knows in advance that a significant event is going to
occur could conceivably set economic conditions so as
to profit from that event. It is the asymmetric nature
of these tactics that affords the greatest opportunity
for success against more powerful opponents, but it is
their effect on conventional institutions that generates
opportunity as a consequence of the event.
Terrorist tactics are normally employed in an
asynchronous framework. It is their asynchronous
character that gains the initiative for the terrorist.
The terrorist picks the time and place of the event
rather than having the time and place defined by its
relationship to other operations. This represents an
offensive framework that is driven by vulnerability,
opportunity, and tailored capability rather than by
fixed capability employed in a conventional construct.
Because these events are asynchronous, however,
does not mean that they are not part of a larger,
more synchronized effort. In fact, it is becoming
increasingly more likely that future terrorist tactics
will be employed in a more synchronous operational
framework. The ability to continuously choose the
time and place of events allows the threat to control
the operations tempo, thereby always retaining the
initiative. To U.S. opponents, it is apparent that these
tactics, planned and prepared in advance, allow a
regional actor to keep a more capable adversary off
MILITARY REVIEW 100 YEARS November-December 2001
balance without significant investment in visible and
costly capabilities.
A Campaign Framework
History has demonstrated that single, isolated acts
of terrorism may have profound effects on perceptions,
policy, national strategy, or even national will; however,
lasting effects involving significant change in the nature
of government or long-term national goals have been
unattainable through single acts. A long-term campaign
with multiple lines of operation is required. This could
be a campaign of asynchronous events to wear down
and shape outcomes, such as the former Soviet Union
sponsored events during the Cold War, or a campaign
employing all elements of power in conjunction with
and complementing terrorist acts.
As an accepted mode of operation, state-sponsored
terrorism came of age during the Cold War when the
Soviet Union guaranteed the survival of states that supported or conducted acts of terror against the United
States and its allies. While today there are still states
that sponsor terrorism, none do so overtly.
Terrorism remains a viable and effective tactic, but
its use is less and less acceptable to the international community when employed in an asynchronous
framework short of declared hostilities. Under conditions of limited warfare or in time of peace, it is a
heinous act unacceptable to most nations. However,
within a framework of total war, terrorism would
be retitled asymmetric
operations and become
Lieutenant Colonel
accepted for achieving
Thomas M. Cowan is a
national objectives. For
military intelligence officer,
this reason, many states
Headquarters, U.S. Army
hostile to the United
Training and Doctrine
David J. Shaughnessy
is the senior intelligence
analyst for Headquarters,
U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command,
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Fort Monroe,
Virginia. He has more than
34 years of federal service,
including 8 years of Active
Army service.
Command, Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Fort
Monroe. He has served
in a variety of intelligence
positions from battalion
to major command level.
He is a graduate of the
U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College and
has a Master’s degree
from Saint Mary College,
Leavenworth, Kansas.
195
Chicago firefighters join the rescue effort at the World Trade Center site. (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
A
symmetric operations are conducted within a campaign framework and
strikes at the will of the American people, the perceived center of gravity
of the United States, rather than at the fringes. Within the scope of unlimited
war, all targets are justified population centers, infrastructure, industry, and
the military. The end state for the terrorist or asymmetric operation is achieving operational or strategic goals, including denial, exclusion, or defeat of the
United States and its allies.
States covertly support transnational organizations capable of conducting terrorist acts. These organizations
are employed for campaigns short of war and permit
distance and deniability by the supporting states
within the international community. At the same time,
these states are developing capabilities for employing
asymmetric means and demanding legally admissible
evidence. This level of proof does not normally exist
because of the manner in which terrorists are organized and operate; when it is available, it often cannot
196
be presented to the public without compromising
intelligence sources or methods.
If the United States elects to attack, transnational
terrorists frustrate targeting by having a signature
undetectable to high-tech collection systems, by
dispersing into complex terrain, or blending into the
civilian population. All these techniques are designed
to defeat the United States’ undisputed asymmetric
advantage in high-tech, precision standoff weapons. U.S. security procedures have been designed
November-December 2001
MILITARY REVIEW 100 YEARS
ATTACK ON AMERICA
primarily to detect, rather than to defend against, a
determined attacker.
Information Operations
Regardless of whether he is responsible, the 11
September attacks raise bin Laden’s prestige in the
Muslim extremist world and attract additional followers
and money to his cause. It also gives other organizations
and states insights into U.S. vulnerabilities. The United
States may appear weak to opponents if it is unable to respond to the attack effectively. The visibility of this event
and its dominance in the media provide opportunities for
a wide range of actors to take advantage of this act.
Carefully planned and executed adaptive campaigns
of terror attempt to demoralize the nation, frustrate
U.S. policies for reaction and retaliation, reduce U.S.
regional presence, and paralyze the national will by exploiting the vast U.S. information system. Information
systems expand the impact of the event and create
strategic effects. On the international scene, well-publicized, effective events may serve to fracture coalitions
by focusing other nations inwardly.
Furthermore, consistent denial of responsibility is
a new tack taken by transnational terrorists. It counters the information and diplomatic superiority of the
United States and creates doubt. It allows nations to
support terrorism without international repercussions.
A successful attack on the United States must be
conducted against the systems upon which it relies for
its dominance. This consists in large part of military
and economic complexes that have formed pillars of
U.S. foreign policy. The attacks on 11 September were
more than symbolic; they targeted the command and
control of the nation’s economy and military. Normally,
isolated attacks not part of a conventional campaign
can be expected to focus on symbolic targets for their
media value and strategic implications. When asymmetric or terrorist attacks are conducted as part of a
more conventional campaign, they will more likely
target operational or strategic capabilities. Within the
framework of a terrorist campaign, terrorists understand that defeating the United States is not a matter
of winning battles but rather of continuously applying
psychological and physical pressure to damage the political, economic, and military foundations of power.
Access denial. Strategic preclusion attempts
to deter or reduce the deployment of U.S. forces.
MILITARY REVIEW 100 YEARS November-December 2001
Sympathetic or supporting nation states lend support
to strategic preclusion efforts by calling for the use of
diplomacy, citing the absence of proof that links the
group to the act and imposing economic measures that
threaten coalition partners’ interests. These actions
are often disguised as respect for international law or a
desire for a peaceful resolution.
Operational exclusion attempts to prevent regional
neighbors from allowing or assisting the deployment
of U.S. forces. Adversaries have long recognized the
United States’ need for significant staging areas. The
adaptive transnational terrorist threatens regional
neighbors with attacks and terror in the event they
cooperate with or provide staging areas for U.S. forces. State sponsors of transnational terrorism conduct
diplomatic and information campaigns to persuade
regional states that the United States is an unreliable
partner and that cooperation will lead to regional economic and diplomatic isolation.
Thwarting U.S. intelligence. Terrorist organizations rely on secrecy to plan and prepare attacks.
Compartmented organization, brutal enforcement of
loyalty, and recruiting criteria based on political and
religious reliability allow better protection of information than is possible in the nation states that terrorists
attack. In a strategic defensive posture, the United
States is unable to force its opponent into an activity
that might compromise locations and intentions. Not
only does asynchronous timing lend security to terrorists, but it also necessitates vigilance by U.S. intelligence
organizations to discern terrorist activities and intentions. Furthermore, to counter the ability of intelligence operations to detect plans and preparations, the
terrorists employ deception. This includes deliberately
leaking false information and statements to the media
to mask the true plan and to desensitize and confuse
intelligence analysis.
The vast U.S. intelligence system was designed to
monitor the former Soviet Union and is built around
technology. Human intelligence has been relegated
to secondary importance and used largely to support
diplomacy. This imbalance has created predictability
and limited depth of collection. Also, the United States
has focused on states rather than on transnational
organizations, and U.S. analysis was designed to assess
the conventional capabilities adversaries possess and
employ. Last, the intelligence community functions well
197
(Top) Egyptian radical and doctor
Ayman al-Zawahiri provides the al
Qaeda organization with intellectual
trappings while former Egyptian
policeman Mohammad Atef (above)
serves as chief of military planning.
(Right) Saudi-born Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda members training
in Afghanistan from a recruitment
video circulated throughout the
Muslim world. (DOD)
T
ransnational terrorists rely on their strategically secure positions to deflect the
conventional strengths the United States could otherwise employ to destroy
their organizations. By seeking sanctuary in areas difficult to attack by using hightech, precision standoff engagement, terrorist organizations protect themselves
from forms of retaliation that they have limited means to counter symmetrically.
during times of crisis but lacks the analytical and human
intelligence underpinnings to sustain the necessary level
of effort this new operational environment requires.
Success in the long term against an adaptive and determined transnational opponent demands a less predictable process, combined technical and human systems
engaged against all threats, continuous operation at peak
performance, and engagement well before a crisis.
198
Implications
Transnational organizations retain the strategic
initiative and bring to bear the means of adaptive attack
by controlling operations tempo. Acts of terror rely on
surprise to magnify the psychological impact of each
event. Unconstrained by the need to retain terrain or
to follow one success with another, either of which
would provide a predictable pattern of operations, the
November-December 2001
MILITARY REVIEW 100 YEARS
ATTACK ON AMERICA
T
he 11 September attack raises bin Laden’s prestige in the Muslim extremist
world and attracts additional followers and money to his cause. It also gives
other organizations and states insights into U.S. vulnerabilities. … The visibility
of this event and its dominance in the media provide opportunities for a wide
range of actors to take advantage of this act.
transnational terror organization can select times and
targets that suit its resources, planning abilities, and the
security environment. The 1993 attack on the World
Trade Center and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole had
no effect on the long-term success of the campaign that
eventually led to the highly successful 11 September
attacks, nor was the timing of the attack related to any
other tactical event, which made it impossible to determine a pattern or predict the next attack.
Terrorist actions are likely to be continuous in
nature but not continuous in rhythm or frequency.
Adaptive terror actions are not simply isolated events
but are linked to other goals and operations—economic,
political, and even military, when feasible. They are also
likely to take many forms and contain several lines of
operation working simultaneously or orchestrated in
space and time. Terrorist activities will range from nonlethal activities such as information operations, to lethal
activities such as direct action using varied conventional
low- to high-technology means and weapons. Future
terrorist actions involving weapons of mass destruction
or effects cannot be discounted. Collection against these
activities requires an intelligence system as flexible, proactive, and adaptive as the organizations it targets.
Unconventional attacks against the U.S. homeland
are part of every future opponent’s strategy and will
be part of its force design and capabilities. Repeated
attacks against the U.S. homeland change social, economic, and political behavior; limit personal freedom;
impede free trade; inflict psychological stresses; and
damage the nation’s international standing as a world
economic and military power.
Terrorists stress adaptation and flexibility to preserve their organization and ensure their continued
power. They conduct strategic operations to degrade
U.S. national will, fracture alliances and coalitions, and
limit the scope of U.S. involvement abroad. Their ability
to adapt faster than defensive measures can complicate U.S. efforts to remain in the strategic defensive.
Operations conducted without discernible frequency or
patterns require the United States to maintain a socially,
politically, and economically expensive posture of constant readiness, which itself does not guarantee success.
Intelligence operations assist in reducing the need for
constant readiness but are not infallible and must be
flexible, adaptive, and broad in scope. Taking the strategic offensive can eliminate an opponent, but it requires
exceptional intelligence and an adaptive force capable
of fighting on a battlefield of unprecedented complexity,
fluidity, and lethality. These challenges can only be met
by creating an adaptable military force capable of dominating this environment. MR
To view “Attack on America: The First War of the 21st Century” as it was originally published in November-December 2001, visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/
JF-22/Original/Shaughnessy.pdf.
MILITARY REVIEW 100 YEARS November-December 2001
199
This content is in the public domain.
War on Terror
WAR ON TERROR
The American war on terror (WOT) can be traced back to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; the phrase was
first used inadvertently by President George W. Bush (b.
1946) on September 16 during impromptu remarks to the
press: “This crusade—this war on terrorism—is going to
take a while” (“Remarks by the President upon Arrival”).
Then on September 20, Bush told a joint session of
Congress that the “war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but
it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated” (“Address to a Joint Session of Congress and
the American People”).
The war on terror began as an international campaign
to eliminate al-Qaeda and other militant nonstate actors.
The Bush administration used the term to refer to a global
military, political, legal, and conceptual struggle against
terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. Although
the administration of President Barack Obama (b. 1961)
stopped using the term, it continued to be used by media
and scholarly sources.
LAUNCHING THE WAR ON TERROR
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda operatives used planes
to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in
what was the worst terrorist attack on American soil in
history, killing over three thousand people. Despite
condemnations from Muslim countries around the world,
anti-Islamic sentiment rose steadily in the United States
and Europe. Following the attack, on September 14, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force against Terrorists,
a Senate joint resolution, targeted those terrorists
responsible for the attack. As a result, the United States
engaged in a war with Afghanistan’s Taliban government,
which was harboring al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin
Laden (1957–2011). The war in Afghanistan launched
the first stage in the global WOT, but the objectives of the
war on terror were yet to be defined.
In February 2003, the Bush administration released a
report titled National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. It
built upon Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, which
declared the existence of an axis of evil, including Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea. The phrase axis of evil was used to
describe governments that the administration accused of
supporting terrorism and seeking weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Most significantly, the administration expressed serious concerns about the potential
coupling of terrorism and WMD. Moreover, the notion
of an axis of evil was used to rally the country around the
war on terror and against specific enemies, in this way
overcoming the ambiguity of terrorism as a concept.
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism enshrined
and expanded upon the ideas in Bush’s axis of evil speech and
defined the objectives of the war on terror. First and
foremost, the administration explained that its strategy was
designed to defeat and demolish terrorists and terrorist
organizations, including Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
This entailed identifying, locating, and attacking these
terrorists and their organizations. However, the strategy went
beyond terrorists and terrorist organizations, aiming to deny
sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists. Specifically, the administration emphasized ending state sponsorship
of terrorism by maintaining an international standard of
accountability for combating terrorism, strengthening and
sustaining the international effort to combat terrorism,
employing a coalition of willing and able states in combating
terrorism, and abolishing terrorist sanctuaries and havens.
The strategy also called for diminishing the underlying
conditions that terrorists sought to exploit, including
the strengthening of weak states and “winning the war of
ideas.” The strategy’s ultimate aim was to defend American
interests at home and abroad, an effort that included the
creation of the Office of Homeland Security.
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
AND BEYOND
While the WOT began in Afghanistan, it was universal in
character. Operation Active Endeavor began in October
2001 and consisted of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) naval operation in the Mediterranean
designed to prevent the movement of WMD and
terrorists in shipping lanes in the region. The main focus
of the WOT, however, was Afghanistan. Operation
Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001;
Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, fell in mid-November. The
remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants, including
Osama bin Laden, retreated to Tora Bora in eastern
Afghanistan. Coalition forces launched Operation Anaconda in March 2002 with the goal of destroying the
remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban elements. It is believed
that Osama bin Laden escaped into Pakistan during this
time. The Taliban regrouped in western Afghanistan,
unleashing insurgent attacks that continued for nearly a
decade. In February 2010, coalition forces launched
Operation Moshtarak in an attempt to destroy the
Taliban once and for all; meanwhile, peace talks between
the Taliban and coalition forces were ongoing. American
troops began their withdrawal from Afghanistan at the
end of 2014, with all remaining forces scheduled to be
removed by 2016.
Operation Enduring Freedom went well beyond
Afghanistan, globalizing the WOT. In the Philippines, the
United States advised and assisted the government in its
battle with Islamist groups. The operation focused on
removing the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah terror
groups from the Philippine island of Basilan. Also, in the
AMERICA IN THE WORLD, 1776 TO THE PRESENT
COPYRIGHT 2016 Charles Scribner?s Sons, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210
1071
War on Terror
AL-QAEDA
&
Al-Qaeda is a multinational terrorist organization founded
by Osama bin Laden (1957–2011) in Afghanistan in
1988. Bin Laden studied Islam under Muhammad Qutb
(1919–2014), the brother of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), a
leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt
who is often seen as the father of modern political Islam,
at King Abdul Azziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
Bin Laden also studied under Dr. Abdullah Azzam
(1941–1989), a key figure in the Muslim Brotherhood in
Jordan, who is often identified as the intellectual architect
of the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and ultimately al-Qaeda. In 1979, bin Laden joined
Azzam in Afghanistan. Both men cast the Soviet invasion
as an attempted conquest by a non-Muslim power on
sacred Muslim territory and people. Bin Laden allegedly
provided funds for recruitment and volunteers throughout
the conflict.
By 1984, Azzam and bin Laden managed to create a
structural network of fund-raising offices located throughout the Arab world, Europe, and the United States. This
network, the Maktab al-Khidamat (services office), is
generally considered the organizational precursor to alQaeda. In 1988, as the war in Afghanistan was winding
down, bin Laden and Azzam contemplated how to utilize
the network they had cultivated. While Azzam wanted this
al-Qaeda (Arabic for “the base”) to be an Islamic rapidreaction force capable of intervening to deal with perceived
threats to Islam, bin Laden saw an opportunity to use the
network to topple secular, pro-Western Arab leaders, such
as Hosni Mubarak (b. 1928) in Egypt and the Saudi royal
family. In November 1989, Azzam was assassinated, giving
bin Laden control of the organization.
The American response to the August 2, 1990, Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait transformed bin Laden from a nominal
American ally against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to
an enemy of the United States. Having returned home to
Saudi Arabia, bin Laden had lobbied Saudi officials not to
Horn of Africa, the United States focused efforts on
detecting and disrupting militant activities, including
piracy, and working with governments to prevent the
emergence of militant activities in the region. Much of the
focus of this operation was on Somalia, where a United
Nations–backed Transitional Federal Government took
control in 2006. In the trans-Sahara, the United States
1072
host American troops in Saudi Arabia, which housed the
holiest places in Islam, instead arguing for a mujahideen
army to oust Iraq from Kuwait. He then relocated to Sudan
in 1991, where he trained al-Qaeda militants. Bin Laden
transformed al-Qaeda into an organization aimed at ousting
secular powers in the region and, most significantly, the
influence of the perceived supporter of those powers, the
United States. During the 1990s, al-Qaeda became a
national security threat to American interests and was
linked to a variety of terrorist attacks throughout the world,
including the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemen, the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City,
the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacked the World
Trade Center and Pentagon. Following these attacks, the
United States launched a war in Afghanistan against alQaeda and the Taliban government, its major sponsor. The
September 11 attacks instilled great urgency in the United
States, which launched a general war on terror aimed at
significantly reducing the threat from al-Qaeda and other
terrorist groups.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bergen, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of
Osama Bin Laden. New York: Free Press, 2001.
Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States. Chaired by Thomas H. Kean and
Lee H. Hamilton. Washington, DC: GPO, 2004.
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road
to 9/11. New York: Vintage, 2006.
Michael F. Cairo
Professor of Political Science
Transylvania University
engaged in counterterrorism efforts, which consisted
mainly of policing the movement of arms and drug
trafficking across central Africa.
THE WAR IN IRAQ
The WOT expanded significantly with the Bush administration’s engagement with Iraq. Iraq had been a central
AMERICA IN THE WORLD, 1776 TO THE PRESENT
COPYRIGHT 2016 Charles Scribner?s Sons, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210
War on Terror
part of American foreign policy since the Iran-Iraq War in
the 1980s. Following that war, in August 1990, Iraq’s
president, Saddam Hussein (1937–2006), invaded
Kuwait. An American-led and United Nations–backed
coalition of forces successfully evicted Iraq from Kuwait,
which led to Iraq’s placement on the US State
Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and to
UN-backed military, economic, and political sanctions.
Iraq had been on the list of state sponsors of terrorism
from 1979 to 1982, but it was removed during the IranIraq War so that the United States could provide Iraq with
material support. However, Iraq had been a diplomatic
problem because of its use of chemical weapons against
Iran and Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980s.
of force against Iraq. Seeing that the resolution would fail
in the Security Council, however, the Bush administration
did not pursue it further. As a result, the administration
continued to move forward in its plans with a “coalition of
the willing.” In March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom
began with air strikes immediately followed by a ground
invasion. By April 2003, Baghdad was under the control
of American forces and Saddam’s government quickly
dissolved. An insurgency, which included al-Qaedaaffiliated militants and former members of Saddam’s
Baathist regime, arose against the American-led coalition
and post-Saddam Iraqi government. In December 2003,
American forces captured Saddam, and he was subsequently executed by the Iraqi regime in 2006.
In the 1990s, the United States and its allies
instituted no-fly zones in Iraq to protect Iraq’s Kurdish
and Shia populations in the north and south, respectively.
At the same time, the United Nations was engaged in
weapons inspections aimed at eliminating Iraqi WMD
capabilities. Throughout the 1990s, Iraq failed to meet
US demands for unconditional cooperation, leading to air
strikes against Iraq known as Operation Desert Fox. Iraq
responded by announcing that it would no longer respect
the no-fly zones and attempted to shoot down American
and coalition aircraft.
In 2004, the insurgents grew stronger. By 2007, it
was necessary for the Bush administration to pursue a new
strategy for dealing with the insurgency. In January 2007,
Bush announced a strategy known as the troop surge.
Developed by General David Petraeus (b. 1952), the
surge was a part of a “new way forward.” It also involved
American support of Sunni groups the administration had
previously sought to defeat. The “new way forward”
proved effective in reducing the violence significantly
(“President’s Address to the Nation” and “Fact Sheet: The
New Way Forward in Iraq”).
When the George W. Bush administration entered
office, it was clear that Iraq was a primary concern. In
the administration’s first National Security Council
meeting, Iraq dominated the agenda. The administration was determined to deal with the problem of
Saddam and Iraq; September 11 provided that opportunity and increased concerns among the administration
that terrorists would eventually use WMD. Following
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the
administration began its campaign to remove Hussein
and his regime from Iraq. The axis of evil speech was
the first step in attempting to build an international
coalition against Saddam and Iraq.
With the 2008 election of President Barack Obama,
the war entered a new phase, and on December 18, 2011,
the last American troops exited Iraq. However, the
situation in Iraq intensified when al-Qaeda in Iraq
invaded Syria and began participating in the Syrian civil
war. As a result, al-Qaeda in Iraq gained enough support
and strength to reenter Iraq’s western provinces, declare
itself the Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant, take over a
large portion of the country, and expand the Syrian
conflict by combining it with the Iraqi insurgency. As a
result, the Obama administration reengaged in Iraq with
air strikes that began on August 10, 2014.
The administration, however, faced significant domestic and international opposition to a war with Iraq. In
an attempt to build support for the invasion, Bush relied
on UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002), which
declared Iraq in “material breach of its obligations” under
the UN sanctions and warned Iraq that it would face
“serious consequences” if it failed to comply. However,
other members of the Security Council, particularly
France, Russia, and China, came to different conclusions
about the intent of the resolution, arguing that the
resolution required further Security Council deliberation
before any military action could be taken.
OTHER TARGETS
Bush, along with Prime Minister Tony Blair (b.
1953) of the United Kingdom, drafted another Security
Council resolution, which would have authorized the use
While the WOT was reigniting in Iraq, the Obama
administration was faced with continuing challenges in
South Asia. After the fall of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, many members of the Taliban resistance fled
to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region where the
Pakistani army had little control. With military support
from the United States, the Pakistani military captured or
killed numerous al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban insurgents. Under the Obama administration, the United
States expanded a drone campaign begun by the Bush
administration on targets within Pakistan. On May 2,
2011, during a raid conducted by American Special
Operations Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Osama bin
Laden was killed.
AMERICA IN THE WORLD, 1776 TO THE PRESENT
1073
COPYRIGHT 2016 Charles Scribner?s Sons, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210
War on Terror
The United States also conducted numerous operations against al-Qaeda militants in Yemen. Yemen’s weak
central government and largely lawless tribal areas led to a
strong al-Qaeda presence. In 2009, the United States
increased its military aid to Yemen, providing over
$70 million, and also provided development assistance
in the hope that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula could
be diminished.
RESPONSE TO THE WAR ON TERROR
A highly controversial aspect of the WOT was the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques, which many observers
regard as torture, in gathering information on militants
and terrorist organizations. Also controversial was the
practice of rendition, or the extrajudicial transfer of
captured terrorists to countries known to practice torture.
The initial human-rights abuses emerged at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, which was under the control of
American military forces; the incidents received widespread condemnation both within the United States and
abroad. Additional abuses occurred at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, an American military prison established in January
2002 to detain, interrogate, and prosecute detainees
suspected of terrorism and war crimes. Controversial
interrogation techniques were used despite denials by the
Bush administration; documents known as the torture
memos, prepared before the invasion of Iraq, later
confirmed that the Bush administration had authorized
certain enhanced interrogation techniques. While the
Bush administration argued that international legal
conventions, mainly the Geneva Conventions, did not
apply to American interrogators overseas, the US Supreme
Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) that the
Geneva Conventions did apply. While Obama claimed
during his candidacy for president that he would close the
Guantánamo Bay detention center if elected, it remained
open as of early 2015.
Additional criticism of the WOT focused on
morality, economics, and even the phrase itself. First, as
of 2014 the WOT had cost nearly ten thousand military
and civilian American lives, and over fifty-six thousand
Americans were wounded or injured. Also, as of 2011, a
congressional report estimated the war’s cost at $1.2
trillion; spending through 2021 was estimated to add an
additional $1.8 trillion. Moreover, the notion of a war on
terror proved contentious, with critics charging that the
concept of “terrorism” was exploited by participating
governments to pursue military objectives, reduce civil
liberties, and infringe upon human rights. Others
suggested that the WOT only increased the resentment
that led to terrorist threats and attacks against the West.
Department of Defense, US; Guantánamo Bay; Iran;
Iraq; Islam; Middle East; Obama, Barack Hussein;
Powell, Colin; Think Tanks
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”
The White House: President George W. Bush, September 20,
2001. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
Authorization for the Use of Military Force. S.J. Res. 23. 107th
Congress (2001). http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
terrorism/sjres23.enr.html
Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between
America and Al-Qaeda. New York: Free Press, 2011.
Cairo, Michael F. The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle
East. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2012.
Clarke, Richard A. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on
Terror. New York: Free Press, 2004.
“Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq.” The White House:
President George W. Bush, January 10, 2007. http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/
20070110-3.html
Final Report of the Guantanamo Review Task Force. Department of
Justice, January 22, 2010. http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/ag/legacy/2010/06/02/guantanamo-review-finalreport.pdf
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_184
Kean, Thomas H., and Lee H. Hamilton. The 9/11 Report: The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004.
Mayer, Jane. The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on
Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals. New York:
Anchor Books, 2009.
National Security Archive, George Washington University. The
Torture Archive. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torture_archive/
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. https://
www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-the-war-on-terrorism/
Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf
“President Delivers State of the Union Address.” The White
House: President George W. Bush, January 29, 2002. http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/
20020129-11.html
“President’s Address to the Nation.” The White House: President
George W. Bush, January 10, 2007. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html
“Remarks by the President upon Arrival.” The White House:
President George W. Bush, September 16, 2001. http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010916-2.html
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002). http://
www.un.org/depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf
Michael F. Cairo
SEE ALSO Abu Ghraib; Afghanistan; Bush, George W.;
Professor of Political Science
Transylvania University
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Cheney, Dick;
1074
AMERICA IN THE WORLD, 1776 TO THE PRESENT
COPYRIGHT 2016 Charles Scribner?s Sons, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210