Requirements: Identify the question you decide to answer at the top of your post. Prompt responses should answer the question and elaborate in a meaningful way using 2 of the weekly class readings (250 words of original content). Do not quote the readings, paraphrase and cite them using APA style in text citations. You can only use ONE multimedia source for your minimum 2 sources each week. The readings must be from the current week. The more sources you use, the more convincing your argument. Include a reference list in APA style at the end of your post, does not count towards minimum word content.
REMEMBER YOU NEED A MINIMUM OF 2 CLASS READINGS TO ANSWER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING
Select ONE of the following:
1) Analyze the 4 types of vulnerabilities present in this case before the event. what could have been done better? What is the biggest lesson learned from the Mount Pinatubo Eruption? Note: Review Coppola reading on vulnerability (week 2): no need to define each type of vulnerability, it is common knowledge now, Coppola does not count for the 2 minimum sources.
2) Describe the issues with the local/ indigenous community in this case. How can governments better communicate with indigenous groups living in at risk locations?
Introduction to International
Disaster Management
Third Edition
Damon P. Coppola
AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON
NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
150 Introduction to International Disaster Management. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801477-6.00003-4
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
CHAPTER
RISK AND VULNERABILITY
3
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Citizens collectively face risks from a range of large-scale hazards. Risk is the interaction of hazard consequences
and likelihood. Using this formula, hazards are compared and ranked, allowing disaster managers to determine
the most effective and appropriate treatment options. The goal of risk analysis is a standard measurement of likeli-
hood and consequence, whether quantitative or qualitative. Consequence describes hazard effects on humans, built
structures, and the environment. Losses may be direct or indirect, and tangible or intangible. Hazard likelihood and
consequences can change considerably over time. These trends can be incremental or extreme, and can occur sud-
denly or over centuries. Risk evaluation is conducted to determine the relative seriousness of risks, and to compare
and prioritize them. Disaster managers must decide what risks to treat, what risks to prevent at all costs, and what
risks to disregard. These decisions are based on risk acceptability. The personal factors that dictate risk acceptabil-
ity are guided by risk perception. Vulnerability is a measure of the propensity of an object, area, individual, group,
community, country, or other entity to incur the consequences of a hazard, and is the result of physical, social,
economic, and environmental factors.
Key Terms: consequence; direct and indirect losses; likelihood; qualitative risk analysis; quantitative risk analysis;
risk; risk evaluation; risk matrix; risk perception; tangible and intangible losses; vulnerability.
INTRODUCTION
Risk is an unavoidable part of life, affecting all people without exception, irrespective of geographic or
socioeconomic limits. Each choice we make as individuals and as a society involves specific, often
unknown, factors of risk, and full risk avoidance is generally impossible.
On the individual level, each person is primarily responsible for managing the risks he or she faces
as he or she sees fit. For some risks, management may be obligatory, as with automobile speed limits
and seatbelt usage. For other personal risks, such as those associated with many recreational sports,
individuals are free to decide the degree to which they will reduce their risk exposure, such as by wear-
ing a helmet or other protective clothing. Similarly, the risk of disease affects humans as individuals,
and as such is generally managed by individuals. By employing risk reduction techniques for each life
hazard, individuals effectively reduce their vulnerability to those hazard risks.
As a society or a nation, citizens collectively face risks from a range of large-scale hazards. Although
these hazards usually result in fewer total injuries and fatalities over the course of each year than indi-
vidually faced hazards, they are considered much more significant because they have the potential to
result in many deaths, injuries, or damages in a single event or series of events. In fact, some of these
hazards are so great that, if they occurred, they would result in such devastation that the capacity of
local response mechanisms would be overwhelmed. This, by definition, is a disaster. For these
151 TWO COMPONENTS OF RISK
large-scale hazards, many of which are identified in chapter 2, vulnerability is most effectively reduced
by disaster risk management efforts collectively, as a society. For most of these hazards, it is the govern-
ment’s responsibility to manage, or at least guide the management of, disaster risk reduction measures.
And when these hazards do result in disaster, it is likewise the responsibility of governments to respond
to them and aid in the recovery that follows.
TWO COMPONENTS OF RISK
Chapter 1 defines risk as the interaction of a hazard’s consequences with its probability or likelihood.
This definition and similar derivatives are used in virtually all technical documents associated with risk
management. Clearly defining the meaning of “risk” is important, because the term often carries mark-
edly different meanings for different people (Jardine and Hrudey 1997). One of the simplest and most
common definitions of risk, preferred by many risk managers, is displayed by the equation stating that
risk is the likelihood of an event occurring multiplied by the consequence of that event, were it to occur:
Risk = Likelihood × Consequence (Ansell and Wharton 1992).
LIKELIHOOD
“Likelihood” can be given as a probability or a frequency, whichever is appropriate for the analysis
under consideration. There are multiple variants to how probability and frequency are displayed, but
these all typically refer to the same absolute value. “Frequency” communicates the number of times an
event will or is expected to occur within an established sample size over a specific period of time. Quite
literally, it tells how frequently an event occurs. For instance, the frequency of auto accident deaths in
the United States equates to approximately one death per 81 million miles driven (Dubner and Levitt
2006).
In contrast to frequency, “probability” refers to single-event scenarios. Its value is expressed as a
number between zero and one, with zero signifying a zero chance of occurrence and one signifying
certain occurrence. Using the auto accident example, in which the frequency of death is one per 81
million miles driven, we can say that the probability of a random person in the United States dying in
a car accident equals 0.000001 if he or she was to drive 81 miles.
When disaster risk managers use a standardized method of calculating risk utilizing this formula
across all identified hazards, comparison and ranking by severity is possible. If hazard risks are instead
analyzed and described using different methods and/or terms of reference for each hazard, or even for
groups of hazards, comparison and ranking becomes very difficult when prioritizing how limited
resources will be dedicated to risk reduction efforts.
This ranking of risks, or “risk evaluation,” is what allows disaster risk managers to determine which
treatment options, whether mitigation or preparedness, or both, are the most effective, most appropri-
ate, and will provide the most benefit per unit of cost. Not all hazard risks are equally serious, and risk
analysis is what enables an informed decision-making process.
Without exception, governments have limited funds available to manage the hazard risks they face.
While reducing the risk of one hazard may be less expensive or more easily implemented than reducing
the risk of another, cost and ease alone may not be valid reasons to choose a treatment option. Hazards
that have the potential to inflict great consequences (in terms of lives lost or injured, or property
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY152
damaged or destroyed) and/or occur with great frequency pose the greatest overall threat. Considering
budgetary limits, disaster risk managers should generally treat those hazard risks that pose the greatest
threat first. Fiscal realities often drive this analytic approach, resulting in situations in which certain
hazard risks in the community’s overall risk profile are mitigated, while others are not addressed to any
degree at all.
The goal of risk analysis is therefore to establish a standard, comparable measurement of the likeli-
hood and consequence factors for each hazard identified. The different mechanisms through which
values are derived for a hazard’s likelihood and consequences fall into two general categories of analy-
sis: quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. Quantitative analysis draws upon mathematical and/
or statistical data to achieve numerical descriptions of risk. Qualitative analysis also relies upon math-
ematical and/or statistical data, but instead uses defined terms (words) to describe and categorize the
hazard risk likelihood and consequence value outcomes. And while quantitative analyses provide spe-
cific data points (e.g., dollars, probability, frequency, or number of injuries/fatalities), qualitative analy-
ses consider ranges of possible values for which each qualifier is assigned. It is often cost- and
time-prohibitive, and often not necessary, to determine the exact quantitative measures for the likeli-
hood and consequence factors of a hazard’s risk. Qualitative measures are much easier to determine and
typically require less time, money, and, most important, expertise, to conduct. For this reason, it is the
most commonly encountered method of assessment in practice. The following section provides a gen-
eral explanation of how these two types of measurements apply to the likelihood and consequence
components of risk.
Quantitative Representation of Likelihood
As previously stated, likelihood can be derived as either a frequency or a probability. A quantitative
system of measurement exists for each. For frequency, this number indicates the number of times a
hazard is expected to result in an actual event over a chosen time frame. For example, a particular area
might experience flooding four times per year, one time per decade, ten times each month, and so on as
calculated. Probability considers the same base data, but expresses the outcome as a measure that lies
between 0 and 1 or as a percentage value that falls between 0 percent and 100 percent. In both cases,
this represents the chance of occurrence. For example, if an area has experienced four flood events in
the past 200 years where floodwaters reached 20 feet above the base flood elevation, then this severity
of flooding has a one-in-fifty chance of occurring in any given year, or a probability of 2 percent, or
0.02, each year. This is also considered to be a 50-year flood. An event that is expected to occur two
times in the next three years has a 0.66 probability each year, or a 66 percent chance of occurrence, and
is much more probable than the 50-year event.
Qualitative Representation of Likelihood
Likelihood can also be expressed using qualitative measurement, applying words to describe the chance
of occurrence. Each word or phrase represents a pre-established range of possibilities. For instance, the
likelihood of a particular hazard resulting in an emergency or disaster event might be described as fol-
lows using a qualitative system of likelihood:
• Certain: >99 percent chance of occurring in a given year (one or more occurrences per year)
• Likely: 50–99 percent chance of occurring in a given year (one occurrence every one to two
years)
153 TWO COMPONENTS OF RISK
• Possible: 5–49 percent chance of occurring in a given year (one occurrence every two to twenty
years)
• Unlikely: 2–5 percent chance of occurring in a given year (one occurrence every twenty to fifty
years)
• Rare: 1–2 percent chance of occurring in a given year (one occurrence every fifty to one hundred
years)
• Extremely rare: <1 percent chance of occurring in a given year (one occurrence every one hun-
dred or more years)
Note that this is just one of a limitless range of qualitative terms and values that can be used to
describe the likelihood component of risk. As long as all hazards are compared using the same range of
qualitative values, the actual determination of likelihood ranges attached to each term does not neces-
sarily matter. (See exhibit 3.1.)
EXHIBIT 3.1 QUALITATIVE MEASUREMENTS: THE CONSIDERATION OF
RISK PERCEPTION AND STANDARDIZATION
In brief, different people fear different hazards for many different reasons. These differences in perception can be based
on experience with previous instances of disasters, specific characteristics of the hazard, or many other combinations of
reasons. Even the word risk has different meanings to different people, ranging from “danger” to “adventure.”
Planners, or members of disaster risk management teams, are likely to draw from diverse backgrounds and may even be
from different parts of the country or the world. Each will have a unique perception of risk (regardless of whether they are able
to recognize these differences). Such differences can be subtle, but they make a major difference in the risk analysis process.
Quantitative methods of assessing risk use exact measurements and are therefore not very susceptible to the effects of
risk perception. A 50 percent likelihood of occurrence is the same to everyone, regardless of their convictions. Unfortu-
nately, there rarely exists sufficient information to make definitive calculations of a hazard’s likelihood and consequence.
The exact numeric form of measurement achieved through quantitative measurements is incomparable. The value of
qualitative assessments, however, lies in their ability to accommodate for an absence of exact figures and their ease of use.
Unfortunately, risk perception causes different people to view the terms used in qualitative systems of measurement
differently. For this reason, qualitative assessments of risk must be based on quantitative ranges of possibilities or clear
definitions. For example, imagine a qualitative system for measuring the consequences of earthquakes in a particular city
in terms of lives lost and people injured. Now imagine that the disaster management team’s options are “None,” “Minor,”
“Moderate,” “Major,” or “Catastrophic.” One person on the team could consider 10 lives lost as minor. However, another
team member considers the same number of fatalities to be catastrophic. It depends on the perception of risk that each has
developed over time.
This confusion is significantly alleviated when detailed definitions are used to determine the assignation of
consequence measurements for each hazard. Imagine the same scenario, using the following qualitative system of
measurement):
1. None. No injuries or fatalities.
2. Minor. Small number of injuries but no fatalities. First aid treatment required.
3. Moderate. Medical treatment needed but no fatalities. Some hospitalisation.
4. Major. Extensive injuries, significant hospitalisation. . . . Fatalities.
5. Catastrophic. Large number of severe injuries. Extended and large numbers requiring hospitalisation. . . . Significant
fatalities. (EMA 2000)
This system of qualitative measurement, with defined terms, makes it more likely that people of different backgrounds
or beliefs would choose the same characterization for the same magnitude of event. Were this system to include ranges
of values, such as “1–20 fatalities” for “Major,” and “more than 20 fatalities” for “Catastrophic,” the confusion could be
alleviated even more.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY154
CONSEQUENCE
The consequence component of risk describes the effects of the risk on humans, built structures, and
the environment. There are generally three factors examined when determining the consequences of a
disaster:
1. Deaths/fatalities (human)
2. Injuries (human)
3. Damages (cost, reported in currency, generally US dollars for international comparison)
Further distinctions have been made to distinguish between damages and losses, as is the case with
the World Bank’s Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA) methodology (see chapter 6). In this case,
damages are defined as the destruction of physical assets, while losses are defined as foregone produc-
tion or income. And while damages occur immediately and can be rebuilt, losses occur over a longer
period of time and may not be recoverable.
Although attempts have been made to convert all three of these consequence factors into monetary
amounts to derive a single number to quantify the consequences of a disaster, doing so has proved
controversial (how can one place a value on life?) and complex (is a young life worth more than an old
life? by how much?). As such, it is often most appropriate and convenient to maintain a distinction
between these three factors when detailing an event’s impact.
Categories of consequence can be further divided, and often are, to better understand their influence
within social and economic contexts. Two of the most common distinctions are direct and indirect
effects (damages/losses), and tangible and intangible effects (damages/losses).
Direct effects, as described by Keith Smith in his book Environmental Hazards, are “the first
order consequences that occur immediately after an event, such as the deaths and economic loss
caused by the throwing down of buildings in an earthquake” (Smith 1992). Examples of direct
effects are
• Fatalities
• Injuries (“The prediction of injuries is often more valuable than the prediction of fatalities,
because the injured will require a commitment of medical and other resources for treatment.”
[UNDP 1994])
• Cost of repair or replacement of damaged or destroyed public and private structures (buildings,
schools, bridges, roads, etc.)
• Loss of possessions
• Relocation costs/temporary housing
• Loss of agriculture and livestock
• Loss of business inventory/facilities/equipment/information
• Loss of usable land
• Community response and cleanup costs incurred
• Loss of historical documents or records
Indirect effects, according to Smith (1992), “emerge later and may be more difficult to attribute to
the event.” Examples of indirect losses include:
• Loss of livelihoods/income potential
• Input/output losses of businesses
155 TWO COMPONENTS OF RISK
• Loss of community population
• Loss of community character
• Loss of critical services due to organization or business losses
• Reductions in business/personal spending (“ripple effects”)
• Loss of institutional/tacit knowledge
• Mental illness/psychosocial impacts
• Bereavement/emotional loss
Tangible effects “are those for which it is possible to assign monetary values” (Smith 1992). Gener-
ally, only tangible effects are included in the estimation of future events and the reporting of past
events. Examples of tangible effects include:
• Cost of building repair/replacement
• Response costs
• Loss of inventory or possessions
• Loss of wages
• Loss of tax revenue
• Loss of trained or technical staff
Intangible effects are those that “cannot be properly assessed in monetary terms” (Smith 1992). This
is the primary reason that human fatalities and human injuries are assessed as a separate category from
the cost measurement of consequence in disaster management. These effects are almost never included
in damage assessments or predictions. Examples of intangible effects include:
• Cultural impacts
• Stress
• Mental illness
• Loss of community character
• Poor morale
• Consequences of a damaged environment
• Increased health risks
• Sentimental value
• Environmental losses (aesthetic value)
Although it is extremely rare for benefits or positive effects to be included in the assessment of past
disasters or the prediction of future ones, they do arise in the aftermath of many disasters. Like losses,
gains can be categorized as direct or indirect, tangible or intangible. Examples of tangible, intangible,
direct, and indirect gains include:
• Decreases in future hazard risk by preventing rebuilding in hazard-prone areas
• New technologies used in reconstruction that result in an increase in quality of services
• Removal of old/unused/hazardous buildings
• Jobs created in reconstruction
• Greater public recognition of hazard risk
• Otherwise-unobtainable funds available for development or disaster risk reduction
• Environmental benefits (e.g., fertile soil from a volcano)
• Community cohesion
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY156
As with the likelihood component of risk, the consequences of risk can be described according to
quantitative or qualitative reporting methods. Quantitative representations of consequence vary accord-
ing to deaths/fatalities, injuries, and damages:
• Deaths/fatalities. The specific number of people who perished in a past event or who would be
expected to perish in a future event; for example, 55 people killed.
• Injuries. The specific number of people who were injured in a past event or who would be
expected to become injured in a future event. Can be expressed just as injuries, or divided into
mild and serious; for example, 530 people injured, 56 seriously.
• Damages. The assessed monetary amount of actual damages and/or losses incurred in a past event
or the amount of damages expected to occur in a future event. Occasionally, this number includes
insured losses as well; for example, $2 billion in damages, $980 million in insured losses. For past
disasters, damages may also be adjusted for inflation to enable a more meaningful comparison of
events that occurred many years apart.
Qualitative Representation of Consequence
As with the qualitative representation of likelihood, words or phrases can be used to describe the effects
of a past disaster or the anticipated effects of a future one. These measurements can be assigned to
deaths, injuries, or costs (the qualitative measurements of fatalities and injuries are often combined).
The list of qualitative terms included in Exhibit 3.1 is one
example.
Additional measures of consequence are possible, depending on the depth of analysis. These addi-
tional measures tend to require a great amount of resources, and are often not reported or cannot be
derived from historical information. Examples include:
• Emergency operations. Can be measured as a ratio of responders to victims, examining the
number of people who will be able to participate in disaster response (both official and unofficial
responders can be included) as a ratio of the number of people who will require assistance. This
ratio will differ significantly depending on the hazard. For example, following a single tornado
touchdown, there are usually many more responders than victims, but following a hurricane,
there are almost always many more victims than responders. This measure could include the first
responders from the community as well as the responders from the surrounding communities
with which mutual aid agreements have been made. Emergency operations also can measure the
mobilization costs and investment in preparedness capabilities. It can be difficult to measure the
stress and overwork of the first responders and their inability to carry out regular operations (fire
suppression, regular police work, regular medical work).
• Social disruption (people made homeless/displaced). This can be a difficult measure because,
unlike injuries or fatalities, people do not always report their status to municipal authorities
(injuries and deaths are reported by the hospitals), and baseline figures do not always exist. It is
also difficult to measure how many of those who are injured or displaced have alternative options
for shelter or care. Measuring damage to community morale, social contacts and cohesion, and
psychological distress can be very difficult, if not impossible.
• Disruption to economy. This can be measured in terms of either the number of working days
lost or the volume of production lost. The value of lost production is relatively easy to measure,
while the lost opportunities, lost competitiveness, and damage to reputation can be much more
157 TWO COMPONENTS OF RISK
difficult. The loss of livelihoods can be extremely difficult to measure, especially in farming
or fishing communities or communities centered around home-based production of crafts, for
example.
• Environmental impact. This can be measured in terms of the clean-up costs and the costs to repair
and rehabilitate damaged areas. It is harder to measure in terms of the loss of aesthetics and public
enjoyment, the consequences of a poorer environment, newly introduced health risks, and the risk
of future disasters.
It does not matter what system is used for qualitative analysis, but the same qualitative analysis
system must be used for all hazards analyzed in order to compare risks. It may be necessary for disaster
managers to create a qualitative system of measurement tailored to the country or community where
they are working. Not all countries or communities are the same, and what amounts to a minor impact
in one could represent a catastrophe in another. Qualitative measures of consequence should therefore
accommodate these differences. For example, a town of 500 people would be severely affected by a
disaster that caused 10 deaths, while a city of 5 million may experience that many, or even more, deaths
just from car accidents in any given week.
Another benefit of creating an individualized system of qualitative analysis is the incorporation of
the alternative measures of consequence (ratio of responders to victims, people made homeless/dis-
placed). The more tailored a system of analysis is to the needs of the study area, the more meaningful
its outcome will be to the disaster risk management process.
Intensive, Extensive, and Emerging Risk
Disaster risk managers are most often focused on addressing those hazards for which the likelihood of
occurrence is highest and the consequences are greatest. The risk for such hazards is considered to be
intensive. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those hazards for which frequency is high or very
high, yet the consequences are generally much less severe—perhaps isolated to an individual or a
neighborhood. Risk for hazards falling in this category are considered to be extensive. And while inten-
sive risk is most often associated with events that impact a large area, this does not mean that extensive
risk impacts only highly localized areas (though that is often the case.)
Events resulting from extensive risk are rarely if ever noteworthy or newsworthy, and often are not
tracked by centralized disaster information systems. Likewise, the required response may be nothing
beyond what is typical for the local emergency services to perform on any given day. It is the collective
sum of extensive risk that is significant, in that it can—and often does—exceed that of the major disas-
ter events incurred in any given year with regard to consequences. (See figure 3.1.) Extensive risk is
thus important to the disaster risk manager not in terms of preparing for response, but rather because it
is often true that the same mechanisms by which intensive risk is reduced hold true for extensive risk.
(See chapter 4 for mitigation options.)
The United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) reports that 97 percent of extensive
risk is weather-related. It is interesting to note that extensive and intensive risks are relative terms, such
that two events of equal consequence in two separate locations might be considered extensive—or
routine—in a large city, yet intensive in a small village. And because of these distinctions between
localities or countries, differences between extensive and intensive risk should be thought of as a matter
of capacity.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY158
The third special category, termed emerging risk, refers to hazards with traditionally low frequen-
cies of occurrencebut which are nonetheless increasing due to new patterns of exposure, increasing
frequencies, and changes in population vulnerability. Space weather is an example of an emerging risk.
In this instance, there is not an increase in the incidence of solar flares, but the impact they have on
modern technological systems, and the reverberations that has on contemporary social and economic
systems, are significant. The expansion of tropical diseases into areas farther and farther from the equa-
tor are presenting another form of emerging risk. The chukungunya virus, which, like Dengue Fever in
the 1980s, is moving quickly through the Caribbean, threatens many countries previously unaffected
because of wetter and warmer conditions that enable breeding of the mosquitos that carry the disease.
TRENDS
Whether risks have existed for centuries or are just emerging, the likelihoods and consequences associ-
ated with them are rarely static. The number of events caused by a particular hazard might increase or
decrease over time, whether due to changing global climate patterns, changes in human activities, or
FIGURE 3.1
Mortality from extensive and intensive disasters between 1989 and 2009, in 21 countries in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and the middle East (including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, India [Orissa and Tamil Nadu], Indonesia, Iran [Islamic Republic of], Jordan, Mexico,
Mozambique, Nepal, Peru, Panama, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, and Yemen)
Source: UNISDR, 2012.
159 TRENDS
both. Likewise, the damaging consequences of existing hazards might increase or decrease, even if
there are no changes observed in the total number of events that hazard causes. These trends can be
incremental or extreme and can occur suddenly or over centuries. Several short-term trends may even
be part of a larger long-term change.
CHANGES IN DISASTER FREQUENCY
A change in disaster frequency occurs when fewer or more disaster events of similar magnitude are
noted in a particular area of study. Such changes can be the result of several things, including an
increase in actual occurrences of a hazard, an increase in human activity in areas regularly exposed to
the hazard, an increase in vulnerability to the hazard among the exposed population, or a decrease in
disaster risk management capacity in the exposed area. It is important to remember that a disaster is not
determined by the occurrence of a hazard, but rather the outcome of the hazard’s consequences. A tor-
nado hitting an open field, for example, is not considered a disaster.
Changes in climate patterns, plate tectonics, or other natural systems can cause changes in the fre-
quency of particular natural hazards, regardless of whether the causes of the changes are natural (e.g.,
El Niño) or man-made (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions). Changes in frequency for technological or
intentional hazards can be the result of many factors, such as increased or decreased regulation of
industry and increases in international instability (terrorism).
Increases or decreases in human activity can also cause changes in disaster frequency. As popula-
tions move, they inevitably place themselves closer or farther from the range of effects from certain
hazards. For instance, if a community begins to develop industrial facilities within a floodplain that was
previously unoccupied, or in an upstream watershed where the resultant runoff increases flood hazards
downstream, the risk to property from flooding increases.
CHANGES IN DISASTER CONSEQUENCES
A change in disaster consequences occurs when a hazard inflicts either more or less severe impacts to
people, property, the environment, and the economy without any significant change in the number of
events caused by the hazard. Similar to changes in disaster likelihoods, changes in consequences may
be the result of one or more factors including changes in the attributes of the actual hazard (e.g.,
cyclones of greater intensity), changes in activity or development that influence the vulnerability of
people or structures, or a decrease in the willingness or ability to take pre-disaster actions to reduce the
impacts of hazard events (i.e., mitigation).
Changes in the attributes of the hazard can occur as part of short- or long-term cycles, perma-
nent changes in the natural processes if the hazard is natural, or changes in the nature of the tech-
nologies or tactics in the case of technological and intentional hazards. The consequences of
natural hazards change only rarely independent of human activities. One example is El Niño
events, with intense flooding increasing in some regions of the world and drought affecting others,
possibly for years. Technological and intentional hazards, however, change in terms of the severity
of their consequences all the time. The high numbers of deaths and the structural damage associ-
ated with the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon together display an increase in the
consequences of international terrorism on Americans and American interests. A mutation of a
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY160
certain viral or bacterial organism, resulting in a more deadly pathogen, can cause a drastic increase
in consequences, as occurred with the West Nile virus, tuberculosis, mad cow disease, SARS, and
MERS, to name a few.
Changes in human activities are probably the most significant cause of increases in the conse-
quences of disasters. These trends, unfortunately, are predominantly increasing. While the effects of
disasters worldwide are great, their consequences are the most devastating in developing countries.
Smith (1992) lists six reasons for these changes:
1. Population growth. As populations rise, the number of people exposed to hazard risk likewise
increases. Population growth can be regional or local if caused by movements of populations.
As urban populations grow, population density increases, exposing more people to hazards than
would have been affected previously.
2. Land pressure. Many industrial practices cause ecological degradation, which in turn can lead to
an increase in the severity of hazards. Filling in wetlands can cause more severe floods. Lack of
available land can lead people to develop areas that are susceptible to, for example, landslides,
avalanches, floods, and erosion, or that are closer to industrial facilities.
3. Economic growth. As more buildings, technology, infrastructure components, and other structures
are built, a community’s vulnerability to hazards increases. More developed communities with
valuable real estate have much more economic risk than communities in which little development
has taken place.
4. Technological innovation. Societies are becoming more dependent on technology. These systems,
however, are susceptible to the effects of natural, technological, and intentional hazards. Technol-
ogy ranges from communications (the Internet, cell phones, cable lines, satellites) to transportation
(larger planes, faster trains, larger ships, roads with greater capacity, raised highways) to utilities
(nuclear power plants, large hydroelectric dams) to any number of other facilities and systems
(high-rise buildings, life support systems).
5. Social expectations. With increases in technology and the advancement of science, people’s
expectations for public services, including availability of water, easy long-distance transportation,
constant electrical energy, and so forth, also increase. When these systems do not function, the
economic and social impacts can be immense.
6. Growing interdependence. The interdependence of individuals, communities, and even nations
is increasing rapidly. Recent outbreaks of viruses, including SARS, avian influenza, swine flu,
enterovirus 71 (EV71), and MERS highlight the ease with which pathogens can quickly impact
dozens of countries in distant regions, thanks to international travel. The economic and social
impacts of major disasters are global, as well. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the
United States caused the global tourism market to slump, while the 2011 Thailand floods caused
drastic cost increases to the global technology sector when production for more than one-third of
the global supply of hard drives was halted.
The validity of identified trends must be verified. Some trends are simply the result of better report-
ing or detection. The technology used to detect many hazards has improved, allowing for recognition
of factors where such recognition was formerly much more difficult or impossible. It is also common
for a trend to exist simply because research or records are incomplete. And finally, standardizing the
mechanisms for measurement across time is important. Costs of disasters, for instance, must be adjusted
161 COMPUTING LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE VALUES
for inflation, or else increases in total disasters costs may be distorted. The same is true with injuries
and deaths, which should be considered in light of total populations and population densities for specific
hazard types such as epidemics.
COMPUTING LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCE VALUES
Because there is rarely sufficient information to determine the exact statistical likelihood that disaster
will occur, or to determine the exact number of lives and property that would be lost, combining quan-
titative and qualitative measurements can provide highly useful yet obtainable risk measures. By com-
bining these two methods, disaster risk management practitioners can achieve a standardized
measurement of risk that accommodates less precise measurements of both risk components (likeli-
hood and consequence) in determining the comparative risk between hazards.
The process of determining the likelihood and consequence of each hazard begins with both quan-
titative and qualitative data and converts it all into a qualitative system of measurement that accommo-
dates all possibilities that hazards present (from the rarest to the most common and from the least
damaging to the most destructive).
DEPTH OF ANALYSIS
The depth of analysis disaster risk managers take is determined by three primary factors: availability of
financial and human resources, seriousness of the risk, and the complexity of the problem. Decisions
regarding the level of effort and resources dedicated to the treatment of each individual hazard are
informed by the hazard identification and assessment processes.
Each hazard may be analyzed in multiple ways as determined by the range of possible intensities
that might be exhibited. The likelihood and consequences for each possible intensity will be different,
which in turn results in different treatment (mitigation) options. (See exhibit 3.2.)
For instance, “earthquake” is a general term used to describe that hazard, though a magnitude 4.0
event is very different from a magnitude 9 event from the planning perspective. Generally, the lower a
hazard event’s intensity (and likewise the milder its consequences), the greater its likelihood of occur-
ring will be. Several thousand earthquakes of very low intensity and magnitude occur daily with few or
no consequences at all. Below a certain threshold, these low-impact events can be disregarded.
However, lower-frequency strong earthquakes must be given greater consideration because of their
potential to inflict massive casualties and damages.
EXHIBIT 3.2 F:N CURVES
Probability curves called f:N curves, which plot historical hazard intensities and likelihoods against the amount of damage
inflicted, can provide an estimation of both the likelihood of events of specific magnitude and the consequences should
those events occur. Examples of worldwide hazard f:N curves are shown in figure 3.2.
Individual communities would plot f:N curves for their locality using local historical data. This graphical representa-
tion illustrates the justification for dividing hazards according to possible intensities.
Source: UNDP, 1994.
jcuadra
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CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY192
Example C shows how new information can change the determination of what is considered accept-
able risk. In this example, we assume that alternative M determines the acceptable risk, as in example
A. However, additional information provided by experience, research, development, or analysis reveals
that the initial assessment of alternative M must be revised. Instead of confirming that M has lower cost
and lower risk than both alternatives K and L, the new information shows that M has both the high cost
of K and the high risk of L. The acceptable risk is now determined by the choice between K and L.
Example D illustrates the effect of values and preferences on the choice between alternatives. In this
example, different preferences for trading off increased cost for lower risk are represented by the two
curves. In case 1, the trade-off curve reflects the willingness to incur large costs to reduce risk by small
amounts. Alternative K is the most attractive choice with this preference. In case 2, the trade-off curve
reflects less of a willingness to increase costs in exchange for specific reductions in risk. This prefer-
ence selects alternative L as the best choice. Because acceptable risk is determined by the choice
between the two alternatives, these different preferences change what is considered acceptable.
VULNERABILITY
The concept of vulnerability was defined in chapter 1 as being a measure of the propensity of an object,
area, individual, group, community, country, or other entity to incur the consequences of a hazard. As
this section illustrates, measurement of vulnerability requires examination of a combination of physi-
cal, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes. Each of these factors influences risk by
causing an increase or decrease in likelihood and/or fewer or greater negative consequences.
It is important to first clarify the difference between the concepts of vulnerability and exposure,
which are often confused. The two words are frequently used interchangeably to describe how a com-
munity, country, or region is likely to experience a certain hazard. However, this is factually incorrect
and causes confusion. We can best understand the difference between vulnerability and exposure by
considering the following statement, which appeared in the United Nations Office for Disaster Reduc-
tion document Living with Risk: “While most natural hazards may be inevitable, disasters are not”
(ISDR 2004).
While vulnerability describes a propensity to incur consequences, exposure merely suggests that the
individual, structure, community, nation, or other subject will be confronted by the forces associated
with that particular hazard. For instance, imagine that someone says, on learning that Spain regularly
experiences extended periods of lower-than-normal rainfall, “The Spanish are vulnerable to drought.”
In the absence of additional information, this statement suggests more than the speaker intended. The
use of the word “vulnerable” implies that the population is likely to incur negative consequences,
whether because of poor coping capacity or other factors, rather than simply stating that droughts hap-
pen there. The reality, as figures 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate, is that while Spain is regularly exposed to
drought, the nation is not vulnerable to its consequences.
Remember that risk is composed of two components: likelihood and consequence. Exposure, or the
measure of whether a person, building, population, or nation is likely to experience a hazard, looks only
at a hazard’s likelihood. Vulnerability, however, is a factor of how small or great the consequences will
be should the hazard manifest. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 illustrate how the many different nations that are
exposed to drought each exhibit differing levels of vulnerability to this hazard. In light of this, it would
be more accurate to state that the Spanish face a drought risk because their exposure likelihood is
jcuadra
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193 VULNERABILITY
FIGURE 3.10
National vulnerabilities to drought risk as a factor of population exposure
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
FIGURE 3.11
National vulnerabilities to drought risk as a factor of population exposure
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY194
greater than zero, but because of the measures that nation has taken to minimize drought consequences,
it is no longer vulnerable to the hazard.
Vulnerability, like likelihood and consequence, is something that can be studied and measured.
Likewise, it can be decreased or increased depending on actions that are taken or events that transpire.
By taking action to prepare for a hazard or mitigate that hazard’s risk, the propensity to incur harm is
thus reduced. (Mitigation and preparedness are detailed in chapters 4 and 7, respectively.) As vulnera-
bility is decreased, resilience is increased. Resilience, which can be defined as the ability to prevent or
avoid the negative consequences of hazards, is the opposite of vulnerability.
As the definition of vulnerability in chapter 1 explains, two identical manifestations of a hazard may
result in a minor issue in one country and a major catastrophe in another. The impacted countries’ vul-
nerabilities are what account for the difference in presentation. There are generally four different types
of vulnerabilities: physical, social, economic, and environmental. Each is determined by a set profile of
factors that are identifiable and measurable.
Physical vulnerability looks at the interaction between living things, structures, material objects,
systems, and the physical forces of hazards. The choices societies make about placing structures, trans-
portation routes, and populations either in or out of harm’s way effectively determine physical vulner-
ability. Most of the risk reduction (mitigation) measures taken to reduce disaster risk seek to enable
people, structures, objects, and systems to resist these physical forces, thus reducing societies’ physical
vulnerability to them. For instance, when a building constructed in a flood hazard zone is elevated
above the limits of anticipated flood heights, its physical vulnerability is reduced. People are also physi-
cally vulnerable to hazards any time they have little protection from the physical forces of the hazards
they encounter (or the forces of objects affected by the disaster and conditions created by the hazard).
As populations move into areas of high risk of disaster, their exposure increases, and the knowledge
they have and actions they take determine whether or not their vulnerability also increases.
Social vulnerability is a measure of the behavioral, social, political, and cultural factors that increase
or decrease a population’s propensity to incur harm or damage as a result of their exposure to a specific
hazard. Certain collective and/or individual behaviors can contribute to or reduce each person’s and
each population’s ability to protect themselves from harm. Within more general populations there are
typically subgroups that exhibit different vulnerability factors than the population as a whole, as is
often the case with the elderly, the poor, those with functional needs, and the very young, to name a few.
Economic vulnerability measures the financial means of individuals, towns, cities, communities, or
whole countries to protect themselves from the effects of disasters. Within societies, there may be many
economic delineations that further divide groups into economically vulnerable subgroups. As previ-
ously discussed, the poor are much more likely to suffer the consequences of disasters as they often do
not have the financial means to avoid extreme hazards.
Environmental vulnerability refers to how health and welfare of the natural environment within the
area of study factors into the propensity of the affected population to incur disaster consequences. Poor
environmental practices, such as deforestation, a lack of land-use planning, and management of hazard-
ous materials, can turn what would have been minor events into major disasters.
Each of these vulnerability elements is interconnected. Economic vulnerability in the form of pov-
erty can lead to limited housing options (social vulnerability), which in turn causes populations to build
on dangerous hillsides (physical vulnerability) thus reducing the ability of those slopes to remain intact
during rainstorms (environmental vulnerability). This is but one of limitless examples of how each fac-
tor is equally important when considering impact of the vulnerability on risk.
195 VULNERABILITY
Disaster risk managers can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of vulnerability by devel-
oping physical, social, economic, and environmental profiles for the area or population being studied.
These four factors provide the context for a vulnerability assessment, which in turn better enables a
planning team to estimate likely consequences and understand which mitigation and preparedness mea-
sures would be most appropriate to treat the causative hazards. Descriptions and samples of these pro-
files are provided in the following section.
THE PHYSICAL PROFILE
The physical profile of a country, which dictates its physical vulnerability, is generally a collective
examination of three principal components: geography, infrastructure, and populations. The more that
is known about each component, the better understood physical vulnerability will be. Each of these
components contributes to the nature of risk, including how likely a risk is to occur and how its conse-
quences will manifest themselves.
The geographic component of the physical profile focuses on the natural makeup of the area of
study. For instance, it is estimated that almost three billion people, or about half of the world’s popula-
tion, currently reside in what is classified as coastal land. This includes all but two of the world’s 15
largest cities (ISDR 2004). The economic and industrial benefits associated with a seaside location
were the drivers behind the original siting of coastal settlements, but in moving there, the residents
increased their exposure to many different hazards, including severe windstorms, flooding, and tsuna-
mis. Whether or not this physical location represents vulnerability depends on the actions that individu-
als and communities take to reduce their risk.
The following list provides several examples of what geographic factors are important to consider
in forming a geographic profile:
• Land cover (vegetation)
• Soil type
• Topography
• Slope
• Aspect (the direction something such as a mountain slope faces)
• Water resources (lakes, rivers, streams, reservoirs, etc.)
• Wetlands and watersheds
• Seismic faults
• Climate (wind, rainfall, temperature)
The infrastructure component of the physical profile focuses primarily on the interaction between
people and the land. This profile is diverse, and may be generalized for regions or segments. (See exhibit
3.10.) Examples of infrastructure factors commonly studied when forming a physical profile include:
• Land use
• Location and construction material of homes
• Location and construction material of businesses
• Zoning and building code delineations
• Critical infrastructure components
• Hospitals and clinics
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY196
EXHIBIT 3.10 SECTORING
Sectoring helps to further understand the ways in which a disaster would affect segments of a country or community. Not
all areas of a community will be affected by an unforeseen event. Sectoring divides an area into manageable segments or
portions based on local geography in relation to a specific hazard. It allows disaster managers to categorize parts of their
study area in terms of response and impacts. It is used to identify local service areas in relationship to a hazard and physi-
cal features, and allows for the identification of especially vulnerable areas, evaluation of how an area could be or has been
affected, and what can be done to respond to specific events.
Knowing the hazard and the potential of its impact in each sector allows for a more accurate identification of appro-
priate mitigation actions as well as warning and emergency response needs. Sectoring can also be used to organize and
conduct emergency response needs within a sector or across adjacent sectors.
Sectors should be defined by easily identifiable boundaries that can be seen on the ground, such as bluffs, rivers, and
major highways. These features often dictate who responds and how a response is managed. Things to think about in
identifying sectors include:
• People
• How many people in each sector
• How many subdivisions in a sector
• Where people work
• Where people recreate
• Where people live
• Where people gather for civic events
• Where the special needs populations are located
• Animals and livestock
• Where animals are located
• What types of animals are in a specific sector
• Housing and living quarters
• How many housing units in the sector
• What types of housing units are present
• Whether all units are insured
• Critical facilities and response
• Fire station locations
• Ambulance locations
• Hospital locations
• Emergency first-response locations
• Emergency coordination locations
• What the responding zones are
• Special facilities and community resources
• School locations
• Nursing home locations
• Health care service locations
• Prison and jail locations
• Important historical or cultural locations
• Infrastructure and lifelines
• Utilities, including pipelines and power lines
• Roads and bridges
• ailroads and yards
• Airports
• Navigable waterways
• Dikes, dams, and flood protection
• HAZMAT facilities/public health concerns
• Leaking underground storage tank (LUST) sites
197 VULNERABILITY
• Schools
• Senior citizen centers
• Daycare/child care centers
• Government and other public facilities
• Prisons and jail facilities
• Power generation facilities and transmission
• Water purification facilities and pipes
• Wastewater treatment and sewer lines
• Gas lines
• Oil and gas transport pipelines
• Oil and gas storage facilities
• Transportation systems
• Roads and highways
• Railroads
• Airports
• Public transportation systems
• Waterways and port facilities
• Bridges
• Communication facilities
• Landfills
• Dikes and flood protection structures and facilities
• Nuclear power generation plants
• Dams
• Military installations
• Industrial sites that manufacture and/or store hazardous materials
• Emergency management systems
• Ambulance services
• Fire services
• Law enforcement services
• Emergency first response services
• Early warning systems
• Municipal emergency services (MES) sites
• Chemical storage sites
• Hazardous materials locations
• Funeral homes
• Sites containing radioactive materials
• Commercial and industrial facilities
• Commercial business areas defined
• Industrial business areas defined
• Agricultural business areas defined
• Port facilities identified
EXHIBIT 3.10 SECTORING—cont’d
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY198
• Emergency operations centers
• Emergency equipment (fire trucks, ambulances, response vehicles, etc.)
• Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) equipment
• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection teams
• Evacuation routes and shelters
• Historical and cultural buildings and areas
The population component of the physical profile is a study of where people are and how they move
throughout the day and the year. Disasters that occur at different times of the day or the year can have
different consequences, and knowing where people are likely to be at certain times helps to determine
vulnerability. Some cities can double or triple in size during the day on weekdays, when workers arrive
from outlying areas. New York City’s Manhattan Island, for instance, grows from a population of 1.5
million at night to over 3 million during the day when commuters arrive. Time of day also factors into
what types of structures people will be inhabiting, which can influence how they are impacted by a
disaster. At night, most people are likely to be in their homes, while during the day on weekdays they
will be at their jobs. The 2008 Sichuan Earthquake struck at 2:28 pm local time, which meant that chil-
dren were in schools and workers were in factories. Because so many schools and factories had not
been constructed to resist seismic forces, this timing of the event translated to thousands of children and
workers being crushed. For this reason, physical vulnerabilities vary depending on the time as popula-
tion movements occur. Examples of measures that help form the physical profile include:
• Population by jurisdiction (i.e., county, city)
• Population distribution within a county or city
• Population concentrations
• Animal populations
• Locations of schools, major employers, and financial centers
• Areas of high-density residential and commercial development
• Recreational areas and facilities
THE SOCIAL PROFILE
The social makeup of the population found within a planning area has a strong influence on disaster vul-
nerability. Aspects of the social profile are diverse and comprise education, culture, government, social
interaction, values, laws, and beliefs, among others. Within most countries, and even within individual
communities, the vulnerability of different groups varies because of a range of sociocultural peculiarities
that help or prevent people from being able to protect themselves from disasters. The prevalence of epi-
demics, in particular, is heavily influenced by social norms and behaviors. (See figure 3.12.)
Certain religious, cultural, and traditional practices and beliefs can help or hinder disaster manage-
ment practices. Although it may not be evident to the people practicing such behavior, their practices
be a product of adjustment to a hazard. In India, for instance, there is a group of people called the Banni
who adapted to the use of a traditional style of single-story, round houses called bhungas after a particu-
larly devastating earthquake in 1819. In 2001, when an earthquake struck in Gujarat, India, killing more
than 20,000 people (primarily as result of residential structure failure), not a single bhunga collapsed.
Disaster managers must be able to recognize when social interactions are either helping or hindering
people in reducing their vulnerability to hazards, and must recognize what aspect of that social process is
199 VULNERABILITY
causing the alteration. People tend to be very attached to places and practices. For instance, despite an ongo-
ing epidemic of the Middle East Respiratory System (MERS) virus in Saudi Arabia in 2014, two million
pilgrims from around the world felt their religious duty to visit Mecca superseded the risk of infection and
possible death (Batrawy 2014). An outsider recommending change without considering the original reasons
for the social practices is unlikely to be taken seriously in that community. Additionally, changing certain
social practices without regard for their historical bases can actually increase vulnerability because of the
common but unintended consequences resulting from a social reaction in response to the change.
Culture can also influence the manner in which response and recovery are conducted, especially
when external resources are involved. Responders need to understand and respect the culture—even if
they don’t understand its basis or it conflicts with their own—if they are to avoid compromising the aid
operation. For instance, in the island country Tonga, maintaining the Sunday Sabbath is a constitutional
requirement. The docking of ships and the landing of planes is prohibited. In past disasters, foreign
responders have had to postpone deliveries of aid until Monday when the government of Tonga refused
their entry on Sunday. To the outsider this may seem extreme, but many if not most of the victims
impacted by the cyclone that caused the disaster agreed with the decision.
Examples of factors to consider in scoping a social profile include:
• Religions
• Age breakdown
FIGURE 3.12
Number of epidemics by country from 1974 to 2003
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY200
• Gender-related issues
• Literacy
• Language
• Health
• Politics
• Security
• Human rights
• Government and governance (including social services)
• Social equality and equity
• Traditional values
• Customs
• Culture
THE ENVIRONMENTAL (NATURAL) PROFILE
The natural environment of a country or community plays a critical role in defining its hazard vulner-
ability (see figure 3.13), and helps to define what risk reduction practices and actions are possible and
most effective. For instance, a mountainous country whose government does not or is not able to
restrict clear-cutting of timber on unstable slopes is likely to have an increased probability of mass-
movement disasters, whereas a country that does not manage the draining or filling in of wetlands may
FIGURE 3.13
Regional differences in hazard portfolios from 1990 to 2011
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
201 VULNERABILITY
show an increase in flood propensity. And the natural environment itself can be impacted by a disaster,
which has associated social and economic impacts and can further impact the likelihood that future
hazards result in disasters.
The health and vitality of the natural environment are critical when measuring vulnerability to each
identified hazard. A healthy and productive natural environment can provide excellent protection from
a variety of hazards, while a damaged and unhealthy natural environment can reduce protection from
specific hazards and, in some cases, increase a hazard’s impact. Healthy and productive wetlands pro-
vide invaluable flood protection by soaking up excess rainwater. Healthy forests are less vulnerable to
catastrophic wildfires and reduce landslide dangers on slopes. Dunes on coastlines provide buffers from
storm surges caused by hurricanes and severe storms. Figure 3.14, developed by the UN as part of the
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), illustrates this process of risk augmentation
through environmental degradation.
Understanding the direct link between a healthy and productive natural environment and a country’s
vulnerability to specific hazards is critical to developing an effective risk management strategy. Con-
ducting an inventory of the features of the country’s natural environment is an important step.
FIGURE 3.14
The link between environmental degradation, natural disasters, and vulnerability
Source: ISDR, 2004.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY202
Measuring the health of the country’s natural environment is vital in understanding the role that it can
play in protecting a community and reducing the impacts from hazard events. (See figure 3.15.) Features
of a community’s natural environment include, but are not limited to,
• Health of waterways (rivers, streams, creeks, etc.)
• Status of wetlands
• Management of lakes
• Management of forests
• Health of coastal dunes
• Health of coral reefs
Human practices that affect the environmental profile of a country (see exhibit 3.11) include:
• Diking or damming rivers and creeks
• Filling in wetlands for development
• Channeling coastal areas such that marsh and wetlands areas are destroyed
• Clear-cutting forests
• Mismanaging forests such that deadwood builds up (serving as fuel for a forest fire)
• Destroying coastal dunes
FIGURE 3.15
Number of severe windstorm events by country between 1974 and 2003
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
203 VULNERABILITY
Natural processes also affect the natural environment, such as:
• Rainfall averages
• Wind
• Snowfall and snowmelt averages
• Seasonal trends in severe storms and cyclonic storms
• Seasonal drought
• Lightning
THE ECONOMIC PROFILE
The financial status of a government, the nonprofit sector, businesses, and populations deeply affects
how a country or community is able to protect itself from the consequences of disaster. Financial
EXHIBIT 3.11 ILLEGAL DESTRUCTION OF CORAL REEFS WORSENED
IMPACT OF TSUNAMI
The illegal mining of corals off the southwest coast of Sri Lanka permitted far more onshore destruction from the 26
December 2004 tsunami than occurred in nearby areas whose coral reefs were intact. This is the principal finding of a team
of researchers from the United States and Sri Lanka who studied the area earlier this year. Their report is published in the
August 16 issue of Eos, the newspaper of the American Geophysical Union.
Some of the differences were startling. Lead author Harindra Fernando of Arizona State University reports that in the
town of Peraliya, a wave of 10-meter (30 foot) height swept 1.5 kilometers (one mile) inland, carrying a passenger train
about 50 meters (200 feet) off its tracks, with a death toll of 1,700. Yet, a mere three kilometers (two miles) south, in Hik-
kaduwa, the tsunami measured just 2–3 meters (7–10 feet) in height, traveled only 50 meters (200 feet) inland, and caused
no deaths.
The researchers found that this pattern of patchy inundation to be characteristic of the study area and was not related to
such coastline features as headlands, bays, and river channels. Rather, the key factor was the presence or absence of coral
and rock reefs offshore. At Hikkaduwa, the hotel strip is fronted by a rock reef and further protected by coral reefs that the
local hoteliers protect and nurture, the researchers report. Relatively little damage and few deaths were recorded from there
to Dodanduwa, around 6 kilometers to the south.
From Hikkaduwa north to Akuralla, however, damage and loss of life were extensive. Local residents, interviewed
by the authors, say that illegal mining had decimated coral reefs in that area, especially by use of explosives that result in
harvests of both coral and fish.
Some eyewitnesses to the tsunami described a visible reduction in the height of the water wall and its deflection paral-
lel with the shore as it approached the coral reef. The researchers conclude that waves that had been blocked by the reef
caused even more inundation and damage where they found low resistance gaps due to removal of coral by humans.
The scientists note that the brunt of the tsunami had hit Sri Lanka’s eastern shore, but that the southwestern, or
leeward, side had also been hit hard. Their analysis of the available data concludes that two or three waves hit the area
within an hour, having been channeled and bent around the southern tip of the island, and that another wave struck around
two hour later, having bounced back after hitting India or the Maldives. They say that existing computer models cannot
adequately explain or predict the wave amplitudes in southwest Sri Lanka, likely due to small-scale ocean processes,
including topographic variations due to coral removal, that are not yet well understood.
The authors note that the low-lying Maldives islands directly in the path of the tsunami escaped destruction. They sug-
gest that this may have been due to the presence of healthy coral reefs surrounding the islands. Apparently, in Sri Lanka,
very little healthy coral was damaged by the tsunami.
Source: American Geophysical Union, 2005.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY204
well-being, however, does not indicate that these entities and individuals will take protective action;
rather, it is merely a measure of the capacity to do so. Other insight may be gained from the economic
profile. Trends and tendencies associated with wealth, or the lack thereof, can be deduced. For instance,
the poor are often marginalized and forced to live on more dangerous land. Their housing is more likely
to be constructed of materials unable to withstand environmental pressures. They are more likely to
have little to no tolerance for delays in basic commodities and services that often follow disasters.
Economic measures that inform vulnerability assessments include:
• Gross domestic product
• Debt
• Access to credit
• Insurance coverage
• Sources of national income
• Availability of disaster reserve funds
• Social distribution of wealth
• Prevalence of business continuity planning
• Economic diversity (the range of products and resources that drive the economy)
• Philanthropic giving
It is recognized that poor countries experience more disasters than wealthy ones, as figure 3.16
illustrates. This is not surprising, however, when considering the definition of a disaster and the concept
of vulnerability. An event only becomes a disaster when the local capacity to respond to the event is
exceeded, requiring external assistance to manage the consequences. The economic strength of wealthy
nations better enables them to develop preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery mechanisms
before events occur, and thus these nations are better able to manage disasters effectively when they
happen. Identical events that occur in a high-income country and a low-income country may manifest
as a routine event in the high-income country but result in a full-scale disaster in the poor country.
Income is not the only factor that would play into the variance in vulnerability between the two coun-
tries, but it is a dominant one.
Another economic factor that influences how significantly an event affects a country is the gross
domestic product (GDP). GDP is a measure of the value of all goods and services produced within a
nation in a given year. When considered in the absence of a nation’s GDP, the financial consequences
of a disaster do not provide a relative sense of how badly the country was impacted. However, present-
ing damages and losses as a percentage of GDP provides a much better perspective of how deeply the
nation’s economy was impacted. For example, a disaster that causes $2 billion in damages may repre-
sent upward of 38 percent of total GDP for a country like Honduras, while it would be equal to less than
one-tenth of a percent of Japan’s GDP. Large-scale disasters that affect poor countries can literally wipe
out all of their economic gains for a year or more. Wealthy nations with strong economies are better
able to absorb the effects of disasters, and many even have reserve funds set aside for expected events,
which would further lessen the impact. Poor countries, on the other hand, often must borrow significant
amounts of financial capital while concurrently cutting vital social and economic programs in order to
cover the expenses of disaster relief and recovery. Long-term development can stall in the face of such
measures and may lag for many years after the disaster has struck—especially when debt responsibili-
ties weigh heavily on future budgets. Figures 3.17 and 3.18 illustrate how differently disaster events
affect economies of varying sizes.
205 VULNERABILITY
RISK FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE VULNERABILITY
In the United Nations Development Programme report Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Devel-
opment, two main factors influencing the risk levels of nations and their populations are identified:
urbanization and rural livelihoods (UNDP 2004). Each of these factors influences and is influenced by
the four main hazard vulnerability factors previously discussed.
FIGURE 3.16
Total number of disasters by year from 1994 to 2003 (by income; reference map provided)
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY206
FIGURE 3.17
Disaster damages as a percent of GDP between 1991 and 2005
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
207 VULNERABILITY
Urbanization
Populations are concentrating in urban centers throughout the world. Between 2008 and 2010, the
world shifted from a majority rural to a majority urban population as urbanization rates topped 50 per-
cent. This number will exceed 70 percent by 2050 if the current rates are maintained. This movement
is fueling the development of large “megacities,” defined as urban centers containing more than 10
million inhabitants. As of 2014, there are 30 megacities. An increase in the number of cities that exceeds
one million people is also occurring. In 1950, there were 75 cities that met this threshold, while in 2014
that number has risen to more than 450, and it is expected to continue to rise to more than 545 by 2025.
(Minto 2011). Of these, 69 cities currently have more than 5 million inhabitants (World Atlas 2014).
Urbanization, especially rapid urbanization, presents significant challenges for disaster risk manag-
ers and urban planners. In the most basic terms, the concentration of people concentrates risk. The
absolute numbers of people who are exposed to individual hazards increases as those people settle in
closer and closer proximity. As populations become denser, land pressures require the poor to settle in
undesirable, often dangerous, parts of urban centers, such as unstable slopes, in floodplains, and on
seismically unstable soil. Without current census data and risk assessment, governments may not be
aware for months, or even years, that these groups are at such high risk.
In addition to concentrating populations, urbanization concentrates national wealth and resources
into small, often vulnerable pockets. Exposure is likewise concentrated, and when disasters occur, there
is a great increase in the likelihood that a significant portion of the nation’s infrastructure, industrial
output, and governance will be affected. As urbanization increases, housing, distribution of food, trans-
portation, communications, public health, and many other resources and services are also impacted to
a much greater degree.
The ability of government to ensure the safety of urban populations decreases significantly when
surges in population occur in a haphazard, informal manner. It can be very difficult, if not impossible,
for officials to prevent people emigrating from rural areas from building and operating in a way that
increases their risk, most significantly in the short term. Disaster management and emergency services
0.00
1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980
Fiscal Year
Federal Disaster Relief as a Percentage of GDP
FEMA relief + 15%
SBA loan activity
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998
0.01
0.02
0.03
%
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
FIGURE 3.18
Disaster relief costs as a percentage of GDP in the United States
Source: Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus and Princeton University, 2001.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY208
capacity must grow in line with population expansion to ensure adequate protection. Even wealthy
countries often experience capacity gaps as recognition and funding catch up. In poor countries, these
lags are compounded by political pressures and the competition of financial interests that rob disaster
management programs of much-needed funding.
Several reasons why urbanization contributes to risk and vulnerability have been identified by the
UNDP, including:
• Risk by origin. Some cities are inherently risky because of their location. Mexico City, for exam-
ple, is located very near active seismic faults and was built upon soft soil that amplifies seismic
waves to dangerous levels in certain parts of the city. In this case, the vulnerability of the popula-
tion is increasing through urbanization because the urban center itself is inherently risky.
• Increasing physical exposure. As mentioned earlier, when rapid urbanization occurs, marginal-
ized groups are very often pushed to the more dangerous, riskier parts of the city, even to places
where construction may previously have been prohibited. In this case, overall population exposure
increases because people are moving into higher risk pockets that exist within the overall bound-
aries of the urban environment.
• Social exclusion. Rural areas often have community-based coping and support systems that allow
for decreased overall vulnerability to the consequences of hazards. However, these bonds are
much less common in urban areas. Migrants often have trouble adjusting to the new demands of
city life, requiring them to disregard many of the protection measures they may have otherwise
taken. Their social safety nets are reduced or eliminated when they move away from families and
friends, and it may be years before they are able to fill the resulting void. These groups tend to
face the greatest risk from disaster consequences.
• Modification and generation of hazard patterns. Rapid urbanization not only changes the charac-
ter and size of a city but also affects its natural and built environments, as well. Growing popu-
lations alter the way many services and resources, such as water, sewerage, garbage disposal,
and hazardous materials generation, are managed. These increased pressures can easily create
or modify existing hazards, or can result in completely new hazards. For instance, land pressure
often results in the filling of wetlands to allow for new construction. The decreased hydrological
holding capacity of the land may result in increased flooding where flooding was previously not
a problem. This filled land may be less stable in the event of an earthquake because of the lack of
bedrock below foundations.
• Increasing physical vulnerability. In addition to causing people to move into high-risk areas
(increasing their physical exposure), urbanization tends to cause groups to live and function in a
manner that increases the likelihood that they will become victim to a disaster. Moving into risky
areas does not automatically imply that vulnerability has been increased. With the proper mitiga-
tion measures, the likelihood and consequence factors of risk can be reduced. However, because
it is the poor who are most likely to move to these areas, expecting that the great (and expensive)
measures required to compensate for the increased hazard risk in the area will be taken is unrealis-
tic. As such, population vulnerability increases. It should be noted, however, that even in previ-
ously populated areas, increased density can result in conditions that increase vulnerability.
• Urbanization of new regions. It is not uncommon, in the modern age of transportation, commerce,
and communications, for previously undeveloped areas to transform into large urban centers in a
relatively short time. New markets, newly discovered resources, and increased population mobility
209 VULNERABILITY
can result in rapid settlement of people in an area at particular risk for one or more hazards about
which few or no people are aware. The UN points out that the disasters resulting from earthquakes
in Peru in 1990 and 1991, in Costa Rica in 1991, and in Colombia in 1992 were consequences of
new region urbanization.
• Access to loss mitigation mechanisms. Rapid urbanization places increased pressure on the gov-
ernment to provide mitigation and other disaster reduction and response services. However, even
if these services are increased or developed, there is always a lag in time between recognition of
the increased vulnerability and the development of services to reduce that vulnerability. Apart
from major disasters, marginalized groups, especially those in informal squatter communities,
face the risk of devastating consequences from minor storms, fires, landslides, and other hazards
that normally would cause little or no damage.
Rural Livelihoods
More than half the world’s population and, according to the World Bank (2014), more than 70 percent
of the impoverished live in rural areas. Like their urban counterparts, rural populations experience vul-
nerability from disasters because of a unique set of factors resulting directly from the classification of
their living conditions as rural. The following lists several of these factors.
• Rural poverty. In the absence of large, organized government entities, rural communities may
be left to fend for themselves for disaster mitigation and response resources. This is pronounced
in the developing world. With little or no money to spend on prevention, the rural poor have
few options to mitigate for disaster risk. When what little they are able to do ultimately fails as
result of a disaster, the catastrophic loss of crops, equipment, livestock, housing, and posses-
sions is devastating, and relief resources may be nonexistent. Although they may have developed
long-established social systems to counteract the effects of disasters, those systems may fail for
many reasons, including changes in the demographic makeup of the community, climate change,
changes in markets, and environmental degradation.
• Environmental degradation. Many of the world’s rural poor engage in environmentally destruc-
tive practices. Most often, these practices are directly related to agricultural or other income-
generating practices. Deforestation, overgrazing of land, poor farming practices, and alteration
of waterways all can lead to an increase in the likelihood or consequence factors of risk. In these
cases, it is typical for common events such as normal annual rains to begin resulting in disasters
such as mudslides and flash floods, which had not previously affected the region.
• Nondiversified economies. Many rural areas rely on just a few sources or even a single source of
income. This increases the possibility that a hazard could significantly impact or fully destroy the
area’s capacity for income generation. A plant epidemic is one example of a hazard capable of
causing a disaster but which could have been easily mitigated with greater diversification. Shifts
in global market prices for a specific commodity can also cause significant reductions in local
income if there exists a high degree of dependence on that one resource. If market demands shift
during the crisis as a result of customers looking elsewhere for the same product or moving to
adapt an alternate product, the negative impacts on the nondiversified economy could become
permanent.
• Isolation and remoteness. Rural populations that are far outside the reaches of national and
regional government services often have little outside intervention to reduce their vulnerability
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY210
from disasters. Poor transportation and communications infrastructure severely hinders pre- and
post-disaster assistance. When a disaster does occur, days or weeks may pass before news of it
reaches the outside world and assistance is provided. War-torn areas are especially susceptible, as
was evident after the 2004 tsunami events in Banda Aceh province in Indonesia.
RISK PERCEPTION
A key requirement of effective disaster risk management is recognition that a hazard exists. However,
recognizing the hazard is only the beginning, as one must also be able to judge the relative seriousness
of that hazard in comparison to other hazards. The process of risk analysis helps disaster managers to
do just that. For lay people, however, and in the absence of such technical and involved analysis, the
mechanisms by which they perceive the hazards that threaten them can be very different, and very
complex.
The study of why people fear the things they do (and also why they do not fear other things) is called
risk perception. Traditionally, people do not tend to fear the things that are statistically most likely to
kill them, and an abundance of research has been dedicated specifically to finding out why. Understand-
ing these trends in public risk perception can help disaster managers understand why people are dispro-
portionately afraid of spectacular hazards they are statistically less vulnerable to than, for instance,
automobile accidents, food poisoning, heart disease, or cancer.
In their article “Rating the Risks,” acclaimed risk perception experts Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff,
and Sarah Lichtenstein begin, “People respond to the hazards they perceive” (Slovic et al. 1979). This
statement is important for two reasons. First, its opposite is true. People generally do not respond to the
hazards they do not perceive. Second, it has been found that these stated perceptions are primarily
based on inaccurate sources of information, such as mass media outlets, social networks, and other
external sources, as opposed to personal experience and expert knowledge.
Slovic et al. (1979) identified four “risk perception fallibility” conclusions to explain the ways in
which people tend to inaccurately view the hazards in their world. These conclusions, which help to
explain how populations decide which disasters to prepare for and why, are:
1. Cognitive limitations, coupled with the anxieties generated by facing life as a gamble, cause
uncertainty to be denied, risks to be distorted, and statements of fact to be believed with unwar-
ranted confidence (Slovic et al. 1979). People tend to fear a specific risk less as they become
better informed and have more details of the risk. However, what a person can discover about
a risk will almost never be complete, as the actual likelihood or consequence most risks pose
cannot be quantified in a way that addresses the specific threat faced by individuals, even well-
known risks such as cancer or heart disease (Ropeik 2001).The more uncertainty a risk poses or,
as Slovic et al. (1979) state, “the more of a gamble something is,” the more people fear it. In the
face of uncertainty, people consciously or subconsciously make personal judgments based on
very imperfect information to establish some individual concept of the risk they face. Judgments
based on uncertainties and imperfect information often cause people to wrongly perceive their
own risk in a way that overstates reality. In Mexico City, for instance, where a public insecurity
crisis is a priority political topic and a constant subject in the press, but where no reliable crime
statistics have been available for more than seven years, people have overestimated their personal
risk from violent crime by up to 86 percent. According to a 2002 comprehensive countrywide poll
211 VULNERABILITY
measuring the incidence of crime, approximately 14 of every 100 citizens of Mexico City would
fall victim to some form of crime in the 12 months following the survey (ICESI 2002). However,
when asked in a poll what they believed their chance was of falling victim to crime in that same
time period, many people thought they had an 80 to 100 percent chance.
2. Perceived risk is influenced (and sometimes biased) by the imaginability and memorability of the
hazard. People, therefore, may not have valid perceptions about even familiar risks (Slovic et al.
1979). People are more afraid of those things that they can imagine or remember. The likelihood
of occurrence of these easily available risks, as they are called, tends to be overestimated. For
instance, we rarely hear about a person dying from a “common” cause such as a heart attack,
unless somebody close to us dies of that specific cause. However, the media will report heavily
on a death that is the result of an “uncommon” cause, like the West Nile virus. The result tends to
be that people underestimate common risks and overestimate rare risks. Social scientists Slovic,
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein performed a study to measure this phenomenon and found that people
greatly overestimated their risk from rare events such as botulism, tornadoes, pregnancy compli-
cations, and floods while underestimating their risk of stroke, diabetes, cancer, and heart disease
(Slovic et al. 1979). Generally, people tend to fear what they hear about repetitively or often. This
phenomenon is referred to as the “availability heuristic,” which states that people perceive an
event to be likely or frequent if instances of the event are easy to imagine or recall. This percep-
tion bias can be correct when considering events that really are frequently observed, such as
people who believe that automobile accidents are common because almost everyone they know
has been involved in one. However, when a risk that is spectacular but not necessarily common
receives constant media attention, people often wrongly assume that similar events are very likely
to occur.
3. [Disaster management experts’] risk perceptions correspond closely to statistical frequencies of
death. Lay people’s risk perceptions [are] based in part upon frequencies of death, but there were
some striking discrepancies (Slovic et al. 1979). It appears that the concept of risk for lay people
includes qualitative aspects such as dread and the likelihood of a mishap being fatal. Their risk
perceptions are also affected by catastrophic potential. It can be difficult for people to fully under-
stand statistics they are given, and even more difficult to conceptualize how those statistics apply
to them personally. Furthermore, statistics tend to do little to affect how people perceive the calcu-
lated risks. This is not to say that the average person lacks sufficient intelligence to process num-
bers; rather, the numbers are not the sole source of influence on public risk perception. Extensive
research has discovered that people rank their risks by using other, more heavily weighted qualita-
tive factors, as well as the quantitative likelihood of a hazard resulting in personal consequence
(Slovic et al. 1979). People are generally more concerned with the consequence component of
risk than they are about the likelihood component (recall that Risk = Likelihood × Consequence).
It is important to examine the quality and usefulness of statistics provided to the public by the
media regarding risks. Without complete information, media-provided statistics are meaningless
and likely misleading. In the absence of complete information, people tend to overestimate rather
than underestimate their vulnerability. Economists have classified this tendency to overestimate
unknown or unclear risks as “risk-ambiguity aversion” (Economist 2002).However, even if statis-
tics provided by the media or other sources are straightforward, people have difficulty understand-
ing how those numbers affect them as individuals, even if they are risk “experts.” Few people can
conceptualize the difference between a “one-in-a-million” and a “one-in-one-hundred-thousand”
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY212
chance of occurrence (Jardine and Hrudey 1997). People tend to need other clues to help them
put these numbers into perspective. Many tend to view their chances of being affected by rare but
spectacular hazards in a comparable fashion to how people believe they can beat long odds to win
a state lottery. James Walsh writes in his book True Odds:
The odds are greater you’ll be struck by lightning than win even the easiest lottery. They’re better
that you’ll be dealt a royal flush on the opening hand of a poker game (1 in 649,739). They’re better
that you’ll be killed by terrorists while traveling abroad (1 in 650,000). Bill Eadington, director of the
Institute for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming at the University of Nevada at Reno,
looks at it this way: If you bought 100 tickets a week your entire adult life, from age 18 to 75, you’d
have a 1 percent chance of winning a lottery. “[Lotteries] really play on the inability of the general
public to appreciate how small long odds are.” (Walsh 1996)
In Walsh’s calculations, the odds of winning the lottery are 1 in 57 × 52 × 100 × 100 =
29,640,000. It is the qualitative factors that people consider most heavily when weighing their per-
sonal risk. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980) propose that there are 17 risk characteristics
that influence public risk perception. These characteristics fall under two subgroups called factors:
Factor 1 is related to dread, and Factor 2 is related to how much is known about the risk. A third
factor, encompassing a single, eighteenth characteristic that measures the number of people
exposed to the hazard, is not covered in this section.
Using these 17 characteristics, Slovic et al. (1980) examined public perceptions of 90 risks and
plotted their findings on a two-dimensional graph depicting Factor 1 on the x axis and Factor 2 on
the y axis. Characteristics of Factors 1 and 2 are described in the following lists:
Factor 1: Factors Related to Dread
a. Dreaded versus not dreaded. People fear risks that cause painful, violent deaths more than
risks that do not. David Ropeik, director of risk communication at the Harvard Center for Risk
Analysis, wrote, “What are you more afraid of: being eaten by a shark or dying of a heart
attack in your sleep? Both leave you equally as dead, but one—being eaten alive—is a more
dreadful way to go” (Ropeik 2001). Of course, millions of people around the world die from
heart attacks while sleeping every year, but fewer than 15 fall victim to sharks in the same time
period (Wiggins 2002).
b. Uncontrollable versus controllable. People tend to be less fearful of risks that they feel
they can control. For instance, most people feel safer as a driver in a car than as a passenger
because they are controlling the movement of the vehicle, and they know their own skills in
accident avoidance. When people lack control of a situation, a risk seems more pronounced.
Examples of uncontrollable risks are airplane travel, street crime, pesticides in food, and
terrorism.
c. Globally catastrophic versus not globally catastrophic. Risks that have the potential to affect
the entire world tend to be deemed greater than those that would only affect local or national
populations. For instance, the effects of nuclear war, whose aftermath could include wide-
spread nuclear fallout and long-term physiological effects beyond the borders of any one state,
is far scarier than are the effects of a conventional war taking place in a country other than
one’s own.
d. Fatal consequences versus not fatal consequences. A risk that results in death is more feared
than other, nonlethal risks. For example, even though auto accidents are much more likely than
213 VULNERABILITY
airplane accidents, the chance of fatality is much greater for airplane accidents, and airplane
accidents are thus more feared.
e. Not equitable versus equitable. Risks that affect one group with a greater statistical likelihood
and/or consequence than the general population tend to be considered greater risks than those
that affect all people equally, especially to those within the groups more severely affected. This
is especially true if the risk disproportionately affects children.
f. Catastrophic versus individual. Risks that affect a great number of people in one location or at
one time are more feared than those that affect individuals one at a time over a wide location.
Terrorism and earthquakes are examples of catastrophic hazards, while heart disease, auto
accidents, and drowning are considered individual hazards.
g. High risk to future generations versus low risk to future generations. A risk that extends
across generations, especially one that will affect future generations, is considered scarier than
ones that will be mitigated or prevented in our own lifetimes. The most apparent example of
this is nuclear radiation, which can remain dangerous for thousands of years. Because of this
extended danger, there are still no agreements on where spent nuclear fuel will be stored in the
United States after it is no longer useful for power generation.
h. Not easily reduced versus easily reduced. People are more afraid of risks that cannot be eas-
ily mitigated. The effort required to reduce crime or drug use is much greater than the effort
required to prevent drowning or bicycle injuries. Simply wearing a helmet on a bike, or a life
preserver on a pleasure boat, greatly reduces the likelihood of injury or death. However, it
takes months or years to combat a crime wave or drug problem plaguing a town or city.
i. Risk increasing versus risk decreasing. A risk that appears to be growing in likelihood or
consequence becomes more feared. However, if a risk appears to be more easily mitigated or is
decreasing in likelihood or consequence, people begin to fear it less.
j. Involuntary versus voluntary. Why are people more afraid of drunk drivers than of eating
high-cholesterol food that will raise their risk of heart disease? How can some people smoke
cigarettes, wholly unconcerned about their cancer risk, while those around them complain
incessantly? The most obvious answer for both questions is that people are more concerned
with risks that are involuntary than with those they bring upon themselves. Keith Smith, in
Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing Disaster, discusses voluntary and
involuntary risk and states, “there is a major difference between voluntary and involuntary risk
perception with the public being willing to accept voluntary risks approximately 1,000 times
greater than involuntary risks” (emphasis added; Smith 1992).
k. Affects me versus does not affect me. Terrorism has been reported almost daily in the media for
years, but until September 11, 2001, Americans who did not travel abroad did not worry about
it. After that date, preventing terrorism became a national concern and a government prior-
ity. The statistical risk to the average person in the United States was raised only a minuscule
amount, but the mere fact that people suddenly knew for certain that foreign terrorism could
occur at home made them much more afraid.
l. Not preventable versus preventable. A risk that cannot be mitigated or prepared for is more
feared than one that can be. For instance, in the early 1980s HIV and AIDS were seen as
always fatal and were terribly feared. With modern medicine, people who are HIV-positive can
live for years without contracting AIDS. While the disease is still feared, it is not perceived to
be as dangerous as it was 20 years ago.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY214
Factor 2: Factors Related to How Much Is Known about the Risk
m. Not observable versus observable. Risks that can be seen are less feared than those that cannot
be seen or visualized. The dangers associated with radon or genetic manipulation are consid-
ered not observable, while secondhand smoke is observable.
n. Unknown to those exposed versus known to those exposed. If people have no way of knowing
whether they are exposed to a risk, they will fear that risk more. Food irradiation and biologi-
cal terrorism are examples of risks where people may not be able to know if they have been
exposed.
o. Effect delayed versus effect immediate. Risks that cause immediate harm or damage tend to be
less feared than those that cause negative effects at some future time following exposure. This
is the primary reason people tend to fear the effects of biological terrorism more than conven-
tional or even chemical warfare.
p. New risk versus old risk. Risks we are facing for the first time are much scarier than risks we
have had plenty of time to become “accustomed” to. Few people fear cars for their accident
risk or fear the risk posed by vaccines, as we have lived with these technologies for decades.
When anthrax was mailed to news agencies and politicians in New York, Washington, DC, and
Florida, people became extremely frightened when opening their mail, while today it is highly
unlikely that anyone continues to wear a mask and rubber gloves while opening letters.
q. Risks unknown to science versus risks known to science. When risks can be explained using
scientific evidence, people fear them less because of increased understanding. Many diseases
raise questions when they are first discovered, but once their methods of transmission, preven-
tion, and cure are revealed, they become less of a concern.
4. Disagreements about risk should not be expected to evaporate in the presence of “evidence.”
Definitive evidence, particularly about rare hazards, is difficult to obtain. Weaker information is
likely to be interpreted in a way that reinforces existing beliefs (Slovic et al. 1979). Slovic et al.
(1979) discovered that “people’s beliefs change slowly and are extraordinarily persistent in the
face of contrary evidence. . . . New evidence appears reliable and informative if it is consistent
with one’s initial belief; contrary evidence is dismissed as unreliable, erroneous, or unrepre-
sentative.” They added, “Convincing people that the catastrophe they fear is extremely unlikely
is difficult under the best conditions. Any mishap could be seen as proof of high risk, whereas
demonstrating safety would require a massive amount of evidence” (Slovic et al. 1979), evidence
that is sometimes impossible to obtain in an accurate or timely manner This stubbornness is com-
pounded by the fact that once people make their initial judgments, they believe with overwhelm-
ing confidence that they are correct. This phenomenon, called the “overconfidence heuristic,”
states that people often are unaware of how little they know about a risk, and of how much more
information they need to make an informed decision. More often than not, people believe that they
know much more about risks than they actually do. Slovic and his colleagues (1979) conducted
a study to determine whether people knew if homicides were more frequent than suicides. Of
participants who answered incorrectly, 12.5 percent gave odds of 100 to1 that their answer was
correct, and 30 percent gave odds of 50 to 1 that their answer was correct. In fact, suicides hap-
pen much more frequently than homicides, with an incidence of 1.7 suicides per homicide (CDC
2002).The overconfidence heuristic has been linked to media coverage of other spectacular events,
specifically regarding how people’s rating of risks is dependent on the amount of media coverage
a risk receives. For example, one study showed that a greater percentage of crimes covered by the
215 VULNERABILITY
media involve perpetrators and victims of different races than occurs in reality. In other words, a
news story is more likely to describe a white victim of a black attacker than a black victim of a
black attacker, even though the latter is more common. This inconsistency in coverage is seen as
the main reason Caucasians overestimate their likelihood of being a victim of interracial crime by
a factor of three (Twomey 2001). Paul Slovic writes that “strong beliefs are hard to modify” and
“naïve views are easily manipulated by presentation format” (Slovic 1986). Often, only time will
change people’s opinions about the risks they personally face. One reason that people are more
scared of a new risk than an old risk is that they have not been able to gather enough information
to alter their initial fearful impression. After time has passed and they realize that their expecta-
tions for victimization have not been realized for themselves or anybody they know, they can
begin to question the validity of their views.
Elspeth Young of the Australian National University describes social constructs of risk. These are
human attributes that define how different people assess risk and determine personal vulnerability.
Young (1998) writes:
1. Socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, income, education, employment,
and health). Older people and children may be much more vulnerable than active adults. Poorer
people, with fewer capital resources, are likely to suffer far more from the effects of hazards such
as flood invasion of their homes. Some specific ethnic groups . . . may be much less able to take
advantage of the assistance offered because of communication problems and cultural differences.
2. People’s knowledge of the environment and the hazards that the environment poses to them e.g.,
traditional ecological knowledge (TEK). TEK may be effectively used to cope with a situation
that outsiders perceive to be threatening, and generally provides much more detailed understand-
ing of local environments. It can be valuable in predicting the threats posed by hazards (e.g., when
significant floods are actually likely).
3. Their ignorance. . . . For example, people who have newly moved into a vulnerable area often
lack knowledge of the actual threats posed by hazards such as severe [wild]fires, and fail to take
suggested precautions seriously.
4. Their ability to cope with those hazards. [People are able to cope] through technology, financial
attributes, education, political power, and having a voice. Knowledge, high levels of education and
high incomes generally give people more confidence in articulating their feelings and needs and
hence they may be able to cope better with adversity.
5. Their ability to access help from outside. Having confidence . . . makes asking for assistance much
easier.
The ways in which hazard risk is presented or reported greatly influence how people perceive the
hazard. For instance, Slovic and Weber (2002) describe several ways that a risk manager could explain
the risk from a nearby factory to an exposed population. All of the measurements will describe the same
risk factor, but each one is likely to produce a different number. The ways in which people perceive that
number will be different, as well. Such measurements include (Slovic and Weber 2002):
1. Deaths per million people in the population
2. Deaths per million people within x miles of the source of exposure
3. Deaths per unit of concentration
4. Deaths per facility
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY216
5. Deaths per ton of air toxin released
6. Deaths per ton of air toxin absorbed by people
7. Deaths per ton of chemical produced
8. Deaths per million dollars of product produced
9. Loss of life expectancy associated with exposure to the hazard
Richard Wilson (1979) describes ways in which risks can be compared by calculating risks that
increase a person’s chance of death by one in one million (0.000001). It must be noted that these risks
are population risks as opposed to individual risks. See exhibit 3.12.
Risk comparisons can also cause incorrect perception of risk if they are not presented in an appro-
priate manner. Kenneth Warner (1989) describes how the media often use vivid comparisons to better
explain risks to their audience. He gives the following three examples of comparisons provided by the
media to describe the risks associated with cigarette smoking:
1. On average, cigarettes kill as many people as would die if three passenger-laden jumbo jets
crashed every day, month after month, year after year.
2. In one year, cigarettes kill more Americans than died in World War I, the Korean War, and the
Vietnam War combined.
3. The annual death toll associated with cigarette smoking is equal to that of a hydrogen bomb
dropped in the heart of a city such as Miami, Kansas City, Cleveland, or wherever. (Warner 1989)
EXHIBIT 3.12 RISKS WHICH INCREASE CHANCE OF DEATH BY 0.000001
(1 IN 1 MILLION; FOLLOWED BY CAUSE OF DEATH)
• Smoking 1.4 cigarettes (cancer, heart disease)
• Drinking one-half liter of wine (cirrhosis of the liver)
• Spending 1 hour in a coal mine (black lung disease)
• Spending 3 hours in a coal mine (accident)
• Living 2 days in New York or Boston (air pollution)
• Traveling 6 minutes by canoe (accident)
• Traveling 10 miles by bicycle (accident)
• Traveling 300 miles by car (accident)
• Flying 1000 miles by jet (accident)
• Flying 6000 miles by jet (cancer caused by cosmic radiation)
• Living 2 months in Denver on vacation from N.Y.(cancer caused by cosmic radiation)
• Living 2 months in average brick or stone building (cancer caused by natural radioactivity)
• One chest X-ray taken in a good hospital (cancer caused by radiation)
• Living 2 months with a cigarette smoker (cancer, heart disease)
• Eating 40 tablespoons of peanut butter (liver cancer caused by aflatoxin B)
• Drinking Miami drinking water for 1 year (cancer caused by chloroform)
• Drinking 30 12 oz. cans of diet soda (cancer caused by saccharin)
• Living 5 years at site boundary of a typical nuclear power plant in the open (cancer caused by radiation)
• Living 20 years near PVC plant (cancer caused by vinyl chloride [1976 standard])
• Living 150 years within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant (cancer caused by radiation)
• Eating 100 charcoal-broiled steaks (cancer from benzopyrene)
Source: Wilson, 1979.
217 VULNERABILITY
Warner describes how the conceptual differences between the slow death associated with smoking-
induced cancer or emphysema and the immediate deaths associated with being shot in a war, inciner-
ated in a hydrogen blast, or killed in a plane crash render such comparisons ineffective. These
comparisons attempt to elicit the fear associated with the risk characteristics identified by Slovic et al.
(1979). Studies have shown, however, that these types of comparisons lack the desired effect.
People’s perceptions of risk can also be influenced by the emotions elicited by a particular report on
a hazard. According to a report in the Washington Post, Jennifer Lerner of Carnegie Mellon University
discovered that people who watched media reports framed in a way to cause fear, like one on bioterror-
ism, would likely overestimate their personal exposure to risk. However, people who watched reports
that elicited anger, such as ones showing Palestinians and other people celebrating the 9/11 attacks,
were likely to perceive their exposure to terrorism as relatively less than the fearful group’s perception.
Lerner attributes to the effects of these fear-inducing reports the fact that “in surveys conducted after
9/11, Americans felt they faced a 20 percent chance of being a direct victim of future attacks, and felt
that the ‘average American’ faced a 48 percent chance” (Vedantam 2003) of being a victim.
Lerner found that women tended to respond more with fear to terrorism risk-related articles, while
men tended to respond more with anger. She contends, “the government and the media can unwittingly
alter risk perception by making people either fearful or angry,” and further states, “Used responsibly,
that connection could also be used to better communicate the real degree of risk” (Vedantam 2003).
Risk Perception Is Necessary for Disaster Management and Communications
Most people do not rely on statistical likelihoods to determine what risks they fear but consider other
qualitative aspects, which can be due to attributes of the hazard itself or each individual’s personal
experience and information exposure. The outcome of these risk perception effects is that there is no
single, universal, agreed-upon ranking of hazard risks.
Disaster managers need to consider risk when performing their assessments, but also are influenced
by the effects of risk perception, regardless of their knowledge or expertise in risk management. C. J.
Pitzer writes in the Australian Journal of Emergency Management:
We make a fundamental mistake when we, as safety managers, deal with risk as a “fixed attribute,”
something physical that can be precisely measured and managed.
The misconception of risk as a fixed attribute is ingrained into our industry and is a product of the
so-called science of risk management. Risk management has created the illusion that risk can be
quantified on the basis of probability, exposure to risk, and from the likely consequences of acci-
dents occurring. Risk management science can even produce highly technical and mathematically
advanced models of the probabilistic nature of a risk.
The problem with this is that risk is not a physical quantum. It is, instead, a social construction.
Everyone has a unique set of assumptions and experiences that shape their interpretations of objects
or events. People tend to ignore, “misperceive” or deny events that do not fit their worldview. People
find what they expect to find. (Pitzer 1999)
Elspeth Young (1998) writes:
Risk should not be defined solely by pre-determined, supposedly objective criteria that enable its
various levels to be gauged through quantification. It is also a social construct, interpreted differently
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY218
by all of us. Some find certain events or situations unacceptably risky and will do their utmost to
avoid being involved, while to others the same events may offer exhilaration and thrills that stimulate
their whole purpose of living. There may even be others to whom the particular event is a non-issue,
something to be totally ignored. These differences in perception and response, coupled with differ-
ences in people’s socio-economic characteristics and circumstances, result in a wide range of vul-
nerability in any community. Social aspects of risk interpretation must be recognized if risk is to be
effectively managed, and community participation in the practical management of the problem faced
is a vital component of this approach.
When disaster risk managers perform the hazards risk management process, they take many steps
during the process that require the use of both qualitative assessments and personal experience and
opinions. Because of differences in risk perception, the hazards risk management process can be flawed
if risk managers do not accommodate inconsistencies between their own and their constituents’ percep-
tions and reality.
During hazard identification, a hazard first must be perceived as a risk before it is identified as one.
Perception is not the same as awareness. An obvious example is a hazards risk management team that
is unaware that chlorine is used to purify water in the community. Without this knowledge, they may
not know that the hazardous chemical (capable of causing mass casualty disasters) is not only trans-
ported by truck through populated areas several times a year, but also stored in a location where a leak
or explosion could result in many fatalities. This is not an issue of risk perception. Now, imagine that
the same team is aware of the above information but they have never heard of a disaster actually hap-
pening, or the one accident they have heard of did not result in any deaths, and they decide that the
chlorine is something they do not need to worry about in their assessment. This is a result of the effects
of risk perception (the availability and overconfidence heuristics, in this case).
Risk perception may have the opposite, compounding effect for disaster managers. For instance, it
is possible that a risk that is essentially harmless or has extremely low likelihood or consequence is
perceived to be much greater than reality by a manager or by the public. Such faulty perceptions on the
part of the disaster management team could result in time or funding wasted in mitigation and prepara-
tion for a risk that may never happen, at the expense of neglecting a more severe risk that threatens the
population to a greater degree. However, if the disaster managers have an accurate impression of a risk
and determine that it is low enough to not worry about, while the public perceives it to be significant,
they run the risk of appearing negligent. Only effective public education and risk communication can
counter the effects of public (mis)perception of risk.
Risk perception can also influence the way the mitigation of a hazard is considered by decision
makers or by constituents within a community. If a hazard is not perceived to be a significant risk by
those who decide to fund mitigation projects, funding is unlikely to be provided without significant
efforts to correct those perceptions. Likewise, if the public does not perceive a hazard to affect them
personally, they are unlikely to take any personal measures to prepare or mitigate for that hazard. Once
again, the presence of differing risk perceptions highlights the need for effective risk communication as
a component of mitigation and preparedness.
Risk perception can lead to difficulties in making important decisions on the management of hazard
risks. Slovic and Weber (2002) write:
Public perception of risk plays an important role in risk analysis, adding issues of values, process,
power, and trust to the quantification issues typically considered by risk assessment professionals
219 VULNERABILITY
(Slovic 1999). Differences in risk perception lie at the heart of many disagreements about the best
course of action. Such differences have been demonstrated between technical experts and members
of the general public (Slovic, 1987), men vs. women (Finucane et al. 2000; Flynn et al. 1994; Weber
et al. 2002), and people from different cultures (Weber and Hsee 1998, 1999). Both individual and
group differences in preference for risky decision alternatives and situational differences in risk pref-
erence have been shown to be associated with differences in perceptions of the relative risk of choice
options, rather than with differences in attitude towards (perceived) risk, i.e., a tendency to approach
or to avoid options perceived as riskier (Weber and Milliman, 1997; Weber, 2001).
Managing risk perceptions is an important component of the hazards risk management process.
With an understanding of the perceptions and misperceptions of risk made by their constituents, haz-
ards risk managers can work to correct those misperceptions and address the public’s fears and con-
cerns. Failure to do so could easily lead to any of the mistakes discussed here.
Barry Glassner provides one example of the secondary effects of misperception of risk on a com-
munity. In the 1990s, the media widely reported on a “crime wave” against tourists in Florida that
resulted in 10 murders. Glassner writes,
[It was called] a crime wave because the media chose to label it as such. Objectively speaking, ten mur-
ders out of 41 million visitors did not even constitute a ripple, much less a wave, especially considering
that at least 97 percent of all victims of crime in Florida are Floridians. Although the Miami area had
the highest crime rate in the nation during this period, it was not tourists who had most cause for worry.
One study showed that British, German, and Canadian tourists who flock to Florida each year to avoid
winter weather were more than 70 times more likely to be victimized at home (Glassner 1999).
This widespread misperception of risk was not adequately managed and made many tourists think
twice before traveling to Florida; the tourism industry suffered as a result.
It is important for risk managers to evaluate personal perceptions because they will undoubtedly
influence the process of risk identification, subsequent analysis, and treatment. Because much of the
risk identification and analysis processes are based on qualitative information, great discrepancies can
exist, even between experts.
Risk managers must be as certain as possible that their assumptions and perceptions concerning risk
mirror reality as closely as possible. Risk managers who incorrectly overstate a hazard will devote a
disproportionate and inappropriate amount of available resources and time to that hazard.
For hazards risk management to be effective, an overall philosophy of cost-effectiveness must be
employed, and without accurate information and risk perceptions, such cost-effectiveness is unlikely.
Disaster risk managers must not assume anything. They must utilize as many historical records and
officially recognized hazard profiles as possible. Many public, private, and nonprofit agencies special-
ize in specific hazards and are likely to have the most accurate information concerning risk likelihood
and consequence data.
The public is likely to overestimate some risks and underestimate others, depending on the general
risk perception characteristics listed above. If the public collectively overestimates the likelihood or
consequence of a particular hazard, such as the presence of a nearby nuclear power plant, then they may
demand from public officials a significant effort to decrease what they see as a great risk. While initiat-
ing an increased level of preparedness and mitigation may not be a particularly effective and efficient
use of resources, simply ignoring the public’s concerns can have significant political implications.
CHAPTER 3 RISK AND VULNERABILITY220
With an understanding of the public’s perceptions, disaster risk managers can initiate a program of
risk communication and public education to increase understanding and steer public concern toward
risks of greater consequence and likelihood, such as house fires and floods.
Conversely, disaster risk managers should be aware of a collective public risk perception that under-
estimates the incidence or consequences of a certain hazard, such as underground power lines. A sig-
nificant number of people have been killed who made contact with underground power lines while
performing construction or landscaping work. Public education campaigns have regularly stressed to
citizens the significance of the hazard. Similar campaigns are employed for risks such as drug abuse,
forest fires, smoking, poisons, and so on. These risks tend to be ones that kill many more people than
all natural hazards combined, but are not considered appropriately “risky” by the public.
The Term Safe
Those involved in disaster risk management are often faced with defining what level of safety from hazard
exposure is considered sufficient. There is not necessarily a correct answer to the question “How safe is
safe enough?” (Derby and Keeney 1981). Most people assume that referring to something as “safe”
implies that all risk has been eliminated. However, because such an absolute level of safety is virtually
unattainable in the real world, risk managers must establish thresholds of risk that define a frequency of
occurrence below which society need not worry about the hazard. Derby and Keeney (1981) contend that
a risk becomes “safe” or “acceptable” if it is “associated with the best of the available alternatives, not
with the best of the alternatives which we would hope to have available” (emphasis added).
This definition can cause great disagreement between the public and disaster risk management offi-
cials. The public may expect a level of safety determined to be zero risk for some hazards, such as
terrorism in the United States. Officials may need to continually recalibrate the public’s perception of
these hazards to let the public know that, while the risks are in fact still possible, they have been miti-
gated to the best of the country’s or community’s social, economic (available resources), and techno-
logical abilities. While the chances of a terrorist attack will always exist, governments strive to attain
levels of security dictating that the risks are so low that people need not worry.
To determine what level of safety is most acceptable, Derby and Keeney (1981) contend that “the
best combination of advantages and disadvantages” must be chosen from among several alternatives.
For instance, although the risk of car accidents is one of the greatest we face on a daily basis, eliminat-
ing the risk by prohibiting the use of cars is impractical. However, we can make cars more resistant to
impact, add seat belts and air bags, and enact laws and regulations that limit the ways in which cars are
operated. The result is a level of safety upon which society agrees is acceptable in relation to the ben-
efits (mobility) retained.
Paul Barnes of the Australia Department of Primary Industries explains the importance of establish-
ing an agreement on what constitutes safety in the community. He writes:
Is our goal Community Safety or Safer Communities? As a societal outcome, Community Safety
can be sought via efficient and effective regulation at an institutional level. Associated with this
regulation must be similarly high standards of risk management applied at the community level. The
establishment of safer communities, however, is a different matter. Before this can be sought as a
goal, determinations must be made about what safety means to the communities themselves. To do
this, institutional regulators must ensure that use of their expertise does not promote inflexibility in
understanding the world-views of the public. (Barnes 2002)
221 REFERENCES
CONCLUSION
Reduction of risk and vulnerability is paramount to reducing the injuries, deaths, and damages associ-
ated with disasters. All nations, regardless of their wealth or facilities, have the capacity to address the
root causes of risk. Yet for most nations, the focus of disaster risk management is on the post-disaster—
namely response and recovery. Global efforts, including the Hyogo Framework for Action and the
Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, have attempted to raise the bar and call nations to
action. The roots of risk and vulnerability run deep, however, and simple structural answers to the prob-
lems that persist will not be enough. By looking at how disaster risk management, sustainable develop-
ment, and, to a rapidly increasing degree, climate change adaptation, together serve to build resilience,
rising trends in disaster risk may soon be stabilized and, with luck, reversed.
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rado. 2001 Hazards Workshop, Boulder, June.
American Geophysical Union, 2005. Illegal Destruction of Coral Reefs Worsened Impact of Tsunami. Press
Release. August 15.
Ansell, J., Wharton, F., 1992. Risk: Analysis, Assessment, and Management. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK.
Barnes, P., 2002. Approaches to community safety: Risk perception and social meaning. Australian Journal of
Emergency Management. Autumn 15–23.
Batrawy, A., 2014. Saudis question Mecca preparedness as MERS spreads. Associated Press. May 16. http://abcn
.ws/1lUBOcV.
Benson, J., 2011. First Germany, now Belgium: Nuclear energy to be phased out by 2015. November 4 Natural News.
Burkett, M., 2009. Climate reparations. Melbourne Journal of International Law 10. http://bit.ly/1slrZra.
Cameron, G., 2002. Emergency risk management: What does it mean? AAPPA Website. Presentation at ATEM–
AAPPA 2002 Conference. Brisbane, Australia, September 29–October 2. www.aappa.com/infoservices/pap
ers/2002_AAPPA_Brisbane/G_Cameron .
CDC (Centers for Disease Control), 2002. Suicide in the United States. CDC Website. www.cdc.
gov/ncipc/factsheets/suifacts.htm.
Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus, 2001. US vulnerability to natural hazards. IRIS, Princeton University.
www.hazardscaucus.org/USHAZPOSTER
Crowe, T.D., 2000. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design: Applications of Architectural Design and
Space Management Concepts. Butterworth-Heinemann, Boston.
Davis, A., 2002. New alarm heats up debate on chemical risks. Arizona Daily Star May 30. www.azstarnet.com/at
tack/indepth/wsj-chemicalrisks.html.
de Becker, G., 1997. The Gift of Fear: Survival Signals That Protect Us from Violence. Little, Brown and Co, Boston.
Derby, S.L., Keeney, R.L., 1981. Risk analysis: Understanding “How safe is safe enough?”. Risk Analysis 1 (3), 217–224.
Dickey, T.S., 1980. Bank robbery: Architectural implications from the criminal’s point of view. Unpublished mas-
ter’s thesis. Georgia Institute of Technology College of Architecture Georgia.
Dresher, M., 1961. Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Dubner, S.J., Levitt, S.D., 2006. How many lives did Dale Earnhardt save? New York Times. February 19.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/19wwln_freak.html?pagewanted=print.
Economist, 2002. The Logic of Irrational Fear. October 19, 29–30.
EMA (Emergency Management Australia), 2000. Emergency Risk Management Applications Guide. EMA Website.
Introduction to International
Disaster Management
Third Edition
Damon P. Coppola
AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON
NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
1Introduction to International Disaster Management. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801477-6.00001-
0
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
CHAPTER
THE MANAGEMENT
OF DISASTERS 1
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of our existence. In response, individuals and societies
alike have made many attempts to decrease their exposure to the consequences of these disasters. All of these
efforts have the same goal: disaster management. The motivating concepts that guide disaster management—the
reduction of harm to life, property, and the environment—are largely the same throughout the world. Whether due
to political, cultural, economic, or other reasons, the unfortunate reality is that some countries and some regions
are more capable than others at addressing the problem. Furthermore, the emergence of a global economy makes
it increasingly difficult to contain the consequences of any disaster within one country’s
borders.
This chapter
examines basic concepts of disaster management and expands upon those concepts to specifically address the
management of international disasters, which is a complex discipline. Like disaster management on the national
level, it involves actions that seek to mitigate the effects of hazards, ensures that populations are prepared for
disasters should they occur, facilitates the response to disasters that do occur, and helps nations and people recover
in the months and years following disaster events. The chapter provides a brief history of disaster management. To
illustrate the disparity in the effects of disasters around the world, an examination of the global impact of disasters
has also been carried out.
Key Terms: civil defense; complex humanitarian emergency; disaster; disaster management; disaster trends;
emergency management; history of emergency management; mitigation; preparedness response; recovery.
INTRODUCTION
Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of our existence. In response, individuals
and societies alike have made many attempts to decrease their exposure to the consequences of these
disasters, developing measures to address initial impact as well as post-disaster response and recov-
ery needs. Regardless of the approach adopted, all of these efforts have the same goal: disaster
management.
The motivating concepts that guide disaster management—the reduction of harm to life, property,
and the environment—are largely the same throughout the world. However, the capacity to carry out
this mission is by no means uniform. Whether due to political, cultural, economic, or other reasons,
the unfortunate reality is that some countries and some regions are more capable than others at
addressing the problem. But no nation, regardless of its wealth or influence, is advanced enough to
be fully immune from disasters’ negative effects. Furthermore, the emergence of a global economy
makes it more and more difficult to contain the consequences of any disaster within one country’s
borders.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS2
This chapter examines basic concepts of disaster management and expands upon those concepts to
specifically address the management of international disasters. A brief history of disaster management
is provided for context. To illustrate the disparity in the effects of disasters around the world, an exami-
nation of the global impact of disasters follows. Finally, several relevant terms used throughout this text
are defined.
DISASTERS THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Disasters are not merely ornamental or interesting events that adorn our collective historical record—
these disruptions have served to guide and shape it. Entire civilizations have been decimated in an
instant. Time and time again, epidemics and pandemics have resulted in sizable reductions of the
world’s population, as much as 50 percent across Europe during the fourteenth century bubonic plague
(Black Plague) pandemic. Theorists have even ventured to suggest that many of history’s great civiliza-
tions, including the Mayans, the Norse, the Minoans, and the Old Egyptian Empire, were ultimately
brought to their knees not by their enemies but by the effects of floods, famines, earthquakes, tsunamis,
El Niño events, and other widespread disasters (Fagan 1999). A worldwide drought in the eighth and
ninth centuries, caused by shifts in the yearly monsoons and resulting in mass crop failure and subse-
quent starvation, is now believed to have been behind the fall of both the Mayan empire in Mexico and
the Tang dynasty in China (Sheridan 2007). From a modern perspective, each of the catastrophic events
that has occurred as of late, including the December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami (over 230,000
killed), the 2005 Kashmir earthquake (80,000 killed), the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in China (68,000
killed), the 2008 Cyclone Nargis (135,000 killed), the 2010 Haiti earthquake (perhaps as many as
200,000 killed), and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (16,000 killed) might seem anomalous, but
these disastrous events are not close to record-breaking, or even unique, in the greater historical context.
(See table 1.1.)
Table 1.1 Selected Notable Disasters throughout History
Disaster Year Number Kille
d
Mediterranean earthquake (Egypt and Syria) 1201 1,100,000
Shaanxi earthquake (China) 1556 830,000
Calcutta typhoon (India) 1737 300,000
Caribbean hurricane (Martinique, St. Eustatius, Barbados) 1780 22,000
Tamboro volcano (Indonesia) 1815 80,000
Influenza epidemic (world) 1917 20,000,000
Yangtze River flood (China) 1931 3,000,000
Famine (Russia) 1932 5,000,000
Bangladesh cyclone (Bangladesh) 1970 300,000
Tangshan earthquake (China) 1976 655,000
Source: St. Louis University, 1997; NBC News, 2004.
3
THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
ANCIENT HISTORY
Hazards, and the disasters that often result, have not always existed. To qualify as a hazard, an action,
event, or object must maintain a positive likelihood of affecting humans or possibly have a consequence
that may adversely affect humans’ existence. Until humans existed on the planet, neither the likelihood
nor the consequence factors of hazards were calculable; thus their presence is negated.
With the appearance of humans, however, followed the incidence of hazards and disasters. Archeo-
logical discovery has shown that our prehistoric ancestors faced many of the same risks that exist today:
starvation, inhospitable elements, dangerous wildlife, violence at the hands of other humans, disease,
accidental injuries, and more. These early inhabitants did not, however, sit idly by and become easy
victims. Evidence indicates that they took measures to reduce, or mitigate, their risks. The mere fact
that they chose to inhabit caves is testament to this theory.
Various applications of disaster management appear throughout the historical record. The story of
Noah’s ark from the Old Testament, for example, is a lesson in the importance of warning, prepared-
ness, and mitigation. In this tale, believed to be based at least partly on actual events, Noah is warned
of an approaching flood. He and his family prepare for the impending disaster by constructing a floating
ark. The protagonist in this story even attempts to mitigate the impact on the planet’s biodiversity by
collecting two of each species and placing them within the safety of the ark. These individuals are
rewarded for their actions by surviving the disastrous flood. Those who did not perform similar actions,
the story tells us, perished.
Evidence of risk management practices can be found as early as 3200 BC. In what is now modern-
day Iraq lived a social group known as the Asipu. When community members faced a difficult decision,
especially one involving risk or danger, they could appeal to the Asipu for advice. The Asipu, using a
process similar to modern-day hazards risk management, would first analyze the problem at hand, then
propose several alternatives, and finally give possible outcomes for each alternative (Covello and
Mumpower 1985). Today, this methodology is referred to as decision analysis, and it is key to any
comprehensive risk management endeavor.
Early history is also marked by incidents of organized emergency response. For example, when in
AD 79 the volcano Vesuvius began erupting, two towns in its shadow—Herculaneum and Pompeii—
faced an impending catastrophe. Although Herculaneum, which was at the foot of the volcano and
therefore directly in the path of its lava flow, was buried almost immediately, the majority of Pompeii’s
population survived. This was because the citizens of Pompeii had several hours before the volcano
covered their city in ash, and evidence suggests that the city’s leaders organized a mass evacuation. The
few who refused to leave suffered the ultimate consequence, and today lie as stone impressions in an
Italian museum.
MODERN ROOTS
All-hazards disaster and emergency management, wherein a comprehensive approach is applied to
address most or all of a community’s hazard risks, are relatively new. However, many of the concepts
that guide today’s practice can be traced to the achievements of past civilizations. While the manage-
ment of disasters during the past few thousand years was limited to single acts or programs addressing
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS4
individual hazards, many of these accomplishments were quite organized, comprehensive, and surpris-
ingly effective at reducing both human suffering and damage to the built environment. See the follow-
ing examples.
Floods have always confounded human settlements. However, archeologists have found evidence in
several distinct and unrelated locations that early civilizations made attempts to formally address the
flood hazard. One of the most celebrated of these attempts occurred in Egypt during the reign of
Amenemhet III (1817–1722 BC). Amenemhet III created what has been described as history’s first
substantial river control project. Using a system of over 200 “water wheels,” some of which remain to
this day, the pharaoh effectively diverted the annual floodwaters of the Nile River into Lake Moeris. In
doing so, the Egyptians were able to reclaim over 153,000 acres of fertile land that would have otherwise
served no use (Quarantelli 1995; ESIS n.d.).
The roots of the modern fire department trace back 2,000 years to when the city of Rome was nearly
destroyed by fire. Before this event, slaves had been tasked with fighting fires, and their poor training, lack
of equipment, and understandable lack of motivation made them highly ineffective. Following the great
fire, Emperor Augustus established a formal, city-wide firefighting unit from within the Roman army
called the Corps of Vigiles. As a result, the firefighting profession became highly respected and, likewise,
highly effective, and was emulated throughout the vast Roman Empire for 500 years. The structure of this
organization was quite similar to many fire departments today, with members filling job-specific roles.
(See exhibit 1.1.) With the fall of Rome, however, came the disappearance of the Corps of Vigiles, and
organized firefighting did not appear anywhere in the world for another 1,000 years.
The Incas, who lived throughout the Andes region in South America during the thirteenth to fif-
teenth centuries, practiced a form of urban planning that focused on their need to defend themselves
from enemy attack. Many of the Incan cities were located at the peaks of rugged, although easily defen-
sible, mountains. The prime example of their architectural achievement is the fortress of Machu Picchu.
However, in locating their cities upon mountaintops and other similar areas, the Incas merely replaced
one man-made hazard with a whole range of environmental hazards. To facilitate life on this extreme
terrain, the Incas developed an innovative form of land terracing that not only conserved water in their
unpredictable climate but also protected their crops—and thus their existence—from the landslides that
occurred during periods of heavy precipitation.
As later eras are examined, still more examples of methods created to address specific hazards
and their consequences emerge. One of the greatest and most effective forms of disaster mitigation
in history is the collective effort of the British and Indian governments, which sought to reduce
Indians’ annual suffering and starvation that occurred as a result of regular drought patterns. These
famines became so devastating during the late nineteenth century that up to a million people were
dying of starvation each year. A government study found that sufficient food existed throughout
EXHIBIT 1.1 JOB TITLES WITHIN THE ROMAN CORPS OF VIGILES
Aquarius: The firefighter whose main duties were the supply of water to the siphos or pumps and the organization of
“bucket chains.”
Siphonarius: The firefighter who was responsible for the supervision and operation of the water pumps.
Uncinarius: The firefighter who was a “hook” man, who carried a large fire hook for pulling off burning roofs.
Source: FFCA, 2014.
5 THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
the country to feed the nation’s entire population at all times, but insufficient capacity to distribute
these resources led to location-specific shortages. To address these problems, planning committees
were formed to develop various preventive measures, including a rapid expansion of the extensive
railway system that crisscrosses the country (to quickly transport food), the adoption of a method
by which indicators of emerging needs were identified and logged in a central repository, and
greater monitoring of public health. So effective at controlling famine were these measures that
many remain in force today. How much of a positive role was played by India’s acclaimed railroad,
which connects almost every settlement nationwide, continues to be debated. (Keniston 2007;
Sweeney 2008).
CIVIL DEFENSE: THE BIRTH OF MODERN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
There is no global formula that explains how the countries of the world developed their disaster
management capacities. However, there is one particular period in recent history that witnessed the
greatest overall move toward a centralized safeguarding of citizens—the Civil Defense era. (See
figure 1.1.)
FIGURE 1.1
Civil defense era poster, Pennsylvania, United
States.
Source: Library of Congress, 2000.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS6
Modern disaster management, in terms of the emergence of global standards and organized efforts
to address preparedness, mitigation, and response activities for a wide range of disasters, did not begin
to emerge until the mid-twentieth century. In most countries, this change materialized as a response to
specific disaster events. At the same time, it was further galvanized by a shift in social philosophy, in
which the government played an increasing role in preventing and responding to disasters. The legal
foundation that allowed for such a shift was the result of advances in warfare technology.
In response to the threat posed by air raids and the ever-present and dreadful prospect of a nuclear
attack, many industrialized nations’ governments began to form elaborate systems of civil defense.
These systems included detection mechanisms, early warning alarms, hardened shelters, search and
rescue teams, and local and regional coordinators. Most nations’ legislatures also established legal
frameworks to guide both the creation and maintenance of these systems through the passage of
laws, the creation of national-level civil defense organizations, and the allocation of funding and
personnel.
Despite these impressive efforts, surprisingly few civil defense units evolved over time into more
comprehensive disaster or emergency management organizations (Quarantelli 1995). But the legal
framework developed to support them remained in place and formed the basis for modern disaster and
emergency management as we know it today. For example:
• Great Britain’s disaster management agency traces its roots to the Civil Defense Act of 1948.
• Canada’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP)
grew out of the Canadian Civil Defense Organization created in 1948.
• The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grew out of the Federal
Civil Defense Act of 1950.
• France’s civil protection is a product of that nation’s 1950 Ordinance and the 1965 Decree Relat-
ing to Civil
Defense.
• Algeria Civil Protection grew out of the 1964 Decree on the Administrative Organization of Civil
Defense.
CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
National emergency management capacity began to take a more centralized role in the 1970s and ‘80s
as countries focused on the creation of national-level emergency management systems. Many devel-
oped their disaster management capabilities out of necessity and an acceptance of the need to formalize
both the authority and budget for an agency to address blatant disaster risk. Other countries formed
their disaster management structures not for civil defense, but after being spurred into action by popular
criticism for poor management of a natural disaster (e.g., Peru in 1970, Nicaragua in 1972, and
Guatemala in 1976 following destructive earthquakes in each country).
And yet others, to a diminishing degree, still have no real emergency management structure to speak
of, irrespective of their disaster history.
THE INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
On December 11, 1987, the United Nations General Assembly declared the 1990s to be the “Interna-
tional Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction” (IDNDR). This action was taken to promote internation-
ally coordinated efforts to reduce material losses and social and economic disruption caused by natural
7 CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
disasters, especially in developing countries, through capacity building. On December 22, 1989,
through UN Resolution 44/236, the General Assembly set forth the goals they wished to achieve during
the Decade. In addition to establishing a special UN office in Geneva to coordinate associated activi-
ties, the resolution directed the various UN agencies to:
• improve the capacity of each country to mitigate the effects of natural disasters expeditiously and
effectively, paying special attention to assisting developing countries in the assessment of disaster
damage potential and in the establishment of early warning systems and disaster-resistant struc-
tures when and where needed;
• devise appropriate guidelines and strategies for applying existing scientific and technical knowl-
edge, taking into account the cultural and economic diversity among nations;
• foster scientific and engineering endeavors aimed at closing critical gaps in knowledge in order to
reduce loss of life and property;
• disseminate existing and new technical information related to measures for the assessment, pre-
diction, and mitigation of natu
ral disasters;
• develop measures for the assessment, prediction, prevention, and mitigation of natural disasters
through programmes of technical assistance and technology transfer, demonstration projects, and
education and training, tailored to specific disasters and locations, and to evaluate the effective-
ness of those programs. (United Nations 1989)
It was expected that all participating governments would, at the national level:
• formulate national disaster-mitigation programmes, as well as economic, land use, and insurance
policies for disaster prevention, and particularly in developing countries, to integrate them fully
into their national development programmes;
• participate during the [IDNDR] in concerted international action for the reduction of natural disas-
ters and, as appropriate, establish national committees in cooperation with the relevant scientific
and technological communities and other concerned sectors with a view to attaining the objective
and goals of the
Decade;
• encourage their local administrations to take appropriate steps to mobilize the necessary sup-
port from the public and private sectors and to contribute the achievement of the purposes of the
Decade;
• keep the Secretary-General informed of the plans of their countries and of assistance that can
be provided so that the United Nations may become an international centre for the exchange of
information and the coordination of international efforts concerning activities in support of the
objective and goals of the Decade, thus enabling each State to benefit from the experience of other
countries;
• take measures, as appropriate, to increase public awareness of damage risk probabilities and of the
significance of preparedness, prevention, relief, and short-term recovery activities with respect to
natural disasters, and to enhance community preparedness through education, training, and other
means, taking into account the specific role of the news media;
• pay due attention to the impact of natural disasters on healthcare, particularly to activities to
reduce the vulnerability of hospitals and health centres, as well as the impact on food storage
facilities, human shelter, and other social and economic infrastructure;
• improve the early international availability of appropriate emergency supplies through the storage
or earmarking of such supplies in disaster-prone areas. (United Nations 1989)
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS8
THE YOKOHAMA STRATEGY – GLOBAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
In May 1994, UN member states met at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in
Yokohama, Japan, to assess the progress attained by the IDNDR. At this meeting, they developed the
Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Through this document, the UN affirmed that:
1. Impact of natural disasters in terms of human and economic losses has risen in recent years, and
society in general has become more vulnerable to natural disasters. Those usually most affected
by natural and other disasters are the poor and socially disadvantaged groups in developing
countries, as they are least equipped to cope with them.
2. Disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and relief are four elements which contribute to
and gain from the implementation of sustainable development policies. These elements, along
with environmental protection and sustainable development, are closely interrelated. Therefore,
nations should incorporate them in their development plans and ensure efficient follow-up mea-
sures at the community, national, subregional, regional, and international levels.
3. Disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness are better than disaster response in achiev-
ing [disaster reduction] goals. . . . Disaster response alone is not sufficient, as it yields only
temporary results at a very high cost. We have followed this limited approach for too long. This
has been further demonstrated by the recent focus on response to complex emergencies, which,
although compelling, should not divert from pursuing a comprehensive approach. Prevention
contributes to lasting improvement in safety and is essential to integrated disaster management.
4. The world is increasingly interdependent. All countries shall act in a new spirit of partnership to
build a safer world based on common interests and shared responsibility to save human lives, since
natural disasters do not respect borders. Regional and international cooperation will significantly
enhance our ability to achieve real progress in mitigating disasters through the transfer of technol-
ogy and the sharing of information and joint disaster prevention and mitigation activities. Bilateral
and multilateral assistance and financial resources should be mobilized to support these efforts.
5. The information, knowledge, and some of the technology necessary to reduce the effects of
natural disasters can be available in many cases at low cost and should be applied. Appropriate
technology and data, with the corresponding training, should be made available to all freely and
in a timely manner, particularly to developing countries.
6. Community involvement and their active participation should be encouraged to gain greater
insight into the individual and collective perception of development and risk, and to have a clear
understanding of the cultural and organizational characteristics of each society as well as of its
behaviour and interactions with the physical and natural environment. This knowledge is of the
utmost importance to determine those things which favour and hinder prevention and mitigation
or encourage or limit the preservation of the environment for the development of future genera-
tions, and in order to find effective and efficient means to reduce the impact of disasters.
7. The adopted Yokohama Strategy and related Plan of Action for the rest of the Decade and
beyond:
a. Will note that each country has the sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens from natu-
ral disasters;
b. Will give priority attention to the developing countries, in particular the least developed,
land-locked countries and the small island developing States;
9 CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
c. Will develop and strengthen national capacities and capabilities and, where appropriate,
national legislation for natural and other disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness,
including the mobilization of non-governmental organizations and participation of local
communities;
d. Will promote and strengthen subregional, regional, and international cooperation in activities
to prevent, reduce, and mitigate natural and other disasters, with particular emphasis on:
– Human and institutional capacity-building and strengthening;
– Technology sharing, the collection, the dissemination, and the utilization of information;
– Mobilization of resources.
8. The international community and the United Nations system in particular must provide adequate
support to [natural disaster reduction].
9. The Yokohama Conference is at a crossroad in human progress. In one direction lie the
meagre results of an extraordinary opportunity given to the United Nations and its Member
States. In the other direction, the United Nations and the world community can change
the course of events by reducing the suffering from natural disasters. Action is urgently
needed.
10. Nations should view the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World as a call to action, individually
and in concert with other nations, to implement policies and goals reaffirmed in Yokohama, and
to use the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction as a catalyst for change. (ISDR
1994)
The participating member states accepted the following principles to be applied to disaster manage-
ment within their own countries. The tenth and final principle formalized the requirement that each
nation’s government accept responsibility for protecting its people from the consequences of
disasters:
1. Risk assessment is a required step for the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction
policies and measures.
2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are of primary importance in reducing the need for disaster
relief.
3. Disaster prevention and preparedness should be considered integral aspects of development
policy and planning at national, regional, bilateral, multilateral, and international levels.
4. Development and strengthening of capacities to prevent, reduce, and mitigate disasters [are] top
priority area[s] to be addressed during the Decade so as to provide a strong basis for follow-up
activities [after that period].
5. Early warnings of impending disasters and their effective dissemination using telecommu-
nications, including broadcast services, are key factors to successful disaster prevention and
preparedness.
6. Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels, from the
local community through the national government to the regional and international levels.
7. Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and patterns of development
focused on target groups by appropriate education and training of the whole community.
8. The international community accepts the need to share the necessary technology to prevent,
reduce, and mitigate disaster; this should be made freely available and in a timely manner as an
integral part of technical cooperation.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS10
9. Environmental protection as a component of sustainable development consistent with poverty
alleviation is imperative in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.
10. Each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, infrastructure, and other
national assets from the impact of natural disasters. The international community should dem-
onstrate strong political determination required to mobilize adequate and make efficient use of
existing resources, including financial, scientific, and technological means, in the field of natural
disaster reduction, bearing in mind the needs of the developing countries, particularly the least
developed countries. (ISDR 1994)
THE UN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION
The international community, through the efforts of the UN, named the 1990s the International Decade
for Natural Disaster Reduction to increase awareness of the importance of risk reduction. Following the
positive advances by the UN and member governments during this time, the UN General Assembly
voted in December of 1999 to further their successes by creating the International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (ISDR).
ISDR was created to help create nations, organizations, and communities that are “disaster resil-
ient” by espousing the idea that disaster reduction must be fully interlinked with development. The
ISDR sought to reduce disasters’ human, social, economic, and environmental toll, which was plaguing
rich and poor countries alike (and continues to). To achieve these goals, the ISDR promoted four objec-
tives as tools toward reaching “disaster reduction for all”:
• Increase public awareness about risk, vulnerability, and disaster reduction. The more people,
regional organizations, governments, NGOs, UN entities, representatives of civil society, and
others know about risk, vulnerability, and how to manage the impacts of natural hazards, the more
disaster reduction measures will be implemented in all sectors of society.
• Obtain commitment from public authorities to implement disaster reduction policies and actions.
The more decision makers at all levels commit themselves to disaster reduction policies and
actions, the sooner communities vulnerable to natural disasters will benefit from applied disaster
reduction policies and actions. This requires, in part, a grassroots approach where communities at
risk are fully informed and participate in risk management initiatives.
• Stimulate interdisciplinary and intersectoral partnerships, including the expansion of risk-
reduction networks. The more disaster reduction entities share information on their research and
practices, the more the global body of knowledge and experience will progress. By sharing a
common purpose and through collaborative efforts, the world’s nations will be more resilient to
natural hazards impacts.
• Improve scientific knowledge about disaster reduction. The more we know about the causes
and consequences of natural hazards and related technological and environmental disasters
on societies, the better prepared we are to reduce risks. Bringing the scientific community
and policymakers together allows them to contribute to and complement each others’ work.
(UNISDR 2001)
The ISDR worked with many different UN agencies and outside organizations, as administered by
the IATF/DR and the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the ISDR. These two bodies were formed by the UN
General Assembly through UN Resolutions 54/219 and 56/195 to implement ISDR.
11
THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK
THE HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (HFA)
In 2005, at The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Kobe, Japan, the 168 countries in
attendance adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations
and Communities to Disasters. This action was endorsed by the General Assembly in UN Resolution
60/195. The HFA outlined a 10-year plan that reflected the intention of the global community to take a
more comprehensive, holistic approach to disaster risk reduction. The HFA called for nations to pursue
three strategic goals during the decade of action in order to bring about a substantial and measurable
reduction of disaster losses (fatalities and social, economic, and environmental losses). These goals
were intended to be aligned with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), signifying a recognition
that disaster risk reduction was closely connected with overall national development. The goals included:
• The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning;
• Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms, and capacities to build resilience to
hazards; and
• The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery programs.
The Hyogo Framework also defined five priorities for action and identified the collective and indi-
vidual roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in its implementation and follow-up. These priori-
ties include:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis
for implementation;
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks—and enhance early warning;
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors; and
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
Following the WCDR, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG)
launched a consultative process to consider practical ways of strengthening the ISDR system, building
on existing mandates, institutions, partnerships, and mechanisms, with the key purpose of implementing
the Hyogo Framework for Action. The rationale for strengthening the ISDR and describing it as a sys-
tem of partnerships was based on the need for making substantial progress in implementing a world-
wide disaster risk reduction agenda, which calls for concerted efforts by all stakeholders. The UN Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR; see chapter 10) developed a standard set of comprehensive
indicators against which regions, nations, and local governments could plan for and measure their
actions. In two-year increments, nations self-assessed their progress against the defined measures of
success, and reported this progress to the world community. The tool was called the HFA Monitor, and
the reports that were submitted were (and remain) available on the UNISDR (http://bit.ly/1mK0Rwe).
THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK
In March of 2015 the global community again meets in Japan—this time in the tsunami-impacted city
of Sendai—to look for a way forward in managing global disaster risk. The Third World Conference on
Disaster Risk Reduction will see the culmination of years of preparation for the follow-up to the Hyogo
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS12
Framework for Action in the development of a new global framework. While at the time of publication
this framework had yet to be given a formal title, it is referred to as the post-2015 framework for disas-
ter risk reduction, or more simply as post-HFA.
The post-2015 framework was called upon by UN General Assembly Resolution 66/199. When
nations meet in Sendai, their actions will represent the culmination of hundreds of meetings held in all
regions of the world and scores of reports drafted to define the outstanding needs. The intention is to
continue progress that has been achieved thus far in international cooperation toward achieving disaster
risk reduction. It will build on the knowledge and practice accumulated through the implementation of
each of the previous efforts, including the IDNDR, the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action, the
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and the HFA.
In June of 2014, the UN General Assembly released a document entitled “Suggested Elements for
the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction” that addressed the structure and content of the
framework to be developed and released in March of 2015. Understandably, the proposed purpose of
the future framework was described as being “to manage disaster and climate risk in development at
local, national, regional, and global levels for the resilience of people, communities, and countries”
(United Nations General Assembly 2014). This document proposes several recommendations for the
new framework inclusive of guiding principles, implementation measures, areas of focus (including
public awareness and education, international cooperation, monitoring, reporting, and reviewing), as
well as how to perform the transition between the existing and the new framework. But perhaps most
telling are the global targets and indicators for the new framework, which include:
• Reducing disaster mortality by half by 2025 (or by a given percentage in a given period of time);
• Reducing disaster economic loss by a given percentage by 2025; and
• Reducing disaster damage to housing, educational, and health facilities by a given percentage by 2025.
MODERN DISASTER MANAGEMENT – A FOUR-PHASE APPROACH
Comprehensive disaster management is based upon four distinct components: mitigation, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery. Although a range of terminology is often used in describing them, effec-
tive disaster management utilizes each component in the following manner:
1. Mitigation. Also called Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), mitigation involves reducing or eliminat-
ing the likelihood or the consequences of a hazard, or both. Mitigation seeks to “treat” the hazard
such that it impacts society to a lesser degree. See chapter 4 for more information.
2. Preparedness. This involves equipping people who may be impacted by a disaster or who may be
able to help those impacted with the tools to increase their chances of survival and to minimize
their financial and other losses. See chapter 5 for more information.
3. Response. This involves taking action to reduce or eliminate the impact of disasters that have
occurred or are currently occurring, in order to prevent further suffering, financial loss, or a
combination of both. Relief, a term commonly used in international disaster management, is one
component of response. See chapter 6 for more information.
4. Recovery. This involves returning victims’ lives back to a normal state following the impact of
disaster consequences. The recovery phase generally begins after the immediate response has
ended, and can persist for months or years thereafter. See chapter 7 for more information.
13
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
Various diagrams illustrate the cyclical nature by which these and other related factors are per-
formed over time, although disagreement exists concerning how such a “disaster management cycle” is
visualized. These diagrams, such as the one in figure 1.2, are generalizations, and it must always be
understood that many exceptions can be identified in each. In practice, all of these factors are inter-
mixed and are performed to some degree before, during, and after disasters. Disasters tend to exist in a
continuum, with the recovery from one often leading straight into another. And while response is often
pictured as beginning immediately after disaster impact, it is not uncommon for the actual response to
begin well before the disaster actually happens.
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
Two separate but interrelated concepts are represented by the term “international disaster manage-
ment”: (1) the study of the diverse emergency and disaster management systems and structures that
exist throughout the world; and (2) the study of disaster management in scenarios where the capacity
of a single nation’s response mechanisms are overwhelmed.
Every country, every government, and every society is unique regarding
• its vulnerabilities and the root causes of such;
• the perception of risk and the methods used to identify and analyze it;
• the institutions, systems, and structures created to manage risk;
• the statutory authorities that guide the management of risk and the management of events that do
actually occur; and
• the mechanisms developed to respond to disaster events and the response capacity of those
mechanisms.
FIGURE 1.2
The disaster management cycle.
Source: Alexander, 2002.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS14
Several times each year, the response requirements of disaster events exceed the disaster manage-
ment abilities of a single nation or several nations. In these instances, the governments of the affected
countries call upon the resources of the international response community. This cooperative interna-
tional response is, by definition, international disaster management.
Over time and through iteration, a recognized and systemic process for responding to interna-
tional disasters has begun to emerge. Standards for response have been developed by multiple
sources, and a recognized group of typical participants has been identified. (See exhibit 1.2.) Through
practice and study, formulaic, methodical processes for assessing both the affected nations’ damage
and their various response needs have been identified, tried, and improved on. What was only 30
years ago a chaotic, ad hoc reaction to international disasters has grown with astounding speed into
a highly effective machine.
It is important to add that disasters do not become international just because they have overwhelmed
a country’s capacity to respond. There must be a commitment on the participants’ part to recognize the
need for international involvement and to accept the appeal made by the host nation’s government. The
sad truth is that, in practice, not all disasters elicit the same level of international interest and response,
whether because of donor fatigue (see chapter 11), media interest, diverted priorities, or other events
that may dilute public interest. The Mozambique floods of 2000 are but one example of a situation in
which the international community was accused of sitting idly by as hundreds of people died. (See
exhibit 1.3.)
Response and recovery alone, however, are not effective means of managing disasters if they are
performed in the absence of a comprehensive regimen of preparedness and mitigation activities.
(See table 1.2.) An important focal shift among the world’s international disaster management
organizations, agencies, and interest groups from disaster response to disaster prevention is evi-
dence of widespread recognition and acceptance of this. Although many national governments,
especially in the developing world, have yet to make a dedicated effort toward initiating or improv-
ing their pre-disaster management activities, many international development and disaster manage-
ment agencies are working to address this issue. The UN, whose members consist of almost every
country in the world, has made a sustained effort to lead its member nations in addressing their
shortfalls: first by dedicating the 1990s to the IDNDR (producing the Yokohama Strategy and the
Plan of Action for a Safer World), and then by following up with the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the Hyogo Framework for Action to ensure that forward momentum
is maintained.
EXHIBIT 1.2 INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PARTICIPANTS
• Victims
• Local first responders
• Governments of the affected countries
• Governments of other countries
• International organizations
• International financial institutions
• Regional organizations and associations
• Nonprofit organizations
• Private organizations—business and industry
• Local and regional donors
15 WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
EXHIBIT 1.3 2000 MOZAMBIQUE FLOODS TIMELINE
February 9 Heavy rain begins falling across most of southern Africa, with Mozambique hit the hardest. The capital,
Maputo, is submerged. Throughout the country, hundreds of thousands of families are left homeless and
stranded. Damage to crops and infrastructure is severe.
February 11 At least 70 people have died due to the flooding. The UN reports that 150,000 people are in immediate
danger from starvation and disease. Dysentery outbreaks are reported outside the capital.
February 22 Tropical cyclone Eline makes a direct hit on the country, worsening the condition in many areas already sub-
merged by the floods. The South African Air Force begins making airlifts to over 23,000 desperate victims.
February 24 The UN makes an appeal for $13 million in immediate relief and $65 million for recovery assistance.
The appeal goes unanswered. Rainfall draining from other parts of southern Africa begins to flow into
Mozambique, worsening already poor conditions.
February 27 More rainfall causes flash floods throughout the country, destroying much of the remaining farmland.
March 2 Floodwaters have risen by up to 26 feet (8 m) in many parts of the country. International aid workers report that
100,000 people are in need of immediate evacuation, and over 7,000 are trapped in trees and need to be rescued
(many have been trapped in the trees for several days without food or clean water). Finally, more than three weeks
after the crisis began, international disaster management agencies begin to send responders and relief assistance.
Source: BBC News, 2000.
Table 1.2 Response and Recovery-Based Management versus Prevention and Risk Reduction-
Based Management
Response and Recovery-Based Efforts Prevention and Risk Reduction-Based Efforts
Primary focus on disaster events Focus on vulnerability and risk issues
Single, event-based scenarios Dynamic, multiple-risk issues and development scenarios
Basic responsibility to respond to an event Fundamental need to assess, monitor, and update expo-
sure to changing conditions
Often fixed, location-specific conditions Extended, changing, shared or regional, local variations
Responsibility in single authority or agency Involves multiple authorities, interests, actors
Command and control, directed operations Situation-specific functions, free and open association
and participation
Established hierarchical relationships Shifting, fluid, and tangential relationships
Often focused on hardware and equipment Dependent on related practices, abilities, and knowledge
base
Dependent on specialized expertise Focused on aligning specialized expertise with public
views and priorities
Urgent, immediate, and short timeframes in outlook,
planning, attention, and returns
Moderate and long timeframes in outlook, planning,
values, and returns
Rapidly changing, dynamic information usage, which is
often conflicting or sensitive in nature
Accumulated, historical, layered, updated, or compara-
tive use of information
Primary, authorized, or singular information sources;
need for definitive facts
Open or public information; multiple, diverse, or chang-
ing sources; differing perspectives and points of view
In-out or vertical flows of information Dispersed, lateral flows of information
Relates to matters of public security, safety Matters of public interest, investment, and safety
Source: Adapted from Jeggle, 2001.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS16
Today, the United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) guides the efforts of the inter-
national community’s overall disaster management mission. (See chapter 10.) Specifically, the UNISDR
seeks to build “disaster resilient communities by promoting increased awareness of the importance of
disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable development, with the goal of reducing
human, social, economic, and environmental losses due to natural hazards and related technological
and environmental disasters” (UNISDR n.d.).
In January 2005, in Hyogo, Japan, the UN held the first World Conference on Disaster Reduc-
tion. More than 4,000 participants attended, including representatives from 168 governments, 78
UN specialized agencies and observer organizations, 161 non-governmental organizations, and
562 journalists from 154 media outlets. The public forum attracted more than 40,000 visitors. The
outcome of the conference was the twenty-four-page Hyogo Framework for Action, adopted by all
member countries, that outlined members’ resolve to pursue “the substantial reduction of disaster
losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and
countries.”
With the adoption of this framework, which coincided with some of the most devastating hazards
and disasters in recent memory, international disaster management climbed to the forefront of the inter-
national policy agenda. UNISDR, through the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, has
increased and maintained international activity to address our growing hazard risk. (See exhibit 1.4.)
For years, the nations of the world have watched as country after country, both rich and poor, have
EXHIBIT 1.4 GLOBAL PLATFORM FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GP) was established by mandate of the UN General Assembly. The GP
is an international meeting that occurs every two years and is attended by the international disaster risk reduction com-
munity, which includes governments, international organizations (including the UN and other regional organizations and
institutions), NGOs, scientific and academic institutions, and the private sector. By mandate, the GP
• assesses progress made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action.
• enhances awareness of disaster risk reduction.
• enables the sharing of experiences and lessons from good practice.
• identifies remaining gaps and recommends targeted action to accelerate national and local implementation.
The first and second sessions of the GP, which occurred in 2007 and 2009, respectively, were attended by more than
152 governments and 137 organizations. These sessions helped to build momentum for national commitments to perform
disaster risk reduction, culminating with the May 2011 GP meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. The benchmarks set out in the
first two meetings focused on five main areas, including the goals to:
1. harmonize disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in the broader context of poverty reduction and sus-
tainable development;
2. reduce community- and local-level risk through partnerships that better recognize the mutual dependence of govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and to promote the role of women as drivers of action (with
special consideration to youth and children’s roles);
3. move toward full implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action through several action targets (e.g., assessments
of and mitigation for educational and health facilities);
4. increase the disaster risk reduction component of national budgets and international development funding (including
humanitarian relief and recovery expenditures), and to improve measurements of the effectiveness of investment in risk
reduction; and
5. continue the efforts of the ISDR in supporting governments and NGOs in their disaster risk reduction efforts.
Based on: PreventionWeb, 2011.
17
DISASTERS, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT
suffered the consequences of terrible disasters. However, it has not been until recently that world lead-
ers have begun to fully grasp that many of these consequences could have been reduced through better
mitigation and preparedness efforts and more effective response capabilities. As a result, the field of
international disaster management is now in a position to influence these leaders in a way not previ-
ously possible.
DISASTERS, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and practice support the theory that there exists a strong correlation between disasters and
poverty. It is well documented that those developing countries repeatedly subject to disasters experi-
ence stagnant or even negative rates of development over time. (See figure 1.3.) Hurricane Mitch,
which destroyed as much as 70 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras and Nicaragua (UNISDR
2004), is a prime example, having been blamed with reversing the rates of development in these and
other Central American countries by at least a decade (and as much as 20 and 30 years in some areas;
Oxfam 1998). The same effect has also been witnessed in many of the areas affected by the 2004 tsu-
nami and earthquake events in Southeast Asia and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. (See exhibit 1.5.) For
countries with developing economies, the financial setbacks these events inflict can be ruinous, in con-
trast to their industrialized counterparts, where a robust economy absorbs such impacts. In 2001, for
example, earthquakes occurred in both El Salvador and the United States (Seattle), each causing
approximately $2 billion in damages. While this amount had little or no noticeable impact on the US
economy, the financial consequences in El Salvador amounted to 15 percent of that country’s GDP
(UNDP 2004a).
The aftermath of a disaster exacerbates the debilitating causes of poverty in developing countries.
Each disaster is unique in its consequences, so there is no single formula that can be used to character-
ize precisely how these problems will play out. The following list, however, provides a general
FIGURE 1.3
Impact of disasters on development.
Adapted from ADRC, 2005.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS18
overview of the many ways in which disasters harm poor countries beyond the initial death, injury, and
destruction:
• National and international development efforts are stunted, erased, or even reversed.
• Sizable portions of GDP often must be diverted from development projects, social programs, or
debt repayment to manage the disaster consequences and begin recovery efforts. (See figure 1.4.)
• Vital infrastructure is damaged or destroyed—including roads, bridges, airports, sea ports, com-
munications systems, power generation and distribution facilities, and water and sewage plants—
requiring years to rebuild.
• Schools are damaged or destroyed, leaving students without an adequate source of education for
months or even years.
• Hospitals and clinics are damaged or destroyed, resulting in an increase in vulnerability to disease
of the affected population.
• Formal and informal businesses are destroyed, resulting in surges in unemployment and decreased
economic stability and strength.
• Reconstruction efforts result in shortages of materials and labor, which in turn drive up construc-
tion costs, inflate salaries, and draw workers away from other sectors where they are needed.
• Residents are forced or impelled to leave the affected zone, often never to return, extracting
institutional knowledge, cultural and social identity, and economic viability from areas that cannot
afford to spare such resources.
• Desperation and poverty lead to a rapid upsurge in crime and insecurity.
• A general feeling of hopelessness afflicts the affected population, leading to increased rates of
depression and a lack of motivation to regain independence from outside assistance.
DISASTER TRENDS
Increased accuracy in the reporting of disaster statistics has helped to provide both greater visualization
and confirmation of something many scientists and disaster managers have been warning of for decades:
the nature of disasters is rapidly changing. These changes are generally regarded as a result of human
EXHIBIT 1.5 TSUNAMI SETS BACK DEVELOPMENT 20 YEARS
IN MALDIVES
Within minutes of the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, much of the economic and social progress in the
Maldives was washed away.
According to government officials, the tsunami caused a 20-year setback in the development of this small country, an
island nation off the coast of India, which only six days before the disaster had been removed from the UN’s list of least-
developed countries. In particular, the tsunami and its resulting floodwaters dealt a serious blow to the tourism sector, the
country’s main source of income. Nearly one-fourth of the 87 resorts in the Maldives were severely damaged and declared
unable to operate. Tourism directly accounts for one-third of the country’s economy, with the resorts alone providing
between 25,000 and 30,000 jobs. When tourism-related tax and customs revenues are included, tourism contributes up to
70 percent of the economy, with the sector expanding each year. These earnings had helped to improve living standards in
the Maldives, including increased school enrollment, lower unemployment, and more students seeking higher education
abroad.
Based on: UNDP, 2005.
19 DISASTER TRENDS
FIGURE 1.4
Selected natural disasters: total damage and share of the GDP between 1991 and 2005.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS20
actions and development patterns. What is troubling is that these trends indicate that more disasters are
occurring each year, with greater intensity, and that a great many more people are affected by them,
either indirectly or directly. And while these disasters are becoming less deadly worldwide, they are
causing a much greater financial impact on both affected and unaffected nations. Finally, and what may
be the most disturbing of these trends, is that the poor countries of the world and their citizens are
assuming a much greater proportion of the impacts of disasters. In sum, recent trends indicate that
• the number of people affected by disasters is rising.
• overall, disasters are becoming less deadly.
• overall, disasters are becoming more costly.
• poor countries are disproportionately affected by disaster consequences.
• the number of disasters is increasing each year.
TREND 1: THE OVERALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS IS RISING
Human settlement has always been directed by the needs of individuals and societies, such as the need
for food, water, defense, and access to commerce. Almost without exception, increased natural hazard
risk has been assumed in favor of these needs, often as result of a confidence that hazard risk can be
accepted as “part of life” or can be effectively managed. Evidence of such behavior is apparent in
almost any example of previous human settlement: communities along rivers build levees; those located
along the sea coasts construct sea walls and jetties; farmers place their houses and sow their crops upon
the fertile slopes of active volcanoes.
However, as the population and size of these settlements grow, the assumed risk becomes more and
more concentrated. The overall rates by which people have relocated from rural areas into cities (urban-
ization) have continued to increase over time. Rising populations in almost all countries of the world
amplify the urbanization effect. In 1950, less than 30 percent of the world’s 2.5 billion people lived in
an urban setting. By 1998, the number of people on earth had grown to 5.7 billion, and 45 percent of
them lived in cities. UN estimates state that by 2025 there will be 8.2 billion people on earth, and more
than 60 percent of them will live in cities (UNFPA 2013; WHO
2014).
When humans settle in high-risk urban areas, the hazard risks they face as individuals increase. As
of the year 2000, it was estimated that at least 75 percent of the world’s population lived in areas at risk
from a major disaster (UNDP 2004a). And because these high-risk areas periodically experience major
disasters, it logically follows that the number of people who are annually affected by disasters (defined
as having their homes, crops, animals, livelihoods, or health impacted) is equally high (UNISDR 2004).
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 display the observed total number of people annually affected by disasters dur-
ing the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Note that, beginning in 1954, there is a significant rise
in the number of people affected. It was during the decade of the 1950s that the mass transition toward
urbanization began in the industrialized nations, a trend that most other nations of the world followed
soon after.
TREND 2: OVERALL, DISASTERS ARE BECOMING LESS DEADLY
The seismic, meteorological, hydrological, and other forces that result in natural hazards are natural
processes that occur irrespective of the actions or existence of humans. Water has overflowed the banks
of rivers since before humans lived beside them. Archeologists and geologists have unearthed evidence
21 DISASTER TRENDS
that earthquake events occurred during every era of the planet’s history. Volcanic activity has been
given as much credit for its role in generating life on earth as it has for destroying it. Natural disasters,
it has therefore been suggested, are merely the result of humans placing themselves directly into the
path of these normal events. (See figures 1.7 and 1.8.) United States Geological Survey (USGS) scien-
tists Susan Hough and Lucile Jones aptly captured this line of thought when they wrote that “earth-
quakes don’t kill people, buildings do” (Hough and Jones 2002).
Humans are adaptable and quickly adjust to the pressures exerted upon them by nature. People have
modified their behaviors and their environments to accommodate their surrounding climate and topog-
raphy, often proving successful at counteracting the negative consequences of common daily hazards
such as rain or extreme temperatures. For less common events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes,
humans have had lower levels of success. Fortunately, modern science has helped to change this fact
significantly, at least in those countries in which the technology and technical expertise is within reach.
Table 1.3 illustrates the success achieved by the United States in adjusting to hurricane risk during the
course of the twentieth century, where death rates fell steadily until the end of the century as explained
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1900–2011
7
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
6
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
5
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
4
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
a
ff
e
c
te
d
1
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 2010
Year
FIGURE 1.5
Total number of people affected by disasters worldwide from 1900 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS22
by several driving forces (including better preparedness, storm tracking, public education, response,
etc.). What is most interesting about this trend is that as we move into the second decade of the twenty-
first century, there is an obvious trend reversal, with the number of US hurricane fatalities reaching
levels that exceed the aggregate of the preceding 60 years. While there are varied theories to explain
such a change, what draws the most support is the belief that this is an unintended consequence of a
post-9/11 shift in US emergency management policy that boosted terrorism prevention at the cost of
natural hazard mitigation and preparedness. Such a consequence only reinforces the theory that global
disaster fatality reduction is the result of our risk reduction efforts.
Globalization and increased international cooperation have helped the world community to more
effectively address risk reduction and limit the human impacts of disasters. Although the number of
disasters has more than tripled since the 1970s, the number of people worldwide who have perished has
fallen by 50 percent (UNISDR 2004). Greater recognition of the importance of emergency management
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1975–2011
7
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
6
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
5
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
4
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
1
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
a
ff
e
c
te
d
Year
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20102005
FIGURE 1.6
Total number of people affected by disasters worldwide from 1975 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
23 DISASTER TRENDS
and sustainable development is turning the tide on disasters. The efforts of the United Nations, the many
non-governmental agencies involved in development and disaster preparedness and response, and the
efforts of individual governments have shown that humans can effectively influence their vulnerability.
There are several explanations for the falling fatality rates of disasters. These include:
• More organized and comprehensive preparedness campaigns are helping individuals and commu-
nities to decrease their vulnerability and to react more appropriately in the face of disaster.
• Early warning systems are giving potential victims more time to leave the dangerous situations
associated with impending disasters.
• Special disaster-specific protection structures, such as tornado safe rooms, are mitigating the
impact that disasters have on human life.
• Building code creation and enforcement are helping to increase the resilience of the various struc-
tures and systems upon which humans depend.
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
k
il
le
d
Number of people reported killed by natural disasters 1900–2011
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 2010
Year
5
0
0
,0
0
0
1
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
1
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
3
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
4
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
FIGURE 1.7
Total number of natural disaster-related deaths reported in the world from 1900 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS24
FIGURE 1.8
Total number of natural disaster-related deaths reported in the world from 1975 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT– International Disaster Database.
Table 1.3 Deaths Attributed to Hurricanes in the United States, 1900–2010
Period Number Killed
1900–1919 10,000 (approximate; exact 1900 Galveston death toll is unknown)
1920–1939 3751
1940–1959 1119
1960–1979 453
1980–1999 82
2000–2014 2200
Source: Thoreau Institute, 2005; FEMA, 1997 (along with other multiple dates).
25 DISASTER TRENDS
• Secondary, post-disaster consequences, such as famine and disease, are more effectively managed
by modern public-health response mechanisms.
• Proper zoning procedures and enforcement are helping to prevent people from moving into the
paths of disasters and helping to remove those who are already there.
• Sustainable development processes are helping to reduce population movement into areas of high-
est risk.
TREND 3: OVERALL, DISASTERS ARE BECOMING MORE COSTLY
The cost of disasters worldwide is increasing at an alarming rate. Twenty-five years ago, the eco-
nomic damage from any given disaster rarely topped the billion-dollar mark, even after accounting
for inflation. Now, several disasters top this mark each year. (See figure 1.9.) By the year 2000, the
FIGURE 1.9
Total amount of reported damages (billion USD at 2009 prices) in the world from 1900 to 2012.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS26
cost of disasters worldwide had topped $60 billion per year, as measured by the international rein-
surance firm Munich Re. In 2013, a new record was set when 41 disasters exceeded $1 billion in
damages worldwide, with all disasters totaling $125 billion. In 2012, while there were fewer bil-
lion-dollar disasters, the total impact of all disasters combined exceeded $175 billion (World Post
2014).
There are many reasons disasters are getting more expensive, including several of the previous
explanations: there are more people in the world, there are more disasters, people are more concentrated
together, and so forth. The fact remains that people continue to move toward urban centers, build
expensive structures and infrastructure in the path of hazards, and try to overcome the risk of disaster
by building structures designed to resist damage. Again consider hurricanes in the United States. Their
basic power and natural characteristics have not changed significantly over time. However, human
settlements in high-risk coastal areas have increased. The result of this human behavior is the rising
costs of hurricane damage during the past 20 years (Riebeek 2005).
There are several explanations for the global increase in financial disaster cost, which include:
• Increasing urbanization in high-risk zones is occurring throughout the world, concentrating
wealth, physical structures, and infrastructure together in high-risk zones.
• Economies are much more dependent upon technologies that tend to fail in times of disaster; one
example is the 2003 northeastern US/Canadian electrical blackout, which resulted in as much as
$6 billion in damages.
• Areas not directly affected are experiencing secondary economic consequences of disaster, as with
many world economies following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.
• A greater number of less deadly but financially destructive disasters are occurring throughout the
world as a result of climate change or other factors.
• Increasing population; the US Census Bureau estimates that the world’s population grew from 3.8
to 6.8 billion between 1950 and 2010.
TREND 4: POOR COUNTRIES ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED
BY DISASTER CONSEQUENCES
Disasters of all kinds strike literally every nation of the world; they do not differentiate between rich
and poor countries. However, developing countries suffer the greatest impact and also most often expe-
rience subsequent internal civil conflict that leads to complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs; see
Definitions). The United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reported in 2011 that 95
percent of the deaths caused by disasters occur in poor countries—a figure that has been steadily rising
for decades. (Lim 2011). What is troubling about this statistic is that the UNDP estimated that only 11
percent of the world’s “at-risk” population can be accounted for in these countries (UNDP 2004a; see
figure 1.10). In fact, on average, 90 percent of disaster-related injuries and deaths are sustained in coun-
tries with per-capita income levels that are below $760 per year (Jha 2010; see figure 1.11).
Based on these facts, inferences can be drawn about a nation’s disaster risk by considering its devel-
opment status. Public health expert Eric Noji identified four primary reasons why the poor in general
are often most at risk.
They (1) are least able to afford housing that can withstand seismic activity; (2) often live along
coasts where hurricanes, storm surges, or earthquake-generated [tsunamis] strike live in
FIGURE 1.10
Total number of deaths and people affected by natural disasters per 100,000 inhabitants from 1974 to 2003.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
FIGURE 1.11
Total amount of economic damages reported in major world aggregates from 1991 to 2005 (billion USD, 2006).
Adapted from EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS28
floodplains subject to inundation; (3) are forced by economic circumstances to live in substandard
housing built on unstable slopes that are susceptible to landslides or are built next to hazardous
industrial sites; and (4) are not educated as to the appropriate lifesaving behaviors or actions that
they can take when a disaster occurs. (Noji 1997)
There are also many secondary reasons that contribute. For instance, injuries sustained in disasters,
and the disease that often follows, are much more likely to lead to death in poor countries, where acute
care may be substandard or nonexistent and the control of disease outbreaks more difficult. The poor
are also likely to suffer greater disaster consequences as the result of minimal or nonexistent enforce-
ment of safety standards, building codes, and zoning regulations. (See figure 1.12.) The full range of
explanations is both extensive and diverse.
Although the importance of disaster preparedness and mitigation is widely recognized by almost all
of the world’s countries, and although these principles are widely applied on a growing basis by inter-
national development agencies, it still comes as no surprise that countries ranking lower on develop-
ment indices place disaster management very low in budgetary priority. These nations’ resources tend
to be focused on social interests such as education and infrastructure or on their military, instead of on
projects that serve a preparatory or mitigation need, such as retrofitting structures with hazard-resistant
construction. Because all disasters, even those that tend to repeat, are chance events and thus not guar-
anteed to happen, disaster management programs in poor countries tend to be viewed as a luxury or
OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Developing countries: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea,
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
Least-developed countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (Western), São Tomé
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu,
Yemen, Zambia.
Source: UNDP, 2004b.
29 DISASTER TRENDS
even superfluous. Compounding this situation, poverty and uncontrolled urbanization force large popu-
lations to concentrate in perilous, high-risk areas that have little or no defense against disasters. Thus,
the difference in the effect of a disaster’s impact in a rich versus poor country is remarkable. Table 1.4
illustrates these differences.
FIGURE 1.12
Number of people killed by disasters by income class between 1991 and 2005 (Note that drought includes
extreme temperature hazards.).
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
Table 1.4 Differences in Disaster Impact between Rich and Poor Countries
Rich Countries Poor Countries
Tend to suffer higher economic losses, but have mecha-
nisms in place to absorb these costs.
Have less at risk in terms of financial value, but maintain
little or no buffer to absorb even low financial impacts.
Economic reverberations can be significant, and social
development ultimately suffers.
Employ mechanisms that reduce loss of life, such as
early warning systems, enforced building codes, and
zoning.
Lack the resources necessary to take advantage of advanced
technologies, and have little ability to enforce building
codes and zoning even if these mechanisms do exist.
Have immediate emergency and medical care that
increase survivability and contain the spread of disease.
Sustain massive primary and secondary casualties.
Transfer much of personal, private, and public risk to
insurance and reinsurance providers.
Generally do not participate in insurance mechanisms.
Divert funds from development programs to emergency
relief and recovery.
�
�
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
March 2006, Vol
.
24, No. 1, pp. 5-43
Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards:
The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo Eruption and
the Aetas of the Philippines
Jean-Christophe Gaillard
Laboratoire Territoires, UMR PACTE 5194 CNRS
Institut de Géographie Alpine
14 bis, avenue Marie Reynoard
38100 Grenoble
France
jean-christophe.gaillard@ujf-grenoble.f
r
This article explores the response of traditional societies
in the face of natural hazards through the lens of the concept
of resilience. Resilient societies are those able to overcome
the damages brought by the occurrence of natural hazards,
either through maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric,
or through accepting marginal or larger change in order to
survive. Citing the case of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption in
the Philippines and its impact on the Aeta communities who
have been living on the slopes of the volcano for centuries, it
suggests that the capacity of resilience of traditional societies
and the concurrent degree of cultural change rely on four
factors, namely: the nature of the hazard, the pre-disaster socio-
cultural context and capacity of resilience of the community,
the geographical setting, and the rehabilitation policy set up
by the authorities. These factors significantly vary in time and
space, from one disaster to another. It is important to perceive
their local variations to better anticipate the capability of
traditional societies to overcome the damage brought by the
occurrence of natural hazards and therefore predict eventual
cultural change.
� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
Introduction
Natural hazards are those natural phenomena that pose a threat
to people, structures and economic assets. Natural hazards include
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, tsunamis, storms and
cyclones, droughts, floods and storm surges among others. The
response capacity of people in the face of natural hazards is defined
by the concepts of vulnerability and resilience.
Early definitions of vulnerability mostly referred to the quantitative
degree of potential loss in the event of the occurrence of a natural hazard
(e.g., United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1992). The
concept eventually evolved to encompass the wider social context in
what is commonly called ‘social vulnerability’. Social vulnerability
may be defined as the propensity of a society to suffer from damage
in the event of the occurrence of a given hazard (D’Ercole 1994:
87-88). Vulnerability thus stresses the condition of a society which
makes it possible for a hazard to become a disaster (Cannon 1994:
13). It basically depends on a large array of factors which interact
in systemic (D’Ercole 1994) and causal directions (Watts and Bohle
1993; Wisner et al. 2004). These factors are demographic, social,
cultural, economic and political in nature. It is further important to
recognize that vulnerability reflects the daily conditions of society
(Maskrey 1989; Wisner 1993). Disasters are therefore viewed as the
extension of everyday hardships wherein the victims are marginalized
in three ways: geographically because they live in marginal hazard-
prone areas, socially because they are poor, and politically because
their voice is disregarded (Wisner et al. 2004). Vulnerability further
varies according to the nature of the hazard (Wisner 2004).
People’s capability of response in the face of natural hazards also
relies on their capacity of resilience. This concept spread widely in the
disaster literature in the 1990s and is still the object of a conceptual
debate around its sense and application among social scientists (e.g.,
Klein et al. 2003). Pelling (2003: 48) views resilience as a component
of vulnerability or the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard
stress. In this regard, it basically includes the planned preparation and
the spontaneous or premeditated adjustments undertaken in the face of
natural hazards. Other scholars (Folke et al. 2002: 13) define resilience
�Gaillard:
Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
as the “flip” (positive) side of vulnerability or the capacity to resist from
damage and change in the event of the occurrence of a natural hazard. A
third approach breaks away from the previous two to define resilience
as the capacity of a system to absorb and recover from the occurrence
of a hazardous event (Timmermann 1981: 21). Dovers and Handmer
(1992: 270) further distinguish three levels of societal resilience and
differentiate 1/ resilience through resistance to change; 2/ resilience
through incremental change at the margins and 3/ resilience through
openness and adaptability. The United Nations International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction (United Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of
the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2004) recently took
over this differentiation in its definition of resilience as “the capacity of
a system, community or society to resist or change in order that it may
obtain an acceptable level of functioning and structure”. Following
the same approach, Walker et al. (2004) differentiate four crucial
aspects of resilience. The first aspect is the latitude or the maximum
amount by which a system can be changed before losing its ability to
recover. The next dimension is the resistance or the ease or difficulty
of changing the system. The precariousness or how close the current
state of the system is to a limit or “threshold” is also of importance.
The final aspect is the panarchy or the cross-scale interactions and
influences from states and dynamics at scales above and below.
Resilience differs from vulnerability by addressing the capability
and the ways people deal with crises and disaster. On the other hand,
vulnerability only encompasses the susceptibility of individuals to
suffer from damage and thus to transform the occurrence of a natural
hazard into a disaster. Both concepts may rely on the same factors
(demographic, social, cultural, political, etc.) which may however
vary on different scales. Resilient societies are able to overcome the
damages brought by the occurrence of natural hazards, either through
maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric, or through accepting
marginal or larger change in order to survive. The concept of resilience
is thus intimately linked to the concept of change. Post-disaster
changes within the impacted society may be technological, economic,
behavioral, social or cultural in nature. The latitude and resistance to
change greatly depend on the type of society affected by the disaster.
The following paragraphs explore the case of traditional societies.
� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
Traditional societies, sometimes called folk, tribal, or primitive
societies, are those groups characterized by their pre-industrial self-
sufficient ways of either hunting / gathering or extensive agriculture
type. These societies are further identified by the intimate relationship
they nurture with their immediate natural environment and the slow
level of cultural change they usually experience (Kottak 2003).
Many researchers have addressed the capacity of industrial
societies to overcome the havoc wrought by the occurrence of
natural hazards with more or less change in the social fabric (see
Drabek 1986; Bates and Peacock 1986; Nigg and Tierney 1993
and Passerini 2000 for syntheses). Fewer scholars discussed the
capability of traditional societies to cope with natural hazards. A
review of the scarce literature further denotes a lack of consensus
among social scientists. Three different theoretical frameworks may
be distinguished from the available corpus of research materials.
The first and dominant framework regards traditional
environment-dependent societies as fragile and unable to cope on
their own with large-scale fast-onset natural hazards. Destruction of
the environment due to extreme natural phenomena deprives these
societies of their main resources and pushes them to rely on external
resources in order to recover. Natural hazards are therefore viewed
as a powerful vector of socio-cultural change (Burton 1972; Burton,
Kates, and White 1993; Dynes 1976; Kates 1971; Kates et al. 1973;
Mileti, Drabek, and Haas 1975). Such an argument largely emanates
from the “top-down” technocratic and western logic characterizing
the dominant paradigm in the hazard and disaster literature. The
proponents of this approach find justification for promoting a transfer
of experience, knowledge and technology from industrialized
countries to developing nations in the poor capacity of traditional
societies to respond to natural hazards. This view takes advantage of
the results of several studies conducted following the 1943 to 1952
eruption of Paricutín volcano in Mexico (Nolan 1979; Nolan and
Nolan 1993), the 1951 eruption of Mt. Lamington in Papua New
Guinea (Belshaw 1951; Keesing 1952; Ingleby 1966; Schwimmer
1977), the 1961-1962 eruption of the volcano of Tristan de Cunha,
�
in the South Atlantic (Blair 1964; Munch 1964, 1970; Lewis,
Roberts, and Edwards 1972), the 1968 eruption of the volcano of
Nila in Maluku (Pannell 1999) and the 1994 eruption of Mt. Rabaul
in Papua New Guinea (To Waninara 2000).
On the other hand, the second theoretical framework sees
traditional societies as capable of recovering on their own from the
impact of natural phenomena. The environmental modifications
resulting from the occurrence of natural hazards forced these societies
to make slight adjustments without modifying the fundamentals of
their social organization (Sjoberg 1962; Torry 1978a, 1979). This
framework emerged from the growing anthropological literature
on hazards and disasters during the 1960s and 1970s (see Torry
1979 and Oliver-Smith 1996 for syntheses). The arguments of this
approach have greatly contributed to challenging the aforementioned
dominant and technocratic paradigm on disaster management by
pointing out the perverse effects of emergency measures and other
technological adjustments set up by western governments. For the
proponents of this approach, if there is temporarily an incapacity of
traditional societies to overcome the consequences of natural hazards
occurrence, it is due to the foreign relief aid that disrupts indigenous
resilience systems rather than to the intrinsic incapability of affected
societies (Waddell 1975, 1983; Torry 1978b, Cijffers 1987, Ali
1992). The radical approach is fed by the work of Spillius (1957),
eventually revisited by Torry (1978a) and Boehm (1996), on the
small island of Tikopia (Solomon islands), which was devastated by
two typhoons and a subsequent famine between 1952 and 1953; the
documentation of Schneider (1957) on the island of Yap regularly
swept by tropical storms; the monumental study of Oliver-Smith
(1977, 1979a, b, c, 1992) about the Quechua Indians of Yungay
following the total destruction of their town by a debris avalanche
triggered by the 1970 Peruvian earthquake; the researches of Lewis
(1981, 1999), Hurell (1984) and Rogers (1981) among the people
of Tonga in the face of typhoons and following the restless activity
of Niuafo’ou volcano in 1946; the comparative study of Holland
and VanArsdale (1986) in Indonesia and Peru among communities
affected by flash floods; and the investigation of Zaman (e.g.
1989, 1994, 1999; Haque and Zaman, 1994) among Bangladeshi
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�0 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
communities recurrently affected by floods, and Cijffers (1987) in
the Cook Islands regularly struck by hurricanes.
Finally, the third approach regarding the responses of traditional
societies in the face of natural hazards defends an intermediate
viewpoint. It argues that the occurrence of natural hazards rather
acts as a catalyst for ongoing cultural changes among traditional
societies increasingly pressured by the industrial world (Blong 1984;
Bates and Peacock, 1986; Oliver-Smith 1996). This phenomenon
has been observed among several Tarascan Indian communities
following the eruption of Paricutín volcano in Mexico between 1943
and 1952 (Rees 1970; Nolan 1979; Nolan and Nolan 1993), among
Guatemalan Mayas after the 1976 earthquake (Bates 1982; Cuny
1983; Hoover and Bates 1985), and among Yemeni highlanders
following the 1982 earthquake (Leslie 1987).
The foregoing frameworks are all driven primarily by the concept of
vulnerability or the susceptibility of traditional societies to experience
disaster following the occurrence of natural hazards. They do not
address cultural change as a way of coping with the havoc wrought
by the disaster. In this paper, we aim to tackle the capacity of response
of traditional societies in the face of natural hazard through the lens of
the concept of resilience. Our discussion will be based on the case of
the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo volcano in the Philippines and its
impact on the Aeta communities. To assess the Aetas’ resilience will
first require evaluating if the eruption brought about some changes in
the folk culture. A critical review of the factors that affected resilience
in the Mt. Pinatubo case will eventually lead to the advancing of an
alternative approach to the response of traditional societies in the face
of the occurrence of natural hazards.
The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo Eruption and the Aetas
The Aetas are one of the many ethnic minorities occupying
the mountains of the Philippine islands. They are found on the
flanks of Mt. Pinatubo which towers at the apex of the provinces
of Pampanga, Tarlac and Zambales on the main island of Luzon
(Figure 1). Considered by some as the direct descendants of the
populations that first inhabited the archipelago during the Pleistocene
��
Period (Headland and Reid 1989), the Aetas’ small height, very
dark complexion, and curly hair easily distinguish them from the
majority of Filipinos who are taller and are characterized by brown
skin and straight hair. The approximately 50,000 Aetas counted on
the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo in 1999 depend for their livelihood on
cultivating root crops and other vegetables, hunting and fishing,
and also on gathering plants and wild fruits that abound in their
surroundings (Barrato and Benaning 1978; Garvan 1964; Reed
1904; Shimizu 1989). The following paragraphs particularly focus
on the communities located within the 200km2-Pasig and Sacobia
River Basins on the eastern flank of Mt. Pinatubo, in the immediate
vicinity of the former Clark American facilities (Clark Air Base
– CAB) (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Areas Affected by the 1991 Eruption of Mt Pinatubo
and Location of the Study Area (After Data from PHIVOLCS
and Mount Pinatubo Commission).
1
2
5
30
40
10
5
MANILA BAY
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
BATAAN
BULACAN
PAMPANGA
NUEVA
ECIJA
TARLAC
ZAMBALES
Botol
an
Cabangan
San
Narciso
San
Marcelino
Olongapo City
Dinalupihan
Guagua
San Fernando
Angeles
City
ConceptionCapas
Tarlac
50
20
15
Mt Pinatubo
SUBIC
BAY
Clark
Air Base
Gumain
River
Sac
obia
/ Ba
mba
n R
iver
O’
Do
nn
el
Ri
ve
r
Bucao River
Sto Tomas
Abacan River
Pasig Potrero River
Porac
River
Bamban
5
Dueg
Palayan City
Kalangitan
Maynang
LubaoSubic
Poonbato
Villar
Subic
Naval
Base
Sapang
Bato
Dau
Magalang
Mt Arayat
20°N
1
5°N
10°N
5°N
120°E 125°E
CELEBES SEA
SULU SEA
PH
ILIPPIN
E SEA
Study
area
Manila
�00 km
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
0 20km
June 1991
pyroclastic depo
sits
Lahar
deposits
Isopachs (in cm)
of airfall deposits
Active lahar channels
Provincial limits
Towns
Doña Josefa
PInaltakan
Mabalacat
Madapdap
Villa
Maria
Aeta resettlement sites
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
Figure 2: Spatial Redistribution of the Aeta Villages in the
Pasig and Sacobia River Basins Subsequent to the
Eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991.
Mabubuteun
Pamatayan
Calang
Kaging
Mataba
StaInes
Sta Rosa
Burug
San Martin
Sacobia
Haduan
Target
Sitio Babo
Inararo
Camatsilis
Sapang Uwak
Sapang Uwak
Sa
cob
ia R
ive
r
Abacan River
Sap
ang
Ca
uay
an
Mar
imla
Riv
er
Mabulilat Angeles City
Mabalacat
Bamban
Sac
obia
Riv
er
Bamba
n Rive
r
Calumpang
Marcos
Village
Pulang Lupa
Clark Air Base Area
PoracDiaz
Calapi
Porac River
Calapi
Inararo
TimboBinga BanabaPanabunganMt
Mc Donald
Mt Dorst
To Planas
To Madapdap
Resettlement
Site
Burakin
To Palayan City
Bliss
Gate 14
Baguingan
Burug
San Martin
Pasig River
To Dueg Resettlement Site
To Kalangitan Resettlement Site
To Maynang Resettlement Site
Abandoned settlements
Old settlements
still occupied in 2001
New settlements
Main towns
Main movements
of population
Kapampangan
lowland territory
50cm ash
20cm ash
fall d
epo
sits
deposits
fall
Villa Maria
Resettlemet
Site0 2km
Isopach of ashfall deposits
Pyroclastic flow deposits
Present upper limit
of Aeta settlements
The Aetas were the first to feel the precursory signs of the volcano’s
restlessness during the first days of April 1991; they responded by
immediately warning the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS) (Lubos na Alyansa ng mga Katutubong
Ayta ng Sambales 1991; Tayag et al. 1996). This abnormal volcanic
activity intensified until June 1991. The eruptive paroxysm
materialized on June 12 and June 15. On these particular dates, the
volcano spewed some 5 to 7 km3 of pyroclastic materials that buried
many Aeta villages located on the slopes of Mt. Pinatubo. Since
15 June 1991, destructive lahars (volcanic debris flows), triggered
by typhoon-associated downpours, tropical monsoon rains and lake
break outs, have flowed down the flanks and foothills of the volcano
affecting anew a large number of these Aeta settlements (Pinatubo
Volcano Observatory 1991; Umbal 1997; Wolfe 1992).
��
In April 1991, with the initial signs of restlessness by the volcano,
almost all of the Aeta communities were already evacuated (Banzon-
Bautista and Tadem 1993). However, an unknown number of Aetas
who refused to leave their homes perished during the eruption.
According to oral accounts, a score of Aetas found shelter in caves that
had eventually been buried by pyroclastic flows (Shimizu 2001). At
first, the Aetas who chose to evacuate were relocated in some major
surrounding towns (Tarlac City, Capas, Bamban, Mabalacat, Angeles
City, Porac, etc.). Eventually, with the paroxysm of the eruption
on June 15 that affected even the town inhabitants, the authorities
had to once again transfer many Aeta families toward evacuation
centers that were much farther (e.g., provinces of Bulacan, Nueva
Ecija and Manila) from their villages. Inside overcrowded school
buildings, gymnasiums, churches or tent camps, nutrition problems
and diseases (pneumonia, measles…) quickly spread and left a
heavy death toll among Aeta children (Lapitan 1992; Magpantay
1992; Magpantay et al. 1992; Sawada 1992).
Faced with the impossibility of sending the Aetas back to their
former villages which had already been buried under meters of
volcanic deposits, the Philippine government had to plan a permanent
resettlement program. By June 1991, the authorities created the
Task Force Mt. Pinatubo, which was replaced in 1992 by the Mount
Pinatubo Commission (MPC), an intergovernmental structure under
the authority of the President of the Philippines. The task force then
had created eleven upland resettlement centers intended primarily
for the Aetas (Task Force Mount Pinatubo 1991). The Aetas from
the Pasig and Sacobia river basins were mainly distributed on four
sites (Villa Maria, Kalangitan, Dueg, and Maynang). Dueg, the most
remote, is about 100km away from the native villages. In each of
the centers, a lot measuring 150m² together with traditional housing
materials (bamboo, palm leaves…) was allocated for each family.
In 1995, more solid building materials (‘GI sheets’, lumber…) were
provided (Tariman 1999). Some Aetas of the Clark Air Base vicinity
were resettled in a lowland relocation site, Madapdap (municipality
of Mabalacat), with 7,000 lowland families from the neighboring
‘Kapampangan’ ethno-linguistic group who were affected by the
lahars from the Pasig-Potrero and Sacobia Rivers. Each family was
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
awarded a 94m² lot with a concrete house equipped with sanitary
installations (Tariman 1999). There were also two resettlement
centers (Doña Josefa and Pinaltakan) implemented by NGOs
at Palayan City (province of Nueva Ecija) where the Pinatubo
Aetas rubbed shoulders with other upland ethno-linguistic groups
(Dumagats and Bagos) from the Sierra Madre mountain range.
Other resettlement attempts in more remote places such as the island
of Palawan failed because of unsuitable conditions that pushed the
Aetas back to Central Luzon (Gaillard and Leone 2000).
Methodology
The following discussion relies on extensive field work conducted
in the basin of the Pasig and Sacobia rivers between July 1999 and
June 2000 and completed by additional field explorations between
June and September 2001. The lack of reliable census data for the
study area compelled the researcher to abandon the sampling survey
and instead opt for open interviews with selected key informants.
Sixteen villages were visited. Only three occupied settlements were
avoided: one because of security concerns and the two others because
of their inaccessibility. The four neighboring resettlement sites (Villa
Maria, Kalangitan, Maynang and Madapdap) were also part of the
study. Key informants were not limited to community leaders and
included other members (both men and women) of the communities
visited. Interviews were conducted in the Kapampangan language
spoken by almost all the Aetas. Local guides sometimes served as
interpreters in the local Aeta Mag-Aantsi dialect. Questions sought
to assess the pre-eruption lifestyle, the response of the victims to
the disaster, notably their journey up to their present settlement,
and the present way of life. Community leaders further provided
approximate population figures for their village. All the respondents
were cooperative and were willing to share their experience.
In addition to the survey among the Aeta settlements, interviews
were conducted with stakeholders of the Mt. Pinatubo disaster
management. Those include the Mt. Pinatubo Commission (MPC),
other government agencies (National Commission for Indigenous
People, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department
��
of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Public Works
and Highways, Department of Health, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Education), local government units (LGUs) and non-
government organizations (NGOs). These interviews were aimed at
assessing the role of the authorities in the shaping of the observations
made on the field. A large amount of useful primary written documents
was also collected from these visits to institutions.
Field work was completed by the collection of secondary written
documents such as journal publications, conference proceedings,
and relevant press clippings from regional and national newspapers.
Both primary and secondary written materials provided information
mostly on the disaster management policy. Very few sources
discussed the response of the populations.
From Uplands to Foothills: The Inevitable
Redistribution of the Population
In 1990, about 1,200 to 1,300 Aeta families (approximately 7,000
individuals) were occupying the Pasig and Sacobia basins on both
the upper slopes and the lower foothills of Mt. Pinatubo (National
Statistics Office 1990; Tadem 1993). After the awakening of the
volcano in 1991, both the unsuitability of the upper flanks of the
mountain and the resettlement policy implemented by the Philippine
government led to a general redistribution of the Aeta population of
the Pasig and Sacobia river basins. Figure 2 shows that the present
upper limit of Aeta settlements matches the lower limit of the 1991
pyroclastic deposits and the 20cm-isopach of ash fall. All the Aeta
communities located on the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo prior to the
eruption had to abandon their small villages which had been buried
under these thick and hot pyroclastic and ashfall deposits preventing
the immediate reoccupation of the settlements. Most of these Aetas
have been relocated in the government resettlement sites, either on the
lower slopes of the volcano or on the foothills (Figures 1 and 2). Today,
these resettlement sites are the biggest Aeta settlements. Kalangitan,
the biggest relocation center is inhabited by 385 families. These
resettlement sites host Aeta communities from both the upper and
lower flanks of Mt. Pinatubo. The lack of land suitable for cultivation
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
and the inadequate housing in resettlement sites has however led many
Aeta families native to the lower slopes of Mt. Pinatubo to return to
their old villages and till their abandoned fields (Gaillard and Leone
2000; Macatol 1998, 2000; Macatol and Reser 1999-2000; Seitz
1998, 2000; Shimizu 1992). With the exception of Villa Maria, the
population of other resettlement centers, like Maynang and Palayan
City, has greatly decreased during the last few years. Other Aetas
native to the upper slopes of Mt. Pinatubo and who chose to leave the
resettlement sites have tried to rebuild their villages on more suitable
sites (e.g., Calapi, San Martin, Burug) or near the relocation centers
(e.g., Inararo). Worth noting is that other Aetas maintain residences
in resettlement sites and at the same time tend their fields near their
former villages. This practice is very prevalent in Villa Maria. It is
now also being practiced in Maynang, prompting the service of daily
or weekly shuttles to and from their original villages. Finally, ten years
after the eruption, several families still live in evacuation centers that
were intended for temporary purposes. At Planas, for example, tents
have been replaced by bamboo huts and other sturdier structures.
All the Aeta settlements are nowadays concentrated on the lower
flanks of Mt. Pinatubo in the immediate proximity of lowland
villages and towns occupied by Kapampangan people, the dominant
ethnic group of the southwestern part of the Central Plain of Luzon
(Figure 2). Henceforth, there are no more Aeta communities left
isolated on the upper flanks of Mt. Pinatubo. All have established
regular contacts with lowlanders.
Increasing Interactions with Lowlanders
The closer geographic proximity between Aeta people and their
lowland neighbors, induced by the downhill redistribution of the
population following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, has increased
the interactions between the two communities. These interactions
are economic and social, as well as political.
Until Mt. Pinatubo erupted in 1991, regular economic interactions
between Aetas and lowlanders were limited to the communities located
on the lower slopes of the volcano. Many Aetas of the villages situated
near the former Clark Air Base were both agriculturists and employed
��
by the US Air Force as watchmen, jungle survival instructors, and
janitors while others earned their living by scavenging the garbage of
the US servicemen in the area or by gathering scrap materials left by the
Americans during their training (Cunanan 1982-83; Gaabucayan 1978;
Simbulan 1983). The Aetas living in villages farther away from Clark
Air Base used to sell or swap their products for rice, coffee, or sugar in
the public markets of the surrounding towns at least once a week. Aeta
communities living on the highest slopes of Mt. Pinatubo lived almost
exclusively on tilling different rootcrops, hunting, fishing and gathering
tropical fruits without regular contact with lowlanders and other
ethno-linguistic groups. Noteworthy is that despite these significant
differences in their way of life, upland and lowland communities can
still be regarded as a single ethnic group on the basis of their common
physical features, language, traditional beliefs and inter-individual
relationship based on a great sense of ‘communalness’ (Barrato and
Benaning 1978; Brosius 1983; Fox 1952; Shimizu 1989). The downhill
redistribution of the population following the 1991 eruption has deeply
modified the economic landscape by making all the Aetas dependent
on the lowland market to earn their living. Interviews conducted in the
Pasig and Sacobia river basins in 1999 and 2000 show that, at present,
there are no more isolated communities and all the Aetas have thus
learnt to sell their produce directly in the public markets of surrounding
towns without being deceived by Kapampangans who used to act as
middlemen. Besides the traditional public markets, the former Clark Air
Base converted into a vast industrial, tourist and commercial complex,
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), has become another fruitful
commercial outlet for the Aetas. The Aetas are now all selling fruits
(bananas, papayas…), vegetables (banana tree hearts…), rootcrops
(taro, cassava…) and souvenir items (flutes, bows, blowpipes…) to
local and foreign tourists visiting the Duty-Free shops of Clark Special
Economic Zone. These economic interactions between Aetas and their
surrounding communities, especially with Kapampangans, now take
place on an almost daily basis and hence concern all the Aeta people.
Social interactions between Aetas and their lowland neighbors
began as soon as they rubbed shoulders together inside the overcrowded
evacuation centers that hosted the victims of the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo in June 1991. Most of the Aetas interviewed who never
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
previously lived beyond the domains of their respective communities
on the upper flanks of the volcano discovered for the first time the
socio-cultural way of life of the lowlands. Aetas also admitted that
they experienced cohabitation difficulties and discrimination from
non-Aetas who had to scamper for the much needed attention of the
authorities. This situation inside the evacuation centers lasted only
for a few months. Nonetheless social contacts between Aetas and
lowland neighbors continued. The redistribution of the population
downhill and the subsequent closer geographic proximity have
resulted in permanent social interactions. For example, the closer
distance to school facilities and the support of government and non-
government organizations have led many young Aetas to now share
school benches with lowland children. Moreover, these interactions
are daily and long-lasting, and concern the young generation that is
supposed to be the most permeable to cultural change. Data from
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) show
that the literacy rate among the Aeta people has thus risen from 4
per cent of the population in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2000. Presently,
most of the youth study until they reach the age of 12 (elementary
school). Moreover, literacy programs for adults are being provided
by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and other NGOs,
especially within the resettlement centers.
Finally, there are increasing political interactions between Aetas
and surrounding lowland communities. Most of these contacts
have been conveyed by the increasing density of population on the
lower slopes of the volcano as a result of the coming-in of former
uphill communities. The competition for land has become intense,
involving long-time downhill Aeta communities, former uphill
Aetas, lowland Kapampangans whose high population growth
rate pushes them toward the lower slopes of the mountain, and the
developers of Clark Special Economic Zone who try to expand the
area intended for economic development. The numerous territorial
conflicts which have emerged following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo
are symptomatic of the increasing pressure put on the land (Gaillard
2002). These conflicts have pressed the Aetas to engage in delicate
political negotiations with their lowland neighbors as well as with
government administrations. The Aetas coming from the upper slopes
��
of the volcano who were interviewed as part of this study admitted
that they were unused to such transactions. They further claimed
that numerous Kapampangans took advantage of the ignorance of
some Aetas on the real land-valuations, managing to buy lands from
the latter at very low prices and use unjust leases.
Non-Aeta Socio-Cultural Inputs in the Aeta Culture (see Table 1)
The redistribution of the population on the lower slopes of the
mountain and the following increasing economical, social and political
interactions between Aetas and non-Aetas had some socio-cultural
implications. These interactions progressively compelled the Aetas to
adopt cultural elements from their lowland neighbors. Differentiation
has yet to be made between the communities coming from the upper
flanks of the volcano and those which have been on the foothills of the
mountain for a long time. Among the latter, acculturation was already
ongoing long before the eruption. The communities which were
located around the former Clark Air Base, in Angeles or Mabalacat,
have been deeply influenced by their daily contacts with the Americans
(Dale 1985). Those located farther away from the base, in Porac or
Bamban, were less acculturated though not spared by their weekly
contact with their lowland neighbors (Mendoza 1982). Therefore, the
input of non-Aeta cultural elements due indirectly to the 1991 Mt.
Pinatubo eruption is more apparent among the communities formerly
settled on the upper slopes of the volcano.
The first cultural change concerns the settlement pattern. Before the
eruption, Rice (1973: 256) and Brosius (1983: 134) described clusters
of two-three to five-fifteen houses as typical settlements of the upper
flanks of Mt. Pinatubo. On the lower slopes, settlements were larger,
especially for the villages in the vicinity of Clark Air Base (Sapang
Bato, Marcos Village). The redistribution of the population downhill
subsequent to the eruption and the concurrent increasing density of
population have led to a generalization of large settlements. This is
evident in the resettlement sites but also in most of the villages located
in the basins of the Pasig and Sacobia rivers visited during field work
conducted as part of this study. Today, most of the Aetas coming from
uphill live in settlements which number several tens of houses.
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�0 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
1990
2000
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��
The second element of cultural change is the religious beliefs of
the Aetas. Before the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, Aetas, especially
those who used to live uphill, traditionally believed in a number of
supernatural beings called ‘Anito’ (good spirit) or ‘Kamana’ (malicious
spirit). The universal creator, or ‘Apo Namalyari’, was supposed to
live at the heart of Mt. Pinatubo (Fox 1952; Lubos na Alyansa ng mga
Katutubong Ayta ng Sambales 1991; Shimizu 1989). On the lower
slopes of the mountain, the number of Aetas getting Christianized by
Catholic or Protestant missions was increasing long before the eruption
but most of them still kept Apo Namalyari and the Anitos at the core of
their beliefs. Due to their redeployment on easily accessible foothills
following the eruption, all the Aetas eventually became easy prey to a
number of religious organizations and sects that mushroomed in their
present villages and used disaster relief as a facade for evangelization.
The ‘kindness’ of the missionaries served as a powerful argument to
lead a large number of Aetas from the Pasig and Sacobia river basins
to become active members of mainstream religions. At present, key
informants acknowledge that Apo Namalyari is assimilated to Jesus
Christ or the representative of God on earth. In the same way, the
Anitos are compared to the Holy Spirit.
Since 1991, there have been modifications in their traditional
medicine as well. These have been brought about both by the
redistribution of the population as well as the extinction of many
plant species following the eruption (Madulid 1992). Indeed, Aetas
were recognized for their expertise in the chemical properties of
plants (Fox 1952). They were also known for their traditional way
of curing sicknesses through ‘manganito’ séances where they used
to seek assistance from the spirits (Shimizu 1983, 1989). Only in the
vicinity of Clark Air Base did the Aetas benefit from free health care
offered by the US Air Force in exchange for the former’s services in
improving their GI’s jungle survival skills. New religious beliefs and
the depletion of many natural drugs pushed the Aetas to adopt modern
medical treatments provided by the government and other civic-
oriented groups (Ignacio and Perlas 1994; Alvarez-Castillo 1997)
which benefit from the easier access to the Aeta settlements. Moreover,
there are now only a few Aetas who still practice manganitos séances
which were once intended to cure the most serious sicknesses.
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
This integration of the two (animist and non-Aeta or lowland)
cultures is also very much visible in the novel social references
of the Aetas. The village chieftain of the Aetas at present is much
different from those of the communities before the eruption, who
then had the appellate ‘Apo’ because of his seniority (Jocano 1998).
The researcher’s interviews indicate that for a chieftain of the clan
to be able to retain a moral influence on the community (especially
at Porac), the ‘captain’ or ‘tribal chieftain’, is usually chosen on the
strength of his political influence exogenously, rather than because
of his age. This exerts a new administrative role. It is indeed viewed
as the representative of the State within the village and, thus, is
in contact with the different local authorities (mayor, governor,
congressman/woman…) and the main institutions. The provincial
government of Tarlac has even established a parallel consultative
political system for the Aetas. This includes a ‘Tribal Chieftain’ at
the level of the village, a ‘Tribal Mayor’ at the municipal level, and a
‘Tribal Governor’ at the provincial level. This hierarchy was largely
shaped by concerns about dealing with political matters. Before
the eruption, Brosius (1983: 136) furthermore asserted that uphill
Aeta communities did not claim discrete and bounded territories.
Only near Clark Air Base and the Sacobia river basin, where former
First Lady Imelda Marcos implemented an integrated development
project, were Aetas used to western land ownership rights (Sacobia
Development Authority 1985; Tadem 1993). The demographic
pressure induced by the redistribution of the population and the
continual encroachment of non-Aetas on their lands pushed all the
Aetas to noticeably modify their relation to their territory and to now
claim their own territorial units (‘barangays’—the smallest Philippine
administrative unit—or ‘ancestral domains’—established as part
of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997), to be administered
exclusively by and for themselves (Gaillard 2002).
The next non-Aeta cultural input in the Aeta culture is the language
of the lowlanders. Before 1991, the Aetas of the upper flanks of Mt.
Pinatubo interviewed for this study used to communicate exclusively
using their native tongue Aeta Mag-Aantsi, an Aeta dialect close to
the Sambal language. Usage of the Kapampangan lowland language
was limited to the lower slopes of Mt. Pinatubo where regular contacts
��
occurred between Aetas and Kapampangans. Today it is widespread
among all the Aetas of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins. Following
their relocation downhill and their subsequent schooling, the young
Aetas had to speak the language of the lowlanders to communicate
with their classmates. It is thus common nowadays to hear Aeta
Mag-Aantsi children speaking Kapampangan when playing in their
backyards. The Kapampangan language also spread among the
adults. Those interviewed admitted that they use the Kapampangan
language due to the increasing political and economic interactions
with Kapampangan people who do not speak Aeta Mag-Aantsi.
Observations during field work and interviews with key informants
show that the western material culture has now also penetrated
communities that would have been most unlikely prior to 1991, owing
to their remoteness from the lowland populations. Lowland house
materials are now rapidly spreading among the Aeta settlements. The
ready-to-use diagonal-oriented ‘sawaling (light wall material made of
waived bamboo) Tagalog’ (from the dominant ethno-linguistic group
of the Philippines) and other modern construction materials (cement,
‘GI-sheet’…) are gaining ground on the traditional and robust square-
oriented ‘sawaling Aeta’. Canned and ‘fast foods’, which former
uphill villagers discovered for the first time in the evacuation centers
in 1991, are also quickly becoming the favorite delicacies of most
of the Aetas in lieu of tubers and fruits. The traditional ‘lubay’ (G-
strings) and other native dresses, which uphill Aetas were regularly
wearing before 1991, are progressively being replaced by pants with
international labels. Drinking (notably gin) has now also become
prevalent among all Aetas. Influenced by the new commercial
markets, traditional craftworks and utensils (bows and arrows,
blowguns, flutes, baskets…) are now being transformed into folkloric
items for sale to tourists visiting Clark Special Economic Zone. For
the Aetas from the vicinity of the former American military facilities
who were used to western clothing and food regularly distributed
by the servicemen, changes were much less radical and limited to a
larger proportion of western housing material.
Another consequence of the increasing social contacts with
lowland neighbors is the Aeta children’s quest for little Christmas
cash gifts (Aguinaldo) during the month of December, a widespread
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
custom among non-Aeta children in the Philippines. For that reason,
Aeta children now roam the streets of Porac, Angeles City and San
Fernando in the hopes of receiving a small Christmas donation from
lowlanders (Sicat 2001).
Other fundamentals of the Aeta social organization have however
undergone less change. The most important is the ‘communalness’ of
the Aetas recognized long before 1991 and considered as the center
of the social and economic life (Barrato and Benaning 1978; Brosius
1983; Fox 1952; Shimizu 1989). Indeed, the Aetas are, among all the
other Negritos of the Philippines, the only group to focus towards
a core which is the grouping of two to five families. In this regard,
it is particularly important to note that this peculiarity has survived
the eruption. Interviews with key informants indeed indicate that
groups of two to three Aeta households still co-exploit swiddens,
share food and journey together to the public markets for economic
transactions. Similarly, Aeta families are still nucleated around a
husband, his wife and their children as they were before the eruption
of Mt. Pinatubo (Brosius 1983; Shimizu 1989). Furthermore, the
survey conducted in the Pasig and Sacobia river basins indicate that
the Aetas have retained the strong identity attachment to their village
mentioned by Shimizu (1989). It is very evident in the gathering of
families from the same villages inside the resettlement sites. These
clusters are always named in respect to the community of origin.
The 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption brought undeniable but
differentiated changes in the Aeta society. On the other hand,
there are some fundamentals of the Aeta social system which have
survived the consequences of the disasters. Is it sufficient to assert
that the Aetas have been resilient in the face of the occurrence of a
powerful natural hazard?
Aeta Resilience in the Face of the Mt. Pinatubo Eruption
Changes in the Aeta society following the 1991 eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo have been brought by the increasing interactions with lowland
neighbors brought by the spatial redistribution of the population on
the foothills of the volcano. Changes have therefore concerned the
components of the Aeta social fabric exposed to these interactions. On
��
the other hand, some of the fundamentals pertaining to relationships
within the society, notably the sense of ‘communalness’, have been
less affected and have survived the eruption and its consequences.
Henceforth, the Aeta social system has not disappeared following the
disaster. It has rather adapted to new environmental, social, economic
and political environments while maintaining a stable core. This
viewpoint is further reinforced by the perseverance of the Aetas to
claim their own ethnic identity, as manifested by their massive abandon
of the resettlement centers. Thus, if resilient societies are those that are
able to overcome the damages brought by the occurrence of natural
hazards, either through maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric, or
through accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive, then
the Mt. Pinabuto Aetas of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins have been
resilient. However, a distinction has to be made between pre-1991
uphill and downhill communities. It is quite evident that the eruption
of Mt. Pinatubo and the subsequent redistribution of the population
brought major and abrupt changes in the way of life of former uphill
Aeta communities. Increased interactions with Kapampangan people
progressively led these communities to adopt lowland cultural
references. They also reoriented their economic activities toward the
market demand in the lowlands and no longer rely exclusively on
environmental resources (Table 1). Aetas from the upper flanks of Mt.
Pinatubo thus became resilient through openness and adaptability. The
latitude of the social fabric was wide and permeable enough to easily
accept large changes but did not allow the loss of some fundamentals
of the Aeta society such as the sense of ‘communalness’. Indeed, the
system was already in a state of precariousness induced by increasing
pressure from lowland groups.
On the other hand, the communities formerly situated at the
foothills of the mountain and near the old Clark Air Base underwent
fewer changes. Among these communities, acculturation was
already ongoing before the eruption, which acted as an accelerator
of the trend through further cultural adjustments and diversification
of economic activities (Table 1). Therefore, Aeta communities
from the lower slopes of Mt. Pinatubo have been resilient through
incremental and marginal change due to a narrower gap or latitude
between lowland and upland cultures.
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
The differential capacity of responses of the Aeta communities
and the amplitude of the cultural change did not lie exclusively in
the pre-disaster social fabric. It has been influenced by the context
of the disaster. For the past two decades, considerable attention has
been given to this question in the hazard and disaster literature (e.g.,
Wisner et al. 2004; Cannon 1994; Hewitt 1983, 1997; Lavell 1997;
Maskrey 1993; Susman, O’Keefe, and Wisner 1983). Natural hazards
such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides, typhoons or
floods have different inherent characteristics such as diverse speed
of onset, temporal spacing and magnitude. Moreover, they occur in
very different geographical, social, political and cultural contexts
that contribute to shape the responses and adjustments of the victims.
It is therefore important to break away from universal patterns of
response to natural hazards as those mentioned in the first section of
this paper. It rather seems that the capacity of resilience of traditional
societies in the face of natural hazards and related cultural changes
are commanded by an intricate interrelation of several factors that
vary in time and space, from one event to another. These factors are
physical, socio-cultural, geographical and political in nature. The
following section illustrates each of them as a new approach to the
capability of traditional societies to overcome the damage brought
by the occurrence of natural hazards. Worth mentioning is that this
framework only applies to fast-onset and contemporary events like
the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption and thus excludes prehistoric and
slow-onset hazards phenomena like droughts and climatic changes.
Factors of Resilience of Traditional Societies in Facing the
Occurrence of Natural Hazards
Based on the Aetas’ experience following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo
eruption, it is possible to identify several interdependent factors that
affect the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in the face of
the occurrence of natural hazards. These factors may be gathered
into four groups (Figure 3).
First is the nature of the hazard. The magnitude and the temporal
spacing of the event played a great role in shaping the long-term
consequences of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption on the Aeta communities.
��
In the Philippines, several authors have demonstrated the ability of
environment-dependent ethnic groups to cope with natural hazards
in a quite efficient way (Blolong 1996; Heijmans 2001; Insauriga
1999; Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology et al.
1998). However, most of the indigenous adaptations are in dealing
with recurrent, usually seasonal, events like typhoons and floods. The
magnitude of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption was far greater. Moreover,
despite the vague existence of an oral memory of a previous eruption
(Gaillard et al. 2005), the Aetas had to deal with a phenomenon they
did not know.
Figure 3: Factors of Resilience among Traditional Societies in
Facing the Occurrence of Natural Hazards.
The extent of damage also played a crucial role in the acculturation
of uphill Aeta communities following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
Most of the Aeta villages were buried under several meters of
hot pyroclastic and ash fall deposits preventing the immediate
reoccupation of the upper slopes of the volcano. This is another
major difference from phenomena like typhoons or floods that allow
post-disaster reoccupation of the stricken area. Relocation downhill
following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo was a must and no other
alternatives were left for the Aetas.
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
The second factor affecting the capacity of resilience of traditional
societies is the intrinsic social condition of the particular group
exposed to a given hazard. It seems that the capability of traditional
societies to overcome disasters particularly depends on the pre-
disaster level of acculturation, the relationships between the affected
group and its neighbors, the diversity of pre-disaster livelihood, the
cultural attachment to the devastated site, the size of the community
affected and the age and the conservatism of the traditional leaders.
It is obvious that the deepest socio-cultural changes occurred
among those communities which were the least acculturated before
the eruption, whereas the most acculturated communities in 1990
only made small adjustments to the new environmental and socio-
economic contexts. The capacity of resilience therefore seems to be
directly linked to the pre-disaster level of acculturation. The more
traditional the community before the occurrence of the hazard, the
more prone it is to cultural change.
Closely related is the amplitude of pre-disaster socio-cultural
differences between the affected ethnic group and its neighbors, as
well as the intensity of inter-group interactions. It seems that the
larger the gap and the slighter the interactions, the more permeable
is the community and the deeper the cultural changes. Aetas from
the upper slopes of the volcano, who discovered the way of life
of the lowlanders during their stay in the evacuation centers, were
the most prone to cultural change. Conversely, changes were much
slighter among the communities from the foothills of the mountain
which had long been interacting with neighboring groups.
This study also confirmed that the communities which were
most prone to cultural changes were those with no diversification
of livelihoods. Uphill communities exclusively dependent on
agriculture for their living were rendered helpless by the destruction
of their fields by volumes of pyroclastic deposits. On the other hand,
the communities situated near the former Clark Air Base which used
to rely on several sources of livelihood turned out to be more capable
of further diversifying their activities after the disaster.
The extent to which a community is affected seems to have a
direct link with the capacity of resilience and post-disaster cultural
change as well. If the whole community is hit by a natural hazard,
��
resistance to cultural changes seems unlikely. The Mt. Pinatubo
eruption spared no Aeta community. All were affected and all the
Aetas experienced life in the evacuation and resettlement centers,
where contacts with the lowlanders first took place for those from
the uphill communities. The absence of intact villages, which would
have taken care of the Aeta traditions, did not allow a retreat to a
preserved socio-cultural environment.
In the Mt. Pinatubo case, preservation of socio-cultural references
was also hindered by the critical shift in leadership that followed
the eruption. The “Apo” or old wise man lost his prerogatives in
preserving and transmitting the indigenous traditions because of his
incapacity to deal with the new issues the Aetas had to cope with after
their relocation downhill. Younger leaders are now emerging from
among the different communities due to their ability to communicate
with lowlanders. This phenomenon has been reinforced by the
greater access of the youth to the educational system. This process
is viewed as a needed evolution in the Aeta society. Nowadays, this
has even compelled some communities to adopt young educated
women as their leaders. The age and conservatism of the traditional
leader before the disaster has thus shown to be a significant element
affecting the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in the face
of the occurrence of natural hazards.
The third factor is the geographic setting which is directly linked
to the two previous points. The lack of space in a homeland-like
environment for relocation without encroachment on other ethnic
groups and cultures is of critical importance. The existence of
available space is directly connected to the magnitude of the event
and the extent of damage brought among the affected communities.
In the case of the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, there was certainly
no space available in a homeland-like environment for spontaneous
relocation. The resettlement sites selected by the government
encroached on lowlander territories and favored contacts between
Aetas and their neighbors. Foothill sites where other Aeta
communities spontaneously resettled also trespass on lowlanders’
lands. Moreover, attempts of the authorities to resettle Aetas in
similar but not identical physical milieu (Palawan and the Sierra
Madre of Luzon) have failed (Gaillard and Leone 2000).
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�0 International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
The fourth and last factor affecting the capacity of resilience and
cultural change among the Aeta communities is the post-disaster
rehabilitation policy set up by the authorities. Some authors
mentioned the insensitivity of disaster managers and their lack of
cultural knowledge about the Aetas (Güss and Pangan 2004: 46).
Others (e.g., Bennagen 1996: 60 and also Shimizu 1992: 2) have
reported that some government officials were boasting of trying
to ‘civilize’ the Aeta through the rehabilitation programs initiated
in response to the disaster, especially through the resettlement
policy and social programs (education, health…). This may be
challenged. Major cultural changes among the Aeta communities
did not occur by direct inputs of the government but rather as a
progressive process due to geographic proximity which led to
increasing interactions with external lowland culture. However, it
is true that education within the resettlement centers contributed to
enlarge the cultural references of the youth. The fact that many Aeta
families are going back to the mountain further questions the role
of the government in the acculturation process that has occurred
among former uphill communities. It clearly demonstrates that the
Aetas tend to meet their own needs without any assistance from
the government or other NGOs (Bennagen 1996; Estacio Jr. 1996;
Seitz 1998). Yet, if the authorities did not directly input lowland
cultural references, they greatly participated in the relocation of
the victims downhill and conditioned the redistribution of the
population that occurred after the eruption. The close proximity
at present between Aeta communities and their lowland neighbors
greatly favor contacts of all sorts.
Furthermore, the fate of the Aeta communities cannot be detached
from the national government policy toward ethnic and cultural
minorities. At the time of the eruption, there were no specific
governmental guidelines to protect and defend ethnic minority rights
in the Philippines. It was only in 1997 that the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act (RA 8371) was legislated (Department of Environment
and Natural Resources 1997). Therefore, it was most unlikely
that the Philippine government took appropriate measures for the
preservation of the Aeta culture in 1991.
��
Conclusions
The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo has implied a massive
redeployment of the Aeta communities of the Pasig and Sacobia
river basins toward the foothills of the volcano. This demographic
redistribution has increased the geographic proximity between
Aeta communities and their lowland neighbors and concurrently
heightened the political and socio-economical relationships between
Aetas and non-Aetas. More than ten years after the eruption, the level
of cultural change induced by these increasing interactions has not
been uniform. The less acculturated communities before the event are
those who have undergone the highest level of cultural transformation.
On the other hand, the eruption only acted as an accelerator of an
on-going trend among the most acculturated communities before
the eruption. Both uphill and foothill communities have however
retained some fundamentals of the Aeta society, notably their sense
of ‘communalness’. An increasing number of families further try to
recover their pre-eruption way of life by leaving the resettlement
centers or by going back to the upper slopes of the volcano when
possible. Hence, Aeta communities have turned out to be resilient in
the face of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. Resiliency required a certain
level of cultural change and adaptation to the new environmental,
social, economic and political context. Former uphill Aetas resorted
to larger changes in their social system than their counterparts long
living on the lower slopes of the volcano who recovered through
marginal changes.
This flexibility of the Aeta society in the face of changing contexts
had already been noticed before the 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo
(e.g., Brosius 1983; Shimizu 1989). For instance, Shimizu (1989: 78)
asserted that “the dynamism of Aeta social life hinges on the flexibility
and durability of the Aeta social system”. Indeed, during their long
history which may date back to the Pleistocene period, the Aetas
have had to cope with major environmental and cultural disturbances,
including several powerful eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo and earthquakes,
climate changes, the arrival of the ‘Austronesian’ agriculturists, the
coming of the Spaniards, and finally the establishment of American
military bases on their territory. Yet, they have managed to retain
Gaillard: Traditional Societies in the Face of Natural Hazards
�� International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
specific cultural traits that still distinguish them from the majority of
the Philippine ethno-linguistic groups today.
The capacity of resilience of the Aetas and the level of culture
change that their society has undergone following the 1991
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo have been commanded by a complex
set of interacting factors. These factors include the nature and
magnitude of the hazard, the pre-disaster socio-cultural context,
the geographical context and the rehabilitation policy set up by
the authorities. It is evident that these factors vary somewhat in
time and space, from one disaster to another. Even at the scale of
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the Aeta people, conclusions drawn
from the case study of the Pasig and Sacobia river basins can barely
be generalized and extended to other flanks of the volcano (e.g.,
Seitz 2004). Given the great diversity of natural hazards and the
multiplicity of their local geographical context of occurrence, the
quest for a unique and universal theoretical framework assessing
the capacity of resilience of traditional societies in facing the
occurrence of natural hazards becomes secondary. More important
is to perceive the local variations of the factors detailed in this
paper to better anticipate the capability of traditional societies
to overcome the damage brought by the occurrence of natural
hazards and therefore predict eventual cultural change. This
framework is in line with the new approach of hazards and disaster
management programs which enhances a local consideration of
the problems rather than being limited to a transfer of technology
from industrialized to developing countries.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Greg Bankoff, Norma Bulaclac,
Jessie Candules, Nestor Castro, Lino Dizon, Rene Estremera,
Cyrene Gaillard, Guy Hilbero, Frédéric Leone, Catherine Liamzon,
Emmanuel Maceda, Joel Mallari, Michael Pangilinan, Wesley
Platon, Lanie Quemada-Dioniso, Tony Sibal and William Tolentino
for their contribution.
��
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in June
1
9
91
Emmanuel M. de Guzman
Consultant (Philippines)
The Pinatubo eruption of June 1991: The nature and impact of the disaster
Nature of the disaster
Reawakened after more than
5
00 years of slumber, Mount Pinatubo in the
island of Luzon in the Philippines showed signs of imminent eruption early April
1991. On 1
2
June 1991 (Philippine Independence Day), its intermittent
eruptions began. Three days after, on
15
June 1991, its most powerful eruption
happened. Mount Pinatubo ejected massive volcanic materials of more than
one cubic mile and created an enormous cloud of volcanic ash that rose as high
as 22 miles into the air and grew to more than
3
00 miles across, turning day
into night over Central Luzon. At lower altitude, the ash was blown in all
direction by intense winds of a coincidental typhoon. At higher altitudes, the ash
was blown southwestward. Volcanic ash and frothy pebbles blanketed the
countryside. Fine ash fell as far as the Indian Ocean and satellites tracked the
ash clouds several times around the globe. Nearly 20 million tons of sulfur
dioxide were injected into the stratosphere and dispersed around the world
causing global temperature to drop temporarily by 1*F from 1991 through 1993.
Mount Pinatubo’s eruption was considered the largest volcanic eruption of the
century to affect a densely populated area.
After the explosive eruptions, posing a more serious and lingering threat to life,
property and environment were the onslaught of lahars. Within hours after the
eruption, heavy rains began to wash deposits of volcanic ash and debris from
the slopes down into the surrounding lowlands in giant, fast-moving mudflows.
Containing
4
0% (by weight) volcanic ash and rock, lahars flow faster than clear-
water streams. These steaming mudflows cascade as fast as 40 miles per hour
and can travel more than 50 miles. With 90% volcanic debris, lahars move
fastest and are most destructive. When they reach the lowlands, they have
speeds of more than 20 miles per hour and are as much as 30 feet thick and
300 feet wide. They can transport more than 35,000 cubic feet of debris and
mud per second.
For years, lahars continued to flow down the major river systems around the
volcano and out into densely populated, adjoining lowlands. They destroyed
and buried everything along their path: people and animals, farm and forest
lands, bridges and natural waterways, houses and cars. They also rampage
with terrifying rumbling sounds. By 199
7
, lahars had deposited more than 0.7
cubic miles (about 300 million dump-truck loads) of debris onto the lowlands,
burying hundreds of square miles of land and causing greater destruction than
1
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
the eruption itself. With the volume of volcanic debris deposited on the slopes
of Mt. Pinatubo, the threat of lahars is expected to continue until year 20
10
.
The disaster brought about by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo had assumed a
unique nature in view of the following: the widespread devastation that impacts
on society and economy, the continuing threat of lahars and flooding, the
destruction of endemic species of flora and fauna, the alteration of landscapes
and land uses, and its impact on the global environment.
Extent of damage and socio-economic impact
The Mount Pinatubo eruptions and their aftereffects, particularly lahars during
rainy seasons, not only have taken the lives of many but also have wrought
havoc to the infrastructure and to economic activities of Central Luzon. Damage
to crops, infrastructure, and personal property totaled at least P10.1 billion ($US
374 million) in 1991, and an additional P1.9 billion ($US
6
9 million) in 1992. In
addition, an estimated P454 million ($US
17
million) of business was foregone
in 1991, and an additional P37 million ($US 1.4 million) in 1992. Lahars
continue to threaten lives and property in many towns in the provinces of Tarlac,
Pampanga, and Zambales.
The actual destruction, coupled with the continuing threat of lahars and ash fall,
had disrupted the otherwise flourishing economy of Central Luzon, slowing the
region’s growth momentum and altering key development activities and
priorities. Major resources had been diverted to relief, recovery, and prevention
of further damage.
The cost of caring for evacuees, including construction of evacuation camps
and relocation centers, was at least P2.5 billion ($US 93 million) in 1991-1992,
and an additional P4.2 billion ($US 154 million) was spent during the same
period on dikes and dams to control lahars.
The longevity and impact of the calamity is so great that the public and private
response must go beyond traditional relief and recovery. Return to pre-eruption
conditions is impossible. Instead, responses must create an attractive climate
for new investments, provide new livelihood and employment alternatives,
promote growth in areas that are safe from future lahars and flooding, and
provide an infrastructure that is tough enough to survive future disasters.
Areas and populations affected
During the eruption of 15 June 1991, heavy ash falls had caused widespread
damage in the provinces adjacent to Mount Pinatubo, as they covered large
tracts of land and caused the roofs of houses, buildings and public facilities to
collapse. These provinces were Zambales, Pampanga and Tarlac.
2
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
The regional office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) had reported a total of 657 persons dead, 1
8
4 injured and 23 missing
as of 29 September 1991. The casualties were mostly victims of collapsing
structures, drowning due to flooding, and diseases in the evacuation center.
The provinces of Zambales and Pampanga accounted for most of the victims.
Moreover, from June 1991 to November 1992, the means of livelihood, houses,
or both were partially or wholly lost in 364 barangays or villages. Per 1990
census, about 329,000 families (2.1 million people) or one-third of the region’s
population lived in these villages.
Table 1. Total number of barangays affected as of November 17, 1992
(National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992). [“Affected” refers to a situation
where means of livelihood, houses, or both are lost or partially or completely
destroyed]
Province Affected barangays No. of families
Zambales 96 30,
11
5
Pampanga 173 239,
13
1
Tarlac 88 44,367
Angeles City 5
14
,197
Nueva Ecija 2 1,331
Total 364 329,141
In 1991, 4,979 houses were totally destroyed and 70,257 houses were partially
damaged. The number decreased in 1992, when 3,281 houses were wholly
destroyed and 3,137 units were partially damaged (Table 2).
Table 2. Total number of houses damaged (National Disaster Coordinating
Council, 1992; Presidential Task Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; Department
of Social Welfare and Development, unpublished data, 1992). [Partial damage
refers to any degree of physical destruction attributed to the disaster. Total
destruction is the condition when the house is no longer livable]
Extent of damage 1991 1992 Total
Totally destroyed houses 4,979 3,281 8,260
Partially damaged houses 70,257 3,137 73,394
Total 75,236 6,4
18
81,654
Of the 329,000 families (2.1 million persons) affected, 7,840 families (35,
12
0
persons) were of the Aeta cultural minority (Office for Northern Cultural
Communities, unpub. data, August 14, 1991). Although constituting less than 2
percent of the total affected population, these cultural minorities had received
significant attention.
3
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Impact on natural resources
Moreover, the eruption had caused massive damage to natural resources. It
had buried about 18,000 hectares of forest land in ash falls of about 25
centimeters. The series of heavy rains following the eruption had induced
lahars to flow down to some 8,968 hectares of low-lying areas. At least eight
major river systems have been clogged up by lahar, namely Balin-Baquero
Bacao, Santo Tomas, Gumain, Porac, Pasig-Potrero, Abacan, Bamban and
Tarlac Rivers.
Reforestation activities had been seriously setback in the mountain range of
Zambales. About 19,799 hectares of new plantations were destroyed ash falls
and some P125 million worth of seedlings were lost. Damage to natural forest
covers and old plantations extended to around 43,801 hectares. About 10,206
hectares of agro-forestry farms under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of
the Department of Natural Resources had been destroyed.
Impact on agriculture
Agricultural land area seriously affected by the ash fall reached some 96,200
hectares. Damage to crops, livestock and fisheries was valued at P1.4 billion.
As of 17 November 1992, damage from s, flooding, and salutation was reported
to be P1.4 billion, with crops and fisheries as most affected.
Table 3. Existing damage to agricultural commodities (in million pesos;
Department of Agriculture, Region III, unpub. data, 1991; National Disaster
Coordinating Council, 1992). [Damage cost = total area damaged x expected
yield per hectare. Expected yield is computed by referring to pre-calamity yield.
Post-calamity yield is derived by referring to pre-calamity yield and subjecting
the damaged crops to recovery chances/percentages. The value of the crops
with negative chances/percentages is derived by multiplying them by the
prevailing market prices of the crops. This value then becomes the damage
cost.]
Commodity 1991 1992 Total
Crops (hectares) 987.2 546.8 1,534.0
Livestock (heads) 203.2 9.8 213.0
Fisheries (hectares) 284.1
16
4.9 449.0
Sugarcane (hectares) 56.9 56.9
Total 1,474.5 778.4 2,252.9
Impact on trade and industry
4
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
The trade and industry sector was also severely affected, especially the
manufacturing and exporting sub-sectors, affecting 599 firms with total assets of
P851 million. Foregone production losses were reported at 45% of potential
sales for the year 1991 or P454 million while capital investments of the 306
affected firms surveyed destroyed stood at a total of P425 million. The hardest
hit in the manufacturing sub-sector was the furniture industry with a total of
P156.5 million in estimated damage with 108 firms affected.
Impact on social services
Health. Morbidity and mortality rates increased mainly in evacuation centers.
The leading diseases were acute respiratory infections (ARI), diarrhea, and
measles (Department of Health, unpublished data, 1991). The death rate (Aetas
and lowlanders combined) was 7 per 10,000 per week during 1991; that for
Aetas in 1991 reached as high as 26 per 10,000 per week, and averaged 16 per
10,000 per week (Department of Health, 1992), and was especially high among
Aeta children.
Social welfare. -The continuing threat of s had required that relief – food,
clothing, shelter, and other help – be provided far beyond the period that is
normal for typhoons and other calamities. As of October 28, 1993,
approximately 1,309,000 people were being served outside evacuation centers.
As of the same date, 159 evacuation centers were being maintained by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) throughout Region III,
housing some 11,455 families or 54,880 persons and providing them with food-
for-work or cash-for-work assistance.
Education. About 700 school buildings with 4,700 classrooms were destroyed
displacing an estimated 236,700 pupils and 7,009 teachers. Damage to school
buildings was estimated to be P747 million as of August 1991 an amount that is
growing with continuing lahar activity. Disruption of schooling was compounded
by the use of undamaged school buildings as evacuation centers, which forced
delays in the opening of classes and caused other disruptions of the school
calendar. Initial damage to instructional materials, furniture, equipment, and
other school supplies was estimated at P93 million pesos (Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports, unpublished data, 1991).
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Table 4. Estimated cost of damage to school buildings by province or city as of
August 12, 1991 (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential
Task Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; Department of Education, Culture, and
Sports, Region III, unpublished data, 1991). [Ash fall is the major cause for this
type of damage]
Province/City Cost (x1000Pesos)
Zambales 410,000
Bataan 34,000
Olongapo City 140,000
Pampanga 130,000
Tarlac 13,000
Angeles City 12,000
Bulacan 5,050
Nueva Ecija 3,200
Total 747,250
Impact on public infrastructure
In its damage assessment report as of August 23, 1991, the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Regional Office III estimated damage to
public infrastructure amounting to P3.8 billion. The gravest destruction was on
irrigation and flood control systems, roads and bridges, and school buildings.
Additional damage of at least 1 billion pesos was done to roads and bridges by
lahars of 1992 (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992).
Table 5. Total cost of damage to infrastructure as of August 23, 1991 (National
Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential Task Force on Mount
Pinatubo, 1992; Department of Public Works and Highways, Region III, unpub.
data, 1991). [The prevailing foreign exchange rate during this period was $1 =
27.07 pesos]
Infrastructure subsector/Facility Damage Cost (x1000Pesos)
Transportation 1,149,908
Communication 13,215
Power and electrification 54,918
Water resources 1,568,642
Social infrastructure 1,045,708
Total 3,832,391
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Overall impact on sectors
As a whole, damage and production losses resulting from the eruption and
subsequent lahars were about P10.5 billion in 1991 and P1.9 billion in 1992.
These values include only damage and losses that were readily quantifiable.
Additional losses, not included in these estimates, include human life, social
fabric of communities, children’s schooling, and other social aspects.
Table 6. Existing sectoral damage and production losses, 1991-92 (in millions
of pesos) (National Disaster Coordinating Council, 1992; Presidential Task
Force on Mount Pinatubo, 1992; National Economic Development Authority,
unpublished data, 1991, 1992).
Sector 1991 1992 Total 1991-92
Public infrastructure 3,830 454 4,284
Agriculture 1,474 1,422 2,896
Military facilities 3,842 0 3,842
Trade and industry 851 0 851
Natural resources 125 0 125
Foregone income (trade and industry). 454 37 491
Total 10,576 1,913 12,489
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Overview of the disaster management by the Philippine Government
Laws, policies and organization
In view of the magnitude and socio-economic impact of the eruption of Mount
Pinatubo, the Philippine Government had initiated and ensured an organized
and integrated response to the calamity and the ensuing crises. In particular,
the Philippine Congress and the Office of the President had passed and
promulgated a series of laws and regulations that governed the country’s
comprehensive response. The relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction
efforts by the government, including those supported by donor governments,
nongovernmental and international organizations, were coordinated and
implemented within the overall disaster management plan and development
strategy pursued by the government.
On 26 June 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino, through Memorandum Order
No. 369, had created the Presidential Task Force on the Rehabilitation of Areas
Affected by the Eruption of Mount Pinatubo or Task Force Mt. Pinatubo. It was
mandated to guide and coordinate all rehabilitation efforts of the government,
including those participated in by the private sector and the international
community. After a year, the Mount Pinatubo Assistance, Resettlement and
Development Commission succeeded the Task Force by virtue of a law,
Republic Act 7637, passed by the Philippine Congress and signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos on 24 September 1992. With a term of six years, the
Commission was mandated, among others, to formulate policies and plans, to
coordinate the implementation of programs and projects, and to administer the
initial 10-billion peso fund appropriated for the “aid, relief, resettlement,
rehabilitation and livelihood services as well as infrastructure support for the
victims.” Specifically, the Commission was tasked to (1) provide additional funds
for the immediate relief of victims, (2) establish resettlement centers and home
sites, (3) provide livelihood and employment opportunities, (4) repair,
reconstruct or replace infrastructure damaged or destroyed, and (5) construct
new infrastructure facilities needed by the affected communities. In pursuit of
these tasks, the Commission, through relevant government agencies,
implemented projects and activities on four major program areas: resettlement,
livelihood, social services and infrastructure. Pursuant to law, President Ramos
extended the term of the Commission to December 2000 by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation 1201 issued on 19 March 1998.
The Commission pursued a comprehensive program that aimed to alleviate the
sufferings of the victims, to protect them from further destruction, to help them
rebuild their homes, and to gain a means of livelihood. In view of the limited
term of the Commission and the necessity to sustain rehabilitation and
development efforts, all government agencies concerned with the
implementation of related works had been directed to include in their respective
annual budget the necessary funding requirements (National Budget
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Memorandum Circular 74). This ensured the continuity and sustainability of
critical rehabilitation programs beyond the Commission’s extended term.
Moreover, as early as 1996, government agencies and local government units
concerned had began integrating into their regular programs the delivery of
basic social services to the affected communities, including school, health and
welfare services. Similarly, the Department of Public Works and Highways had
assumed the implementation, monitoring and improvement of engineering
intervention works and lahar mitigation activities since 1997.
Before the Commission expired, President Joseph E. Estrada transferred its
chairmanship to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and
directed the preparation of a winding up program (Executive Order No. 269
issued on 19 July 2000). Upon her assumption to office in 2001, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued a series of directives to ensure the continuity,
integration and sustainability of the Commission’s work. Executive Order No. 4,
issued on 5 March 2001, created an ad hoc body to complete the wind up
activities of the Commission. Executive Order No. 5, issued on 5 March 2001,
transferred the administration of upland Pinatubo resettlement communities
from the Commission to the concerned local government units. Executive
Order No. 6, issued on 20 March 2001, transferred 14 existing lowland Pinatubo
resettlement sites under the supervision of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). Also, it created under the
Council the Pinatubo Project Management Office (PPMO) to manage the
resettlement areas. Eventually, under Executive Order No. 54, the PMMO
assumed the assets, records, funds, personnel, liabilities and all related
functions, tasks and responsibilities from the defunct Commission.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Disaster response
Early warning and evacuation
Evacuation of the population at risk had been the concern of local authorities as
early as April 1991 when the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
(PHIVOLCS) declared a 6-mile-radius danger zone around the volcano.
PHIVOLCS, jointly with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), had conducted
intensive studies and monitoring of the volcano’s activity from which it forecast
and declared an imminent eruption and issued early warnings to the
communities at risk. Among the first to have evacuated were the indigenous
Aeta highlanders who had lived on the slopes of the volcano. About 20,000 in
population, the Aetas had been safely evacuated before the eruption. People
from the lowlands heeded also the warnings and fled to safer distance from the
volcano. Also, more than 15,000 American servicemen and their dependents
had evacuated from Clark Air Base before the eruption.
Immediate response
In the immediate aftermath of the eruption, the National Disaster Coordinating
Council mobilized civilian and military resources to respond to the evacuation,
rescue and relief requirements of the affected populations. Government
agencies mobilized their respective facilities (hospitals, schools, etc.) and
personnel (medical, social workers, teachers, etc.) to provide the necessary
basic services in designated evacuation centers. The Department of Social
Welfare and Development was in the forefront of providing emergency relief
assistance to displaced families and victims in evacuation centers. The
Department of Health led in the provision of medical care and public health
services at evacuation centers, including disease surveillance. Heath advisories
were also issued and broadcast to guide the public in coping with the ashfall as
health hazard since the fine volcanic particles could cause sore eyes or trigger
asthma.
Later on, a host of countries extended humanitarian relief assistance to the
Philippine Government and its support NGOs, including the Philippine National
Red Cross. These countries included Australia, Belgium, Canada, China,
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
Malta, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, U.K., and U.S.A. International
organizations such as WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNDRO and WFP also extended
humanitarian relief assistance. The relief assistance was in the form of cash
donations or relief items such as food packs, medicines, and shelter materials.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Recovery and reconstruction plan
Development planning concerns
The government’s recovery and rehabilitation plan was guided by a
development principle that rehabilitation and reconstruction should not be
limited to restoration of destroyed or damages areas, facilities and systems to
their original conditions but should address the vulnerabilities and deficiencies
of previously existing conditions and mitigate any future disaster impact.
With the magnitude and extent of the destruction wrought by the eruption,
development planners and policy-makers were confronted by the following
concerns, which required immediate action as well as long-term solutions.
1) Resettlement. There was need to resettle people whose places of residence
had been devastated and were beyond immediate reconstruction or had
been damaged or affected and deemed unsafe for habitation. There were
two target beneficiaries for resettlement: the indigenous Aeta highlanders
and the displaced lowlanders. The resettlement strategy for the two groups
had to differ to consider the variation in socio-cultural orientation and socio-
economic activities of the Aetas and the lowlanders.
2) Livelihood. Government had to address the pressing concern of providing
immediate and long-term, livelihood opportunities to displaced farmers and
workers. Many farmlands had been unsuitable for agriculture and caused
disruption of production of agriculture-based industries. The closure of Clark
Air Base also presented the need for short-gestating livelihood opportunities
and for alternative uses of base lands to cushion the effect of the massive
displacement of workers.
3) Social Services. The continuing nature of the calamity had put pressure on
social services sector to provide continued social services in terms of health,
social welfare and education. Health and psycho-social services had to be
extended to victims both in and outside the evacuation centers. The
immediate opening of the classes and the extension of the school calendar
had to be considered by the government at the same time that it was
providing relief services to evacuees in school facilities. Social services
would have to be extended in resettlement areas in order to prepare the
resettlers for final resettlement.
4) Infrastructure. The eruption had caused massive destruction to the region’s
roads and bridges, public buildings and facilities, communication, utilities
and river and flood control structures. There was also need to institute
disaster mitigation measures in view of the continuing threat of lahars and
flashfloods.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
5) Land use and environmental management. The effects of the eruption,
especially lahar, continue to destroy farmlands, forest lands and watersheds
and had caused damages to the river systems and overall environment of
the region. This required careful physical land use re-planning of the region.
6) Science and Technology. The need to undertake scientific studies and
formulate corresponding studies and policies was an evident concern and
challenge for science and technology. The development of alternative uses
of ash fall for commercial or industrial was an important concern for both
government and the private sector.
In response to the above-mentioned concerns, the government vigorously
pursued the following specific development objectives:
・ To mitigate further the destruction brought about by the adverse effects
of the eruption, especially the lahars;
・ To normalize and accelerate economic recovery including the creation of
an alternative investment climate;
・ To provide adequate livelihood and employment alternatives, especially
for displaced farmers and workers;
・ To promote growth and development in resettlement and new settlement
areas serving as alternatives to permanently damaged/ high-risk areas;
・ To ensure the continuous flow of goods and services, especially during
relief operations when calamity strikes (lahars had made many areas
inaccessible);
・ To strengthen institutional structures, arrangements, and mechanisms
for disaster preparedness/ responsiveness and raise public awareness
on disaster mitigation and reduction;
・ To reduce susceptibility of vertical and horizontal infrastructures to
damages due to lahars and other disasters; and
・ To prevent further degradation of the environment and rehabilitate
damaged ecosystems.
Development strategy
As key feature of its development strategy, the government adopted team work
or “kabisig” in the pursuit of rehabilitation and reconstruction programs and
projects. As an overall approach, the government emphasized cooperation and
coordination among national and local government agencies, private sector,
including NGOs and the victims themselves to prevent duplication of efforts.
The government also ensured that these programs and projects were consistent
with the broader regional development framework. The overall spatial
development strategy for Central Luzon envisioned the region as the transit
lane between the resource-based areas of the Northern Luzon and the highly
populated and industrialized areas of the National capital region. As such the
region shall continue to serve as the catchment area for population and industry
spillover from Metro Manila and assume the provide the requirements of the
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Northern Luzon provinces in terms of processing and manufacturing of goods
and their distribution.
Moreover, the government developed specific strategies, programs and projects
that address the concerns earlier mentioned, i.e. in areas of resettlement,
livelihood, social services, infrastructure, science and technology, and land use
and environmental management. These were made in consultation with local
government officials, community leaders and the beneficiaries themselves.
Programs and projects
In accordance with the development strategy, the government established
programs for the following:
・ Resettlements for the Aetas highlanders (P349 million) and the
lowlanders (P1.689 billion).
・ Livelihood programs focused on agriculture and industry, providing
quick-generating income opportunities to affected families: Bamboo
Development Project (P80 million), Agricultural Rehabilitation Program
(P197.4 million); Agricultural Development Program ((P615 million);
Productivity Centers (P1.12 billion), Integrated Cattle Fattening program
( (P120 million), Integrated Poultry Livelihood Program ( (P40 million),
Deep Sea Fishing ( (P58 million), Financing Programs (P3.718 billion),
Common Service Facilities (P50 million).
・ Delivery of basic social services: relief services (P370.5 million), health
and nutrition service ((P367 million).
・ Infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction: River Systems
Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (P2.9 billion), Reconstruction
and Rehabilitation of Roads and Bridges (P1.5 billion), Development of
Alternate Routes in Capas-Botolan Road (P537 million) San Fernando-
Dinalupihan Road (P1.4 billion), and in Angeles-Porac-Floridablanca-
Dinalupihan Road ( (P169 million), Rehabilitation of Damaged Schools
and Public Buildings (P982 million), Mobile Health Facilities (P40 million),
Repair and Rehabilitation of Damaged National and Communal Irrigation
Systems (P228.6 million), Rehabilitation of Railway Facilities (P70
million).
With the assumption by the national government agencies of certain programs
and projects, the National Disaster Coordinating Council and the National
Economic Development Authority are currently consolidating and assessing the
status, outcome and impact of critical rehabilitation and reconstruction programs
and projects.
In general, the government had acted in dispatch in implementing rehabilitation
and reconstruction programs and projects, including the construction of
infrastructures for lahar and flood mitigation. For example, for the protection and
rehabilitation of lahar-threatened areas in Central Luzon, the DEPWH had
completed in just four (4) months the construction of the 24-kilometer Pasig-
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Potrero Outer Dike or “Megadike”in Bacolor, Pampanga. The megadike served
as a defense of the vulnerable areas against rampaging lahars during the 1996
rainy season.
Moreover, the participation and support of the private sector, including the
NGOs, had hastened and enhanced the delivery of basic services to the
affected populations and had ensured that the necessary services, where ever
and whenever government was seen to be deficient, were present and
responsive to the needs of victims.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Significance of international assistance
With the magnitude of rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in Central Luzon,
the government was able to pursue its recovery and rehabilitation plan more
efficiently and effectively with the support and assistance of other governments
and international funding institutions.
Most of the foreign assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction came in the
form of grants, loans, and technical assistance packages. Among the countries
that had extended assistance included Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Israel, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and U.S.A. World Bank and Asian
Development Bank had also extended support and loan facilities.
Some specific projects under the auspices of the DPWH, which were made
possible by foreign assistance, included:
・ ADB-funded Mt. Pinatubo Damage Rehabilitation Project
・ German Bank for Reconstruction-funded Mt. Pinatubo Emergency Aide
Project
・ Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)-funded Mt. Pinatubo
Relief and Rehab Project
・ USAID-funded United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Mt. Pinatubo
Recovery Action
・ Dutch-funded dredging of the Pasac- Guagua-San Fernando Waterway
・ Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF)-funded Pinatubo Hazard
Urgent Mitigation Project
・ German Centrum for International Migration (CIM)-funded Technical
Assistance for Mount Pinatubo Emergency-PMO
・ JICA-funded Grant Aid for Water Supply in Mt. Pinatubo Resettlement
Areas and Study on Flood and Mudflow control for Sacobia-
Bamban/Abacan Rivers
・ IBRD-funded Technical Assistance for Mt. Pinatubo and Rehabilitation
Works
・ Swiss Disaster Relief-funded Technical Assistance for Mt. Pinatubo
Rehabilitation
・ JBIC Yen Loan Package-funded Pinatubo hazard Urgent Mitigation
Project
Based on the Philippine experience in responding to and coping with the impact
and lingering effects of the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, inter-agency
coordination and multi-sectoral and multilateral cooperation are vital in
achieving short-term and long-term goals for recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction. With the accomplishment of urgent development projects, the
affected communities were able to recover quickly from the disasters and
government was able to institute necessary disaster mitigation measures.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
The application and use of good practices and experiences made available
through technical assistance extended by other governments and international
organizations facilitated the development and implementation of critical
development programs and projects and the early recovery and rehabilitation of
the affected areas.
16
Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
Promoting cooperation and coordination of international assistance
In view of the beneficial impact of international assistance on recovery and
rehabilitation, the promotion of cooperation and coordination in this area is
worthwhile if not an imperative to ensure early recovery from disasters.
Disaster-stricken countries or communities should have ready access to
international assistance, or, at least, to bodies of information on best practices
on recovery and rehabilitation. This access could be established and realized if
there is an efficient and effective mechanism for sharing information and
coordinating or facilitating international assistance. An efficient information
system on local damage and needs and the available external resources,
including funds and expertise, plays a critical role in the coordination or
facilitation of any international assistance.
Moreover, on one hand, the national or local disaster coordinating body or focal
point agency is a critical enabling mechanism whose initiative and involvement
in accessing, securing and availing an international assistance has to be
ensured. On the other hand, international bodies or organizations that may
assume the role of facilitator or coordinator in matching local appeals with
external assistance should possess an efficient system for information sharing
and communication among the national and local focal points and the potential
donors in the international community.
However, while its significance in ensuring early recovery and rehabilitation is
appreciated, the establishment of a truly efficient and effective coordinating
body or organizational function at the international level may only be achieved
through a process of consultation and consensus-building (especially on
procedures and protocols) among the critical stakeholders, including
governments (decision-makers), national focal points, donor agencies,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.
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Eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines Asian Disaster Reduction Center
References
・ Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program for Mt. Pinatubo-Affected
Areas, Task Force Mt. Pinatubo 1992
・ Socioeconomic Impacts of the Mount Pinatubo Eruption, Mercado, R.,
Lacsamana, J, and Pineda , G. 1999
・ National Disaster Coordinating Council, unpublished document and
report compilations, 1991-2004
・ Reducing the risk from volcano hazards: lahars of Mount Pinatubo,
Philippines, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 114-97
・ Reducing the risk from volcano hazards: The Cataclysmic 1991 Eruption
of Mount Pinatubo, Philippines, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 113-
97
・ Reducing the risk from volcano hazards: Benefits of volcano monitoring
far outweigh costs – The case of Mount Pinatubo, U.S. Geological
Survey Fact Sheet 115-97
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