us military history
Write a double spaced, 10-12 page argumentative essay on
Despite the United States’ economic, technological and military advantages, why did it have an uneven record of victory since 1941? What are the implications of your answer for today’s military professionals?
*The essay will include documentation in the form of endnotes or footnotes (but not in-text citations)
* + 2 pages Outline and 1 page Annotated Bibliography
* The thesis should be in the introduction
RUBRIC: –
A: 100-90% Written work demonstrates mastery of the continuum of competition, conflict, and war by analyzing the historical context of large scale combat operations through battles, campaigns, operational variables, mission variables, key leader decisions, or tenets of key theorists. Furthermore, the written work reaches conclusions that transcend the block material. Essay is concise, adheres to the style guide, exhibits appropriate tone, and has no spelling or grammar errors. The writer uses appropriate and sufficient historical evidence with correct documentation. Thesis is clear and unambiguous.
Please need A+ in this essay, and please NO PLAGIARISM, and need the citation to be clear and I have access to all references.
THANKS, AND GOOD LUCK.
Next page is the whole history block in summary, the essay should be from the history block
The Rise of the American Way of War: Global Strategy and Mobilization in World War II
This two-hour lesson builds on the historical and strategic context established in H100. It asks the question of whether there is an American Way of War, and gives you one definition by strategist Colin Gray to build on those given in the block stagesetter by Brian M. Lynn and Antulio J. Echevarria. The concept of an American Way of War and the responses by potential opponents is a theme that will continue across all the lessons of H400. H401 covers the concept of power projection (in its largest possible sense), and the costs of doing that across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Part of the American Way of War as discussed by strategist Colin Gray centers on this very issue—that America fights “large scale” with “logistical excellence,” due to the unique geography of the United States as a continental island that fights its modern war overseas.
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The material here, thus, focuses on mobilization on the one hand, and then movement of mobilized personnel and equipment, primarily via interoceanic shipping. Later lessons will offer an opportunity to look at the challenges of the anti-access conditions in place during World War II, which will likely also challenge any major American effort against a peer competitor today of the kind discussed in your Common Core instruction
LSCO/MDO Sea Power: Carriers, Marines, and the Tyranny of Distance (Guadalcanal)
This two-hour lesson builds on the theoretic, historical, and strategic context established in H100 and H401. It examines the challenges that the joint forces of the United States and Japan faced in power projection and sustainment during the campaign to hold and clear the island of Guadalcanal from August 1942 to February 1943. Part of the American Way of War as discussed by strategist Colin Gray centers on this very issue—America fights “large scale” with “logistical excellence” due to the unique geography of the United States as a continental island that fights its modern wars overseas
LSCO/MDO: Air Power Theory, Doctrine, and Practice (Combined Bomber Offensive)
The emergence of air power theory and doctrine in the interwar period provides keen insights into how nations thought about fighting in the multi-domain battlespace of the period 1920-1945. Furthermore, this two-hour lesson evaluates the claims and promises of air power theory and doctrine versus the performance of individual air forces, specifically the United States, during the Second World War.
LSCO/MDO Ground Warfare: D-Day to the Elbe
This two-hour lesson covers one of the largest campaigns, in terms of manpower and forces committed, that the United States ever embarked upon—the liberation of Northwest Europe, 1944-1945. This joint and multi-national operation would eventually grow to encompass 90 divisions (American, British, Canadian, French, and Polish) spread across three army groups, eight armies, and 19 corps. This force does not count the tens of thousands of tactical and strategic aircraft that flew in support of the armies. It has come to embody high intensity warfare supplemented by lavish use of firepower. When the modern US military thinks about LSCO, this campaign is the first that springs to mind. In point of fact, this nearly year-long series of offensives certainly helped frame both Russell Weigley and Colin Gray’s definitions of the American Way of War.
Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and the Return of Limited Warfare
With the use of atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the United States ushered the world into a new military and political epoch. This two-hour lesson’s objective is to provide insights into the international, political, and military changes resulting from the onset of the Cold War as the United States military services wrestled with the concept of limited war in the nuclear age.
The Chinese Way of War
This two-hour lesson addresses the concept of a Chinese Way of War through an examination of the writings of Sun Tzu (Sunzi) and Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong). Sunzi’s Art of War is arguably “the world’s oldest treatise on war,” a translation of which was available in France at the time of Napoleon. Master Sun’s thirteen chapters provide the foundation for the study of a distinct Chinese way of thinking about war. The Mao readings for this lesson were written in the 1930s during a pause in the Chinese Civil War. In 1936, Mao’s Communists and the Nationalists under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) formed a temporary 2nd United Front to oppose further Japanese territorial encroachments from Manchuria. In July 1937, the 2nd Sino-Japanese War began two years before Hitler’s attack into Poland. The Chinese fought alone for more than three years against the Japanese until December of 1941, when the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Hong Kong brought the United States and Great Britain into World War II in Asia. With the allied victory over the Japanese in 1945, and despite attempts by the United States to unify the two Chinese factions, the civil war began anew. After four more years of war, Mao and the Communists prevailed and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By October of 1949, the Nationalist forces had retreated to Taiwan and several smaller offshore islands to re-establish the Republic of China (ROC). In 1950, Mao’s ongoing consolidation of Communist China was interrupted by the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula leading to a direct military confrontation with the United States.
Limited War and LSCO: Korea 1950-1953
On the morning of 25 June 1950, North Korean forces launched a surprise attack across the 38th Parallel into South Korea. Within days, President Harry Truman had commited US military forces to a war that the United States had not expected and was not prepared to fight.
The strategic context of this unexpected war was a worldwide struggle between the Soviet-led Communist bloc and the US-led “Free World.” However, for both sides, the conflict in Korea would be an intentionally limited one. The original goal of American intervention was modest, the defense of a small ally, South Korea. The war’s limited goals were matched by a limited geographic scope; the fighting was limited to the Korean peninsula (a place most Americans could not find on a map). However, because losing in Korea meant a victory for world Communism, the stakes seemed to be far higher than just the fate of the Korean peninsula.
Vietnam: The Challenge of Hybrid Warfare
War is difficult and even when the enemy conforms to the plan, chance and friction can derail an operation and lead to failure. Hybrid warfare offers a different complication for the commander to face. In combining conventional and unconventional threats, those facing a hybrid enemy have to develop an operational approach that can counter a wide range of military capabilities. Given the unconventional aspect of hybrid warfare, there will also be a strong political component at the tactical and operational levels as well. It is not enough to focus only on the conventional enemy and fall for the illusion that defeating the conventional force will solve the unconventional threats of the war. These are just some of the reasons why hybrid warfare is so difficult.
The Limits of Military Power – Tet and Vietnam
Compound warfare, or Hybrid war, is the war of the future. A Hybrid war environment, where threat forces consist of conventional and unconventional capabilities, is extremely complex, full of ambiguity, and requires innovative problem solving and adaptive leaders and organizations. In twenty-first century warfare, the hybrid environment will most likely be laid over an equally complex and dynamic urban warfare environment. U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General John Milley stated:
… the world is “rapidly urbanizing,” Milley said. Today, between 50 percent and 60 percent of the world’s population live in urban areas, he said. By 2050, Milley predicts that will jump to 80 percent to 90 percent.
Re-forging the Broken Sword: The U.S. Army 1972-1990
H410 is a two-hour lesson that examines the U.S. Army’s transformation in the post-Vietnam War years from a war-scarred, internally-divided institution that was clearly outmatched by the Soviet Army and Warsaw Pact into a confident, well-trained force that effectively employed new doctrine and cutting edge technologies to defeat the world’s fourth-largest army during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. This lesson also considers how this process of transformation did (or did not) exemplify some of the characteristics that Colin Gray attributes of a distinct American Way of War.
DESERT STORM and the American Way of War
The American response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to herald the dawn of what president George H. W. Bush termed a “new world order,” where the U.S. would oversee global stability as the world’s remaining superpower. Much of this American assertiveness rested on the lopsided victory of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. In a 42-day air campaign and a “100 hours” ground war, the United States and its coalition partners ousted the Iraqis from Kuwait and severely diminished the offensive capabilities of Iraqi military. To the American military this stunning victory was the culmination of its painful efforts to reform and rebuild the armed forces in the wake of the Vietnam War. To many military officers and pundits, the coalition success in the war was proof of a “Revolution in Military Affairs” brought about by technological breakthroughs in precision guided weapons, surveillance and information, command and control, and night vision systems. As LTG Charles Horner, the CENTCOM air component commander during Operation desert shield and desert storm, later noted, “in some ways the Gulf War is a watershed in the history of warfare, it was a revolution.”[1] The war also seemed to validate the U.S. Army’s 1982 AirLand Battle doctrine and its focus on defeating the Soviets in large-scale combat operations.
Iraq and Beyond: The Change and Continuity in Warfare
In March of 2003, less than two years after invading Afghanistan, the United States led a coalition invasion of Iraq that toppled the Baathist regime and aimed to establish a secure and democratic Iraqi Republic. Despite optimistic predictions, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM soon devolved into a chaotic and bloody quagmire that would challenge the very foundations of the American Way of War in the 21st century. Even as it executed dispersed counterinsurgency and reconstruction efforts across the entire country, the U.S. military launched a series of offensives to clear insurgent strongholds that culminated in a final ‘Surge’ of combat forces to secure Baghdad in 2007. This recommitment—even as it stressed the U.S. Army to its breaking point—eventually allowed American forces to draw down under OPERATION NEW DAWN and completely exit the country in 2011.
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