Clean Edge Razor case

CleanEdgeRazorCase1

 Clean Edge provides a distinct opportunity to demonstrate understanding, and mastery, of corporate decision-making with respect to marketing strategy, and the use of financial analysis to support those marketing decisions. The case asks students to select a preferred launch approach, BUT FOR OUR WORK, THE REQUIRED ASSIGNMENT IS MODIFIED. Specifically, students are to prepare a 4-part analysis: – Support for mainstream launch; -possible challenges to the mainstream launch -Support for niche launch -possible challenges for niche lunch Your written work will stimulate the discussions taking place in the board rooms as the executives consider the pros and cons of each approach. Because these discussions will be real-time, rapid fire, make sure your supporting work is well organized to the point! In addition, the Clean Edge case provides significant financial information for use in analyzing and supporting the required decision-making, so full utilization of that information is required, and spreadsheets supporting your work will be an essential part of the required analysis. Finally, it is quite clear that the case may, in fact, be asking us the wrong question entirely. ADDRESS WHAT YOU THINK IS A BETTER, MORE ACCURATE APPROACH, for use in making the boardroom decision required in Clean Edge 

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HBS Professor John A. Quelch and writer Heather Beckham prepared this case solely as a basis for class discussion and not as an endorsement, a
source of primary data, or an illustration of effective or ineffective management. This case, though based on real events, is fictionalized, and any
resemblance to actual persons or entities is coincidental. There are occasional references to actual companies in the narration.

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J O H N A . Q U E L C H

H E A T H E R B E C K H A M

Clean Edge Razor:
Splitting Hairs in Product Positioning

On August 9, 2010, a group of executives from Paramount Health and Beauty Company
(Paramount) sat in a research room intently observing a dozen men shaving on the other side of a
two-way mirror. The subjects were testing out Paramount’s newest nondisposable razor, Clean Edge,
and discussing the experience. The verdict was extremely encouraging. The majority of men felt it
was the closest, cleanest, and smoothest shave they had encountered.

Clean Edge’s improved design provided superior performance by utilizing a vibrating technology
to stimulate hair follicles and lift the hair from the skin, allowing for a more thorough shave.1
Jackson Randall, product manager for Clean Edge, sat in the darkened observation room considering
the positioning strategy for this new product. He had led the new product development process and
was now grappling with how to position the product for the upcoming launch. All executives at
Paramount agreed Clean Edge should be priced in the super-premium segment of the market.
However, some executives believed Clean Edge should be launched as a mainstream entry within
that segment, with the broad appeal of being the most effective razor available on the market. Others
felt a more differentiated niche strategy, targeting the most intensely involved super-premium
consumers, would be optimal. Paramount had decided to launch this technologically advanced
product into the men’s market first where the company had the strongest presence, with an
introduction into the women’s market following soon after.

As Stuart Quimby, director of Paramount’s U.S. Grooming Division, left the observation room, he
asked Randall to provide a recommendation to the executive steering committee by the end of the
week for product positioning, brand name, and marketing budget allocations for the launch. Randall
felt he understood this new product better than anyone; now he just had to determine the best course
of action for Clean Edge and convince his boss of the merits of his strategy.

1 Paramount would be the first company to provide scientific testing by a third-party lab to back these claims.

4 2 4 9
J A N U A R Y 1 9 , 2 0 1 1

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4249 | Clean Edge Razor: Splitting Hairs in Product

Positioning

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The U.S. Razor Market

Background

The U.S. Razor market could be broken up into several categories, including nondisposable
razors, refill cartridges, disposable razors, shaving cream, and depilatories. Clean Edge competed in
the nondisposable razor and refill cartridge categories. Nondisposable razors experienced
approximately 5% growth per year from 2007 to 2010, with refill cartridges capturing slightly less
growth of approximately 2% per year over the same time period. Most of the growth in this market
can be attributed to innovations and new product introductions. Table A provides retail sales for the
select categories.

Table A U.S. Shaving and Hair Removal Products: Retail Sales ($ in millions)

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Nondisposable Razors $ 178 $ 212 $ 188 $ 198 $ 208 $ 218
Refill Cartridges $ 763 $ 801 $ 802 $ 815 $ 832 $ 853
Disposable Razors $ 440 $ 456 $ 477 $ 490 $ 504 $ 522
Shaving Cream $ 271 $ 275 $ 269 $ 266 $ 263 $ 260
Depilatories $ 104 $ 101 $ 106 $ 100 $ 94 $ 88

Source: “Shaving and Hair Removal Products – U.S. – May 2008,” Figure 5, Mintel International Group
Note: 2008 figures are mid-year projections; 2009-2010 figures are estimates.

Market Segments and Consumer Behavior

Currently, industry experts divided the nondisposable razor and refill cartridge market into three
segments based on price and quality: value, moderate, and super-premium. In the last decade, the
industry had experienced significant growth in the super-premium segment. Numerous product
innovations in the super-premium segment (e.g., 5-blade technology, glide strips, lather bar, low
resistance blade coating, etc.) fueled the growth. Table B provides a breakout of industry sales by
segment.

Table B 2009 Nondisposable Razors and
Refill Cartridge Retail Sales by Segment

Volume Dollar

Super-Premium 25% 34%
Moderate 43% 44%
Value 32% 22%

Note: Information is fictional.

Paramount studies from 2009 showed that consumers purchased razors and replacement
cartridges more frequently than they had in any year previously. Executives felt the replacement
cycle had been shortened due to consumers trying out new products as well as advertising and
sponsored articles that touted the benefits of frequent blade replacement.

In addition to the traditional price/quality segments that industry experts tracked, Paramount’s
consumer research indicated distinct segmentation in terms of product benefits and consumer
behavior. Research showed these segments held true for both men and women. Exhibit 1
summarizes Paramount’s findings on these groups.

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The intensity of involvement with the product varied significantly among consumers. There was
a group of consumers that Paramount labeled as “Maintenance Shavers” who were almost
completely disinterested in the product category. Involved users could be broken up into
“Social/Emotional” and “Aesthetic” shavers. Both groups were willing to experiment with new
technology. “Social/Emotional” shavers were motivated by the overall shaving experience, while
“Aesthetic” shavers were more interested in cosmetic results.

Trends

The rate of new-product introductions for nondisposable razors and refill cartridges had
accelerated in recent years, with an unprecedented flurry of 22 new stock-keeping units (SKUs) being
introduced between 2008 and 2009. Most of these new SKUs were line extensions targeted at the
super-premium segment and promoted benefits from advances in technology.

As a result of new-product introductions and in order to stimulate demand, total media
advertising expenditures in this category had been rising faster than retail market sales, and this
trend was expected to continue. Exhibit 2 provides media expenditures for the major brands, and a
breakout of advertising/promotion expenditures for Paramount nondisposable razors and refill
cartridges are given in Exhibit 3.

In general, distribution outlets responded to the growth in nondisposable SKUs by increasing
shelf space for the product category. Razors were not purchased frequently enough to be a traffic
builder for the stores, but retail margins associated with the products tended to be considerably
higher than other personal care items (e.g., toothpaste). Distribution was also starting to shift outside
traditional food and drug stores. In 2000, food stores sold over half of all razors, but by 2009 they
represented only 42% of sales. Exhibit 4 summarizes the changes in retail channel distribution from
2007 to 2010E.

Male-specific grooming products seemed to be a bright spot in the industry. Recent trends
indicated men’s grooming routines moved well beyond a splash of aftershave. New products such as
men’s body spray, fragranced shower gel, and skincare lines proliferated in the last several years.
Male-specific personal care products outpaced the growth in the women’s beauty market as these
products became more mainstream. With more media attention on men’s grooming issues and less
stigma associated with men’s preening, the segment seemed poised for growth.

Company Overview

Paramount was a global consumer products giant with $13 billion in worldwide sales and $7
billion in gross profits for 2009. Paramount’s corporate divisions included Health, Cleaning, Beauty
and Grooming. Paramount entered the nondisposable razor market in 1962 and quickly became a
respected brand in the industry. Sales from Paramount’s nondisposable razors and refill cartridges in
the U.S. contributed $170 million in revenue, gross profit of $92 million, and operating profit of $26
million in 2009. Paramount currently offered two lines of nondisposable razors and refill
cartridges—the Paramount Pro which was positioned in the moderate segment of the product
category, and the Paramount Avail, which was considered a value offering. Neither Pro nor Avail
had introduced significant technology innovations in the last five years. Together, these two
products allowed Paramount to capture the unit-volume market-leader position in 2009, with a 23.3%
retail unit share.2

2 Average contribution per unit for Avail and Pro combined was $1.76 for razors and $2.80 for cartridges.

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Competition

Competition for nondisposable razors included direct competitors as well as substitute products.
Disposable razors provided a “wet” shave alternative, but appealed primarily to the value-oriented
customers or to customers that wanted a new blade for each shave. Disposables generally competed
on price and lacked the technology and innovations that were standard in the nondisposable market.
Electric shavers captured a moderate percentage of the overall market (approximately 27% of men
used an electric shaver). Although they did not provide as close a shave as “wet” razors, electric
shavers were easier to maneuver and produced less skin irritation. As a result, electric shavers
generally appealed to older consumers. Other substitutes included depilatory creams, waxing, and
laser hair removal.

In 2010, the nondisposable razor and refill cartridge market was dominated by three multinational
players: Paramount, Prince, and Benet & Klein. New entrants, Radiance Health Inc. (Radiance) and
Simpsons—both established personal-care products companies—had recently intensified competition
in the space. Other smaller competitors and private-label brands comprised the rest of the market.
The majority of these other competitors were priced in the value segment of the market. Exhibit 5
details each of the main players’ market shares. Exhibit 6 provides representative retail prices for
each major brand by product segment.

Prince – Prince manufactured and sold personal care products throughout the world. The
company’s principle focus included oral care products, skin care products, shaving products, and
deodorants/antiperspirants. Prince had been a market leader in nondisposable razors since the 1950s
and held the number one position in terms of retail dollar sales in 2009. Prince sold nondisposable
razors and refill cartridges under the brand names Cogent and Cogent Plus. Both were considered
super-premium products. Revenues for Prince’s nondisposable razors and refill cartridges in 2009
were approximately $224 million with $45 million in operating profit.

Benet & Klein (B&K) – B&K was a multinational beauty and health products company that
manufactured and sold vitamins, cosmetics, shaving products, skin care products, hair care products,
and fragrances. B&K entered the nondisposable razor market in 1985 with the Vitric brand. B&K
unveiled a new product line of nondisposable razors and refill cartridges (Vitric Master) in 2009 that
provided an advanced lubrication strip, non-slip handle, and superior anti-corrosive technology
blades.

New Entrants – On August 1, 2009, Simpsons launched a new nondisposable razor using its
deodorant brand, Tempest. The Tempest razor touted an advanced pivoting head that allowed for a
smoother shave. Radiance also planned to extend its deodorant brand name, Naiv, into
nondisposable razors. The Naiv razor offered a pulsing feature that was somewhat similar to Clean
Edge’s vibrating technology. Executives at Paramount had learned the Naiv razor was due to launch
nationally in September 2010. In test markets, Naiv acquired a 13% share. Estimates for 2010 market
share are provided in Exhibit 5. Based on Radiance’s past launches in new-product categories,
Paramount believed it would come out of the gate strong. Paramount marketing executives
estimated Radiance would spend over $16 million for media advertising to support the Naiv launch
in 2010. There were also widespread rumors of significant promotion events that would soon be
unveiled. Currently, Radiance and Paramount were fierce competitors in several personal care
product categories.

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Clean Edge Razor

Design and Testing

In 2007, Paramount’s CEO created a special nondisposable-razor project team devoted to
developing a technological breakthrough and providing Paramount with a standout new product in
the category. The team was led by Randall and included representatives from R&D, marketing, and
production. The team evaluated several new designs and determined that a vibrating, ultra-thin five-
blade design (dubbed Clean Edge) would be the revolutionary product Paramount needed to
establish themselves as an innovation leader. One AAA battery was housed in the handle of the
razor which provided vibrations that stimulated hair follicles. In addition, the larger, heavier handle
allowed for better balance, grip and control while shaving, and the advanced ultra-thin blade design
reduced irritation. Over an 18-month period, extensive clinical testing and consumer research were
performed. Clinical trials indicated Clean Edge achieved a 25% increase in hair removal versus other
leading nondisposable razor brands (e.g., Cogent and Vitric). Trials also proved benefits to overall
skin condition with more even skin tone and improved skin texture.

Randall managed the development and testing process and was now spearheading the product’s
launch. Senior executives already determined that Clean Edge would be priced somewhere in the
super-premium segment, and the launch of the men’s razor would occur in January 2011, with the
women’s razor to follow soon after. The looming question was how to best position Clean Edge.

Positioning

Within the super-premium segment, Randall had the option of recommending Clean Edge for a
niche product position focusing on highly involved, fastidious groomers looking for a superior
shaving experience, or a mainstream position focusing on the broad advantage of offering the closest
possible shave. Randall had consulted with marketing and manufacturing teams to develop initial
financial forecasts for both options. Exhibit 7 summarizes Randall’s assumptions and forecasts.

In order to develop a comprehensive pro forma income statement for each positioning option,
Randall knew he would also have to consider the impact of cannibalization. In a recent division
status meeting, Randall had observed a heated exchange on this topic between Paramount’s newly
hired corporate marketing director, William Kim, and Paramount Pro’s product manager, Albert
Rosenberg. Kim had been brought on board to provide a fresh perspective to the nondisposable-
razor product category. Rosenberg had been a respected manager in the Grooming Division for over
two decades and had significant political capital in the division.

When the question of Clean Edge’s product positioning was broached, Rosenberg said, “I can’t
believe we are even considering a mainstream positioning strategy. You will just siphon off
consumers from Pro. A mainstream strategy will dilute the brand power for our bread-and-butter
product, Pro. We will just be cannibalizing ourselves. A niche strategy makes more sense. It will
complement our existing product portfolio perfectly.”

Kim thought Rosenberg was too concerned with protecting his turf and not thinking of what was
best for the overall company. He responded, “Albert, research shows our consumers are becoming
more sophisticated and expect more advanced technology. Pro does not provide this. Pro is in the
mature phase of the product lifecycle. It is only a matter of time before we see the decline.
Positioning Clean Edge as a mainstream product will help prevent loyal Paramount customers from
being wooed away to more innovative brands. Clean Edge has the potential for true market
domination and needs to be positioned as such.”

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4249 | Clean Edge Razor: Splitting Hairs in Product Positioning

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Randall was unsure of the exact effect of cannibalization, but product launches in other
Paramount product categories indicated a considerable portion of the volume sales for Clean Edge
could come at the expense of Paramount Pro and Avail. Randall’s team spent a good amount of time
researching potential cannibalization scenarios. They determined 60% of Clean Edge sales would
likely come from current Pro/Avail customers in a mainstream positioning scenario and 35% of
Clean Edge sales would likely come from current Pro/Avail customers in a niche positioning
scenario.

Branding Considerations

Randall had not yet determined the relative emphasis of the “Paramount” and “Clean Edge”
names on packaging or in advertising. He had informally discussed two options with different
executives. Those executives who felt the design was a major breakthrough in grooming believed the
product should stand apart from the current lines with an emphasis on the “Clean Edge” name (e.g.,
“Clean Edge by Paramount”). In opposition to this were a handful of executives who thought
Paramount’s name should receive top billing as this was consistent with the overall corporate
strategy of building the Paramount brand name equity. The name this group preferred was
“Paramount Clean Edge.” Focus groups revealed both concept names were viewed favorably.
Randall knew his decision would have an impact on how closely consumers associated Clean Edge
with Pro and Avail and consequently influence the rate of cannibalization.

Marketing Budget

Paramount executives had not yet decided how to incorporate Clean Edge into the overall
nondisposable razor and refill cartridge marketing budget and if an increase in overall budget was
necessary. The 2010 budget totaled $48.3 million with $20.2 million for advertising and $28.1 million
for consumer and trade promotions. Randall was aware that the steering committee was looking to
curb excessive marketing expenses in all product categories. If the budgets were to remain constant
for 2011, then a reallocation would have to occur. Randall considered the option of allocating the
budget based on an expected percentage of sales; but this would not be sufficient for Clean Edge to
enter the market in a meaningful way. Clean Edge needed significant marketing dollars to ensure a
successful launch. However, Rosenberg was already campaigning to protect his allocations.
Rosenberg had been quite vocal in his stance that Paramount Pro was the backbone of the company’s
razor line and as such needed to sustain current marketing allocations.

To capture the volume estimates laid out in Exhibit 7, Randall determined a niche positioning
strategy would require $15 million in total marketing expenditures for Clean Edge’s first year. In
order to reach full sales potential with the mainstream position, a $42 million marketing budget
would be needed for year one. It was clear to Randall that launching Clean Edge as a mainstream
product would require significantly more marketing support. Mainstream razor unit volumes were
expected to capture over three times niche volumes in the first year, and reaching the masses would
require an extensive advertising campaign. In addition, considerable consumer and trade promotion
events would be needed and many expenses associated with these events would be volume based. In
order to induce trial, several consumer promotions were being considered. Cents-off coupons (e.g.,
$1.00 off purchase) would be an important part of the consumer promotion strategy for either
positioning strategy. A coupon for a free razor with cartridge purchase had also been proposed.
Randall estimated the cost of this promotion to be approximately $4 million and had included it in
his initial marketing budget assumptions for the mainstream launch located in Exhibit 7. Even
though an increase in the overall product category marketing budget would be highly scrutinized,
Randall felt this might be the best route.

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Conclusion

Randall’s gut told him Clean Edge had significant mainstream potential in the super-premium
segment. He felt the vibrating, thin-blade razor would become the new standard in men’s shaving
and would quickly gain mass appeal. However, Randall had to consider the optimal positioning
strategy in the context of the entire company. He knew Paramount Pro’s product manager,
Rosenberg, would vehemently oppose a mainstream launch, and he had to consider if launching as a
niche product for a year or two might be a better move. Randall hoped that an economic analysis
would help him find the right answer. He planned to build a simple profit-and-loss pro forma that
took into account the effects of cannibalization on Paramount Pro and Avail. Randall also realized it
would be important to develop contingency plans to address different scenarios. After this was
complete, he could make a more informed decision about a positioning recommendation and then get
started on brand name and budget recommendations.

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Exhibit 1 Behavior Segmentation of Nondisposable Razor Consumers

Involved Razor Users Involved Razor Users Uninvolved Razor Users
Social/Emotional Shavers Aesthetic Shavers Maintenance Shavers

(39% of Nondisposable Razor Users) (28% of Nondisposable Razor Users) (33% of Nondisposable Razor Users)

Differentiate among products.
Search for products based on both

functionality and messaging.

Search for products that most
effectively remove hair.

View products as the same. Lack of
interest in product category.

Shaving as an essential part of a daily
grooming ritual.

Shaving is consistently done to
remove unwanted hair.

Shaving routine is inconsistent.

Shaving makes them feel more
attractive and confident.

Shaving is a means to smooth skin
they desire.

Shaving is a chore they try to finish as
quickly as possible.

Note: Information is fictional.

Exhibit 2 Nondisposable Razor Media Advertising Expenditures,a 2009–2010E

2009 2010E
Media ($ in millions) Media ($ in millions)

Benet & Klein $ 35.2 $ 36.8
Prince 27.8 29.2
Paramount 19.1 20.2
Simpsons $ 2.4 15.2
Radiance – $ 16.1

a Media advertising expenditures does not include trade or consumer promotion.

Exhibit 3 Advertising and Promotion Expenditures for
Nondisposable Paramount Razors: 2009–2010E ($ in millions)

2009 2010E

Media $ 19.1 $ 20.2
Consumer Promotions $ 11.5 $ 13.1
Trade Promotions $ 13.7 $ 15.0
Total $ 44.3 $ 48.3

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Exhibit 4 % of Nondisposable Razor Sales by Retail Channel: 2007–2010E

2007 2008 2009 2010E
Vol (%) $ (%) Vol (%) $ (%) Vol (%) $ (%) Vol (%) $ (%)

Food Stores 45 47 44 44 42 42 42 43
Drug Stores 32 33 31 33 29 33 29 31
Mass merchandisers 19 17 18 18 21 20 21 21
Club Stores 1 1 4 3 5 3 5 3
Other 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2

Note: Information is fictional.

Exhibit 5 Nondisposable Razor Unit and Dollar Market Share by Brand: 2007–2010E

2007 2008 2009 2010E
Brand Vol (%) $ (%) Vol (%) $ (%) Vol (%) $ (%) Vol (%) $ (%)

Paramount
Paramount Pro 12.0 12.6 13.7 15.2 16.9 18.5 17.3 18.5
Paramount Avail 8.5 6.6 8.1 6.2 6.4 4.9 4.9 2.9

Total 20.5 19.2 21.8 21.4 23.3 23.4 22.2 21.4

Prince
Cogent 24.0 31.7 24.5 32.6 22.1 29.4 16.1 21.3
Cogent Plus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.3 3.7 4.9

Total 24.0 31.7 24.5 32.6 23.1 30.7 19.8 26.2

Benet & Klein
Vitric 18.1 20.5 18.2 20.0 17.8 20.0 15.2 15.8
Vitric Advanced 2.5 2.7 1.6 1.9 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.1
Vitric Master 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 4.0 5.2

Total 20.6 23.2 19.8 21.9 19.2 22.0 19.4 21.1

Radiance
Naiv 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.6

Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.6

Simpsons
Tempest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 4.6 5.7

Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 4.6 5.7

Other 34.9 25.9 33.9 24.1 33.5 22.8 32.0 23.0

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Exhibit 6 Select Nondisposable Razor Brand Prices:a 2009 Suggested Retail Price

Razor

Standard Refill
Cartridges

(Average 4-count)

Super-Premium
Cogent Plus $ 12.50 $ 10.00
Cogent $ 11.19 $ 8.89
Naivb $ 11.80 $ 9.45
Vitric Advanced $ 11.20 $ 8.99
Vitric Master $ 10.85 $ 8.65
Tempest $ 10.99 $ 8.75

Moderate

Paramount Pro $ 9.50 $ 7.55
Vitric $ 8.89 $ 7.00

Value

Paramount Avail $ 5.75 $ 4.60

a Table includes only key brands in the market. Prices are representative of most popular
SKU in the brand category. Prices for other SKUs will vary.

b Projected price at launch

Exhibit 7 Financial Forecasts: Alternative Positioning Scenarios for Clean Edge

Niche Positioning Mainstream Positioning

Planned capacity Razor unit volume (millions of units) Year 1 1.0 3.3
Year 2 1.5 4.0

Planned capacity Cartridgea unit volume (millions of units) Year 1 4.0 9.9
Year 2 10.0 21.9

Capacity costs ($ in millions) Year 1 $ 0.61 $ 1.71
Year 2 $ 0.87 $ 2.45

Razor: Production per unit cost $ 5.00 $ 4.74
Razor: Manufacturer price $ 9.09 $ 7.83
Razor: Suggested price $ 12.99 $ 11.19
Cartridge:a Average Production unit cost $ 2.43 $ 2.24
Cartridge:a Average Manufacturer price $ 7.35 $ 6.22
Cartridge:a Average Suggested price $ 10.50 $ 8.89

Advertising ($ in millions) Year 1 $ 7 $ 19
Year 2 $ 7 $ 17

Consumer promotions ($ in millions) Year 1 $ 6 $ 17
Year 2 $ 6 $ 14

Trade promotions ($ in millions) Year 1 $ 2 $ 6
Year 2 $ 3 $ 8

a Cartridge unit assumes average 4-count refill package.

For the exclusive use of L. BENTIL, 2020.
This document is authorized for use only by LAWRENCE BENTIL in MGT 500 SP 20 taught by CHRISTOPHER QUINN, Holy Family University from Dec 2019 to Jun 2020.

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/ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.76 /HSamples [2 1 1 2] /VSamples [2 1 1 2] >>
/JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
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/GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
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/JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/AntiAliasMonoImages false
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/Description << /CHS
/CHT
/DAN
/DEU
/ESP
/FRA
/ITA (Utilizzare queste impostazioni per creare documenti Adobe PDF adatti per visualizzare e stampare documenti aziendali in modo affidabile. I documenti PDF creati possono essere aperti con Acrobat e Adobe Reader 5.0 e versioni successive.)
/JPN
/KOR
/NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken waarmee zakelijke documenten betrouwbaar kunnen worden weergegeven en afgedrukt. De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR
/PTB
/SUO
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/ENU ()
>>
>> setdistillerparams
<< /HWResolution [600 600] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice