Discussion 11 - Paper Answers

Requirements: Identify the question you decide to answer at the top of your post. Prompt responses should answer the question and elaborate in a meaningful way using 2 of the weekly class readings (250 words of original content). Do not quote the readings, paraphrase and cite them using APA style in text citations. You can only use ONE multimedia source for your minimum 2 sources each week. The readings must be from the current week. The more sources you use, the more convincing your argument. Include a reference list in APA style at the end of your post, does not count towards minimum word content.

Choose one:

1) What is bottom-up implementation emergency management? What were the issues with the bottom-up practices of Emergency Management in Nepal during the earthquake? Why was the bottom up practice ineffective in the case of Nepal?

2) Analyze the social, economic, physical and environmental vulnerabilities of Nepal before the earthquake. How did these influence the consequences after the earthquake?

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Journal of Earthquake Engineering

ISSN: 1363-2469 (Print) 1559-808X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ueqe20

Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures and
Buildings Due to the 2015 Nepal Gorkha
Earthquake

Satish Bhagat, H. A. D. Samith Buddika, Rohit Kumar Adhikari, Anuja
Shrestha, Sanjeema Bajracharya, Rejina Joshi, Jenisha Singh, Rajali Maharjan
& Anil C. Wijeyewickrema

To cite this article: Satish Bhagat, H. A. D. Samith Buddika, Rohit Kumar Adhikari, Anuja
Shrestha, Sanjeema Bajracharya, Rejina Joshi, Jenisha Singh, Rajali Maharjan & Anil C.
Wijeyewickrema (2018) Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures and Buildings Due to the
2015 Nepal Gorkha Earthquake, Journal of Earthquake Engineering, 22:10, 1861-1880, DOI:
10.1080/13632469.2017.1309608

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13632469.2017.1309608

Published online: 23 Jun 2017.

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Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures and Buildings Due to
the 2015 Nepal Gorkha Earthquake
Satish Bhagata, H. A. D. Samith Buddikaa, Rohit Kumar Adhikaria, Anuja Shresthaa,
Sanjeema Bajracharyaa, Rejina Joshia, Jenisha Singha, Rajali Maharjanb,
and Anil C. Wijeyewickremaa

aDepartment of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan;
bDepartment of International Development Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan

ABSTRACT
Cultural heritage structures are an integral facet of the irreplaceable
cultural heritage of a nation and have been constructed several hun-
dreds and even thousands of years ago. In this paper, based on a field
reconnaissance of the highly damaged areas of Kathmandu Valley and
Sindhupalchowk district, damage to cultural heritage structures due to
the 2015 Nepal Gorkha earthquake and its impact on Nepal are
reported. Damages to engineered and non-engineered buildings are
also discussed. The damage patterns observed and discussed will be
useful for the prevention of damage to cultural heritage structures and
other buildings in seismically active countries.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 10 February 2017
Accepted 27 February 2017

KEYWORDS
Cultural Heritage Structures;
Earthquake Reconnaissance
Survey; Engineered and
Non-Engineered Buildings;
Structural Damage; 2015
Nepal Gorkha Earthquake

1. Introduction

An earthquake of momentous magnitude ðMwÞ 7.8 occurred in the central region of Nepal
on April 25, 2015, at 11:56 Nepal Standard Time. The epicenter (28.147°N, 84.708°E) of
the earthquake was located in the village of Barpak, Gorkha district, which is approxi-
mately 78 km northwest of the capital city, Kathmandu (Fig. 1), and its focal depth was 15
km [USGS, 2015]. Over 472 aftershocks with Mw greater than 4.0 have been recorded as of
October 2016 [NSC, 2016], with some significant seismic events having Mw 6:7 on April
26, 2015, and Mw 7:3 on May 12, 2015 (Fig. 1). The earthquake resulted in a Maximum
Mercalli Intensity of IX (Violent) with about 8790 deaths, and 22,300 people injured
[NPC, 2015]. Significant damages to many public and private buildings were reported. In
addition, many cultural heritage structures were also damaged, ranging from moderate
damage to total collapse. It was reported that 2900 structures with a historical and
religious significance were affected [NPC, 2015], of which 133 had collapsed, 95 were
partially collapsed and 515 were partly damaged [DOA, 2015].

The cultural heritage of a nation depicts the social beliefs, customs, and traditions that
connect people and provide a sense of unity and belonging to a nation. Cultural heritage
structures (i.e. tangible cultural heritage) also serve as tourist attractions but are vulnerable
to strong ground shaking due to seismic events, as these structures were obviously built
before structural design guidelines were established. The traditional materials used for the

CONTACT Anil C. Wijeyewickrema wijeyewickrema.a.aa@m.titech.ac.jp Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, O-okayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan.
Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/ueqe.

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING
2018, VOL. 22, NO. 10, 1861–1880
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construction of cultural heritage structures need proper maintenance at regular intervals
to maintain structural integrity. Lack of regular maintenance and deterioration of con-
struction materials can lead to significant damage to these structures, even under minor
ground motion intensity levels.

Damage to cultural heritage structures in Italy are discussed in detail by Parisi and
Augenti [2013]. Protection of cultural heritage structures is always a matter of concern
and has gained significant attention in many European countries [Kappos et al., 2007;
Milani and Valente, 2015]. In Nepal, the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act empowers
the Department of Archeology to be responsible for all heritage sites in the country.
Inadequate resources and mechanisms to implement projects and protect heritage sites,
and conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders involved in conservation and mainte-
nance of heritage structures, have led to a situation where there are problems with the
implementation of regular maintenance of all cultural heritage structures [Chapagain,
2008]. This resulted in extensive damage to cultural heritage structures due to the 2015
Nepal Gorkha earthquake.

Many engineered and non-engineered buildings were also damaged due to the 2015 Nepal
Gorkha earthquake. A total of 498,852 buildings were fully damaged and 256,697 buildings
were partially damaged [NPC, 2015]. This includes both engineered and non-engineered
buildings. Damage to buildings due to the 2015 Nepal Gorkha earthquake have been reported
in many studies [for e.g. Adhikari et al., 2015; Sun and Yan, 2015; Goda et al., 2015; Shakya
and Kawan, 2016; Sharma et al., 2016]. These studies mainly focused on damage to

Figure 1. Location of the mainshock and two major aftershocks of the 2015 Nepal Gorkha earthquake
[modified from Parajuli and Kiyono, 2015]. Note: Kathmandu Valley consists of Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and
Bhaktapur districts.

1862 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

reinforced concrete buildings highlighting some of the major causes such as weak column-
strong beam mechanism, lack of confining reinforcement, low-quality construction materi-
als, and poor reinforcement detailing. Parajuli and Kiyono [2015] investigated damage to
stone masonry structures. However, these studies do not discuss damage to cultural heritage
structures, which are one of the most valuable cultural assets of a nation.

In the last few decades, shortly after the occurrence of a major seismic event, many
reconnaissance surveys have been carried out by different groups of researchers. The reconnais-
sance surveys mainly focusing on structural damage can be broadly categorized as focusing on
(a) damage to building structures [e.g. Tsai et al., 2000; Eberhard et al., 2010; Kawashima et al.,
2010; Romão et al., 2013; Parajuli and Kiyono 2015; Lukkunaprasit et al., 2016; Yazgan et al.,
2016]; (b) damage to cultural heritage structures [e.g. Leite et al., 2013; Sorrentino et al., 2014;
Adami et al., 2016] (c) seismic pounding of buildings [e.g. Kasai and Maison, 1997; Cole et al.
2012]; and (d) damage to bridges [e.g. Kawashima et al., 2009; Schanack et al. 2012].

The present paper reports the findings of the earthquake reconnaissance after the 2015 Nepal
Gorkha earthquake, where the focus is on the damage caused to cultural heritage structures and
the resulting impact on Nepal. A field reconnaissance of the highly damaged areas of
Kathmandu Valley (which consists of Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur districts) and
Sindhupalchowk district (Fig. 1) was conducted by a team from the Tokyo Institute of
Technology, Japan from June 1 to 8, 2015. In addition, damage to engineered and non-
engineered buildings located in areas where there were a large number of casualties is also
discussed. The observations and related discussions provided in this paper would be useful when
formulating plans to preserve cultural heritage structures and other buildings from future
earthquakes in seismically active nations.

2. Characteristics of Nepalese Heritage Structures

Kathmandu Valley has seven monument zones included in the list of UNESCO World heritage
sites, revealing a wide range of historic and artistic achievements over the centuries. These
monument zones include the Durbar Squares of Kathmandu, Patan, and Bhaktapur, the
Buddhist stupas of Swayambhu and Boudhanath, and the Hindu temples of Pashupatinath
and Changu Narayan [UNESCO, 2016]. All these cultural heritage structures have unique
features and depict the traditions and culture of Nepal. Besides this, the design approach,
materials, and craftsmanship adopted during the construction of these structures represent the
ancient remarkable architectural typologies. Most of these cultural heritage structures are built
using stone masonry and brick masonry bonded with mud mortar or lime mortar, which easily
deteriorate with time (in a few of these structures the main frame is made of timber), thus
making them susceptible to damage under lateral shaking. In general, Nepalese temples can be
broadly grouped into three categories based on their architectural pattern: Pagoda style, Stupa
style, and Shikhara style, all of which vary from each other in their construction methods.

3. Seismicity of Nepal

Since Nepal lies in the vicinity of the active plate boundary between the Indo-Australian and
Eurasian plates, there is always a risk of a major earthquake. Nepal is divided into three tectonic
zones from south to north, viz., the Main Central Thrust (MCT), the Main Boundary Thrust
(MBT), and the Himalayan Frontal Thrust or the Main Frontal Thrust (MFT). The major and

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1863

minor earthquakes in Nepal are associated with these active thrusts. Some of the major earth-
quakes in Nepal up to 2016 and their locations are shown in Fig. 2. The 1934 Nepal-Bihar
earthquake was the most devastating seismic event that led to 8514 fatalities in Nepal, of which
4296 fatalities were in Kathmandu Valley alone [Pandey and Molnar, 1988]. It is noted that the
April 25, 2015 earthquake occurred near the MFT, between the subducting Indo-Australian
plate and the overriding Eurasian plate, moving at a relative rate of approximately 45 mm/year
towards the north-northeast [USGS, 2015] region. The acceleration time histories of East-West
(EW), North-South (NS), and vertical (UD) components for the ground motion recorded at the
KATNP station during the mainshock of April 25, 2015 are shown in Fig. 3. The EW, NS, and
UD components had peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.158, 0.164, and 0.186 g, respectively.
The response spectra of the acceleration time histories are shown in Fig. 4, where the EW
component has a predominant period of 4.55 s and the NS component has two predominant
periods at 0.43 and 4.85 s. The predominant period of the UD component is 0.08 s. Hence, both
low- and high-rise structures are expected to have more damage due to the NS component of the
ground motion, while the EW component is expected to cause more damage to taller structures
with a longer fundamental period. However, 40- to 50-story high-rise buildings (corresponding
to buildings with a fundamental period approximately in the range of 4.0–5.0 s) have not yet
been constructed in Kathmandu Valley. The tallest building in Kathmandu Valley when the
earthquake occurred was an 18-story high-rise building.

Ms 7.7 Nepal-Tibet
August 28, 1916
Darchula

district

Mw 6.8 Nepal-Bihar
August 21, 1988
Udayapur district

Ms 8.0 Kathmandu-Bihar
August 26, 1833
Rasuwa

Mw 6.9 Nepal-Sikkim
September 18, 2011
Taplejung district

Mw 8.1 Nepal -Bihar
January 15, 1934
Udayapur district

Ms 6.5 Kathmandu
July 7, 1869
Kathmandu district

Mw 7.8 Nepal-Gorkha
April 25, 2015
Gorkha district

Ms 6.3 Nepal-India
July 27, 1966
Bajhang district

Ms 6.5 Nepal-Pithoragarh
July 29, 1980
Bajhang district

Mw 7.3 Nepal-Dolakha
May 12, 2015
Dolakha district

B
A

district

Figure 2. Map of Nepal showing the major earthquakes up to 2016.
Note: Mw = moment magnitude; Ms = surface wave magnitude. (A) Kathmandu Valley (Kathmandu,
Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur districts) and (B) Sindhupalchowk district.

1864 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

4. Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures

The devastating earthquake caused enormous destruction to historic centers in Nepal, resulting
in irreparable damage to the cultural legacy of the country. Major destruction was observed in
most of the cultural heritage sites in Kathmandu Valley. Of the nearly 750 damaged or destroyed
monuments, about 450 were located in Kathmandu Valley and 20 were located in
Sindhupalchowk district. Most of the Nepalese temples and monuments were constructed
during the 14th–19th centuries, without considering proper seismic resistance requirements.
Some of the inherent structural characteristics of Nepalese monuments, such as symmetrical

0 20 40 60 80 100 120
–

0.2

–

0.1

0.0

0.1
0.2

PGA = 0.158g

A
cc

el
er

at
io

n
(g

)

KATNP-EW

0 20 40 60 80 100 120
-0.2

-0.1

0.0
0.1
0.2

PGA = 0.164g

A
cc
el
er
at
io
n
(g
)

KATNP-NS

0 20 40 60 80 100 120
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2

PGA = 0.186g

A
cc
el
er
at
io
n
(g
)

Time (s)

KATNP-UD

Figure 3. Ground motion recorded at Kantipath station (KATNP), Kathmandu on April 25, 2015 [Source:
USGS, 2015].

0 2 4 6 8
0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

T
NS, 1

= 0.43 s

EW
NS
UD

S
pe

ct
ra

l
ac

ce
le

ra
ti

on
(

Period (s)

T
EW

= 4.55 s

T
NS, 2

= 4.85 s

T
UD

= 0.08 s

Figure 4. Response spectra for ground motion recorded at Kantipath station (KATNP), Kathmandu on
April 25, 2015.

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1865

construction, multi-level plinth, and conical mass distribution resulted in an enhanced seismic
performance. However, the lack of vertical structural continuity, lack of rigid connections
between various structural components, and heavy roof structures make these structures more
vulnerable to strong ground motions.

4.1. Temples

During the earthquake reconnaissance survey carried out by the authors in June 2015, it
was observed that some of the temples constructed with brick masonry and a timber frame
sustained less damage than those constructed without a timber frame. Additionally, it was
also observed that the construction materials used in most of the damaged monuments
were already deteriorated, highlighting the need for appropriate repair and maintenance
programs. Damages to these cultural heritage structures are discussed using the photo-
graphs taken during the field survey.

Figure 5 shows the Nautalley Durbar (which means nine-story Palace), located in
Kathmandu Durbar Square, that was damaged during the earthquake. This structure
was built in 1768 AD to commemorate the victory of King Prithvi Narayan Shah of
Nepal. The lower three stories were constructed in the Newari farmhouse style, while
the upper six stories (four tiers) were constructed in the Pagoda style. The brick

Figure 5. South face of Nautalley Durbar located in Kathmandu Durbar Square viewed from Basantapur
Dabali: (a) before earthquake, (b) after earthquake, (c) load path discontinuity in Nautalley Durbar, and
(d) damage to white masonry building next to the Durbar. The upper three stories (two tiers) of the
Nautalley Durbar collapsed due to the earthquake. The white masonry building next to the Durbar
suffered severe damage and the entire front part of the building (south face) was destroyed.

1866 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

masonry and timber structural elements used in the four-tiered roofs contributed to the
heavy weight at the top, causing collapse of the upper three stories (two tiers). In
addition, the lack of continuous vertical structural elements (i.e. load path discontinu-
ity) from the base to the roof in the pagoda style construction of the Durbar as seen in
Fig. 5(c) resulted in toppling of the upper floors in this structure. Moreover, the lack of
proper connections between struts, purlins, joists, and load bearing walls witnessed
during the field survey, was another factor to undermine the seismic strength. The
masonry building next to the Nautalley Durbar was also heavily damaged as seen in
Fig. 5(d). The damage to this building was due to deterioration of the bricks and
mortar used for the construction, as well as seismic pounding of the building with the
adjacent Nautalley Durbar, as seen in Fig. 5(d).

The pre- and post-earthquake photographs of the pagoda-style Maju Dega temple and
Narayan temple constructed in the late 17th century, also located in Kathmandu Durbar
Square, are shown in Fig. 6. The massive multi-level plinth supported the Maju Dega
temple above it, while the plinth of the Narayan temple was relatively lower in height
(Figs. 6(a) and (b)). The walls used for the main structures are constructed over the inner
timber beams (Fig. 6c), where a firm connection between the brick walls and the wooden
beams at the top level of plinth could not be observed. The timber column stands over a
timber beam on a base with a pin inserted into the base stone. The connection between

Narayan
temple

Maju Dega
temple

Narayan
temple
Maju Dega
temple

Inner beams

External beams

Base stone

Figure 6. Pagoda style Maju Dega temple and Narayan temple located in Kathmandu Durbar Square:
(a) before earthquake, (b) after earthquake, and (c) close-up view of the connection of Narayan temple
after damage. The lack of a rigid connection between the base and the superstructure led to the
collapse of the temple.

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1867

the timber column and the base stone is also described in Shakya et al. [2014]. The lack of
a rigid connection between the base and the superstructure led to the collapse of the
superstructure of these two temples. A similar collapse occurred at the Fasidega temple
that was also supported on a multi-level plinth located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square is
shown in Fig. 7. This temple was rebuilt after it was fully damaged in the 1934 Nepal-
Bihar earthquake.

In contrast to the collapse of the Maju Dega temple and the Fasidega temple (Figs. 6 and 7),
some temples that had a wide plinth sustained no damage and performed well during the
earthquake. The Taleju Bhawani temple located in Kathmandu Durbar Square (constructed in
1549 AD) and the Nyatapola temple located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square (constructed in 1702
AD), shown in Figs. 8(a) and (b), did not suffer any damage, while a small temple located in front
of the Taleju Bhawani temple collapsed completely.

The brick masonry walls on the ground floor of the pagoda-style Changu Narayan temple
located in Bhaktapur district suffered severe damage as shown in Fig. 9. The temple was
originally built in the 4th century and was rebuilt in 1702 AD after a major fire damaged the
temple. Local residents confirmed that frequent repairs and maintenance of the temple used to
be carried out. The vertical layers of brick walls built with mud mortar, were not well
interconnected and could not withstand large displacement demands and resulted in out-of-
plane failure as seen in Fig. 9(b). During the field survey, it was observed that the temple was
extensively supported by shores, to carry out necessary repair and retrofitting works (Fig. 9(a)).
However, there were no signs of tilting or out-of-plumb of the timber frame that supports the
entire structure.

Another type of temple that was damaged during the earthquake was the Shikhara style
temples with a superstructure composed of a tall curvilinear or pyramidal tower. These are
slender structures, constructed using brick masonry with lime mortar or mud mortar.
They are brittle in nature, and their slenderness makes them more susceptible to damage

Figure 7. Fasidega temple located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square: (a) before earthquake and (b) after
earthquake. The lack of a rigid connection between the base and the superstructure led to the collapse
of the temple.

1868 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

under large lateral displacements. Some of the Shikhara style temples located in Bhaktapur
Durbar Square that sustained damage are shown in Figs. 10–12. The pinnacle of the Siddhi
Laxmi temple that was built in 1702 AD tilted, but the rest of the temple was intact
(Fig. 10). Only the upper part of the Shiva temple that was constructed in 1674 AD
collapsed (Fig. 11), but the entire Vatsala Durga temple that was constructed in 1696 AD
had collapsed (Fig. 12). The smaller size of columns in the Vatsala Durga temple and
added weight above it (Fig. 12(a)) resulted in failure of the columns leading to total
collapse. The deterioration of the construction materials is clearly visible in Fig. 11(c), and
lack of regular maintenance was the reason for collapse.

Figure 8. Temples with wide plinth that sustained no damage due to the earthquake: (a) Taleju
Bhawani temple located in Kathmandu Durbar Square and (b) Nyatapola temple located in
Bhaktapur Durbar Square. Rubble in front of Taleju Bhawani temple is from a small temple in the
vicinity that collapsed completely.

Figure 9. Changu Narayan temple located in Bhaktapur district: (a) shores used to support the temple
after the earthquake and (b) out-of-plane failure of the corner brick masonry walls at the main
entrance. The timber frame that supports the entire structure was intact. ((b) source: http://rubinmu
seum.org/page/then-and-now-changu-narayan).

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1869

http://rubinmuseum.org/page/then-and-now-changu-narayan

4.2. Landmark Tower

The failure of the 203 foot (61.88 m) tall Dharahara tower, which is made of brick masonry with
lime mortar and mud mortar, is shown in Fig. 13. The tower had been constructed with thick
walls to make the structure stable and capable of withstanding gravity loads and to accommodate
an internal spiral stairway (Fig. 13(c)). The increased weight of the structure due to the thick
walls and absence of reinforcing bars resulted in a brittle mode of failure, which prevented people
from evacuating, leading to the deaths of 180 people. Since April 25, 2015 was a Saturday, there

Figure 10. The Shikhara style Siddhi Laxmi temple located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square: (a) before
earthquake and (b) after earthquake. The pinnacle was tilted due to the earthquake.

Figure 11. The Shikhara style Shiva temple located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square: (a) before earthquake,
(b) after earthquake, and (c) deterioration of bricks used for construction exposed after the earthquake.
The upper part collapsed due to the earthquake.

1870 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

were many people who were visiting the Dharahara tower and were using the internal spiral
stairway. Most of the people who lost their lives or were injured were on the internal spiral
stairway of the Dharahara tower.

5. Damage to Engineered and Non-Engineered Buildings

5.1. Damage to Engineered Reinforced Concrete (RC) Buildings

The 2015 Nepal Gorkha earthquake caused damage to many reinforced concrete (RC)
buildings. Damages to residential buildings, school buildings, factories, and apartment

Figure 12. The Shikhara style Vatsala Durga temple located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square: (a) before
earthquake and (b) after earthquake. The temple was completely destroyed.

Figure 13. The historic landmark tower known as Dharahara: (a) before earthquake and (b, c) after
earthquake. The spiral stairway is visible in (c).

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1871

buildings were observed during the survey. Inadequate seismic design (and not obtaining
approval from the relevant authority prior to the construction of buildings), use of low
quality construction materials, and poor workmanship were the major reasons for damage
to RC buildings. Here, an overview of the performance of RC buildings and some of the
major causes for damage in Kathmandu Valley and Sindhupalchowk district surveyed by
the Tokyo Tech team in June 2015 are discussed.

5.1.1. Inadequate Seismic Design, Low-Quality Construction Materials, and Poor
Workmanship
Evidence of inadequate seismic design is shown in Figs. 14 and 15. Buildings where the
size of columns required to resist the lateral forces due to the earthquake was insufficient
are shown in Figs. 14(a) and (b), and the close-up view of a damaged column is shown in
Fig. 14(c). The absence of stirrups at beam-column joints (Fig. 15(a)) and wide spacing of
stirrups at beam-column joints (Figs. 15(b) and (c)) were observed in collapsed and
severely damaged buildings.

A severely damaged building where low-quality construction materials had been used
for the structural members is shown in Fig. 16. Although the size of columns and the
amount of rebars required to sustain the load of the superstructure may have been
sufficient during the design phase, the use of low quality concrete during the construction

Figure 14. Inadequate seismic design—insufficient size of columns: (a) fully collapsed building, (b)
tilted building, and (c) close-up view showing the size of columns.

Figure 15. Inadequate seismic design—stirrup issues: (a) no stirrups at the joint, (b), and (c) wide
spacing of stirrups at the beam-column joint.

1872 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

led to the failure. The rebars that were used were already corroded, and the concrete used
did not have proper grading of aggregates.

Figure 17 shows an example of poor workmanship during construction, where it is clear
that there is inadequate cover concrete in the beam (Fig. 17(a)) and improper concreting at
the beam-column joint (Fig. 17(b)), which resulted in corrosion of the exposed rebars.

5.1.2. Soft Story Collapse of a School Building
The Jana Jagriti Higher Secondary School with three main buildings, located in
Sindhupalchowk district, was inaugurated in October 2005 but suffered damage due to
the earthquake as shown in Fig. 18. Figure 18(b) shows the complete collapse of the first
story of the four-story building. The circular columns with 300-mm diameter had six 16-
mm rebars, but the stirrups were placed at 150 mm spacing, which was inadequate.
However, the two-story building in the same school compound constructed about 5 m
away from the collapsed building suffered only minor structural damage (Fig. 18(c)), while
the three-story building located about 30 m from the collapsed building sustained only

Figure 16. Low-quality construction materials used for structural members: (a) crushing of core
concrete and (b) failure of column.

Figure 17. Poor workmanship during construction: (a) insufficient cover concrete in beam and (b)
improper concreting of beam-column joint.

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1873

non-structural damage (Fig. 18(d)). The four-story building was constructed at the edge of
a slope, while the other two buildings had no such slopes nearby. Evidence of differential
settlement could be observed as indicated by the inclination and cracks on the first floor
slab as seen in Figs. 18(e) and (f). However, lack of stirrups due to inappropriate spacing
at the joints (Fig. 18(b)) was also one of the causes of failure.

5.1.3. Structural Failure Due to Addition of Stories to Existing Buildings
In some buildings that were severely damaged, the building facade indicated that addi-
tional stories had been added to the existing building. The increase in the weight of the

Cantilever slab

(i)

(d)(c)

(a) (b)

(ii) (iii)

4-story 2-story 3-story

(e) (f)

Figure 18. Damage to a school building in the Sindhupalchowk district: (a) plan view of the three main
buildings in the school compound, (b) collapse of the first story of the 4-story building, (c) minor
structural damage to the 2-story building, (d) non-structural damage to the 3-story building, (e), and (f)
cracks and inclination in the first floor slab.

1874 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

building resulted in increased story shear demands during the earthquake, and resulted in
pancake failure of the fourth floor (Fig. 19(a)). Although the building in Fig. 19(b) did not
collapse, it is almost impossible to repair or retrofit the building, as there is complete
failure at the column joint of the first story.

5.2. Damage to Non-Engineered Unreinforced Masonry (URM) Buildings

Several non-engineered unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings built without any con-
sideration of seismic performance had partially collapsed or fully collapsed. Most of these
URM buildings were made of brick masonry bonded with cement mortar, lime mortar, or
mud mortar with timber joist floors. In the case of mud mortar, the mortar hardens with
time, leading to shrinkage and separation of joints in masonry structures. The most
common damage patterns observed in such structures are: (a) curtain fall collapse of the
side walls (partial or full) (Figs. 20(a) and (b)); (b) vertical cracks on walls along the
mortar joint (Fig. 20(c)); (c) diagonal cracks across the walls due to the inability of the wall
to resist tensile stresses (Fig. 20(d)); and (d) collapse of the entire structure (Fig. 20(e)).
Similar damage to URM buildings was also observed during the 2011 Sikkim-Nepal
earthquake [Shakya et al., 2013]. The main cause of damage to these URM buildings is
due to: (a) strength deterioration of the construction materials; (b) lack of regular
maintenance; (c) lack of proper connections at the corners; and (d) excessive weight in
the upper part of the building.

6. Performance of Restored Structures and Seismically Retrofitted Structures

Some of the cultural heritage structures that had been restored prior to the earthquake
were unaffected by the earthquake, while some suffered only minor damage. The Bhimsen
temple located in Patan Durbar Square, the Palace of Fifty-Five Windows and Chyasilin
Mandap located in Bhaktapur Durbar Square, and the Pashupatinath temple were restored

Figure 19. Structural failure due to insufficient load carrying capacity: (a) pancake failure of 4th floor
due to addition of extra story on the top and (b) insufficient load carrying capacity of lower floor
columns due to the addition of extra upper floors.

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1875

before the earthquake and survived with only very minor damage. Restored cultural
heritage structures performed remarkably well during the earthquake and are also dis-
cussed in the EERI report [EERI, 2016].

A total of 160 public schools in Kathmandu Valley, which were part of an Asian
Development Bank (ADB)–supported school safety program that included seismic retrofit,
withstood the earthquake and its aftershocks [ADB, 2015]. A number of hospitals, which
were seismically retrofitted as a core part of a preparedness plan under a World Health
Organization initiative, provided continuous service after the earthquake [UNISDR, 2015].

Partially damaged structures must undergo seismic performance assessment to evaluate
the remaining seismic capacity, followed by retrofitting work. Restoration and retrofit of
cultural heritage structures have been done in many seismically active countries such as
Chile, Greece, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and Turkey. The techniques adopted in these
countries can be useful for the restoration and seismic retrofit of cultural heritage
structures in Nepal and other countries that have not yet implemented such plans in a
comprehensive manner.

7. Impact of Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures on Nepalese Society

Cultural heritage structures are crucial to the tourism industry in Nepal, and are one of
the major sources of income for the country. Damage to cultural heritage structures due to
the 2015 Nepal Gorkha earthquake has caused a large reduction in the number of tourists

Figure 20. Damage observed in non-engineered URM buildings: (a) and (b) curtain fall collapse of the
side wall, (c) vertical disintegration of brick joints, (d) cracks along the walls due to excessive tensile
stress, and (e) collapse of the entire building.

1876 S. BHAGAT ET AL.

and resulted in a significant reduction in the revenue generation of the country. A decline
in the number of tourists from 790,118 in 2014 to 583,970 in 2015 was reported as a
consequence of the earthquake [MOCTCA, 2015]. A loss of 600 million Nepalese rupees
(NPR) (approximately 6M USD) was expected due to the decline in revenue generated
from ticket sales at cultural heritage sites in Kathmandu Valley [NPC, 2015]. The decline
in the number of tourists visiting Nepal after the earthquake has also affected the employ-
ment of local people who mainly depend upon the tourism industry for their livelihood.

In addition to the economic impact, damage to cultural heritage structures has affected
the social and cultural aspects of the Nepalese society. Cultural heritage structures are not
only the pride of the nation but also the inseparable part of daily life of the people. These
cultural heritage structures include a number of temples that many people visit on a daily
basis for religious reasons. Cultural heritage sites are also a place for social and cultural
interactions where traditional events are organized on a frequent basis. Sudden destruc-
tion of these structures has lowered the morale of the people, as well as disrupted their
daily lives.

The estimated total loss due to the damage caused to the physical assets and infra-
structure at the cultural heritage sites is 16.9 billion NPR (approximately 169M USD)
[NPC, 2015]. These direct and indirect losses may be recovered with proper restoration of
the damaged cultural heritage structures and the reconstruction of collapsed structures.
The National Planning Commission of Nepal estimates that about 21 billion NPR
(approximately 210M USD) and a period of six years will be required for the restoration
and reconstruction of these cultural heritage structures, and for seismically retrofitting the
structures [NPC, 2015].

8. Summary

The magnitude 7.8 Nepal Gorkha earthquake, which occurred on April 25, 2015, caused
widespread damage to cultural heritage structures as well as engineered and non-engi-
neered buildings in Nepal. The damage was exacerbated by two significant aftershocks of
Mw 6:7 on April 26, 2015, and Mw 7:3 on May 12, 2015. In the present paper, the damage
levels in Kathmandu Valley and Sindhupalchowk district are discussed, as these areas had
the largest number of casualties. Valuable lessons can be learned from the damage that
was observed.

The damage to cultural heritage structures was mainly due to the magnitude of the
seismic event, the deterioration of construction materials, and lack of maintenance. Major
damage may have been prevented if there was a planned schedule of restoration and
seismic retrofit, followed by routine maintenance of these structures. Seismic vulnerability
assessment of cultural heritage structures that were partly damaged or not damaged
should be carried out, followed by appropriate restoration and seismic retrofit with
minimal disturbance to the original structural features. In addition, the connection of
the timber framing with the brick masonry walls must also be investigated, as many
temples have a timber main frame. Since these structures must be preserved for posterity,
scheduled inspections should be carried out, and repairs should be done immediately, if
required.

Damage to engineered buildings was mainly due to inadequate size of columns
necessary to resist lateral forces, large spacing of stirrups at the beam-column joints,

JOURNAL OF EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 1877

and insufficient concrete cover leading to corrosion of the rebars. Considering the con-
struction materials and construction quality, structural damage should have been expected
following the occurrence of a major seismic event. It is important that appropriate seismic
design, good-quality construction materials and approved construction methods are used
to minimize damage to engineered buildings.

Since non-engineered URM buildings were constructed using brick masonry with cement
mortar or lime mortar, such buildings are not capable of withstanding large lateral deforma-
tions due to its brittle nature. Reinforcing these structures will ensure that these buildings will
be capable of sustaining large deformations and prevent major structural damage.

Adopting proper design and engineering practices to build resilient structures will
ensure the operability of structures right after an earthquake. Besides this, seismic mon-
itoring of cultural heritage structures and important buildings could be done to observe
the dynamic behavior during a seismic event.

Policymakers and government officials in seismically active countries, especially develop-
ing countries, should recognize the threat to cultural heritage structures and develop appro-
priate plans to safeguard the irreplaceable, cultural heritage structures from seismic events.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Professor Junichiro Niwa, Dr. Jiro Takemura, and Professor Akihiro Takahashi
of the Department of Civil Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology for their kind support and
encouragement of the field visit. They convey special thanks to Professor Prem Nath Maskey of the
Institute of Engineering (IOE), Tribhuvan University (TU) for providing useful suggestions and
assisting with the field visit in Nepal. They also extend thanks to Professor Gokarna Bahadur Motra,
Dr. Basanta Raj Adhikari and Mr. Nagendra Raj Sitaula of IOE, TU, and Dr. Ramesh Guragain,
Deputy Executive Director of NSET-Nepal for their kind cooperation and suggestions relevant to
the field visit.

The authors acknowledge the anonymous review comments that have improved the manuscript.

Funding

Partial financial support from the Department of Civil Engineering and the Civil Engineering Alumni
Association of the Tokyo Institute of Technology for the field visit is gratefully acknowledged.

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Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Characteristics of Nepalese Heritage Structures
3. Seismicity of Nepal
4. Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures

4.1. Temples
4.2. Landmark Tower

5. Damage to Engineered and Non-Engineered Buildings

5.1. Damage to Engineered Reinforced Concrete (RC) Buildings
5.1.1. Inadequate Seismic Design, Low-Quality Construction Materials, and Poor Workmanship
5.1.2. Soft Story Collapse of a School Building
5.1.3. Structural Failure Due to Addition of Stories to Existing Buildings
5.2. Damage to Non-Engineered Unreinforced Masonry (URM) Buildings

6. Performance of Restored Structures and Seismically Retrofitted Structures
7. Impact of Damage to Cultural Heritage Structures on Nepalese Society
8. Summary

Acknowledgments
Funding
References

The

Crisis Response to the Nepal Earthquake:
Lessons Learned

Research Paper
May 2016

The Crisis Response to the
Nepal Earthquake:
Lessons Learned

Morten Wendelbo
Federica La China
Hannes Dekeyser
Leonardo Taccetti
Sebastiano Mori
Varun Aggarwal

Omar Alam
Ambra Savoldi

Robert Zielonka

European Institute for Asian Studies – EIAS a.s.b.l.
26 Rue de la Loi, 10th Floor, 1000 Brussels, Belgium

Tel.: +32-2 230 81 22 Email: eias@eias.org

Website: www.eias.org
EiasBrussels European Institute for Asian Studies @EIASBrussels

The European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) is a leading Brussels-based Think Tank and
Policy Research Centre, which provides a platform for the promotion of dialogue and
understanding between the European Union and Asia on affairs of strategic regional and global
importance, hereby ensuring in-depth, comprehensive research and information exchange.

Our research and events span a wide variety of topics, and are often held or written in
cooperation with other think tanks, international organisations, embassies or EU institutions.
As a Think Tank, EIAS seeks to provide information and expertise to the European Union
institutions, the academic world and business by producing concise, thoroughly researched and
up-to-date material on EU-Asia relations and important developments in Asia

Moreover, as a Policy Research Centre, EIAS wants to assess present policy-making and make
an impact on future decisions on EU-Asia cooperation, proving the Institute’s commitment to
action, promoting improvement of political, social and economic relations between the two
regions.

This research paper is the result of a year-long effort to assess the disaster resilience of Nepal leading up to the
earthquakes, and the response efforts, domestic and international. It was conducted by the European Institute for
Asian Studies (EIAS) asbl. The report is researched, drafted and prepared by an EIAS team comprising – Morten
Wendelbo (Associate Researcher), Federica La China (Programme Coordinator), Hannes Dekeyser (Programme
Coordinator), Leonardo Taccetti (Associate Researcher), Sebastiano Mori (Associate Researcher), Varun Aggarwal
(Junior Researcher), Omar Alam (Fellow), Ambra Savoldi (Junior Researcher) and Robert Zielonka (Programme
Coordinator). We would also like to acknowledge all the experts consulted, and the companies and agencies that
contributed to this report.

This report expresses the views of the authors and not the views of the European Institute for Asian Studies.

CONTENTS

FOREWORD …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9

1. DOMESTIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11

1.1 THE FULL SCALE ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11

1.1.1 Infrastructure sectors ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12

1.1.2 Social sectors …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 13

1.1.3 Productive sectors ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15

1.1.4 Cross-cutting sectors ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 15

1.2 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 16

1.2.1 A tiered structure …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17

1.2.2 A new framework …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 18

1.2.3 Other mechanisms………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 18

1.3 MOBILISATION ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19

1.3.1 Availability of critical infrastructure ………………………………………………………………………………….. 20

1.4 CIVIL AND PUBLIC RESPONSE …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22

2. INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ………………………………………………………………………………….. 24

2.1 THE FULL SCALE ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 24

2.1.1 The regional intervention ………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24

2.1.2 The international intervention …………………………………………………………………………………………. 25

2.2 DECISION MAKING PROCESS ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 28

2.2.1 The international framework …………………………………………………………………………………………… 28

2.3 MOBILISATION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 29

2.3.1 Time horizon and mobilisation main issues ……………………………………………………………………….. 29

2.3.2 International Funding ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 31

2.4 CIVIL AND PUBLIC RESPONSE …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 32

3. THE ROLE OF MIGRANT REMITTANCES ……………………………………………………………………………………… 34

3.1 REMITTANCES AND PREPAREDNESS ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 34

3.2 REMITTANCES AND DISASTER RECOVERY ………………………………………………………………………………… 35

4. COORDINATION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 36

4.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 36

4.2 COORDINATING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS ……………………………………………………………………. 38

4.3 COORDINATION OBSTACLES …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 39

4.3.1 Logistical causes …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 39

4.3.2 Lack of communication and consultation ………………………………………………………………………….. 40

4.3.3 Lack of trust and understanding ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 41

4.3.4 The role of media & motives ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 44

4.4 INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL IMPERFECTIONS ………………………………………………………………… 45

4.4.1 Domestic ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 45

4.4.2 International ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47

5. PAKISTAN 2005 TO NEPAL 2015: A LEARNING TRAJECTORY? ……………………………………………………….. 47

5.1. BACKGROUND …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47

5.1.1 Overview of the Earthquake …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47

5.1.2 Extent of Damage …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 48

5.2 THE RESPONSE: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION …………………………………………………………………………. 49

5.2.1 Rescue Phase …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 49

5.3 DOMESTIC RESPONSE ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 50

5.3.1 Military vs Civilian Response ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 51

5.3.2 Local vs National Response ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 52

5.4 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 52

5.4.1 Challenges in Response …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 53

5.4.2 Civil-Military Coordination ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 54

5.4.3 Humanitarian Needs Assessment ……………………………………………………………………………………… 54

5.5 FROM PAKISTAN TO NEPAL: LESSONS LEARNED? ……………………………………………………………………… 54

6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT IN NEPAL: PREVENTION AND RECOVERY …………………………………………….. 56

6.1 DAMAGE TO FOREST AREA …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 57

6.2 DAMAGE TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURES ………………………………………………………………. 58

6.3 OTHER POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS ………………………………………………………………………………………. 59

6.3.1 Institutions Involved for the Environmental Assessment ………………………………………………. 60

6.4 RESILIENCE IN NORTH EAST INDIA: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ……………………………………………… 60

BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 62

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AADMER ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response

ACDM ASEAN Committee for Disaster Management

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

ADB Asian Development Bank

AEPC Alternative Energy Promotion Centre

AHA Centre ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on

Disaster

Management

AJK Azad Jammu Kashmir

AOC Air Operations Cell

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BSNC Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited

CAAN Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal

CAO Civil Aviation Office

CAP Consolidated Appeal Process

CARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CERF Central Emergency Response Fund

CFE-DMHA Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

CFUG Community Forestry User Group

CNDRC Centre Natural Disaster Relief Committee

CSO Civil Society Organisations

DART Disaster Assistance Response Team

DDR Disaster Risk Reduction

DDRC District Disaster Relief Committee

DNPWC Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation

DoF Department of Forests

DoSCWM Department of Soil Conservation and Watershed Management

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office

EIAS European Institute for Asian Studies

EOC Emergency Operation Centre

ERAT ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team

ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator

ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre

ERRA Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FECOFUN Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal

FRC Federal Relief Commission

FTS Financial Tracking System

GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GLOF Glacial Lake Outburst Flood

GNDR Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Reduction

GoN Government of Nepal

GoP Government of Pakistan

HAS Humanitarian Staging Area

HFA Hyogo Framework for Action

IAF Indian Air Force

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICSO International Civil Society Organisations

IDRC International Disaster Response Law

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

INSARAG International Search and Rescue Advisory Group

KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

LoC Line of Control

MNMCC Multinational Military Coordination Centre

MoCTCA Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation

MoFALD Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development

MoFSC Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation

MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs

MoHP Ministry of Health and Population

MRE Meal Ready-to-Eat

MSF Médecins sans Frontières

MTNL Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBC National Building Code

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NDRF National Disaster Response Framework

NDRRM National Disaster Rapid Response Mechanism

NDRRM National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management

NEOC National Emergency Operation Centre

NPC National Planning Commission

NPR Nepalese Rupee Rate

NRB Nepal Rasta Bank

NRCS Nepal Red Cross Society

NRF NATO Response Force

NRRC Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium

NSDRM National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management

NSET National Society for Earthquake Technology

NTNC Nepal Trust for Nature and Conservation

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OSOCC On-Site Operations Coordination Centre

PA Protected Areas

PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessment

PDNA Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment

PLA People’s Liberation Army

REOC Regional Emergency Operation Centre

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAR Search and Rescue

SDMC SAARC Disaster Management Centre

SDMRAF SAARC Disaster Management Rapid Action Force

SEARHEF South East Asia Regional Health Emergency Fund

TIHA Taiwan International Health Action

TIA Tribhuvan International Airport

UK DFID UK Department for International Development

UN United Nations

UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination

UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and cultural organisations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USAR Urban Search and Rescue

VDC Village Development

Committees

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organisation

WoT War on Terror

FOREWORD

Nearly a year ago, the first in a series of destructive earthquakes struck Nepal. In the two
largest earthquakes alone, on April 25 and May 12, nearly 9,000 Nepalese lost their lives, and
another 22,000 were injured. The many who escaped without physical harm were still likely to
see their lives change permanently as more than 800,000 home were partially or completely
destroyed. To this day, millions of Nepalese still live in temporary dwellings, many of them
made from the emergency tent materials distributed by international donors, without basic and
lifesaving amenities. In the past year, more than 400 major aftershocks have rocked the
country, and they continue still.

This report is the result of a year-long effort to assess the disaster resilience of Nepal leading
up to the earthquakes, and the response efforts, domestic and international. The report is
researched and written with an eye toward informing Nepal’s reconstruction efforts, and
improving future response efforts, both domestic and international. The majority of the take-
away lessons put forward herein are relevant to other disaster-prone countries dealing with all
kinds of natural disasters as well – and they are important lessons for domestic governments
and international donors alike.

The most salient lesson, perhaps, is the clear evidence that what made Nepal’s experience a
disaster was not inevitable. With a better response and a higher level of resilience, thousands
of lives would have been saved, and millions of people would not have seen their lives
transformed. That is, of course, good news. It is indeed possible, through targeted action, to
reduce a natural disaster to a mere natural phenomenon. With greater resilience, the next
major earthquake to strike Nepal will not go unnoticed, but it also will not change the life of an
entire nation.

More than a dozen researchers from a multinational and multidisciplinary team at the
European Institute for Asian Studies contributed to this report. Evidence used here is gathered
from the academic literature, supported by expert testimonies, expert seminars, conversations
with international responders and domestic planners, news sources, primary data collection on
the ground in Nepal and many other sources. It is a comprehensive, though by no means
exhaustive, look at what caused such high levels of damage in Nepal and surrounding areas,
and at what we can learn from it so more lives can be protected from harm in the future.

Morten Wendelbo
Associate
European Institute for Asian Studies
Brussels, Belgium
April 23, 2016

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The response to the earthquakes in Nepal
was among the strongest in history, seen
from an international perspective, and
given the severity of the calamities. Dozens
of countries came to the aid of Nepal, some
of them, such as India and Pakistan, within
a few short hours. Nonetheless, an
unnecessary amount of people were killed,
injured or otherwise had their lives
permanently altered. This report details
many of the challenges experienced by
international and Nepalese actors before,
during and after the disaster. Here, the
main findings are briefly summarized.

Overall, three major themes are persistent
throughout: 1. Insufficient preparation for a
natural disaster of this magnitude, 2. lack
of information and dissemination thereof,
3. Lack of effective coordination at all levels
of resilience and response.

Planning: Nepal was actually engaged
heavily in planning for resilience to natural
disasters, but these efforts did not take off
fast enough that it made much of a
difference. Across all metrics for disaster
resilience, especially for a country as
disaster-prone as Nepal, efforts fell well
short of what is commonly held to be
necessary. The frameworks, rules and
regulations that were indeed in place, were
neither fully funded not subsequently fully
enforced.

Building codes: Nepal has an extensive
set of scientifically sound building codes,
based on the norms in other disaster-prone
countries. However, these building codes
are not enforced, even though it is
estimated that very few lives would have
been lost if most buildings fulfilled even
basic building requirements. The building
codes, developed with international donor
assistance are hollow if the Nepalese
government does not possess the capability
to ensure their use.

Household damage: Despite the
international and domestic focus on
infrastructure and public facilities, the vast
majority of the damage accrued to
individual, and often rural, households, and
reconstruction efforts should reflect this.

Conflict: The majority of the damage
occurred in districts that also experienced
the majority of the conflict during the 1996-
2006 armed conflict in Nepal, where
infrastructure and government reach is
poor.

Logistical challenges: Nepal possesses
only one international airport with the
capability to receive international aid.
International aid was bottlenecked there for
so long that rescue efforts were mostly for
naught, with some international rescue
teams returning home without ever leaving
the airport. Other transport infrastructure,
even without earthquake damage, was
insufficient to support aid entering from
outside at this one point alone.

Communication: In the case of natural
disasters, communication technology is
paramount to a coordinated and informed
response. Damage estimates must be made
locally and transmitted to the central
authorities, while instruction for responders
and the population must be disseminated
from the central authorities. Nepal’s
communication infrastructure crumbled,
both literally and figuratively, during and
after the major earthquakes. This was
especially troublesome because Nepal’s
response apparatus is set to operate from
local responders, who could not
communicate with the authorities. This also
meant that international responders
entered the country blind, without knowing
where their assistance was most needed.

Domestic Civil Society: Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs) participated
extensively and often filled the gaps that

domestic and international responders left.
However, although these organisations
were crucial and should be supported, the
main objective should be to avoid the gaps
in the official response. That is, CSOs
should not be primary, but rather
secondary responders.

International Civil Society: International
Civil Society Organisations (ICSO) lack local
knowledge necessary to respond effectively
to disasters. On occasion, entry of certain
ICSOs were actually detrimental to the
emergency response and recovery efforts
by employing responders, drivers and so
forth to carry out ineffective and locally
inappropriate projects. ISCOs, despite good
intentions, should be discouraged from
operating within disaster struck countries
without oversight or cooperation by local
authorities and/or local CSOs.

Social Media: Social media was used
extensively, to the extent that the
communication networks could support the
traffic. The central government should use
social media to reach out, inform and
coordinate emergency management. Much
of the damage (and bottlenecking at the
international airport) occurred because
many Nepalese had access to very little
information on how to behave in the
immediate aftermath – social media
appears to be the most efficient way of
disseminating that information, but using
social media effectively requires dedicated
staff in government departments.

Regional coordination: The bottlenecking
of international responders in Tribhuvan
International Airport was exacerbated by no
coordination among the arriving responders
– particularly the early arrivals from India,
Pakistan and China. Response time is
clearly of the essence, but in this case the
quick response made coordination difficult.
We propose to create a standardized
response mechanism, with norms for
response coordination – led by trained local
staff.

Politicization of emergency response:
Taiwanese response teams were turned
away because of diplomatic hurdles with
China in a situation where Nepalese lives
were at stake. Humanitarian response
should be universally recognized as
apolitical under international charters, and
countries such as China should recognize
the efforts of other entities without
pursuing other diplomatic goals, in the
interest of saving lives.

Misplaced response focus: International
responses, whether private or government
sponsored, often favour high-visibility
response efforts such as K9 rescue dog
teams, even while other responses are
much more efficient at saving lives and
supporting reconstruction. In some cases,
these inefficient types of aid have perverse
consequences – K9 rescue teams are, for
example, very costly in terms of local
resources (they need lodging, large
amounts of food in an already food scarce
situation, require extensive transportation).
Greater efforts to support disaster struck
countries based on need should be
emphasized across the board.

Insincere and unhelpful pledging
practices: After the earthquakes, pledges
of support for both resilience and response
flooded in – some 4 billion USD within a
month or so of the first quake. However, in
the vast majority of cases it was unclear
which form this support would take. Loans,
interest free loans, in-kind aid, tied aid, or
some other form. In many cases, the
money pledged also did not translate into
support delivered. As the Government of
Nepal planned recovery efforts, they were
severely hampered by a lack of follow-
through by international donors, not just
because support did not actually arrive, but
because the lack of faith in pledged made
planning difficult.

Remittances: Nepal’s economy is already
very dependent on remittances from
diaspora all over the world, particularly
India, Europe, the United States and

Australia. However, in the immediate
aftermath remittances significantly
increased. In the year since, the level of
remittances has remained higher, and they
dwarf the financial contributions of
international donors. Facilitation of
remittances, such as subsidizing transfer
fees, establishing local branches of
remittance companies, is an effective way
of supporting locally driven development
because remittances are more likely to flow
to individual households to whom the
majority of damage accrued.

Migrant returns: A large share of Nepal’s
most skilled labour works abroad
temporarily, and is the source of most
remittances. In the aftermath of the
disaster, many attempted to return home
to help out family members and friends –
their skilled labour highly valuable to the
country – but most were unable to do so.
Aid efforts should support these temporary
migrant returns. Out-migration

subsequently occurs in the long run
because a much higher level of income is
necessary for families to recover – and
economic opportunities were not available
in Nepal. Most of this immigration is
temporary and should be encouraged.

Military-Civilian coordination: In nearly
every country in the world, a single
domestic organization has the prerequisite
skills and infrastructure to respond to
severe disasters: the military. This is
particularly true because logistics are of
great importance to any response, and
militaries, by virtue of their mandate,
specialize in logistics, and they have the
vehicles necessary to distribute aid. Any
civil government coordination bodies, and
civil society responders must be able to
work with the military apparatus. Having
clear guidelines for military/civil interaction
in place before a disaster is paramount to
an efficient response.

1. DOMESTIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE

1.1 THE FULL SCALE

Nepal is among the twenty most disaster-prone countries in the world. Several factors such as
its geophysical structure, complex geology, unfavourable climatic conditions, and frequent
tectonic movements make this country extremely vulnerable to a wide range of natural
hazards. The most common and most devastating disasters in Nepal are landslides, floods,
droughts and earthquakes: in the past hundred years, floods have caused the most in
damages, droughts have affected the largest number of people and earthquakes have caused
the most deaths.1 The country’s geographical location on the Alpine-Himalayan seismic belt –
where approximately the 17 per cent of the world’s largest earthquakes occur – makes Nepal
the eleventh most earthquake-prone country in the world.2

Furthermore, Nepal’s geographical location and its adverse topographic setting constitute large
barriers for the overall development of the country. The Himalayan mountain range and the
perennial rivers in the north, the cold deserts in the inner Himalayan valley, and the lowland
plains in the south represent great physical hurdles for upgrading transportation, infrastructure
and utilities throughout the country. Furthermore, its terrain makes it extremely difficult to
connect the remote rural regions – some of which are not served by any kind of land
transportation systems – during regular times, not to mention during post-disaster states of
emergency. The 7.8 magnitude earthquake, which struck Nepal on April 25 2015, is a prime
example of how challenging it is to provide a reliable disaster needs assessment and
implement an effective relief and emergency response in a country such as Nepal.

The estimated total cost of the disaster, comprised of damages and losses, caused by the
series of earthquakes amounts to NPR 706 billion (EUR 6.3 billion), of which NPR 517 billion
(76 per cent of the total effects) is the value of destroyed physical assets, and the remaining
NPR 189 billion (24 per cent) reflects the other losses arising from the disaster.3 The most
affected sectors are the social and economic activity sectors (58 per cent of the total effects),
followed by productive sectors (25 per cent), infrastructure (10 per cent) and cross-cutting
issues (7 per cent).4 Furthermore, damages and losses are not evenly distributed between
public and private sectors (predominantly individual households), the latter suffering about 3.3
times more than the public sector.

The following section aims at giving a brief overview of the full scale of the disaster, touching
upon the infrastructure sectors (community infrastructure, housing, transport, communication
and sanitation), social sectors (health, nutrition, education and cultural heritage), productive
sectors (agriculture, commerce and tourism), and cross-cutting issues (gender equality and
social inclusion).

1 According to the Nepal Disaster Management Reference Handbook: “In the past 100 years, earthquakes have caused
the most deaths of all natural disasters. However, floods have cost the most in damages at upwards of USD $1 billion
for a total of 50 reported events. In terms of total persons affected, drought is the most severe, affecting nearly 5
million people since 1915.” Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (2015). Nepal
Disaster Management Reference Handbook.
2 The Kathmandu Valley experiences a major seismic activity every 70-80 years.
3 “The effects of the disasters illustrate that the estimated value of total damages and losses (changes in flows) is
equivalent to about one third of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in FY 2013-2014”. Government of Nepal National
Planning Commission (2015). Nepal Earthquake 2015 Post Disaster Needs Assessment – Volume A: Key Findings, p.
xiv.
4 Ibidem.

1.1.1 Infrastructure sectors

The earthquakes caused extensive housing destruction. About 500,000 houses were destroyed
and more than 250,000 were partially damaged. The devastation impacted residential and
government buildings, transportation infrastructure, heritage sites, schools and health
facilities, water supply systems and hydropower plants. The widespread and large-scale impact
resulted primarily from the lack of construction regulations and seismic resistant infrastructure.
The majority of the buildings in Nepal do not follow the National Building Code (NBC): despite
being approved by the government in 2003, enforced in 2005 and serving as a legally binding
document in all 130 municipalities, such regulation is not applied to towns and villages, which
follow the Village Development Committees (VDCs).5 As a result of inefficient implementation,
monitoring and a lack of resources, most of the buildings and homes are not in compliance
with national regulatory mechanisms and thus extremely vulnerable to damage from
earthquakes and other natural disasters. 6 Naturally, this low-cost small-scale ‘community
infrastructure’ is socially and economically linked with the livelihoods of the region, as it
ensures basic services and fundamental needs to the community. It is important to note that,
because this local micro-infrastructure building process is a community-driven initiative, its
post-disaster recovery is dependent on the local populations in the same way. This presents
significant challenges and makes the recovery process a complex undertaking.

Legal and procedural requirements present a massive regulatory obstacle in Nepal: despite
Nepalese legislation that allows the acquisition and use of land for emergency shelters in the
aftermath of a disaster, burdensome bureaucratic processes hinder its efficacy. 7 Although
steps have been made over the years to improve construction standards 8 and to spur
economic development9, little has been done to help the Nepalese government improve the
country’s inadequate infrastructure and create employment to increase resilience to natural
disasters.

Nepal’s topography makes internal transportation very challenging. Many hilly regions are
devoid of land transportation systems and are very difficult to access, which leaves air
connections the most reliable option to link major urban areas. Air transportation in Nepal is
well developed with over 50 airports categorised into four types 10 : Remote/high altitude
airport, Remote/hilly airports, Terai/Low land airports, and one international airport.11

Several institutions and organizations – including the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN),
the Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) and the Civil Aviation Office (CAO) – have been
making great strides to ensure better preparedness and immediate post-disaster recovery.12
However, in the aftermath of the April 2015 earthquake, difficult conditions, logistics problems
and coordination challenges hindered aid efforts considerably. In the first hours after the
disaster, mostly all the ground search and rescue teams were concentrated in Kathmandu,

5 For more information, please visit http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/2015-04-25-nepal/2015/05/05/nepal-national-
building-code-nbc-an-overview/
6 Most of them are built by the owner with the help of a local mason and they are made of bricks with either a concrete
or mud mortar. PDNA Guidelines, Volume B.
7 Nepal Disaster Management Reference Handbook, p. 78.
8 National Building Code 1994; Building Act 1998, Disaster Management Reference Handbook (2015), p. 78.
9 Immediate Action Plan for Economic Development and Prosperity 2012 (2015). Disaster Management Reference
Handbook, p. 70.
10 For the full list, please see Disaster Management Reference Handbook (2015), p. 72.
11 In 2014, The Tribhuvan International Airport, Nepal’s only International Airport, was ranked the third worst in the
world. For more information, please visit http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/19/aviation/worlds-worst-airports-2015/
12 Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (2012). Tribhuvan International Airport
Disaster Response Plan. Retrieved from
http://www.flagship2.nrrc.org.np/sites/default/files/knowledge/TIADRP_final_v1-2

while the remote rural areas in the central and western regions of the country remained
isolated due to road damage and obstructed mobile connectivity. International aid only entered
Nepal via Tribhuvan Airport in Kathmandu. Ultimately, timely relief outreach and support of
people in danger are crucial factors after the occurrence of a natural disaster, making logistics
a key concern.

Among the most critical logistics concerns, telecommunications and ICT are key sub-sectors
not only because the ability to communicate is vital in emergency and post-disaster situations,
but also because disruption compounds the damage to the economic infrastructure. While
telecommunications in Nepal were significantly affected 13 , service providers managed to
restore nearly all their networks. For the long-term recovery strategy, the goal is to rebuild a
resilient communication infrastructure and a services sector that is capable of meeting the
needs of a digital Nepal.

The damages to the infrastructure sector also included water sources and sanitation services.14
The disruption and dysfunction of water supply and wastewater treatment negatively affected
not only the economic activities, but also impacted health standards, especially for women who
take on the responsibility of 75 per cent of all household water management.15

1.1.2 Social sectors

The health sector suffered severe damages and losses.16 As over 80 per cent of the affected
health facilities are located in the worst hit districts17, the ability of these institutions to face
the needs of local populations was heavily compromised, with severe consequences for victims
requiring immediate treatment, and for post-earthquake recovery in general. Despite poor
access to healthcare in Nepal, the country has undergone many positive developments in the
past decades. Quality healthcare does, however, still remain out of reach to many sections of
the population. Some of the reasons for this include the inaccessibility of remote health
facilities, and also inequities inherent to caste and ethnicity-based culture. This ultimately
undermines the healthcare of the most marginalised people.

In Nepal, nutrition is inextricably linked to healthcare, as nutrition-specific interventions are
often provided through health facilities and community-based services. Under-nutrition has
been, and still is, a major and persistent problem for Nepal. Nutrition is dependent on several
other sectors including agriculture, water, hygiene and education. According to a post-
earthquake assessment, consumption practises devolved into acute malnutrition in the hardest
hit districts. However, due to longer-term factors such as food insecurity (chronic
malnutrition), poor sanitation and quality of water, insufficient hygiene and disease outbreaks,
the consequences tend to manifest themselves gradually in the aftermath of an earthquake.
For this reason, the immediate concern goes to those sections of the population that require

13 In the field of communications, the total damages and losses in economic flows are estimated at NPR 3.6 billion
(USD 36.10 million) and NPR 5 billion (USD 50.85 million), respectively. The cost of recovery and reconstruction is
estimated at NPR 4.9 billion (USD 49.39 million). Government of Nepal National Planning Commission (2015). Nepal
Earthquake 2015 Post Disaster Needs Assessment – Volume A: Key Findings, p. 36.
14 “The net total value of damages and losses to the water and sanitation sector is estimated at NPR 11.4 billion at
pre-disaster prices, of which NPR 10.5 billion pertains to infrastructure and physical assets.” Government of Nepal
National Planning Commission (2015). Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment – Vol. A: Key
Findings, p. 45.
15 Ibidem, p. 46.
16 446 health facilities were completely destroyed, including five hospitals, 12 Primary Health Care Centers (PHCCs),
417 HPs and 12 others. In the private sector, 16 health facilities were destroyed. PDNA Volume B (2015), p. 21.
17 For the complete list, please visit http://karuna-shechen.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/list-of-affected-
districts

special attention because of specific nutritional needs, namely pregnant and lactating women,
and children.18

The education sector in Nepal – one of the largest government departments both in terms of
the total population served and in terms of annual budgetary allocations – has suffered a total
of about NPR 28,064 million (about EUR 240 million) in damages to its infrastructure and
physical assets, with the impact primarily affecting the public sector.19 According to the Post
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), more than 80 per cent of the damages and losses
occurred in the 14 most hit districts: 8,242 public schools have been affected, with 25,134
classrooms fully destroyed and 22,097 partially damaged; private schools also experienced
high levels of damage, with 956 classrooms destroyed and 3,983 partially damaged.20

It is important to note that the consequences would have been more severe had the
earthquakes struck on a weekday, instead of a Saturday afternoon, the weekly holiday.
However, while the consequences of the earthquake on physical assets and infrastructure are
relatively easy to determine, the assessment becomes more complicated when considering
long-term education processes. In the short to medium term, a decline in learning outcomes
has been predicted, not only due to the complete closure of schools and colleges for an
extended period of time, but also due to psychological ramifications resulting from the
displacement of families and the post-disaster emergency situation as a whole. Although much
data collection is still necessary, preliminary findings by some researchers show that the
earthquakes can account for significant drops in enrolment and attendance in primary and
middle schools in some of the hardest hit districts.21 Nepal does have bright spots despite
setbacks caused by the earthquakes. There is improved access, parity and efficiency in school
education, including improved levels of gender equity in enrolments at all school levels, and
increased overall literacy rate over the past decade. Priorities and strategies for early recovery
should now be devoted to strengthening systemic capacity and improving the non-structural
aspects of the education system.

During the recent earthquakes, Nepalese cultural heritage suffered its worst loss since the
1934 earthquake. In Kathmandu’s seven World Heritage Monument Zones – designated as
such by UNESCO the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO) – major monuments were critically damaged and many were completely destroyed.
About 2,900 structures with cultural, religious, social and historical heritage value were
affected, and the total estimated damages amount to NPR 16.9 billion (about EUR 157
million).22 Cultural heritage is a huge draw for tourism in Nepal, and as such its preservation
occupies a very important place for the work of the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil
Aviation (MoCTCA). However, some urban development programmes have shown a
progressive shift from preservation to modernisation recently, causing an accumulation of sites
that require restoration. The loss of tangible cultural heritage is linked to the loss of intangible
heritage and the country’s identity: loss of traditional dwellings will have an impact on people’s
daily life, just as the damage to temples and religious sites will affect daily worship, rituals,
celebrations, and community culture. For this reason, a new rationale is needed for repairing,
restoring, reconstructing and protecting all the monuments and sites. Doing so requires
reviewing laws and investment procedures, and professional and logistical support.

18 250,000 children and 135,000 pregnant and lactating women were affected by the earthquake in the 14 districts.
PDNA Volume B (2015), p. 37.
19 Of the total effect, 92 per cent is born by the public sector and only 8 per cent by the private sector. Ibidem, p. 49.
20 Ibidem, p. 52.
21 Brewer et al. (Forthcoming). Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University.
22 PDNA Volume B (2015), p. 65.

1.1.3 Productive sectors

In the agricultural sector – which constitutes about one-third of the national GDP – roughly
one million small farming households across 24 districts were adversely affected, with
especially grave consequences for those managed by women and the elderly.23 Except for the
Kathmandu Valley, the regions affected by the earthquake are mostly rural and heavily
dependent on agriculture and livestock. This dependency gives us a first indication of what,
where and how much should be invested during the recovery and reconstruction phase.
Farmers have suffered widespread loss of crops, seeds and agricultural tools, in addition to the
estimated 25 per cent of livestock animals lost. Key agricultural and irrigation infrastructure
was damaged or destroyed. In the post-disaster context, approximately 3.5 million people
required immediate food assistance, drastically increasing the vulnerability of rural
communities to food insecurity.24 The influx of women into the agricultural sector, a necessary
consequence of the massive male migration to cities in Nepal or abroad, means that women in
rural areas face the toughest challenges in the recovery process. Moreover, their vulnerability
is linked to the fact that they have very limited access to land ownership, and almost no other
alternative livelihoods from which to choose. The same is true for minorities and caste-based
communities.

Industry and commerce sectors are among the major contributors to Nepal’s economic
development. Prior to the earthquakes, industry and commerce sectors provided the majority
of employment opportunities. In a country where services account for over half of the nation’s
GDP, the disruption of enterprises affected these productive sectors in many ways. On top of
the damage to trade-related infrastructure, other disruptions are linked to a decrease in
production capacity, lack of labour and reduced demand for goods. Tourism has also been
adversely affected after the earthquakes, which occurred during one of the two high seasons of
the year. Seven out of ten World Heritage sites and major trekking routes were negatively
impacted, destroying tourism-related services and infrastructure, and decreasing the tourist
influx. The negative consequences are likely to have an impact on the Nepali tourism industry
for the next couple of years, as a tourism contraction of approximately 40 per cent has been
predicted for the next 12 months, and 20 per cent for the following 12 months.25

1.1.4 Cross-cutting sectors

The 2015 earthquakes not only showed the country’s vulnerabilities with regard to human
development indicators and weak governance systems, but it also highlighted some of the
major inequalities involving gender and social inclusion.

As detailed previously, Nepal’s central and western regions are characterised by a high female
population due to massive male out-migration. As a result, the responsibility of restoring the
economic and social sectors in these areas relies heavily on women. Burdened by a
disproportionate amount of responsibilities, women have been heavily affected by the disaster.
Addressing the issues of gender equity, social inclusion and social protection becomes very
important to help reduce the consequences for the most disadvantaged groups and enhance
their resilience.

23 Ibidem, p. 79.
24 Ibidem, p. 81.
25 Ibidem, p. 115.

The earthquakes had a negative impact on the livelihoods of approximately 2.29 million
households and 5.6 million workers in 31 districts. 26 The worst hit sector was agriculture,
followed by tourism, commerce and industry. The reconstruction and recovery phases
represent the best opportunity to boost employment growth and create jobs.

1.2 THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Nepal’s political, legal and administrative structures are extensively equipped with emergency
tools and procedures in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), a sign that the country learns from and
responds proactively to the frequent natural hazards to which it is exposed. Over the past
decades, the decision-making process during a state of emergency has been reviewed and
improved through constant updating, institutionalising the hierarchy of accountability and
assigning responsibility in domestic response. On paper, the framework is comprehensive, as it
includes the emergency response management as well as the more long-term, resilience-
enhancing countermeasures and prevention projects.

Although Nepal is structured in five developmental macro-regions, the local authorities and
smaller governmental bodies have a greater impact and more responsibilities, due to the
extensively delegated administrative structure of disaster relief. The administrative structure is
thus defined:

Significantly, beyond the actual emergency response, it is at the Village Development Council
level that most projects are developed and implemented, even down to Community Based DRR
projects.

By delegating arrangements and projects to a local level, Nepal aims to equip even the most
rural and remote parts of the country with the right DRR tools and mechanisms. Building
community-level capabilities has been a core objective of the Nepalese Ministry of Federal
Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD)27: it is reported that standardisation of said projects
and practices occurred in most municipalities and villages by January 2015, with joint-projects
targeting Risk Sensitive Land Use and crop/livestock insurance with the Ministry of Agriculture
Development, and finally providing the technology necessary for communication and early
warning systems. However, this decentralised approach to decision-making and
implementation at a community level has proved lacking in the aftermath of last spring’s
earthquakes.

As highlighted by the PDNA 201528, although it has been noted how family networks and
organizations at a community level have proved valuable in the first stages of recovery, real
development of local level resilience is still at an early stage. Low levels of socio-economic
development in some areas of the country and Nepal’s complex topography have been named
as contributing factors. On the one hand, beyond the closed family network, cultural

26 Ibidem, p. 211.
27 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, Nepal Disaster Management Reference
Handbook.
28 Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment.

5 Regions 14 Zones 75 Districts

58 Municipalities
(Urban) Urban Wards

Over 3,000 Village
Development

Councils (Rural)

Rural Wards
(9 for each VDC)

differences and low literacy levels prevent effective implementation of community-based
projects; moreover, language and gender discrepancies within communities negatively impact
participation of all members in the local level management of DRR projects.

On the other hand, spatial disparities between areas affect the capability of DRR planning
across the Nepalese territory. This makes the most remote areas simultaneously the most
vulnerable to ill management of projects due to a lack of information and accessibility.
Consequently, these rural areas are the most vulnerable to damages caused by natural
disasters. In this respect, the most important areas for development in the short and medium
term are related to road connectivity and ICT rehabilitation. Decision-making processes rely
heavily on the micro-level of community-based projects and organisations. In the long term,
this could prove effective at building resiliency once the present social and spatial hurdles are
resolved.

1.2.1 A tiered structure

From a legal perspective, the first major instrument for disaster management was the Natural
Calamity Relief Act 2039 of 1982, which was then amended in 1992. Under this law, the
Government of Nepal is responsible for formally stating which areas are in danger, labelling
them as ‘disaster areas’ and publishing the list in the Nepal Gazette. Once an area has been
labelled through this process, the Government is entitled to emergency jurisdiction over it: for
example, it can require any governmental body to assist in the emergency phase or confiscate
property (while offering compensation) that could be of use in relief assistance.

Moreover, the Calamity Relief Act created the coordination mechanisms from the Ministry of
Home Affairs (MoHA) – the body leading all activities related to DRR by Work Division
Regulation 2064 – to local District officers, pairing them up with equivalent-level Disaster
Relief Committees. The legal basis for local response was strengthened by the Local Self-
Governance Act (1999).

The Centre Natural Disaster Relief Committee (CNDRC), once briefed, urges the Nepalese
Cabinet to declare a state of emergency in order to activate funds and coordination
mechanisms. The CNRDC is chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs and counts among its 22
members various Ministers (Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Home and Population, Education
etc.), representatives from departments including Meteorology, Health Services, Urban
Development, Nepalese Army and Police Forces and other governmental and non-
governmental bodies (Nepal Red Cross Society and Nepal Scouts, for example).

A similar tiered structure (National, Regional, District, Local) is used for Emergency Operation
Centres, which deal with data collection and analysis during emergencies. The National
Emergency Operation Centre in Kathmandu operates as secretariat for the CNDRC. For

Central Natural
Disaster Relief

Committee (CNDRC)

Supply, Shelter and
Rehabilitation sub-

committee

Relief and
Treatment sub-

committee

Regional Disaster
Relief Committee

(RDRC)

District Disaster
Relief Committee

(DDRC)

Local Disaster Relief
Committee (LDRC)

example, it drafts the first recommendations to the committees for response and action, such
as search and rescue activities. Finally, the National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) is in
charge of communication between the CNDRC and other coordinating authorities such as the
Onsite Operation Coordination Centre (OSOCC – in charge of domestic and international
coordination) and the Multinational Military Coordination Centre (MNMCC), which becomes
automatically active during emergencies.

The National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) (2009-2010) was the
result of combined efforts and consultations between the National Society for Earthquake
Technology (NSET) and a Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) created for the occasion,
with members such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the European Commission and the United
Nations Development Programme.

The strategy established the National Council for Disaster Management (with the Prime
Minister as Chair, the Minister of Home Affairs as Vice-Chair and other ministers as council
members) as the node of coordination/monitoring activities through the National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA), which has a secretarial role, equipping it with the power to
pressure the government of Nepal to declare a state of emergency and push forward DRR
policies.

1.2.2 A new framework

Nepal’s National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) of 2013 replaced the previous laws and
regulations, including them in a single DRR framework, in order to formulate a “National
Disaster Response Plan that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of Government and Non-
Government agencies involved in disaster risk management”.29 It expands the power of the
Ministry of Home Affairs as the main actor for emergency management under this decision-
making framework:

1.2.3 Other mechanisms

The Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund, established by the Prime Minister Natural
Disaster Relief Fund Regulation 2064, is “used for rescue, treatment, relief, rehabilitation
of victims and restoration of physical infrastructure damaged by natural disaster and
calamities.” 30 The funds are supervised by the Auditor General of Nepal, to ensure
accountability and transparency.

All operations undertaken through this fund are guided by the related Regulations (2006)
document and managed by the Central level through a Committee, chaired by the Vice-Chair
of the National Planning Commission (NPC) and made up of eight secretaries from key

29 Government of Nepal – Ministry of Home Affairs (July 2013). National Disaster Response Framework. Retrieved from
http://www.flagship2.nrrc.org.np/sites/default/files/knowledge/NDRF_English%20version_July-2013
30 Nepal Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund. About Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund. Retrieved from
http://pmrelief.opmcm.gov.np/about.aspx

Disaster

Assessment
by District
Disaster

Relief
Committees

Assessment
by Regional

Disaster
Relief

Committees

Ministry of
Home Affairs
is briefed by
CNDRC and

NEOC

Ministry of Home
Affairs urges

Cabinet to
declare state of
emergency and
‘disaster areas’

Action and
coordination

(domestic and
international)

Ministries. Funds are then established and released following the same structure as the
Disaster Relief Committees and Emergency Operation Centres (Central, Regional, District,
Local EOCs), after approval of the MoHA.

Finally, a Government Cluster Mechanism establishes the coordination between domestic
clusters of ministries and international agencies in structuring the emergency response and
drafting DRR policies on short- and long-term bases. The 11 clusters are: Health; Water,
Sanitation and Hygiene; Shelter; Food Security; Logistics, Education; Protection;
Telecommunication; Nutrition; Early Recovery Network; Camp Coordination and Camp
Management.

The decision-making process within the domestic response to emergencies in Nepal is highly
structured. It is meant to reach all areas of the country, whether urban or rural, once they are
affected by a disaster. It attempts to establish an effective network of data sharing,
assessment and response at all levels. A balance of power and responsibilities between the
leading body in DRR response, the MoHA, and local bodies, in coordination with the Emergency
Operation Centres of corresponding level31, is achieved through the delegation of projects and
assessment.

Improvements in the decision-making process should address the coordination mechanisms
and data/knowledge sharing. According to the PDNA, coordination will be achieved and
fostered at the different administrative levels within specific governmental clusters, which
would then communicate among each other through the EOCs. Moreover, although the local
levels are granted extensive powers in times of emergency response and disaster relief, an
assessment of effectiveness and scope of their activities should be conducted, in order to
further extend the capillarity of intervention and feedback channels in all districts of the
country. In fact, in the concluding remarks of the PDNA, the role of local governance is further
stressed as critical, and special institutional mechanisms to monitor this process have been
promised by the Government of Nepal. Independent monitoring agencies are also mentioned
to achieve the best programme management outcomes.32

1.3 MOBILISATION

The clearest outline of the domestic mobilisation mechanism is found in the NDRF published by
Nepal’s MoHA in March 2013. The document outlines a detailed timeline for disaster response,
listing all the actions that should be carried out during emergencies and appointing
governmental bodies as leaders and coordinators on the ground, alongside UN agencies
involved in humanitarian relief.

Immediate mobilisation is activated during the first hour after the earthquake and continues
for one month after the earthquake.33 Among the first tasks, information and data about the
scale, hazards and priorities must be communicated effectively. The Nepalese National
Seismologic Centre is the starting point for all such assessments, drawing from information
collected by the District Disaster Committees and other organisations at the lowest
administrative level, with a bottom-up framework. The NEOC and the MoHA then take over,
calling for meetings and handling media communication to the population about emergency
warning and on-going rescue operations.

31 The Government of Nepal, National Disaster Response Framework.
32 Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment.
33 Government of Nepal – Ministry of Home Affairs (March 2013). National Disaster Response Framework. Retrieved
from
http://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/2011%20National%20Disaster%20Response%20Framework%20%28unofficial%20tran
slation%20%29

The first 24 hours are crucial for achieving the best management of earthquake response.
Governmental clusters responsible for health emergencies are activated and coordinate with
security forces and hospitals to provide emergency first aid; agents of transportation and road
safety clusters activate to ensure fire brigades, air and ground security all have access to
every area of the country. At the same time, the UN cluster system is allowed to intervene
right after the Nepalese Government declares a state of emergency.

Summary of the NDRF Mobilisation Timeline:

Within 48 hours after the earthquake, clusters in charge of supplying food, electricity and
water and ensuring transport and movement of goods and people should establish a solid
response network. The mechanism is therefore fully active: registration of the affected
population and the establishment of camps and emergency centres operate alongside the
collection and management of waste, debris and casualties among the human population and
livestock. These activities are continuously upgraded and implemented in the week following
the earthquake: the clusters communicate with Disaster Relief Committees at local levels,
arranging special protection for the most vulnerable – usually children and the elderly –
preventing tension in the new camps and fostering equal access to resources and relief items.
Meanwhile, the outcomes and hurdles of emergency response are monitored and addressed on
the ground, leading to an initial report that is circulated among members of the relief and
assistance teams.

Within a month, according to the NDRF, healthcare and education provision should be
operational, in order to promote an easy and quick recovery of livelihoods. Moreover, more
funding is made available for relief support of the affected population, while the Ministry of
Home Affairs drafts and publishes a “comprehensive report of disaster incident, search and
rescue operation, relief and immediate assistance, camp management and rehabilitation
initiatives”.34

1.3.1 Availability of critical infrastructure35

It is clear that the NDRF relies heavily on the efficient and complete availability of critical
infrastructure, which must be easily accessible and promptly upgraded to support full-scale
emergency phases. As evidenced during the earthquakes in 2015, much of this infrastructure

34 Ibidem.
35 Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment.

0-24 h

– Information
sharing
– Communication
Networks
– First Aid
– Transportation
– UN clusters

24-72h

– Food/Water/Enegry
Supply
– Search and Rescue
– Registration of
affected population
– Casualties count
– Debris management

1 week – 1 month

– Camp setup and
management
– Multi-sector assessment
– Cash injections to relief
programmes
– Restoring livelihoods
– Comprehensive Report

was still unplanned or unavailable. An example of the key role that critical infrastructure plays
is the Tribhuvan International Airport in Kathmandu: a new Humanitarian Staging Area was
opened in March 2015, as a joint project between the MoHA, the Civil Aviation, the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Food Programme (WFP).36
Designed to serve as a hub for delivering humanitarian assistance and goods specifically
designed for emergencies, it facilitated distribution in the aftermath of April’s earthquakes.
Another example is the efficient usage of public spaces for setting up transit shelters near
Kathmandu, as outlined in the DRR plans.37

At the same time, infrastructure is also one of the most vulnerable sectors during natural
disasters, as it is easily disrupted when events such as an earthquake occur. Therefore, its
availability and quality are the foundations of good disaster prevention and response, since
most human casualties from natural disasters are linked to the persistence of unsafe
infrastructure.38 In Nepal’s case, public infrastructure suffered relatively little compared to the
damages and losses in the private sector (overall, the PDNA calculated losses for the latter to
be 3.3 times higher than that of the public sector).39 This can be seen in the fact that most
public infrastructure, concentrated in urban areas, has been frequently upgraded through DRR
plans. In comparison, rural areas received less support in pre-disaster times, and showed
worse resilience capability during emergency, suffering the largest damage in terms of
infrastructure, economic and human losses.

This explains the renewed importance of resilience building and infrastructure strengthening at
all administrative levels and in all areas of the country, with a more evenly distributed
approach to resources. Projects targeting the reconstruction of physical and non-physical
infrastructure are, in fact, also at the heart of the efforts pledged to rebuild after last spring’s
earthquakes: examples of this are an emergency telecommunications network strategy and an
integrated ICT network to cover rural areas.40

According to the PDNA (2015), critical infrastructure sectors include electricity supply,
communications, community infrastructure, transport infrastructure and water and sanitation
supply. To this list, it is possible to add other physical infrastructure – either private or public –
such as buildings and emergency camps that should be made available in the first hours, days
and weeks of disaster response phases. After the earthquakes, it became immediately clear
that most critical infrastructure was not adequately ready for a disaster of such magnitude:
many infrastructure sectors of affected districts in rural areas were damaged to the point of
non-recoverability.41 Roads, bridges and trails suffered the most damage, making search and
rescue and transportation operations difficult to complete; in more rural areas, water resources
were disproportionately disrupted, further highlighting how the availability of critical
infrastructure is varied across the country. This must be targeted through projects enhancing
connectivity and communication between areas.

As detailed in the NDRF, the availability of ICT and Telecommunications is key to emergency
management and information sharing; at times of disaster relief, other infrastructure sectors
need to be ready and equipped to provide emergency-contingent services and products. In
order for this to happen, constant renewal, transparent maintenance and inspection must be

36 World Food Programme (2015). Nepal Opens First Humanitarian Staging Area, Built With Government & UK Aid
Support. Retrieved from https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/nepal-opens-first-humanitarian-staging-area-built-
government-uk-aid-support
37 Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment.
38 World Economic Forum, The World Bank, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2008).
Building Resilience to Natural Disasters: A Framework for Private Sector Engagement.
39 Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment.
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem.

put into place in the resiliency-building phases of reconstruction, inevitably linking this aspect
of disaster management to good governance, accountability and transparency at the political
level.

1.4 CIVIL AND PUBLIC RESPONSE

Civil society and public responses played a key role during all phases of the earthquake
aftermath, starting from the search-and-rescue efforts to the resiliency-building stage. It is
worth noting that civil society organisations (CSOs) tend to be extremely proactive in
educating the public about disaster preparedness and community-based risk management,
empowering the local population, creating spaces for dialogue and interaction, and by
promoting self-help mechanisms.42

In fact, CSOs usually cover the gap between national policies and local implementation, by
reducing costs, making change acceptable to communities and improving the overall human
capital. Moreover, domestic groups such as those active in Nepal, are usually embedded in a
network of partnerships at the international level, which improves the quality of their work on
the ground. For example, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is a
network that proved valuable in coordinating and channelling donations to Nepalese CSOs in
the past years and in times of emergency.43 Another network affiliated with GDRFF, the Global
Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), lists among its members
18 local civil society organisations in Nepal.44 Finally, another believer in the power of domestic
institutions is the World Bank, which has a dedicated Social Resilience and Climate Change
Group.45

Among the CSOs that were active on the ground, the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) was
part of said partnerships and had an important impact during last spring’s events. They initially
coordinated with Nepalese authorities (as also envisaged in the NDRF, CSOs and international
organisations to provide emergency services such as healthcare, shelter and basic household
items, and then became the channel for cash distribution and restoration of livelihoods.46

On 12 June 2015, the NRCS held an earthquake-planning meeting in Kathmandu to assess the
quality of the intervention up until that point, together with the government and other
stakeholders from the world of CSOs.47

Another important role of CSOs in times of emergency is that of managing communication
between humanitarian organisations and the public. Traditional and social media became the

42 Sanderson, D. and Ramalingam, B. (2015). Nepal Earthquake Response: Lessons for Operational Agencies. ALNAP
Report. Retrieved from http://www.alnap.org/resource/20140
43 Among the partnerships and strategies aimed at domestic civil society organizations in Nepal, for example, between
2010 and 2012, “GFDRR awarded a USD 600,000 contract to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies and the Nepal Red Cross Society to build flood resilience using a community-based approach,
benefitting at least 70,000 people in the Kosi Basin.” Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2014).
Annual Report.
44 The list includes: Mercy Corps Nepal, National Society for Earthquake Technology, Disaster Preparedness Network
Nepal, Plan Nepal, Handicap International, OXFAM Nepal, DanChurchAid, Friends Service Council Nepal, Narayan
Municipality, The Lutheran World Federation Nepal, Focus ED Nepal, Youth UNESCO’s Club, Tribhuvan University,
Home And Life Foundation, AIN Task Group On Disaster Management & Climate Change, Sajha Foundation, Practical
Action Integrated Effort For Development Nepal, Human Rights Social Awareness And Development Center. Global
Network of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (2015). DRR Data Mapping Project. Retrieved from
http://gndr.simbiotica.es/#ASS/NPL
45 The World Bank (2015). Social Development. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialdevelopment
46 Nepal Red Cross Society (2014). World Disasters Report. Focus on local actors, the key to humanitarian
effectiveness. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Retrieved from
http://www.nrcs.org/sites/default/files/resources/World-Disasters-Report_2015
47 Nepal Red Cross Society (2015). Earthquake Planning Meeting Started. Retrieved from
http://www.nrcs.org/updates/earthquake-planning-meeting-started

channels to share disaster-related information with affected people. For example, NRCS
updated its Facebook page consistently to engage affected and non-affected communities: for
the first group, by sharing practical advice on healthcare and immediate disaster response
concerns, and explaining how to register missing people or search for relatives and friends.48
For the latter group, CSOs websites such as that of NRCS were (and still are) mobilised to
share updated news and establish online donation payment systems.

Covering the more traditional means of communication, local CSOs had access to radio
coverage, although on a rather limited basis: NCRS broadcasted twice a week on its
frequencies49, although these channels were often shared among different organizations and
the public to 25 community radio stations. Nepal Telecom, one of Nepal’s leading
telecommunication companies, reacted with an early warning text message service for
earthquake survivors to better prepare for the coming monsoon season. Similarly, Facebook
launched a Nepal Earthquake Safety Check status update for users in the area and a ‘friends
finder option’, while messaging and chatting giants Viber and Skype provided similar coverage
and services. Two State-run Indian Telecom companies (which also cover Nepal), Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL), as well as a
private one, Idea Cellular, decided to charge local rates for calls to Nepal.50

The response of domestic CSOs in Nepal was often compared to that of international
organizations on the ground, and some key areas of tension and room for improvement were
quickly identified. The main issue has been the lack of contextual understanding on the
international organisations’ side, an area where domestic CSOs could have directed teams and
expertise on the ground, had communications between the domestic and international sides
been clearer and more structured.51

This was visible in the most remote areas, where better coordination could have meant better
service to those in need, and where cases of duplication or under-distribution of aid and effort
occurred. The lack of coordination and communication also resulted in a lack of coherence in
responding to the crisis. For example, international medical staff were not adequately trained
or briefed on the local context. In other situations, different teams neglected some isolated
areas to cover others with additional distribution of goods and healthcare, unaware of the
efforts already undertaken.52 The level of inequality in assistance and aid received is also clear
when considering those areas that are closer to main roads or transportation networks
compared to remote communities. In order to avoid what happened last spring, domestic CSOs
should call for an inclusive response, with NGOs pulling in different directions, so as to
establish an efficient and streamlined relief mechanism.

An important pre-requisite for an effective recovery programme is continuous engagement
with the affected communities. Given the fact that the people of Nepal demonstrated a high
level of self-awareness and resilience capabilities in their reaction to the disaster, recovery
should follow a people-based approach relying on local skills and expertise. The participation of
the community as a whole will also increase the inclusion of women in the consultations,
improving their role in local Nepalese society. As highlighted by the PDNA 2015, involving

48 Nepal Red Cross Society (2014). World Disasters Report. Focus on local actors, the key to humanitarian
effectiveness. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
49 Ibidem.
50 NDTV Gadgets (2015, April 26). Earthquake in Nepal – How Tech and Telecom Companies Are Extending a Helping
Hand. Retrieved from http://gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/news/earthquake-in-nepal-how-tech-and-telecom-companies-
are-extending-a-helping-hand-685816
51 CIVICUS (2015). State of Civil Society Report. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/report/world/2015-state-civil-
society-report
52 Nepal Red Cross Society (2014). World Disasters Report. Focus on local actors, the key to humanitarian
effectiveness. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

youth and overseas migrants will be extremely beneficial during the recovery and
reconstruction phase. Nepal is in the process of developing an efficient people-based resilience
system. In fact, Nepal implemented the community-based early warning system for hazards,
which demonstrated their effectiveness in facing floods and glacial lake outbursts.
Notwithstanding the institutional commitment in this regard, the early warning system at
national and local levels still did not achieve comprehensive or substantial results in
responding to the earthquakes.53

Finally, the public response in Nepal has been subject to many news headlines and insight
reports, showing how pervasive the culture of resilience and response is in the Nepalese
society. Rhetoric focused on how “small, independent initiatives have flourished”, including
private and volunteer efforts. 54 Therefore, it should be concluded that CSOs need
strengthening from government authorities and support from international organisations, with
the latter recognizing the guidance role that domestic actors from the civil society can assume
in the recovery process during times of emergency and resilience building.

2. INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

2.1 THE FULL SCALE

2.1.1 The regional intervention

Nepal’s neighbouring states, lacking the regional infrastructure to act together, were forced to
respond to Nepal’s disaster on their own. National Disaster Forces Response teams were
deployed by several states in a short time. India was the first to send rescue teams and aid in
massive quantities within six hours of the event. From April 25 to June 4, the “Operation
Maitri” (Friendship) was critical in deploying an immense amount of relief material and forces
to Nepal. The Indian Air Force (IAF) immediately intervened, airlifting thousands of stranded
persons and landing tonnes of relief material and equipment.

Likewise, Pakistan sent aircraft forces with relief and assistance packages in the immediate
aftermath of the disaster.55 However, good intentions on the part of both countries and the
rivalry between them ensued in a sort of “aid race”. This resulted in negligent errors, including
the delivery of MREs (Meal Ready-to-Eat) by Pakistani forces containing beef, which is
forbidden for consumption in the predominantly Hindu nation of Nepal. 56 Fostering greater
coordination and cooperation on disaster responses at the SAARC level could avoid such
potential mistakes resulting in a more effective delivery of humanitarian aid and avoiding an
offensive image of the overall relief support.

Also Chinese Search and Rescue (SAR) forces intervened in the first 24h to provide aid to
Nepalese population. The rescue team arrived on Sunday morning, together with a group from
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a second 58-members medical team arrived on

53 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (2015). Nepal Disaster Management
Reference Handbook. Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/disaster-mgmt-ref-hdbk-
2012-nepal
54 Prashant, J. (2015, May 5). Recovery in Nepal. The New Yorker. Retrieved from
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/recovery-in-nepal
55 An army field hospital, doctors, 3,000 meals ready-to-eat (MREs), 1,725 tents and 15 community shelters were
provided by Pakistan during the initial phase of disaster relief. Jinnah Institute (2015, May 14). Jinnah Institute’s
Roundtable on ‘Natural Disasters and SAARC Protocols: Lessons for Pakistan’. Retrieved from http://jinnah-
institute.org/jinnah-institutes-roundtable-on-natural-disasters-and-saarc-protocols-lessons-for-pakistan/
56 Khan, O. F. (2015, April 30). Pakistan sends food with beef masala to Nepal, blames Indian media for row. The
Times of India. Retrieved from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/Pakistan-sends-food-with-beef-
masala-to-Nepal-blames-Indian-media-for-row/articleshow/47111961.cms

Monday. 57 However, the deployment of Taiwanese rescue teams was refused, even if the
country has strong capabilities in disaster recovery and relief. Instead, Nepal accepted a team
from Taiwan International Health Action (IHA) and medical equipment.58

Table 1. Neighbouring States’ Initial Intervention

Neighbouring States

Initial Funds Aid Provided Time Frame

Bangladesh – 6 medical teams; relief material;
100,000 tonnes of rice; drinking
water59

0-24h

Bhutan USD 1 million 37-member medical team60 0-48h

China USD 3,2 million
(CNY 20 million)

62-member SAR team61 0-24h

India – One C-130J aircraft, two C-17 and
one IL-76, airlifting 295 NDRF
personnel, 46.5 tonnes of load and
five sniffer dogs.62

Maldives USD 50,00063 – 0-48h

Sri Lanka – First rescue contingent: 44 army
personnel, including 4 civil medical
consultants.64

0-24h

Pakistan Set-up a specialized Relief
Fund

04 C-130 plane-load of relief
assistance, 50 doctors, 38 member
SAR team and a 30-bed hospital65

0-24h

2.1.2 The international intervention

The international assistance will be provided only after an explicit request by the disaster-
affected country in order to respect its sovereignty. According to the UN General Assembly
resolution 46/182, a number of UN mechanism facilitate the coordination and deployment of
international aid, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the Consolidated
Appeal Process (CAP), the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee (IASC).66 The international emergency response provided in the initial 24h from the
disaster is essential to save more lives and bring relief supplies to displaced people.

57 China Daily (2015, April 27). 4,000 Chinese stranded, army sent to help Nepal. Retrieved from
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-04/27/content_20553895_2.htm
58 Rauhala, E. (2015, April 27). China Rushes Aid to Nepal After Deadly Earthquake; Taiwan Is Turned Away. The
Time. Retrieved from http://time.com/3836182/china-nepal-earthquake-taiwan-geopolitics/
59 Bangladesh Military Forces (2015, April 26). Bangladesh sends aid for Nepal Earthquake victims. Retrieved from
http://www.bdmilitary.com/bangladesh-forces-international-deployments/bangladesh-sends-aid-nepal-earthquake-
victims/
60 Royalista (2015, April 27). Bhutanese King sends medical team to Nepal. Retrieved from
http://royalista.com/99490/bhutanese-king-sends-medical-team-nepal/
61 Xinhua News Agency (2015, April 26). China search & rescue team leaves for Nepal. Retrieved from
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-04/26/c_134184830.htm/
62 NDTV (2015, June 4). India’s ‘Operation Maitri’ in Earthquake-Hit Nepal Ends. Retrieved from
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indias-operation-maitri-in-earthquake-hit-nepal-ends-768795
63 The Presidency of the Republic of Maldives (2015, April 28). Maldives’ Government to donate to Nepal’s recovery
efforts. Retrieved from http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/Index.aspx?lid=11&dcid=15501
64 Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense (2015, April 26). Army Rescue & Relief Contingents Fly to Nepal to Assist Earthquake
Victims. Retrieved from
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Army_Rescue_Relief_Contingents_Fly_to_Nepal_to_Assist_Earthquake_Victim
s_20150426_02
65 Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015, May 3). Earthquake in Nepal – Pakistan’s Response, Relief Assistance.
Retrieved from http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mjc1NQ
66 U.N. General Assembly Resolution, 78th Plenary Meeting (1991, December 19). Strengthening of the coordination of
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations (A/RES/46/182).

The table below shows the full scale of the international intervention by the main actors
comparing the initial aid with a three-months-after snapshot. The data highlights how the
international community moved rapidly in providing assistance to Nepal. During the initial
phase several funding possibilities were offered immediately to support the intervention and to
help Nepalese people. In addition to the neighbouring states, also the international community
strongly contributed in sending rescue teams in the first 24h after the earthquake. It was a
large-scale intervention with a massive amount of equipment and supplies that gave a hard
time to Nepal government to coordinate the assistance. Taking a look at the outcomes after
three months, UN agencies and international actors continued in providing assistance and
adapting it to the growing needs of the affected population. The large number of international
actors intervening in the aftermath of the crisis posed a huge challenge to coherence and
integrated approaches.67 However, as it will be shown in the following paragraphs the quantity
of relief and assistance support is not the only important thing. On the contrary, the quality of
aid and the coordination in meeting the needs of the population in accordance with the
timeframe for action is the most crucial part.

In order to “Build Back Better”, the resource mobilisation supporting the reconstruction and
recovery should not falter. A realistic timeframe for a complete recovery and an effective
resilience system is from five to seven years. The private sector and the international actors’
support will be of utmost importance to sustain rehabilitation and rebuilding of resilient
infrastructures in the long-term.68

67 ACAPS (2015, April 27). Lessons Learned for Nepal Earthquake response. Retrieved from
http://acaps.org/img/documents/l-acaps_lessons_learned_nepal_earthquake_27_april_2015
68 Government of Nepal National Planning Commission, Nepal earthquake 2015 – Post Disaster Needs Assessment.

Table 2. The international response

69 European Commission (2015, April 26). Nepal Earthquake: EU mobilises all emergency response means. Retrieved
from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4859_en.htm
70 ECHO (2015, June 25). Nepal Earthquake Factsheet. Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/nepal_earthquake_en
71 IFRC (2015, April 25). Red Cross volunteers in action following 7.8 magnitude earthquake in Nepal. Retrieved from
https://www.ifrc.org/news-and-media/news-stories/asia-pacific/nepal/earthquake-in-nepal-68486/
72 IFRC (2015, April 27). Nepal: Red Cross rushes help to quake affected population as needs escalate. Retrieved from
http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/press-releases/asia-pacific/nepal/nepal-red-cross-rushes-help-to-quake-
affected-population-as-needs-escalate/
73 IFRC (2015, July 7). Nepal: Emergency Appeal Operation Update. Retrieved from
http://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=92320
74 UNOCHA (2015, April 27). Nepal: A race against time. Retrieved from http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-
stories/nepal-race-against-time
75 UNOCHA (2015, April 26). Nepal: UN and partners scale up emergency response activities. Retrieved from
http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/nepal-un-and-partners-scale-emergency-response-activities
76 White House (2015, April 27). America’s Response to the Earthquake in Nepal: What We Can Do to Help. Retrieved
from https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/04/27/america-s-response-earthquake-nepal-what-we-can-do-help
77 USAID (2015, September 2). Nepal Earthquake Factsheet #23. Retrieved from
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/nepal_eq_fs23_09-02-2015
78 Beck, L. (2015, May 12). WFP flies emergency biscuits to earthquake survivors. World Food Programme. Retrieved
from https://www.wfp.org/stories/bangladesh-wfp-flies-emergency-biscuits-earthquake-survivors
79 WFP (2015, July). WFP’s Nepal Earthquake Response. Retrieved from
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/newsroom/wfp276670
80 WHO (2015, May). Nepal Earthquake 2015: Country Update and Funding request. Retrieved from
http://www.who.int/emergencies/nepal/nepal-donor-may
81 WHO (2015, August). Nepal Earthquake 2015: Medical Resources Delivered. Retrieved from
http://www.searo.who.int/entity/emergencies/crises/nepal/5f ?ua=1

Initial Funds Aid provided Timeframe Three-months-after Snapshot

ADB USD 3 million – 0-24h Pledged to donate USD 200 million to the
rehabilitation phase

EU EUR 3 million Activation of EU Civil
Protection Mechanism: mobilisation
of rescue team, medical team and
relief supplies69

0-24h EUR 12 million in Humanitarian assistance;
Humanitarian aid and civil protection
experts deployed;
Large number of member states offered
assistance coordinated by the ERCC.70

IFRC CH 500,000
from Disaster
Relief
Emergency
Found71

1,500 volunteers and 300 staff
member; Hygiene kits, blood
supplies, 2,000 tents72

0-24h 109, 678 emergency shelters;
697, 765 WatSan items;
food for approx. 1,200,000 people;
Access to safe water to 60,111 people.73

SAARC – Member states acted individually.
Lack of a Disaster Rapid Response
Mechanism and Force.

– –

UN
OCHA

USD 15 million
provided by
CERF74

UNDAC team set up an On-Site
Operation Cooperation Center
(OSOCC)75

0-24h

US USD 10 million DART sent76 0-24h USD 64.5 million of humanitarian funding;
support shelter intervention and safe
house reconstruction; USD 3.1 million to
WASH needs; support emergency food
assistance77

WFP – Humanitarian Staging Area (HAS)
at the Tribhuvan airport; provided
3 million emergency biscuits also
in remote mountain areas78

– Food for more than 2 million people;
More than USD 1 million cash to people for
cash-to-work projects;
Aiming to build 50 temporary health clinics
with the WHO79

WHO USD 175,000
from SEARHEF

Health kits and medical supplies
for 40,000 people for three
months80

6h 99% of the destroyed health facilities
resumed service;
In partnership with Nepal’s Ministry of
Health and Population deployed 141
Foreign Medical Teams (FMs), 50 Medical
Camps Kits (MCKs), 80 Medical Tents and
26 tons of medical equipment.81

2.2 DECISION MAKING PROCESS

2.2.1 The international framework

The international response to the earthquakes in Nepal operated in accordance with the
principle “Build Back Better” enshrined in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015-2030, the recent updated version of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA).
However, the HFA was still under implementation in Nepal, as the National progress report
issued by Nepal’s MoHA highlighted on 23 April 2015.82 According to the Sendai Framework,
seven new global targets to be achieved over the next 15 years have been established:
substantially reduce global disaster mortality; lower the number of affected people; reduce the
economic loss in relation with to global GDP; reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure;
increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies;
enhance international cooperation to developing countries and increase the availability of and
access to multi-hazard early warning systems.83

In Nepal, the states and international organisations worked with national and local NGOs and
authorities in order to improve the coordination of the international assistance and funding.
Since there is no international core binding treaty on disaster response, global cooperation and
coordination is based on regional and non-binding regulatory agreements.

The only existing working framework in the world, related to HFA, is the legally binding ASEAN
Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). Ratified by all
ASEAN member states in late 2009, it was implemented during the period 2010-2015,
establishing an ASEAN Committee for Disaster Management (ACDM), an ASEAN Coordinating
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) and a fully
functional ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT). The AADMER was put into
action already three times in 2013, after the disasters caused by the Typhoon Haiyan and the
Bohol Earthquake in the Philippines and after the floods in Lao People’s Democratic Republic.84

The SAARC established the other legally binding regulatory agreement on disaster
preparedness and response action – the Natural Disaster Rapid Response Mechanism
(NDRRM). It could have reinforced the emergency response from the member states in Nepal,
if it was not still in the process of being ratified. This regional mechanism represents a
significant help in assisting countries affected by disasters in the region. However, due to the
lack of one member state’s ratification, it could not be activated.85 The NDRRM was signed by
member states in 2011, but after four years Afghanistan has not ratified the resolution yet.
Following the 2014 Summit in Kathmandu, Nepal, SAARC member states once again failed to
set up a SAARC Disaster Management Rapid Action Force (SDMRAF), deeply needed in case of
natural disaster as the recent earthquake in Nepal demonstrated. The absence of an effective
collective response mechanism in the region drove the states to act individually, overlapping
their capacities and efforts, increasing the risk of duplication and Nepal’s dependence on the
international community. Improvements of the SAARC Disaster Management Center (SDMC)
and its capabilities to rapidly and efficiently respond to natural disasters are necessary in order

82 Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs (2015, April 23). National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo
Framework for Action. Retrieved from http://www.preventionweb.net/files/41755_NPL_NationalHFAprogress_2013-
15
83 United Nations (2015, March 18). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Retrieved from
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren
84 AHA Centre (2012). AADMER, The Framework for Effective Disaster Management Initiatives in ASEAN. Retrieved
from http://www.ahacentre.org/about-aadmer
85 Acharya, G.C. International Response to Nepal Earthquake. Nepal Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from
http://nepalforeignaffairs.com/international-response-to-nepal-earthquake-overwhelming-yet-inadequate-and-
patronizing-2/

to be able to deploy a SAARC rapid action forces to mitigate the effects of the calamity
immediately.86 Nepal’s earthquake proved that a collective regional response in a zone highly
vulnerable to various kinds of natural catastrophes could have a significant role in helping the
affected-areas rather than acting on a mere bilateral basis. Coordination would have been
better and pooling and sharing of resources would have definitely improved the quality of the
aid provided. Moreover, Nepal was chairing SAARC since the 18th SAARC Summit in
Kathmandu, held in November 2014, and despite this fact, it was not able to activate the
NDRRM in the aftermath of the earthquake.87

A model that could be used by SAARC in order to develop an efficient regional disaster
management mechanism is, indeed, the AADMER, despite its lack of effectiveness in several
cases in South East Asia.88 If another natural disaster hits the region, the implementation of
the NDRRM will be critical to respond adequately to the needs of the people affected by the
calamity.

2.3 MOBILISATION

2.3.1 Time horizon and mobilisation main issues

The mobilisation of international technical teams can be achieved during the first 24/48h in the
aftermath of a natural disaster. Depending on the extent of the emergency, different scales of
tools and services are made available to the requesting country. The earthquake in Nepal was
a self-evident large-scale disaster, which required the deployment of heavy Urban Search and
Rescue (USAR) teams and the involvement of other UN agencies. The rapid intervention of
technical response teams is essential to make an initial assessment. Furthermore, a Virtual
OSOCC exists under the umbrella of the UN and the European Commission, which aim is to
facilitate the mobilisation of USAR teams and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA)-managed International Search and Rescue Advisory Groups (INSARAG).
Following a disaster an OSOCC is set up to coordinate the activities of international relief
efforts on the ground. The mobilisation of bilateral technical response teams follows the
request by the disaster-affected country of assistance to make an assessment of needs for
contribution. 89 United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Disaster
Assistance Response Teams (DART) and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)’s
Civil Protection and Rapid Response teams were deployed immediately in Nepal to cover this
role.

86 Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (2015, June 2). The Nepal Earthquake: Could SAARC have been
Effective?. Retrieved from http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/TheNepalEarthquakeCouldSAARC_nnayak.html
87 Republica (2015, May 18). SAARC invisible as Nepal struggles in post-quake situation. Retrieved from
http://www.myrepublica.com/politics/story/21128/saarc-invisible-as-nepal-struggles-in-post-quake-situation.html
88 White, S. (2015). A critical disconnect: the role of SAARC in building the DRM capacities of South Asian countries.
Brookings Institution.
89 UNOCHA. Tools and Services for Disaster Response. Retrieved from
http://www.unocha.org/publications/asiadisasterresponse/ToolsAndServicesForDisasterResponse.html

Table 3. Time horizon of the international intervention90

International organisations and UN agencies strongly contributed to financial assistance and
provision of relief supplies within the first 24 hours. Flash appeals for donors were launched
and spread on the web to rapidly mobilise flows of financial support for the affected
communities. As the previous table shows, in 24/48h DARTs and Search and Rescue Teams
(SAR) were deployed by several states in the area.

Under the ECHO Civil Protection Mechanism established in 2011, EU member states offered
their assistance, which was coordinated by the EU Emergency Response Coordination Center
(ERCC). In support of the relief and rescue operations the Copernicus Emergency Management
Service was activated to provide maps and satellite images.91 However the coordination at the
European level was not reflected in the international framework. For example, the congestion
faced by the Belgium rescue team after arriving at the Tribhuvan International Airport
represented a huge challenge. The Belgian “B-Fast” rescue team could land on Nepalese
territory only four days after the earthquake. While managing the landing and taking off at the
airport is a domestic problem, the coordination and mobilisation of the needed assistance in
due time is a problem of international cooperation. Belgian “B-Fast” rescue team arrived late
and with the wrong equipment.

The Indian Air Force also faced the same problem once it arrived at the Tribhuvan
International Airport. Four IAF heavy lift aircrafts were forced to return to Delhi, but India
could manage to alleviate the congestion by sending several Mi-17 helicopters to a nearby site,
thanks to its proximity to the affected territory.92 A luxury that most international responders
did not have.

Another example of trouble managing the huge inflow of foreign assistance in the country is
the one of NYC Medics, a Harlem-based charity. Due to a mix of misunderstandings and
coordination problems, the medical team was unable to find an area where its help was
required for several days. At that time the local health office’s priorities changed from medical

90 UNOCHA. Tools and Services for Disaster Response. Retrieved from
http://www.unocha.org/publications/asiadisasterresponse/ToolsAndServicesForDisasterResponse.html
91 ECHO Nepal Earthquake Factsheet (2015, June 25). The EU is operating in Nepal since 2001, contributing for over
EUR 80 million of humanitarian aid. Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/nepal_earthquake_en #view=fit
92 Hindustan Times (2015, April 28). Nepal earthquake: Operations at Kathmandu airport hit by congestion. Retrieved
from 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepal-earthquake-operations-at-kathmandu-international-
airport-hit-by-congestion/article1-1341680.aspx

care to the provision of food and shelter. They managed to assist hundreds of people, but the
operation was highly cost-inefficient. If the NYC Medics team had arrived earlier, the
contribution they could have made to the people in need would have been greater.93

These examples only highlight the importance of arriving at the disaster-affected location with
forces that meet the needs of the affected-people in a specific time frame – coordinated in
advance. On the contrary, rushing to help stranded and injured people with the wrong
equipment is an inefficient use of experts and funds that could otherwise save a greater
number of lives. Heavy USAR teams are, for example, only useful if deployed within 32h of the
disaster. Past that point, other kinds of assistance are required (such as non-emergency
medical assistance, and provision of food and shelter).

2.3.2 International Funding

“There is no material you can send that has the flexibility that a cash donation has.”
Juanita Riling, Director of the Center for International Disaster Information at USAID

Cash donation is fundamental for addressing – in the short and long term – the needs as they
arise. In case of Disaster relief operations, cash donation is the most efficient tool for NGOs
and the easiest for donors.94

Regarding the funding provided by the states or intergovernmental organisations the reasoning
does not change. Within four months of the 25 April 2015 UN OCHA Financial Tracking System
(FTS) registered increasing commitments by several countries, while a huge gap still existed
between the current funding of USD 241.2 million provided and USD 422 million requested.
Furthermore, if we consider the total humanitarian funding – USD 471.1 million were provided
– while over USD 322 million pledged remain uncommitted. The ADB should provide a large
part of the last amount – USD 200 million – for project in the first phase of the rehabilitation of
the country.95 The outstanding commitment of the ADB is in fact a soft loan with an interest
rate of one per cent repayable in 40 years. 96 In addition to this provision of financial
assistance, ADB further increased the amount of funding by allocating other USD 400 million –
of which USD 3 million went from disaster relief grant, USD 30 million budget support for rural
finance and USD 15 million grant from the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction.97

As the above data shows, even if UN-coordinated appeals represent the largest collective
request for humanitarian assistance, significant demands and requests are not included and
their responses operate through other channels (notably IFRC and Médecins sans Frontières).
These appeals outside of the UN umbrella usually aim to specific and small-scale crisis or
disaster relief missions, which are not covered by UN-coordinated appeals (ex: IFRC appeals
for the drought in Kenya or floods in Bangladesh and Pakistan). In some cases there are
overlaps between the largest UN and non-UN appeals, such as for recent crisis in CAR, Iraq,

93 McDonell, N. (2015, August 18). Dollars to Disasters: the gamble of emergency relief. The New Yorker. Retrieved
from http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/dollars-to-disasters-the-gamble-of-emergency-relief
94 Igoe, M. (2015, April 28). To help Nepal, choose a sector and do your homework. Devex. Retrieved from
https://www.devex.com/news/to-help-nepal-choose-a-sector-and-do-your-homework-86011
95 UNOCHA (2015, April). Financial Tracking System: Nepal Earthquake – April 2015.
96 Republica (2015, June 12). US$ 200 million ADB soft loan to rebuild schools, road, governmentt offices. Retrieved
from http://www.myrepublica.com/politics/story/22649/200-million-adb-soft-loan-to-rebuild-schools-roads-govt-
offices.html
97 ADB (2015, June 25). ADB Offers US$ 600 million Assistance to Help Nepal Rebuild After Earthquake. Retrieved from
http://www.adb.org/news/adb-offers-600-million-assistance-help-nepal-rebuild-after-earthquake

South Sudan and Syria between the appeals from UN and the International Committee of the
Red Cross.98

Problems with funding were registered during the first month in the aftermath of the
earthquake. Comparing the financial commitment with other similar disaster-affected situation
like Haiti (2010) and Philippines (2013), the amount of funding received by UN OCHA is of a
significantly lower scale. Only USD 92.4 million were donated within a month from the
earthquake, while in Haiti USD 735 million had been committed. 99 The availability of the
required amount of funding in the aftermath of a disaster is fundamental to “Build Back
Better”. Without the needed financial aid, it is tough or nearly impossible for the affected
country to improve its preparedness and to invest in DRR policies. In areas prone to disaster
risk, countries have to heavily invest in reconstruction programs aimed at reinforcing the
resilience of the existent structures and building destroyed ones anew respecting the standards
to make them earthquake-resistant. Investing upfront in disaster preparedness strongly helps
saving money later on in reconstruction and rehabilitation. In light of the recent events and
taking into consideration the amount of funding required and what was received, stronger
efforts and an increase in the donations by the international community are necessary in order
to make Nepal adequately prepared for the next big quake.

2.4 CIVIL AND PUBLIC RESPONSE

The civil society’s contribution to the crisis in Nepal was huge and fundamental. Both private
companies and no-profit international organizations strongly supported the humanitarian aid,
financially and by donating drinkable water and food. Communication companies, namely T-
Mobile, Sprint, Verizon, Vodafone Time Warner Cables and others, offered free calls from and
to Nepal. Payment providers such as Apple, PayPal and Square Cash waived their fees to ease
the donations process. The search engine Google and the social network Facebook enabled
useful tools to help the search for missing and displaced persons.100 The instrument that these
two huge companies created provided substantial help in finding people and in spreading news
about the ongoing situation in Nepal. The impact of social media such as Facebook or Twitter
in the aftermath of a natural disaster deeply contributed to keeping people aware of the rapid
changes in the situation and in keeping them informed about the assistance provided. In fact,
in August in Myanmar these practices were used again successfully. 101 Finally, private
companies, such as UPS 102 , DHL 103 and FedEx 104 , helped strengthening the on-the-ground
logistic support and reinforced the coordination among other organisations in order to provide
assistance for long-term recovery needs. Beside funding and the important provision of
drinkable water and food supplies, in post-disaster situation a fully functional and reliable

98 Global Humanitarian Assistance (2015). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. Retrieved from
http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/GHA-Report-2015_-Interactive_Online
99 Newar, N. (2015, May 26). Lives at risk as Nepal earthquake funding dries up. IRIN. Retrieved from
http://www.irinnews.org/report/101542/lives-at-risk-as-nepal-earthquake-funding-dries-up
100 Petroff, A. and Rooney, B. (2015, April 28). Nepal earthquake donations: Who’s sending what. CNN Money.
Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/27/news/nepal-earthquake-donations/
101 Palatino, M. (2015, August 12). How Social Media Moved People to Act in Flood-Ravaged Myanmar. Aid &
International Development Forum. Retrieved from http://www.aidforum.org/disaster-relief/how-social-media-moved-
people-to-act-in-flood-ravaged-myanmar
102 UPS (2015, April 29). UPS Commits $500,000 and Logistics Expertise in Support of Nepal Earthquake Recovery.
Retrieved from
https://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressroom/ContentDetailsViewer.page?ConceptType=PressReleases&id=1430334323
852-733
103 DHL (2015, April 28). Deutsche Post DHL Group sends Disaster Response Team to Nepal within 48 Hours after
earthquake. Retrieved from
http://www.dhl.com/en/press/releases/releases_2015/group/dpdhl_group_sends_disaster_response_team_to_nepal_
within_48__ours_after_earthquake.html
104 FedEx (2015, April 28). FedEx Response to Nepal Earthquake. Retrieved from
http://about.van.fedex.com/blog/nepal-earthquake/

logistic makes the difference. The increasing commitment of civil society organizations and the
private sector to disaster-affected people during the last decades drastically improved the
quality and the effectiveness of aid provided. They efficiently represent the link between the
action of states and international organization and the needs of local communities affected by
disasters. Like in the above-mentioned cases, civil society can fill the gaps in logistic and
communication that governments and intergovernmental organisations could not cover. The
NGOs and non-profit organisations like Water International, BRAC 105 , Cooperative for
Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), ActionAid, AmeriCares and Red Cross societies
played a significant role in giving a comprehensive approach to the humanitarian crisis in
Nepal, thanks to their sectorial specialisations and to their longstanding presence on the
ground. At the same time they are involving people from all over the world to contribute by
donation to sustain the on-going operations in the long-term.106 A major task that civil society
has to accomplish is to foster and increase confidence among the actors present on the ground
to avoid futile duplication of their efforts and work. Coordination with the government and local
community is essential in order to achieve this outcome.

In fact, one of the major challenges faced by the NGOs, such as Médecins sans Frontières
(MSF), was how to reach the mountain and rural communities, in particular if we consider that
the monsoon season was coming towards the end of May. Huge inflow of NGOs and
international assistance provoked several coordination problems and affected the mobility at
the airport. Delays were common due to the congestion and chaos engendered by thousands
of people trying to leave the country and hundreds attempting to arrive and provide help. Four
MSF teams reached Gorkha district by road from northern India in order to avoid being
entrapped getting out of Kathmandu airport and to deliver aid faster. 107 The international
NGOs often cooperated with local communities and national NGOs efficiently, but sometimes
lack of information and chaotic organisation hindered an adequate management of medical and
rescue teams. As mentioned before, NYC Medics wasted several days looking for the right spot
where their assistance was highly needed.

Maita Nepal NGO, an organisation that fights against women and children trafficking, strictly
cooperating with UNICEF and Friends of Maiti Nepal, which is the US representative,
complained about the government inefficiency and entangled bureaucracy to approve the
delivery of commodities and relief packages.108 Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the
cooperation and coordination among these different three actors: the national government, the
local CSOs and the international CSOs.

In order to meet the needs of the local population to “build back better” and to avoid wasting
resources and efforts, the international NGOs have to collaborate closely with the national
NGOs. Engaging with local communities and organisations allows a better managing of the
relief efforts and better coordination with the local chief district officers and village
development committees. Working alongside local communities and understanding their own
way of thinking strongly contributes to increasing people’s awareness and commitment to DRR.
For instance some affected communities refused to move in new style buildings and prefer to
continue living in the traditional houses. Listening to them strongly helps the international

105 The Daily Star (2015, May 21). Brac plans to spend Tk 117 core in two years to help earthquake victims in Nepal.
Retrieved from http://www.thedailystar.net/backpage/brac-spend-15m-nepal-quake-victims-84976
106 Barcia, L. (2015, May 11). Global NGOs supporting earthquake relief efforts in Nepal. Devex. Retrieved from
https://www.devex.com/news/global-ngos-supporting-earthquake-relief-efforts-in-nepal-86102
107 Matthew, P. (2015, May 1). Nepal Earthquake Response: reaching people in remote areas. MSF. Retrieved from
http://blogs.msf.org/en/staff/blogs/nepal-earthquake-emergency-response/nepal-earthquake-response-reaching-
people-in-remote
108 Herman, S. (2015, May 2). Nepal Official Slammed Over Aid Response. VOA. Retrieved from
http://www.voanews.com/content/nepal-government-faces-criticism-for-quake-aid-response/2745909.html

community efforts to be tailored for specific needs and to be time and cost-efficient for
“building back better”. Also technology transfer needs to be contextualized due to the high
variety of conditions in the 14 worst affected districts.109

The real problem is that the numbers claimed by the International NGOs are often misleading
and take credit for activities they did not commit. The relationship among international NGOs
in responding to a disaster is complex and not transparent. Often, several organizations that
are working together attribute to themselves the results that they achieved together. In this
way the international response quadruple-count the aid and the assistance provided. It is
really difficult for donors to understand how many actors on the ground are taking credits for
the same activity. For instance, let’s examine the relation between three actors in Nepal for
the provision of tarps. The real distribution chain is the following: USAID donated 6,200 tarps
to IOM; then IOM gave 350 to ACTED, a French organization, which distributed them to
Nepalese people. Each actor claims to have alone reached by itself an outstanding number of
people while in reality it is the total number they reached together, virtually multiplying the
real aid provided. This intertwined cooperation not only gives the wrong figures of the reality
of the international response, but also hides the real costs of the operation. In addition, the
international funding is directed mainly towards international organisations and only in a
second place to local Nepalese NGOs, which are usually sub-contractors. The impact of the
donations will thus affect slightly Nepal, respect to what a more direct donation will do.110

3. THE ROLE OF MIGRANT REMITTANCES111

The Nepalese economy is highly dependent on remittances from its diaspora abroad. All
reliable estimates peg 30 per cent of GDP to be based on remittance receipts – this does not
factor in informal remittances such as transfers made through hawala or hundi,112 and other
forms of unrecorded remittances such as hand delivered cash from India, which potentially can
increase the magnitude of this dependency further. Moreover, the Nepalese Government
estimates that the incidence of poverty would increase from 19 to 35 per cent if remittances
stopped. This dependency has had critical implications for the affected households and
communities during the earthquake in terms of preparedness and recovery. The widely
reported increase in remittances during the aftermath – about 30 per cent according to
surveys conducted – illustrates the relationship between migration and disaster resilience in
Nepal.

3.1 REMITTANCES AND PREPAREDNESS

The broader literature seems to indicate that migration and remittances can foster disaster
preparedness through improved economic and social resilience. Surveys conducted by Sijapati
et al. suggested that a large number of households with external migrants reported being
better prepared for the earthquake.113

109 Francis, A. (2015, June 2) Local partners key to building back better in Nepal. Retrieved from
https://www.devex.com/news/local-partners-key-to-building-back-better-in-nepal-86271
110 Troutman, E. (2015, June 19). What Happened to the Aid? Nepal Earthquake Response Echoes Haiti. Aid Works.
Retrieved from http://aid.works/2015/06/nepal-haiti/
111 For the purposes of this section, remittances are defined as money or in-kind transfers from household members
abroad. The transfers made by internal/domestic migrants are not discussed, though they also have a critical role to
play. In general, this section focuses only on external migration. For more on internal migrants’ role, see Bandita et al.
(2015).
112 Informal value transfer systems operating outside of official financial channels.
113 Sijapati, B. et al. (2015). Migration and Resilience. Experiences from Nepal’s 2015 Earthquake. ILO Research Paper
VII. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—asia/—ro-bangkok/—ilo-
kathmandu/documents/publication/wcms_379082

NEPAL EARTHQUAKE: A RAPID REVIEW OF THE RESPONSE

AND A FEW LESSONS LEARNT

François Grünewald & Anne Burlat

January 2016

Groupe URD: Evaluation, research and training institute for international aid organisations

Created in 1993, Groupe URD is an independent institute which specializes in the analysis of practices and the

development of policy for the humanitarian and post-crisis sectors. Its role is to help organizations to improve the quality

of their programmes through evaluations, research and training, and by providing them with methodological support.

We have run a number of aid observatories (Haiti, Chad and Afghanistan) in order to be able to work with organisations

in the field and promote lessons learned.

As an independent observer, we produce strategic analysis of emergency and post-emergency contexts based on our

holistic, cross-sector vision. On the strength of this unique vision, we also make proposals and develop innovative tools

for the humanitarian sector.

As an internationally recognized think tank, we provide strategic advice to operational and policy-oriented organizations

(United Nations agencies, donors, Red Cross institutions, NGOs, etc.).

The authors

François Grünewald is the Executive Director of Groupe URD.

Anne Burlat is the Housing and Urban Specialist of Groupe URD.

Groupe URD

La Fontaine des Marins

26170 PLAISIANS

Tel: + 33 (0)4.75.28.29.35

Fax: + 33 (0)4.75.28.65.44

E-mail: urd@urd.org |

www.urd.org

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors alone.

Groupe URD

Acronyms

BoO Base of Operation

CADRE Community Action for Disaster Response

CBDRR Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction

CCCM Camp Coordination and Camp Management (cluster)

CDMC Community Disaster Management Committee

CDO Chief District Officer

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CGIS Corrugated Iron Sheet

DD District Development Committee

DDPR (P) District Disaster Preparedness and Response (Plan)

DFID UK Department for International Development

DiPECHO Disaster Preparedness ECHO

DIU District Implementation Unit

DRR Disaster Risk Reduction

DRM Disaster Risk Management

DUDBC Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (under MoUD)

DWCC District WASH Coordination Committee

DWSS Department of Water Supply and Sewerage (under MoUD)

ECHO European Office for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

EPS Earthquake Preparedness for Safer Communities programme

EPP Emergency Preparedness Project

ER Early Recovery

ERU Emergency Response Unit

FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

FMT(CC) Foreign Medical Team (Coordination Cell)

GFDRR World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GLOF Glacial Lake Outburst Flood

GoN Government of Nepal

GIS Geographic Information System

HEOC Health Emergency Operation centre

HFA Hyogo Framework for Action

HFT Himalayan Frontal Thrust

HI Handicap International

HOPE Hospital Preparedness for Emergency project

ICC Inter Cluster Coordination

ICIMOD International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent movement

INSARAG International Search And Rescue Advisory Group

IOM International Organisation for Migration

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

KAP Knowledge, Attitude, Practice

KVERMP Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project

LDO Local Development Officer

MBT Main Boundary Thrust

MCM Mass Casualty Management

MCT Main Central Thrust

MoAD Ministry of Agriculture Development, Government of Nepal

MoE Ministry of Education, Government of Nepal

MoFALD Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development

MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Nepal

MoHP Ministry of Health and Population, Government of Nepal

MoUD Ministry of Urban Development, Government of Nepal

NEOC National Emergency Operation centre

NCDM National Council on Disaster Management, Government of Nepal

NDMA National Disaster Management Authority

NDRF National Disaster Response Framework

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NFI Non Food Items

NPC National Planning Commission

NRA National Reconstruction Authority

NRCS Nepal Red Cross Society

NRRC Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium

NSDRM National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management

NSET National Society for Earthquake Technology, Nepal

OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODF Open Defecation Free zone (Program)

IOM International Office of Migration

OSOCC On site Operation Coordination Center

PDNA Post-Disaster Need Assessment

PIU Project Implementation Unit

RCC Reinforced Cement Concrete

RCO Resident Coordinator Office

RCS Reception on Dispatch Center

SAR Search and Rescue

SEDM Study on Earthquake Disaster Mitigation (for Kathmandu Valley)

UN United Nations

UNDAC United Nations Disasters Assessment and Coordination

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children

UNRC-HC United Nations’ Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USAR Urban Search and Rescue

VCA Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment

VDC Village Development Committee

WASH Water Sanitation and Hygiene

WHO World Health Organisation

Table of contents
Executive summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

FULL REPORT ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

1. BACKGROUND ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9

2. NEPAL RISK PROFILE AND INSTITUTIONAL SET UP FOR DRM …………………………………………………

2.1. Geopolitics …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

2.2. Risk profile …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

2.2.1. Rural Nepal’s risk profile …………………………………………………………………………………………..

2.2.2. Urban Nepal’s risk profile …………………………………………………………………………………………

2.3. Legal framework and institutional set up for disaster management …………………………………….

2.3.1. The legal framework ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 13

2.3.2. The operational set up…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1

3. THE POST EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT ………………………………………………………………………………….. 1

3.1. Immediate response to the April earthquake and the May aftershocks ………………………………..

3.1.1. The national response …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19

3.1.2. The international response ………………………………………………………………………………………

3.2. International Coordination ……………………………………………………………………………………………..

3.3. Transition to development …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 24

3.4. The impact of the border problems on relief and reconstruction ………………………………………… 2

4. LESSONS LEARNT AND AREAS TO BE IMPROVED ………………………………………………………………..

4.1. Clarify the policies and roles of the line ministries …………………………………………………………….. 28

4.2. Improve communication with the affected population ……………………………………………………… 28

4.3. Need to develop a building code for rural housing …………………………………………………………….

4.4. Strengthen national search and rescue capacity ……………………………………………………………….. 29

4.5. Improve coordination of international relief support during the early phase ……………………….. 29

4.6. Enhance access to remote areas ……………………………………………………………………………………..

4.7. Raise the capacity of emergency warehouses and increase prepositioned stocks …………………. 30

4.8. Improve the management of internal displacements ………………………………………………………… 30

4.9. Debris removal and management …………………………………………………………………………………… 30

4.10. Improve communication with the affected population ……………………………………………………… 30

4.11. Improve the national capacity for Information and data management …………………………………

5. THE WAY FORWARD ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 31

5.1. Supporting the Nepali Government in its recovery efforts …………………………………………………. 31

5.2. Residual and future humanitarian needs …………………………………………………………………………. 31

5.3. Promoting risk-informed recovery and reconstruction ………………………………………………………. 31

5.4. Kathmandu ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

ANNEXES ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Annex n°1: Risk in Nepal ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 33

Annex n°2: DRR Efforts in Nepal ………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Annex n°3: Deployment of international usar teams …………………………………………………………………….. 38

Executive summary

Nepal’s risk profile

Nepal is a small landlocked country between India and China. Its population is about 26.6 million with an

annual growth rate of 1.40 percent (preliminary findings of 2011 census) and it is one of the poorest countries

in the world (currently ranks 157 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index with a per capita

income of less than US$650). Administratively, the country has been divided into seven states since the

promulgation of a new constitution in autumn 2015.

Nepal is one of the 20 most disaster-prone countries in the world and has gone through many crises in the last

20 years, including a bloody civil war, and regular disasters of different kinds (floods, landslides, earthquakes,

windstorms, hailstorms, fire, glacial lake outburst flood (GLOFs) and avalanches). Out of 200 countries, Nepal

ranks 11th and 30th, respectively, with regard to relative vulnerability to earthquakes and floods (UNDP/BCPR,

2004). The physical vulnerability of Nepal is very high, with most buildings and infrastructures built without

reference to hazard-resistant technology.

Kathmandu is the most populated district in Nepal. According to the preliminary findings of the Population

Census of 2011, Kathmandu was the district with the highest population growth rate in the country over the

previous decade with 60.93 percent and a population density of 4408/ km2. Its population, which was 1.6

million ten years ago, currently stands at 1.74 million.

Kathmandu valley (consisting of three districts; Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur) is one of the fastest-

growing urban agglomerations in South Asia, with a population of around 2.5 million people. It is situated on

a major fault line, placing it at significant risk of an intense earthquake. Out of 21 cities worldwide that lie in

similar seismic zones, Kathmandu is the most at risk in terms of impact on people. Moreover, rapid, haphazard

urban development, including non-compliance with the building code, failure to use qualified engineers or

trained masons, encroachment of buildings on open spaces and water table depletion are increasing

vulnerability at a significant rate. Kathmandu’s critical infrastructure and essential services are also extremely

vulnerable.

According to the Global Earthquake Safety Initiative, Kathmandu is exposed to the greatest earthquake risk

per capita among 21 megacities around the world, largely due to building collapse and insufficient

preparedness and medical care. The older neighbourhoods which form the historical core of Nepal’s cities are

particularly vulnerable to earthquake tremors. The poor quality of building and infrastructure construction is

the main cause of structural vulnerability. The fact that over 90% of existing structures are non-engineered,

and the poor quality control of materials and construction practices mean that the built environment, and

especially lifeline facilities, are problematic.

The importance of DRR in the Nepalese context

Due to its position on the slopes of the Himalaya ranges, Nepal has been a priority for the disaster risk

reduction community, with several donors (ECHO, DFID, OFDA, etc.) investing massive amounts of resources

in the development of risk reduction and management capacities, including through a flagship programme,

the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC), bringing together UN agencies and other DRR stakeholders1 to

work on earthquake and flood preparedness. Specific activities have been carried out to make the health

system resilient to shocks and able to remain operational to deliver health services of all kinds after a high

1 For more, see: GRUNEWALD F & CARPENTER S., 2014, Urban Disaster preparedness in Katmandu, Nepal; British Red Cross and Groupe URD.

impact disaster. The programmes implemented have involved both rural and urban CBDRR and a number of

specific programmes supported by USAID, DIFD and DG ECHO have aimed to ensure that health services will

function in the event of a high-impact earthquake both in the Kathmandu Valley and in other parts of the

country.

The initial response to the 2015 earthquakes: successes and

shortcomings

Three key factors shaped the post-earthquake situation. First of all, neither the April nor the May earthquakes

were the very high magnitude shock that had been feared. Secondly, although they affected part of

Kathmandu Valley, their locations in rural districts meant that the main impact was in low-density rural areas,

even though some small towns were also affected. Thirdly, the first tremor fortunately occurred on a Saturday

around mid-day, when most people were not at work. If it had taken place on a working day when people

were in their offices and children were in their schools, the situation would have been even more tragic.

Reaching the 864,000 people living below the poverty line in hard-to-reach areas, and who had lost their

homes, was a priority.

As in many earthquake situations, there were many casualties due to collapsed buildings and infrastructure.

The capacity of the health system to care for the wounded was crucial. Prior to the earthquakes, both

development and emergency donors had focused on providing assistance to help strengthen the resilience of

the health system at all levels.

With the impending monsoon rains expected to further isolate remote villages, district authorities and

humanitarian partners prioritized the distribution of shelter materials in the northern-most Village

Development Committees (VDCs).

Moving to recovery and rehabilitation: challenges and innovations

The transition to recovery has been difficult due to the problems caused by the political situation in Nepal.

The constitutional reform towards federalism that was implemented led to heated debate about the number

of new entities to be created. This led to tension at the Indian-Nepali border in the Madesh territory in Terai.

As a result it became difficult to import consumer goods, food items and fuel from neighbouring India. This

led to a sharp increase in the price of construction materials and transportation, making reconstruction

extremely costly for individuals and aid agencies. 8 months after the earthquake, many remote areas were

still in ruins or had been rebuilt in a very rudimentary manner as the people living there could not afford to

“build back safer”.

Similarly, the political stalemate has held up the creation and staffing of the National Reconstruction Agency.

The political leaders who are expected expected to bring together all national forces and bring about a proper

and risk-informed reconstruction, are lost in internal politics. It took them 9 months to vote through the

reconstruction bill despite the suffering of the population affected by the monsoon rains and the cold winter.

Despite this, many innovations have been tried in the Nepali context: cash distributions have been used

relatively frequently despite the weakness of the banking system in remote rural areas. 3 D printers have been

used for the first time to deliver spare parts for water system rehabilitation. The Health Emergency Operation

Centre, its network of hospital hubs and its relatively well trained health personnel has been able to provide

treatment to most of the patients in the Kathmandu Valley, showing that DRR pays off.

Key lessons learnt and recommendations

Clarify the policies and roles of the line ministries: The new Disaster Management Act needs to be adopted

rapidly as it will fill the gap in policy definition, and implementation guidelines preparation and supervision.

All national

institutions involved in the national disaster structures will then have a clear action plan and their

responsibilities will be clearly spelled out. Revisions should be made regularly to make the policies more

practical

Improve communication with the affected population: In Nepal, where the political context is very complex

and is still affected by the decade of civil war and the complexity of the peace process, aid delivery has been

affected a great deal by political factors, there is a need to invest more in communication to establish more

active

dialogue with the affected populations.

Develop a building code for rural housing: It is essential to adjust the Building Code to rural settings and

ensure that all building codes are

implemented in urban, peri-urban and rural areas.

Strengthen national search and rescue capacity: The development and strengthening of national rescue and

relief capacity should be made a priority. The Nepalese army, police and fire brigades should be trained so

that they can act as a middle level rescue capacity. A 7/7 medium type USAR team should be established with

a National Disaster

training centre.

Improve coordination of international relief support during the early phase: It is important to ensure that

incoming actors have a much better understanding of the context and existing needs, as well as the gaps that

need to be filled. The list of items to be provided to disaster victims should be decided in advance, in a

coordinated manner by all stakeholders. Tax deduction procedures should be designed accordingly. A “one

door system for relief provision” should be put in place for relief distribution, using the Disaster Relief

Committees under the supervision of local institutions and aid agencies.

Enhance access to remote areas: To assist the population in high altitudes, difficult terrain and bad weather,

there should be a sufficient number of helicopters in country. The MOHP/NEOC should also have their own

flying capacity. Helipads should be identified and marked at an early stage at the VDC and DCO levels.

Raise the capacity of emergency warehouses and increase prepositioned stocks: National and decentralized

pre-positioned stocks should be increased.

Improve the management of internal displacements: It is very important to find ways to improve the

management of IDPs with proper movement tracking procedures and registration processes

Debris removal and management: Policy decisions will have to be made in relation to all the weakened and

dangerous buildings that need to be demolished and the debris that needs to be removed.

Improve communication with the affected population: The call centre established in the Ministry of

Information and Communication (call 1234) should be put in place at the NEOC and HEOC and made more

widely known

amongst the public.

Improve the national capacity for Information and data management: There should be a strong IS system

available at the NEOC, and it should be easily accessible by the national disaster centre. A Victim ID Card

system should be put in place

FULL REPORT

1. BACKGROUND

The key objective of disaster response is to minimize morbidity and mortality. The initial “search and rescue

/medical” response is usually followed by relief operations, where the main areas of activity are food, shelter,

water and sanitation. During this phase, a number of cross-cutting issues are taken into account, such as

gender, protection and “do no harm”. Subsequently, there is a transition to development, via the early

recovery and recovery phases.

Of course, rather than this sequence of clear and distinct phases, in reality there are a lot of overlaps between

phases.

The lessons learned from the response to the earthquakes in Nepal in 2015 are of particular interest because

the country had previously been the focus of numerous peace building, humanitarian and disaster

management activities.

Over a period of four years, Groupe URD conducted a series of field visits to Nepal, two before the earthquakes

and three since. These have provided valuable insight into the way disaster management has evolved in the

country.

The following review presents lessons learned about the strengths and weaknesses of the disaster response,

particularly the initial phases of the response and the difficulties faced in recovering from this period. It is

structured as follows:

– The first chapter deals with Nepal’s risk profile and Disaster Risk Management (DRM) activities that

were in place before the earthquake;

– The second one describes some of the key features of the response to the 2015 earthquake, including

successes and shortcomings;

– Finally, the report examines key lessons learnt and includes a series of recommendations.

2. NEPAL RISK PROFILE AND INSTITUTIONAL SET UP FOR DRM

2.1. Geopolitics

After a decade of civil war, from 1996 to 2006, and after the abolition of the Rana monarchy in 2008, the

political situation in Nepal is not yet stable. It is faced with the difficulty of establishing an effective coalition

government2 due to the tensions between the main parties (the Congress Party, the Maoist Party, who were

the flag bearers of the insurrection at the time of the civil war, and the Marxist-Leninist Party, which was

created following a split in the Maoist Party3.

There is still not a great deal of confidence between the population, the Armed Forces, the Police, and the

administration and social unrest, strikes and “banh”( street demonstrations) are frequent.

The drafting of the new constitution has been held up even though a second constituent assembly has been

formed. The blockages are the result not only of the tensions between the main political parties, but also

disagreements about the type of federalism to put in place, either on a purely territorial basis, or taking into

account ethnic-religious considerations in dividing the different territories4.

Indeed, Nepal’s economy is fragile. The country is landlocked, with no industrial sector and very limited

resources apart from its agriculture and the manpower it exports to the Gulf countries. It therefore faces many

challenges. Due to its location in a complex political landscape surrounded by China and India, Nepal has found

itself in the middle of a geostrategic equation that has resulted in a great deal of aid being allocated

(International Crisis Group, 2013).

2.2. Risk profile

Nepal is exposed to several types of natural and man-

made hazards (Government of Nepal, 2011). A wide

variety of physiographical, geological, ecological and

hydro-meteorological factors contribute to the high

levels of hazards faced. Other factors, such as rapid

population growth, slow economic development, high

levels of poverty, lack of awareness of mitigation

measures, and a lack of political and social commitment

also contribute to making the country extremely prone

to disasters.

The greatest risk of disaster is linked to the geological and climatic features of the country. The seismic record

suggests that the risk of a strong intensity earthquake on the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale (MMI X6) is

high. The main source of seismic activity in Nepal is subduction of the Indian plate under the Tibetan plate (the

Himalayas).

2 This is the 7th government since the end of the civil war.
3 Of the 601 members of parliament, 185 represent the Congress Party, 160 the Marxist-Leninists and 127 the Maoists,

and there are about 15 small parties.
4 Indo-Nepalese (Hindu), Tibetans (Buddhists) and Tibetan-Burmese (mixture of Hindu, Buddhist and animism).

2.2.1. Rural Nepal’s risk profile

In rural Nepal, many extreme events, leading to floods and landslides, are caused by the Monsoon rains. The

related hazards are presented in the table below. The Nepal Ministry of Home Affairs regularly produces

Disaster Reports. The geological map below appeared in the 2011 report.

2.2.2. Urban Nepal’s risk profile

There are a lot of small, fast-growing cities in Nepal exposed to a wide range of risks: floods, landslides and

earthquakes, political unrest, epidemics and economic crises. However, most of the efforts on risk profiling

have taken place in the capital city, Kathmandu. It is located at an altitude of 1200m in the Himalayan

mountain belt, which was produced by the collision between the Indian and Eurasian plates in the early

tertiary period. Three major faults, the Main Central Thrust (MCT), the Main Boundary Thrust (MBT) and the

Himalayan Frontal Thrust (HFT), run throughout the length of Nepal from east to west and have resulted in

many earthquakes in the past in excess of moment magnitude M8. There is therefore a need to estimate

possible hazards in order to engage in risk estimation. In 1934, the fault line that runs beneath the Kathmandu

valley slipped. In the 20th century alone, over 11,000 people have lost their lives in four major earthquakes.

The 1934 earthquake destroyed 20 percent and damaged 40 percent of the building stock in the Kathmandu

valley (NSET, 1999). In Kathmandu itself, a quarter of all homes were destroyed. Many of the temples in

Bhaktapur were destroyed as well. Three earthquakes of similar size occurred in Kathmandu Valley in the 19th

Century: in 1810, 1833, and 1866. The most damaging recent earthquake to take place before the earthquakes

in 2015 was the earthquake of 1988. This magnitude 8.4 earthquake destroyed more than 80,000 buildings

and claimed 8,500 lives. Since 1988 the city of Kathmandu has evolved enormously.

Kathmandu metropolitan area

Due to the evolution of the context in Nepal since 2000, Kathmandu has become one of the fastest-growing

urban agglomerations5 in South Asia, with 5000 new concrete buildings built in the valley every year. Rapid

population growth and urbanization due to migration to the Kathmandu Valley from different parts of the

country has increased demand for housing, water, electricity, drainage, roads and other utilities (Bhattara and

Conway, 2010), leading to infrastructure expansion and major pressure on the environment.

As is often the case, new urban constructions are built on the nearest agricultural land and along the roads

leading to the city, land that does not have basic infrastructure (road, water, drainage, etc.) but is more easily

accessible to new migrants. Subsequently local governments face increased demand for the provision of

infrastructure after the construction of houses. Implementing infrastructure in these cases renders the

housing on agricultural land more expensive in the long run than on urban developed land. Central

government agencies and municipalities (with financial contributions from local communities) are responsible

for providing basic services, but most often the agencies and municipalities are not in a position to expand

their networks due to lack of funds, lack of management capacity, and lack of proper planning. Local

authorities do not have the capacity to provide the appropriate infrastructure and services and their roles are

limited to local-level infrastructure only.

Urbanization in the Kathmandu valley but also in other cities has been largely uncontrolled and even though

building codes have existed since 1994, they have not been very effective in promoting earthquake resistant

construction due to their poor implementation. Every year there is greater risk due to declining construction

practices, uncontrolled urban development and a rapidly increasing population, which has now reached two

million people in the urban agglomeration. If an earthquake were to take place, it could be even more deadly

than the Haiti earthquake of January 2010.

The Ministry of Urban Affairs and the Ministry of Land Management are both involved in revising urbanization

in Kathmandu and the different vulnerabilities and structural fragilities in cities (Chamlagain, 2013). Many

studies have been carried out in the past to study the seismic risk in the Himalaya Range and to evaluate the

5
Muzini and Apericio, Urban growth and spatial transition in Nepal, 2013.

http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/731284070

earthquake risk in the Kathmandu Valley and there is abundant scientific literature on the subject. There has

also been abundant survey literature following the growth of Kathmandu.

The most significant of these studies is the Study on Earthquake Disaster Mitigation for Kathmandu Valley

(SEDM) which was carried out by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) in 2002 with support from the Japan

International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (JICA, 2002). However, given the changes in the Valley it is generally

agreed that this survey needs to be updated.

Building materials are an important factor when predicting the potential impact of an earthquake:

– Mud buildings: a lot of people will be suffocated by mud dust (based on the experience of the Bam

earthquake in Iran in 2003);

– RCC buildings: this will lead to a predominance of broken bones, open wounds, and haemorrhagic

wounds (based on the experience in Haiti).

Land use and occupancy, land tenure, and house and flat rental are still not fully understood and in-depth

study of these phenomena is needed. Two processes are currently taking place:

– The city limits are expanding rapidly, with new buildings being constructed in the middle of the rice

paddy every day;

– Roads are being widened, especially in the old areas. This has an impact on both house occupancy and

the structural integrity of buildings that have to be altered.

The Kathmandu Valley is now a densely populated home to almost 2.5 million people, many living and working

in buildings that will not withstand a significant seismic event. In addition, many buildings are not being used

for the purpose that they were intended with many private schools and hospitals, restaurants and offices in

buildings intended for residences. An earthquake could displace more than 1.8 million people, kill over

100,000 and injure a further 300,000. Sixty percent of buildings could be destroyed or damaged, according to

NSET.

2.3. Legal framework and institutional set up for disaster management

Improving the response to natural and man-made disasters is a core component of any resilient and

sustainable community. In order to increase their capacity to respond to an emergency, local institutions, from

the national to the community level, engage in “preparedness” activities which are defined as the “set of

measures that ensure the organized mobilization of personnel, funds, equipment, and supplies within a safe

environment for effective relief.”6

2.3.1. The legal framework

With its high exposure to disasters, Nepal is considered to be one of the first countries in South Asia to have

created a policy and legal environment for disaster risk management. The formulation of policy and legislative

procedures on disaster issues in Nepal dates back to the early 1980s with the 1982 Natural Calamity (Relief)

Act. This document formalizes disaster response as a responsibility of the government to provide relief to the

6 World Health Organization, Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action. WHO and Emergency Preparedness

at the Global Level. September 13, 2000. Available at: www.who.int/disasters/repo/5813 . Accessed October 4,

2015.

victims of disasters, and it designates authorities at the centre and district levels to coordinate the rescue and

relief efforts of various response agencies. However, the experience of the past three decades has shown that

this structure is only capable of coordinating small to medium level disasters. The institutional mechanisms

that were created were unable to manage the emergency response to above medium level disasters such as

the Udayapur earthquake of 1988 or the flood disaster in south-central Nepal in 1993. The overarching

mechanism for policy elaboration is the National Council for Disaster Risk Management (NCDM). The NCDR is

the highest level institution involved in DRM under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The Minister of

Home Affairs is the Deputy Chair and Council members include ministers, the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of

the police departments and representatives of civil society. The NCDM is responsible for:

– The endorsement of national policies on DRM;

– Approving national & sector-wide DRM plans (including the existing 49 sectoral response plans being

currently put into place);

– Guiding and overseeing the management of fund generation and mobilization on Risk Reduction,

Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, Recovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;

– Providing policy guidance for bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international cooperation in the area

of DRM.

Learning from the devastating 1988 Udayapur earthquake, the Nepali Government began drawing up the

Nepal National Building Code, which was finally completed in 1994, and carried out several studies. The

Building Code that was developed incorporated provisions for making buildings earthquake-resistant, and

addressed the problems not only of buildings designed by engineers but also of houses in rural, semi-urban

and urban areas that are mostly constructed without input from staff qualified in para-seismic construction.

However, the building code was not enforced immediately. The Government only decided to make compliance

with the building code mandatory in all government buildings in 2003 and encouraged its implementation in

all municipal areas. It is widely recognized that it is not yet enforced by municipalities who do not have the

capacity to do so.

To cope more broadly, proactively and practically with disaster risks, Nepal drew up its National Strategy for

Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) based on the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA) in

consultation with the relevant stakeholders across all levels7. This aimed to implement Disaster Risk

Management (DRM) in Nepal in line with current international understanding, scientific progress and regional

initiatives. The strategy provides the road map for all sectors to prepare sector specific programs for DRM and

formulate the necessary policy decisions for facilitating mainstreaming DRM into the development process.

The Disaster Management Bill, 2009 aims to promote effective management of risk reduction throughout the

disaster management cycle – preparedness, mitigation, rescue and relief, rehabilitation and recovery. The

proposed Disaster Management Bill, 2009 is due to replace the existing Natural Calamity (Relief) Act, 1982.

The principal features of the proposed DM Bill are:

– Disasters are defined distinctly as natural and human-induced;

– Provision for National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) to be chaired by Prime Minister of

Nepal with clear mandate and functions, duties, responsibilities and authority of the Council;

7Reference to HFA was made not only because it recommends what every country should do for disaster reduction, but

also because the Government of Nepal had taken part in developing this framework and has made commitments to

implement it.

– Proposal to set up National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) under the NCDM, to act as the

focal point for disaster management functions in Nepal from formulation of appropriate strategies

and plans to implementation and supervision of disaster management activities;

– Clarifies the role, responsibility and functions of security forces including Nepal Army, Nepal Police

and Armed Police Force; institutions, industrial sector and private organizations. These institutions are

the key responder in the first 48 hours – the military are the most competent of all the trained forces

(trained by US engineer corps and US PACOM).

When the Disaster Bill is passed, a National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) will be created and will

become the national focal point for the implementation, facilitation, coordination and monitoring of Disaster

Risk Management strategies. During and after a national level disaster, the NDMA should be responsible for

emergency response, recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation. At this stage, the National Emergency

Operation Centre is the de facto NDMA, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs

Strategies, standards and guidelines, and design plans and programmes for capacity building and emergency

response will need to be developed. The draft text of the Disaster Bill promoted the constitution of Regional,

District and local level Disaster Management Committees (DMC). It is very urgent for the Disaster Management

Bill to be passed to support the implementation of the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management

(including the creation of the NDMA) in order to help the country to prepare for the challenges ahead. The

Disaster Bill has two main objectives:

– To reinforce inter-ministerial coordination for overall disaster management (to increase the

involvement of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Health Foreign Affairs, Urban construction, Land

Management, etc. in addition to the Ministry of Home Affairs);

– To streamline operational procedures by having a strong NDMA that is directly controlled by the

highest levels of the state.

In addition to these preparedness efforts, processes are being put in place to be applied in the event of a mega

disaster requiring international assistance. In such a situation, as described in the National Disaster Response

Framework (NDRF), the Government of Nepal can request help from the UN system, through the humanitarian

Coordinator, regional organizations (ICIMOD, the organization of South Asia), neighbouring countries (India,

China), bilateral donors, the Red Cross Movement, and national and international NGOs. Until the NDMA is

set up, the Ministry of Home Affairs will facilitate and coordinate the overall management of the international

humanitarian community, in accordance with the Guidelines for Accepting International Assistance and Early

Registration to be prepared in consultation with the Ministry of Finance.

2.3.2. The operational set up

The central body of the operational set up, in the absence of the NDMA, is the National Emergency Operations

Centre (NEOC) under the Planning and Special Services Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The

NEOC is responsible for the coordination and communication of disaster information throughout the country,

and acts as the central command and control body at the national level for the different government agencies

and other response and recovery stakeholders. The NEOC is located in a standalone prefabricated building

situated in the Ministry of Home Affairs premises in Singha Durbar. The building has been built to earthquake

standards and is completely self-contained, including multiple back-up power supplies. With its Operation

room, its capacity to keep staff present 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, and its communication equipment

(still relatively rudimentary), the NEOC is supposed to remain on stand-by 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and

works round the clock during a disaster. It is currently run by a nine-member personnel team under the

leadership of the Under-Secretary. Many of the staff would welcome additional training in large-scale disaster

management and coordination (with UNDAC and international military forces who might be deployed in the

case of a disaster).

Nepali Urban search and rescue capacity

Prior to the earthquake, there was only a mid-level USAR team and a limited dog search capacity in Nepal.

These are principally connected to the Army, the Police and the Armed Police. The network of fire brigades is

insufficiently developed. Some efforts are being made to move towards more INSARAG compliant capabilities

for collapsed structure USAR and develop a group of INSARAG-light trained instructors who will increase the

capacities of the Army, the Police and the Fire brigades.

A large number of people have been trained and equipment has been distributed by NGOs, through DIPECHO,

DFID and USAID funded projects, by the NRCS under the CADRE project as well as by NSET – Nepal. The

quantity of kits of equipment distributed by the CADRE project to wards and sub-wards (2 kits by CDMC) is

insufficient to have much of an impact if a major event takes place. They will nevertheless help to give the

impression that some people are equipped and are “trying to do something” and will appease anxiety and

tension.

Prior to the 2015 earthquakes, Nepal was highly dependent on external actors in the event of a major

earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley. If national capacities are overwhelmed in the future, Nepal will have

little choice other than to rapidly dispatch USAR teams, probably under regional leadership (India, China), or

international leadership (USA, UNDAC). The critical factor in these circumstances will be the state of the airport

and of the road and bridge networks between Kathmandu and India and neighbouring Nepali provinces (for

the transportation of heavy equipment which is in short supply in the Valley).

The health emergency response system

Regarding health, a Health Emergency Operation Centre was created in 2014. Having been tested for the first

time following the 2014 floods, it was activated very rapidly after the earthquake. Making the health sector

able to withstand shocks and still remain operational has been seen by both the Government and donors as

key to the resilience of the city (Merlin, 2012). There are many public and private hospitals in the Kathmandu

Valley, but how many of these will remain operational after a large-scale earthquake is open to question. The

structural safety of private hospitals and schools is currently being looked into by the State, donors and NGOs.

It should also be mentioned that the Nepali Army has been given two field hospitals to be deployed in the

event of a disaster to complement their USAR capacity.

Hospital Safety: Ensuring hospitals remain intact to save lives and treat the injured

NRRC Flagship 1: School and Hospital Safety (www.nrrc.ne)

According to a 2001 assessment, a major earthquake in the Kathmandu Valley would result in only 10% functionality of

hospitals, which will threaten the response to immediate needs, sustainable recovery efforts and health driven

development. Led by the Ministry of Health and Population and the World Health Organization, the NRRC Flagship 1 will

ensure that hospitals in the Kathmandu Valley will structurally survive a major earthquake and have the capacity to

operate after a disaster to save lives, treat the injured and support recovery.

Strategy

– Structural and non-structural vulnerability assessments to determine which hospitals are in critical need of attention.

– Phased physical retrofitting/strengthening of hospitals of prioritized hospitals.

– Training of health practitioners and engineers in earthquake resiliency and the development of national training

materials to guide hospital safety.

Objectives

– To complete non-structural safety work in 3 hospitals in Kathmandu Valley by the end of 2012.

– A seismic vulnerability survey of major hospitals in 2012 will identify priority hospitals for structural surveys and

retrofitting design. A donor conference will be held in mid-2013 to identify funding for major structural retrofitting

programmes in 10 hospitals. This will ensure that key hospitals are structurally resilient to a natural disaster and remain

fully functional for post-disaster needs and recovery.

Major accomplishments to date:

– A comprehensive structural survey is been conducted through 2012-2013 to provide detailed plans for 10 hospitals.

– A Technical Advisory Group has determined how to prioritize hospitals for the comprehensive structural survey. This

will include the 7 priority hospitals identified during a government workshop held in 2010.

– The Government of Nepal has allocated funds for retrofitting Patan Hospital.

– Non-structural assessments have been completed in 2 hospitals in Kathmandu Valley with non-structural retrofitting

(including water systems) currently ongoing in TU (Teaching Hospital).

This project complements another project by a group of partners (World Health Organization, Handicap

International, Merlin and Oxfam) funded by DIPECHO.

Enhance the capacities of MOHP (Ministry of Health and Population), health facilities and catchment communities

around the targeted health facilities to respond effectively to a major disaster (Earthquake)

Objectives

The project aims at contributing towards enhancement of capacities of MOHP, health facilities and surrounding

communities to respond effectively to earthquake in Kathmandu Valley.

The project builds upon the DIPECHO VI cycle activities, during which the project has developed the national mass

casualty management strategy for health sector, trauma guidelines, national emergency referral guidelines and key

documents to document best practices on health sector emergency preparedness. It aims to replicate lessons learnt and

best practices from DIPECHO VI cycle and where needed scale up to other facilities and surrounding communities to

increase their preparedness and response capacity to manage mass casualty incidents during major disasters.

Strategy:

The project adapts a multi-pronged strategy; at first level the project seeks to strengthen the capacities of MOHP to carry

forward the implementation of comprehensive mass casualty management systems and replication in other areas; at

second level, building the capacities of health facilities including personnel’s skills to respond to mass casualty incidents

and at third level to strengthen the capacities of targeted catchment communities of health facilities to be better

prepared and respond to disasters. Taking into account the characteristics of the highly populated population catchment

of the Kathmandu Valley, the project implemented several activities:

– Preparedness of critical infrastructure needed (nonstructural as most of the structural retrofitting work was done under

other projects, especially those funded by DFID);

– Ensure that mechanisms are in place for the response, including the support to the creation of an HEOC, connected with

the National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) which operates under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The HEOC

represents the main Incident Command system in health and can support different types of activation mechanisms,

including the activation of the Hub system, the deployment of health professionals, etc.;

– Establishment of the referral network around a certain number of Hub hospitals servicing lower level health structures;

supported by an established early deployment scheme of the Nepali Health professionals on the basis of a roster;

– Preparedness for the functioning of health systems: MCM, medical guidelines, treatment guidelines and standardized

training packages.

In addition to the development of these emergency health capacities, a specific set of activities have taken

place for dead body management. In Nepal this issue has important legal, religious, cultural and symbolic

connotations. Places in morgues and mortuaries are limited, and due to the heat during part of the year, dead

body management should be implemented relatively swiftly. Bodies are cremated, after which analysis and

identification are impossible. This means that it is particularly important that bodies are identified early, that

families are informed, misconduct is prevented, rituals are implemented, and that any other forensic

procedures are carried out as required. The ICRC has developed training modules on dead body management

which are extremely well suited to Nepal.

3. THE POST EARTHQUAKE CONTEXT

Nepal was struck by a 7.8 Magnitude earthquake on Saturday 25th April 2015 with the epicentre located 81

km northwest of the Nepali capital Kathmandu at a depth of 15km. This was not the “big one” everybody was

fearing, and turned out to be more of a rural disaster than an urban one. Luckily, most people were at home

in the city and were able to escape from their houses.

Many people stayed outside in open spaces for a few nights, but the large fields where IOM and OXFAM had

set up facilities were largely underused. There was less destruction in the Kathmandu valley than had been

feared, and most people preferred to stay in their neighbourhoods to protect their belongings and remain

with their friends and relatives.

After a series of aftershocks (including a 6.7 magnitude earthquake and, on 2 May 2015, another 5.0

magnitude quake near Pokhara), another significant tremor of 7.3 magnitude affected another area west of

Kathmandu on 12 May 2015. This caused further damage, and increased levels of fear and anxiety. Aftershocks

continued for many months. It is estimated that around eight million people have been affected overall.

Luckily, the airport was unaffected and remained operational, but was rapidly congested. Most of the critical

infrastructures of the city remained more or less functional, including telecommunications, electricity, and

water, with only short disruptions. There were no major fires, despite the fact that these are often caused by

earthquakes in urban settings.

As of 3 June 2015, the Government of Nepal (GoN) reported a total of 505,745 houses destroyed and 279,330

houses damaged by the 7.8 magnitude earthquake on 25 April 2015 and the 7.3 earthquake on 12 May 2015.

The earthquakes killed 8,702 people and injured thousands of people. An estimated 2.8 million people are still

in need of humanitarian assistance.

It is important to clarify some salient features of the situation:

– April- May was not a cold period, although weather was an issue for the high altitude villages that

were affected;

– The events took place before the rainy season when access was still relatively easy. The transportation

of people and goods became much more complicated when the monsoon rains started; there were

frequent landslides in areas where the geological substratum had been weakened by the series of

tremors;

– The majority of people tried to avoid staying too long in tents in the camps and, as soon as they could,

they managed to find shelter with relatives. Very few camps were established in the districts although

groups of temporary shelters were erected, but in most instances these were located very close to the

former houses if not on the same sites;

– The situation became much more complicated when the political situation at the Indian border made

it difficult to import goods. Fuel and many priority consumer goods are now in very short supply;

– Transporting aid and reconstruction materials, and travelling to and from the field for staff rotation

and monitoring became contingent on the capacity to access black market fuel…

– Several political events took place during the post-earthquake period and contributed to slowing

down key processes, such as the creation of the National Reconstruction Authority, the promulgation

of the reconstruction code, etc.

– The earthquakes took place while the harvest was in granaries and seeds were being stored in houses.

Due to the destruction in rural areas, many agricultural assets were lost;

– After an initial phase where the flow of aid actors was made easy, the GoN restricted the granting of

working permits and NGO accreditation, arguing that national human resources should take

precedence over international ones. Only a few international NGOs were registered. Others had to

work through a Nepalese organization or illegally.

3.1. Immediate response to the April earthquake and the May aftershocks

3.1.1. The national response

First responders

Despite its many structural and institutional weaknesses and limited means, the Government of Nepal reacted

relatively swiftly. The fact that the earthquake took place at mid-day on a Saturday, during the only day off of

the week, meant that all offices were closed and key staff involved in the response had to rush to their work

place. The national institutions reacted as well as they could in this context, with the immediate activation of

the NEOC (National Emergency Operation Centre) and the mobilization of the Nepali Armed Forces (which

comprise “special response teams”) and the Nepali Red Cross.

However, the specific characteristics of the event took everybody by surprise: the disaster mainly affected

rural areas, though several urban centres, including Kathmandu itself, were also seriously affected, and there

were several aftershocks, a particularly strong one taking place in a different region. The news on the situation

in the districts reached the staff on duty in the NEOC who immediately informed the chain of command. A lot

of unforeseen difficulties were created by the fact that the earthquake took place in more remote districts,

while existing response plans for a high magnitude earthquake were focused on Kathmandu. This situation

continued after the second significant aftershock in Sindupalchock area. To respond to this situation, the

government mobilized its full logistical capacity, including the fleet of military helicopters to deploy national

staff (and soon international teams) to remote areas. However, many areas remained accessible only on foot

due to the large number of landslides caused by the weakened geological strata.

The decentralized structure of the country (districts and village development committees), which is the result

of a reportedly relatively effective process towards federalism, meant that information could be shared

relatively soon after the first earthquake. The strong institutional position of the district authorities helped

with regard to the transfer of information to the central level, and by mid-May, the Government had

announced that 14 of the 75 Nepali districts had been severely impacted. However, the engagement of Chief

District Officers and Local Development Officers (who respectively report to the MoFALD and the MoHA) was

uneven, as was their internal capacity to coordinate the aid system. They nevertheless played a key role in the

humanitarian response and recovery phases.

As an auxiliary to the public authorities, the Nepali Red Cross Society (NRCS) rapidly activated its Emergency

Operation Centre, mobilized its resources, including many volunteers in the district chapters and branches.

The NRCS has given a central place to DRR for a number of years, with many preparedness programmes

supported by the Red Cross family (IFRC, British Red Cross, etc.). As a result of this, and the experience it gained

during the decade of conflict in the country, it played a strategic role in the early response. Light USAR teams

present in the different branches and chapters of the NRCS were mobilized in the afternoon of the 25th and

started to work immediately.

Health

The response to the earthquake was the first test for the Nepali health system since the beginning of the

efforts to improve its response capacity. Staff mobilized rapidly, leaving their families at home to reach their

duty stations in the different health institutions. It is very important to differentiate between the response in

Kathmandu valley and the response in rural districts, as there had been far fewer health preparedness

activities beyond the limits of the Kathmandu Valley. The government rapidly decreed that health fees would

be waivered during the state of emergency. Unfortunately, this information did not reach every area and many

wounded people stayed at home out of fear that they would have to pay for expensive surgical operations

and post-op care.

For Kathmandu, Mass Casualty Management and injury management were managed in a relatively

comprehensive manner with positive results in the areas of first aid, rescue, triage, surgery and wound care

and slightly less positive results in terms of continuity of care beyond discharge, including early rehabilitation,

and follow up in different kinds of environments (hospitals, communities, and rehabilitation centres). The first

steps of mass casualty management were put in place very quickly thanks to the response capacity developed

through pre-earthquake preparedness (EPP project, HOPE project, DFID support). Many of the sources

interviewed indicated that triage was relatively well organised with red, yellow and green zones rapidly

established. As well as the earthquake victims, the hospital staff also had to deal with all the patients who had

been evacuated and were afraid of aftershocks. The large number of patients who refused to go back to their

wards due to the aftershocks made the situation chaotic. Help desks were set up rapidly and played an

important role in the first days by providing patients with information. Coordination between the different

desks was essential but not sufficiently effective. Due to the prepositioning of drugs and equipment (drugs

and surgical equipment by WHO, mobility and rehabilitation devices by HI), operational wards and post-op

systems were able to function in a satisfactory manner. However, hospitals ran out of stock rapidly and were

not resupplied as quickly as expected. Contingency stocks are never sufficient and have to be rapidly

supported by proper resupply systems. This area was a little weak in Kathmandu.

The situation was much more complicated in rural areas, where many health facilities had been partially or

completely destroyed. Either spontaneously or at the initiative of the HEOC, most of the emergency cases

were transferred to Kathmandu in the first 6 days. While this was not always ideal, it was a wise decision as it

allowed better case management, due to the poor conditions in many health structures in the districts. While

some facilities were underused, others struggled to provide quality care to patients and had to discharge some

who were still in need of care. The lack of a clear referral system was the main reason for

underutilization/overloading. In many health structures in the districts, there was no MCM plan in place, and

the response was very much on an ad-hoc basis. Limited triage capacity and no Standard Operational

Procedures for evacuation meant that there was “no prioritization of cases”. This led to a certain amount of

chaos and exhaustion amongst the clinicians. The post operation and discharge procedures were even more

chaotic as these took place in a largely destroyed environment.

The Nepali army and police deployed their own tented hospitals, with equipment and specialized staff.

According to several witnesses, these health structures functioned extremely well despite all the constraints.

Dead body management remained a complicated issue. The Nepali Police and the local administration were

mobilized to ensure that Dead Body Management procedures were followed in areas where bodies were

retrieved from debris.

Grant allocation for disaster victims

The government established a system for allocating financial assistance to earthquake victims, so that they

could start rebuilding basic facilities. This initial cash grant allowed many affected families to repay their depts.

3.1.2. The international response

As soon as the earthquake took place, several national and international response mechanisms were

activated. Nepal (GoN) requested international humanitarian assistance on 26 April 2015. The reaction from

the international community was also very rapid and generous. One principal concern was to not repeat the

mistakes made in Haiti after the earthquake (the phrase, “Haiti is the Bogey man”, was frequently heard8). The

UNRC-HC (United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator) encouraged UN agencies to take action

outside Kathmandu, where the humanitarian needs were reported to be much greater, and not to stay within

the confines of the UN compound.

The search and rescue response

UNDAC deployed rapidly a strong capacity via an electronic event on the Virtual-OSOCC listserv on the

dedicated OCHA web site and in the field with an OSOCC in Kathmandu, a Reception and Dispatch Center (RDC)

at the airport and a Base of Operation (BoO) to coordinated logistics for field displacements. Many USAR teams

arrived in the country in the days after the earthquake with varied effectiveness and impact, as shown by the

table presented in annex N°3, obtained from the NEOC.

In view of the type of disaster (with the capital slightly affected but the main impact in rural areas stretching

over 14 districts), light, mobile and self-sufficient SAR teams performed much better than the INSRAG

registered “heavy teams”. The one-storey houses in rural areas rarely cause the quantity of debris that

requires canine teams.

On 27 April, the GoN decided that there were enough in-country SAR teams to meet the remaining needs and

announced the end of the international USAR phase on 3 May. The GoN also asked all foreign USAR teams to

leave the country as it began the transition from relief to early recovery activities. No additional international

teams were requested to respond to the May aftershock, which caused additional damage, as a certain

number teams were still present in country.

The health response

WHO called for assistance and many countries and organizations sent Foreign Medical Teams (FMT) to support

Nepal with medical services such as surgery, mobile clinics, orthopaedics, gynaecology, obstetrics, and

psychiatry? A Foreign Medical Teams Coordination Cell (FMTCC) was established, directly coordinated by the

HEOC to coordinate the presence and activities of the 142 FMTs from 123 organizations following the OSOC

model (tasking and placement on the basis of needs assessed and skills provided). Very rapidly, the FMTs in

Kathmandu realized that the significant and relatively well-prepared national health capacity in Kathmandu

was able to cope with the needs. There were far greater needs in rural areas, but many teams that had been

deployed did not have the logistical capacity to reach isolated areas and function relatively autonomously. In

fact, the MSF field hospital and the Red Cross health Emergency Response Units (ERU) were among the few

health structures that were able to function in the harsh conditions of rural Nepal. Thus, early in the response,

the government asked for the deployment of additional FMTs to be postponed or cancelled.

The Red Cross and Red Crescent system mobilized its Health Emergency Response Units. Field clinics (Basic

Health Care Units), and field hospitals (Rapid Deployment Emergency Hospitals) were deployed. They are fully

self-sufficient for one month, and can operate for up to four months with supplies and a multidisciplinary team

of 10 to 20 aid staff. Rapidly after their arrival in Nepal, ERUs were dispatched to the different areas in need,

under the guidance of the HEOC. They provided both surgical care to the earthquake victims and all other

health care services that were required, including mother and child care, community health and psychosocial

support. Some of these ERUs were sent to difficult areas in mountainous areas. The Canadian Red Cross field

hospital in Dhunche, for instance, had a full medical team including a surgeon, an obstetrician, emergency

medicine physicians and general practitioners. The staff also provided the doctors, nurses and health aid

8 Meaning that the difficulties and mistakes made during the Haiti earthquake response had to be avoided at all costs.

workers from the Nepali health system who were still active in the community with support. Other ERUs were

sent to less difficult districts, such as the Norwegian Red Cross field hospital which played a key role in a district

capital where the hospital had been seriously damaged by the earthquake.

Despite the efforts of the HEOC, coordinating health actors in the field was much more complicated. Much of

the response in rural areas was limited to places that were easily accessible and this sometimes led to

saturation and duplication, while many areas in need did not receive any assistance. Some villages were visited

by a number of different evaluation teams, sometimes even three health assessment teams, who had not

coordinated their visits.

Shelters and NFI

With many houses completely or partly destroyed and the monsoon season arriving fast, the distribution of

basic shelter materials and non-food items (NFI) was seen as a priority. The initial idea (based, to a great

extent, on the experience in Haiti) was to skip the tarpaulin phase and to move straight to the distribution of

Corrugated Iron Sheets (CGIS) to limit complex and time-consuming distributions and related processes

(identification, recording, targeting, distribution, post-distribution monitoring). Due to the scarcity of local

stocks and problems in negotiating tax-free CGIS imports with the GoN (which took up a lot of time and was

unsuccessful, despite the efforts and mediation of the door community and UN), aid agencies had to resort to

multiple tarpaulin distributions, causing delays, additional costs, and a lot of frustration on the part of the

population. A massive effort was then put in place to move tons of CGFIS to the affected villages, including by

helicopter and on people’s shoulders in hard-to-reach mountainous areas. Different models of shelter were

built (squares, tunnel forms, etc.), using different materials (bamboo and clay in certain areas, wood and CGIS

in others, etc.), the vast majority being erected by the populations themselves, some with technical advice

from aid agencies. A large number of cash-based programmes were implemented for the reconstruction but

many people had already undertaken repairs long before they received cash assistance due to the approaching

monsoon.

NFI distributions were also delayed by airport congestion, customs clearance difficulties in Nepal, lengthy

border crossings at the India-Nepal border (made worse by demonstrations by the Madesh people blocking

the whole Terai region). Emergency prepositioned stocks (NFI, Wash, tarpaulins) were rapidly dispatched to

the 14 open spaces that had been identified and where part of the population stayed for the first few nights.

Food security and economic security

Food security was assessed as being relatively precarious in several areas, although in many other places,

farmers managed to save most of the stored crops, seeds and animals and managed to plant and transplant

rice in their terraces. The FAO and several NGOs provided assistance to families who had lost draft animals,

milking buffalo females, seeds and equipment. While food aid was widely used for emergency relief, there

was also a large cash-based response. This usually took the form of unconditional cash transfers, with people

able to use the cash as they wanted: shelter, food, school, health, or debt repayment, which was a significant

issue for many families. The regular distribution of 15.000 Nepalese Rupees (a bit more than 100 Euros) was

for specifically vulnerable families complemented by an NFI distribution (tarpaulins, blankets, kitchen sets,

shelter kits) to ensure that the cash would be used for other priority needs.

Cash was transferred in a number of ways, from the simple handing out of envelopes to bank transfers. Very

few agencies had a pre-earthquake negotiated agreement with a Financial Service Provider, though this sector

was booming due to the large number of remittances sent by Nepalese overseas workers. This meant that

cash was transferred late, and arrived in a disconnected manner in relation to needs: people had already gone

into additional debt in order to begin reconstruction work or to meet basic needs when the cash arrived.

Debris removal

Proper debris removal is essential for the return to a certain level of normality, and first of all, to allow people

to move around. In most situations, this took place naturally and was undertaken by the population itself so

that they could return to their houses and find out what kind of life they could re-establish there. In rural areas

this was relatively simple, as the quantity of debris was relatively small (when there was no additional debris

caused by a landslide) and could be stored nearby, though there was some added difficulty due to the fact

that many areas were sloped. In addition, temporary shelters were often constructed near the destroyed

houses, and debris was initially left in the nearby rice fields. In urban centres, the quantity of debris was much

higher, transportation and storage was more complex and there were more technical issues involved. As a

result, it took a long time and many areas were still not cleared months after the tremors.

It is important to underline that no building reconstruction can take place before the demolition of dangerous

structures and the removal of debris have been properly carried out. Debris removal labelled as “early

recovery activity” under the coordination of the Early Recovery (ER) Cluster, was led by the MoFald and co-led

by UNDP. The ER cluster therefore had an important role to play and it was also important that it cooperated

properly with other clusters. The government established that only debris lying on the roads, damaged public

buildings and buildings that were a danger to the public would be removed.

Private owners had to manage the removal of debris from their buildings. Heavy equipment, such as heavy

duty vehicles were sometimes needed, particularly for multi-storey concrete buildings. However, this

equipment is difficult to use in the narrow streets that can often be found in older neighbourhoods. Many of

these areas were still not cleared at the end of 2015, 9 months after the earthquake.

A second issue of concern is damaged private houses that are still standing, but have been classified “red” by

the expert assessment. Nine months after the earthquake, the situation is unchanged. The inhabitants /

owners are not living in these unsafe houses and nothing has been done to demolish them.

Debris removal is a dangerous job, and thus requires care and supervision. The whole chain has to be

considered as a comprehensive system, with different chains of actions:

– On-site debris removal to the primary point of deposit, then transportation to a secondary storage

point and then on to the final point of storage would have been the normal course of events. This was

made very difficult and costly by the topography and the frequent disruption of transportation due to

landslides.

– Possible on-site utilization (land stabilization, terracing, road repairs, etc.).

The environmental impact of either solution needed to be assessed properly.

In order to increase efficiency, debris removal has been shared between two main actors, UNDP and the

International Organisation for Migration (IOM). The IOM is responsible for cities and urban centres, while

UNDP is in charge of villages and rural areas. They have developed two different ways of working:

– The IOM hires contractors who either contract local companies with heavy equipment and people

through Cash for Work Programmes (“daily labourers recruited by private companies”).

– UNDP operates through the local authorities and then promotes community participation through

Cash for Work Programmes. However, this is a much more time-consuming approach and requires a

lot of additional measures to ensure the safety of the workers.

As is often the case, these activities can have either a positive or a negative impact on local markets as well as

on the labour market. The latter is especially important in Nepal as a significant proportion of young men work

abroad as labourers in the Gulf States. In the field, the IOM hires equipment on the local market (i.e. cars and

drivers), thus providing income for local entrepreneurs, but also inducing price increases. UNDP, on the other

hand, procures everything it needs from Kathmandu. As a result, it does not have a negative impact on the

local market, but does not contribute to the local redistribution of wealth.

3.2. International Coordination

The OCHA office in Nepal was closed for some times and did not reopen its office in Nepal immediately after

the 25th April earthquake. Instead, a strong surge capacity was deployed from the OCHA Bangkok Regional

office to support the office of the RC-HC. The OCHA Head of office arrived 4 weeks later, and immediately

opened three hubs in the three main affected districts (apart from the Kathmandu valley), Sindhupalchok,

Gorkha and Dolakha. These were closed at the end of September, five months after the earthquake. Initially,

in Dolakha, the cluster system had been implemented on the basis of the District Disaster Preparedness and

Response Plan (DDPRP9 – 2011), which only included five clusters (without the Early Recovery cluster). In view

of the critical involvement of the District institutions, various clusters brought the coordination down to the

district level, allowing for decentralized decision-making and a shorter response time. OCHA was only present

for a short time. After the Government decided that the humanitarian period was over, OCHA closed its office

at the end of 2015, when the situation remained highly precarious and unpredictable.

Following the Government of Nepal’s request for help and the UN mobilization, the full cluster system was

immediately deployed at the central level using the pre-existing cluster system in place prior to the

earthquake. The organization of the cluster system differed slightly from the usual set up in this post-

earthquake response. For instance, when most of the camps closed down in Kathmandu, it became clear that

the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster was no longer needed. The CCCM and shelter

clusters therefore merged.

3.3. Transition to development

As is often the case after a disaster of this kind, a PDNA was launched to assess the level of damage and

quantify recovery and reconstruction needs. The needs identified included:

– Public buildings and facilities (hospitals, health posts, schools, and administrative buildings – for CDOs,

and LDOs, for instance);

– Private buildings (houses, shops);

– Some infrastructure (roads, bridges);

– Agricultural systems (irrigation, damaged seed stocks);

– Livestock and agricultural assets that are normally sheltered or

stocked in house compounds;

– Water sources and water distribution systems that were

damaged by the different shocks.

– Etc.

Though it is important to estimate the cost of the reconstruction, the PDNA was limited to quantitative

analysis, and did not include qualitative analysis of how to take advantage of the situation to “build safer”.

9 http://un.org.np/page/list/Preparedness2011/key%20document

On 25th June, exactly two months after the earthquake, the Government of Nepal organized the International

Conference of Nepal’s Reconstruction 2015. The Prime Minister announced the government’s decision to

establish “a high level National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) under the Prime Minister for carrying out the

tasks of sustained, durable and planned reconstruction”. Discussions were held with the Head of a similar

structure that was established in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake about how this type of agency could

function. On 13th August, Govind Raj Pokhrel, was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the NRA. In his previous

post as the Vice-Chair of the National Planning Commission (NPC) he had led the task of preparing the PDNA

report, which was unveiled just before the 25 June International Conference. A few days before this meeting

of donors, the GoN announced the end of the tax exemption for humanitarian products (a list of around 15

products). Two months after the disaster, all imported materials were subject to a 42 % import tax. After the

earthquake, humanitarian stakeholders had asked for a tax exemption for CGI sheets, but this was refused by

the government, who argued that some retailers had already paid taxes. CGI sheets, which are essential for

the roofs of temporary shelters, were never exempted.

One of the reasons the Government of Nepal declared that the humanitarian phase was over was so that

recovery funds went through the Ministries, who would then implement projects once policies had been

established. Many donors, UN agencies and NGOs did not fully agree with this process, due the risks on aid

integrity and are still waiting for the operational policies to be formulated in order to see how they can

operate. Some are working in partnership with district authorities and are trying to implement a response

based on existing needs. The difficulties encountered in setting up the NRA have shown that concerns about

political stability were largely founded. The Reconstruction Bill permitting the creation of the Reconstruction

Agency was only adopted a few days before Christmas, nearly 8 months after the disaster and the Agency is

far from being operational.

The aid sector has been implementing the transition to recovery for a number of months. By July all the

clusters had begun thinking about their own transition to recovery. As part of the initial efforts, the ER cluster

was activated very early under the leadership of the Joint Secretary of the MoFALD (first meeting on 27th April).

An Early Recovery advisor was nominated straight away at the RCO (Resident Coordinator Office), for 6 weeks.

The ER Advisor was not maintained as the system evolved quickly and the different technical agencies with

development departments who had been active in the country prior to the earthquake had initiated their own

transition to recovery. The task of advising on ER issues was given to the inter-cluster coordination under

OCHA.

The shelter cluster – DUDBC, (Department of Urban Development and Building Reconstruction / MoUD), IFRC

The IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross, Red Crescent movement), the co-lead of the shelter

cluster, immediately appointed an (early) recovery advisor who stayed a few months. The targets for housing

recovery and reconstruction were established by the World Bank as the sector leader in the PDNA. They are

preparing a large and apparently well-funded program with the MoUD. The first step will be an exhaustive

reconstruction needs assessment. REACH already carried out damage assessment just after the earthquake

and its aftershock10. In August, four months after the earthquake, the Shelter Cluster had set up a Recovery

and Reconstruction working group led by the IFRC.

Even though the DUDBC (Department of Urban Development and Building Reconstruction, MoUD) is the

cluster lead, various working groups have been created to address specific issues, under the initiative of the

Shelter Cluster co-chaired by IFRC. The MoUD has mainly developed its expertise in cities and it is planning

BBB projects in Kathmandu, in areas where buildings have been destroyed. However, these projects focus on

10 Shelter and settlements vulnerability assessments, June 2015.

house owners to the detriment of those who rent flats. The reconstruction of destroyed buildings will also be

a major part of the recovery in small urban centres in rural districts.

The MoFALD, the early recovery cluster lead, is very active in rural and remote areas, where their CDOs are

the core institutional level. Care should be taken to avoid overlapping of reconstruction activities by these two

structures. It might be useful to limit the MoUD to major urban areas and let the MoFALD operate in rural and

remote areas, where its local institutions have good knowledge of contexts and needs. It is not the Shelter

cluster’s role to propose this separation of areas of activity, but it could still have some influence.

All clusters, including the shelter cluster were closed at the end of 2015. As there was still a need for

coordination, a platform was set up, embedded in UN Habitat, to continue the coordination of the housing

reconstruction sector. The first meeting of this platform, the HRRP (Housing Recovery and Reconstruction

Platform), was held in the last week of 2015, chaired by the CEO of the National Reconstruction Authority

(NRA).

The WASH cluster -DWSS (department of Water Supply and Sewerage / MoUD), UNICEF

Before the earthquake, there were a lot of activities in the WASH sector. Water supply systems had been

installed in both rural and urban settings. A long-term project to improve hygiene had been running, the ODF

program (Open Defecation Free zone), co-led by the DWSS (under the Ministry of Urban Development) and

UNICEF. Despite these efforts, there was still a high prevalence of water-borne diseases and cholera was

endemic in the Kathmandu Valley. The relief response after the earthquake consisted largely in building

emergency latrines, mainly inside camps, but also in affected rural areas (1 latrine for 1 to 5 houses). These

shared latrines are not in keeping with Nepalese customs and are not well appropriated by the Nepalese. As

almost all the camps are closed and people are trying to rebuild their lives close to their former houses, the

GoN has rapidly resumed the ODF approach before people return to their former habits. As the ODF program

is implemented at the district level, the WASH clusters will be turned into DWCCs (District WASH Coordination

Committees). The DWCCs will be chaired by LDOs and will have a particular focus on Sanitation and Hygiene.

The residual emergency work on IDPs will be undertaken by a WASH task force in DWCC sub-groups.

The WASH cluster did not focus on water supply, which is managed at the central level. Local water treatment

is carried out using purification tablets. Water and sanitation systems were less damaged than initially feared.

The water safety system should be revised with the aim of Building Back Better.

The health cluster – MoHP (Ministry of Health and Population), WHO & UNFPA

Many activities had been taking place in the health sector prior to the earthquake, with support to the health

surveillance system, and to the curative and preventive health services at the central and decentralized levels.

The impact of the earthquake was strongly felt in the sector as many buildings where health institutions were

located were either destroyed (or their equipment rendered unusable) or weakened structurally, making them

unsafe.

The recovery approach was based on a series of steps, including:

– Dismantling the emergency health structures set up by the aid agencies and re-establishing health

services either in their original buildings when it was possible to retrofit them rapidly or in temporary

buildings when the hospitals or health posts had been destroyed by the earthquake or had to be

demolished. This critical component of the health recovery approach is largely focused on “destroy,

remove and rebuild”. The IOM is very involved in “destroy and remove” activities while several

financial institutions have promised sizeable envelopes for the reconstruction and re-equipment of

health infrastructures.

– Discussing how to manage the impact of the return to the health fees and cost recovery schemes that

were in place prior to the earthquake. The earthquake underlined how difficult it is for many

inhabitants in remote areas to pay for health care as they also have to pay for costly transportation

and lodgings for the patients and their care takers.

– Taking disaster preparedness in the health sector into consideration in the light of the lessons learnt

from previous efforts under the EPP.

The earthquake also revealed the imbalance in the number of health personnel between Kathmandu Valley

and the rest of the country. This is an issue that the Ministry of Health wants to address as part of the recovery

efforts, with different types of incentive mechanisms.

Food Security cluster – MoAD, WFP & FAO

Once the initial phases of food distributions with high protein biscuits and other emergency food had been

implemented, the Food Security Cluster had to address a number of key issues:

– What should be done in areas where the earthquakes had destroyed existing food stocks, seed

reserves and livestock?

– When and where should food be distributed and when and where should there be a rapid transition

to cash transfer programmes?

– How should the recovery potential of agriculture and livestock activities be assessed?

– How should the “off farm” sector be assessed and supported, especially in the different types of urban

centres affected by the earthquake?

While the shift to cash was extremely rapid, support for the productive sector was a bit slower and support

for the resumption of non-agricultural activities was largely left to individuals and the private sector.

Education cluster -DOE (Department of Education / MoE), UNICEF & Save the Children

In the education sector, only buildings were destroyed, as the earthquake took place on Saturday at mid-day,

when there was nobody in the schools. Temporary solutions were built in many areas, to ensure that children

could continue to attend school up to the end of the school year. UNICEF and a wide range of NGOs supported

these temporary schools and supplied basic school equipment. A transitional phase will take place from

September to December after which the National Education Cluster is planned to be de-activated.

The national co-lead agencies will continue to provide coordination capacity at the national and district levels

until December. It is expected that the full National Education Cluster will be replaced by a core group of NGO

representatives who will meet regularly and could be called upon on an ad hoc basis as needed. School building

reconstruction is planned to take place through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), chaired by the DoE’s

Director General, and District Implementation Units (DIUS) at the district level.

3.4. The impact of the border problems on relief and reconstruction

The revision of the Constitution and the establishment of a federal system of 8 regions led to serious political

problems with the Madesh people living in the Terai region. As this ethnic group is present on both sides of

the border, they managed to create a situation of insecurity at the different border crossing points between

Nepal and India. This led to a quasi-blockade that caused major scarcity of nearly all the goods that are

normally imported via or from India. Fuel, cement, cooking gas, and even some food items became more and

more rare and costly. It has now become extremely expensive to transport people, relief items and

reconstruction items, and as a result, reconstruction efforts are being held up.

4. LESSONS LEARNT AND AREAS TO BE IMPROVED

4.1. Clarify the policies and roles of the line ministries

With the Disaster Management Act not yet approved by the Assembly, the legal framework for national and

international organisations remained rather weak, and ad-hoc solutions had to be found all the time. This led

to difficulties in the management of the response and led to a lot of different implementation methods running

in parallel, which created problems. In a disaster of this kind, a single ministry cannot be effective, so a “whole

of government” response has to be implemented. There were signs of efforts in this direction in the response

to the earthquakes, but they had no solid legal basis.

� Therefore, the new Disaster Management Act needs to be adopted rapidly as it will fill the gap in

policy definition, and implementation guidelines preparation and supervision. All national

institutions involved in the national disaster structures will then have a clear action plan and their

responsibilities will be clearly spelled out. Revisions should be made regularly to make the policies

more practical.

4.2. Improve communication with the

affected population

In Nepal, where the political context is very complex and is still

affected by the decade of civil war and the complexity of the

peace process, aid delivery has been affected a great deal by

political factors. Aid actors and donors may see targeting as a

virtuous process, but in Nepal, it is, at best, socially rejected, and,

at worst, manipulated for political gain or to favour a particular

political or ethnic faction. In addition, in most places, lists had to be approved by Government officials. While

VDC and District officials were often extremely helpful and processed the files with energy and dedication,

cases of corruption and political manipulation were also reported. In order to counterbalance these trends, it

is necessary either to implement an extremely complex, and often costly and time-consuming procedure, or

to engage in extensive and in-depth dialogue with local opinion makers, social leaders and local activists to

diffuse any potential time bomb linked to unaccepted targeting systems.

This does not apply only to Nepal. Indeed, while Nepal benefits from a high level of sympathy abroad, which

helped to mobilize financial resources, for many governments their key concern was their own citizens

stranded in Kathmandu and along trekking routes, due to politics at home. The high level of resources that

were mobilized to locate and evacuate foreign tourists and trekkers was regularly criticized in the Nepali

media.

In addition, in many cases, the affected population were insufficiently informed about what they could expect

from aid agencies, where they could get relief and medical assistance, etc. Although agencies started to use

social media, local radio and other mechanisms to communicate with the affected population, many of the

interviewees felt that these had been insufficiently used to give information about programmes, explain

selection procedures, counteract rumours, and prevent political manipulation.

� The only solution to these two problems is to invest more in communication to establish more active

dialogue with the affected populations.

4.3. Need to develop a building code for rural housing

While urban construction is largely standardized, using concrete beams, cement blocks and special retrofitting

techniques which incorporate existing para-seismic technologies, in rural areas, the existing building code is

not adequately implemented and there are a lot of self-built houses. As a result, there was a lot of damage and

a high number of casualties in the villages. In addition, many areas were already prone to landslides and this

has been made worse by the 2015 tremors.

� It is essential to adjust the Building Code to rural settings and ensure that all building codes are

implemented in urban, peri-urban and rural areas.

4.4. Strengthen national search and rescue capacity

In large-scale urban disasters, a key factor of a successful emergency response is how fast you are able to get

people out of the rubble. What is needed is:

– a highly-trained formal Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) force capable of undertaking collapsed

structure interventions in multi-storey buildings and dangerous situations;

– a medium-level capacity in the form of a network of equipped fire brigades;

– a largely decentralized light and very light search and rescue capacity able to operate rapidly in all

areas even if communication and transportation lines are cut.

Due to a lack of trained human resources and equipment, foreign help was requested in this domain where

the quality of the response depends on timeliness and technical know-how.

� The development and strengthening of national rescue and relief capacity should be made a priority;

� The Nepalese army, police and fire brigades should be trained so that they can act as a middle level

rescue capacity. A 7/7 medium type USAR team should be established with a National Disaster

training centre.

4.5. Improve coordination of international relief support during the early phase

The first few days after a disaster are often very complicated with the arrival of many relief teams and

organizations who are not necessarily well equipped or prepared. It is often difficult for the national authorities

to know what and how much to expect from these organisations. OCHA/UNDAC normally provides the sector

with early guidance and information on needs, but in Nepal, as too often in disaster situations, many more

people than were needed arrived from abroad. A lot of money was spent inappropriately and national

institutions are still burdened with having to coordinate these different actors.

� When Nepal requests international support, it is important to ensure that incoming actors have a

much better understanding of the context and existing needs, as well as the gaps that need to be

filled in order to orient the flow of aid towards where it is actually needed.

There was little coordination of the items provided to disaster victims, and many private organizations brought

inappropriate items.

� The list of items to be provided to disaster victims should be decided in advance, in a coordinated

manner by all stakeholders. Tax deduction procedures should be designed accordingly.

Although there were several attempts to organise a “one door policy” for relief distribution at the DCO and

VDC, this initiative was not supported a great deal by aid agencies, leading to gaps, duplications and inequality.

This “one door” system does not mean that agencies lose visibility or assessment and monitoring capacity. It

just means that a more coherent system will be in place and that this will alleviate the burden on local

institutions.

� A “one door system for relief provision” should be put in place for relief distribution, using the

Disaster Relief Committees under the supervision of local institutions and aid agencies.

4.6. Enhance access to remote areas

As the earthquake affected mountainous and hilly regions, there was great demand for helicopters. The

national army provided theirs and all other options were used. India, China and the US provided a few, but not

enough. Due to high altitudes, difficult terrain and bad weather, many helicopters could not be mobilized

effectively. In many remote VDCs, it was very difficult to evacuate the wounded and provide relief.

� Helipads should be identified and marked at an early stage at the VDC and DCO levels.

� There should be a sufficient number of helicopters in country, with the security providers. The

MOHP/NEOC should also have their own flying capacity.

4.7. Raise the capacity of emergency warehouses and increase prepositioned

stocks

Although the WFP has warehouses in the different airports and in different areas, the overall storage capacity

is insufficient.

� National and decentralized pre-positioned stocks should be increased.

4.8. Improve the management of internal displacements

Many people were displaced within or outside their district of origin. This created some difficulties in terms of

relief allocation. In addition, in the Kathmandu valley, people took shelter in a number of different locations in

fear of additional aftershocks. It was very difficult to find these people and provide them with assistance.

� It is very important to find ways to improve the management of IDPs.

4.9. Debris removal and management

Debris management was difficult in rural areas as well as in urban centres. Many houses have cracks and have

been weakened structurally, and they will have to be destroyed. Rubble clearing will require a lot of equipment

and heavy machinery, and will take a long time in rural areas and in certain parts of Kathmandu.

� Policy decisions will have to be made in relation to all the weakened and dangerous buildings that

need to be demolished and the debris that needs to be removed.

4.10. Improve communication with the affected population

The call centre established in the Ministry of Information and Communication (call 1234) has been widely used.

� This system should also be put in place at the NEOC and HEOC and made more widely known

amongst the public.

4.11. Improve the national capacity for Information and data management

Due to the geographical complexity of the terrain, many VDC and DCC were not fully taken into account.

� There should be a strong IS system available at the NEOC, and it should be easily accessible by the

national disaster centre.

Victim identification, follow up and long-term assistance requires proper data management and is always a

challenge following a large-scale disaster. An open system that can be used by all agencies, and that can be

properly monitored and adjusted is needed. One solution would be a non-duplicable Victim ID system.

� A Victim ID Card system should be put in place.

5. THE WAY FORWARD

5.1. Supporting the Nepali Government in its recovery efforts

The central government has shown real commitment to establishing policies on recovery and reconstruction,

including building codes. The responsibility for implementing the national recovery and reconstruction

strategy has been largely placed in the hands of the district and village levels, as there is a direct link between

district authorities and populations and they are usually aware of people’s needs. However, it will be important

to ensure that there is a sufficiently strong feeling of accountability among district staff, and also that they

have the right competencies. These are areas where international and national NGOs could join forces and

support the whole process to ensure that needs are properly covered and that aid reaches the population.

In this respect, the debate concerning the establishment of the Prime Minister Relief Fund is of particular

interest. Although, from the beginning, the GoN wanted all international actors to contribute to the PMRF,

instead they purchased essential relief items and distributed them themselves. International Development

Partners did not follow the “one goal policy” which would have been more coherent with the OECD Paris

development Principles than to GHDI humanitarian principles and this led to a lot of frustration in government

circles.

� After the next big disaster, the international community could channel some resources through the

PMRF on an experimental basis and carefully monitor how they are used to learn from the process.

5.2. Residual and future humanitarian needs

The Nepalese government’s desire to move on from the humanitarian phase as quickly as possible should not

mean that the remaining humanitarian needs are overlooked. Even though recovery is very fast in certain areas

(urban centres, areas close to roads), there are still many areas in the hard-to-reach zones that will recover

only very slowly from the effects of the earthquake. Care should be taken to ensure that possible humanitarian

needs in these areas are monitored and responded to. At the same time, there remain numerous political,

agro-ecological, climatic and geological risks in Nepal.

� The Nepalese authorities and the aid community should remain able to move rapidly to high alert

mode and respond to possible future needs.

5.3. Promoting risk-informed recovery and reconstruction

Risk-informed recovery and reconstruction should be the overall paradigm, and this also applies to the early

phase of the recovery. This implies that risks are analysed, and taken into account when recovery operations

are designed and implemented. Specific markers could be used, such as the recently developed ECHO marker

on DRR and resilience which is very simple.

� Risk informed programming should be promoted at all costs.

5.4. Kathmandu

Although the city was less affected than feared, many buildings have been structurally weakened. Various

types of retrofitting activities have been observed, but it is likely that major difficulties still lie ahead, especially

if there is a significant new tremor. UNHABITAT and a few other actors are concerned about this and regularly

voice their worries. So far, this issue has not yet been taken up properly by the sector…

A specific issue is that of preserving old houses and cultural and religious heritage. The latest earthquake

damaged many buildings of cultural significance. Although it was known that there were high risks, little was

done to make them more resilient, or even to maintain them adequately. Specific measures are needed for

both the reconstruction and preservation of the cultural heritage.

ANNEXES

ANNEX N°1: RISK IN NEPAL

Flood – Flood is a recurrent problem in the Tarai as well as in the mountain regions. Most part of Terai

faces problem of floods during the monsoon periods (June-August). Most of the flood disasters take

place along the banks of the larger rivers such as Mechi, Kankai, Koshi, etc. Rivers originating from the

Siwaliks are mostly of ephemeral nature, being wild during the monsoon season, and they also pose

high flood hazards to the Terai. Extensive inundation in the Terai plain is due to frequent change in the

river courses, bank erosion and erosion in the river meanders. In the mountainous regions, rivers are

in spates during the monsoon season. Bank undercutting, inundation of the flood plains are the results.

But more disastrous are the floods in the high gradient tributary streams due to cloud bursts or high

intensity rainfall concentrated usually in a small catchment. Such flash floods cause triggering of

landslide, deep scouring of the stream bed and the side slopes and they rapidly develop into debris

flows capable of transporting several cubic meter sized boulders. The problem of flooding in the Terai

is also high due to the high bed load, in addition to the suspended load, barred by the rivers. In the

plains, all the rivers are widening and cutting their banks each year.

Drought – A severe drought hit Nepal during 1981-1982 causing heavy damage to crops leading to a

decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by about 1.4%. Failure of monsoon rains or its late arrival

causes partial drought affecting major crops in different parts of the country. Uneven distribution of

the monsoon rains, with several parts of the country not receiving the required rains in the required

time for the major crop is a recurrent phenomenon. Since a large part of the country still depends on

rainfall for cultivation, such phenomena affect the agriculture production of the country very

adversely.

Storm – Storms (line-squalls) with heavy rainfall and hail are common during the summer months in

the tropical and sub-tropical parts of the country. Major damage from storms has been recorded in

eastern Nepal (1980) and mid-western Nepal (1983). Storm winds of even moderate velocities have

major effects in the Tarai, where most of the houses and structures are lightly roofed. The most

occurring disaster in March/April and October are hailstorms that have a disastrous effect especially

on agriculture. While most of the hail that precipitates from the clouds is fairly small and virtually

harmless, there have been cases of golf ball sized hail that causes much damage especially to the

standing crops and inflict injuries.

Landslide and Debris Flow – The causes of landslides in Nepal can be assigned to a complex interaction

of several factors which are natural as well as human activity related. High relief, concentrated

monsoon rainfall, withdraw of underlying as well as lateral supports by toe cutting and bank erosion,

presence of weaker rocks, active neotectonic movements and a complex geological history, which has

resulted in very intense faulting, folding and fracturation of the rocks, are the natural factors causing

landslides in Nepal. But human activities are also responsible for the very high extent, and they add to

the density of landslides in the country. Overgrazing of protective grassy cover, mass felling of trees

leading to an unprecedented deforestation, disturbance of the hill slopes by road/canal construction,

non-consideration of the geologic conditions in the corresponding location, planning or designs of

infrastructures etc. are some of the important anthropogenic factors leading to landslides. There are

other social causes for the greater extent of damage. Unawareness on the part of the population and

the decision makers may be cited as the most important of all the anthropogenic activity related

indirect causes of landslides. High intensity rainfalls during the monsoon season trigger many highly

destructive debris slides and debris flow along the high gradient hill slope channels. Incessant rainfall

during the period, when the antecedent moisture content of the land surface reaches a certain critical

stage, is accompanied by landslides. Debris flows, frequent in the mountainous parts of the country,

are caused by deep scouring of the stream bed and side slope by a high gradient stream. Damming of

rivers and tributaries due to landslides and debris and subsequent sudden breaching of the dam is

another important phenomena for the generation of debris flows. In the higher mountains, debris

flows are frequently generated by Glacial Lakes Outburst Floods (GLOFs) due to the breaching of the

moraines or glacier ice damming the lakes. The debris flow travels usually to greater distances along

the river valley and destroy terraces, infrastructures and settlements along its course.

Earthquake – The entire territory of Nepal lies in high seismic hazard zone. The country’s high

seismicity is related to the movement of tectonic plates along the Himalayas that has caused several

active faults. A total of 92 active faults have been mapped throughout the country by the Seismic

Hazard Mapping and Risk Assessment for Nepal carried out as part of the Building Code Development

Project – 1992-1994 (MHPP, 2994). Earthquakes of various magnitudes occur almost every year and

have caused heavy losses of lives. The entire country falls in a high earthquake intensity belt: almost

the whole of Nepal falls in high intensity scale of MMI IX and X for the generally accepted recurrence

period. The seismic zoning map of Nepal, which depicts the primary (shaking hazard), divides the

country into three zones elongated in northwest-southeast direction: the middle part of the country is

slightly higher than the northern and the southern parts (Bilham & al, 1997). Based on the data

available from the Department of Mines and Geology, CBS (1998) concludes that earthquakes of more

than or equal to 5.0 on the Richter scale have occurred at least once every year in The Richter scale

Nepal since 1987, with the exception of 1989 and 1992 when no such events were recorded. The

current disaster database of Nepal shows that there were 22 earthquakes with magnitudes ranging

from 4.5 to 6.5 on the Richter scale throughout the country for last 37 years period (1971-2007). About

34,000 buildings were destroyed and 55,000 were damaged (DesInventar, 2007) during this period due

to earthquakes. Earthquake is another important landslide triggered. Apart from developing fissures

both along and parallel to the hill slopes, and thus generating the potentials for debris slides, the

earthquakes are found to trigger a variety of landslide types including huge rock slide, rock fall and

slumps. Some of the very big landslides have been reported to have been initiated by the Nepal-Bihar

earthquake of 1934 AD.

Epidemic – Epidemics are in fact the number one killer in Nepal, with an average of 410 deaths per

year. During 1983-2010, fifty-two per cent of the 22,306 people who lost their lives were caused by

epidemics. The pattern is not much changed during later time as well. Lack of treated drinking water

supply and poor hygiene conditions, not only in the rural areas but also in the crowded, unplanned

urban settlements are the cause for the potentially high risk from epidemic. Gastro-enteritis, cholera,

encephalitis, meningitis, dysentery and diarrhoea account for more than 50% of the total deaths due

to epidemics. Break out of epidemics after a major disaster such as flood and earthquake etc. is quite

frequent. Epidemics of contagious diseases have two peaks: during the months of May and June,

before the rainy season begins and in August, the height of the monsoon. Unsafe drinking water and

poor sanitation are the main causes of water-borne diseases in Nepal. Waterborne diseases continue

to take lives in Nepal. In fact, over 80 per cent of all illness is attributed to inadequate access to clean

water supplies, poor sanitation and poor hygiene practices.

Source: 2011 Nepal Disaster report, MoHA

ANNEX N°2: DRR Efforts in Nepal

For over a decade, the international community witnessed the conflict and froze most development

aid and kept is presence largely focused on humanitarian aid. With the end of the internal conflict and

the emergency of a more peaceful context, the aid community re-engaged vigorously in Nepal in order

to stabilize the peace and deliver peace dividends. Disaster Preparedness attracted a lot of interest in

this country frequently affected by disasters. DIPECHO programmes have been very important.

DIPECHO programmes have significantly contributed to o enhance the capacities and resilience of local

authorities and communities vulnerable to natural hazards through effective linkages, strengthening

DRR systems and structures and replication of DRR initiatives across project areas.

Due to the years of conflict and the frequency of disasters, the humanitarian and DRR communities

are quite dynamic in Nepal, with a fully developed Humanitarian Country Team, a complete set of

clusters is in place inherited from the conflict period, many national and international agencies working

on disaster management and a strong commitment of Donors towards DRR and resilience building.

Yet, if DRR has been for long time and still largely focussed on rural issues, it is not anymore the case

and the urban contexts are more and more taken into account.

The originality of Nepal nowadays is the existence of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium11 (NRRC),

an initiative arising from the commitment of the Government to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)

and supported by the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management NSDRM.

The NRRC (NRRC 2012a,) brings together aid agencies (IFRC, UNOCHA, UNDP, NGOs) and main donors

(World Bank, Asian Development Bank, DFID, USAID). The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)

was conceived in 2009 and formally launched in 2011. Driven by key motivated individuals within the

government and in key agencies, especially the RC/HC and donors (DFID, USAID), the NRRC is probably

to date the most integrative project to support resilience in a significant manner in a high risk prone

context. The NRRC seeks to mitigate the many risks identified in Nepal, but with a focus on two main

ones: the risk of “big one” in the Kathmandu Valley and the frequent devastating floods of the Koshi

River (NRRC, 2012-b).

The political context (reconciliation, preparation and agreement of a new constitution and uncertainty

about what this will mean for local government structures in the context of coming local elections)

made it very challenging, but also created a very useful platform for dialogue (Taylor, G. & al, 2013).

The NRRC has three objectives:

– Support the national efforts in DRM;

– Develop multi-stakeholder collaboration and coordination;

– Deliver key practical outputs through five Flagship areas (see below).

11 See Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Flagship Programmes, NRRC Secretariat (2012) ‘The Nepal Risk

Reduction Consortium’, Humanitarian Exchange, 53, pp. 32-34, February 2012.

A set of specific programmes derived both from the commitment of the NRRC and the lessons learnt

from the Haiti earthquake, for instance the identification and preparation of open spaces to host

affected population in and around Kathmandu. There is now an “Open Space Act, a legislative

reference for the identification and the protection of 83 sites that can host around 900.000 people.

OXFAM is currently mapping them and pre-stocking arrangements are being made for water and

sanitation equipment for these sites. Several key projects were launched both for global preparedness

and for specific sectoral aspects, ranging from by the earthquake risk assessment and scenario

development in 1997 by Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project (KVERMP)

implemented by the National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal (NSET) to specific activities

to enhance school and hospital “resilience” to earthquake, so they can continue to perform and be key

centres of activity even in the case of global chaos. UNDP is conducting a more detailed hospital

assessment, in three phases, beginning with 60 hospitals and ending with the selection of 10 hospitals

to go to a 2014 donor conference for retrofitting.

The Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Risk Management Project (KVERMP)

The KVRMP was implemented from between 1997 and 1999 by the National Society for Earthquake

Technology – Nepal (NSET) in technical collaboration with GeoHazards International (GHI), the Asian

Urban Disaster Mitigation Program (AUDMP) of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), with

core funding by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID.

Objectives:

1) To evaluate Kathmandu Valley’s earthquake risk and prescribe an action plan for managing that risk;

2) To reduce the public schools’ earthquake vulnerability;

3) To raise awareness among the public, government officials, the international community and

international organizations about Kathmandu Valley’s earthquake risk;

4) To build local institutions that can sustain the work launched in this project.

Activities

KVERMP included a wide variety of activities aimed at beginning a self-sustaining earthquake risk

management program for Kathmandu Valley. Project components included the following.

1) Development of an earthquake scenario and an action plan for earthquake risk management;

2) A school earthquake safety program · A survey was conducted of all of the public school buildings in

Kathmandu Valley. Studies were conducted to determine the most vulnerable types of school building

construction prevalent in Kathmandu Valley and to determine methods for retrofitting these

structures.

ANNEX N°3: DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL USAR TEAMS

MNMCC OSOCc

coordinated USAR

Country group

Country

Nbr

members

Canine

team Arrival date

Dead

body

Person

rescued Departure

MNMCC /

OSOCC

Algeria 73 9 01-may 10-may M and 0

Australia na na 27-apr Na O

Bangladesh 19 0 26-apr 09-may M and 0

Belgium 44 2 28-apr 10-may O

Bhutan 77 0 27-apr 21-may M

Canada 199 10 29-apr 1 25-may O 56/M

China 942 12 26-apr 3 03-may 0 131/M

France 32 9 27-apr 2 01-may O

German 58 7 27-apr 06-may O

Hungary 3 0 27-apr 06-may O

India 1415 8 25-apr 128 11 05-may O 330/M

Indonesia 105 0 28-apr 14-may O20 / M

Israel 286 2 28-apr 11-may 0 123 /M

Japan 114 8 26-apr 5 Na O 95 / M

Malaysian 56 0 28-apr 06-may O 9 / M

Mexico 20 0 30-apr 10-may O

Netherland 66 11 27-apr 3 10-may O

Norway 35 5 1 1 10-may O

Oman 20 0 01-may 10-may O

Pakistan 94 0 28-apr 15-may M

Philippines na na 28-apr Na O

Poland 85 12 27-apr 03-may O 4 / M

Russia 87 7 10-may O

South Korea 24 2 28-apr 5 10-may O

Singapore 182 4 28-apr 1 09-may O 71 / M

Spain 60 11 28-apr O20 / M

Sri Lanka 141 0 26-apr 11-may M

Sweden 42 0 29-apr 10-may O

Switzerland 9 0 27-apr 2 10-may O

Thailand 54 0 29-apr 12-may O 17 / M

Turkey 82 2 26-apr 1 10-may O

Emirates 87 6 30-apr 10-may O

UK 134 2 28-apr O 56/M

USA 286 12 28-apr 1 O 108 / M

Total 4521 141 149 16

Groupe URD

La Fontaine des Marins

26170 Plaisians – FRANCE

Tel: + 33 (0)4 75 28 29 35

www.urd.org

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