1. In preparation for our Writing Lab on Thursday, review the Paper PPT (posted above) and check out the grading rubric and other writing resources (for citations, etc.) in the “useful stuff” folder here in D2L Content. On the basis of that information, begin writing a draft (thesis, outline, evidence, etc.), and post your draft (minimum of 100 words with thesis idea and outline for the evidence you wan to use) in the D2L Discussion folder. Bring your draft (and any questions) to class and be ready to work on it.
2. After reading Bowker/Star, come up with one example of a classification system underlying your life and one historical example of a classification system and post it here. The more hidden yet impactful the system, the better.
3. Read and follow the instructions in the Differentia Specifia & Classification Systems PDF. Post your responses to the questions in the file here.
Paper 1 Instructions & Prompt
Finding everything you need
Find the prompt, expectations, rubric, and writing resources in this PPT (and most of it also on the syllabus and D2L again).
The paper is due on Thursday, 2/17, 3:30PM in the D2L Paper 1 Assignment folder.
Work on your draft before and during the Writing Lab class!
Come to any of the office hours offered to learn more, come up with or check your thesis, and earn 5%!
You can also get additional help from campus offerings like
Think Tank
and SALT and earn 5% for that (upload a separate picture with your paper submission that includes your name & the date and confirms you got help from one of those sources)
You can take a 48-hour extension (without asking) once on one of the papers! Just write “extension taken” in the comment field with your paper submission.
Paper 1 Prompt
Write a definition of the concept of life.
Please note that most definitions of life you have written so far would not be enough, mostly because they lacked concrete evidence, i.e., quotations from reputable sources. The paper is not about “the one, comprehensive right definition” (we’ve already figured out that that’s impossible), but about going beyond what a dictionary or textbook can offer.
Think of it as making an argument/thesis/claim about the concept “life,” not a subjective opinion or a dictionary entry. It cannot be so subjective (“life is my family”) that nobody else could possibly be included or convinced and it cannot be so general (“we can’t define it,” “it’s the biological characteristics”) or tautological (“life is living”) that it cannot be sustained for more than a paragraph or backed up with evidence.
Paper 1 Prompt Cont’d
Your thesis should specify how broadly or specifically you are defining life, e.g., “life for humans is…” or “life as a mammal is…” or “life in x text/for x philosopher is…”, but make sure it is neither just your own private life you are defining, nor a summary or description of someone else’s concept, like summarizing the biological characteristics or describing an existing philosopher’s point of view.
A good approach would be to argue “life for x (e.g., humans) is… a (e.g., these biological characteristics), b (e.g., this philosophical idea), and c (e.g., this other thing),” where a/b/c each turn into a body paragraph and come from a different angle/perspective.
Argument & Evidence
An argument is one focused, debatable claim (can be argued against, not too simple or broad), written for an unknown audience (explain everything you mention), in a neutral tone (not personal, not colloquial), with supporting evidence (citations, works cited).
Each of these paragraphs should be supported by quoted evidence. Cite at least one of our class texts, and if you are using outside sources, make sure they are reputable (these can range from philosophy to science to poetry but avoid Wikipedia, dictionaries, and inspirational quotes… put keywords in the library search catalog & ask a librarian for help)!
Always explain how your evidence supports your argument!
Think of the task as convincing a stranger who does not know this class (i.e., contextualize/explain and use appropriate language).
How do I find a reputable outside source?
Depending on what your thesis is, think about what background information we need to know for that, for instance philosophical, cultural, or historical context.
That piece of background information might have come up in class, but you want to find an official source for it.
Start by googling your key words, and go from less reputable sources (study sites, Wikipedia) to THEIR sources (footnotes, bibliography), so you end up with a book or .edu source.
You can also use the library catalog and ask librarians for help (the library has a chat feature and delivers scans by email) if that doesn’t work.
You don’t necessarily have to quote from the source, but you can also use it as an in-text reference that supports your introductory background information, for instance.
If you’re not sure about a source, check with us!
Content & Structure
The paper should make an analytical argument with evidence from reputable sources for an unknown reader.
An introduction should
Propose one argument that responds to the prompt. An argument is a thesis that is debatable and is not simply a description or observation. Have no more than one main argument.
Include the following information about the main text(s)/source(s) you are analyzing or drawing on: the title in italics, the author, publication date, and genre. E.g., “Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis (1915) is a novella about a man who wakes up as a bug.”
Each body paragraph should
Be organized around one sub-claim that helps support your main argument.
Give evidence for your sub-claim by quoting from your main text/source or sources. This includes analyzing the quotations, i.e., stating which aspect of a quote supports your claim in which way.
(cont’d on next page)
Content & Structure Cont’d
Each body paragraph should also
Give necessary context to an audience that does not know the material. Don’t summarize or describe the entire text/context, only what is necessary for your reader to understand the part you’re analyzing and be convinced by your argument. Be brief. You can also make this part of your introduction.
Make sure the main terms of your argument are defined for your specific context. Don’t assume everybody knows how you understand a term. You can do this “by the way” rather than dictionary style, e.g., “Life, in its biological sense, is central to…”
A conclusion should
Summarize the paper’s argument, telling us what we learned about the text/source/issue from your argument.
State the stakes or implications of your analysis, i.e., tell us what your argument changes about our understanding of the text/source/issue. That’s like responding to someone asking, Nice point, but so what? Why does this matter?
Format
Write 1000 words (+/-100 words), double-spaced, typed, with 1” margins all around and 12-point Times New Roman font (papers that are 100 words or more below/above the limit of 1000 will experience deductions, according to the percentage below/above—see syllabus re: Late and Incomplete Work).
Include your name, the date, the course, and the paper number in the header, and page numbers in the footer.
Special characters (e.g., punctuation) in your file name will lead to upload problems.
Quote properly and list all your sources (remember: at least one course & one reputable outside source) under Works Cited at the end: http://new.library.arizona.edu/research/citing/plagiarism
Chose and stick with a citation style, like MLA: https://new.library.arizona.edu/research/citing/guide
Grading Rubric (also see PDF in the D2L folder)
The grading rubric names five areas of varying importance:
Thesis & Analysis (30%): you have one clear overall thesis that you explain and analyze convincingly and in depth
Organization (20%): each paragraph makes one clear point and the paragraphs follow in logical order
Development and Evidence (20%): each point supports and develops your thesis further with strong evidence (quoting) and your paragraphs are well developed and connected
Style/Clarity/Flow (15%): the sentences are clear and fluidly connected, the style is appropriate for an academic essay (not colloquial, not personal)
Mechanics of Writing and Referencing (10%): there are no errors in grammar, spelling, or word choice, nor in citing and referencing (Works Cited)
Audience/Tone (5%): everything that needs to be explained to a stranger is explained in appropriate language for an academic paper
What to avoid? Pt. 1
Avoid spelling mistakes and incorrect word choices: Proofread and edit your paper, and use spell-check. Ask others to read your paper (Writing Center, preceptors, roommates…). Re-read it yourself and try that out loud!
Avoid personal reflection: Avoid saying “I believe” or drawing from your personal experience. Instead focus on the text or sources to analyze. This is an analytical academic paper, not a personal essay.
Avoid generalizations: Don’t make statements about “things all people do/think/agree on,” “stuff everybody knows,” or “what’s normal.” Instead be specific and give evidence for all your claims.
Avoid letting quotations speak for themselves: Always explain what a specific piece of evidence contributes to your argument and/or what you see in it.
Avoid writing more because you have more to say: Edit carefully and be succinct. This is part of the challenge of paper writing. More is not better. Follow the instructions to succeed.
Avoid writing for your teacher: Write for a reader who is not familiar with the text or context (i.e. give them all the information about the text or topic they will need to understand your argument) and write in a tone that is appropriate for a stranger and an analytical paper (i.e. no colloquial language).
What to avoid? Pt. 2
Avoid having more than one argument or focusing on too many texts: Less is more. Go for a well backed-up argument and an in-depth analysis rather than touching on this and that superficially. This will also help with a clear structure.
Avoid describing instead of analyzing: Don’t give too much summary or description and make sure you have an argument that you back up with quotations.
Avoid giving Wikipedia or other non-reputable sources as evidence: The sources Wikipedia gives for its claims are evidence, but Wikipedia itself can be changed by anyone and is not always in the best shape. The same goes for study sites. Go for the printed word over the posted word for quality control, and favor .edu and .gov sources. Google Books is a great resource, and so are the librarians next door. And when you use an online source, cite it properly; don’t just post a link into your Words Cited list (see above).
Avoid inspirational quotes. Famous people or inspirational sayings can be great, but they are not evidence that will hold up to analysis. The reader wants to hear your argument, supported by reputable academic evidence.
A few more tips
Plan out the structure of your paper: If this is my argument, what do I need to explain and prove for all it’s components, and which order makes this clearest? Or, where do I need to go and which steps do I need to take to make my point?
Coming up with a thesis and organizing your thoughts is hard, so let us help you! Use the in-class exercises, office hours, etc. to run your thesis by us and your peers and refine it. The Writing Center offer lots of help too. Remember that you get an automatic 5% grade bonus if you upload evidence of having gotten help with your paper from either of these sources.
Test your argument on your roommate, your mom, your best friend… share what you’ve written to get feedback. It can only improve your paper.
Don’t ignore the word minimum/maximum instructions! Re-read your own paper out loud, use spell-check, and double-check whether you followed all instructions (quotations? word count? format?…). This stuff goes a long way.
This excerpt from
Sorting Things Out
.
Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star.
© 1999 The MIT Press.
is provided in screen-viewable form for personal use only by members
of MIT CogNet.
Unauthorized use or dissemination of this information is expressly
forbidden.
If you have any questions about this material, please contact
cognetadmin@cognet.mit.edu.
Our lives are henged round with systems of classification, limned by
standard formats , prescriptions , and objects. Enter a modern home
and you are surrounded by standards and categories spanning the
color of paint on the walls and in the fabric of the furniture , the types
of wires strung to appliances, the codes in the building permits allow
–
ing the kitchen sink to be properly plumbed and the walls to be~
adequately fireproofed . Ignore these forms at your peril – as a building
owner, be sued by irate tenants; as an inspector, risk malpractice suits
denying your proper application of the ideal to the case at hand ; as a
parent , risk toxic paint threatening your children .
To classify is human . Not all classifications take formal shape or are
standardized in commercial and bureaucratic products . We all spend
large parts of our days doing classification work , often tacitly, and we
�
Introduction .. To Classify Is Human
In an episode of The X-Files, a television show devoted to FBI investigations
of the paranormal , federal agents Mulder and Scully investigated a spate of
murders of psychics of all stamps: palm readers, astrologers, and so forth . The
plot unfolded thusly : The murderer would get his fortune read or astrological
chart done, and then brutaly slay the fortune -teller. It emerged during the
show that the reason for these visits was that he wanted to undel ~stand what
he was doing and why he was doing it , and he thought psychics could help
him understand his urges to kill people . Only one psychic, an insurance
salesman with the ability to scry the future , was able to prdict his murderous
attacks and recognize the criminal . When finally the murderer met this psy-
chic, he burst into his impassioned plea for an explanation of what he was
doing . ” Why am I compelled to kill all these people,” the salesman responded
in a world -weary tone such as one might take ‘\’\’ith a slow child : ” Don’t you
get it , son? You’re a homicidal maniac.” The maniac was delighted with this
insight . He then proceeds to try to kill again. The salesman’s answer is both
penetrating and banal- what it says about classification systems is the topic of
this book . Why is it so funny ?
2 I ntrod uction
make up and use a range of ad hoc classifications to do so . We sort
dirty dishes from clean, white laundry from colorfast, important email
to be answered from e- junk . We match the size and type of our car
tires to the amount of pressure they should accept. Our desktops are
a mute testimony to a kind of muddled folk classification : papers that
must be read by yesterday, but that have been there since last year,. old
professional journals that really should be read and even in fact may
someday be, but that have been there since last year,. assorted grant appli –
cations, tax forms , various work -related surveys and forms waiting to
be filled out for everything from parking spaces to immunizations .
These surfaces may be piled with sentimental cards that are already
read, but which cannot yet be thrown out, alongside reminder notes to send
similar cards to parents, sweethearts, or friends for their birthdays , all
piled on top of last year’s calendar (which – who knows?- may be
useful at tax time ). Any part of the home, school, or workplace reveals
some such system of classification : medications classed as not for chil –
dren occupy a higher shelf than safer ones; books for reference are
shelved close to whe11e we do the Sunday crossword puzzle; door keys
are color -coded and stored according to frequency of use.
What sorts of things order these piles, locations, and implicit labels?
We have certain knowledge of these intimate spaces, classifications that
appear to live partly in our hands- definitely not just in the head or
in any formal algorithm . The knowledge about which thing will be
useful at any given moment is embodied in a flow of mundane tasks
and practices and many varied social roles (child , boss, friend , em –
ployee). “”Then we need to put our hands on something ,’ it is there .
Our computer desktops are no less cluttered . Here the electronic
equivalent of ” not yet ready to throw out ” is also well represented . A
quick scan of one of the author ‘s desktops reveals eight residual cate-
gories represented in the various folders of email and papers : ” fun ,
”
” take back to office ,” ” remember to look up ,” ” misc . ,” ” misc . corre –
spondence,” ” general web information ,” “teaching stuff to do ,” and ” to
do.” We doubt if this is an unusual degree of disarray or an overly
prolific use of the ” none of the above” category so common to stan-
dardized tests and surveys .
These standards and classifications , however imbricated in our lives ,
are ordinarily invisible . The formal , bureaucratic ones trail behind
them the entourage of permits , forms , numerals , and the sometimes –
visible work of people who adjust them to make organizations run
smoothly. In that sense, they may become more visible, especially when
To Classify Is Human 3
they break down or become objects of contention . But what are these
categories? Who makes them , and who marT change them ? When and
why do they become visible? Ho “\l\f’ do they spread? What , for instance,
is the relationship among locally generated categories, tailored to the
particular space of a bathroom cabinet, and the commodified , elabo-
rate, expensive ones generated by medical diagnoses, government
regulatory bodies, and pharmaceutical firms ?
Remarkably for such a central part of our lives, we stand for the
most part in formal ignorance of the social and moral order created
by these invisible , potent entities. Their impact is indisputable , and as
Foucault reminds us, inescapable. Try the simple experiment of ignor –
ing your gender classification and use instead whichever toilets are the
nearest; try to locate a library book shelved under the wrong Librar )T
of Congress catalogue number ; stand in the immigration queue at a
busy foreign airport without the right passport or arrive without the
transformer and the adaptor that translates between electrical stan-
dards. The material force of categories appears always and instantly .
At the level of public policy, classifications such as those of regions,
activities, and natural resources play an equally important role .
Whether or not a region is classified as ecologically important , whether
another is zoned industrial or l-esidential come to bear significantly on
future economic decisions. The substrate of decision making in this
area, while often hotly argued across political camps, is only intermit –
tently visible. Changing such categories, once designated, is usually a
cumbersome, bureaucratically fraught process.
For all this importance , classifications and standards occupy a
peculiar place in studies of social ordel-. Anthropologists have studied
classification as a device for understanding the cultures of others-
categories such as the raw and the cooked have been clues to the core
organizing principles for colonial Western understandings of ” primi –
tive ” culture . Some economists have looked at the effects of adopting
a standard in those markets where networks and compatibility are
crucial . For example, videotape recorders , refrigerators , and personal
computer software embody arguably inferior technical standards, but
standards that benefited from the timing of their historical entr )T into
the marketplace. Some historians have examined the explosion of
natural history and medical classifications in the late nineteenth
century, both as a political force and as an organizing rubric for
complex bureaucracies. A few sociologists have done detailed studies
of individual categories linked “\I\f’ith social movements, such as the
diagnosis of homosexuality as an illness and its demedicalization in
the wake of gay and lesbian civil rights . Information scientists work
every day on the design, delegation , and choice of classification systems
and standards, yet few see them as artifacts embodying moral and
aesthetic choices that in turn craft people’s identities , aspirations, and
dignity .1 Philosophers and statisticians have produced highly formal
discussions of classification theory, but few empirical studies of use or
impact .
Both within and outside the academy, single categories or classes of
categories may also become objects of contention and study. The
above -mentioned demedicalization of the category homosexual in the
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual 3 (the DSM, a handbook of psychiatric classification) followed
direct and vigorous lobbying of the ..L~PA by gay and lesbian advocates
(Kirk and Kutchins 1992). During this same era, feminists were split
on the subject of whether the categories of premenstrual syndrome
and postpartum depression would be good or bad for women as they
became included in the DSM. Many feminist psychotherapists were
engaged in a bitter argument about whether to include these catego-
ries. As Ann Figert (1996) relates, they even felt their own identities
and professional judgments to be on the line . Allan Young (1995)
makes the complicating observation that psychiatrists increasingly use
the language of the DSM to communicate with each other and their
accounting departments , although they frequently do not believe in
the categories they are using .
More recently , as discussed in chapter 6 , the option to choose mul –
tiple racial categories was introduced as part of the u .s. government ‘s
routine data-collection mission, following Statistical DirectivTe 15 in
October 1997. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB ) issued
the directive ; conservatively, its implementation will cost several mil –
lion dollars . One direct consequence is the addition of this option to
the U.S. census, an addition that was fraught with political passion. A
march on Washington concerning the category took the traditional
ultimate avenue of mass protest for American activists . The march was
conducted by people who identified themselves as multiracial , and
their families and advocates. At the same time , it was vigorously op-
posed by many African -American and Hispanic civil rights groups
(among several others), who saw the option as a “whitewash” against
which important ethnic and policy -related distinctions would be lost
(Robbin 1998 ) .
4 Introduction
Despite the contentiousness of some categories, however, none of
the above-named disciplines or social movements has systematicall)’
addressed the pragmatics of the invisible forces of categories and
standards in the model~n built world , especially the modern informa –
tion technology world . Foucault’s ( 1970., 1982) work comes the closest
to a thoroughgoing examination in his arguments that an al~chaeologi-
cal dig is necessary to find the origins and consequences of a range of
social categories and practices . He focused on the concept of order
and its implementation in categorical discourse. The ubiquity de-
scribed by Foucault appears as an iron cage of bureaucratic discipline
against a broad historical landscape. But there is much more to be
done, both empirically and theoretically. Noone , including Foucault,
has systematically tackled the question of how these properties inform
social and moral order via the new technological and electronic infra –
structures . Few have looked at the creation and maintenance of com –
plex classifications as a kind of work practice, with its attendant
financial , skill , and moral dimensions . These are the tasks of this book .
Foucault ‘s practical archaeology is a point of departure for examin –
ing several cases of classification, some of which have become formal
or standardized , and some of which have not . We have several con –
cerns in this exploration , growing both from the consideration of
classification work and its attendant moral dimensions . First , we seek
to understand the role of invisibility in the work that classification does
in ordering human interaction . We want to understand how these
categories are made and kept invisible , and in some cases, we want to
challenge the silences surrounding them . In this sense, our job here
”
is to find tools for seeing the invisible , much as Emile Durkheim
passionately sought to convince his audience of the material force of
the social fact- to see that society was not just an idea- more than 1
0
0
years ago (Durkheim 1982 ) .
The book also explores systems of classification as part of the built
information environment . Much as a city planner or urban historian
would leaf back through highway permits and zoning decisions to tell
a city’s story, we delve the dusty archives of classification design to
understand better how wide – scale classification decisions have been
made .
We have a moral and ethical agenda in our querying of these
systems . Each standard and each category valorizes some point of view
and silences another. This is not inherently a bad thing – indeed it is
inescapable. But it -is an ethical choice, and as such it is dangerous- not
To Classify Is Human 5
6 I ntrod uction
bad , but dangerous . For example , the decision of the U . S . Immigration
and Naturalization Service to classify some races and classes as desir -,I
able for U . S . residents , and others as not , resulted in a quota system
that valued affluent people from northern and western Europe over
those ( especially the poor ) from Africa or South America . The decision
to classify students by their standardized achievement and aptitude
tests valorizes some kinds of knowledge skills and renders other kinds
invisible . Other types of decisions with serious material force may not
immediately appear as morally problematic . The ,collective stan –
dardization in the United States on \ THS , rideotapes over Betamax , for
instance , may seem ethically neutral . The classification and stan –
dardization of types of seed for farming is not obviously fraught with
moral weight . But as Busch ( 1995 ) and Addelson ( 1994 ) argue , such
long – term , collective forms of choice are also morally weighted . We2
are used to viewing moral choices as individual , as dilemmas , and as
rational choices . We have an impoverished vocabulary for collective
moral passages , to use Addelson ‘ s terminology . For any individual ,
group or situation , classifications and standards give advantage or they
give suffering . Jobs are made and lost ; some regions benefit at the
expense of others . How these choices are made , and how we may think
about that invisible matching process , is at the core of the ethical
project of this work .
Working Infrastructures
Sorting Things Out stands at the crossroads of the sociology of knowl –
edge and technology , history , and information science . The categories
represented on our desktops and in our medicine cabinets are fairly
ad hoc and individual , not even legitimate anthropological folk or
ethno classifications . They are not often investigated by information
scientists ( but see Kwasnik 1988 , 1991 ; Beghtol 1995 ; Star 1998 ) . But
everyone uses and creates them in some form , and they are ( increas –
ingly ) important in organizing computer – based work . They often have
old and deep historical roots . True , personal information managers
are designed precisely to make this process transparent , but even with
their aid , the problem continues : we still must design or select catego –
ries , still enter data , still struggle with things that do not fit . At the
same time , we rub these ad hoc classifications against an increasingly
elaborate large – scale system of formal categories and standards . Users
To Classify Is Human 7
of the Internet alone navigate , now fairly seamlessly, more than 200
formallv elected Internet standards for information transmission each)
time they send an email message. If we are to understand larger scale
classifications , we also need to understand how desktop classifications
link up with those that are formal , standardized , and widespread .
Every link in hypertext creates a category . That is, it reflects some
judgment about two or more objects : they are the same , or alike , or
functionally linked , or linked as part of an unfolding series . The
rummage sale of information on the World Wide Web is overwhelm –
ing , and we all agree that finding information is much less of a problem
than assessing its quality – the nature of its categorical associations and
by whom they are made (Bates , in press ). The historical cultural model
of social classification research in this book , from desktop to wide -scale
infrastructure , is a good one through which to view problems of
indexing , tracking , and even compiling bibliographies on the Web . In
its cultural and workplace dimensions , it offers insights into the proble –
matics of design of classification systems, and a lens for examining their
impact . It looks at these processes as a sort of crafting of treaties . In
this , a cross-disciplinary approach is crucial . Any information systems
design that neglects use and user semantics is bound for trouble down
the line – it will become either oppressive or irrelevant . Information
systems mix up the conventional and the formal , the hard technical
problems of storage and retrieval with the hard interactional problems
of quer )Ting and organizing .
Information systems are undergoing rapid change . There is an
explosion of information on the Web and associated technologies , and
fast moving changes in how information may converge across pre –
viously disparate families of technology – for instance , using one ‘s tele –
vision to retrieve email and browse the Web , using one ‘s Inter –
net connections to make telephone calls . Whatever we write here
about the latest electronic developments will be outdated by the
time this book sees print , a medium that many would argue is itself
anachronistic .
Conventions of use and understandings of the impact of these
changes on social organization are slower to come . The following
example illustrates the intermingling of the conventional and the local
in the types of classificatory links formed by hypertext . A few years
ago , our uni \rersity was in the enviable position of having several job
openings in library and information science . Both the authors were on
8 Introduction
the search committee . During the process of sifting through applica-
tions and finding out more about candidates, the need arose to query
something on the candidate’s resume. We used the Alta Vista search
engine to find the candidate’s email address. (Of course, the first thing
one really does with Alta Vista is ego surfing – checking one’s own
name to see how many times it appears on the Web – but ‘ we had
already done that .) His email address and formal institutional home
page appeared in about fifteen seconds on our desktop, but so did his
contributions to a discussion on world peace , a feminist bulletin board ,
and one of the more arcane alt .rec Usenet groups . We found ourselves
unable to stop our eyes from roving through the quoted Usenet
posts- category boundaries surely never meant to be crossed by a job
search committee . Fortunately for us as committee members , we inter –
preted what we found on the Web as evidence that the applicant was
a more well rounded person than his formal CV resume had conveyed.
He became a more interesting candidate .
But of course, it might have gone badly for him . In less than a
minute we had accessed information about him that crossed a social
boundary of de facto privacy, access, and awareness context (Glaser
and Strauss 1965). The risk of random readership had been there in
some sense when he posted to a public space, but who on a search
committee in the old days of a couple of years ago could possibly be
bothered searching listserv archives ? Who would have time ? There are
many ethical and etiquette -related questions here , of course , with the
right to privacy not least among them . The incident also points to the
fact that as a culture we have not yet developed conventions of clas-
sification for the Web that bear much moral or habitual conviction in
daily practice. The label alt.rec does not yet have the reflex power that
the label private does on a desk drawer or notebook cover. We would
never open someone’s desk drawer or diary . We are not usually known
to be rude people, but we have not yet developed or absorbed routine
similar politeness for things such as powerful Web search engines. We
were thus somewhat embarrassed and confused about the moralit } T of
mentioning the alt .rec postings to the committee .
As we evolve the classifications of habit- grow common fingertips
with respect to linkages and networks- we will be faced with some
choices . How standardized will our indexes become ? What forms of
freedom of association (among people, texts and people, and texts) do
we want to preserve and which are no longer useful? Who will decide
these matters ?
To Classify Is Human 9
Investigating Infrastructure
People do many things today that a few hundred years ago would have
looked like magic. And if we don’t understand a given technology
today it looks like magic: for example, we are perpetually surprised by
the mellifluous tones read off our favorite CDs by, we believe, a laser.
Most of us have no notion of the decades of negotiation that inform
agreement on , inter alia, standard disc size, speed, electronic setting,
and amplification standards. It is not dissimilar to the experience of
magic one enjoys at a fine restaurant or an absorbing play. Common
descriptions of good waiters or butlers (one thinks of Jeeves in the
Wodehouse stories ) are those who clear a table and smooth the un –
folding of events ”as if by magic.” In a compelling play, the hours of
rehearsal and missteps are disappeared from center stage, behind a
seamless front stage presentation . Is the magic of the CD different
from the magic of the waiter or the theater ensemble ? Are these two
kinds of magic or one – or none ?
This book is an attempt to answer these questions , which can be
posed more prosaically as:
. What work do classifications and standards do ? Again , we want to
look at what goes into making things work like magic: making them
fit together so that we can buy a radio built by someone we have never
met in japan , plug it into a wall in Champaign , Illinois , and hear the
world news from the BBC .
. Who does that work ? We explore the fact that all this magic involves
much work : there is a lot of hard labor in effortless ease .3 Such invisible
work is often not only underpaid , it is severely underrepresented in
theoretical literature (Star and Strauss 1999 ) . We will discuss where all
the ” missing work ” that makes things look magical goes.
. What happens to the cases that do not fit ? We want to draw attention
to cases that do not fit easily into our magical created world of stan-
dards and classifications: the left handers in the world of right -handed
magic, chronic disease sufferers in the acute world of allopathic medi-
cine , the vegetarian in MacDonald ‘s (Star 1991b ), and so forth .
These are issues of great import . It is easy to get lost in Baudrillard ‘ s
(1990) cool memories of simulacra. He argues that it is impossible to
sort out media representations from “what really happens.” We are
unable to stand outside representation or separate simulations from
Classification
Introduction10
nature . At the same time , he pays no attention to the work of con-
structing the simulations , or the infrastructural considerations that
undel ~write the images or events (and we agree that separating them
ontologically is a hopeless task). The hype of our postmodern times is
that we do not need to think about this sort of work any more . The
l~eal issues are scientific and technological , stripped of the conditions
of production – in artificial life , thinking machines, nanotechnology,
and genetic manipulation . . . . Clearly each of these is important . But
there is more at stake- epistemologically, politically , and ethically- in
the day-to-day work of building classification systems and producing
and maintaining standards than in abstract arguments about repre –
sentation. Their pyrotechnics may hold our fascinated gaze, but they
cannot provide any path to answering our moral questions.
Two Definitions .” and
Standards
Up to this point , we have been using the terms classification and
standardization without formal definition . Let us clarify the terms now .
Classification
.l4 classification is a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the
world. A “classification system” is a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal )
into which things can be put to then do some kind of work – bureau –
cratic or knowledge production . In an abstract, ideal sense, a classifica-
tion system exhibits the following properties :
1. There are consistent, unique classificatory princiPles in operation. One
common sort of system here is the genetic principle of ordering . This
refers not to DNA analysis, but to an older and simpler sense of the
word : classifying things by their ol~igin and descent (Tort 1989). A
genealogical map of a family ‘s histol~y of marriage , birth , and death is
genetic in this sense (even for adopted children and in -laws). So is a
flow chart showing a hierarchy of tasks deriving from one another over
time . There are many other types of classificatory principles – sorting
correspondence by date received (temporal order ), for example , or
recipes by those most frequently used (functional order ).
2. The categories are mutually exclusive. In an ideal world , categories
are clearly’ demarcated bins, into which any object addressed by the
system will neatly and uniquely fit . So in the family genealogy, one
mother and one father give birth to a child , forever and uniquely
attributed to them as parents- there are no surrogate mothers , or
To Classify Is Human 11
issues of shared custody or of retrospective DNA testing . A rose is a
rose , not a rose sometimes and a daisy other times .
3 . The s~ystem is complete. With respect to the items , actions , or areas
under its consideration , the ideal classification system provides total
coverage of the world it describes . So, for example , a botanical classifier
would not simply ignore a newly discovered plant , but would always
strive to name it . A physician using a diagnostic classification must
enter something in the patient ‘s record where a category is called for ;
where unknown , the possibility exists of a medical discovTery, to be
absorbed into the complete system of classifying .
No real -world working classification system that we have looked at
meets these ” simple ” requirements and we doubt that any ever could .
In the case of unique classificatory systems , people disagree about their
nature ; they ignore or misunderstand them ; or they’ routinely mix
together different and contradictory principles . A library , fOl~ example ,
may have a consistent Library of Congress system in place , but sup –
plement it in an ad hoc way. Best sellers to be rented out to patrons
may be placed on a separate shelf ; very rare , pornographic , or expen –
sive books may be locked away from general viewing at the discretion
of the local librarian . Thus , the books are moved , without being
formally reclassified , yet carry an additional functional system in their
ph )Tsical placement .
What Are You ?
I grew up in Rhode Island , a New England state large I)’ populated by
Italian -Americans and French-Canadians that is known chiefly for its
small stature. When I was a kid in our neighborhood , the first thing )TOU
would ask on encountering a newcomer was ” what ‘s your name ?” The
second was ” what are you ? ” ” What are you ” was an invitation to recite
your ethnic composition in a kind of singsong voice: 90 percent of the
kids would say ” Italian with a little bit of French ,” or ” half -Portuguese,
one -quarter Italian and one -quarter Armenian .” When I would chime
in with ” half -Jewish, one-quarter Scottish and one-quarter English ,” the
range of responses went from very puzzled looks to ” does that mean
you’re not Catholic ?” Wherein , I guess, began my fascination with clas-
sification , and especially with the problem of l~esidual categories, or, the
” other , ” or not elsewhere classified .
– Leigh Star
12 I ntrod uc lion
For the second point , mutual exclusivity may be impossible in prac-
tice, as when there is disagreement or ambivalence about the member-
ship of an object in a category. Medicine is replete with such examples,
especially when the disease entity is controversial or socially stigma-
tized. On the third point , completeness, there may be good reasons to
ignore data that would make a system more comprehensive. The dis-
covery of a new species on an economically important development site
may be silenced for monetary considerations. An anomaly may be
acknowledged, but be too expensive- politically or bureaucratically- to
introduce into a system of record keeping. In chapter 2, we demon-
strate ways of reading classification systems so as to be simultaneously
sensitive to these conceptual, organizational , and political dimensions.
Consider the International Classification of Diseases (ICD ), which is
used as a major example throughout this book . The full title of the
current (tenth ) edition of the lCD , is: ” ICD – IO- International Statis-
tical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems; Tenth
Revision.” Note that it is designated a statistical classification: Only
diseases that are statistically significant are entered here (it is not an
attempt to classify all diseases).
The ICD is labeled a “classification,” even though many have said
that it is a ” nomenclature ” since it has no single classificatory principle
(it has at least four , which are not mutually exclusive, a point developed
in chapter 4). A nomenclature simply means an agreed-upon naming
scheme, one that need not follow any classificatory principles . The
nomenclature of streets in Paris, for example, includes those named
after intellectual figures , plants and trees, battles, and politicians , as
well as those inherited from former governments, such as Rue de
Lutece (Lutece was the ancient Roman name for Paris). This is no
classificatory system. Nomenclature and classification are frequently
confused, however, since attempts are often made to model nomencla-
ture on a single, stable system of classification principles , as for exam-
ple with botany (Bowker, in press) or anatomy. In the case of the lCD ,
diagnostic nomenclature and the terms in the ICD itself were conflated
in the American system of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), much to
the dismay of some medical researchers. In many cases the ICD rep –
resents a compromise between conflicting schemes.” The terms used
in categories C82- C85 for non -Hodgkin ‘s lymphomas are those of the
Working Formulation , which attempted to find common ground
among several major classification systems. The terms used in these
schemes are not given in the Tabular List but appear in the Alphabeti –
To Classify Is Human 13
cal Index ; exact equivalence with the terms appearing in the Tabular
List is not always possible ” ( ICD – 10 , 1 : 215 ) .
The lCD , however , presents itself clearly as a classification scheme
and not a nomenclature . Since 1970 , there has been an effort under –
way by the WHO to build a distinct International Nomenclature of
Diseases ( IND ) , whose main purpose will be to provide : ” a single
recommended name for every disease entit ) ” , ( ICD – 10 , 1 : 25 ) .
For the purposes of this book , \ \ Joe take a broad enough definition so
that anything consistently called a classification system and treated as
such can be included in the term . This is a classic Pragmatist turn –
things perceived as real are real in their consequences ( Thomas and
Thomas 1917 ) . If we took a purist or formalist view , the ICD , , ‘ ould
be a ( somewhat confused ) nomenclature and who knows what the IND
would represent . With a broad , Pragmatic definition we can look at
the work that is involved in building and maintaining a family of
entities that people call classification systems rather than attempt the
Herculean , Sisyphian task of purifying the ( un ) stable systems in place .
Howard Becker makes a cognate point here :
Epistemology has been a . . . negative discipline , mostly devoted to saying what
you shouldn ‘ t do if you want your activity to merit the title of science , and to
keeping unworthy pretenders from successfully appropriating it . The sociol –
ogy of science , the empirical descendant of epistemology , gives up trying to
decide what should and shouldn ‘ t count as science , and tells what people who
claim to be doing science do . ( Becker 1996 , 54 – 55 )
The work of making , maintaining , and analyzing classification systems
is richly textured . It is one of the central kinds of work of model ‘ nity ,
including science and medicine . It is , ” “‘ e argue , central to social life .
Standards
Classifications and standards are closely related , but not identical .
While this book focuses on classification , standards are crucial compo –
nents of the larger argument . The systems we discuss often do become
standardized ; in addition , a standard is in part a way of classifying the
world . \ t \ That then are standards ? The term as we use it in the book
has several dimensions :
1 . A ” standard ” is any set of agreed – upon rules for the production of
( textual or material ) objects .
2 . A standard spans more than one community of practice ( or site of
activity ) . It has temporal reach as well in that it persists over time .
Introduction14
3 . Standards are deployed in making things work together over dis –
tance and heterogeneous metrics . For example , computer protocols
for Internet communication involve a cascade of standards (Abbate
and Kahin 1995 ) that need to work together well for the average user
to gain seamless access to the “”Teb of information . There are standards
for the components to link from your computer to the phone network ,
for coding and decoding binary streams as sound , for sending mes-
sages from one network to another , for attaching documents to mes-
sages, and so forth .
4 . Legal bodies often enforce standards , be these mandated by pro –
fessional organizations , manufacturers ‘ organizations , or the state . We
might say tomorroV ‘t’y that volapiik , a universal language that boasted
some twenty -three journals in 1889 (Proust 1989 , 580 ), or its successor
Esperanto shall henceforth be the standard language for international
diplomac }T. Without a mechanism of enforcement , howe ,rer, Ol~ a grass-
roots movement , we shall fail .
5. There is no natural law that the best standard shall win – QWERTY ,
Lotus 123 , DOS , and VHS are often cited as examples in this context .
The standards that do win may do so for a ,rariety of other reasons :
they build on an installed base, they had better marketing at the outset ,
or they were used by a community of gatekeepers who favored their
use. Sometimes standards win due to an outright conspiracy , as in the
case of the gas refrigerator documented by Cowan ( 1985 ).
6 . Standards have significant inertia and can be very difficult and
expensive to change .
It was possible to build a cathedral like Chartres without standard
representations (blueprints ) and standard building materials such as
regular sizes for stones , tools , and so forth (Turnbull 1993 ). People
invented an amazing array of analog measuring devices (such as string
lengths ). Each cathedral town posted the local analog metric (a length
of metal ) at its gates , so that peripatetic mastel ~ builders could calibrate
their work to it when they arrived in the town . They did not have a
wide -scale measurement system such as our modern metric or decimal
systems . (Whether as a result of this local improvisation or not , Turn –
bull notes , many cathedrals did fall down !)
It is no longer possible to build a complex collective project without
standardized measurements . Consider a modern housing develop –
ment where so much needs to come together from distant and proxi –
mate sources – electricity , gas, sewer, timber sizes, screws, nails and so
on . The control of standards is a central , often underanalyzed feature
of economic life (see the work of Paul David- for example David and
Rothwell 1994- for a rich treatment ). It is key to knowledge produc –
tion as well . Latour (1987) speculates that far more economic resources
are spent creating and maintaining standards than in producing
” pure ” science. There are a number of histories of standards that point
to the development and maintenance of standards as being critical to
industrial production .
At the same time , just as with classifications, these dimensions of
standards are in some sense idealized. They embody goals of practice
and production that are never perfectly” realized, like Plato’s triangles .
The process of building to a standardized code, for example, usually
includes a face-to-face negotiation between builder (s) and inspector (s),
which itself includes a history of relations between those people . Small
deviations are routinely overlooked , unless the inspector is making a
political point . The idiom ” good enough for government use” embod-
ies the common -sense accommodations of the slip between the ideal
standard and the contingencies of practice.
In this and in many other ways, then , classifications and standards
are two sides of the same coin . Classifications mayor may not become
standardized . If they do not , they are ad hoc, limited to an individual
or a local community , and/or of limited duration . At the same time ,
evel~y successful standard imposes a classification system, at the very
least between good and bad ways of organizing actions or things . And
the work -arounds involved in the practical use of standards frequently
entail the use of ad hoc nonstandard categories. For example, a patient
may respond to a standardized protocol for the management of
chronic back pain by approximating the directions and supplementing
them with an idiosyncratic or alternative medical classification scheme.
If the protocol requires a number of exercises done three times a day,
patients may distinguish good days from bad days, vacation days from
working days, and only do the exercises when they deem them
necessary.
Classifications and standards are related in another sense, which
concerns the use of a classification by more than one social world or
community of practice, and the impact that use has on questions of
membership and the taken-for -grantedness of objects (Cambrosio and
Keating 1995). Throughout this book, we speak of classifications as
objects for cooperation across social worlds , or as boundary objects
(Sta11 and Griesemer 1989). Drawing from earlier studies of
To Classify Is Human 15
interdisciplinary scientific cooperation , we define boundary objects as
those objects that both inhabit several communities of practice and
satisfy the informational requirements of each of them . In working
practice, they are objects that are able both to travel across borders
and maintain some sort of constant identity . They can be tailored to
meet the needs of anyone community (they are plastic in this sense,
or customizable). At the same time , they have common identities across
settings. This is achieved by allowing the objects to be weakly struc-
tured in common use, imposing stronger structures in the individual –
site tailored use. They are thus both ambiguous and constant; they
may be abstract or concrete. In chapter 9, we explore in detail the
abstract ramifications of the use of classifications by more than one
community and the connection with the emergence of standards.
Part I : Classification and Large-Scale Infrastructures
Classification systems are integral to any working infrastructure . In
part I (chapters 2 to 4) we examine how a global medical classification
system was developed to serve the conflicting needs of multiple local,
national , and international information systems.
Our investigation here begins in the late nineteenth century with
another kind of information explosion- the development of myriad
systems of classification and standardization of modern industrial and
scientific institutions .
In the nineteenth century people learned to look at themselves as
surrounded by tiny , invisible things that have the power of life or
death : microbes and bacteria. They learned to teach their children to
I ntrod uc lion16
The Structure of This Book
To explore these questions , we have written a first chapter detailing
some key themes of the work to fo 110 \\IT. We have then divided the
middle of the book into three parts , which look at several classification
systems . We have structured these studies around three issues in turn :
classification and large -scale infrastructures (part I ), classification and
biography (part II ) , and classification and work practice (part III ).
Weaving these three themes together , \\ITe can explore the texture of
the space within which infrastructures work and classification systems
from different worlds meet , adjust , fracture , or merge . In two conclud –
ing chapters , we elaborate some theoretical conclusions from these
studies .
wash their hands of germs before eating, and later, to appl )T antiseptic
salve to a cat scratch or an inflamed fingernail . Company washrooms
sprouted signs admonishing employees to wash hands before return –
ing to “\I\ITork, especially if they worked with food served to others. In
this period , people also learned how to perform surgery that would
not usually be fatal and how to link gum disease with bacteria between
the teeth .
At the same time they learned these practices about germs, another
ubiquitous set of tiny , invisible things were being negotiated and sewn
into the social fabric . These were formal , commodified classifications
and standards, both scientific and commercial . People classified, meas-
ured , and standardized just about everything – animals, human races,
books, pharmaceutical products , taxes, jobs , and diseases. The catego-
ries so produced lived in industry , medicine , science, education , and
govTernment. They ranged from the measurement of machine tools to
the measurement of people’s forearms and foreheads. The standards
were sometimes physically tiny measures: how big should a standard
size second of time be , an eyeglass screw, or an electrical pulse rate ?4
At other times , they were larger : what size should a railroad car be , a
city street , or a corporation ? Government agencies , industrial consor –
tia , and scientific committees created the standards and category sys –
tems . So did mail – order firms , machine – tool manufacturers , animal
breeders , and thousands of other actors . Most of these activities be –
came silently embodied in the built environment and in notions of
good practice . The decisions taken in the course of their construction
are forever lost to the historical record . In fact, their history is consid-
ered by most to be boring , trivial , and unworthy of investigation .
There are some striking similarities to our own late twentieth –
century histol~ical moment in that faced by Europeans at the end of
the nineteenth century . A new international information -sharing and
gathering movement was starting , thanks to the advent of wide-scale
international travel , international quasigovernmental governance
structures , and a growing awareness that many phenomena (like epi-
demics and markets ) would not be confined to one country . In the
nineteenth centurYT, for the first time people faced large numbers of
bodies and their microbes moving rapidly across national borders and
between large bureaucracies- and at an unprecedented rate. Espe-
cially in the case of epidemics, international public health became an
urgent necessity. Attempts to control these passengers represent one
of the first large-scale western medical classification schemes: ships that
To Classi[ ‘V Is Human 17
18 Introduction
R U � S S A� E
Figure 1.1
Map indicating the geographical distribution of the sources of cholera and
�the progress of cholera epidemics� by land and sea routes. The progression
by land is shown by the line with small vertical marks (1 823�i 847), by sea in
1865 via ship, and new progressions overland from 1892. Note the sea routes
marked between Mecca and Marseilles.
Source: A. Proust 1892.
called at ports on the way back from Mecca had to fbllow a period of
quarantine during which anyone infected would becoirie sympto-
matic�thus emulating the slower timeline of horse or camel travel (see
figure 1.1).
After quarantine, one was given a �clean bill of health� and allowed
freedom of transport. This was a costly delay fbr the ships, and SO a
black market in clean bills of health appeared shortly thereafter . . .
The problem of tracking who was dying of what and where on earth
became a permanent feature of international bureaucracy (see figure
1.2).
Constructing such a list may appear to be to us a comparatively
straightforward task, once the mechanisms fbr reporting were in place.
To Classify Is Human 19
For over 100 years, however, there has never been consensus about
disease categories or about the process of collecting data. So one
culture sees spirit possession as a valid cause of death, another ridicules
this as superstition; one medical specialty sees cancer as a localized
phenomenon to be cut out and stopped from spreading, another sees
it as a disorder of the whole immune system that merely manifests in
one location or another. The implications for 1)0th treatment and
classification differ. Trying to encode both causes results in serious
information retrieval problems.
In addition, classifications shift historically. In Britain in 1650 we
find that 696 people died of being �aged�; 31 succumbed to wolves, 9
to grief, and 19 to �King�s Evil.� �Mother� claimed 2 in 1647 but none
in 1650, but in that year 2 were �smothered and stifled� (see figure
1.3). Seven starved in 1650 (Graunt 1662), but by 1930 the WHO
would make a distinction: if an adult starved to death it was a misfor-
tune; if a child starved, it was homicide. Death by wolf alone becomes
impossible by 1948, where death from animals is divided between
venomous and nonvenomous, and only dogs and rats are singled out
for categories of their own (lCD-S 1948, 267).
�- —- lii N° REPUBLIQUE FRAN AISE PORT
0
p TENTE DE SANTE ADMINISTRATION SANITAIRE
z
4 PATENTE DE SANT1
Neal dec bâtiment… cc
Nature dii bàtiment.. Nous, de Ia sante a
Li. certifions quo le bâtiment ci-aprŁs ddsignO part de ce
pavilion port dans los conditions suivantes, düment constatdes:
Tonneaux Nom du bIctiment
Canons L i i Nature du bâtiment… Malades a bord
Pavilion
Appartonant an port d 0 Tonneaux Etat hygidnique du na-
Destination Canons vire .
Appartenant au port d Etat hygidnique de 1 –
Nero du capitaino.. Destination quipage (couchage,
Nom du mddecin w Nom du capitaine vŒtements, etc.)
Nom du mdclecin. Etat hygiØnique des
Equipage (tout corn-cc Equipage (tout compris) passagers
pris)…. Vivres et approvision-Passagers nements divers
Passagers Cargaison Eau
4
Cargaison . Conformdment aux articles 30, 31, 32 et 33 dii regle-
�Dent, I�dtat sanitaire du navire a dtØ vdrifld, la visite
Etat hygiØnique du na-I- mddicale a etc passde au moment do l�embarquement
vire des passagers et ii a etC constatd quit n�existait bord,
ate moment du depart, aucun malade atteint d�affection
Etat hygidnique do 16- pestilentielle (cholera, fidvre jaune, peste), ni lingo sale,
quipage (couchago, z
ni substance susceptible de nuire a la sante du bord.
vDtements, etc.)….
Nous certifions, en outre, dii port est
Etat hygidnique des que l�dtat sanitaire des environs est
passagers U)
et qu�il a CtC constatC dans le ( cas de choidra
Vivres et approvision- port(ou ses environs) pendant cas de fiŁvre jaune
cements divers la derniŁre semaine CcoulCe cas de peste
Eau z En foi de quoi, nous avons ddlivrd ia prŒsente pa-
tente, a , le du mois d
0 189 , a beure dii
LExpØditionnaire Sceau de l�Administration,
Ialades äbord I- de ix Patente,
4 Lx ox LA SANT
cc
Etat du port
sanitaire des environs I-
11 a dtd constatddans
I c port ou ses environs U)
pendant la dernidre PRESCRIPTIONS EXTRAITES DU REGLEMENT GEN RAL
sernaine dcoulde:
z DE POLICE SANITAIRE MARITIME
cas de cholera.
cas de fiŁvre
jaune.
cas de peste.
0
D l jvrŒe le du mois
d 189 4 VOIR AU VERSO.
I c heure du
Figure 1.2
French bill of health. An original �clean bill of health.�
Source: A. Proust 1892.
To Classify Is Hu,man 21
The first part of this book is dedicated to understandig the construc –
tion of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD ) : a classifica –
tion scheme with its origins in the late nineteenth century but still
present today- indeed , it is ubiquitous in medical bureaucracy and
medical information systems. The ICD constitutes an impressive at-
tempt to coordinate information and resources about mortality and
morbidity globally. For the background research for understanding
international processes of classification , we went to Geneva and studied
the archives of the WHO and its predecessors such as the League of
Nations and the Office Internationale d’Hygiene Publique . Roughly
every ten yea11s since the 1890s , the ICD has been revised . The UN
and the WHO have kept some records of the process of revision ;
others are to be found in the file cabinets of individuals involved in
the revision process .
\\ That we found was not a record of gradually increasing consensus,
but a panoply of tangled and crisscrossing classification schemes held
together by an increasingly harassed and sprawling international pub –
lic health bureauc11acy. Spirit possession and superstition never do
reconcile , but for some data to be entered on the western – oriented
death certificate , it becomes possible from the WHO point of view for
a death to be assigned the category ” nonexistent disease.”
One of the other major influences on keeping medical records has
been insurance companies, as we discuss in chapter 4. As the working
lives of individuals became more closely tied up \”\I~ith the state and its
occupational health concerns , the classification of work -related dis –
eases (including industrial accidents ) became very important . Life ex –
pectancy measures were equally important , both for estimating the
available labor force and for basic planning measures. Of course,
occupational and nonwork related medical classifications did not al –
ways line up : companies might have been reluctant to take responsi –
bility for unsafe working conditions , latency in conditions such as
asbestosis makes data hard to come by; thus there may have been
moral conflicts about the cause of such illnesses .
In similar fashion , any classification that touched on religious or
ethical questions (and surprisingly many do so) would be disputed . If
life begins at the moment of conception , abortion is murder and a
fetus dead at three months is a stillbirth , encoded as a live infant death .
Contemporar )T abortion wars in the United States and western Eu11ope
attest to the enduring and irreconcilable ontologies inv’olved in these
codifications .
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For a bureaucracy to establish a smooth data collection effort , a
means must be found to detour around such higher order issues. The
statistical committee discussed in chapter 4, assigned with determining
the exact moment of the beginning of life by number of attempted
breaths and weight of fetus or infant , cuts a Solomon-like figure against
such a disputed landscape. At the same time , there is an element of
reductionist absurdity here- how many breaths equals ” life ” ? If not
specified, another source of quality control for data is lost; if specified,
it appears to make common sense ironic . This is an issue we will revisit
as well in the discussion of nursing interventions , in chapter 7.
Algorithms for codification do not resolve the moral questions in –
volved , although they may obscure them . For decades, priests, femi –
nists, and medical ethicists on both sides have debated the question of
w hen a human life begins. The moral questions involved in encoding
such information – and the politics of certainty and of voice involved –
are much more obscure.
Forms like the death certificate , when aggregated, form a case of
what Kirk and Kutchins (1992) call “the substitution of precision for
validity ” (see also Star 1989b). That is, when a seemingly neutral data
collection mechanism is substituted for ethical conflict about the con-
tents of the forms , the moral debate is partially e11ased. One may get
ever more precise knowledge, without having resolved deeper ques-
tions, and indeed , by burying those questions.
There is no simple pluralistic answer to how such questions may be
resolved democratically or with due process. Making all knowledge
retrievable , and thus re-debatable, is an appealing solution in a sense
from a purely information scientific point of view. From a practical
organizational viewpoint , however, this approach fails. For example, in
1927, a manual describing simultaneous causes of death listed some
8,300 terms, which represented 34 million possible combinations that
might appear on the face of a death certificate . A complete user
manual for filling out the certificate would involve sixty-one volumes
of 1,000 pages each. This is clearly not a pragmatic choice for conduct –
ing a task that most physicians also find boring , low-status, and clini –
cally unimportant .
As we know from studies of work of all sorts, people do not do the
ideal job , but the doable job . When faced with too many alternatives
and too much information , they satisfice (March and Simon 1958). As
an indicator of this, studies of the validity of codes on death certificates
repeatedly show that doctors have favorite categories; these are region –
24 Introduction
To Classify Is Human 25
~ Tith the rise of very-large-scale information systems, the Internet ,
the Web, and digital libraries , we find that the sorts of uncertainties
faced by the WHO are themselves endemic in OUl~ own lives. When we
use email filters , fOl~ example, we risk losing the information that does
not fit the sender’s category’: junk email is very hal~d to sort out
automatically in a reliable way. If we have too many detailed filters , we
lose the efficiency sought from the filter in the first place. As we move
into desktop use of hyperlinked digital libraries , we fracture the tra –
ditional bibliographic categories across media, versions, genres, and
author . The freedom entailed is that we can customize OUl~ own library
spaces; but as Jo Freeman (1972) pointed out in her classic article ,
” The Tyrann )T of Structurelessness,” this is also so much more work
that we may fall into a lowest level convenience classification rather
than a high -level semantic one. In one of our digital library projects
at Illinois , for example, several undergraduates we inter \Tiewed in
ally biased; and autopsies (which are 1-arely done) have a low rate of
agreement with the code on the form (Fagot-Largeault 1989).
Even when there is relatively simple consensus about the cause of
death, the act of assigning a classification can be socially 01- ethically
charged. Thus , in some countries the death certificate has two faces:
a public certificate handed to the funeral director so that arrangements
can be made quickly and discreetl)7, and a statistical cause filed anony-
mously with the public health department . In this case, the doctor is
not faced with telling the family of a socially unacceptable form of
death : syphilis can become heart failure , or suicide can become a
stroke. For example, as we discuss in chapter 4, the process of moving
to an anonymous statistical record may reveal hidden biases in the
reporting of death. Where the death certificate is public , stigma and
the desire to protect the feelings of the family may reign over scientific
accuracy.
Ove1- the years, those designing the list of causes of death and disease
have struggled with all of these problems . One of the simple but
important rules of thumb to try to control for this degree of uncer –
tainty is to distribute the residual categories. ” Not elsewhere classified”
appears throughout the entire lCD , but nowhere as a top -level cate-
gory. So since uncertainty is inevitable , and its scope and scale essen-
tially unknowable , at least its impact “,”‘ill not hit a single disease or
location disproportionately . Its effects “,”‘ill remain as local as possible;
the quest for certainty is not lost, but postponed , diluted , and
abridged .
26 Introduction
focus groups stated that they would just get five references for a term
paper – any five – since that is what the professor wanted , and refer –
ences had better be ones that are listed electronically and available
without walking across campus .
The ICD classification is in many ways an ideal mirror of how people
designing global information schemes struggle with uncertainty , am –
biguity , standardization , and the practicalities of data quality . Digging
into the archives , and reading the ICD closely through its changes ,
reveals some of the upstream , design – oriented decisions informing the
negotiated order achieved by the vast system of forms , boxes , software ,
and death certificates . At the same time , we have been constantly aware
of the human suffering often occasioned by the apparently bloodless
apparatus of paperwork through which these data are collected .
Part II .. Classification and Biography
The second part of this book looks at two cases where the lives of
individuals are broken , twisted , and torqued by their encounters with
classification systems . This often invisible anguish informs another
level of ethical inquiry . Once having been made , the classification
systems are applied to individual cases – sometimes resulting in a kind
of surreal bureaucratic landscape . Sociologist Max Weber spoke of
the ” iron cage of bureaucracy ” hemming in the lives of modern work –
ers and families . The cage formed by classification systems can be
constraining in just this way , although cage might be too impoverished
a metaphor to describe its variations and occasional stretches . In
chapters 5 and 6 we look at biography and classification . We chose two
examples where classification has become a direct tool mediating
human suffering . Our first case concerns tuberculosis patients and
the impact of disease classification on their lives . We use historical
data to discuss the experience of the disease within the tuberculosis
asylum .
Tuberculosis patients , like man } ‘ with chronic illness , live under a
confusing regime of categories and metrics ( see also Ziporyn 1992 ) .
Many people were incarcerated for years – some for decades – waiting
for the disease to run its course , to achieve a cure at high altitudes , or
to die there . They were subjected to a constant battery of measure –
ments : lung capacity , auscultation , body temperature and pulse rate ,
x – rays , and , as they were developed , laboratory tests of blood and other
bodily fluids . The results of the tests determined the degree of free –
dom from the sanatorium regime as well as, ultimately , the date of
release.
Of no surprise to medical sociologists, the interpretation and nego-
tiations of the tests between doctor and patient were fraught with
questions of the social value of the patient (middle -class patients being
thought more compliant and reliable when on furlough from the
asylum than those from lower classes), with gender stereotypes, and
with the gradual adaptation of the patient ‘s biographical expectations
to the period of incarceration . Thomas Mann ‘s The A1agic Mountain
and Julius Roth’s Timetables are full of stories of classification and
metrication . We examine how different time lines, and expectations
about those time lines, unfold in these two remarkable volumes. Biog-
raphy , career, the state of the medical art with respect to the disease,
and the public health adjudication of tuberculosis are all intertwined
against the landscape of the sanatorium .
Life in the sanatorium has a surreal , almost nightmarish quality, as
detailed by Mann , Roth , and many other writers throughout the
twentieth century . This sense comes precisely from the misalignment
of a patient ‘s life expectations, the uncertainties of the disease and of
the treatment , and the negotiations laden with other sorts of interac –
tional burdens . It is one thing to be ill and in the hospital with an
indefinite release date. It is quite another when the date of release
includes one’s ability to negotiate well with the physicians, their inter –
pretation of the latest research, and the exigencies of public health
forms and red tape. We call this agglomeration torque, a twisting of
time lines that pull at each other, and bend or twist both patient
biography and the process of metrication . When all are aligned , there
is no sense of torque or stress; when they pull against each other over
a long period , a nightmare texture emerges.
A similar torque is found in the second case in this section, that
of race classification and reclassification under apartheid in South
Africa . Between 1950 and the fall of apartheid forty years later, South
Africans were ruled under an extremely rigid , comprehensive system
of race classification. Divided into four main racial groups-
white/European , Bantu (black), Asian and coloured (mixed race)-
people’s lives were rigidly segregated. The segregation extended from
so-called petty apartheid (separate bus stops, water fountains , and
toilets) to rights of work , residency, education , and freedom of move-
ment . This system became the target of worldwide protest and even-
tually came to a formal end . These facts are common knowledge . What
To Classify Is Human 27
28 I nlrod uc lion
has been less well documented or publicized are the actual techniques
used to classify people by race . In chapter 6 , we examine in detail some
cases of mixed – race people who applied to be reclassified after their
initial racial designation by the state . These borderline cases serve to
illuminate the underlying architecture of apartheid . This was a mix –
ture of brute power , confused eugenics , and appropriations of
anthropological theories of race . The scientific reason given for apart –
heid by the white supremacist Nationalist party was ” separate devel –
opment ” – the idea that to develop naturally , the races must develop
separatel ) ” .
In pursuing this ideology , of course , people and families that crossed
the color barrier were problematic . If a natural scientific explanation
was given for apartheid , systematic means should be available to win –
now white from black , coloured from black and so on . As the chapter
delineates , this attempt was fraught with inconsistencies and local
work – arounds , as people never easily fit any categories . Over 100 , 000
people made formal appeals concel ~ ning their race classification ; most
were denied .
Although it lies at a political extreme , these cases form a continuum
with the classification of people at different stages of tuberculosis . In
both cases , biographies and categories fall along often conflicting tra –
jectories . Lives are twisted , even torn , in the attempt to force the one
into the other . These torques may be petty or grand , but they are a
way of understanding the coconstruction of lives and their categories .
Part III .. Classification and Work Practice
In part III , chapters 7 and 8 , look at how classification systems organ –
ize and are organized by work practice . We examine the effort of a
group of nursing scientists based at the University of Iowa , led by
Joanne McCloskey and Gloria Bulechek , to produce a classification of
nursing interventions . Their Nursing Intervention Classification
( NIC ) aims at depicting the range of activities that nurses carry out in
their daily routines . Their original system consisted of a list of some
336 interventions ; each comprised of a label , a definition , a set of
activities , and a short list of background readings . Each of those inter –
ventions is in turn classified within a taxonomy of six domains and
twenty – six classes . For example , one of the tasks nurses commonly
perform is preparing and monitoring intravenous medication . The
nursing intervention ” epidural analgesia administration ” is defined as :
” preparation and delivery of narcotic analgesics into the epidural
space;” another common one, “cough enhancement,” groups activities
designed to help respiration .
The Iowa NIC researchers built up theil ~ system of nursing inter –
ventions inductively . They created a preliminary list that distinguished
between nursing interv’entions and activities, then nurtured a large
grass roots network of nursing researchers.5 This group narrowed the
preliminary list of interventions to the original 336 published in NIC
and further validated them via surveys and focus groups . Different
interventions were rev’iewed for clinical relevance, and a coding
scheme was developed. The classification s)Tstem grew through a co-
operative process, with nUl1ses in field sites trying out categories, and
suggesting new ones in a series of regional and specialist meetings.
Since 1992 the nurses have added over 50 interventions to their
original list . We attended a number of these meetings, and interviewed
many of the nurses involved .
Caring work such as calming and educating patients, usually done
by nurses, often cuts across specific medical diagnostic categories. The
NIC investigators use their list of interventions to make vTisible and
legitimate the work that nurses do. The idea is that it will be used to
compare work across hospitals, specialties, and geographical areas, and
to build objective research measures for the outcomes. NIC , although
still relatively young , promises to be a major rallying point for nurses
in the decades to come. Before NIC , much nursing work was invisible
to the medical record . As one nurse poignantly said, “we were just
thrown in with the cost of the room .” Another said, ” I am not a bed !”
The traditional , quintessential nurse would be ever present, caregiv-
ing , and helpful – but not a part of the formal patient -doctor informa –
tion structure . Of course, this invisibility is bound up with traditional
gender roles, as with librarians , social workers , and primary school
teachers.
But as with the lCD , classifying events is difficult . In the case of ~ IC ,
the politics move from a politics of certainty to a politics of ambiguity .
The essence of this politics is walking a tightrope between increased
visibility and increased surveillance; between overspecifying what a
nurse should do and taking away discretion from the individual. .
praCtitIoner.
When discretion and the tacit knowledge that is part of every occu-
pation meet the medical bureaucracy, which would account for every
pill and every moment of health care workers ‘ time , contradictions
To Classify Is Human 29
I ntrod uction30
ensue. This is especially true in the ” softer” areas of care. Social-
psychological care giving is one of the areas where this dilemma is
prominent . For example, NlC lists as nursing interventions ” anticipa –
tory guidance” and ” mood management”- preparation for grief or
surgery. Difficult though these are to capture in a classification scheme,
one much more difficult is ” humor .” How can one capture humor as
a deliberate nursing intervention ? Does sarcasm, irony , or laughter
count as a nursing intervention ? When do you stop? How to reimburse
humor , how to measure this kind of care? No one would dispute the
importance of humor , but it is by its nature a situated and subjective
action. A grey area of common sense remains for the individual staff
nurse to define whether some of the nursing interventions are worth
classifying.
There are continuing tensions within NIC between just this kind of
common sense and abstracting away from the local to standardize and
compare, while at the same time rendering invisible work visible.
Nurses’ ” rork is often invisible for a combination of good and bad
reasons. Nurses have to ask mundane questions, rearrange bedcovers,
move a patient ‘s hand so that it is closer to a button , and sympathize
about the suffering involved in illness. Bringing this work out into the
open and differentiating its components can mean belaboring the
obvious or risking being too vague.
One of the battlefields where comparability and control appear as
opposing factors is in linking NIC to costs. NIC researchers assert that
the classification of nursing interventions will allow a determination of
the costs of services provided by nurses and planning for resources
needed in nursing practice. As the nurse above says, nursing treat-
ments are usually bundled in with the room price . NIC is used in the
development of nursing health care systems and may provide a plan –
ning vehicle for previously untracked costs. As we shall see, NIC can
also be problematic for nurses. Like any other classification scheme
that renders ” Tork visible, it can also render surveillance easier- and
it could in the end lead to a Tayloristic dissection of the tasks of nursing
(as the NlC designers are well aware). So-called unskilled tasks may
be taken out of their hands and the profession as a whole may suffer
a loss of autonomy and the substitution of rigid procedure for common
sense.
As in the case of the lCD , there are many layers of meaning involved
in developing and implementing nursing classification. NIC might
look like a straightforward organizational tool : it is in fact much more
To Classi/)1 Is Human 31
than that . It merges science, practice, bureaucracy, and information
systems. NIC coordinates bodies, impairments , charts, reimbursement
systems, vocabularies, patients, and health care professionals. Ulti –
mately, it provides a manifesto for nursing as an organized occupation ,
a basis for a scientific domain , and a tool for organizing work practices.
Why It Is Important to Study Classification Systems
The sheer density of the collisions of classification schemes in our lives
calls for a new kind of science, a new set of metaphors, linking tradi –
tional social science and computer and information science. We need
a topography of things such as the distribution of ambiguity ; the fluid
dynamics of how classification systems meet u p- a plate tectonics
rather than a static geology. This new science will draw on the best
empirical studies of work -arounds , information use, and mundane
tools such as desktop folders and file cabinets (perhaps peering back-
wards out from the Web and into the practices). It will also use the
best of object-oriented programming and other areas of computer
science to describe this territory . It will build on years of valuable
research on classification in librar )’ and information science.
We end this introduction with a future scenario that symbolizes this
abstract endeavor. Imagine that you are walking through a forest of
interarticulated branches. Some are covered with ice or snow, and the
sun melts their touching tips to reveal space between. Some are so
thickly brambled they seem solid; others are oddly angular in nature ,
like esplanaded trees.
Some of the trees are wild , some have been cultivated . Some are old
and gnarled , and some are tiny shoots; some of the old ones are nearly
dead, others show green leaves. The forest is still wild , but there are
some parks, and some protocols for finding one’s way along, at least
on the known paths. Helicopters flying overhead can quickly tell you
how many types of each tree, even each leaf, there are in the world ,
but they cannot yet give you a guidebook for bird -watching or forestry
management. There is a lot of underbrush and a complex ecology of
soil bacteria, flora , and fauna.
Now imagine that the forest is a huge information space and each
of the trees and bushes are classification systems. Those V\JTho make
them up and use them are the animals and plants, and the soil is a
mix of the Internet , the paper world , and other communication infra –
structures .
Your job is to describe this forest. You may write a basic manual of
forestry, Ol~ paint a landscape, compose an opera, or improve the maps
used throughout . What \\rill your product look like ? Who will use it ?
In this book , we show from our studies of medical, scientific, and
race classification that , like a good forest, some areas will be left wild ,
or in darkness, or even unmapped (that is, some ambiguity will re-
main ). We will show that abstract schema that do not take use into
account- say, maps that leave out landmarks or altitude or how read-
ers use maps- will simply’ fail . (That is, common sense will be seen as
the precious resource that it is.) We intuit that a mixture of scientific,
poetic, and artistic talents, such as that represented in the hypertextual
world , will be crucial to this task. We will demonstrate the value of a
mixture of formal and folk classifications that are used sensibly in the
context of people’s lives.
32 I ntrod uction,
This excerpt from
Sorting Things Out.
Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star.
© 1999 The MIT Press.
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of MIT CogNet.
Unauthorized use or dissemination of this information is expressly
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DifferentiaSpecifica & Classification Systems
Aristotle introduced the concept of definition. According to Aristotle, the definition of a species
consists of genus proximus (e.g. animal, i.e. “a living organism that feeds on organic matter, typically
having specialized sense organs and nervous system and able to respond rapidly to stimuli”,
according to the OED) and differentia specifica (e.g. having reason). The differentia specifica is that part
of the definition not provided by the genus.
The genus expresses an is–a relationship, while the differentia specifica expresses a has–a relationship.
Two species (e.g. humans and elephants) with the same genus (animal) are said to be members of
that genus (animal). The differentia is the attribute by which one species is distinguished from all
others of the same genus, i.e. what differentiates humans from elephants?
Differentiation
(a) An animal is a human if it has the capacity for reason.
(b) An animal is an elephant if it has a trunk.
Example (a) defines, per genus proximus and differentia specifica, the species human by presenting
the genus (animal) and the differentia specifica (capacity for reason). Example (b) defines another
member of the same genus (animal) by differentiation (has a trunk).
(Adapted from: http://pennance.us/home/downloads/definition )
What are other differentia specifica of humans, i.e. what makes human different from other
animals or zombies or plants? Think of a few differentiations other than ‘having reason’ that
hold up across various comparisons.
Take a look at the following classification systems/taxonomies. How does each of them
divide up living beings? Are there any differences?
1) Aristotle’s Scala Naturae or Ladder of Life (from Charles Singer, A Short History of Biology):
http://pennance.us/home/downloads/definition
2) The Great Chain of Being (sometimes called Divine
Order): http://www.jasonbengtson.com/earlymodern/index.html# (explore the tiers by
clicking on them)
3) Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae (1735), here animal kingdom (identify the names of categories I-VI
if you can): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Linnaeus_-_Regnum_Animale_(1735)
4) Tree of Life:
a. Darwin’s only illustration in On the Origin of Species By Natural
Selection (1859): http://darwin-online.org.uk/graphics/Origin_Illustrations.html
b. Haeckel’s tree of life in The Evolution of
Man (1879): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tree_of_life_by_Haeckel
c. The Tree of Life project explains
phylogeny: http://tolweb.org/tree/learn/concepts/whatisphylogeny.html
d. The Hillis Plot (tree of life based on completely sequenced genomes):
http://www.zo.utexas.edu/faculty/antisense/tree (zoom in!)
e. The “New Tree of Life”: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/science/scientists-
unveil-new-tree-of-life.html (read explanation and click on picture to see details)
http://www.jasonbengtson.com/earlymodern/index.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Linnaeus_-_Regnum_Animale_(1735)
http://darwin-online.org.uk/graphics/Origin_Illustrations.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tree_of_life_by_Haeckel
http://tolweb.org/tree/learn/concepts/whatisphylogeny.html
http://www.zo.utexas.edu/faculty/antisense/tree
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/science/scientists-unveil-new-tree-of-life.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/science/scientists-unveil-new-tree-of-life.html
2
Differentia Specifica and classification Sytems
Student’s Name
Course
Instructor’s name.
Institutional Affiliation
Differentia Specifica and classification Sytems
Differentia Specifica Of Humans
Humans are different from other animals mainly because of their high brain capacity. Other factors differentiating humans from other animals include; bipedalism, lack of a tail, their ability to use their forelimbs to manipulate and use tools, and also their advanced communication and language.
Classification Systems
Different classification systems have been used to categorize organisms over time. These include Aristotle’s Scala Naturae which ranks organisms on the order of their “superiority” in the ladder of life(Archibald, 2018). Inanimate matter is placed at the lowest while humans are placed at the top. Another classification system is “The Great Chain of Being”.In this, God is at the top while satan is at the bottom ( Egan, 2016). Human beings occupy the fourth position. The difference between this system and others is that it includes deities in its ranking of life.Other classification systems such as Linnaeus “Systema Natura” classify the natural world into; plants, animals, and minerals ( Müller-Wille, 2017). Each is further classified into; classes, orders, genres, and species.While these classification systems focus on showing the difference between organisms, Heckel’s tree focuses on showing how all organisms evolved from one primordial ancestor
References
Archibald, J. D. (2018). From Aristotle’s Teleology to Darwin’s Genealogy: The Stamp of Inutility. Philosophical Inquiries, 6(2), R1-R3.
Egan, G. (2016). Gaia and the great chain of being. In Ecocritical Shakespeare (pp. 81-93). Routledge.
Müller-Wille, S. (2017). Names and numbers:“data” in classical natural history, 1758–1859. Osiris, 32(1), 109-128.
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