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Chapter1. Three Things to Know before You Dive into Philosophy
Chapter 1
Three Things to Know before You Dive into Philosophy
Copyright by Paul Herrick,
20
20. For class use only. Not for distribution. The chapters you are about to read online this quarter are excerpted from a textbook that will be published later this year. This chapter: 28 pages of reading.
Part 1. How Philosophy Began
1.1 From Mythos to Logos
In all ages of recorded history, human beings around the world have asked funda
men
tal questions. Why are we here? Why does the universe exist? What is truth? How do we distinguish knowledge from opinion, reality from illusion, right from wrong? What is justice? Universal questions like these are fundamental in the sense that the answers we give to many other questions depend on the answers we have already given to these. The “fundamental questions of life,” as they are sometimes called, are important because the answers we give form the foundation of our worldview—our general understanding of the universe and our role within it. And whether we realize it or not, the choices we make in life all reflect, to one degree or another, our worldview.
At the beginning of the sixth century BC, most people around the world turned to their society’s myths (from the Greek root mythos) for answers to the fundamental questions of life. The ancient myths presented authoritative answers in the form of colorful, easily memorized stories that could be handed down orally from generation to generation. Here are three, from ancient Egypt, China, and Africa, respectively.
· A god named Khnemu, depicted as a man with a ram’s head, built an egg. When the egg hatched, the sun popped out. Khnemu then “sculpted the first man on a potter’s wheel.” This is the origin of man.[endnoteRef:2] [2: . “Khnemu (Khnum),” Ancient Egypt: The Mythology, last updated April 11, 2017, http://www.egyptianmyths.net/khnemu.htm.]
· In the beginning “there was darkness everywhere, and Chaos ruled. Within the darkness there formed an egg, and inside the egg the giant Pangu came into being. For aeons, safely inside the egg, Pangu slept and grew. When he had grown to a gigantic size he stretched out his huge limbs and broke the egg. The lighter parts of the egg floated upwards to form the heavens and the denser parts sank downwards, to become the earth. And so was formed earth and sky, Yin and Yang.”[endnoteRef:3] [3: . “Chinese Myths: Pangu and the Creation of the World,” Living Myths, last updated April 12, 2016, http://www.livingmyths.com/Chinese.htm.]
· In the beginning there was only darkness, water, and the great god Bumba. One day Bumba, in pain from a stomach ache, vomited up the sun. The sun dried up some of the water, leaving land. Still in pain, Bumba vomited up the moon, the stars, and then some animals: the leopard, the crocodile, the turtle, and, finally, some
men. This is the origin of man.[endnoteRef:4] [4: . “African Creation Myths,” last modified July 24, 1999, http://www.mythome.org/creatafr.html. ]
The ancient Greeks, too, had a rich collection of myths offering explanations of everything from the origin of the universe to the nature of justice. Most people took the myths for granted. However, not everyone was satisfied with the answers they offered. Beginning in the early sixth century BC, a group of independent Greek scholars rejected the customary myths of their society and proposed a new way to make sense of the world. Their motivation sounds surprisingly modern: Although myths contain answers to some of the most fundamental questions of all, they argued, those answers are not backed by any supporting evidence or logical reasoning. But if there is no reason at all to believe the answers they offer are true, then why believe them?
Seeing no good reason, these independent thinkers turned their thoughts in a radically new direction. Each human being, they said, has a mind and the power to reason, observe, and learn. Why rely on unsubstantiated stories contained in myths when we can think for ourselves? With that, they rejected the myths and sought to answer the fundamental questions of life using their unaided cognitive abilities alone, including reason (Greek: “logos”).
This reliance on reason may sound commonplace today; it was a radical innovation in the early sixth century BC. The ancient Greeks named these independent thinkers “philosophers” (from the Greek words philo for “love” and sophia for “wisdom,” literally “lovers of wisdom”) and a new subject was born: philosophy—“the love of wisdom.”[endnoteRef:5] As the Greeks originally defined it, philosophy is the attempt to answer the most fundamental questions of all using unaided reason and careful observation alone, thus without reliance on unsubstantiated myth, blind faith, unquestioned authorities telling us what to believe, and the like. [5: According to a well-attested story, the word philosophy began to circulate after someone asked Pythagoras (c. 570–c. 495 BC), one of the early philosophers, “What are you?” and he replied, “I am a lover of wisdom.” ]
Introducing the Founder of Philosophy
At the beginning of any endeavor, someone has to get the ball rolling. We know very little about the lives of most individuals around the world in the sixth century BC. However, we know quite a bit about the life and thought of the very first person in recorded history to reject the myths of his society and pursue reason-based answers to the fundamental questions of life because the ancient Greeks preserved the names, biographical information, and thoughts of their leading thinkers to an extent unparalleled in ancient times.[endnoteRef:6] For the details, we turn to Aristotle (384–322 BC), one of the greatest of the ancient Greek philosophers and the author of the first history of philosophy.[endnoteRef:7] (We’ll meet Aristotle later in this chapter.) [6: The ancient Israelites of the Old Testament period are a second exception to this generalization: they too preserved in much detail the names, dates, and biographical information of their major figures. The ancient Hebrews also reflected deeply on the big questions of life. The Book of Job is only one of many examples. Their writings, however, are not considered philosophy because although they were not based on unargued myth they also were not based on independent or stand-alone philosophical arguments. The Old Testament is a religious rather than a philosophical collection of writings. ] [7: The collected writings of Aristotle fill two 1,200-page volumes, both still studied and discussed by scholars today. However, only one-fifth of his written works were preserved. We know from ancient lists that his complete writings would fill approximately fifty thick volumes in a modern university library if they had all survived. Some ancient commentators attributed to Aristotle 170 manuscripts on scores of academic subjects. ]
Aristotle traced philosophy back in time through a succession of major writers to the prosperous Greek seaport of Miletus and to an individual there named Thales, whom he called “the first philosopher.” His historical research has since been confirmed: Thales of Miletus (c. 625–c. 546 BC) indeed deserves the title history has conferred on him, “founder of philosophy,” for no record has been found of any individual anywhere before Thales rejecting the customary myths of his or her society and developing in their place answers to fundamental questions supported by independent reasoning and observation alone.[endnoteRef:8] [8: Some have claimed that the ancient Egyptians invented philosophy and then taught the Greeks to philosophize. However, this claim has been thoroughly examined by historians, and not a single document in the records of ancient Egypt contains a single theory supported by distinctly philosophical arguments, that is, arguments asserted independently of myth, priestly authority, magic, or unquestioned tradition. A dialectical tradition of back-and-forth reasoned philosophical debate preserved in written form appears in Greece and does not appear in the records of any other ancient civilization of the sixth century BC.]
Evidence also exists that Thales circulated his answers and supporting arguments in written form, hoping to stimulate rational discussion and reasoned debate.[endnoteRef:9] One of his students—for Thales was a teacher—raised logical objections to his teacher’s hypotheses and proposed alternative answers. That student, Anaximander (c. 615–545 BC), the second philosopher in recorded history, supported his hypotheses with reasoned arguments of his own that he circulated in a manuscript titled On Nature. The discussion continued. Anaximander’s student Anaximenes (528–585 BC), the third philosopher on record, criticized his teacher’s reasoning on logical grounds and proposed new ideas which he too circulated in a book containing his reasoning and evidence. [9: . See Patricia F. O’Grady, Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and Philosophy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002). Unfortunately, none of his writings survived; we know of his work through commentaries written by later philosophers, including Aristotle. Put very roughly, Thales proposed that all things are different manifestations of, or are composed out of, a single underlying element. ]
In no other society of the sixth century BC is there a documentary record of (a) independent scholars proposing nonmythological, reason-based answers to fundamental questions circulated in written form for reasoned debate while (b) their students, in turn, write books challenging the hypotheses of their teachers using arguments of their own while contributing new hypotheses stated in written form accompanied by further reasoning. The Greeks are the founders of philosophy as an academic discipline.
1.2 The First Philosophical Question: The Problem of the One and the Many
Thales began with one of the most fruitful questions ever asked. Here is one way to put the first documented philosophical issue:
The universe contains extremely diverse things: plants, animals, consciousness, mountains, stars, ideas, love, and people. Yet everything seems to be interconnected in some way, for the universe in the largest scale displays an overall pattern or order that allows us to make accurate predictions. Why doesn’t it all fly apart? What unites the many into one to make this a uni-verse rather than a multi-verse? Is there something—a One Over the Many—that unites everything into one orderly whole?
Historians call this a “gateway question” because of the many lines of research it opened and the advances in thought it sparked. Thales’s question, known as “the problem of the one and the many,” has been raised by nearly every major philosopher, East and West, since his day. It has also been addressed by many of the greatest scientists, including theoretical physicists working on the cutting edge of big bang astrophysics today searching for something they call a “grand unified theory” of the physical structure of the universe. Thales’s opening question has also been applied within every academic subject, with the same fruitful results. Applied to economics, for example, his question becomes, What holds a modern economy together? What are the fundamental principles that explain the way an economic system works? Applied to a nation, the question is, What unites the many different people into one nation? The problem of the one and the many remains a cutting-edge idea today.
Thales proposed a hypothesis regarding the general structure of the universe, supported it with at least six lines of empirical (observable) evidence, circulated his idea, and sought critical, reasoned feedback. His hypothesis has since been overturned—as we would expect of any initial idea of ancient origin. However, this should not detract from the importance of what he accomplished. The historian of philosophy Wallace Matson calls the emergence of the first nonmythological, reason-based theory of the universe in Greece during the sixth century BC “the most stupendous intellectual revolution in recorded history.”[endnoteRef:10] J. V. Luce, also a historian of philosophy, calls Thales [10: . Wallace Matson, A New History of Philosophy, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), 4. Note that I am using the terms theory and hypothesis interchangeably here to mean “a proposed explanation offered as the starting point for further investigation.” We often use these two words in this way in everyday life. Some prefer the more technical definitions: A hypothesis, they say, is “a proposed explanation based on limited data and offered as a basis for further study, while a theory is a proposed explanation that is already well-confirmed.” ]
the first thinker to propound a comprehensive account of the physis [nature] of the world, based largely on his own observations and inferences. He seems to have outlined a daring and unified scheme . . . thought out along rational lines, which justly marks its author as a major innovator in the history of thought.[endnoteRef:11] [11: . J. V. Luce, An Introduction to Greek Philosophy (Dublin: Thames and Hudson, 1992), 22.]
Among the ancient Greeks, the term arche (pronounced ar-KAY) meant “a foundational principle explaining and unifying everything within a specified domain.” For a modern example, the US Constitution is the arche of US law. According to Aristotle, Thales was searching for the arche of the entire universe—one ultimate principle or source that would explain the interconnectedness of everything and make rational or reason-based sense of the whole.
An Intelligible Universe?
Thales’s quest for the arche of the universe led him to raise a second gateway question, one that also ranks as one of the most fruitful questions of all time. If there is an arche of the universe—a One Over the Many–can its existence and nature be understood by the human mind through reason and careful observation? In other words, is the arche rationally intelligible? Thales had a hunch that the answer is yes and on that assumption set out to see how far his own cognitive abilities might take him.
We can easily miss the significance of Thales’s second gateway question. His working assumption—that we live in an intelligible universe—was revolutionary. The historian of philosophy David Stewart calls Thales’s rational intelligibility thesis a “brilliant leap forward in the history of thought . . . an advance absolutely essential to the development of modern physical science.”[endnoteRef:13] L. P. Gerson, another scholar of ancient thought, writes that it is “a remarkable advance on common sense to intuit that there are reasons for the regularity [of the universe] and that different sorts of regularity or patterns in nature are linked by common underlying principles [that can be grasped by the human mind].” The hypothesis of the intelligibility of the universe, Gerson claims, is one “without which any scientific enterprise cannot hope to begin.”[endnoteRef:14] In one of his many path-breaking books, the philosopher Thomas Nagel writes that “science is driven by the assumption that the world is intelligible . . . that [its basis] can not only be described but understood . . . without the assumption of an intelligible underlying order, which long antedates the scientific revolution, [its major] discoveries could not have been made.[endnoteRef:15] [13: David Stewart, Exploring the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 77.] [14: L. P. Gerson, God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology (New York: Routledge, 1990), 14. ] [15: Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 16. Nagel also argues quite convincingly that the amazing things we have learned about the deep structure of the universe—discoveries based on the assumption that the universe is intelligible–are strong evidence that the universe is intelligible.]
Albert Einstein placed himself in the tradition of Thales when, more than twenty-five centuries later, he wrote, “Certain it is that a conviction, akin to a religious feeling, of the rationality or intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order.”[endnoteRef:16] Indeed, the idea that the universe is rationally intelligible is a presupposition not just of science but of every academic subject. In chapter 2, we’ll explore some amazing implications of this gateway idea—the working assumption that we live in an intelligible rather than an unintelligible or random universe. [16: Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Crown, 1954), 261–262.]
Philosophy and Belief in God
Thales’s first theory was naturalistic, that is to say, it referred only to physical or material elements and principles within the observable or natural universe. However, according to the doxographers—ancient Greek historians who commented on the great texts of their culture’s past—Thales did not believe his naturalistic hypothesis went deep enough. They tell us he also argued for the existence of a supernatural arche of the universe existing above and beyond the material, or physical, world, a “divinity, an immortal being, something living which, precisely because it is living, is capable of self-initiated movement and change.”[endnoteRef:17] For example, in Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius (third century AD), one of the greatest doxographers, attributes this statement to Thales: “God is the most ancient of all things, for he had no birth: the world is the most beautiful of things, for it is the work of God.”[endnoteRef:18] [17: Merrill Ring, Beginning with the Pre-Socratics (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing, 1987), 2
2.
] [18: See http://classicpersuasion.org/pw/diogenes/dlthales.htm..]
If Thales conceived of the One Over the Many in divine or supernatural terms, which he likely did, he was the first philosophical theist (from the Greek theos for “God,” literally “one who believes in God, or a supreme being”). Of course, in his day the word theos did not carry all its modern connotations. For Thales it likely meant something like “the divine, transcendent source of all observable things.” As philosophy developed and as philosophers reasoned more about the problem of the one over the many, theos acquired deeper meanings.
Thales’s reasoning for the existence of God, or a supreme being, likely took the form of argument philosophers today call “inference to the best explanation.” In general, a best explanation argument fits the following abstract format:
1. D
is a collection of data (facts, observations) in need of explanation.
2. Hypothesis H, if true, would explain D.
3. No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does.
4. Thus, D is the best explanation available.
5. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that H is true.[endnoteRef:19] [19: I am indebted to the logician and philosopher of science Stathis Psillos (University of Athens) for this particular way of stating the logical form of inference to the best explanation. ]
One reason theism may have seemed to Thales to be the most reasonable solution to the problem of the one and the many is that it unites arche and logos within one explanatory structure to provide a unified account of the whole of reality. Discovering a unifying account of varied data from diverse domains has always been a goal of serious intellectual thought.
The historical evidence indicates that both Anaximander and Anaximenes—the second and third philosophers in recorded history—also reasoned that the underlying order and intelligibility of the universe is best explained if we suppose that the universe is the product of a superintending intelligence. Both philosophers sought to explain the overall order of the universe in a unified way and in the process gave philosophical arguments for the existence of God, or a supreme being. Thus, reason, argued first three philosophers, points beyond the material, or natural, universe to a supernatural but rational mind above it. Arguments for God’s existence can be found throughout the ancient philosophical tradition. This helps explain the fact that by the fifth century BC, most educated Greeks were monotheists (from the Greek mono for “singular,” literally “believers in one God, or supreme being”).[endnoteRef:20] We’ll examine some of these arguments—and their modern successors—in the course of this book. As we’ll see, philosophical arguments for God’s existence bring to light logical connections between the intelligibility of the universe, God’s existence, and the validity of science, math, and even reason itself. [20: The Hebrews, of course, were monotheists long before this, although not for strictly philosophical reasons. They preserved their religious experiences and thoughts of God in the books we call the Old Testament today.]
Thales in Retrospect
The specific details of Thales’s first hypothesis—a theory of the world which he supported with at least six lines of empirical evidence–are of historical rather than philosophical interest today. His proposal was primitive by modern standards, of course. His hypothesis sounds strange to the modern ear—as one would expect of a theory 2,600 years old. It has been superseded, obviously. However, all of this should not detract from the importance of what Thales did. What is important is not the specifics of his theory but the fact that he supported it with reason and observation apart from myth and authority.
The ancient Greeks maintained a special roster honoring their wisest thinkers, or sages. The greatest were known as the “Seven Sages of Greece.” Although archeologists have discovered differing lists, the name Thales of Miletus appears in first place on each one.
1.3 A Definition of Our Subject
This very abbreviated history of ancient philosophy has covered a lot of ground. Can the basic idea be encapsulated in a concise definition? Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989) characterizes philosophy as the rational effort “to see how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.”[endnoteRef:21] Referring to the method rather than the goal of our subject, Laurence BonJour (b. 1943) writes that philosophy is “essentially dialectical in nature, consisting of arguments, and responses, and further arguments and further responses back and forth among the different positions on a given issue.”[endnoteRef:22] These statements by major philosophers both describe academic philosophy as it is practiced today, yet they are equally true of the way philosophy was practiced in the days of Thales. The independent use of our own cognitive abilities, combined with the goal of understanding the whole of reality in a rational way, is the common thread linking Thales’s thoughts to ours today. Reason is our common currency. [21: . Quoted by Laurence BonJour in Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 1. Originally from Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 1.] [22: Ibid., viii.]
Pulling all the foregoing threads together, I believe the following definition captures the core meaning that hasn’t changed since ancient times. Philosophy is the attempt to answer the most fundamental questions of human existence using our cognitive abilities alone, including reason and observation.
Defined in this way, philosophy may sound too abstract to be of any significance. However, several considerations suggest otherwise. We have already noted that the answers each of us give to the fundamental questions of life form the basis of our worldviews—our general understanding of the world. But our worldviews influence the choices we make in life. Since the choices we make affect the way we live, our choices matter. Indeed, one of life’s lessons is that seemingly small choices sometimes have huge consequences. The big questions of philosophy are not mere idle daydreams—they give expression to one of the most universal and practical of all human needs, namely, the need to make sense of life as a whole so as to know how to truly live.
1.4 Scientism: A Challenge to Philosophy
Since ancient times, philosophy has been considered the place to go for carefully reasoned answers to the most fundamental questions of all. In recent years, however, an increasing number of people have been turning to other sources. Many today believe that we should reject philosophy and rely solely on science when deciding what to believe, including what to believe regarding the most fundamental matters. The only real knowledge, they say, is scientific knowledge. Nothing counts as knowledge unless it has been validated by the scientific method of hypothesis testing. According to this view, known as “scientism,” science is our only path to truth, our only legitimate form of knowing. Any claim to knowledge not validated by science is merely unfounded (and expendable) opinion.
If scientism is true, philosophy is as outmoded as the horse and buggy.[endnoteRef:23] But is it true? As we proceed here, keep in mind the distinction between science and scientism. Science is not the same thing as scientism. Science refers to those subjects (physics, chemistry, biology, geology, etc.) that restrict themselves to research that employs the scientific method of hypothesis testing. The sciences also limit themselves to claims about the material world—the generally accepted scientific method prohibits reference to anything supernatural such as God, angels, spirits, etc. The sciences have certainly enlarged our knowledge. All philosophers today agree on this. The scientific method is surely one guide to truth. However, it doesn’t follow, from the fact that science is one guide to truth, that science is the only guide to truth. Scientism goes further and claims, not that science is one guide to truth but that science is our only guide to truth. Scientism, then, is a thesis about the scope and limits of human knowledge. [23: Recent advocates of scientism include the famous physicists Stephen Hawking, Lawrence Krauss, and Neil deGrasse Tyson. ]
However, as many philosophers have pointed out, scientism is false according to its own method of validation. The reasoning is plain. Consider the following sentence, which we shall name S:
S: Science is our only path to truth; nothing outside of science counts as real knowledge
Exactly which scientific experiment or series of experiments has ever proved that S is true? Which verified scientific theory appearing in the standard textbooks shows that science is the only path to truth? No scientist has ever carried out an experiment or developed a theory showing scientifically that S is true. Which is why scientism is neither presented nor defended in any reputable physics, chemistry, or biology textbook
There is a reason for this. Scientism has neither been tested nor proved because it is not a scientifically testable thesis. But if scientism cannot be established using the only method it claims is valid—the scientific method—then why believe it? Considered critically, scientism refutes itself in the sense that if you accept it then you have logical grounds to reject it.
In the course of this book, we’ll examine many phenomena that science alone cannot explain—even in principle—including the fact that the material universe exists, the fact that it is orderly and predictable, the fact that it is intelligible, and the existence of knowledge, truth, consciousness, free will, and objective moral value. Scientific knowledge is a fraction of the sum total of all knowledge and needs to be interpreted within that sum total.
1.5 The First Free Marketplace of Ideas
At the start of a new subject, it is the questions that matter most, not the first answers given. Thales asked questions that stimulated discussion and opened new fields of investigation. The discussion he started grew into a “dialectic,” a many-sided conversation in which (1) one person puts forward a hypothesis backed by careful reasoning in an intellectual environment in which people are free to think for themselves, speak their minds, and reason together; (2) others offer critical feedback in response, also based on reasoning; (3) the first speaker either defends his hypothesis, revises it, or rejects it; and (4) the process repeats itself. Economists call this “information spillover” because freely traded ideas tend to give birth to new ideas that give birth to still more ideas spilling from mind to mind as the process cascades into ever-widening circles of knowledge and understanding.
The dialectic started by Thales and his students must have spread quickly, for we know that by the fifth century BC, at least one hundred independent philosophers scattered across some 200 Greek city-states were formulating and debating accounts of the universe on the basis of reasoning that they circulated in written form for debate and critical feedback. This is an amazing number of independent thinkers given the stage of history at the time. Today we are accustomed to large numbers of people publishing, sharing, and debating ideas in a climate of intellectual freedom. This was unheard of anywhere in the world outside ancient Greece during the sixth century BC.[endnoteRef:24] The world’s first free marketplace of ideas was open for business. [24: See Donald Treadgold, Freedom: A History (New York: New York University Press, 1990) and Orlando Patterson, Orlando. Freedom. Volume 1. Freedom in the Making of Western Culture. (New York: Basic Books, 1991.) The point is that no other civilization had an institutionalized intellectual tradition of free, reasoned debate with diverse arguments from opposing points of view circulating in written form among a large society of independent scholars. The idea of free expression may have existed to a limited degree in a few places in the ancient world but the idea was lost, or never carried through, outside Greece. ]
Historians call the earliest Greek philosophers the pre-Socratics because they lived before Socrates (470–399 BC), an awesome human being and philosopher whose personality and method of thought revolutionized the nature of the subject, as we’ll see in a moment.
The pre-Socratics are an amazing group. Sir Karl Popper, one of the most distinguished philosophers of the twentieth century, argued that it is part of the pre-Socratic philosophical tradition
to be critical, and to try and improve not only the founder’s teaching, but also that of the later teachers. Perhaps for this reason, each generation produced at least one major change, and the name of the innovator is openly transmitted . . . not only were the doctrines, the theories, and the innovations traditionally transmitted, but so was a kind of second-order methodological advice: “Try to improve upon the theories! Try to make them better for they are not perfect.”. . . I suggest that this self-critical methodology must have come from the founder, Thales, and that it was transmitted . . . to [his successors].[endnoteRef:25] [25: Karl Popper, The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Pre-Socratic Enlightenment (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 36.]
The historian of philosophy Wallace Matson writes that the “core achievement” of the re-Socratics was
the invention of critical or dialectical thought about the world. . . . Myths are not conversations. Their format is that of the speaker addressing the silently listening audience. But [Thales’s student] Anaximander criticized Thales. . .[and] Anaximenes [a student of Anaximander] likewise criticized Anaximander.[endnoteRef:26] [26: Matson, ANew History of Philosophy, 15–16. ]
Commenting on the pre-Socratic tradition, historian of philosophy J.V. Luce writes:
It is impossible to over-emphasize its pervasive effect on subsequent European thought. The whole fabric of Western culture is still deeply colored by its assumptions, methods, and terminology. Atomic theory and ethics, mathematics and logic, metaphysics and theology, are more than just ancient Greek words. They are key modern ways of ordering experience and comprehending reality, and they remain closely patterned on their original models [in ancient Greece].”[endnoteRef:27] [27: Luce, Introduction to Greek Philosophy, 9.]
Nearly all the great issues that will occupy the rest of this book—and that occupy professional philosophers today—make their first appearance in print in a strictly philosophical context in the writings of this innovative group of scholars.
One of the lessons of history is that reasoning together peacefully, in a dialectical fashion, can lead to great discoveries that advance both knowledge and the human condition. Certainly a partial proof of this important thesis is the fact that the wide-ranging dialectic launched by the pre-Socratics led to many other advances in human thought, including the birth of mathematics as we know it today.
1.6 Philosophy and the Birth of Mathematics as an Abstract, Theoretical Subject
The history of ideas is fascinating because one idea gives birth to another, which leads to another, and when we look back we see ideas interconnected in amazing ways. Thales’s quest for a reason-based as opposed to a mythical account of the world led not only to the birth of philosophy and the first theories of physics, it also led to the birth of mathematics as we know it, namely, math understood as a theoretical, proof-based, axiomatic academic discipline.
While it is true that a thousand years before the Greeks reached a stage of civilization advanced enough for mathematics the Egyptians and Babylonians had discovered many important mathematical principles, it is also the case that neither Egyptian nor Babylonian mathematics advanced beyond mensuration—empirical rules for measuring parcels of land and constructing large government buildings. The art of measurement could only go so far because it contained no method of proof and thus no procedure for systematic mathematical inquiry.[endnoteRef:28] It was Thales, “the founder of the earliest school of Greek mathematics,” who introduced the first theoretical, axiomatic proofs.[endnoteRef:29] Thus, the noted historian of mathematics Sir Thomas Heath writes, “With Thales . . . geometry first becomes a deductive science depending on general propositions.”[endnoteRef:30] The historian of mathematics David Burton writes: [28: See Sir Thomas Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford University Press, reprinted by Dover Publications in two volumes in 1981, 122. Heath writes, “We might suppose, from Aristotle’s remark about the Egyptian priests being the first to cultivate mathematics because they had leisure, that their geometry would have advanced beyond a practical stage to something more like a theory or science of geometry. But the documents which have survived do not give any ground for this supposition; the art of geometry in the hands of the priests never seems to have advanced beyond mere routine.”] [29: W. W. Rouse Ball, A Short Account of the History of Mathematics (New York: Dover, 1960), 14.] [30: Heath, History of Greek Mathematics, 128. Heath’s A History of Greek Mathematics is over one thousand pages long and only provides a summary of the Greek accomplishment. As Heath notes, the word geometry is of Greek origin. ]
The Greeks made mathematics into one discipline, transforming a varied collection of empirical rules of calculation into an orderly and systematic unity [based on a system of proof]. Although they were plainly heirs to an accumulation of Eastern knowledge, the Greeks fashioned through their own efforts a mathematics more profound, more rational, than any that preceded it.[endnoteRef:31] [31: Burton, The History of Mathematics, 85.]
Thales and his students went beyond mensuration by asking (and answering) theoretical rather than merely practical questions. Although the Egyptians and Babylonians knew many practical mathematical formulas, Thales was the first to look at the known formulas and ask, Why are these true? What makes them true? The historian of mathematics Dirk Struik writes:
Modern mathematics was born in this atmosphere [of Greek rationalism]—the mathematics that not only asked the Oriental question “How?” but also the modern scientific question “Why?” The traditional father of Greek mathematics is the merchant Thales of Miletus. . . . [In the figure of Thales we find] the circumstances under which the foundations, not only of modern mathematics, but of modern science and philosophy, were established.[endnoteRef:32] [32: Dirk J Struik, A Concise History of Mathematics (New York: Dover Publications, 1967), 38.]
It was the theoretical questions that inspired Thales (and the Greek mathematicians who came after him) to create the first system of deductive mathematical proof, known today as an “axiom system.”[endnoteRef:33] The discovery of the axiomatic method unleashed a flood of mathematical discoveries. By the third century BC, the Greek mathematician Euclid (c. 350 –c. 250 BC) was able to record thirteen books of proven geometrical theorems as well as giant leaps in number theory and at least five other areas of mathematics. To the extent that we regard mathematics as a theoretical, proof-based subject consisting of axioms and theorems derived from axioms, the Greeks are its inventor. [endnoteRef:34] [33: An axiom system begins with statements (axioms) considered self-evident and therefore not in need of proof. Further statements (theorems) are then deduced from the axioms using exact definitions and gap-free deductive reasoning. The Greek discovery of the axiomatic method unleashed a flood of new discoveries.] [34: The Greek achievement in mathematics is well documented and quite remarkable. For confirmation, pick up any standard reference work such as Victor Katz’s A History of Mathematics (New York: Harper Collins, 1993).]
Why was theoretical mathematics invented by the Greeks rather than by one of the older and much larger civilizations? Burton suggests it was the Greeks’ preference for reason and abstract thought that
distinguished them from previous thinkers; their concern was not with, say, triangular fields of grain but with “triangles” and the characteristics that must accompany “triangularity.” This preference for the abstract concept can be seen in the attitude of the different ancient cultures toward the number √2; the Babylonians had computed its approximation to a high degree of accuracy, but the Greeks proved it was irrational.[endnoteRef:35] [35: Burton, History of Mathematics, 85. ]
Is There a Math-Philosophy Connection?
Struik suggests a deep connection.
The early Greek study of mathematics had one main goal: the understanding of man’s place in the universe according to a rational scheme. Mathematics helped find order in chaos, to arrange ideas in logical chains, to find fundamental principles. It was the most rational of all sciences, and although there is little doubt that the Greek merchants became acquainted with Oriental mathematics along their trade routes, they soon discovered that the Orientals had left most of the rationalization undone. Why did the isosceles triangle have two equal angles? Why was the area of a triangle equal to half that of a rectangle of equal base and altitude? These questions came naturally to men who asked similar questions concerning philosophy, biology, cosmology, and physics.[endnoteRef:36] [36: Ibid., 38.]
Are math and philosophy partners in the same quest? The quest to answer fundamental questions and thereby to make rational sense of the universe as a whole? Pythagoras (570–495 BC) one of the early Greek mathematicians, thought so, as have many mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers since.
Many students, upon learning about the enormous extent of the Greek contribution to civilization, ask a thoughtful question. Why did all of this originate in the tiny land of the ancient Greeks instead of in one of the larger, older, and more established civilizations such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, or India? One reason historians offer is that an active tradition of reasoned intellectual inquiry requires a social environment in which many individuals are free to think for themselves, speak their minds, debate, and freely trade ideas unconstrained by the ruling authorities, rigid social mores, or the weight of tradition. By the sixth century BC, the Greeks had achieved the necessary degree of intellectual and social freedom; other ancient societies had not. Which brings us to another major advance in human thought that we owe to the pre-Socratics.
1.7 Philosophy and The Birth of the Idea of Freedom
The ancient Greeks were the first people in history to set up a working democracy (Greek for “rule by the people”) complete with voting machines, jury trials, citizens running for public offices, government officials who could be removed from office by the people, and written laws passed by elected assemblies and posted in public for all to read. These revolutionary advances stemmed from an earlier and equally significant Greek innovation: The Greeks were the first to give philosophical expression to—and to publicly debate–the ideals of freedom, individual rights, constitutionalism, trial by jury, citizen participation in government, and democracy. The system of government they established was not perfect—their professed ideals were not fully realized. (Should we expect humanity’s first steps toward freedom to have been perfect?) Yet that system was the first step in world history in the direction of modernity.
Many historians have noted that the ancient Greeks placed an unusually high value on freedom, reason, individualism, rationally justified institutions, consensual government, private property, and the idea of power limited by democratic restraint. The claim is borne out by the facts. The Athenian state was limited by a written constitution based on an articulated concept of the rule of law. Greek generals were subject to recall by the people. The Greek infantrymen, or hoplites (from hoplon, the Greek word for “shield”), went into battle as free men, that is, as citizens possessing rights and liberties guaranteed by law. Each hoplite also fought to defend his own private property—land and goods he held by a right guaranteed by the state—a state he had helped elect and in which he had a say. [endnoteRef:37] In the ancient world the philosophical ideals of freedom, individualism, citizenship, the rule of law, and democracy existed nowhere else. [37: See Orlando Patterson, Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1992.). It is true that the Code of Hamurabi is a legal code and constitution of sorts, but it begins with an invocation of the gods as the source of all authority, it states the divine origin of government, and it justifies slavery. It is also true that an idea of freedom, swaraj, appears slightly earlier in the Hindu Upanishads and in the Bhagavad-Gita, but it is a spiritual rather than a civic or a political freedom, an inner freedom, and it is not given philosophical expression, that is, articulation independent of unbacked myth, unexamined religious authority, or custom. Rather, it is embedded within a religious and mythical tradition. I have also been told (by Jim Slagle in correspondence) that there is a Hebrew word for “freedom,” khufshah (in Leviticus 19:20). However, it is my understanding that this is a spiritual rather than a civic freedom. ]
In 490 BC and again in 480 BC Persia—the largest and most powerful empire in the world at the time–invaded Greece, one of the smallest nations in the world. Despite being vastly outnumbered (in some battles the Greeks were outnumbered hundreds to 1), both times the Greeks beat back the Persians to save their freedom.[endnoteRef:38] After the Greco-Persian Wars (as the encounters are called), the Greek historian Herodotus (c. 484-425 BC) analyzed the conflict as a titanic struggle between two opposing cultures or ways of life: freedom vs slavery. In his famous history of the conflict, he noted that the Greek hoplites fought as
citizens
possessing rights and liberties guaranteed by a written constitution that strictly limited the power of the state. Each hoplite, he emphasized, fought to defend a government he had helped elect. [endnoteRef:39] [38: Persia (centered approximately in present-day Iran) encompassed some five million square miles of conquered territory and fifty million conquered people (almost half the world’s population at the time). Greece was a tiny country of four or five million people occupying 132,000 square miles. ] [39: See Orlando Patterson, Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1992.). It is true that the Code of Hamurabi is a legal code and constitution of sorts, but it begins with an invocation of the gods as the source of all authority, it states the divine origin of government, and it justifies slavery. It is also true that an idea of freedom, swaraj, appears slightly earlier in the Hindu Upanishads and in the Bhagavad-Gita, but it is a spiritual rather than a civic or a political freedom, an inner freedom, and it is not given philosophical expression, that is, articulation independent of unbacked myth, unexamined religious authority, or custom. Rather, it is embedded within a religious and mythical tradition. I have also been told (by Jim Slagle in correspondence) that there is a Hebrew word for “freedom,” khufshah (in Leviticus 19:20). However, it is my understanding that this is a spiritual rather than a civic freedom. ]
The Persians, on the other hand, fought as unfree subjects forced into battle by an all-powerful, authoritarian, and unelected despot who had absolute say over everything and everyone. (Persian troops were literally driven into battle by overseers wielding whips.) The Persian king Xerxes held legal title to all land—he could confiscate anyone’s property arbitrarily and at will. Each Persian soldier was legally a “chattel” of the King, according to Babylonian law. Not only was there no legal definition or even free discussion of freedom in Persia—“even satraps [governors] were referred to as slaves in imperial correspondence.”[endnoteRef:40] Merely disagreeing with the Persian King could mean death. Indeed, like twentieth century dictators, the Persian despot actually possessed a secret police, called “the King’s eyes and ears,” which reported and brutally squashed any political dissent. [40: Even the “grand vizier,” the King’s second-in-command, called himself a “slave of the great king.” See Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Powers (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 34. ]
No one in ancient Persia freely debated philosophical concepts of freedom, individualism, democracy, rights, elections, and the gateway idea of a government limited by a constitution to the rule of law. Everyone kneeled in a subservient manner before Xerxes, whose self-title was “King of all Kings.” No citizen kneeled before a governor in ancient Greece.
Box Herodotus is often called “the founder of history as an academic subject” because he was the first person on record to attempt a critical, reason-based account of the past independent of unquestioned myth and absolute religious or priestly authority, an analysis that is not merely a glorification of a ruler, an account that attempts to go beyond a mere chronology of events. Herodotus directed criticism wherever he felt it was deserved, including at his own society, ancient Greece. As works of reason-based critical thinking applied to the past, his historical writings were unprecedented in world history. Unlike all previous writers, he didn’t merely chronicle events, he analyzed them on the basis of reasons and evidence. And unlike those before him, Herodotus called his own society into question when he felt criticism was called for. The Greeks are the inventors of history as an academic subject. Box.
1.8. Retrospective on the pre-Socratics
When we look back on the world’s first free marketplace of ideas we see more nuanced hypotheses emerging with each new round of rational discussion. The wide-ranging dialectic launched by the pre-Socratics led to major advances in human thought, including the following.
· The birth of philosophy as an academic subject presented in written form.
· The first system of formal, theoretical mathematics complete with a system of proof (called an “axiom system” today).
· The first systematic, reason-based investigation of nature, which the Greeks named “physics” (from the Greek word for nature, physis).
· The first distinctively philosophical theories of freedom, democracy, self-rule, citizenship, individual rights, constitutional government, and the rule of law.
· The first works of history as an academic, critical-thinking based subject.
· The first strictly philosophical writings on the nature of mind, free will, knowledge and truth, morality, and the existence and nature of God.
Edith Hamilton, one of the wisest to comment on them, calls the ancient Greeks “the first Westerners.” “The spirit of the West, the modern spirit,” she writes, “is a Greek discovery; and the place of the Greeks is in the modern world.” [endnoteRef:41] Whether we realize it or not, she argues, “we have all been schooled by the Greeks.” [41: Edith Hamilton, The Greek Way. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1930), 14.]
Thales and his conversation partners spawned a new way to make sense of the world, a freer mode of thinking, a promising way for thought to advance. One of the lessons of history deserves repeating: we make the most progress when we respectfully reason together in a back-and-forth process of argument and counterargument in a setting in which we are free to think for ourselves and express our thoughts rationally. The intellectually dormant parts of the world today remain those places where the minds and wills of the people are shackled by authoritarian governments, totalitarian religious authorities, and rigid cultural attitudes that prevent people from reasoning freely and openly about the fundamental questions of life.
During the fifth century B.C. a philosopher was born who devoted his life, and ultimately gave his life, for the cause of reason, freedom, and unfettered philosophical discussion. He also contributed something of inestimable value to the emerging discipline of philosophy. His name was Socrates.
Part 2. The Socratic Method
2.1 Introducing Socrates
The second thing it’s good to know before we dive into philosophy is the method of thought first taught by the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates (470–399 BC). Although he never wrote a book or lectured at a university, Socrates was one of the most influential individuals of all time. His unique contribution, the “Socratic method,” remains a central part of philosophical inquiry twenty-four centuries after his death. And Socrates has never become outdated: new books and scholarly papers on his philosophy appear every year. We’ll turn to his famous method after a brief look at his life and times, for Socrates’s great contribution only comes alive and acquires its full meaning in the context of the amazing life he lived.
Socrates was born in a modest neighborhood located just outside the south entrance to Athens, Greece. In his teens, he became interested in philosophy, geometry, and theoretical physics. According to his student Xenophon (c. 428–c. 354 BC), Socrates and his friends met regularly to read “together the treasuries of ancient wisdom in books, and to [make] extracts from them.”[endnoteRef:42] Thus, as a youth Socrates began a lifelong quest to answer the fundamental questions of life using his own powers of reason and observation. As he read and discussed works of philosophy with his friends, he came to believe that we learn best not when we lock ourselves away alone like a hermit on a mountaintop, but when we actively reason together with others in serious conversation, receiving and giving thoughtful feedback. [42: Quoted in W. K. C. Guthrie, Socrates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 53. ]
He served as an infantryman in the Athenian army from his teens into his fifties and fought on the front lines in numerous military campaigns.[endnoteRef:43] His bravery in battle became legendary. According to all accounts, he was a fearless combat soldier. This is remarkable when you consider the nature of ancient warfare. In Socrates’s day, Greek infantrymen marched across the battlefield side by side in the phalanx formation, thousands at a time. As the Athenian phalanx approached the opposing force, the men increased the pace to crash into the enemy line at the “double-quick.” Blood and severed limbs would be flying everywhere. The Greek hoplite confronted the enemy in personal, face-to-face, hand-to-hand combat. Infantry warfare in Socrates’s day was unimaginably brutal, bloody, and horrific.[endnoteRef:44] On numerous occasions his commanders tried to decorate him for bravery, but he turned them down, suggesting the medals be given to others. [43: Some question whether his military service is relevant to his life as a philosopher. Surely it helped shape his character and gave him a perspective on what’s important in life. Perhaps his distaste for violence stemmed in part from his experience in battle. Seeing the worst of life in battle certainly affected his philosophy of life. ] [44: See Nicholas Sekunda, Greek Hoplite 480–323 BC: Weapons, Armour, Tactics (Elms Court, UK: Osprey, 2000). ]
Some wonder how a philosopher can serve as a dedicated combat soldier. In his personal life Socrates opposed violence in all forms, but when he was required to defend his beloved city, he felt morally bound to answer the call of duty. He even gave a philosophical argument in defense of his commitment to the laws of Athens. (Plato recreates Socrates’s argument in the dialogue known as the Crito.)
According to his friends, Socrates cared little for fame, money, material possessions, or physical comforts. Discussing the big questions of life with others so as to attain the most reasonable worldview mattered much more to him. While walking through the busy agora (marketplace) in downtown Athens one day, he is reported to have said, “So many things I can do without.” His student Xenophon, who went on to become a war hero, writer, and famous general, described Socrates as “frugal” and said that even shoes were too much of a bother for him: Socrates was known to go barefoot all year long, even on winter military campaigns and even during battles fought in the snow. Every day he wore the same old cloak too—the one he also slept in. Although he could have had more possessions, Socrates sought an uncluttered life and practiced what is today called “voluntary simplicity.”[endnoteRef:45] [45: On voluntary simplicity today, see http://www.choosingvoluntarysimplicity.com/ and http://www.enjoysimpleliving.blogspot.com/. ]
Socratic Suggestion. Take an inventory of your possessions and remove unnecessary clutter from your life to make more room for the most important things.
Because he believed that answers to fundamental questions were best pursued on the basis of careful reasoning and in serious conversation with others, Socrates could often be found sitting in the marketplace of Athens discussing philosophical issues with anyone who cared to join in. According to eyewitness accounts, in these discussions he treated everyone—regardless of social standing—with equal respect. His commitment to human equality and to the intrinsic value of each individual was a novel moral attitude in his day. Those discussions in the marketplace must have been fascinating, for crowds would often gather to listen.
Socrates married late in life; he and his wife Xanthippe had three children (all boys). Their marriage, according to some accounts, had its moments. In one incident, Xanthippe climbed onto the roof and poured a bucket of pee on Socrates’s head as he left the house for one of his philosophy discussions in the agora. He is said to have later quipped to his friends, “Well, after the thunder comes the rain.” It could not have been easy being the wife of a philosopher who wants to hang out all day in the marketplace talking big ideas with anyone who cares to join in. Accounts by Plato and Xenophon suggest, however, that the marriage was a good one.
2.2 Life’s Mission Found
At some point around the middle of his life, in part as a result of his conversations in the marketplace, Socrates became convinced that many people think that they know what they are talking about when in reality they do not have a clue. He came to believe that many people, including famous politicians and smug experts, are in the grips of illusion. Their alleged knowledge is a mirage. Similarly, he also saw that many believe that they are doing the morally right thing when they are really only fooling themselves—their actions cannot be rationally justified. At the same time, he also believed that people blinded by illusions could improve their lives by using their own powers of reason and observation more fully. As this realization sank in, Socrates found his life’s purpose: he would help people use their own innate reasoning ability to discover their own ignorance and uncover their illusions as a first step to attaining more reality-based beliefs and values. But how to proceed?
Some people, when convinced that others are deluded, want to grab them by their collars and yell at them. Others try to force people to change their minds. Many people today believe violence is the only solution. None of this was for Socrates. He felt so much respect for each individual—even those in the grips of illusion and moral error—that intimidation and violence were unthinkable. His was a completely different approach: he asked people questions. Not just any questions, though. He asked questions designed to cause others to look in the mirror and challenge their own assumptions on the basis of rational and realistic standards of evidence.
When Socrates got through to someone on an issue, these are among the questions they would be asking themselves: Why do I believe this? What is my evidence? Are my assumptions on this matter really true? Or am I overlooking something? Have I looked at all the evidence or only that which supports my preexisting view? Are my actions morally right? Or am I only rationalizing bad behavior?
Looking in the mirror in a Socratic way can be painful. For reasons perhaps best left to psychologists, it is easy to criticize others, but it is hard to question and challenge ourselves. There are intellectual hurdles as well. Which standards, or criteria, should we apply when we test our basic beliefs and values?
Socrates, by his example, stimulated a great deal of research into this question. Over the years, many criteria for rational, reality-based thinking have been proposed, tested, and accepted as reliable guides to truth, with truth understood as correspondence with the facts or with reality. These standards are studied in the field of philosophy known as “logic”—the study of the principles of correct reasoning. We’ll examine some of these principles in the next section of this chapter.
Today we call someone whose thinking is guided by realistic and rational criteria a “critical thinker.” (We also call such a person “reflective.”) Our current notion of criterial, or critical, thinking grew directly out of the philosophy of Socrates. Thus, the highly respected Center for Critical Thinking begins its history of the subject with this statement: “The intellectual roots of critical thinking are as ancient as its etymology, traceable, ultimately, to the teaching practice and vision of Socrates 2,500 years ago.”[endnoteRef:46] For this reason, many historians of thought consider Socrates to be the founder of critical thinking as a systematic and disciplined form of inquiry. [46: See “A Brief History of the Idea of Critical Thinking,” The Foundation for Critical Thinking, http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/a-brief-history-of-the-idea-of-critical-thinking/408. Taken from the California Teacher Preparation for Instruction in Critical Thinking: Research Findings and Policy Recommendations: State of California, California Commission on Teacher Credentialing, Sacramento, CA, March 1997. Principal authors: Richard Paul, Linda Elder, and Ted Bartell.]
His unique method of thought had a huge impact on those he talked with but also on those who have applied it since his time. Over the centuries, many have discovered that they can improve their lives by looking in the mirror and asking themselves Socratic questions. So many valuable insights have resulted from the example he set that it is impossible to distill the Socratic method into a few words. Here is my attempt:
Never be afraid to question your beliefs and values on the basis of rational, realistic criteria and an honest look at the evidence. When examining your beliefs, ask yourself questions like these: Are my assumptions on this issue really true? Or am I mistaken? Am I overlooking something important? What are my grounds? What does the evidence indicate? When examining your values, ask yourself questions like these: Are my actions morally right? Or am I only fooling myself and rationalizing bad behavior? Will I be proud of my actions ten years from now, or ashamed?
Test your assumptions frequently by discussing them with others. When you do, listen closely to what they have to say. They might see something you missed. When someone makes a statement you disagree with, don’t automatically assume the person is wrong. Ask for a supporting argument. Listen calmly and try to understand where the person is coming from. He (or she) might have something to teach you. Just as you bring a body of knowledge to the discussion and see the matter through your own worldview lens, others see the world through their own lens and contribute their own knowledge. This is not to say there is no objective truth of the matter. But both of you are more likely to reach it if you listen to each other and look for the value in the other’s point of view. Together you might see further than you see separately. The Socratic point is that if the two of you will listen to each other and look for the value in the other person’s point of view and if you will both evaluate your assumptions on the basis of rational standards, you both might learn something. The other person’s information might broaden your view, and your information might broaden the other person’s view.
Finally, sometimes we are not clear when we express ourselves. If the other person’s thinking is vague or disorganized, don’t assume he is hopelessly mixed up. Ask him to clarify his ideas and help him by asking good questions. Again, the other person might just have something to teach you. The reverse, of course, is true as well.
Socrates’s approach to life is as relevant and alive today as it was in the fifth century BC when he challenged his fellow Athenians to question their assumptions and passionately search for the truth using their own cognitive capacities, including disciplined reason and careful observation guided by tested criteria.
Socratic Suggestion. Withdraw from the commotion from time to time and think critically about your life. If you are not doing so already, strive to become a “reflective person.”
So, moved by the pervasiveness of ignorance, bias, egocentrism, half-truths, rationalization, and the way these shortcomings diminish the human condition, Socrates spent the rest of his life urging people to be reflective and examine their assumptions in the light of rational standards as the first step to attaining true wisdom.
Critical or reflective thinking requires courage, for one of the first things a critical thinker often uncovers is his or her own ignorance and personal failings. But uncovering one’s own flaws is a prerequisite for moral and intellectual growth, as Socrates argued. For just as a contractor must clear away brush before building a house, people must clear away ignorance and error before building knowledge. As this reality sank in, his conversations in the marketplace shifted from the big questions of cosmology (from the Greek kosmologia for “the study of the universe as a systematic and beautiful whole”) to questions about the human condition, the proper care of one’s soul, and to the question he now believed to be the most important of all: What is the best way to live, all things considered?
1. What exactly do you mean by that?
Socrates would ask this when he believed his conversation partner’s thinking was unclear or mixed up. For how can we get at the truth of a matter if we are not even sure what we are talking about? When he asked this first question, Socrates was seeking a precise definition of a key idea. A definition is “an explanation of the meaning of a word or phrase.” It probably goes without saying that the foggier the idea, the more detailed the definition should be.
2.
Why do you believe that?
Socrates asked this question when he suspected that his interlocutor’s claim lacked a basis in reality. When he asked this question, Socrates was seeking an argument for a key claim. An argument, as philosophers use the word, is one or more statements, called “premises,” offered as evidence or reasons to believe that a further statement, called the “conclusion,” is true. Many people, upon being asked either of these Socratic questions, have come to see that their idea is unrealistic and needs revision.
Socrates’s mission—to help others discover their own ignorance as the first step on the path to wisdom—explains why he expected honesty on the part of his interlocutors. If the other person did not answer honestly, he would not be led to examine his own beliefs and values. And if he did not look in the mirror, he would not advance. For Socrates, honest self-examination guided by reason was one of life’s most important tasks. This is why Socrates carried on his philosophical mission in the agora in one-on-one conversations with individuals rather than in lectures to crowds.
His emphasis on individual self-examination also explains why Socrates compared his role in conversation to that of a midwife. Just as the midwife helps the mother give birth but does not herself give birth, Socrates helped his interlocutors give birth to more realistic beliefs of their own—truths they discovered using their own power of reason. The philosopher Ronald Gross writes that when Socrates acted as an intellectual midwife, we can almost hear him saying, “Push! Push! You can bring forth a better idea!” The Socratic process of giving birth to a better idea, Gross observes, can be “painful.” Yet at the same time, it can be “immensely gratifying.”[endnoteRef:47] [47: Ronald Gross, Socrates’ Way: Seven Master Keys to Using Your Mind to Its Utmost (New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher / Putnam, 2002), 9.]
Socratic Suggestion. Examine your values regularly, asking yourself, Are my actions morally right? Am I doing the right thing? Or am I only fooling myself? Am I only rationalizing bad behavior? Be honest with yourself. Socratic self-examination requires honesty because it is about self-reform.
I mentioned earlier that Socrates never wrote a book. Many find this fact surprising. How, they ask, do we know so many details about a man who left behind no written works? The answer is that we know about him thanks to the writings of his students. After his execution in Athens in 399 BC (for reasons we’ll examine), at least eleven of them wrote entire books in which they tried to preserve their remarkable conversations with their teacher.[endnoteRef:48] The writings of his most famous student, Plato (429–347 BC), stand out. After Socrates died, Plato spent the rest of his life memorializing his teacher in a series of dramatic dialogues that re-created the conversations of Socrates that he witnessed. Plato’s Dialogues total more than two thousand pages and are considered by scholars to be among the most beautifully written works of philosophy and literature in world history. In all but one, Socrates is the central character, challenging others to think more deeply about fundamental questions concerning knowledge, truth, justice, morality, the care of the soul, God, and how to live the best life possible on earth. In many of his dialogues, Plato introduces new theories of his own—new ways of thinking inspired by and based upon the thoughts of his teacher. The philosophy of Plato is one of the most influential systems of ideas in world history and it remains influential today. There are scholars who spend their entire careers analyzing his thought and finding new insights on fundamental matters. New scholarly studies of Plato’s philosophy are published every year—Plato has never gone out of style.[endnoteRef:49] [48: See C. C. W. Taylor, Socrates: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 26.] [49: Plato’s dialogues are available in many inexpensive editions, for example C. D. C. Reeve, ed., A Plato Reader: Eight Essential Dialogues (New York: Hackett, 2012). For the complete works, see Edith Hamilton, Huntington Cairns, and Lane Cooper, eds, The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).]
Socratic Suggestion. If someone says something that angers or upsets you, resist giving an immediate response. Instead, wait, cool down, think calmly about what you want to say, edit it, and then offer a more reflective reply.
Two Further Challenges to Philosophy
“It’s Impossible.”
As we’ve seen, some people reject philosophy because they believe science is the only path to truth. Others reject philosophy because they believe that a particular religious scripture provides the basis of all we need to know. An increasing number of people today reject philosophy for another reason: the fundamental questions, they claim, cannot be answered using our human cognitive abilities. The big questions are simply too much for our limited intellects. The Socratic method, in short, is a waste of time.
When Socrates encountered individuals with this attitude, he asked them to consider the consequences of their position. When we reach maturity we discover that many of the assumptions we made in the past turned out to be false. The question naturally arises: How can we know that we are not making the same mistakes today? If we refuse to reason critically about fundamental issues, how can we know that our basic beliefs are as realistic and life affirming as possible?
Socrates went further when he argued that our nature as rational beings mandates that we apply reason to our basic beliefs and values. The alternatives are not attractive. We could just passively accept the assumptions of our social milieu. However, if we passively adopt our basic beliefs in this way, without any rational reflection on our part, then our beliefs and values are not our own, we are just mimics, and we are not truly free.
Or we might take our basic assumptions from nonrational sources such as unchecked emotions, spontaneous hunches, wish fulfillment, blind faith, authorities telling us what to believe. and so forth. The problem with these sources, Socrates argued, is that they can be the product of prejudice, bias, falsehoods, half-truths, bad reasoning, and other random factors unrelated to truth.
Thinking deeply about worldview issues can be hard work. But if we have not reasoned carefully about the most basic questions of life, how can we be sure our answers to the less basic questions are as good as they can be? For as we have seen, the answers we give to the less basic questions logically depend on the answers we have already given to the more fundamental ones. In short, what good is it to think if the basis of our thought has been left to chance?
Furthermore, the claim that we cannot apply reason to the big questions is not itself based on proven reasons. I hope to demonstrate in this book that we can pursue answers to fundamental worldview questions using our own cognitive abilities, and many of the answers we find in this way are rationally justified and worth believing. The history of thought is full of cases in which the philosophical examination of extremely fundamental issues enlarged our understanding and led to major advances. This is why almost no one today believes that slavery is morally acceptable, that the sun orbits the earth, or that men should be in charge of women the way parents are in charge of children. In the course of this book, we’ll examine many more examples—major advances in human thought inspired by philosophical discussions of fundamental matters.
“It’s a Waste of Time.”
Some people today reject philosophy for yet another reason. They draw a distinction between “theoretical” and “practical” disciplines and then argue that only the practical subjects matter. By theoretical they mean “concerned only with thinking,” and by practical they mean “concerned with getting things done.” On the basis of some such distinction, they claim that philosophy doesn’t matter because it is all theory and no action. Philosophy, in other words, is a waste of time because it has no practical application.
However, the distinction between the theoretical and the practical is bogus. We must think before we act, or we will be acting blindly. Imagine, for example, campaigning for a candidate without having given any thought beforehand to the meanings of justice, equality, and democracy and to the candidate’s own positions. Would that be wise? Imagine choosing a career without giving a moment’s thought to the kind of life you want to live or to what matters most. The more complex our activity, the more thought we need to give it before we act. And unless our thought process remains superficial, it will eventually reach fundamental matters and become philosophical.
One of the biggest lessons of life is that action without forethought can have negative consequences. This is why medical schools, for example, include theory as well as practice. (Would you want to be treated by a doctor who knows no medical theory?) The point is that our thinking cannot all be practical. Theoretical and practical thinking are two sides of the same coin. In the course of this book, we’ll examine philosophical ideas that inspired major advances in thought that led to significant improvements in the human condition—theoretical ideas that made a practical difference.
Socrates argued that philosophy is the most practical of all disciplines, for its chief goal is attaining the most realistic worldview possible. Why does our worldview matter? It matters because, as we have seen, our worldview or philosophy of life influences everything we do. Certainly we are more likely to accomplish our goals if our action is based on realistic assumptions rather than fantasies.
One of the themes of this book is the following: if none of our ancestors had thought philosophically about the big questions, our vocabulary today wouldn’t include words and concepts such as critical thinking, debate, theory, evidence, science, human rights, freedom, democracy, rule of law, separation of power, and government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1.1
1. I
s there (or has there ever been) a Socratic figure in your life? If so, describe this person, your relationship, and the difference this person made in your life. Did you make a difference in his or her life?
2. If Socrates were to be miraculously transported in time from ancient Athens to the present day, what do you think he would say about modern life? What do you think he would say to us?
3. I
f Socrates were to be transported to our time, what do you think he would say about American politics today?
4. State a significant belief you held in the past that you do not hold today. Why did you accept the belief? What was your reasoning? Why did you give up the belief? What were your reasons?
5. Explain a situation in your life in which (a) you were going to do something, but (b) you decided not to, and (c) your decision was made on the basis of Socratic thinking.
6. What are the main steps of the Socratic method?
7. Why do we sometimes learn more in conversation with others?
8. This is a personal question. Has there ever been a time in your life when you needed, but did not get, Socratic questioning? What was the result?
9. Do we need both practical and theoretical thinking? Discuss.
2.3 Reason and Religious Faith
Many people are surprised to learn that Socrates was religious, probably because they assume that his uncompromising commitment to reason and to following the most logical arguments wherever they might lead, would have ruled out belief in the supernatural. However, in his student Xenophon’s remembrance, Socrates is presented discussing theological issues and arguing for the existence of God, understood as a divine intelligence presiding over the cosmos and maintaining its orderly working. According to Xenophon, Socrates also believed that God is morally good, cares about human beings, and sometimes responds to prayer.
Socrates saw no conflict between his religious beliefs and his commitment to reason because he held his religious beliefs on the basis of reasoning that to him seemed compelling. According to Xenophon, Socrates’s monotheism was based on a philosophical argument for God’s existence that Xenophon heard Socrates give on a number of occasions. That argument, known in philosophy today as the “design argument,” is the subject of chapter 2, so we won’t examine it here.
His belief that God responds to prayer was based on a peculiar sensation that occurred off and on throughout his life, often when he was about to make a momentous decision. This sensation took the form of a small inner voice, which he interpreted (on the basis of reasoning) as a voice from above, that is, as divine in origin. He called this inner voice his “daimon” (“divine thing”) and, according to all accounts, took it very seriously. There are eyewitness reports of Socrates retreating from the hustle and bustle of life—in one case even in the middle of a military campaign—to consult his “divine voice” before making a serious decision.
Socrates, in short, had religious beliefs, but those beliefs, like the rest of his beliefs, were based on reasoning he found to be compelling. As he saw it, there is no contradiction in being a philosopher and in being religious—as long as one’s religious beliefs pass the test of reason.[endnoteRef:50] [50: For more on Socrates’s religious beliefs, see Nicholas D. Smith and Paul B Woodruff, eds, Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).]
2.4 Care for Your Soul!
Socrates argued that when we look inside ourselves we find that our soul, or inner self, contains three distinct parts: reason, emotions, and desires.
· The rational part seeks knowledge and wisdom through critical reasoning. We reason when we conclude one thing on the basis of something else and we reason critically when our thinking follows logical, realistic criteria.
· The emotional part of the soul is the source of such passions as anger, happiness, sadness, joy, love, hatred, jealousy, revenge, and envy.
· The desires are bodily impulses aimed at sensual enjoyments such as the feelings produced by food, drink, sex, and drugs.[endnoteRef:51] [51: See Book 4 of Plato’s Republic, 330–341 ….]
We know that reason, emotion, and desire are distinct parts of the soul, Socrates argued, because (a) we experience conflicts among them, and (b) things that can stand in conflict must be distinct from each other. For example, sometimes our reason recommends one course of action while our desires push us in a different direction. Or our emotions say one thing while reason says another. Thus, reason, emotion, and desire do not always function in harmony.
When we are bouncing wildly between reason, emotion, and desire, Socrates argued, a “civil war” is occurring within our soul. The result, as experience teaches, is often bad decisions, regrettable actions, and misery. In particular, experience teaches several lessons:
· When our emotions overrule our reason, the result is often something we later realize, using our best reasoning, was harmful. In such cases, we look back and wish we had followed the prompts of reason rather than raw emotion. Road rage is a contemporary example.
· When our bodily desires overcome our reason the result is usually something we later realize, again using our best reasoning, was unhealthy. In such cases, we look back and wish we had followed reason rather than uncontrolled bodily desire. Overeating and drinking too much are examples.
· Life problems usually magnify when either the emotions or the bodily desires rule the soul unchecked by reason.
· We live better, more fulfilling lives when our soul is ruled by reason than when it is ruled by unexamined emotion or uncritical desire.
Have you ever done something out of pure anger only to wish later you had acted more reasonably? Have you ever acted out of raw desire only to later wish you had followed the promptings of reason instead? Common sense confirms that emotions and desires, when not governed by reason, can lead to actions we later regret. Of course, our faculty of reason can be distorted and sometimes also leads us astray. Reason only functions at its best when it follows realistic and rational criteria—the objective standards of critical thinking.
Reason stands out, Socrates argued. It is the one part of the soul whose built in purpose is to seek truth and real goodness on the basis of objective and realistic standards. Emotion and desire by themselves are wild, irrational, unruly, and often lead us into unhealthy and unproductive actions. Part of reason’s full-time job, argued Socrates, is keeping the emotions and desires in check and balanced. The urgings of emotion and desire are fine, he argued, as long as they are governed by sound reasoning.
To those whose souls are all tangled up, Socrates says this. Life does not have to be out of control and miserable. Our souls, like all things, were created by God to function in a specific way. The soul functions as it was meant to function when reason, guided by rational criteria and a firm knowledge of true goodness, governs the emotions and the desires. When reason rules wisely, the soul achieves its proper balance. With balance achieved, a state of flourishing results–a moral life that surpasses in value any earthly value, including the alleged goods of unrestrained bodily pleasure, fame, power, glory, or wealth.
Many people have changed their lives for the better after learning that their soul has these three parts and that they have the power within themselves to achieve harmony and moral clarity by exerting disciplined rational control over their emotions and desires.
Modern psychology recognizes many Socratic insights. Today we have impulse control counseling for people who need to reign in their urges. We have anger management classes for people who—to their own detriment—let their emotions rule without rational control. In both kinds of instruction, the Socratic method is used to correct a disjointedness in the soul. Modern psychotherapy and groups like Alcoholics Anonymous use Socratic techniques to help people discover that when desire and emotion are governed by reason, addiction can be overcome and a better life can result.
Socratic insights about the soul have also become part of our ordinary discourse. We naturally speak of people who have a “balanced” or “well-integrated personality” while observing that some people seem to be “messed up inside” or “out of joint.” As Socrates saw it, the study of philosophy can help us get our soul into balance, attain moral clarity, and achieve a more worthwhile life—a life of well-being independent of chance and circumstance.
2.5 Socrates in Retrospect
Before Socrates, Greek philosophers focused on big questions such as these: What is the ultimate nature of reality? What are the elements or building blocks of the universe? Why is the universe orderly rather than chaotic? By the sheer force of his personality, Socrates shifted the focus from abstract cosmological speculation to the human condition and to the following issue: What is the best life a human being can live, all things considered? The Roman philosopher and statesman Cicero (106–43 BC) put it this way: “Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the sky, set it in the cities and even in the home, and have it consider life and morals.”[endnoteRef:52] [52: Read this online at http://www.litera.co.uk/cicero_socrates/.]
Gregory Vlastos, a noted expert on Socrates, calls the Socratic method “one of the great achievements of humanity” for
. . . it makes moral inquiry a common human enterprise, open to every man. Its practice calls for no adherence to a philosophical system, or mastery of a specialized technique, or acquisition of a technical vocabulary. It calls for common sense and common speech. And this is as it should be, for how man should live is every man’s business, and the role of the specialist and the expert should be only to offer guidance and criticism, to inform and clarify the judgment of the layman, leaving the final judgment up to him.[endnoteRef:53] [53: Gregory Vlastos, “The Paradox of Socrates,” in Gregory Vlastos, ed. The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor Books, 1971), 20.]
Socrates’s idea that each of us is capable of critical thinking and has the potential to live an examined life was revolutionary when first proposed. It marked a major turning point in the history of thought. Indeed, Vlastos calls the Socratic method the “first major step toward the ideal of the universal moral equality of all of humanity.”[endnoteRef:54] [54: An ideal that humanity is still struggling to achieve, some twenty-four hundred years after Socrates. The same ideal was advanced about the same time by the Chinese philosopher Mozi (c. 470–c. 391 BC), who rejected the Confucian aristocratic, family-centered morality of his day in favor of a morality of universal concern and impartiality toward all. ]
Ronald Gross finds the following closely related idea to be another of Socrates’s contributions: the claim that each individual has moral authority over his or her own soul. This idea, also revolutionary in its day, is one of the historical roots of the modern theory of individual freedom. It is also one of the historical precedents for the idea of universal human rights. Correlative to both notions is the Socratic claim that, as Gross puts it, “Our human dignity mandates that we rule ourselves through participation in constitutional government.”[endnoteRef:55] The ideas Socrates died for were not merely theoretical. [55: Gross, Socrates’ Way, 2.]
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 1.2
1. What did Socrates mean by “the examined life”?
2. This is for aspiring playwrights. Write a short, three-page drama in which Socrates travels through time to the present and questions a famous politician or powerful person of our time who needs it.
3. Have you ever acted on pure emotion and done something that you later regretted? Would you have made a better choice if you had given reason more of a say in the matter?
4. Have you ever indulged your bodily desires and as a result harmed your health or the well-being of others? Would your choice have been better if it had been guided by reason?
5. What kind of person would not learn anything at all from a conversation with Socrates?
6. What kind of person would gain a great deal from a conversation with Socrates?
Part 3. And a Few Principles of Logic
3.1 What Is Logic?
Human beings have been thinking logically (and sometimes illogically) since the earliest era of human existence. However, they have not always been aware of the general principles that distinguish logical from illogical forms of thought. Logic, as an academic subject, is the systematic study of the standards, or criteria, of correct reasoning. The logician asks, Which principles should we follow if we want our reasoning to be the best possible? A brief introduction to this fascinating subject will be helpful, because philosophy, as we have seen, requires careful reasoning for and against various philosophical claims.
Logic may at first sound too abstract to be of any use, but you’ll see by the end of this book that logic is one of the most practical of all fields because its principles can be applied to every area of life. Here are some considerations that bear on the point. The rules of logic are guides to correct reasoning, just as the rules of arithmetic are guides to correctly adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing numbers; the principles of photography are guides to taking good photos; and so on. You can improve your reasoning by studying the principles of logic, just as you can improve your mathematical abilities by studying the principles of mathematics. Because correct reasoning can be applied to any subject matter, the number of potential applications of logical theory is practically unlimited.
The Greek philosopher Aristotle wrote the first book on the standards of correct reasoning and later wrote five additional treatises on the subject. Thus, in six highly original and extremely complex works of logical theory, collectively known as the Organon (Greek for “tool,” as in “general tool of thought”), Aristotle earned the title historians have conferred on him: founder of logic.[endnoteRef:56] The noted twentieth-century logician and philosopher Benson Mates writes: [56: An editor applied the name Organon (“tool”) to Aristotle’s logical works after his death. The name reflects Aristotle’s claim that logic is an all-purpose tool of thought, a guide to the precise thinking needed to attain solidly proven truth on any subject.]
[W]e can say flatly that the history of logic begins with the Greek philosopher Aristotle . . . Although it is almost a platitude among historians that great intellectual advances are never the work of only one person (in founding the science of geometry Euclid made use of the results of Eudoxus and others; in the case of mechanics Newton stood upon the shoulders of Descartes, Galileo, and Kepler; and so on), Aristotle, according to all available evidence, created the science of logic absolutely ex nihilo.[endnoteRef:57] [57: Benson Mates, Elementary Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 206. Ex nihilo is Latin for “out of nothing” and means “from scratch” in this context.]
Logic was first taught as a course of study in the Lyceum, the university Aristotle founded in Athens during the fourth century BC. For twenty-four hundred years, it has been considered a core academic requirement at institutions of higher learning around the world. Logic remains in the core curriculum today because its principles can help anyone reason more accurately, no matter what the subject matter. The Greeks were not exaggerating when they characterized logic as an all-purpose tool kit for the mind. Before we go further, however, a few words about the founder of the subject.
At the age of seventeen, Aristotle traveled to Athens and enrolled in the university Plato had founded a few years before, the Academy—the world’s first independent institution of higher learning based on critical thinking. Plato’s school would become “the prototype for all subsequent colleges and universities.”[endnoteRef:58] Aristotle studied philosophy, cosmology, and mathematics at the Academy for the next twenty years and earned a reputation as Plato’s most brilliant student. Plato nicknamed him “Nous” (Greek for “the mind”). [58: . Luce, Introduction to Greek Philosophy, 95. ]
After Plato died in 347 BC, Aristotle left Athens to visit philosophers in other Greek colonies. At Assos, he met and married Pythias, and the couple had a daughter. Aristotle later moved to the island of Lesbos, where he set up the world’s first scientific research station.
After returning to Athens around 335 BC, Aristotle founded the Lyceum, the second university in world history. Here he taught and wrote treatises on philosophy, logic, theoretical physics, metaphysics, biology, marine biology, botany, zoology, psychology, epistemology (theory of knowledge), philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, meteorology, literary criticism, and poetics while conducting research in just about every existing area of human knowledge. Many of his manuscripts have been lost over time, but the historical records indicate that his complete works would require fifty large volumes in a modern library.[endnoteRef:59] Aristotle also established the world’s first scientific research station and the first system of biological classification. In addition to founding logic as an academic subject, he is considered the founder of biology and a number of other academic subjects. [59: See Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 4. ]
By the end of his life, the library at the Lyceum was the greatest in the world at the time, and his university included an extensive collection of natural specimens, maps, and objects that was probably the first organized museum in history. He died in 322 BC, most likely from stomach cancer.
Many of the greatest scholars have paid tribute to him. The medieval poet Dante called Aristotle the “master of those who know.” Charles Darwin, the author of the theory of evolution, regarded Aristotle as one of the greatest biologists of all time, commenting that “Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods . . . but they were mere schoolboys to old Aristotle.”[endnoteRef:60] He was surely one of the greatest intellectuals in world history.
3.2 Elements of Logical Theory
Recall that an argument is one or more statements, called “premises,” offered as evidence or reason to believe that a further statement, called the “conclusion,” is true.” In plainer terms, an argument is reasoning offered in support of a conclusion. Arguments are part of everyday life—you present one every time you put your reasoning into words to share with others. In the following example, the premises are marked P1 and P2, and the conclusion is labeled C.
P1. All songwriters are poets.
P2. Bob Dylan is a songwriter.
C. Therefore, Bob Dylan is a poet.
The second elementary building block of logical theory is the distinction, first noted by Aristotle, between deductive and inductive reasoning. A deductive argument aims to establish its conclusion with complete certainty, in such a way that if all its premises are true, then its conclusion must be true. Put another way, the underlying claim in the case of a deductive argument is that it is not even possible that all of its premises are true and yet its conclusion is false.[endnoteRef:61] The word certain in the following argument indicates that the argument is deductive: [61: In logic, something counts as possible if it is not self-contradictory. It is logically possible that a lucky person wins the state lottery one hundred times in a row. It is not logically possible that there is a man who is older than all men. ]
P1. Tiny Tim played the ukulele.
P2. Anyone who plays the ukulele is a musician.
C. Therefore, it is certain that Tiny Tim was a musician.
Deductive arguments aim for complete certainty and nothing less. If the premises and conclusion of a deductive argument are related in such a way that the conclusion must be true if its premises are true, then it is a valid deductive argument. If a deductive argument is not valid, it is invalid.
A valid deductive argument thus has the following feature: If its premises all are true, then its conclusion must be true. Put another way, a deductive argument is valid if it is not possible its premises are all true while at the same time its conclusion is false. It follows that a deductive argument is invalid if it is possible its premises are true and its conclusion is false. The following deductive argument is clearly valid because if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true:
P1. All cats are mammals.
P2. All mammals are animals.
C. Therefore, necessarily, all cats are animals.
In contrast, the following deductive argument is invalid because it is possible that its premises are true while, at the same time, its conclusion is false.
P1. Ann and Sue are cousins.
P2. Sue and Rita are cousins.
C. So, Ann and Rita must be cousins.
Examine the following deductive argument carefully. It is valid, yet its premises happen to be false:
P1. All students are millionaires.
P2. All millionaires drink vodka.
C. Therefore, necessarily, all students drink vodka.
This argument is valid by virtue of the fact that if its premises were to be true then its conclusion would have to be true. This illustrates the fact that a deductive argument can be valid and at the same time have false premises and a false conclusion. Of course, a deductive argument can also be valid and have true premises and a true conclusion. The point is that true premises are not required for validity. Valid, in short, does not mean “true.”
Of course, the attainment of truth is the ultimate goal of reasoning. A deductive argument is said to be sound if, in addition to being valid, its premises are all true. Thus, a sound deductive argument has two features: (a) it is valid, and in addition (b) its premises are true. If a deductive argument is sound, its conclusion must be true, as in this example:
P1. All whales are mammals.
P2. All mammals are warm-blooded.
C. Ergo, certainly all whales are warm-blooded.
An inductive argument, on the other hand, does not aim to show that its conclusion is certainly true if its premises are true. Rather, it aims to show that its conclusion is probably, though not certainly, true, if its premises are true. How probable? So probable that it is reasonable to accept the conclusion. The word probable in the following argument indicates that the argument is inductive:
P1. Joe has eaten a Dick’s Deluxe burger for lunch every day for the past month.
C. So, it is very probable that he will have a Dick’s Deluxe for lunch tomorrow.
If the premises and conclusion of an inductive argument are related in such a way that the conclusion is probable (but not certain) if the premises are true, it is a strong argument. An inductive argument that is not strong is a weak argument. Thus, a strong inductive argument has the following feature: if all its premises are true, then its conclusion is probable, although not certain. The following inductive argument appears to be quite strong.
P1. We interviewed one thousand people from all walks of life and every social group in Seattle during a ten-week period, and 90 percent said they drink coffee.
C. Therefore, it is likely that about 90 percent of Seattleites drink coffee.
But the following inductive argument is clearly weak.
P1. We interviewed one thousand people from all walks of life as they exited coffee shops in Seattle, and 98 percent said they drink coffee.
C. So, probably about 98 percent of Seattleites drink coffee.
Consider the following inductive argument carefully. It is strong, yet its premises happen to be false:
P1. It has been snowing for 300 days straight in Seattle.
P2. All the Seattle weather reports predict snow for tomorrow.
C. Therefore, it will probably snow in Seattle tomorrow.
This argument is inductively strong by virtue of the fact that if its premises were to be true then its conclusion would very probably be true. This illustrates the fact that an inductive argument can be strong and at the same time have false premises and a false conclusion. Of course, an inductive argument can also be strong while having true premises and a true conclusion. Strong, in short, does not mean “true.”
Of course, as we have noted, the attainment of truth is the ultimate goal of reasoning. An inductive argument is said to be cogent if it is (a) strong, and in addition (b) all its premises are true. For example:
P1. NASA announced that it found evidence of water on Mars.
P2. NASA is a scientifically reliable agency.
C. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude there is or was water on Mars.
Deductive and Inductive Indicator Words
If you want to make it clear to your audience that your argument is deductive, introduce your conclusion using deductive indicator words such as necessarily, certainly, must, and surely, and phrases such as “therefore, it necessarily follows that,” and “it is therefore certainly true that.” To make it clear that your argument is inductive, use inductive indicator words like the following when you introduce your conclusion: probably and likely, and phrases such as “it is therefore probably true that,” and “it is reasonable to conclude that.” If you look for them, you will see deductive and inductive indicator words in the arguments just presented.
Logic Gym™ Exercise 1. In each case, is the argument deductive or inductive? Hint: look for deductive and inductive indicator words.
1. Every human being deserves to be treated with equal respect and dignity. Homeless people are human beings. Therefore, homeless people certainly deserve to be treated with equal respect and dignity.
2. Some cats are pets. All pets are social creatures. So, surely some cats are social creatures.
3. Every time I take the freeway during rush hour, it is clogged. I’m about to take the freeway during rush hour. So, it will probably be clogged.
4. All dogs are mammals. All mammals are animals. Therefore, necessarily, all dogs are mammals.
5. If Anna swims today, then Eddy will swim today. But Eddy won’t swim today. Thus, necessarily, Anna won’t swim today.
6. If Anna swims today, then Eddy will swim today. But Anna won’t swim today. So, certainly Eddy won’t swim today.
7. If Anna swims today, then Eddy will swim today. Eddy will swim today. Therefore, certainly Anna will swim today.
8. Abby and Tan are not both home. But Tan is home. Therefore, Abby must not be home.
9. The sun has risen every day for thousands of years. Thus, it will likely rise tomorrow.
10. Figure ABCD is a square. Therefore, necessarily, it has four equal sides.
11. Most feral cats won’t let you hold them. Oscar is a feral cat. So, Oscar probably won’t let you hold him.
12. If Mika swims, then Pranav swims. Mika swims. Therefore, Pranav surely swims.
13. If Maria swims, then Amha swims. If Amha swims, then Darmon swims. Thus, surely if Maria swims, then Darmon swims.
14. Either Yeo has the book or Yang Ting has the book. Yeo does not have the book. Thus, necessarily, Yang Ting has the book.
15. Marta has eaten lunch every day for the past year at Spud Fish & Chips, a venerable Seattle institution since 1935. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that she will eat there tomorrow.
Logic Gym™ Exercise 2. The following arguments are deductive. In each case, is the argument valid or invalid?
1. José is older than Maria. Maria is younger than fifty. Therefore, José must be older than fifty.
2. José is younger than Maria. Maria is younger than fifty. Therefore, José certainly is younger than fifty.
3. José is taller than Maria. Maria is taller than Pablo. Therefore, necessarily, José is taller than Pablo.
4. All chemists are Lutheran. Rita is Lutheran. So, Rita must be a chemist.
5. All cats love fish. Peter is a cat. Therefore, Peter certainly loves fish.
6. Every time Sue swims, Joe swims, no exceptions. Sue is swimming. Therefore, Joe must be swimming, too.
7. Cream was one of the great rock bands of the 1960s. Jack Bruce was a member of Cream. Therefore, it is certain that Jack Bruce belonged to one of the great rock bands of the 1960s.
8. All birds have wings. Your pet does not have wings. So, your pet certainly is not a bird.
9. No birds have gills. My pet has gills. Therefore, necessarily, my pet is not a bird.
10. Parents are always older than their children. Lauren is the mother of Lucca. So, Lucca must be younger than Lauren.
Logic Gym Exercise 3. The following arguments are inductive. In each case, is the argument strong or weak?
1. Sue has eaten lunch at Spud Fish & Chips (a Seattle institution since 1935) every day for the past five years. Therefore, it is likely she will eat lunch there tomorrow.
2. Jan ate lunch at Spud Fish & Chips for the first time yesterday. Therefore, she will likely eat lunch there again tomorrow.
3. Kramer hasn’t worked a day in the past two years. Therefore, it is probable he won’t be working tomorrow.
4. I
t has been snowing in Tampa, Florida, for thirty days in a row. The sky is full of snow clouds, and the prediction is for more snow tomorrow. Thus, it will likely snow in Tampa tomorrow.
5. We surveyed a thousand people, asking them if they believe in God, and 99 percent answered yes. Our survey was conducted outside churches in the Seattle area on a Sunday morning, and the people we interviewed were exiting church services. Therefore, most Seattleites believe in God.
6. We surveyed a thousand people, asking them if they like broccoli, and 80 percent answered yes. We surveyed people randomly, from all walks of life and from all demographic and social groups. Therefore, around 80 percent of all people probably like broccoli.
7. Unless there is some sort of emergency, Denny’s restaurant never closes. I see the lights on and the door open at the local Denny’s. Therefore, the local Denny’s is probably open.
8. Marisol is a vegetarian. Meat is all they serve at Joe’s Meathouse Restaurant. Therefore, it is probable that Marisol is not a regular at Joe’s restaurant.
9. We carefully tested a drug for liver disease on a group of one hundred monkeys with liver disease, and the drug cured the disease in all cases. Humans and monkeys have very similar livers. The drug is not known to not work in humans. Therefore, the drug will probably cure liver disease in humans, too.
10. We observed one hundred bats, and all were black. Therefore, the next bat we observe will probably be black.
11. The bank was robbed by a 7-foot-tall man who had a red beard and long red hair. The dye pack exploded all over his clothes as he ran from the bank carrying $10,000 in his hands. Joe Doakes was found hiding in an alley an hour later. He is 7 feet tall, has a red beard, long red hair, and red dye all over his clothes. In addition, he is carrying $10,000 in his backpack. The best explanation of all the facts is that Doakes is the bank robber. Therefore, Doakes probably robbed the bank.
12. For fifty years, Dad’s cars have always been Chevrolets, and they have always been mechanically sound. This car is a Chevy. Therefore, this car is probably mechanically sound.
13. The first car I owned was a brand X. It was a lousy car. This car is a brand X. I conclude that it is probably also a lousy car.
14. We surveyed one thousand people at twenty-five randomly selected local churches and asked them if they really believe in God. Ninety-nine percent replied yes. Therefore, we conclude that 99 percent of the total population of the country probably believes in God.
15. We surveyed one thousand people at twenty-five randomly selected local churches and asked them if they really believe in God. Ninety-nine percent replied yes. Therefore, we conclude that 99 percent of churchgoers in this town probably believe in God.
3.3 Information Spillover
The history of philosophical ideas is fascinating because often one idea leads to another, which leads to a completely unexpected discovery. Aristotle discovered logical principles so exact they could be expressed in symbols like those used in mathematics. Because they could be expressed mathematically, he was able to develop a system of logic similar to, and as definite as, geometry. Recall from middle school that geometry begins with statements, called “axioms,” asserted as self-evident. With the addition of precise definitions, the geometer uses deductive reasoning to derive further statements, called “theorems.” Using axiomatic thinking, the ancient Greeks discovered hundreds of fascinating geometrical theorems. Aristotle’s system of logic began in a similar way, with precise definitions and logical formulas asserted as self-evident. With a basis established, he derived a multitude of logical theorems that branched out in many directions. When he was finished, his system of logic was as exact, and as proven, as the system of geometry.
Some claim that the rules of his system are too mechanical and abstract to be of any practical use. They are mistaken. Aristotle’s system of logic was actually the first step on the path to the digital computer. It is not widely known, but the first person to design a computing machine was a logician who, after reflecting on the exact and mechanical nature of Aristotle’s logical principles, asked one of the most seminal questions ever: Is it possible to design a machine whose gears, by obeying the “laws” of logic, compute for us the exact, logically valid conclusion every time?
The logician who first asked the question that connected logic and computing was Raymond Lull (1232–1315), a philosopher, Aristotelian logician, and Catholic priest. Lull moved from theory to practice when he designed a computing mechanism consisting of rotating cogwheels inscribed with logical symbols from Aristotle’s system and aligned to move in accord with the rules of Aristotle’s logic. In theory, the operator would enter the premises of an argument by setting the dials, and the machine’s gears would then accurately crank out the logically valid conclusion. Aristotle’s logic was the model and inspiration for the design of the first mechanical computer!
Lull’s design may have been primitive, but for the first time in history, someone had the idea of a machine that takes inputs, processes them mechanically on the basis of exact rules of logic, and outputs a logically correct answer. Since he was the first to conceive and design a computing machine, Lull has been called the “father of the computer.” We usually associate computing with mathematics, but the first design for a computer was based not on math but on logic—the logic of Aristotle.
This is a lesson already mentioned: Ideas have consequences, and sometimes theoretical ideas that seem impractical at first have results that are quite practical. Lull was the first in a long succession of logical tinkerers, each seeking to design a more powerful computing machine. You have a cell phone in your hand right now, thanks to the efforts of these innovators, each trained in Aristotle’s logical theory.
A continuous line of thought can thus be traced from Aristotle’s Organon, or logical tool kit for the inquiring mind, to the amazing advances in logic and computing of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which led eventually to the completion of the world’s first working digital computer (at Iowa State College in 1937) and from there to the much smaller yet more powerful laptops and tablets of today. It is no coincidence that the circuits inside every digital computer are called “logic gates.” In the logic classroom, this is my answer to those who suppose that abstract logical theory has no practical applications.
But computer science is only one spin-off of logical theory; many more could be cited. The subject Aristotle founded remains as vital today as it was in ancient Athens. Aristotle probably had no idea how important his new subject would be—or how long the spillover and information overflow would continue.
What does all of this have to do with anything? In philosophy, as in everyday life and indeed as in every academic subject, reason is our common currency. It follows that the ability to reason well is both an essential life skill and an important academic skill. But skills require knowledge in addition to practice. Since logic is the study of the principles of correct reasoning, a familiarity with elementary logic and its applications can help anyone improve his or her thinking. Some people suppose logic is a useless subject; the truth may be the reverse—it may be the most useful subject of all. In the rest of this book, we’ll employ principles of logic as we reason carefully about the most fundamental questions of all—questions that help us define our worldviews, our lives, and thereby ourselves.
Appendix
Answers to Logic Gym Exercises 1, 2, 3, in Opening Lecture
Logic Gym Exercise 1. D = deductive. I = Inductive
1. D
2. D
3. I
4. D
5. D
6. D
7. D
8. D
9. I
10. D
11. I
12. D
13. D
14. D
15. !
Logic Gym Exercise 2 I = invalid V = valid
1. I
2. V
3. V
4. I
5. V
6. V
7. V
8. V
9. V
10. V
Logic Gym Exercise 3 S = strong W = weak
1. S
2. W
3. S
4. S
5. W
6. S
7. S
8. S
9. S
10. S
11. S
12. S
13. W
14. W
15. S
Notes
20
Chapter
2
. The Design Argument
Chapter 2
The Design Argument
The first half of this chapter: sections 1-5
The second half: sections 6-11.
Copyright by Paul Herrick, 2020. For class use only. Not for distribution. The chapters you are about to read online this quarter are excerpted from a textbook that will be published later this year. This chapter: 37 pages of reading.
The heavens declare the glory of God; And the firmament shows his handiwork.”— Psalm 19, King David
What could be more clear or obvious when we look up to the sky and contemplate the heavens, than that there is some divinity of superior intelligence? —Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman philosopher, lawyer, statesman, De Natura Deorum
1. A Philosophical Tale
On the first morning of summer in the year 430 BC, the sun is coming up and an old philosopher is sitting on a hill above Athens, Greece. Observing. Listening. Reflecting on the cycles of life. The sun continues to rise, revealing the flowers in bloom. On a nearby hill, a sheep gives birth. A small stream gently makes its way to the sea. As he has observed many times before, he thinks again:
Each thing within nature has its own unique role to play within the overall order of things.
He reflects on nature’s order:
Within the system of nature, the many parts are intertwined and balanced like the notes of a song. Nature is a system of interconnected parts functioning in harmony.
Nature certainly does reflect an underlying order. We make predictions on the basis of that order every time we take a step, sit on a chair, drink a cup of water, or take a breath of air.
The old philosopher now looks at the city below. Athens is beginning to awake. Farmers are transporting their produce along roads leading into the city. People are gathering in the center of town, waiting for the agora (marketplace) to open. His thoughts continue:
Each part of the city has its own unique role to play within the overall economy of the city-state. Roads lead into the city so that farmers and merchants can transport their goods into and out of town; the marketplace serves people buying and selling; public speeches are given at city hall. The whole wouldn’t function properly if each part within the whole did not serve its intended purpose.
What holds it all together?
Like nature, Athens has an underlying order. Day by day the city, like the system of nature, goes through its cycles, intertwined parts balanced in an overall harmony.
In a nearby grove of olive trees, a shepherd plays a flute. The melody causes the old philosopher to think:
Each note in the song contributes to the harmony and beauty of the whole. Each note is placed on purpose for the unique role it will play.
The balance and harmony of the song reminds him of a recent experience. As he was standing in front of a temple in downtown Athens, he was deeply moved by its beauty.
Each column, each piece of marble, each statue, each architectural element makes its own contribution to the overall harmony of the whole; the beauty of the structure emerges from the way in which the parts are arranged.
This calls to mind an argument he recently heard his friend and fellow philosopher Socrates give. The argument went approximately like this:
Nature, like a magnificent building, a beautiful song, or a city plan, is a system of intertwined, balanced parts functioning in harmony. We know the cause of the temple’s order: it was designed by an architect to reflect a purpose. Similarly, the orderly arrangement of Athens is due to the work of city planners. The harmony in a song is crafted by the composer. In each case, when we trace cause and effect back, the ultimate cause of order is an intelligent designer. Since the deep order we see in nature is similar in form, and since it is common sense that similar effects probably have similar causes, the cause of nature’s order—like the cause of the order displayed by a temple, city plan, or a song—is probably also an intelligent designer, although one great enough to have crafted the entire cosmos. The most reasonable conclusion to draw is therefore that the cosmos owes its deep order to an intelligent designer.[endnoteRef:1] [1: In his memoirs, Socrates’s student Xenophon reports hearing his teacher give this argument. See Xenophon, Conversations with Socrates (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2005), “Socrates Proveth the Existence of a Deity,” chap. 4.]
The Greek word cosmos is very significant here. To the ancient Greeks the word meant not simply the “universe” but “the universe understood as an orderly, harmonic, and beautiful system.” Our modern word cosmetics is derived from the same Greek root. It was the majestic order of the universe as a whole that especially caught Socrates’s eye and pointed his thoughts to a divine, presiding intelligence above it all.
Upon hearing a philosophical argument, the first thing to do is to understand it. There will be plenty of time to criticize after it has been understood. Recall that an inductive argument aims to show that its conclusion, although not completely certain, is so probable or likely that it is the most reasonable conclusion to draw based on the premises. The placement of the word probable near the conclusion of Socrates’s argument indicates that it is inductive in nature. Socrates’s claim is that the conclusion, although not mathematically certain, is the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the data. But there are different kinds of inductive argumentation. Logicians call Socrates’s induction an “analogical” inductive argument because it starts with an analogy, or similarity, between two or more things. Let’s pause to clarify the structure of this very common form of reasoning.
Boiled down to essentials, an analogical inductive argument follows this general format:
1. A and B have many properties, or characteristics, in common.
2. A has property x.
3. B is not known not to have property x.
4. Therefore, B very probably has property x as well.
5. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that B also has property x.
Here is an example from medical science:
1. Monkey hearts are very similar to human hearts.
2. Drug X cures heart disease in monkeys.
3. Drug X is not known not to cure heart disease in humans.
4. Therefore, drug X will probably cure heart disease in humans.
5. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that drug X will cure heart disease in humans.
This example of analogical reasoning is perhaps more familiar:
1. I’ve taken three of professor Smith’s classes and I learned a lot in each one.
2. Professor Smith has a new class scheduled for next quarter.
3. I have no reason to think his new class will be different in quality from his other classes.
4. Therefore, I will probably learn a lot if I take his new class.
5. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that I will learn a lot if I take his new class.
Here is Socrates’s analogical argument translated into “textbook” (step-by-step) form:
1. The deep order we observe in the universe is similar in form to the deep order we observe in songs, buildings, city plans, and works of art, namely, many parts fit together to form an improbable, interrelated, complex system that functions in an identifiable way.
Comment: The orderly nature of the universe is evident in the predictable events, natural cycles, and complex but stable systems that characterize the world from the smallest scales to the largest. Thanks to the discoveries of the Greek mathematician Pythagoras (570-495 BC), the ancient Greeks even knew that orderly mathematical substructures exist within nature at levels too fundamental to be observable.[endnoteRef:2] [2: For one example, Pythagoras discovered that musical harmony is a reflection of precise mathematical ratios.]
2. When we trace things back, the root cause of the underlying order we observe in buildings, cities, songs, and works of art is always found to be an intelligent designer.
Comment. The ultimate source of the building’s design plan is the chief architect; the song’s composer is the source of its melody; the artist is the source of the painting’s order, and so forth.
3. The deep order of the universe is not known not to be the result of intelligent design.
4. Therefore, the cause of nature’s deep order is probably also an intelligent designer, although one great enough to have designed the entire cosmos.
5. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that the source of nature’s deep order is an intelligent designer. The order of the cosmos, in short, is the expression of a rational mind.
We reason by analogy all the time. Suppose Pat gets sick and has a specific set of symptoms. The next day his sister Maria gets sick and shows the same symptoms. When the doctor discovers that the cause of Pat’s illness is a flu virus, she naturally concludes by analogy that the cause of Maria’s illness is probably also a flu virus. Or, a teenager prepares to buy his first car. He doesn’t have much money, but he wants it to be reliable. He reasons analogically: “Dad’s car is a Chevrolet, and it’s reliable. Mom’s car is a Chevrolet, and it’s reliable. The car for sale down the street is also a Chevrolet, so it’s probably also reliable.” Analogical reasoning, in short, is part of our shared common sense. Applied to nature, this universal pattern of inductive reasoning points logically to the existence of an intelligent designer of the cosmos. So argued Socrates.
In their fascinating book, Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking,
Douglas Hofstadter
and
Emmanuel Sander
argue that “analogy is the core of all thinking.” From an advertisement for the book on Amazon.com:
Why did two-year-old Camille proudly exclaim, “I undressed the banana!”? Why do people who hear a story often blurt out, “Exactly the same thing happened to me!” when it was a completely different event? How do we recognize an aggressive driver from a split-second glance in our rearview mirror? What in a friend’s remark triggers the offhand reply, “That’s just sour grapes”? What did Albert Einstein see that made him suspect that light consists of particles when a century of research had driven the final nail in the coffin of that long-dead idea? The answer to all these questions . . . is analogy-making—the meat and potatoes . . . the fuel and fire . . . of thought. Analogy-making, far from happening at rare intervals, occurs at all moments, defining thinking from . . . the most fleeting thoughts to the most creative scientific insights.[endnoteRef:3] [3: Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander. Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking (New York: Basic Books, 2013). ]
2. Introducing the Design Argument
The argument given by Socrates and by the old philosopher on the hill above Athens is known in philosophy as the “argument from design” (or the “design argument”). It is also called the “teleological argument” (from the Greek word telos for “purpose,” or “end state”) since it claims that the overall order of the universe appears purposive, that is, intentionally directed toward an end state. In general, an argument from design is a philosophical argument that begins with the orderly nature of the material universe and reasons from there to the conclusion that an intelligent designer is the ultimate source of that order.
Most philosophers throughout history have agreed with Socrates that an analogy exists between the order of a song, a building, a city plan, or a mechanism such as a clock, and the deep order of the cosmos. Most philosophers throughout history have also agreed that the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that the deep order of nature is the product of a rational mind. Thus, an argument from design can be found in the writings of almost every major philosopher of the ancient, medieval, and modern periods, starting with the pre-Socratics, and after them Plato, Aristotle, the Greek and Roman members of the Stoic school of philosophy, and following the Stoics such towering figures as Augustine (354–430), Aquinas (1225–1274), Leibniz (1646–1716), Hume (1711-1776), and Paley (1743–1805). Versions of the design argument can also be found in the Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim philosophical traditions. The list of recent philosophers East and West who have defended the design inference is very long and includes many of the most eminent philosophers and scientists of our time. In short, this argument is not only historically important and mainstream, it is also very contemporary!
Some may object at this point: Why not many designers instead of just one? After all, it takes many architects to design a skyscraper; and John and Paul wrote most of the Beatle’s hits. Defenders of the design argument reply that the highly integrated unity of the cosmos as a whole points to one supreme designer, not many. Modern astrophysics supports this reply with its discovery of massive evidence pointing to the existence of one “grand unified theory” of the cosmos—a system of mathematical equations uniting every material aspect of the universe under one principle.
If you reject the conclusion of the design argument, then you face an extremely difficult philosophical question. How do you explain the fact that the material universe as a whole is orderly and predicable rather than not orderly? More specifically, How do you explain the fact that the trillions and trillions of particles of matter and quanta of energy that compose our universe are not randomly and aimlessly flitting about with no predictable pattern but instead exhibit a deep order—a unity that can be expressed with mathematical equations? Put even more sharply, how do you explain the fact that the behavior of the many particles of matter and quanta of energy that compose the material universe can be described using a single system of interrelated differential equations that is intelligible to a rational mind?
Let’s consider this question for a moment. Physicists have discovered that the behavior of matter and energy can be expressed with intricate differential equations. It now appears almost certain that the equations fit together into one unified system of interconnected formulas stemming from a single source. But physicists—in their capacity as physicists–have never explained why this mathematically expressible, unified order exists. Why isn’t motion entirely random or unpredictable all the way down to the subatomic level? Of course, if the universe were to be unpredictable we would not exist (no structures at all would likely exist for more than a nanosecond). But we can imagine the possibility and ask the question. Physicists have also not explained why the universal order is accessible to rational minds. Look at a college physics textbook and you’ll see hundreds of equations describing the predictable behavior of matter and energy across every domain; what you won’t see is even an attempt at explaining—within the domain of physics–why matter obeys an intelligible system of laws rather than no laws at all. Even the technical condition scientists call “chaos” is governed by laws that can be expressed with equations (fractal mathematics).
Sidebar. Try to imagine a state of complete disorder–no laws of nature, no regularities, no persisting structures, and units of matter distributed so randomly that no predictions are possible. Here is an interesting question: How could a stable state of order such as the observable universe arise out of such a state? The problem actually cuts deeper than this. Atoms are composed of subatomic particles (electrons, protons, neutrons, quarks, etc.). Molecules are composed of atoms. Each quanta of energy and each particle of matter in our universe functions in accord with mathematical laws. Years of calculus and other fields of advanced mathematics are required just to understand the mathematics of subatomic particles such as the proton, neutron, and electron. Further study is required to understand the mathematics of the quarks that compose protons and neutrons. The universal order runs deep. Why is nature orderly rather than not orderly? What underlying reality explains the order we observe? Why this order rather than another logically possible order? These are among the questions that drive further research into the design argument today. End sidebar.
These questions suggests a different kind of design argument, called an “inference to the best explanation” or a “best explanation argument” for a designer of nature. A best explanation argument is an inductive argument that fits the following abstract format:
1. D is a collection of data (facts, observations) in need of explanation.
2. Hypothesis H, if true, would explain D.
3. No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does.
4. Thus, D is the best explanation available.
5. Therefore, it is probable that H is true.
6. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that H is true.[endnoteRef:4] [4: I am indebted to the logician and philosopher of science Stathis Psillos (University of Athens) for this particular way of stating the logical form of inference to the best explanation. ]
When we decide which explanation is best, we employ rational standards such as the following:
· A good explanation is consistent with already known facts.
· A good explanation is internally consistent, i.e., it is not self-contradictory.
· One explanation is better than another if it explains a wider array of facts.
· If two explanations explain the very same set of facts, the simpler explanation—the one that makes fewer assumptions or posits fewer entities or both—is the more reasonable choice.
Comment, Generally, the simpler of two explanations that explain the same data is the more reasonable choice for three reasons. (1) Because it makes fewer unnecessary assumptions, it is less arbitrary. (2) If it is less arbitrary, then it is more intelligible. (3) On the assumption, necessary for science and all rational thought, that the universe is intelligible, it follows that the simpler (more intelligible) of two explanations–when both explain the same data–is more reasonable.
Here is Socrates’s design argument translated into contemporary terms in the form of an inference to the best explanation rather than an analogical induction.
1. Observation indicates that the universe from the smallest to the largest scale is orderly rather than not orderly.
2. The evidence from physics indicates that the universal order is highly unified.
3. The evidence from physics indicates that the universal order stems from a single source.
(Premises 1,2, and 3 constitute the data in need of explanation.)
4. One possible explanations of the data is that the universal order is the product of a mind–an intelligent designer.
5. A second possible explanation is that the universal order is the product of absolute, blind, unstructured, undirected random chance.
6. No alternative hypothesis—scientific or otherwise—is conceivable.
7. The design hypothesis makes the best sense of the data.
8. Intelligent design is therefore the best explanation.
9. Therefore, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that the order of the universe is ultimately the product of an intelligent designer.
Argument for premise 1. Current physics reveals that the cosmos, from the smallest observable particles to the largest sheets of galaxies, is orderly in the sense that its operations are predictable and can be expressed with mathematical equations.[endnoteRef:5] [5: See George Seielstad, Cosmic Ecology: The View from the Outside In (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983). In Chinese philosophy, Taoism also holds that the universe is a purposive, orderly whole whose parts are in delicate balance.]
Argument for premise 2. The latest research in big bang astrophysics indicates that the universal order of cause and effect is highly unified—the equations that describe the way the universe functions appear to constitute a single interconnected system.
Argument for premise 3. In Dreams of a Final Theory, the theoretical physicist and Nobel-prize recipient Steven Weinberg, one of the greatest physicists of our time, writes:
Think of the space of scientific theories as being filled with arrows, pointing toward each principle and away from the others by which it is explained. These arrows of explanation have already revealed a remarkable pattern: They do not form separate disconnected clumps, representing independent sciences, and they do not wander aimlessly—rather they are all connected and if followed backward (to deeper levels) they all seem to flow from a common starting point.[endnoteRef:6] [6: Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 6. Most leading physicists today believe that the universe displays one overall, comprehensive order. See James Trefil, Reading the Mind of God: In Search of the Principle of Universality (New York: Doubleday, 1989); Paul Davies, The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); P. C. W. [Paul] Davies, The Accidental Universe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chap. 2; and J. H. Mulvey, The Nature of Matter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).]
This is an amazing statement worth pondering for a moment or two: All the evidence indicates that the universal order, as revealed by modern astrophysics, originates from a single cause.
Argument for premises 4 and 5. Both are obvious possibilities.
Argument for premise 6. No one within science has ever given a scientific explanation for the fundamental fact that the universe is orderly rather than not orderly and no one in science ever will. There is a reason for this. Every scientific explanation presupposes the intelligibility as well as the orderly nature of the universe and then attempts, on that basis, to explain how one part or another of the orderly universe functions. Science, in short, takes the universal order for granted. It follows that science cannot explain why the universe is orderly rather than not orderly–that question is simply too fundamental to be handled by the method of science alone. Philosophers from the start have probed the question, and no hypothesis that does not involve mind at a fundamental level has ever succeeded in making even the slightest sense of the fact that the universe is orderly rather than not.
Argument for premise 7. Imagine that you walk into class one day to find 100 colorful leaves arranged on the floor in the form of the following English sentence: “The professor is sick today; class is cancelled.” Which hypothesis makes the best sense of the data:
H1. The wind blew the leaves in from outside and they formed the sentence by sheer, blind, random chance.
H2. An intelligent being with a knowledge of English arranged the leaves on purpose, namely, to convey a message.
Does H1 make logical sense of the data? Isn’t H2 the more reasonable explanation?
What are we to make of this version of the design argument? The first thing to note is that this kind of inductive reasoning is also common. We give best explanation arguments all the time in everyday life. For example, Jan comes home hungry and finds that the leftover cauliflower soup is gone. She reasons, “My roommate Joe hates soup. My roommate Sue can’t stand cauliflower. The cat would eat it, but he can’t get into the refrigerator. However, my roommate Chris loves cauliflower soup, and he has done this before. The best explanation is therefore that Chris ate the leftover soup. The most reasonable conclusion to draw is that Chris is the culprit.”
Best explanation arguments are also common in both civil and criminal courts of law. When a jury finds the defendant guilty, it is usually because the hypothesis—that the defendant committed the offense—best explains the verified facts presented by the prosecution.
Inference to the best explanation is also routinely employed in the physical sciences and in every one of the social sciences. For example, the arguments Einstein gave for his general and special theories of relativity, like the argument Darwin gave for his theory of evolution and the arguments economists give for their theories, are best explanation arguments. (In the conclusion of his greatest work, the Origin of Species, Darwin explicitly claims that his theory is reasonable because it is the “best explanation” of the facts.) The case for every large-scale scientific theory ultimately boils down to the claim that the theory at hand provides the best explanation of the data.
So, reject best explanation reasoning and you will have to give up much if not most of what you believe about the world—if you are consistent. Inference to the best explanation is a very useful form of reasoning. Many philosophers believe that the design argument is more compelling when stated in the best explanation form rather than as an analogy. Compare the two kinds of design argument and decide for yourself.
One thing is certain: In either form—analogical or best explanation—the conclusion of the design argument contradicts nothing in physics. Indeed, the design argument complements physics and science in general for it adds a level of depth to all explanations. But is intelligent design really the best explanation of the universal order? Let’s turn to the first known critique of the argument.
Does Blind Chance Make Better Sense of the Data?
In the fifth century BC, Leucippus of Miletus founded the school of philosophy known as “atomism” based on the hypothesis that every observable material object is composed of tiny, indivisible particles too small to be seen, which he named “atoms” (from the Greek word for “uncuttables”). Leucippus’s atomic hypothesis anticipated modern physics by over two thousand years. He was as aware as anyone else that the universe is amazingly orderly. In place of intelligent design, however, he proposed the following explanation, which I paraphrase:
There is no intelligent designer. The most reasonable explanation of the unified order of nature is that it is just one giant accident. Long ago, billions and billions of primeval atoms randomly falling through the void (empty space) happened by sheer random chance to fall into the predictable patterns we observe in nature—for no reason at all. Blind random chance is the ultimate explanation of all order.[endnoteRef:7] [7: Epicurus hypothesized that this happened an infinite number of times in the past. Given this assumption, every possible combination of atoms has existed an infinite number of times. An infinite number universes are a lot to hypothesize.]
Leucippus’s critique targets premise 7 of the best explanation design argument as we have stated it. Let’s reflect on his proposal for a moment. Suppose we are playing poker and I am dealing. Imagine that I deal myself an ace-high straight flush fifty times in a row and win every game. When you finally question my honesty, I reply, “It was just an amazing run of pure, dumb luck—one big chance accident.” Would that be a reasonable and intellectually satisfying explanation of my winning streak? Would that make sense of the highly improbable pattern of the hands I have dealt? Would you keep playing? Or would intelligent design—in this case the hypothesis that I cheated—make better sense of the data?
Defenders of the design argument ask, If blind random chance is not a good explanation for a small-scale order, such as a winning streak in a crooked game of cards, why is it a reasonable explanation for the largest, deepest, and most persistent order of all, the order of all orders, the order of nature that has persisted for billions of years? [endnoteRef:8] [8: But notice that even a single partical of matter such as an electron or a proton is a highly organized (and intelligible) entity—even if it is as smooth and round as a billiard ball. A particle of matter has a definite boundary between itself and the rest of the world. Every proton has the same physical properties and obeys the same set of physical laws, interacts with the same set of particles, and so forth. The atomists knew that even single particles of matter are complex—they argued that each atom has hooks and flaps by which it attaches to other atoms. Given the huge number of atoms held together in a single macroscopic object such as a rock or a planet, it was obvious even in ancient times that atoms must have something like hooks and buckles if they are to attach to each other and stay together. My point is that it is obvious to plain common sense that atoms, if they exist, cannot be simple objects but instead must be very complex entities. Upon reflection, astonishing order is apparent at the most fundamental material level even if we assume that everything in the cosmos is composed of microscopic atoms. ]
And we are back to where we started. Socrates would ask, If you do not believe that intelligent design is the best explanation, then how do you explain the fact that the universe is orderly rather than not orderly? Why isn’t it all just a completely random chaos? Thales would ask, What holds it all together? What is the One Over the Many that makes this one universe?
Going Deeper
A rigorous argument can be given for the proposition that design rather than chance is a better explanation of the data. First, the following is an additional criterion commonly used in science and philosophy when choosing the best explanation:
· If the data is more expected on one possible explanation or hypothesis (call it “H1”) than on another (“H2”), then H1 is the more likely and thus the more reasonable explanation.
For a contemporary example, suppose a jewelry store owner is shot during a robbery. Using video footage from the store’s cameras, detectives focus on a career criminal who lives nearby, Sam Smith. The stolen jewels are found in Smith’s possession immediately after the crime and Smith’s fingerprints are found on the murder weapon that was left behind at the store. This is the data in need of explanation. Now consider two hypotheses:
H1: Smith robbed the store and shot the owner.
H2: Someone else robbed the store and shot the owner.
On the basis of H1, the evidence (Smith’s fingerprints on the gun and the jewelry found in his possession shortly after the crime) is expected. For if Smith robbed the store we would expect to find his fingerprints on the gun left behind and we would not be surprised to learn that the jewels were found in his possession shortly after the crime. However, if we suppose that someone else robbed the store, the evidence is not expected at all. For if someone else committed the crime, it would be highly unlikely that Smith’s fingerprints would be found on the murder weapon and that the jewels would be found in his possession shortly after the crime. The data is therefore more likely on the assumption that H1 rather than H2 is true. In other words, the evidence is more likely on H1. If the data is expected on the first hypothesis and is not expected on the second, this is a reason to suppose H1 is more likely true. It follows, by the standard just cited, that H1 is the better explanation.
Now consider two hypotheses for the overall order of the universe:
H1: The universal order is the product of an intelligent designer who imposed the order on purpose.
H2. The universal order is the product of absolute, blind, unstructured, purely random chance governed by no laws.
If we suppose the initial state or the ultimate explanation of the universal order is an intelligent designer who intends to create an orderly universe, the universal order is very likely. If we suppose the initial state is absolute, random, unstructured, blind chance not governed by any laws whatsoever, the universal order we observe is extremely unlikely and unexpected.
To test your intuitions here, suppose that one day fifty white rocks are observed scattered randomly on the ground in front of Judy’s house at 5133 Kensington Avenue. The next day they are observed in an arrangement that spells out in perfectly formed letters Judy’s address, “5133.” One possible explanation is that a blind, random gust of wind picked the rocks up and they accidentally fell into the observed pattern—an arrangement that just happened to give the correct address. In this case, the explanation is blind, random chance. A second hypothesis is that the rocks were arranged by an intelligent agent on purpose (to display the correct address). Isn’t the fact in need of explanation—the orderly as well as correct arrangement of the rocks—more expected if we suppose an intelligent agent arranged them on purpose? Isn’t it highly unlikely that a random, mindless, unguided gust of wind blew the rocks into the correct arrangement by accident? If an intelligent agent intends to arrange the rocks so that they show the correct address, it is likely the rocks will be arranged in the highly specific pattern that shows the address. If a random gust of wind blindly blows the rocks, it is highly unlikely they will accidentally fall into place so as to spell out the house’s address, for the direction the mindless wind blows has no cause and effect relation to the address of the house. Thus, the data is more expected—more likely–on the design hypothesis. By this common standard—used throughout science as well as everyday life–design rather than chance is the more reasonable explanation for the universal order.
Recall the philosopher David Stewart’s observation: the hypothesis that the universe is a cosmos rather than a chaos was a “brilliant leap forward in the history of thought, an advance absolutely essential to the development of modern physical science.”[endnoteRef:9] No wonder most scientists throughout history have believed that science supports, rather than contradicts, belief in a supreme designer or God. Many scientists throughout history, including Charles Darwin, have reported at times feeling an almost irresistible inclination to see the deep order of the cosmos as the expression of a rational mind.
3. A Surprising Boost for the Design Argument
Thomas Nagel, University Professor of Philosophy and Law, Emeritus, at New York University, is the author of numerous influential works of philosophy. He is also one of the leading philosophers of mind of our time. He has stated that he is an atheist; however, he has also stated that his atheism is based not on philosophical argument but on emotion. In The Last Word, Nagel writes:
In speaking of the fear of religion, I don’t mean to refer to the entirely reasonable hostility toward certain established religions and religious institutions, in virtue of their objectionable moral doctrines, social policies, and political influence. Nor am I referring to the association of many religious beliefs with superstition and the acceptance of evident empirical falsehoods. I am talking about something much deeper–namely, the fear of religion itself. I speak from experience, being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that. [endnoteRef:10] [10: Thomas Nagel, The Last Word”(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 150, (emphasis added).]
In his latest book, Mind and Cosmos:
Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False
, Nagel surprised the philosophical world by presenting an argument that adds a great deal of scientific as well as philosophical support to the theistic argument from design. Here is my summary of his reasoning:
1. The success of contemporary theoretical physics, including the surprising revelations contained in general relativity theory, special relativity theory, quantum theory, and evolutionary biology, indicates that the material universe at the deepest level discernable by science is governed by complex laws that are intelligible to rational minds.
2. If the universe at the deepest level discernable by science is governed by complex laws that are intelligible to rational minds, then the universe at the most fundamental level discernable by science is rationally intelligible.
3. If the universe is rationally intelligible at the most fundamental level that science can reach, then rational consciousness is not simply an accidental consequence of the deepest laws of nature working in an undirected, random fashion on matter moving aimlessly; rather, the fact that rational minds exist must be closely related to the nature of the universe at the most fundamental level.
4. Therefore, the universe at the most fundamental level has something importantly to do with, or is intrinsically connected to, mind, consciousness, and rationality. [endnoteRef:11] [11: Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 16-17. ]
But what is the connection between mind and the intelligible basis of the cosmos? Nagel admits that theism explains the data; however, he stops short of endorsing belief in God for the emotional reasons quoted above. That doesn’t stop theistic philosophers from extending his reasoning. Here is one way to complete Nagel’s argument:
5. The most obvious way to explain the fact that the material universe at the most fundamental level has something importantly to do with mind or consciousness is to conclude that the order of the material universe was imposed by a superintending rational mind. The order of the universe, in short, is the expression of a mind.
6. This is elementary theism.
7. The alternative explanation is that the origin of all order is absolute, blind, random, unpredictable, unstructured chance: all order arose from an initial state of randomness containing no laws of nature, no structure, no reason, no predictability, and no mind.
8. No one has ever suggested any remotely plausible alternative explanation for the data in question.
9. The existence of an intelligible universe is extremely unlikely on the random chance hypothesis.
10. The existence of an intelligible universe is very likely on the theistic hypothesis.
11. The design hypothesis is internally consistent and explains a wider range of facts.
12. Therefore, design–elementary theism–is the best explanation of the fundamental intelligibility of the universe.
13. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the material universe is the product of a superintending rational mind. Put another way, elementary theism is the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the data of deep physics and the fact that the universe is rationally intelligible.
Recently an impressive number of scientists, philosophers, and mathematicians have argued that the deep order of nature points logically to an intelligent designer. Despite the rigorous nature of their arguments, intelligent design theorists have been ridiculed by powerful members of the scientific and intellectual establishments. Given Nagel’s position, it should not be surprising that he writes, to the chagrin of the secular and atheist establishments, this:
I believe the defenders of intelligent design deserve our gratitude for challenging a scientific world view [scientific naturalism which includes the denial of God’s existence] that owes some of the passion displayed by its adherents precisely to the fact that it is thought to liberate us from religion. That world view is ripe for displacement….
And:
In thinking about these questions I have been stimulated by criticisms of the prevailing scientific world picture… by the [theistic] defenders of intelligent design. Even though writers like
Michael Behe
and
Stephen C. Meyer
[contemporary proponents of the design argument] are motivated at least in part by their religious beliefs, the empirical arguments they offer against the likelihood that the origin of life and its evolutionary history can be fully explained by physics and chemistry [i.e., without reference to God or anything supernatural] are of great interest in themselves….The problems that these iconoclasts pose for the orthodox scientific consensus should be taken seriously. They do not deserve the scorn with which they are commonly met. It is manifestly unfair.
Going Deeper Still: In response to the latest versions of the design argument some propose that the universal order simply has no explanation at all. The universal order, they hypothesize, has just always existed and nothing more can be said. This proposal has serious problems. First, the basic order of the universe is logically contingent—it could have taken a different form. (Generally, something is logically contingent if it could have been otherwise.) Experience teaches that the cause of any contingent order is always something outside itself. A contingent structure therefore points beyond itself to an external cause. If a contingent order has no cause, then it is unexplained and its existence is arbitrary. If its existence is arbitrary then its existence is unintelligible. It follows that if the universal order has no explanation, then the universe is unintelligible. But the evidence indicates that the universe is intelligible. Furthermore, it is astronomically unlikely that an orderly, intelligible universe arises from a completely random and unintelligible base. The probability that the universe is orderly and intelligible–given that its base is random–is almost infinitely smaller than the chance that a super gun blindly aimed at random from earth hits a target the size of a pea sitting across the universe. The proposal that the universal order has no explanation is extremely problematic.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 2.1
1. What did the ancient Greeks mean by the word cosmos?
2. What is an analogical argument?
3. Give an example of a situation in your life when you employed analogical reasoning.
4. In what ways is the cosmos like a designed system?
5. In your own words, explain the old philosopher’s reasoning.
6. In your own words, explain the logical structure of an inference to the best explanation.
7. Give an example of a situation in your life when you employed inference to the best explanation reasoning.
8. In your own words, explain the atomists’ objection to the design argument.
9. What do philosophers and scientists mean when they claim that the universe is intelligible?
10. Why is the notion of the universe as a cosmos such a fruitful idea?
11. Which is the better explanation, the chance hypothesis or the designer hypothesis? Argue for your position.
12. Suppose you walk into a classroom one autumn day to see leaves from a tree outside the door scattered in no particular order on the floor in the front of the room. Would you be inclined to suppose that the leaves had been placed in their specific positions on purpose by an intelligent designer? Now suppose you walk into a classroom and see leaves on the floor in a definite pattern that spells out the following sentence, “The instructor will not be in class today.” In this case, would you be inclined to suppose the leaves had been placed in their positions on purpose by an intelligence? What is the difference between the two scenarios? How do these thoughts relate to the design argument?
13. This is a much more difficult question: In the second scenario just mentioned, would it be reasonable to suppose that the leaves had been randomly blown by the wind into an English sentence by sheer accident and at the same time to also believe that the English sentence is meaningful and informative? What bearing, if any, does this have on the design argument?
14. How likely would the intelligible structure of the universe be if the design hypothesis is true? How likely would it be if the chance hypothesis is true? If we suppose that there was initially pure absolute chance, with no structure, no order, no laws of nature or regularities, then it is unlikely an orderly universe would exist. Is it reasonable to suppose that absolute, blind chance produced the order of the universe? Dec 22, 2019…..
15. There are two ways an inductive argument might go wrong. First, one of its premises might be false. Second, its reasoning might be weak. Thus, if you do not accept the design argument, you must believe that either (a) one of its premises is false or (b) its reasoning is weak. If you do not accept the design argument, then either (1) identify the premise you reject and state your argument against that premise; or (2) give an argument for the conclusion that the design argument’s reasoning is weak.
4. The Design Argument during the Rise of Modern Science
Modern experimental science, that is, science based on hypothesis-testing and applied mathematics, with laboratories, specialized scientific instruments such as the microscope and telescope, textbooks, full-time experimenters, university courses, and experimental results disseminated in written form across a continent through scientific societies publishing technical journals, was born in Europe during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. This was a remarkable age that also saw the birth (in Europe) of modern mathematics (including analytic geometry, calculus, advanced number theory, and statistics), the first social sciences, and many other academic fields considered standard today.[endnoteRef:12] In this period in Europe we also see the first application of science to agriculture, industry, technology, medicine, public health, transportation, communications, business, information technology, and dozens of other areas of life. [12: Historians have named the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of European history “the Enlightenment.” Modern technology, modern agriculture, modern medicine, the science of public health, modern political theory, the modern university system, modern systems of finance, communications, transportation, information storage, business, innovation and invention, as well as the industrial revolution and the mass publication of books for a literate public, began in Europe during this period or within a few years following it. During the nineteenth century, Europeans began spreading their advances to nonEuropean societies around the world]
The relevant point is that everywhere scientists pointed their new instruments, tested their new theories, and employed their new methods, they discovered previously unknown dimensions of intelligible order of stunning complexity. Microscopes revealed that a drop of pond water contains tiny living creatures with amazingly complex bodies. Telescopic observations, combined with advances in theoretical mathematics made by Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz, revealed that the cosmos in the large scale operates according to exact mathematical formulas. To the first generation of modern scientists, it seemed that no matter how deeply they probed the cosmos, their instruments revealed intricate functional systems of ravishing complexity.
The pioneers of modern science interpreted the new dimensions of intelligible order as empirical (observable) evidence that the universe is governed by a supreme mind or intelligence fittingly called “God.” Where else could structures on this scale come from? Many included a philosophical design argument within their scientific works.
For example, in The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation, John Ray (1627–1705), the founder of modern botany and a pioneer of ecology and modern zoology, argues that the order of nature is best explained by reference to a designer:
The bee, a creature . . . [such] that no man can expect it to have any considerable measure of understanding . . . yet makes her combs and cells with that geometrical accuracy that she must needs be acting by an instinct implanted in her by the wise author of Nature.[endnoteRef:13] [13: Quoted in Ernan M. McMullin, ed., Evolution and Creation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 28. For Ray’s argument, see Alan Olding, Modern Biology and Natural Theology (New York: Routledge, 1991), x–xi. (According to the biologist Ernst Mayr, Ray’s Historia Plantarum catalogued 18,665 plant species!)]
In 1665, Thomas Hooke, the first great microscopist, published the first book containing sketches of microscopic creatures. In his greatest work, Micrographia, Hooke interprets the intricate wonders of life seen in a drop of pond water as signs of “God’s handiwork.”[endnoteRef:14] [14: Quoted in McMullin, ed., Evolution and Creation, 126.]
Robert Boyle (1627–1691), one of the pioneers of modern chemistry, was fascinated by the structure of an insect’s eye. His microscope revealed “hundreds of little round protuberances curiously ranged on the convexity of a single eye” of a common housefly. When Boyle discovered their function, he called the engineering of the fly’s eye “a tribute to the wisdom of the creator.” Boyle also argues:
[The universe as a whole] is like a rare clock . . . where all things are so skillfully contrived that the engine being once set moving all things proceed according to the artificer’s design . . . The excellent contrivance of that great system of the world [has] been . . . the great motive that in all ages and nations induced philosophers to acknowledge a Deity as the author of these admirable structures.[endnoteRef:15] [15: Quoted in John Marks Templeton, ed., Evidence of Purpose (New York: Continuum, 1994), 50.]
Sir Isaac Newton (1643–1727), the founder of modern, mathematical physics, deserves special mention. His The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (1687) is considered one of the two or three greatest single works of science ever written. I. Bernard Cohen, the noted historian of science, calls Newton’s treatise “the culmination of thousands of years of striving to comprehend the system of the world, the principles of force and of motion, and the physics of bodies moving in different media.”[endnoteRef:16] Newton included in his great treatise of mathematical physics a detailed philosophical argument for an intelligent designer of the cosmos. We can make rational sense of the deep order of nature, he believed, only if we suppose it is the expression not of blind chance but of a rational mind. [16: I. Bernard Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960), 152–153.]
5. David Hume’s Critique of All Design Arguments
By the middle of the eighteenth century, the argument from design was accepted by most scientists, and nearly everyone agreed that belief in God and in science fit together logically. This consensus, however, did not last. Two major events popped the bubble. The first was the publication in 1778 of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. The second was the publication in 1859 of Charles’s Darwin’s The Origin of Species. We’ll begin with Hume’s Dialogues, the first major philosophical work to challenge the design argument.[endnoteRef:17] Many in the New Atheist movement today believe that the objections raised by Hume demolished the design argument and show that theism and science stand in logical conflict. Siding with science, they conclude that belief in God is irrational. Let’s test their claim by examining three of Hume’s famous criticisms. [17: David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980), part 9. Excerpts may be found in Louis Pojman, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), 37–43.]
Objection 1. Why Not an Unintelligent Designer?
Hume wrote the Dialogues in the form of a fictional conversation between three characters debating the existence of God. Philo, the first character, has a skeptical attitude toward religion; Cleanthes argues that we have good reason to believe in God; Demea is a religious dogmatist who believes that reason does not affect religious belief. In the course of their discussion, Hume puts the following interesting objection to the design argument into the mouth of Philo. Here is my summary: If we must posit a designer as the best explanation of the universal order, why assume with religious people that the designer is intelligent and personal? Why suppose it is a divine being we would want to worship? Why not suppose it is an unintelligent being within the material universe? Consider a spider web. Seen glistening in the morning light, it has a complex and beautiful geometrical order. Yet this complex order is produced by an unintelligent insect. Complex order therefore does not always come from intelligence. Thus, it is just as reasonable to conclude that the order of the universe was produced by a gigantic, unintelligent spider or something similar. Philo continues:
The [Hindu] Brahmins assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and resolving it into his own essence. [endnoteRef:18] [18: Ibid, Part 7.]
This is a clever objection. But is Hume’s alternative hypothesis–that an unintelligent being created the universal order–a reasonable explanation for the fundamental order of the entire cosmos, including the mathematical equations discovered by modern physics and the chemical equations discovered by modern chemistry?
There is a deeper problem with this hypothesis. An unintelligent source would be nonrational. But if it is nonrational, then it is arbitrary. And if it is arbitrary, it is unintelligible. One problem is that the evidence of science suggests the universal order is intelligible. Furthermore, it is astronomically improbable that an order as vast as that of this universe would burst forth from an arbitrary, unintelligible source. And we have seen that when design and unguided, unintelligible chance are compared as explanations for the universal order, design is the more reasonable explanation.
Objection 2. Why Not Many Designers?
When scientists and philosophers of Hume’s day presented the design argument, they typically argued that one supreme designer exists. In other words, they believed that the argument supports monotheism (belief in one God). In reply, Philo asks essentially, Why not postulate many designers, instead of one? After all, a machine, a temple, or a complex mechanism is typically the product of a committee: “A great number of men join in building a house or a ship,” says Hume, “why may not several deities combine in framing a world?” This is polytheism (belief in many gods).
The theist has a strong reply on this point. Philosophers and scientists from the earliest times have tested their hypotheses on the assumption that when two hypotheses equally explain the same data, the simpler hypothesis (the one making the fewest assumptions or positing the fewest entities) is the more reasonable choice. Since the fourteenth century, this principle has been called “Ockham’s razor” in honor of William of Ockham (1287–1347), a medieval logician and scientific pioneer who was the first to state it explicitly and defend it. Ockham’s razor is now an integral part of scientific practice because scientists discovered that (a) for every set of data, there exist an infinite number of possible explanations, each of increasing complexity, and (b) it is impossible to choose one explanation over another without assuming Ockham’s razor.
But Ockham’s razor is also common sense. Suppose that detectives find sixty identical shoeprints at the scene of a crime. One hypothesis is that one person left all sixty prints. A second hypothesis is that two people, each wearing identical shoes with identical wear patterns, each left thirty prints. Another hypothesis is that three individuals, each wearing identical shoes, left twenty prints each, and so forth. Each hypothesis explains the same data. How do we decide which one makes the best sense? We employ Ockham’s razor and go with the simplest hypothesis: one individual left all sixty prints. In the absence of any evidence pointing to more than one culprit, such as shoeprints in two or more sizes, the most reasonable hypothesis is that one person left all sixty prints. An infinite number of hypotheses of increasing complexity can be formulated for any set of data. Therefore, without Ockham’s razor it is impossible to ever settle on one explanation—in science, in the courtroom, or in everyday life.
The application to the design argument is obvious. Consider the conclusion that one designer exists. Now consider the conclusion that two independent but cooperative designers exist. Both hypotheses explain the same data set, yet the first is obviously simpler (makes fewer assumptions and posits fewer entities). Scientific considerations of simplicity, as well as common sense, thus support monotheism over polytheism.
Modern physics also offers evidence supporting one rather than many designers of nature. Recall the words of Steven Weinberg, one of the leading theoretical physicists of our time.
Think of the space of scientific theories as being filled with arrows, pointing toward each principle and away from the others by which it is explained. These arrows of explanation have already revealed a remarkable pattern: They do not form separate disconnected clumps, representing independent sciences, and they do not wander aimlessly—rather they are all connected and if followed backward (to deeper levels) they all seem to flow from a common starting point.[endnoteRef:19] [19: Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory, 6. Most leading physicists today believe that the universe displays one overall, comprehensive order. See Trefil, Reading the Mind of God; Davies, The Mind of God; Davies, Accidental Universe, chap. 2; and Mulvey, Nature of Matter.]
And in The Little Book of the Big Bang: A Cosmic Primer, the astrophysicist Craig Hogan presents the now-standard model of the universe in the form of a single, unified chain of causes and effects that traces back through many cosmic epochs to a single creation event.[endnoteRef:20] Although they could not have known it, Thales, Socrates, and the old philosopher on the hill over Athens were in line with contemporary big bang physics when they argued for a single source of order—a One Over the Many—to explain the overall structure of the cosmos. [20: Craig J. Hogan, The Little Book of the Big Bang: A Cosmic Primer (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1998).]
Add: As Thomas Nagel observes, Ockham’s Razor can also be supported by the thesis of the intelligibility of nature. The success of deep physics suggests that the universe is intelligible at the deepest level. Now, if two explanations explain the same data, and the first explanation is theoretically simpler, then the first is more intelligible than the second. The intelligibility of the universe thus suggests that the simpler of two explanations, when both explain the same data, is more likely to be true.
Objection 3. Blind Chance Is a Better Explanation
Philo next recycles an idea similar to the atomists’ ancient hypothesis. Blind chance, he suggests, rather than an intelligent designer, is a better explanation of the universal order.
Let us suppose [matter] is finite. A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: And it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times…Suppose …that matter were thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force, it is evident that this first position must in all probability be the most confused and disorderly imaginable., without any resemblance to those works of human contrivance which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an adjustment of means to ends…Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last?…may we not…be assured of it…[settling into this system at least for a time]…and may not this account for all [that looks like]wisdom and contrivance in the universe?
The design theorist has a commonsense response. This hypothesis requires that the universe is carefully governed by an immensely complex and highly functional background order that holds the whole together while trying out one transformation after another, each time varying the fundamentals so that all possibilities get their day in the sun. Imagine a very large roulette wheel designed to give every possible number an equal chance. Wouldn’t the underlying mechanism governing such a wheel be complex? Wouldn’t it require intelligent design? Don’t the roulette wheels in Las Vegas embody a great deal of intelligent design? Does Hume’s random chance hypothesis really reduce all order to chance? Think for yourself and decide on the basis of your best reasoning.
The Balance of the Evidence
Surprisingly, after the conversation between Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea ends, Hume editorializes and sides with his character Cleanthes! The order we observe in nature, he states, is indeed good evidence that the universe was designed by a superintending mind. The most reasonable conclusion to draw is, after all, that nature’s order is the product of an intelligent designer of immense magnitude. Hume writes:
Cleanthes and Philo did not pursue this conversation much further; and as nothing ever made greater impression on me than all the reasonings of that day, so I confess that on carefully looking over the whole conversation I cannot help thinking that Philo’s principles are more probable than Demea’s, but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth. [endnoteRef:21] [21: Many different editions of Hume’s Dialogues have been published this neglected passage appears on the last page of each. ]
Given Hume’s endorsement here of intelligent design, it is surprising that most secular philosophers and secular philosophy texts today present Hume’s arguments as the classic refutation of the design argument. I remember being taught in my first philosophy class that Hume demolished the design inference. The passage just quoted suggests that Hume did nothing of the sort.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 2.2
1. How does the ancient design argument differ from the argument commonly given during the rise of modern science?
2. Explain one of the design arguments given during the rise of modern science.
3. In the light of modern science, does the design argument show that it is reasonable to believe in an intelligent designer? Argue for your position.
4. In your own words, explain one of Hume’s criticisms of the design argument. How do you think Socrates would reply?
5. Do any of Hume’s criticisms hit home? Argue for your position.
6. Paley’s Famous Update: The “Watchmaker” Argument
Hume’s criticisms of the design argument did not convince everyone. They certainly did not convince William Paley (1743–1805), professor of philosophy at Cambridge University and archdeacon in the Anglican Church. In 1802 Paley wrote an entire book defending the design argument based on the latest science of his day. Paley’s treatise, titled Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature, became a best seller. His book is fascinating because it delves into many of nature’s most interesting wonders. Not only did it become one of the most influential works of philosophy of the nineteenth century, philosophers today agree that Paley’s book contains one of the clearest and most complete expositions of the design argument ever given, which explains why it still gets honorable mention in just about every introductory philosophy text.
Paley begins his famous argument with a thought experiment. Suppose you are out for a stroll and find a watch lying on the ground. Your response would be different from the thought you would have if you saw a rough stone lying in the same spot. If you were to see an ordinary stone, you would not be inclined to suppose it was given its rough shape by an intelligent being. But if you were to see a watch, you would instinctively conclude that its parts were arranged and adjusted by an intelligent designer—by a watchmaker who knew what he was doing—and not by the blind and chance processes of nature (wind, erosion, floods, earthquakes, etc.). Why?
The purposeful nature of the watch’s organization, according to Paley, gives it away—the fact that
· it is a system of many interrelated parts;
· the parts are arranged in a highly improbable order; and
· the parts work together to serve an identifiable purpose.
Paley next describes in detail living organisms whose structures look every bit as designed as the insides of a watch. His argument in skeletal form, minus its accompanying scientific data, looks about like this:
Paley’s Design Argument
1. The deep order of nature and the order of a watch are similar in many ways.
2. Like effects probably have like causes.
3. The cause of a watch’s order is an intelligent designer (a watchmaker).
4. Therefore, the cause of nature’s order is probably also an intelligent designer.
5. It is thus reasonable to conclude that nature owes its order to the mind of an intelligent designer.
Paley’s analogy can be condensed to the slogan watch is to watchmaker as nature is to a designer of nature. Here are some excerpts from his famous “watchmaker” argument:
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place. I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first?[endnoteRef:22] [22: From William Paley, Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature. Extensive selections from Paley’s book are found in William Paley, Natural Theology: Selections (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). A shorter excerpt from Paley’s book may be found in Pojman, Philosophy of Religion. This passage is drawn from ibid., 34.]
The answer, Paley believes, is the purposefulness exhibited by the structure of the watch:
For this reason, and for no other, namely, that when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g., that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none that would have answered the use that is now served by it. This mechanism being observed, the inference is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker. That there must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.[endnoteRef:23] [23: Ibid.]
From here Paley reasons by analogy:
Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.[endnoteRef:24] [24: Ibid., 36.]
Paley’s Natural Theology contains wonderful examples of organizational structures in nature that certainly look designed. The hinge on a clamshell, for example, is similar in design to the hinge on a door made by a carpenter; the lens of the human eye follows many of the design principles opticians build into the lens of a telescope, and so on. With each new example of apparent design in nature, argues Paley, it becomes more and more reasonable to believe that nature’s order is the product of intentional design.
7. Darwin Rejects Paley’s Watchmaker
The lives of famous people are sometimes connected in surprising ways. On October 15, 1827, nineteen-year old Charles Darwin entered Cambridge University planning to study for the Presbyterian ministry. Although Paley was no longer teaching there (he had died more than twenty years before), every Cambridge undergraduate at the time studied Paley’s Natural Theology (and his Evidences of Christianity) in preparation for a comprehensive exam at the end of the second year. Darwin not only studied Paley’s books, he fervently agreed and defended Paley in discussions with fellow students. Like most universities, Cambridge had student housing. In an amazing coincidence, Darwin was assigned to live in Paley’s old room at Cambridge.[endnoteRef:25] There is a reason why this coincidence is surprising. [25: Of Paley, Darwin writes, “I was charmed and convinced by the long line of argumentation [in Natural Theology].” See George Gaylord Simpson, ed., The Book of Darwin (New York: Washington Square, 1982), 42. ]
In 1831 Darwin was hired to serve as the naturalist aboard the HMS Beagle, a British Royal Navy vessel ordered to conduct a trans-Atlantic scientific expedition. As the ship’s naturalist, Darwin’s job was to collect and catalogue specimens at every port of call. When the ship set sail from Plymouth, England, on December 27, 1831, thanks in large part to having studied Paley’s books, Darwin interpreted the wonders of nature as beautiful evidence of divine design. However, when the Beagle returned to England five years later, he was having doubts. A new theory was forming in his mind.
At the time, two opposing views on the origin and history of life competed for allegiance.
· Creationism. In the beginning God created all the biological species at once and gave each one a fixed and unchanging nature.
· Evolutionism. The species were not created at once, and they do not have fixed natures. Rather, species have changed over time, and presently existing species developed slowly, step-by-step, out of very small changes in previously existing species. There are no permanent natures in nature.
Creationism was the dominant view for two reasons: First, it seemed to be implied by the Bible. Second, no one could explain how piecemeal evolutionary change could possibly have produced the extremely complex and diverse forms of life we see today. In other words, the evolutionary hypothesis lacked an underlying mechanism.[endnoteRef:26] [26: On the intellectual debate that preceded the introduction of Darwin’s theory, see Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).]
Darwin presented his new theory in 1859 in his masterpiece, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. His book contained the first systematic scientific theory of evolutionary change combined with an account of an underlying mechanism.
Unlike many large-scale scientific theories, Darwin’s can be summarized without mathematics and in layman’s terms. Here is my attempt: First, organisms tend to produce more offspring than their environment can support. As a result, the members of each generation compete in a struggle for survival, and many die. Next, observation also reveals that inheritance is high fidelity but not perfect fidelity. That is to say, offspring resemble their parents closely but not exactly. As a result, small variations appear with each new generation. Now, assuming that variations occur randomly, some will be advantageous in the struggle for existence while others will be harmful. (Inherited variations are random in the sense that they do not occur because they are needed for survival.) Organisms possessing advantageous variations will tend to live longer and reproduce in greater numbers, while organisms possessing harmful variations will tend to die off before reproducing. In other words, the more “fit” will reproduce in greater numbers. With each new generation, this process (called “natural selection”) repeats. Over time, ever-more adaptive life-forms will develop. If one extremely simple life-form with the power to make high but not perfect fidelity copies of itself came into existence long ago, then over long periods of time ever-more complicated and functional life-forms might develop through natural selection alone. In this way, without intending to, nature acts like a plant or animal breeder, selecting some forms for reproduction while rejecting others.
The most controversial aspect of Darwin’s revolutionary theory, however, was not the mechanism of change that he proposed (natural selection acting on random inherited variations). Nor was it his claim that human beings have evolved from apes by small modifications over long periods of time. Rather, it was a separate and completely unsubstantiated claim that Darwin (and other scientists) added to his theory. Natural selection, Darwin and others claimed, is a completely purposeless, unplanned, unguided process. It is not the result of, and it does not reflect in any way, intelligent design, God, or any supernatural guidance. In short, it is entirely natural—there is nothing supernatural about it. The intended conclusion was obvious: We can explain the appearance of design in nature without reference to God or an intelligent designer.
Darwin did not make this claim in his famous book. Indeed, in the book’s conclusion he wrote:
I see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock the religious feelings of any one. It is satisfactory, as showing how transient such impressions are, to remember that the greatest discovery ever made by man, namely, the law of the attraction of gravity, was also attacked …as subversive of religion. A celebrated author and divine has written to me that “he has gradually learnt to see that it is just as noble a conception of the Deity to believe that he created a few original forms capable of self-development into other and needful forms as to believe that he required a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of his laws. 443
Indeed, Darwin’s concluding statement actually refers to God and affirms theism:
There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. Footnote: Mentor edition, 1959, p 450.
However, Darwin eventually came to believe that natural selection is a completely unguided process that can be explained entirely in naturalistic terms, that is, without reference to God or anything supernatural. In private correspondence he wrote:
The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails now that the law of natural selection has been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by a man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection than in the course which the wind blows.[endnoteRef:27] [27: Quoted in Robert Augros and George Stanciu, The New Biology: Discovering the Wisdom in Nature (Boston: New Science Library, 1987), 228–229. ]
Think carefully now about this claim: Natural selection reflects no purpose at all. It is not aimed at a goal, it has no designer, it is as purposeless as “the course in which the wind blows.” This was Darwin’s unscientific opinion; it was not a scientific proposition derived from the observable evidence he had collected. It was not validated by a scientific experiment. Indeed, it was not even a properly scientific claim. Let’s delve into the reason, for this is a most important point.
Standard science restricts itself to claims about the material or natural universe. (The view that scientists must restrict themselves to claims referring only to the material universe is called “methodological naturalism.”) This restriction means that a scientist cannot in principle make assertions about what may or may not lie above or beyond the system of space, time, matter and energy. It follows that Darwin’s assertion–that natural selection does not reflect intelligent design or a higher power in any way–is not scientific. No wonder he never even attempted to substantiate his claim that there is no intelligent designer. His denial of design was simply an opinion added to his theory.
Despite the fact that his denial of intelligent design was nothing more than an unsubstantiated and nonscientific add-on, after 1859 mainstream scientific thought shifted heavily in a naturalistic direction, thanks in large part to Darwin’s theory. Many contemporary biologists today add Darwin’s unsubstantiated naturalistic assumption to their scientific presentations. For example, the biologist Douglas Futuyma, in his Introduction to Evolutionary Biology, writes that “by coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection, Darwin made theological, or spiritual, explanations of life superfluous.”[endnoteRef:28] And the biologist Julian Huxley writes, “Darwinism removed the whole idea of God as a creator of organisms from the sphere of rational discussion.”[endnoteRef:29] Thanks to statements like these, generations of college students have been taught that Darwin refuted the design argument and rendered belief in an intelligent designer rationally unnecessary. [28: Quoted in William Dembski, Mere Creation: Science, Faith, and Intelligent Design (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), 73.] [29: Quoted in Augros and Stanciu, New Biology, 188.]
If we simply assume, without any argument or evidence at all, that the system of natural selection does not reflect intelligent design or purpose in any way, and if we simply assume that natural selection explains all order, then of course there is no longer any need to suppose that nature is the product of intelligent design. But to do so is to abandon reason in favor of dogmatism. Similarly, if we simply assume without argument that the first cars simply popped into existence out of thin air, fully designed, by sheer accident, then there is no longer any need to suppose an intelligent engineer designed the first car. Yet most contemporary biologists continue to teach that Darwin’s theory eliminated all need to refer to a designer of nature. One famous example is particularly instructive.
8. Richard Dawkins’s “Proof” that Modern Evolutionary Theory Has Rendered Intelligent Design Obsolete
In his New York Times best seller, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design, the famous biologist and New Atheist Richard Dawkins uses a computer simulation to support his claim that there is no intelligent designer.[endnoteRef:30] Dawkins begins his argument with a question. What is the probability that in one try a computer prints out, by blind chance alone, the following line from Shakespeare’s play Hamlet: “Methinks it looks like a weasel”? The probability can be calculated. Here is how small the likelihood is: a computer program generating one random string of letters after another for trillions of years would almost certainly never hit the target. Dawkins calls this kind of random chance “single-step selection.” [30: Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a World without Design (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987). ]
Next, Dawkins introduces a computer program he wrote that, he claims, mimics evolution by routinely executing the following sequence:
Step 1. Using a random character generator, the computer types out a sequence of twenty-eight characters (the length of the target sentence). Since this sequence is not planned or directed in any way, it is extremely unlikely the computer types out in one try “Methinks it is like a weasel.” At the first step, the computer produces a string of nonsense letters.
Step 2. The computer “breeds” from this initial sequence of twenty-eight characters by copying it over and over again thousands of times, with one wrinkle: Dawkins wrote a rule into the program that introduces into each new copy a small chance of a random copying error (representing a random genetic mutation).
Step 3. The program scans all the thousands of copies of the original random string. Although most are exactly like the original, a few contain minor copying errors. The program automatically selects the one random copy that most resembles the target sentence. In the beginning, this will be a random string with one or two letters in common with the target sentence.
Step 4. The program repeats step 2.
Step 5. The program repeats step 3.
And so on . . .
The first time Dawkins tested his program, it produced the highly improbable yet complex and orderly sentence “Methinks it is like a weasel” in less than an hour while he was out of the room. The program, he claims. produced the highly unlikely result without any intelligent design or oversight. Since natural selection operates in a similar way, this shows, he argues, that an unguided process of natural selection, operating on randomly generated entities, can produce a highly improbable, complex, and orderly outcome without the oversight of an intelligent designer. Dawkins calls this kind of chance process “cumulative selection” because the process, although based in chance, builds on itself over time as chance results are fed through one filter after another.
Evolution, Dawkins notes, operates by cumulative, rather than by single-step, selection. The difference between the two kinds of selection is huge. Consider single step selection first. If we place a monkey in front of a computer keyboard and have him start typing random sequences of twenty-eight letters, each time starting over from scratch, there is one chance in 10,000 million million million million million million that he will type “Methinks it is like a weasel.” It would take approximately a million million million million million years to get the sentence by single-step selection. However, Dawkins notes, using cumulative selection, his computer program reaches the target sentence in a few minutes—while operating on nothing but randomly generated strings of letters. It follows, he concludes, that an unguided, purely naturalistic process of natural selection can begin with simple organisms and transform them over time into highly complex and improbably structured entities.
A Flaw in Dawkins’s Argument?
A defender of the design argument has an immediate and somewhat obvious rejoinder. Dawkins’s computer program is itself an intelligently designed system! Dawkins purposely designed his software to produce a predetermined result. It is simply not true that his system achieves its goal without intelligent oversight—it embodies intelligent oversight. Dawkins is the intelligent designer. But the flaw in Dawkins’s reasoning runs deeper than this. His intelligently designed program accomplishes its purpose only when it is running within a deeper intelligently designed system, namely, his computer’s operating system. And the operating system of a digital computer is a masterpiece of intelligent design. Yet without that program running in the background, Dawkins’s smartly designed simulation of natural selection would not function.
Dawkins’s simulation program therefore does not show that natural selection is as blind and unplanned “as the course in which the wind blows.” Nor does it show that a blind evolutionary process operating on random mutations can produce intelligent life. All it shows is that an intelligently designed system operating within a deeper intelligently designed system can mimic the evolutionary process. Which brings us to the latest design argument.
During the second half of the twentieth century, theoretical physicists discovered a background program functioning deep within the universe at the subatomic level. To their great surprise, they discovered that no conceivable process of evolution can even get started unless this background program, or one very, very similar, is already in place and running. It followed that the newly found background order operating deep within nature (and needed if any evolutionary process is to occur) cannot itself be the product of an unplanned evolutionary process.
Even more surprising was the stunning degree of organized complexity displayed by this background order: it looked every bit as designed as Paley’s watch. One scientist claimed it looked as designed as a Boeing jumbo jet.[endnoteRef:31] [31: Hoyle on Evolution, Nature, Vol. 294, No. 5837 (November 12, 1981), p. 105.]
A number of scientists and philosophers drew the obvious implication: a Darwinian theory of natural selection—or any naturalistic theory of evolution—cannot explain all of nature’s amazing order all the way down to the most fundamental level. Rather, at a deep level there exists a complex, functional order that is not itself due to any evolutionary process. And this order—being logically contingent—looked like the result of choice not chance. What is this newly discovered pre-evolutionary background order? Why does it look like the result of a choice? The details are contained in the latest version of the design argument, one first given by astrophysicists during the second half of the twentieth century, often called the “fine-tuning argument” but sometimes called “the new watchmaker argument.”
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 2.3
1. In your own words, explain Paley’s argument.
2. State an objection to Paley. How might a defender of Paley’s argument reply?
3. What is the difference between natural and revealed theology?
4. In your own words, explain Darwin’s hypothesis of natural selection.
5. Was Darwin’s claim that natural selection does not in any way reflect intelligent design a scientific claim? Was it supported by empirical (observable) data? Discuss.
6. Imagine that Socrates is transported through time to meet Darwin. What does he say after Darwin presents his theory of natural selection and his claim that natural selection is completely purposeless?
7. What was the impact of Darwin’s theory?
8. Did Darwin’s theory make intelligent design intellectually obsolete? Discuss.
9. The New Watchmaker or “Fine-Tuning” Argument
Since the new design argument rests on recent discoveries in fundamental physics, some background will be essential.[endnoteRef:32] [32: For example, see John Polkinghorne, “Providence,” in Science and Providence (Boston: New Science Library, 1989), chap. 3. Polkinghorne is a former professor of mathematical physics at Cambridge, who became an Anglican priest. See also Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). For articles dealing with the argument from the fine-tuning of the cosmos, see Dembski, Mere Creation. ]
The Atomic Nuts and Bolts of the Universe
Early in the twentieth century, physicists began discovering the atomic details of the deep structure of the material universe. The current model is based on data concerning the fundamental particles of matter, including the following:
· Protons and neutrons make up the dense central nucleus of the atom.
· Electrons gyrate around the atomic nucleus in orbitals.
· Photons carry electromagnetic radiation.
· Quarks exist inside protons and neutrons.
And data on the four fundamental forces of nature:
1. The electromagnetic force holds the negatively charged electrons in their orbitals around the positively charged atomic nucleus.
2. The strong nuclear force holds protons and neutrons together within the atom’s nucleus.
3. The weak nuclear force governs radioactivity and controls such processes as the conversion of neutrons into protons, electrons, and neutrinos.
4. The gravitational force is an attractive force operating between all particles of matter. Among other things, gravity holds planets in their orbits, clusters stars into galaxies, and forms galaxies into clusters of galaxies.
The Discovery of the Universal Constants
Thanks to powerful computers and advanced telescopes, astrophysicists have discovered that no matter which region of the cosmos we study, the basic particles and the fundamental forces have the same unchanging properties. Thus, the laws of physics hold across all domains. These unchanging properties have been measured and are represented in the general equations of physics by constants—numbers that do not change. Since these constants describe the deep structure of the entire universe, they are called the “universal constants.”[endnoteRef:33] The astrophysicists John Gribbin and Martin Rees write: [33: See Davies, Accidental Universe, chap. 2. Astronomers have taken readings from many galaxies across the universe and have found that the constants never vary, no matter where they look. See also Mulvey, Nature of Matter; Trefil, From Atoms to Quarks; Davies, Forces of Nature; John Barrow and Frank Tippler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Joseph Silk, The Big Bang, rev. ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1989).]
Physicists have now reduced nature still further. They now believe that the basic structure of the entire physical world—not just atoms but stars and people as well—is in principle determined by a few basic “constants.” These are the masses of a few so-called elementary particles, and the strengths of the forces—electric, nuclear, and gravitational—that bind those particles together and govern their motions.[endnoteRef:34] [34: See John Gribbin and Martin Rees, Cosmic Coincidences: Dark Matter, Mankind, and Anthropic Cosmology (New York: Bantam Books, 1989), 4. ]
Once physicists had precise values for several universal constants, they asked an intriguing question: What would the universe have been like if these constants had taken different values? For instance, what would the cosmos be like if the force of gravity had been 1 percent less or 1 percent more? What would the cosmos be like if protons were 1 percent heavier? To their amazement, when they plugged alternative values into their mathematical models of the universe, they discovered that if even one of the universal constants had taken a slightly different value, the universe would have been so disorderly that no evolutionary process of any kind would have been possible and life in any conceivable form would not have been possible.[endnoteRef:35] [35: See, for example, Davies, Accidental Universe; Tippler and Barrow, Anthropic Cosmological Principle; Gribbin and Rees, Cosmic Coincidences; George Greenstein, The Symbiotic Universe (New York: William Morrow, 1987); and Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).]
Physicists’ Comments on the Constants
Many respected physicists have commented on the fortuitous arrangement of the universal constants.
Paul Davies:
If we could play God, and select values for [the fundamental constants] by twiddling a set of knobs, we would find that almost all knob settings would render the universe uninhabitable. Some knobs would have to be fine-tuned to enormous precision if life [in any form] is to flourish in the universe.[endnoteRef:36] [36: Paul Davies, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Science” in Templeton, Evidence of Purpose, 49.]
John Barrow:
If we were to imagine a whole collection of hypothetical “other universes” in which all the quantities that define the structure of our universe take on all possible permutations of values, then we find that almost all of these other possible universes we have created on paper are stillborn, unable to give rise to that type of chemical complexity that we call “life.” The more we examine the other types of universe that the laws of physics appear to allow, so the more special and unusual do the properties of the actual universe appear to be.[endnoteRef:37] [37: Barrow, Ibid., 360. ]
Heinz Pagels:
The universe, it seems, has been finely tuned for our comfort; its properties appear to be precisely conducive to intelligent life. The force of gravity, for example, could hardly have been set at a more ideal level.[endnoteRef:38] [38: See Heinz Pagels, “A Cozy Cosmology,” reprinted in John Leslie, ed., Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, 174. ]
John Gribbin:
Our form of life depends, in delicate and subtle ways, on several apparent “coincidences” in the fundamental laws of nature which make the universe tick. Without these coincidences, we would not be here to puzzle over the problem of their existence.
Gribbin and Martin Rees:
If we modify the value of one of the fundamental constants, something invariably goes wrong, leading to a universe that is inhospitable to life. Whenever we adjust a second constant in an attempt to fix the problem the result is generally to create three new problems for every one we “solve.” The conditions in our universe really do seem to be uniquely suitable for life-forms like ourselves.[endnoteRef:39] [39: Gribbin and Rees, Cosmic Coincidences, 269. ]
[T]he universe seems to have been set up in such a way that interesting things can happen in it. It is very easy to imagine other kinds of universes, which would have been stillborn because the laws of physics in them would not have allowed anything interesting to evolve.[endnoteRef:40] [40: Ibid., 10.]
By the 1980s, astrophysicists generally agreed that no systematic evolutionary process of any kind would have occurred and life in any form would not exist if the fundamental constants had taken slightly different values. To many of the leading physicists who studied the matter, the arrangement of the universal constants did not look random at all—it looked intentional. In other words, it looked designed. Let’s have a look some of the physical relationships that many scientists and philosophers today call the “cosmic coincidences.” After this we will take up the question: Is the surprising arrangement of the universal constants physical evidence that the universe was intelligently designed?
Cosmic Coincidence 1. Electron-Proton Charges in Precise Balance
The positively charged proton (normally found in the nucleus of the atom) differs in many ways from the negatively charged electron (normally found orbiting the atomic nucleus). For instance, the proton is about 1,836 times heavier than the electron. About a million electrons would theoretically fit inside a proton. The two particles also have different magnetic properties, and the proton participates in processes involving the strong nuclear force while the electron does not.[endnoteRef:41] [41: In addition, each proton is composed of two “up” quarks bound to one “down” quark by the exchange of mysterious particles called “gluons.” Electrons are not constituted by smaller particles.]
Given their many fundamental differences, it is amazing that the negative charge on the electron precisely balances the positive charge on the proton. The two charges could theoretically have been unbalanced, for there are an infinity of alternative values each could have taken, most of which would have left them out of balance.
How accurate is the balance? Accurate at least to one part in 100 billion, according to the astrophysicist George Greenstein.[endnoteRef:42] If the charges were to differ by just one part in 100 billion, our bodies would explode like sticks of dynamite.[endnoteRef:43] If the balance were to be off by just one part in a billion billion, objects like the earth and sun would explode. Thus, had the charges been out of balance by just one part in 100 billion, life would never have evolved. It follows that if the universe is to have any structure at all, let alone an evolutionary one, and if it is to have stars, galaxies, planets, and intelligent life, the charges of electrons and protons must be finely tuned to an astonishing degree. [42: Greenstein, Symbiotic Universe, 64–65.] [43: Ibid. ]
Cosmic Coincidence 2. The Balance between the Electromagnetic and Gravitational Forces
The strengths of the electromagnetic and gravitational forces appear to be fine-tuned to each other to an accuracy of one part in 1040. If these two forces had been out of balance by one part in a billion billion billion billion, the explosion mechanism inside large stars would not have functioned, supernova explosions would not have scattered complex elements into interstellar space, complex elements would not have been available for the evolution of life, and life in any form would not have been possible.[endnoteRef:44] Davies writes: [44: See ibid., chap. 3; Gribbin and Rees, Cosmic Coincidences, chap. 1.]
In one of the categories of stars, the “red” stars, the stars do not become supernovas and so do not scatter heavy elements into the interstellar medium. In another category of stars, the “blue” stars, the stars burn too fast for life to form. To prevent all stars from crowding into one or the other category, the relative strengths of the electromagnetic force and the gravitational force must be balanced to one part in 1040.[endnoteRef:45] [45: Paul Edwards, Physical Cosmology and Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1990), 16. ]
Cosmic Coincidence 3. The Initial Expansion Rate of the Universe
We now know that the material universe began a finite time ago in an explosive event astrophysicists call the “big bang.” When astrophysicists calculated the initial expansion rate of the universe, they discovered that if that rate had been different by one part in a billion billion billion billion billion billion, evolution in any form and life of any kind would not have been possible.[endnoteRef:46] Specifically, if the initial expansion value had been higher by just one part in a billion billion billion billion billion billion, the universe would have expanded too fast for stars to form, and the universe would be unfit for any kind of life. But if the initial expansion value had been less by the same infinitesimal amount, the expanding universe would have collapsed before stars could form, also producing a universe unfit for life. Gribbin and Rees write: [46: See Gribbin and Rees, Cosmic Coincidences, 18.]
[T]he implication is that the relevant number, the so-called “density parameter,” was set, in the beginning, with an accuracy of one part in 1060. Changing that parameter, either way, by a fraction given by a decimal point followed by 60 zeroes and a 1, would have made the universe unsuitable for life as we know it.
These two astrophysicists add that the density parameter is “the most accurately determined number in all of physics, and suggests a fine-tuning of the universe, to set up conditions suitable for the emergence of stars, galaxies, and life, of exquisite precision.”[endnoteRef:47] [47: Ibid., 26.]
Speaking of the universe’s initial rate of expansion, the astrophysicist George Seielstad writes:
In some way, by chance or otherwise, our universe managed to thread the narrow line between these two extremes [an expansion that is too fast for stars to form and an expansion that is too slow for stars to form], a circumstance without which we would never have been.[endnoteRef:48] [48: Seielstad, Cosmic Ecology, 65.]
Dozens of other examples of fine-tuning at the atomic level have been verified by astrophysicists. Let’s now interpret the data.
Physicists Interpreting the Data
In The Symbiotic Universe, Greenstein writes:
As we survey all the evidence, the thought insistently arises that some supernatural agency or rather Agency must be involved . . . Was it God who stepped in and so providentially crafted the cosmos for our benefit? Do we not see in its harmony, a harmony so perfectly fitted to our needs, evidence of what one religious writer has called “a preserving, a continuing, an intending mind; a Wisdom, Power, and Goodness far exceeding the limits of our thoughts?” A heady prospect . . .[endnoteRef:49] [49: Greenstein, Symbiotic Universe, 27. ]
But Greenstein immediately says of the “religious” view: “I reject it utterly. I will have nothing to do with it.” Greenstein, like Darwin, gives no argument for rejecting a theistic interpretation of the data. He apparently rejects it for no reason at all. Notice that although he rejects the theistic conclusion, he admits that the universe displays a harmony at the atomic level “perfectly fitted to our needs.” Greenstein also offers no alternative explanation to replace intelligent design—he prefers to leave the fine-tuning coincidences brute (unexplained) facts.
Freeman Dyson, one of the twentieth century’s leading physicists, believes that something more is going on: “The more I examine the universe and study the details of its architecture, the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense must have known that we were coming.”[endnoteRef:50] Dyson also speaks of the “numerical accidents [the fundamental constants] that seem to conspire to make the universe habitable” and of the “peculiar harmony between the structure of the universe and the needs of life and intelligence.” [50: See Freeman Dyson, “The Argument from Design,” an essay reprinted in Dyson, Disturbing the Universe (New York: Basic Books, 1981) 250. Dyson defends the thesis that the improbable arrangement of the fundamental constants is evidence of design.]
Davies sounds almost like a pre-Socratic philosopher when he writes:
It is hard to resist the impression of something—some influence capable of transcending space-time and the confinements of relativistic causality—possessing an overview of the entire cosmos at the instant of its creation, and manipulating all the causally disconnected parts to go bang with almost exactly the same vigor at the same time, and yet not so exactly coordinated as to preclude the small scale, slight irregularities that eventually formed the galaxies, and us.[endnoteRef:51] [51: Ibid., 95.]
Barrow states that the “structure of the universe beyond the earth constrains the environment within which the more familiar processes of biological evolution, adaptation, and cultural development can occur.” The universe’s “deep unalterable structure,” he writes, forms a “cosmic environment” for evolution stretching farther and wider than Darwin ever imagined.[endnoteRef:52] [52: John Barrow, The Artful Universe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 34–35.]
[B]efore biological complexity can begin to develop, there must exist atoms and molecules with properties that permit the development of complexity and self-replication; there must exist stable environments; and there must exist sites that are temperate enough for those structures to exist. All these things must persist for enormous periods of time. Deep within the inner spaces of matter, unseen and unnoticed, exist the features that enable these conditions to be met . . . [without these features] all structures complex enough to evolve spontaneously by natural selection would be impossible.[endnoteRef:53] [53: Ibid, 34–35.]
The Best Explanation?
All of this leads us to the fundamental question, What explains the finely-tuned arrangement of the fundamental constants? The question is surely reasonable: seeking explanations is what reasonable people do. If the question reminds you of the problem of the One Over the Many first raised by Thales at the dawn of philosophy, then you are connecting this chapter with the first chapter. Two thought experiments will help us proceed.
Imagine that the pizza maker Vincenzo Luigi invents an automatic pizza machine. When dough, water, vegetables, seasonings, sauce, and other ingredients are fed into one end of the machine, intricately formed pizzas come out the other end—but only if the machine’s fifty dials are set properly. The machine is so sensitive that all fifty dials must be set, each within a millionth of an inch, or the product that comes out will be not be edible.
Now, imagine walking into Luigi’s shop and seeing his famous machine cranking out intricately formed pizzas. Which hypothesis would make the best overall sense of the observable data?
1. The dials were set by a blind, random process such as the wind, a lottery wheel, or an earthquake—an unconscious process that embodied no purpose and that was not aimed at the formation of pizzas.
2. The dials were set on purpose by an intelligent being who intended to make intricately formed pizzas.
The next thought experiment involves an imaginary computer game that allows you to design a possible universe on your laptop. After loading Sim Universe on your computer, you design a model universe by typing in fifty mathematical equations with atomic constants governing the way the various parts of your universe will interact. Each constant is a number that must be entered to sixty decimal places. Once you have chosen values for your constants and entered them into the equations, the background order is in place, and Sim Universe cranks out a simulation of your “possible universe.”
The goal of the game is to design a functional universe containing diverse life-forms and lots of action. However, such a universe will not result unless the constants are set so that they produce chemical diversity, a sufficiently stable environment, stable sources of energy, and so forth. The challenge is that the constants must be set within very narrow tolerances. Unfortunately, the game’s manual does not give you the required numbers.
On the first day, you load Sim Universe on your laptop and type in all fifty mathematical equations along with your choice of fundamental constants, each to sixty places. You are operating blindly, so your numbers are chosen randomly. After setting up the background order, you give the command and your universe starts to operate. But after one hour you’re bored—it isn’t doing anything. It is just a disorderly blur. Nothing interesting or complex develops and lasts.
This is a letdown because at the software store, the Sim Universe demo showed stars forming, unusual galaxies coalescing, supernovas spewing out complex elements into space, and weird life-forms developing on planets with stable environments. After several weeks of effort, you give up. This was smart because out of millions of billions of trillions of possible combinations of values for the fundamental constants, a vanishingly small fraction produces an active universe containing life forms.
Now suppose a friend comes over and asks if she can give the game a try. She sits at the terminal and begins typing constants into equations. Soon, a complex, stable, interesting universe is developing, complete with stars, galaxies, and an evolutionary process leading to complicated life-forms. Would you believe your friend if she told you that she hit the right numbers by pure random chance? Or would you be strongly inclined to suppose she chose those numbers on purpose—on the basis of a preexisting knowledge of what it takes to produce the background order needed for a life-sustaining universe?
In light of our two thought experiments, which hypothesis makes the best overall sense of the fine-tuning of the universal constants—intelligent design or blind chance? This is a best explanation version of the fine-tuning argument—an inductive argument for intelligent design.
Finally, here is the argument in summary form.
The Fine-Tuning Argument
1. The values of the fundamental constants of physics are fine-tuned to each other to a ravishing degree, such that if even one were different by an astronomically small amount, no evolutionary process would have been possible and life in any form would not have been possible. (This is the data to be explained.
2. The data is highly unlikely on a chance hypothesis.
3. The data is expected on an intelligent designer hypothesis.
4. The best explanation is an intelligent designer hypothesis.
5. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the order of the universe is the product of a rational mind existing above the fray, in short, an intelligent designer.
10. The Biggest Objection: The Multiverse Hypothesis
Victor Stenger, a physicist and prominent New Atheist, agrees with theists that the intricate and hugely improbable arrangement of the universal constants of nature certainly looks designed. He also agrees that the fortuitous (for us) arrangement of the constants needs an explanation. However, the best explanation, he argues, is not intelligent design; rather, it is the multiverse hypothesis (“MH”), also called the “many worlds hypothesis” and the “many universes hypothesis.”
His proposal has three parts: First, let’s suppose there is no intelligent designer, no creator, no god, and nothing supernatural in any sense. Second, suppose the material universe we inhabit is just one universe embedded within a hyperspace containing an infinite number of other universes, each spatially and temporally discontinuous from the others.[endnoteRef:54] Third, let’s suppose that the fundamental constants vary randomly from one universe within the hyperspace to the next, for no reason at all, without any intelligent designer responsible for the variations. The variations between universes are due to nothing but blind chance. Stenger’s hypothesis suggests the following image: the many “mini” universes exist within the hyperspace, or “multiverse,” somewhat like raisins within a giant plum pudding.[endnoteRef:55] [54: Discontinuous means that “no signals or information or entities can pass from one mini-universe to another.” ] [55: For more on the many universes hypothesis, see Davies, God and the New Physics, 164–176; George Gale, “Cosmological Fecundity: Theories of Multiple Universes” in Leslie, Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, and Davies, Accidental Universe, chap. 5. See also the discussion in Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), chap. 8.]
Now, Stenger argues, if our universe is just one mini-universe within a multiverse containing an infinite number of other mini-universes, and if the fundamental constants vary randomly from one mini-universe to the next by sheer chance, there is bound to be a universe or two like ours just by chance alone. We happen to exist in one of the few universes accidentally fit for life.
Thus, claims Stenger, if we adopt MH, we can explain the fine-tuning coincidences without reference to an intelligent designer at all, by arguing like this:
1. Suppose that MH is true. There is no creator, no intelligent designer, no God, nothing supernatural exists. Our cosmos is just one mini-universe within a multiverse containing an infinite number of mini-universes each spatially and temporally discontinuous from the rest. The fundamental constants vary randomly from one mini-universe to the next.
2. Out of an infinity of different mini-universes, there is almost certain to be one or two like ours just by blind chance alone.
3. We simply happen to live in one of the mini-universes accidentally suited for life.
4. This explains the surprising arrangement of the constants within our universe without reference to intelligent design.
5. Since MH eliminates reference to a supernatural intelligent designer, it is simpler than the intelligent design hypothesis.
6. The best explanation of the cosmic coincidences is therefore the multiverse hypothesis.
7. MH is therefore the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the fine-tuning data.
Similarly, if we assume large amounts of time and zillions of flips of billions of coins, we can expect that occasionally, once every few trillion trillion trillion years, a coin flipped over and over again will come up heads one thousand times in a row by random chance alone. Stenger writes:
The multiverse provides a very simple, purely natural, solution to the fine-tuning problem. Suppose our universe is just one of an unlimited number of individual universes that extend for an unlimited distance in all directions and for an unlimited time in the past and future. If that’s the case, we just happen to live in that universe that is suited for our kind of life . . . The multiverse explanation is adequate to refute [the fine-tuning design argument]. [endnoteRef:56] [56: Victor Stenger, God and the Multiverse. Humanity’s Expanding View of the Cosmos. (Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books, 2014), 351. ]
However, as attractive as Stenger’s naturalistic explanation of the finely-tuned constants seems at first glance, there are severe problems.[endnoteRef:57] [57: If you flip a penny ten times and it comes up tails ten times in a row, you will logically suppose that the coin was purposely rigged to come up tails. It would be very hard to believe that this run of tails was pure luck. However, imagine five billion people all flipping coins at the same time that you flip your coin. Each person will flip his or her coin ten times. In this case, you would expect a few of the five billion to get ten tails in a row just by pure chance. Given the prior assumption (that five billion are flipping coins at the same time), you will now suppose that you are just one of the lucky few when you get ten tails in a row. ]
Box: Two-kinds of multiverse. Type 1: The universe began in a big bang and as it expanded, different regions expanded at different rates. As the expansion continued, the many regions separated, each going off on its own. These separate regions are now so far apart that no signals of any kind can travel between them–they are thus spatially and temporally discontinuous. Each region randomly acquired its own set of fundamental constants as it went its own way. Of course, on this hypothesis we must not only assume an infinite number of discontinuous regions, we must also assume a great deal of background structure, indeed, a background structure that guarantees the requisite number of life permitting universes. This will be an enormous background structure that has no explanation at all. EndBox
Type 2. The universe began in a big bang and as it expanded, bubble-like regions formed. Soon each bubble broke off into a spatially and temporally distinct universe in its own right. Again, on this hypothesis we must not only assume an infinite number of discontinuous bubbles, we must also assume an enormous background order, and one that guarantee a sufficient number of life permitting universes—leaving an enormously complex background order with no explanation at all.
Questioning the Multiverse Hypothesis
First, according to Stenger’s MH (and to both types of multiverse hypotheses), no physical signals or information can pass from one mini-universe to another. Thus, the other mini-universes cannot be detected or observed empirically from our universe. It follows that no strictly scientific evidence could ever prove MH true. In short, the multiverse hypothesis is metaphysics, not science. Of course, it does not follow from this that the theory is false. Bigger problems begin when we consider premise 5.
The intelligent design hypothesis explains the arrangement of the fundamental constants in terms of one single underlying cause—an intelligent designer. In contrast, MH posits (for the most basic level of explanation) an infinity of empirically undetectable mini-universes existing beyond space, time, matter, and energy. Both hypotheses explain the same data, but intelligent design posits fewer entities at the most fundamental level. Intelligent design is therefore the simpler explanation. This observation led Paul Davies to comment that “to explain the [fine-tuning] coincidences by invoking an infinity of useless universes seems like carrying excess [explanatory] baggage to the extreme.”[endnoteRef:58] Ockham’s razor, an idea essential to modern science, therefore clearly favors intelligent design over MH. In short, premise 5 is false. [58: Davies, Accidental Universe, 128.]
The multiverse hypothesis also has internal logical problems. The philosopher C. Stephen Layman writes:
Even if we suppose that there are infinitely many universes, we do not have a guarantee that at least one will support life. Consider this simple mathematical fact: There are infinitely many even numbers. So we can have an infinity of possibilities without covering every possibility.[endnoteRef:59] [59: See C. Stephen Layman. Letters to a Doubting Thomas: A Case for the Existence of God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 130. ]
Layman’s point is that the advocate of the multiverse hypothesis cannot simply posit an infinity of other mini-universes and be done with it, for an infinite number of lifeless mini-universes is theoretically possible. Another theoretical possibility is a multiverse of universes each governed by the same unchanging set of constants. Thus, simply hypothesizing a random infinity of universes is not, by itself, enough to statistically ensure at least one mini-universe fit for life. Rather, the advocate of MH must posit a very special infinity of universes—one that includes within its boundaries a sufficiently large percentage of life-generating mini universes. With this special addition, however, the multiverse begins to look as rigged as a royal flush drawn from a random deck dealt on the first hand of a high stakes poker game.
If Layman’s point is not obvious, consider the following infinite sequences each of which is not exhaustive of the infinite set of positive integers:
2, 4, 6, 8 . . .
1, 3, 5, 7 . . .
10, 12, 14, 16 . . .
9, 11, 13, 15 . . .
Notice that although each sequence is infinite, each sequence leaves out an infinite number of numbers.
Thus, the advocate of the multiverse hypothesis cannot simply posit a generic infinity of separate mini-universes and be finished. He must posit a very specific kind of infinity out of an infinity of infinities—an infinity designed beforehand to ensure that a universe like ours emerges with a sufficiently high probability. From a mathematical point of view, Stenger’s multiverse looks as designed as Luigi’s pizza machine. Contrary to Stenger, then, it seems we need to infer an intelligent designer even if we hypothesize a multiverse.
A new objection to the multiverse hypothesis has emerged recently in the philosophical literature. According to the “This-Universe Reply ” first developed by Alvin Plantinga, the existence of a multiverse might explain why some universe or other (out of an infinity) is fit for life; it would not, however, explain why this specific universe—the one we inhabit–is fit for life. Plantinga writes:
Here is one response to this many-worlds objection. True, given many universes displaying different sets of parameters, the probability that one or another of them will be fine-tuned, display a life-permitting set of parameters, is high…But how does that affect the probability that our universe, this particular universe is fine-tuned? Return to the Old West: I’m playing poker, and every time I deal, I get four aces and a wild card. The third time this happens, Tex jumps up, knocks over the table, draws his sixgun, and accuses me of cheating. My reply: “Waal, shore, Tex, I know it’s a leetle mite suspicious that every time I deal I git four aces and a wild card, but have you considered the following? Possibly there is an infinite succession of universes, so that for any possible distribution of possible poker hands, there is a universe in which that possibility is realized; we just happen to find ourselves in one where someone like me always deals himself only aces and wild cards without ever cheating. So put up that shootin’ arn and set down’n shet yore yap, ya dumb galoot.” Tex probably won’t be satisfied; this multi-game hypothesis, even if true, is irrelevant. No doubt someone in one of those enormously many poker games deals himself all the aces and a wild card without cheating; but the probability that I (as opposed to someone or other) am honestly dealing in that magnificently self-serving way is very low. (In the same way, it is not probable that I will live to be 110 years old, although it is very likely that someone or other will.) It is vastly more likely that I am cheating; how can we blame Tex for opening fire? And doesn’t the same go for the many-worlds objection to [the fine tuning argument]?[endnoteRef:60] [60: Plantinga, Alvin. Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism. (Oxford University Press. ,,,,cite Kindle Edition.]
Notice that the card dealer’s multiverse hypothesis doesn’t explain his winning hands even if the game is one of an infinity of games being played at the time. Likewise, Stenger’s multiverse hypothesis does not explain why this universe looks designed. What is the best explanation of the fine-tuning of the universe? You decide, on the basis of your best reasoning.
11. Concluding Reflections
In On the Origin of Species, Darwin notes that when a single hypothesis explains and unifies a number of widely divergent facts, this is a good reason to adopt the hypothesis. He also argues that the main evidence for his theory of natural selection is that it explains and unifies widely divergent facts from biogeography, the fossil record, and natural history—facts that had not previously been explained or linked. Darwin supported his theory with an inference to the best explanation.
The intelligent design hypothesis explains and unifies an even wider array of divergent facts, for it links together facts from astrophysics, chemistry, biology, geology, and many other fields—facts that cannot be explained and unified on the basis of natural selection alone. In addition, the facts unified and explained by intelligent design reflect the deepest known order in the entire universe, a system that cannot (as we have seen) ultimately be explained by any evolutionary process operating within the universe. Does Darwin’s own criterion of explanation ultimately point to an intelligent designer? Is there a better explanation for the deep order of the cosmos reflected in the arrangement of the fundamental constants?
As we saw in chapter 1, Thales and other ancient Greek philosophers had a term for the source of all order. They called it the “Arche.” One of the great debates in the history of thought has concerned the question, Is the Arche of the universe a chaos or a logos? That is, is the fundamental basis of all order pure blind chance or a reasoning mind? Many of the greatest scientists of history, including Charles Darwin himself, have stated in autobiographical works or in personal correspondence that when they look deeply into the systemic order of the material universe they sometimes experience a strong inclination to see it as the expression not of blind chance but of a mind. The philosopher Peter van Inwagen suggests one reason why many people resist the theistic option:
If the Arche is a chaos, our existence has no meaning; if the Arche is a Logos, our existence has a meaning. If the Arche is a chaos, then we are just one of those things that happen from time to time. If the Arche is a Logos, then we exist for a purpose, and that is the only sense in which the existence of anything can have a “meaning.” . . . If my life has no purpose, if I and everyone are the results of a series of accidents that are not part of the purpose of anyone or anything, then I am free to live my life according to my own desires—or at any rate the obstacles to my doing this will be those other inconvenient features of everyday life (people whose plans are incompatible with mine, the laws of physics, death—that sort of thing) with which everyone is familiar. If, however, there is a rational being who has designed the universe for a purpose, who could say whether that being’s plans and mine were compatible? . . . Chaos won’t make demands on me—a Logos might have a plan for me.[endnoteRef:61] [61: Van Inwagen, Metaphysics, 146.]
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 2.4
1. How does the fine-tuning argument differ from Paley’s argument?
2. What is a cosmic coincidence? Give an example.
3. Describe the deep background order said to be required for any evolutionary process.
4. In your own words, explain the main steps of the fine-tuning argument.
5. Explain an objection to the fine-tuning argument.
6. Does MH provide a better explanation? Why or why not?
7. Can the fortuitous arrangement of the fundamental constants be explained naturalistically, that is, without reference to an intelligent designer? Argue for your view.
8. Is the arrangement of the fundamental constants evidence for an intelligent designer? Argue for your view.
To the Next Chapter
Philosophical theists find it hard to believe that there is no explanation at all for the deep order and rational intelligibility of the material universe. They also find it hard to believe that this universe, with its ravishing beauty and majestic order, simply sprang forth fully formed out of nothing at all, for no reason at all. Is the mere existence of the universe—apart from its intelligible order—also evidence for the existence of God, or a supreme being? We take up this question in the next chapter. The conversation continues.
Notes
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Chapter 5. What Can We Know?
Chapter 5
What Can We Know?
Copyright by Paul Herrick. For class use only. Not for distribution. This chapter: 16 pages of reading.
To abandon facts is to abandon freedom. If nothing is true, then no one can criticize power, because there is no basis upon which to do so. If nothing is true, then all is spectacle.
— Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century.[endnoteRef:1] [1: Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century (New York: Tim Duggan Books; 1st ed. (February
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8, 2017). I was drawn to this passage by the professor Tom Taylor, Seattle University, during a history conference at the University of Washington in August 2017. ]
1. Relativism, Skepticism, and the Birth of Epistemology
Many people today claim that there is no such thing as objective truth. Truth, they confidently say, is relative to each person. By this they mean two things: First, each person has a unique perspective. Second, each person’s perspective is equally valid because there is no objective basis for saying that one person’s belief is true and another’s is false. Thus, if you believe something is true, that makes it true for you and no one has any objective basis for saying that your belief is false. Likewise, if I believe the opposite is true, that makes that true for me and no one has any objective basis for saying that my belief is false. So, for example, if Fred believes that global warming is a hoax, that is his truth. If Susan believes that global warming is real, that is her (alternative) truth, and there is no objective fact that decides the matter one way or the other. Both are right.
In philosophy, this view is known as “alethic relativism” (from the Greek word aletheia for “truth or disclosure”). It is also called “relativism about truth.” According to the advocate of this view, those who believe in objective truth are mistaken. The real truth about truth is that truth is relative to each person. There is no such thing as an objective truth that is the same for everyone or that can be accessed by everyone. Of this the alethic relativist is certain.
Relativism about truth sounds exciting to many today, especially to those who have an adversarial attitude toward traditional ideas. The claim that truth is relative can be found, in one form or another, in the writings of philosophers who call themselves “postmodernists.” It can also be found in the writings of those multicultural theorists who copy their basic premises from relativistic postmodernist philosophy. Some of these multicultural theorists go further and relativize truth not to each person but to each racial or ethnic group. If one group believes such and such, then that makes such and such true for that group and the group’s belief cannot be criticized by anyone outside the group for there is no objective fact of the matter that is the same for everyone across all groups. If another group believes that so and so, then that makes so and so true for that group, and that group’s belief cannot be criticized by anyone outside that group (for the same reason). Each group, on this view, has a unique perspective that cannot be assessed or criticized on objective or rational grounds by members of another group.
However, whether in the individual or group form, relativism about truth has severe problems. When the relativist asserts that truth is relative, isn’t he making an objective claim about the nature of truth? Isn’t he saying that (being relative) is the way truth really is—“really is” in a non-relative way? Isn’t he saying that, in fact, truth is relative and we all should agree? In other words, isn’t the relativist in effect claiming that it is objectively true for all of us that truth is relative? If so, isn’t he contradicting himself? But if a theory cannot even be asserted without self-contradiction, why believe it?
Furthermore, if the relativist gives us reasons to believe that truth is relative—in hopes we will see the light and agree on the basis of common grounds—doesn’t that contradict his claim (that truth is relative)? For common reasons given for a view—reasons available to all–would have to be nonrelatively true, wouldn’t they? But if no good reasons can be given for the view, then why believe it?
The question, What is objective truth? is examined in metaphysics, the branch of philosophy that seeks a rational account of the most fundamental aspects of reality. (We’ll examine the concept of objective truth in a moment.)
The concepts of truth and knowledge are closely related. When we say that someone “knows” something, for instance, “Pat knows that the moon has mountains,” we ordinarily mean, in part, that the claim said to be known (in this case, the proposition that the moon has mountains) is true in an objective sense. As we will see in more detail in a moment, we also ordinarily suppose that the knower has a sufficient reason to believe that the claim is true. It follows that if objective truth does not exist, then neither does knowledge in the traditional sense of the word.
It should be no surprise, then, that those who deny the existence of objective truth usually also reject the traditional concept of knowledge. “Knowledge with a capital K is a myth,” some say. “Nobody really knows anything. All we have are opinions, and one opinion is as valid as any other.” Those who make this claim usually sound so confident that they give the impression they really know what they are talking about.
Time for another definition. A skeptical person is someone who is hard to convince. A skeptic with respect to a particular subject is someone who is hard to convince on that subject. A religious skeptic, for instance, is hard to convince on matters of religion. In philosophy the denial of all knowledge is called “global skepticism.”
If the global skeptics are correct, knowledge as we normally use the term is a total mirage. Which raises an interesting question. If knowledge does not really exist, then what are people doing when they claim to know something? The answer some postmodernist global skeptics give echoes an idea first stated by global skeptics in ancient Greece who debated and opposed Socrates. A claim to knowledge, they claim, is in reality just a sinister power grab. When someone claims to know something, they are simply trying to bully you into agreeing with them. In other words, they are trying to get their way. In most cases, they are attempting to gain power over you. As some of the ancient Greek Sophists put it, victory, not truth, is the hidden goal of every claim to knowledge. Or so say many critics of the traditional concept of knowledge.
However, if the global skeptics are right, then isn’t their confident assertion—that a claim to knowledge is merely a disguised power grab unrelated to real truth—also a disguised power grab unrelated to real truth? When they try to convince us to agree with them, aren’t they merely doing what they claim to hate? Isn’t their skepticism also nothing but a sinister power grab? If it is, why believe it?
Furthermore, if all we have are unsubstantiated opinions, and if one opinion is no better than another, then the postmodernist rejection of the traditional notion of knowledge is just one more unsubstantiated opinion. If so, then why believe it? These critics of tradition can give no solid reason for their view without contradicting themselves. But if postmodernist relativism cannot support itself without contradicting itself, then it is an irrational viewpoint unworthy of a serious critical thinker.
I meet students every quarter who subscribe to these relativistic and skeptical postmodernist views. The traditional concepts of objective truth and traditional knowledge are under attack today in some quarters of the academic world. Knowledge and truth, many academics now believe, are collective delusions, throwbacks to primitive times, or (worse) mind-control tools imposed by the ruling class, “the man,” or the establishment. Are these critics of tradition right? Or can the traditional notions of truth and knowledge be defined in plausible terms and rationally defended in the twenty-first century? That is the question before us in this chapter.
For clarification we’ll begin with the underlying metaphysical question, What is truth? After that we’ll turn to epistemology (from the Greek word episteme for “knowledge”)—the philosophical study of the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge. What exactly is knowledge? How (if at all) does it differ from mere opinion? What (if anything) can we know? What is the relationship between knowledge and truth? Socrates, as recorded in Plato’s dialogues, was the first to ask these questions in a philosophical context and to propose precise answers within a systematic theory of epistemology.[endnoteRef:2] His student Plato was the first to examine them in depth and work out a unified theory in written form. The ancient Greeks are the founders of epistemology as an academic subject. [2: Stated most clearly in Plato’s Meno and in his Theaetetus. ]
2. What Is Truth?
The most widely held definition among philosophers today is the account first expressed by Socrates in the dialogues of Plato and stated more formally in the logical works of Aristotle:
A proposition is true if it accurately corresponds to the facts; it is false if it does not.
Truth, in short, is correspondence with the facts. In philosophy, this is known as the correspondence theory of truth.
Notice the way each of the following true statements accurately corresponds to, or specifies, the relevant facts:
· There are craters on the Moon.
· The White House is located in Washington DC.
And notice the way the following false statements fail to correspond:
· There are large cities with skyscrapers on the Moon.
· The White House is located in Minnesota.
Although most philosophers throughout history have thought that the correspondence theory of truth is simply common sense made precise, two alternative theories have been proposed. According to the coherence theory of truth, what makes a proposition true is that it belongs to a coherent system of propositions. A system of propositions is coherent if its members are (a) logically consistent and (b) stand in a sufficient number of explanatory and logical relations to one another. A well-written novel is an example of a coherent system of propositions.
However, the coherence theory faces an objection that nearly all philosophers find decisive. It is possible to specify two equally coherent systems of propositions that are related in such a way that one contradicts the other. Since the two systems are contradictory, they cannot both be true. Yet both are equally coherent. If so, then truth cannot be mere coherence.
A second alternative to correspondence is the pragmatic theory of truth. According to this theory, truth is usefulness. A proposition is useful if belief in the proposition serves a human purpose. The pragmatic definition also faces an objection that most philosophers find fatal. Some propositions are useful in the pragmatic sense, even though they are clearly false. Hitler’s racial theories, for example, were useful to him in the sense that people who believed them helped him attain power, yet his theories have been proven false. But if a theory can be useful and yet false, then truth is not simply usefulness. For many reasons, the correspondence theory remains the mainstream, as well as the commonsense, view.
truth is objective if that which makes it true—its “truthmaker”–is an objective fact or feature of reality—a fact that exists on its own, independently of what anyone may or may not believe. A truth is subjective if that which makes it true is a subjective aspect of a person’s consciousness. Suppose I believe that strawberry ice cream tastes better than vanilla ice cream, and I state my opinion. My opinion is subjectively true because it is true by virtue of my personal or subjective sense of taste. It is not true (that strawberry ice cream tastes is better than vanilla) for those who dislike the taste of strawberry, and it will no longer be true for me if my taste changes. There is no objective fact of the matter, existing independently of my subjective taste, that makes the statement true. That which makes my opinion true for me is my inner sense of taste—a subjective aspect of my consciousness alone. An objective truth, on the other hand, is true by virtue of the facts, which are what they are regardless of what people may or may not believe or like. For example, it is objectively true that the moon has mountains. This proposition will remain true even if a dictator takes control of the world and convinces everyone that the surface of the moon is as smooth as silk. The proposition (that the Moon has mountains) will remain true even if everyone believes it is false, for its truthmaker is a fact about the Moon—a fact that exists independently of what people may or may not believe. In this way, some truths are objective, and some are subjective. On the standard interpretation, the correspondence theory of truth is a theory of objective truth.
The Last Word
3. What Is Knowledge?
There are many different kinds of knowledge. We may say that a person “knows” how to drive a car. This is practical, or how-to, knowledge. We say that a carpenter “knows” how to build a house. Call this “craft-knowledge.” We often say that one person “knows” a second person. This is acquaintance knowledge. There is also “public knowledge” (information that has been made public) and “common knowledge” (facts known by most people).
But we also say things like “I know that there are an infinite number of prime numbers” and “I know that the moon has craters.” Epistemologists call this “propositional knowledge” because a proposition or statement (rather than a skill, a person, etc.) is that which is known.[endnoteRef:3] In Plato’s Dialogues, Socrates seems quite interested in craft knowledge. However, when he works out a strict definition, his focus is propositional knowledge. This is understandable, since the context in the dialogues is intellectual. From here on, by knowledge we’ll mean the propositional kind. So, what exactly is propositional knowledge? [3: Recall that a proposition is not the same thing as a sentence. Two different sentences can express one and the same proposition. Technically, a proposition is the claim expressed by a declarative sentence. You won’t go wrong if you think of a proposition as the meaning of a declarative sentence. When two different sentences mean the same thing, they express the same proposition. ]
In his Dialogues, Plato portrays Socrates seeking an answer to the following question: When is it correct to say that someone “knows” something? Socrates’s first observation, put in modern terms, is that we would not ordinarily say a person knows that some proposition P is true if the person does not believe that P is true, i.e., corresponds to the facts. (Socrates and Plato accepted the correspondence theory of truth.) Surely believing P is a necessary condition for knowing P. If I sincerely state that I do not believe that whales are mammals, then it would not be correct to say that I “know” that whales are mammals.
Next, Socrates observes, we do not ordinarily say that a person knows some proposition P if, in fact, P is not true. For a contemporary example, some people actually believe that the earth is flat. They claim to have credible evidence. However, the earth is not flat. This is why we do not say, “They know that the earth is flat.” Rather, we say, “They believe that the earth is flat.” The truth of the proposition said to be known is clearly a necessary condition for the presence of knowledge.
Finally, we do not normally say that a person “knows” that some proposition P is true unless the claim that P is true is anchored to reality by good reasoning showing that P is certainly or at least very likely true. For example, imagine that during a drawing I believe that Ann will win the door prize, and she, in fact, does. However, suppose that I had no reason to believe that she would win; my belief was a lucky guess. In that case we would not say that I “knew” (beforehand) that she would win, for guesses are not justified by credible evidence. In general, a true belief only rises to the level of knowledge if it is tethered to reality by reason, that is, by an argument making it certain or very likely that the proposition said to be known is indeed true.
In sum, three conditions need to be satisfied before we ordinarily say that a person or “subject” S knows that a proposition P is true:
1. S believes that P is true. (This is called the “belief condition.”)
1. The proposition P is true. (This is called the “truth condition.”)
1. S has an adequate justification for believing that P is true, where the justification for a claim P is “a sufficiently strong reason or justification for thinking that P is true.”[endnoteRef:4] (This is called the “justification condition.”) [4: Laurence Bonjour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 15.]
The epistemologists Ernest Sosa and Laurence BonJour summarize all three conditions compactly in the following words: “Ever since Plato it has been thought that one knows only if one’s belief hits the mark of truth and does so with adequate justification.”[endnoteRef:5] [5: Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 1.]
For example, Jane knows that Jupiter’s atmosphere is mostly hydrogen and helium only if (a) she believes that the atmosphere of Jupiter is mostly hydrogen and helium, (b) it is true that the atmosphere of Jupiter is mostly hydrogen and helium, and (c) she has adequate justification for her belief in the form of a sufficiently strong reason for thinking that her belief is true.
Socrates and Plato argued that the belief, truth, and justification conditions are jointly sufficient and individually necessary for the presence of knowledge. Some terminology is required before this will be precise. A condition is a sufficient condition for X if its presence all by itself guarantees X. For example, jumping in Green Lake is a sufficient condition for getting wet. A condition is a necessary condition for some X if it is a requirement for X, which means that without it, X cannot exist. For example, oxygen is a necessary condition for human life. Here’s a shorthand way to think of it: a sufficient condition is a guarantee; a necessary condition is only a requirement. Notice that oxygen is necessary but not sufficient for life (you need more than oxygen), while jumping in a lake is sufficient but not necessary for getting wet (there are other ways to get wet).
So, the Socratic and Platonic claim is that if all three conditions are satisfied, knowledge is present (the person knows that P), but if even one condition is not satisfied, knowledge is not present (since each condition is required). Because this was the first philosophical theory of knowledge, it is also called the “classical account of knowledge.” Today it is also sometimes called the “JTB theory of knowledge” because it may be summarized with the slogan that knowledge is “justified true belief.”
The justification condition is the only one of the three that is difficult to understand. People can have many different kinds of justifications for holding a belief. Someone might believe a proposition simply because he finds the belief comforting—although the person might not realize that comfort is the unconscious reason he accepts the belief. The belief serves as an emotional crutch. The reverse, of course, is also possible: someone might reject a proposition simply because he doesn’t want it to be true. These are emotional justifications for belief.
Some beliefs are held for self-serving reasons. For instance, someone benefits greatly from a certain economic system, and this—rather than a reasoned argument–is the real reason why the person believes that the system is best.
A belief might also be accepted because it is useful—although the believer might not realize that this is the unconscious reason he accepts the belief. This would be a pragmatic reason to accept a belief.
Emotional, self-interested, and pragmatic justifications do not satisfy the JTB justification condition for knowledge because neither kind of justification is intrinsically related to the goal of the cognitive enterprise, which is the attainment of objective truth. The fact that believing P comforts you or makes you happy does not make it likely that P is true. Just because you want P to be true, or hope that P is true, does not make it certain, or even likely, that P is true. A belief could be useful and yet false. (Hitler’s racial beliefs, for instance.) In short, emotional, self-interested, and pragmatic justifications of a belief do not satisfy the JTB justification condition for knowledge because there is no intrinsic connection between unexamined emotions, feelings, ego, self-interest, or usefulness, and actual truth.
Today epistemologists call the type of justification required for knowledge “epistemic justification” to distinguish it from other kinds of justification. Epistemic justification consists in reasoning that make it certain or likely to a sufficient degree that the belief said to be known is true. Epistemic justification is thus reasoning that is truth-conducive. As BonJour, a leading contemporary epistemologist, puts it, epistemic justification “increases or enhances to an appropriate degree . . . the likelihood that the belief is true.”[endnoteRef:6] This is appropriate because (again) only this kind of justification is aimed at the goal of cognition, namely, the attainment of truth. [6: Bonjour, Epistemology, 35.]
For a plain example, my (epistemic) justification for believing that it is snowing outside right now is that (a) I clearly seem to see snow coming down, (b) my senses are not impaired, (c) I am in a lucid frame of mind, (d) I have no reason to think someone is tricking me, and (e) I already know what snow is. For another example, my justification for believing that the Beatles’ last concert was at Candlestick Park, San Francisco, on August 30, 1966, is that (a) I read an account in a reputable book written by a trusted author, (b) the book contained documentation, and (c) I have no reason to doubt its accuracy. The supporting reasons for both beliefs make it very likely, if not certain, that each belief is true. Thus, in each case I know.
Reflecting on some of the lessons he had learned in life, Socrates once said:
And isn’t it a bad thing to be deceived about the truth, and a good thing to know what the truth is? For I assume that by knowing the truth [we] mean knowing things as they really are.[endnoteRef:7]
[7: See Plato’s Apology in the second part of the Interlude “Socrates at Work.” ]
Do you agree with Socrates? Isn’t knowledge valuable? And isn’t it valuable because it puts us in touch with reality, which we all seek? Don’t we value truth over falsehood, reality over illusion?
4. Why Accept the JTB Theory?
Socrates and Plato based their theory of knowledge on observations of the way we use the verb to know in propositional contexts. With this in mind, let’s briefly examine the conditions one by one. An obvious reason to accept the belief condition is that we do not ordinarily say that someone “knows” that a proposition P is true if the person does not believe that P is true. Certainly, believing that P is true is a necessary condition—a requirement—of knowing that P is true.
Why accept the truth condition? The main reason is that we ordinarily do not dignify a belief by calling it “knowledge” if the belief is false. For example, if someone claimed to know that George Washington is still president today, we would reply, “That may be your belief or your opinion, but it is not genuine knowledge.” (And the reason the belief is not knowledge is that it is false, right?) Certainly, truth is a necessary condition if a belief is to qualify as real knowledge.
Turning to the third condition, imagine that a fortune-teller reads a crystal ball and predicts that it will snow tomorrow. Suppose that she believes her own prediction and her prediction comes true. Nevertheless, we would not say she knew that it would snow. For she had no good reason connected to reality to conclude that it will snow. She just made a lucky guess, and a lucky guess is not genuine knowledge. Lacking justification, her true belief does not count as real knowledge. In everyday discussion, a true belief only rises to the level of knowledge when it is solidly anchored to reality by reasoning that makes it certain, or at least very likely, that the proposition believed really is true. We know that there are craters on the dark side of the moon because we have good evidence solidly linking the proposition to reality.
I mentioned but did not examine the distinction between opinion and knowledge. With the JTB theory in hand, that distinction can now be clarified. An opinion (or a guess or a hunch) is a belief that does not rise to the level of knowledge because it is not solidly grounded in reality by a sufficiently strong reason to believe it is true. In other words, an opinion is not real knowledge because it is not epistemically justified.
5. Objections and Replies
Some argue against the belief condition by pointing out that we sometimes say, “I know it, but I don’t believe it.” They suppose that statements such as this show that knowing does not require believing. However, when someone makes such a statement, the person normally does not intend to be taken literally. It’s just a way of saying, “I’m astonished.” The objection fails.
A common objection to the truth condition runs like this: “In the Middle Ages, it was common knowledge that the sun circles the earth. But the proposition (that the sun circles the earth) was false; therefore, we can know that which is false.”
This argument is flawed. We misuse the word knew if we say that people in the Middle Ages “knew” the sun circles the earth. It is more accurate to say that in the Middle Ages, people claimed to know that the sun revolves around the earth. It would be even better to say, “In the Middle Ages, it was commonly believed that the sun circles the earth.”
Some have argued that the justification condition is not needed. They observe that people sometimes make lucky guesses—based on no grounds or evidence whatsoever—and then say, “See, I knew it!” It follows, they conclude, that justification is not a necessary condition for knowledge. The problem is that examples such as this are not cases of genuine knowledge. People can say that they have knowledge, but saying so doesn’t make it so. In the absence of any grounds or evidence, such cases do not constitute real knowledge.
Let’s now return to the global skeptics who claim that genuine knowledge doesn’t exist. All we have, they say, are unjustified opinions (and one opinion is as valid or true as any other). But isn’t it a matter of common sense that many beliefs are epistemically justified (while many simply are not)? Aren’t we justified in believing that there are craters on the moon? That electrons have a negative charge? That basketballs are bigger than atoms? And that many diseases are caused by viruses and bacteria? Don’t we know these things? Don’t we know them because we have very good reason to believe that they are true?
And aren’t the following three beliefs epistemically unjustified? Cancer is caused by witches. A secret civilization of green giants inhabits the center of the earth. The sun orbits the moon. Can we give up the traditional notions of objective truth and knowledge and still make sense of our world?
Furthermore, if the claim that knowledge doesn’t exist is true, then no beliefs are epistemically justified, including the claim that knowledge doesn’t exist. If the claim is unjustified, then why believe it? Global skepticism—the claim that knowledge doesn’t exist– refutes itself.
Cultural Relativism and Knowledge
Some who reject the traditional definition of knowledge advocate in its place a culturally relative notion of knowledge. Each culture, they claim, has its own “way of knowing” and no one way of knowing is better or more valid than any other. If a shaman in a traditional society claims that disease is caused by witches casting spells, his claim is true relative to his culture. If a scientist from a western society claims that disease is caused by bacteria and viruses, his claim is true relative to his culture. Both “ways of knowing” are equally valid, says the cultural relativist, for there is no objective basis for saying one culture is right and the other is wrong. I have known people who advocated this view. However, when they contracted a serious illness, they went to a western-trained doctor dispensing medicines tested in scientific laboratories.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 5.1
1. What is truth, according to the correspondence theory?
2. What is truth, according to the coherence theory?
3. What is truth, according to the pragmatic theory?
4. Is it always better to know the truth than to remain in darkness? Discuss.
5. Can someone deny the existence of objective truth without contradicting himself?
6. Can alethic relativism be defended without self-contradiction?
7. Can global skepticism be argued for without self-contradiction?
8. How does propositional knowledge differ from other kinds of knowledge?
9. What is knowledge, according to the JTB theory?
10. What is epistemic justification? How does it differ from other kinds of justification?
11. Give three examples of things we know and three examples of things many people mistakenly think they know.
12. What is the difference between a merely true belief and knowledge?
13. What is the difference between opinion and knowledge, according to the JTB theory?
14. Does the JTB theory provide an adequate definition of knowledge? Or is it missing something? Argue for your position.
15. Can you think of an item of knowledge that does not satisfy the JTB account?
16. If you believe the JTB analysis is on the wrong track, can you state an alternative account? Does your theory agree with the way we ordinarily use the word knowledge?
17. Why do we value truth over illusion? Discuss.
6. How Does Justification First Arise?
According to the JTB theory, a true belief only qualifies as knowledge if it is adequately justified. But how does epistemic justification get started in the first place? What is the first premise? BonJour gives the mainstream answer in contemporary epistemology:
Historically, most epistemologists have distinguished two main sources from which the epistemic justification of a belief might arise. It has seemed obvious to all but a very few that many beliefs are justified by appeal to one’s sensory (and introspective) experience of the world. But it has seemed equally obvious to most that there are other beliefs, including many of the most important ones that we have, that are justified in a way that does not depend at all on such an appeal to experience, justified, as it is usually put, by reason or pure thought alone.[endnoteRef:8] [8: Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2.]
Examples of sensory, or sense, experience include the experienced smell of a rose, the experienced color of a sunset, the experienced sound of a bell, the experienced roughness of sandpaper, and the experienced taste of chocolate. Surely a great deal of what we know about the material world is justified at least in part on the basis of experiential data we received through our physical senses (sight, taste, touch, smell, and hearing). For example, I know that Mount Rainier has snow on its peak. How do I know? What justifies my belief? At least part of the answer is that I saw the snow with my own eyes. For another example: I know that soap tastes bitter. How do I know? What justifies my belief? I’ve tasted soap.
Other beliefs, as BonJour notes, are justified on the basis of pure reasoning alone, without any reliance on experiential input from the physical senses. For example, we know that the decimal expansion of the square root of 2 goes on to infinity without ever repeating itself. How do we know this? The justification does not depend at all on what our five senses tell us about the material world, for it would take an infinite number of lifetimes to physically look at every number in the decimal expansion of the square root of 2 so as to justify the knowledge claim in this case by observation. Fortunately, we don’t need to look at any physical object when we justify this mathematical truth. We know that the proposition is true (that the decimal expansion of the square root of 2 goes to infinity etc.) through an inner process of mathematical reasoning alone—an intellectual process that occurs inside our minds, a train of thought that justifies the claim to knowledge without reliance on anything the senses might tell us about material objects. It seems, then, that some justifications require sense experience of the material world, others do not. Now for the definitions.
If sense experience is required—at least in part–for the justification of an item of knowledge K, then K is called a posteriori knowledge (from the Latin for “after experience”). Such knowledge is also called “empirical knowledge” (from the Latin empiricus, which stems from the Greek empiricos for “experience”), or simply “experiential knowledge.”[endnoteRef:9] In short, if sense experience is necessary for the justification of an item of knowledge, then that knowledge is a posteriori or empirical knowledge. All our knowledge of the material world that is justified by natural science is justified a posteriori and qualifies as a posteriori or empirical knowledge. [9: Sense data is the term epistemologists use for the states of mind produced directly by our physical senses that we experience immediately. ]
If an item of knowledge K can be justified on the basis of “reason or pure thought alone,” without reliance on sense experience of the material world, then that knowledge is called a priori knowledge (from the Latin for “prior to experience”). This kind of knowledge is also called ratiocinative knowledge (from the Latin ratio for reason). In short, if pure reason alone is sufficient for the justification of an item of knowledge, then that knowledge is a priori or ratiocinative knowledge. All our knowledge of purely mathematical objects (in fields such as algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and calculus) is justified a priori and qualifies as a priori knowledge. This will make more sense after we look at examples.
Examples of a Posteriori Knowledge
Nearly everyone knows that the moon has phases. But what justifies our belief in this case? The answer is obvious: we observe the phases of the moon with our own eyes. The justification may involve reasoning, but sense experience is also required. The following are additional examples of knowledge justified on an a posteriori basis:
· Mount Everest has snow on its peak.
· The ocean contains salt.
· Ripe bananas are yellow.
· Lemons taste sour.
· The moon has craters.
· The earth is round.
If I were to claim that the moon has craters and someone were to ask me to justify my belief, I would reply, “I saw them through a pair of binoculars.” Ask me how I know that the earth is round, and I will begin by pointing out that when ships disappear over the horizon, we see their masts disappear last. I might add that photos taken from space show that the earth is round. In each case, my knowledge is justified a posteriori.
Examples of a Priori Knowledge
Now think carefully about the following statement:
Necessarily, nothing in the universe is both purely red all over and purely green all over at the same time.
Is the indented statement true or false? It is clearly true, isn’t it? But what justifies this claim? How do we know? Our knowledge in this case is justified on the basis of reason alone, without reliance on sensory experience. To justify the indented statement, all we need to do is to think carefully (and rationally) about its meaning. Once we understand the meaning, or content, of the statement, we see directly, with a kind of intellectual insight, that it must be true. This is a rational, rather than a physical, kind of seeing, for you can think about the statement with your eyes closed and your other physical senses deadened and still see, just by reasoning, that the proposition expressed by the statement must be true.
If this does not seem obvious, think about it another way. We certainly know that the indented statement is true. But how could anyone justify this truth empirically, that is, on the basis of particular sense experiences of the material world? Wouldn’t you have to travel around the entire universe looking carefully at each object, checking each object to see if it is (or is not) both purely red all over and purely green all over at the same time? You would have to keep a list and your travels would take you not just to the other planets of our solar system but to the four hundred billion stars of the Milky Way galaxy. However, even if you scoured the entire galaxy, you would not have proved, using your senses alone, that the indented statement is true, for the universe contains at least one hundred billion other galaxies, each containing on average several hundred billion stars. Wouldn’t it take more than a lifetime to visually check every colored object in the universe and verify empirically, using just your senses, that necessarily no object anywhere is both red all over and green all over at the same time?
Yet you know with complete certainty that the indented statement is true. How do you know? The obvious answer is, you know just by thinking rationally about the content of the proposition expressed. It seems, then, that the knowledge in this case is justified on the basis of “reason or pure thought” alone—through a kind of intellectual seeing that does not rely on inferences from, or inputs supplied by, physical sense experience. No knowledge of atoms and molecules and quanta of energy is needed.
If further examples are called for, consider the statement, or proposition, that the number 3 is greater than the number 2. What justifies this mathematical certainty? No information from the physical senses about the material world could possibly prove it true. (The number 3 is not physically greater than the number 2.) Our knowledge that 3 is greater than 2 is justified on the basis of an interior act of reasoning alone, without reliance on sensory data.
Epistemologists commonly distinguish four kinds of a priori knowledge or knowledge justified a priori: mathematical, logical, moral, and conceptual. The following are examples of mathematical truths justified on an a priori basis.
· There are an infinite number of positive integers.
· The rational number line is dense.
· Every square has four sides.
· Two angles equal to a third angle must be equal to each other.
To reinforce the point yet again, consider the second example. How could you ever prove empirically, using your senses alone, that the rational number line is dense (that a rational number exists between any two rational numbers to infinity)? Wouldn’t it take more than a lifetime to physically observe every case? Yet, we know the truth in question with complete certainty. And isn’t our certainty in this case eminently reasonable?[endnoteRef:10] We know the proposition is true on the basis of a priori reasoning alone. No knowledge of atoms and molecules is needed. [10: Some reply as follows: “But we must use our senses to read the sentences and to hear the arguments. Thus, our knowledge in these cases is partly based on the senses and empirical data.” This objection is mistaken. We use our senses to understand the meanings of the propositions involved, not their truth. We use pure reason alone to see that the propositions in question, once understood, are true (and must be true). ]
Principles of logic are also justified a priori. For instance,
· If all As are Bs and all Bs are Cs, then necessarily all As are Cs,
where A, B, and C are variables ranging over categories of things.
The realm of a priori knowledge is generally also thought to include abstract truths about morality. For example,
· If an act A is morally right in situation S, then A is morally right in any other morally similar situation.
· If it is morally wrong to treat one person in a certain way in a certain situation, then it is morally wrong to treat any other person in a similar situation in that way.
The standard list of truths justified a priori also includes conceptual truths such as these:
· The whole is always greater than the part.
· All bachelors are unmarried.
Think about the last example, the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried. Could this be justified through an empirical survey of all bachelors around the world? The epistemologist Dan O’Brien gives the standard answer in his field: “The answer is No. You do not have to ask your bachelor friends whether they are married; you are justified in believing they’re not, simply by virtue of possessing the relevant concepts.”[endnoteRef:11] [11: Dan O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 25–26. ]
The human faculty of a priori reasoning is amazing. Using reason alone we discover vast realms of highly abstract and complex mathematical truths, in fields such as algebra, geometry, trigonometry, calculus, and topology. Reason operating a priori also discovers vast domains of highly abstract truths in mathematical logic, including the many fascinating theorems of modal logic, quantum logic, tense logic, deontic logic, and epistemic logic.
Our sense faculties are amazing too. Using our senses aided by reason we have discovered remarkable truths about the very small and the very large, the distant past and the distant future, in the highly theoretical fields of quantum and relativistic physics, chemistry, biology, geology, and astrophysics. We’ll come back to the amazing capabilities of the human mind in the last part of this chapter, when we ask, Can a naturalistic or purely materialistic account of the evolutionary process explain the surprising reach of human reason?
With the traditional accounts of a priori and a posteriori justification clarified, it’s time to apply epistemology to real life.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 5.2
1. List two things you know that qualify as a posteriori knowledge. How would you justify each belief if pressed to do so?
2. Why can’t our senses always be taken at face value?
3. Under what conditions does it become likely our senses are impaired?
4. State two ways our senses can mislead us.
5. What, if anything, do we know a priori? Give an example to illustrate your claim.
6. Is mathematics known a priori? Discuss.
7. This may require research. How do we know that the square root of 2 is irrational?
8. In each case, is the proposition known a priori or a posteriori? Explain.
a. The White House is white.
b. 1 + 1 = 2.
c. All octogenarians are at least eighty years old.
d. Octopuses are very intelligent.
e. All triangles have three sides.
f. Some people are one hundred years old.
g. Every square has four equal sides and four equal angles.
h. Soap tastes bitter.
i. Unsweetened baking chocolate tastes awful.
j. The decimal expansion of pi goes on forever and never repeats itself.
7. Application: Critically Evaluate Your Beliefs!
A great deal of what we know about the world is known on the basis of testimony received from others. Many other beliefs are supported by our memories. Both kinds of belief can and should be evaluated rationally.
Belief Supported by Testimony
Testimony may be defined as purported information received from other people. Much of what we know about the world is based on testimony received from others. For example, I know that there is a scientific research station on the South Pole. However, I have never been there and have never seen it with my own eyes. I also know that protons weigh more than electrons, although I can’t prove it and wouldn’t know how to operate the complicated instruments in a physics lab that prove it.
Of course, the mere fact that a belief is based on testimony does not by itself show that the belief is true. The person supplying the information may be lying, misinformed, or biased. Which raises the question: When should we trust testimony, and when should we doubt it? When does testimony give us knowledge, and when does it only give us only opinion?
A good suggestion is that we go with ordinary common sense. It is common sense to accept someone’s testimony as veridical (truthful) unless we have good reason to doubt it. This principle was first stated and defended by the Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–1796), known as the “commonsense philosopher.” Reid argued that when it comes to ordinary testimony, the default position is trust, and the default is only overridden when we have good reason to suspect someone’s testimony is false. In defense of his principle, known as “the principle of testimony,” Reid argued that in ordinary situations people have a natural “propensity to speak truth” and that lying “is doing violence to our nature.”[endnoteRef:12] [12: Ibid., 56.]
Something worth considering is the fact that we do follow Reid’s principle in everyday life. Furthermore, if we did not follow it, we would know very little about the world around us (and probably could not even function).
However, it is also good to keep in mind that people are fallible and therefore testimony is never completely certain. Here are some reasons we might have for doubting a person’s testimony:
· The person has a record of lying.
· The person has a record of providing incorrect information.
· The person has a motive to be less than truthful.
· The person is known to have biases that may have distorted his perceptions.
· The person is known to have been mentally or physically impaired at the time.
· The testimony conflicts with previously established (“prior”) information.
· The testimony conflicts with the reliable testimony of others who were present.
· The best explanation of all the facts is that the person giving the testimony is lying or deluded.
When we are unsure of an item of testimony and want to test it, we can do the following:
· Check the person’s reliability by looking at his or her past testimony.
· Try to corroborate the testimony with the testimony of others.
· Investigate the person’s cognitive condition at the time: Were the person’s faculties working properly? Is there any evidence the person’s perception was impaired by bias, prejudice, wishful thinking, illness, drugs, and so forth?
· Investigate the person’s motives.
Expert Testimony Some of our testimony comes from ordinary people with no expertise in a subject (friends, associates, pundits on TV, etc.). Other testimony comes from experts—individuals who have a great deal of verified knowledge in a particular area. For example, someone with a PhD in nuclear physics from a reputable institution qualifies as an expert in nuclear physics; a person who has worked successfully as a journeyman plumber for many years qualifies as an expert in plumbing, and so on. Evaluating expert testimony calls for additional canons. But first, what makes a person an expert in an area?
Someone’s status as an expert is normally based on (a) academic education or nonacademic training in the subject or area; (b) professional accomplishments; (c) reputation among peers in the field; and (d) a history of reliable judgment. For example, Richard Feynman (1918–1988) was widely considered an expert on quantum mechanics (a branch of physics that studies the motions of subatomic particles), and rightly so. On his graduate school entrance exam, he earned a perfect score in mathematics and physics—something no one had ever before accomplished. He earned a PhD in physics from Princeton University in 1942, taught at leading universities, and was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics for his work in quantum electrodynamics. The theories he developed were confirmed on the basis of the precise predictions they yielded. In a worldwide poll of physicists in 1999, he was ranked one of the ten greatest physicists of all time. Feynman’s opinion on matters having to do with physics carried great weight, and for good reason.[endnoteRef:13] [13: See James Gleick, Genius: The Life and Science of Richard Feynman (New York: Vintage, 1993). ]
However, since experts are fallible human beings, their testimony should not always be accepted without question. First, expert opinion carries more weight than the opinion of a nonexpert only when an expert is rendering an opinion in his or her area of expertise. A nuclear physicist’s opinion on politics or religion, for example, does not qualify as expert opinion, any more than does a politician’s opinion on nuclear physics. An expert is only an expert in his or her area of expertise.
Second, if an expert makes a claim, but many qualified experts disagree on the point at issue, that is grounds for doubt. In such a case, it may be reasonable to withhold judgment and investigate the matter before reaching a conclusion.
Third, if an expert is an “interested party” in a matter, that is, if the expert stands to personally gain if his or her testimony is believed, that calls his or her testimony into question. For example, imagine that an expert on cures for the common cold testifies in favor of a particular commercial cold remedy while owning stock in the company. This information suggests that the expert might not be objective. Further evidence is needed before taking his testimony at face value.
Also, if an expert’s testimony appears to be biased, it is reasonable to question it. We have reason to suspect bias if we have evidence the person is motivated by something other than the pursuit of objective truth.
A final reason to doubt the testimony of an expert hardly needs saying. If the expert gives poor arguments, that is grounds for doubt. Experts are human and they can, like all of us, make mistakes. Thus, you have grounds for doubt if an expert, no matter how famous, gives weak arguments in support of a conclusion, considers only half the evidence, does not treat opposing views with respect, appears overly emotional, or appears too dismissive of counter arguments.
Belief Drawn from the Internet
The Internet is now the biggest source of testimony in the world. Many people base much of what they know on what they have read on the World Wide Web. Since the Internet contains much that is plainly false, information received from online sources must be critically examined before a claim to know can be justified.
It is important to keep in mind that almost complete freedom of speech exists on the Internet: anyone can say almost anything about anything. In addition, everyone knows that some people make money by peddling false claims in the online world. Many absurd claims can be found on the Internet. So, how do we separate the trustworthy from the questionable, the true from the false, when considering a web source?
The first step is to identify the author or organization behind the website. If an author created the website, the next step is to evaluate the author’s credibility. What justifies placing trust in his or her claims? Begin by asking, What are the author’s credentials? Can they be checked? (Are they even real?) Are the credentials issued by a respected institution, one with a track record of accomplishment? Credentials from a trusted institution are not always required, however. In the absence of credentials, we should ask, What justifies trusting this author as a source of information? We can pursue this question by asking, What is the author’s background? Is the author a recognized expert in the subject area? Does the author have a proven track record on the subject?
If the information is controversial, we must ask, What evidence does the author present to back up the claim? Is the evidence logically sufficient? Is the evidence up to date? If an argument is presented, the following is important: Does the author consider and answer counterarguments and objections? If so, that’s an indication (but not proof) that the author is a critical thinker who is interested in the truth.
It is good to keep in mind that authors are fallible human beings. Even if the author is an expert in the area, facts may need to be cross-checked against other reliable sources, statements from other experts on the matter may need to be consulted, evidence and counterevidence may need to be weighed, and so on.
When an organization has produced a website, similar questions ought to be asked. What is the organization behind the website? What are its qualifications? Is it a recognized authority in the subject area? If so, then the usual checks on expert evidence may be performed.
We can also ask, Does the organization have a proven track record? Is it known for reliable, proven information? Or does it have a track record of misinformation? Is its information up to date? Does it back up its claims with solid evidence? Does it cite its sources? Or does it assert things without any documentation? If it does provide documentation, is the backing public? Can interested people look it up and verify it?
Remember that organizations are created by human beings. Does the organization stand to gain financially if the information it distributes is accepted? If so, then it is an interested party and caution is advised. Is the organization biased in some way? For example, is it funded by political or special interests that stand to gain if the information it distributes is widely accepted? Is the organization closely associated with a particular political party or political or ideological movement? Political and ideological movements have an agenda to promote and are interested parties in a matter. Does the organization devote more time, space, and energy to one side of a controversial issue? These facts alone, if verified, do not show that the organization’s claims are false, but they call for further investigation.
Consulting an academic website associated with a respected institution of higher learning is a good way to begin a research project. Such websites exist on nearly every subject. The information they provide is probably reliable if it was written by recognized content experts and in addition underwent rigorous criticism before being posted. In the field of philosophy, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (
www.plato.stanford.edu
) and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (
www.iep.utm.edu
) are two highly respected and reliable sources of information on all areas of the discipline. If you are searching without success for a reliable academic website on a particular subject, you might also consider consulting a professor who teaches the subject.
First published in 1768, the Encyclopedia Britannica is the oldest and most respected encyclopedia in the world. Although not associated with an academic institution, its articles are now all available online. Every Britannica article is written by one or more academic scholars who are tested experts in their areas. The encyclopedia’s website (
www.britannica.com
), or a hard copy edition of the encyclopedia, is an excellent place to begin almost any research project.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 5.3
1. What is testimony? Give an example.
2. What makes someone an expert?
3. When is testimony trustworthy? When is it not trustworthy?
4. What, according to Thomas Reid, is the commonsense principle governing testimony received from ordinary people?
5. Is Reid’s principle of testimony reasonable? Make your case.
6. How do we evaluate expert testimony?
7. How do we evaluate personal (nonexpert) testimony?
8. Choose a public expert on some subject, and critically evaluate his or her expertise on the basis of the principles explained in this chapter.
9. State an item of information that you know on the basis of personal (nonexpert) testimony alone. State an argument that supports your claim to know.
10. State an item of information that you know on the basis of expert testimony alone. State an argument that supports your claim to know.
11. State some of the principles we use when determining the veracity of a website.
12. Visit a web “truth checker” such as
www.snopes.com
,
www.truthorfiction.com
, or
www.factcheck.org
, and document an interesting online myth.
13. Choose a website and critically evaluate it for accuracy and reliability on the basis of the principles discussed in this chapter.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 5.3
1. What makes someone an expert?
2. When is testimony trustworthy? When is it not trustworthy?
3. What, according to Thomas Reid, is the commonsense principle governing testimony received from ordinary people?
4. Is Reid’s principle of testimony reasonable? Make your case.
5. How do we evaluate expert testimony?
6. How do we evaluate personal (nonexpert) testimony?
7. Choose a public expert on some subject, and critically evaluate his or her expertise on the basis of the principles explained in this chapter.
8. State an item of information that you know on the basis of personal (nonexpert) testimony alone. State an argument that supports your claim to know.
9. State an item of information that you know on the basis of expert testimony alone. State an argument that supports your claim to know.
10. State some of the principles we use when determining the veracity of a website.
11. Visit a web “truth checker” such as www.snopes.com, www.truthorfiction.com, or www.factcheck.org, and document an interesting online myth.
12. Choose a website and critically evaluate it for accuracy and reliability on the basis of the principles discussed in this chapter.
Belief Supported by Memory
Much of what we claim to know is based on memory. But our faculty of memory can’t always be trusted. Sometimes our memories are selective—we remember only what we want to remember. Other times our memories are creative—we remember events but with embellishments added. Sometimes our memories are simply not accurate, for example, when they result from impaired perception. In some cases we remember an event inaccurately and then this inaccurate memory becomes lodged in our minds. We’ve all experienced this: two people remember the same episode in very different ways. Caution is therefore always advised when relying on memory alone.
But memories can be tested. We can check them against witnesses who were present, against physical records or memorabilia of an event such as photographs, and against other solidly confirmed memories. When one of your memory claims conflicts with another, it can sometimes be helpful to cross-examine yourself.
These considerations explain why attorneys in the courtroom ask eyewitnesses so many detailed questions. If the witness’s version of events is the result of impaired perception, the fact is likely to emerge if enough questions are asked during cross-examination. However, since memory is sometimes creative, there is always the opposite danger: that leading questions from a forceful attorney might alter an eyewitness’s perceived memories. These are all reasons why the mere fact that someone was present when an event occurred does not necessarily mean that the person’s memory of the event is accurate.
These thoughts are further reasons to follow Socrates’s advice: never be afraid to look in the mirror and examine your assumptions on the basis of careful, realistic reasoning.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 5.4
1. State two ways in which memory can be biased.
2. Under what conditions is memory trustworthy?
3. Describe a time in your life when you asserted a claim on the basis of memory, but others who were present argued that your claim was mistaken. On the basis of their argument, you changed your mind and decided that you had misunderstood the situation.
4. Describe a time in your life when you asserted a claim based on a “false memory” that you later corrected due either to (a) the testimony of others who were present, or (b) cross-checking it against real memories, or (c) independent evidence that caused you to reject the alleged memory claim.
Notes
2
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7
The Mind-Body Problem
During week 5 read the first half of this chapter (Sections 1-5).
During week 6 read the second half (Sections 6-end).
Copyright by Paul Herrick, 2020. For class use only. Not for distribution. This chapter: 32 pages of reading.
1. Are You Your Brain?
Sometimes we refer to our brains; other times we refer to our minds. BJ the Chicago Kid titled his second album In My Mind. But Screeching Weasel titled its third studio album My Brain Hurts. Are the mind and the brain two different things? Or are they one and the same? To put the question another way: Are thoughts, sensations, mental images, and such nothing more than physical events or processes of the physical brain? Are they just neurons (brain cells) firing or something like that? Or is the mind an immaterial, nonphysical entity distinct from the brain but interacting in some way with it? In philosophy, these and related questions make up the mind-body problem.
Since ancient times, the common view has been that the mind—the part of us that is conscious, that thinks, that makes choices, that bears moral responsibility—is immaterial and cannot be physically seen, touched, weighed, or otherwise directly detected by instruments. On this view, the mind–often called the “soul,” “spirit,” or “self”—is not the brain or any part of the body or any physical thing at all. However, since mind and body obviously interact, the common view has long been that the mind or soul can affect the body and the body can affect the mind. More specifically, the immaterial mind can cause changes in the physical body, through the interface of the physical brain, and the brain can cause changes in the mind.
In philosophy, this traditional view is called “mind-body dualism” (“dualism” for short) because it claims that mind and body are two distinct things. The common view is sometimes also called “mind-body interactionism” because it claims that mind and body, though distinct, interact. Philosophical dualists argue that the universe divides into two radically different kinds of substances—mindless matter and thinking mind or, as some prefer to put it, matter and spirit, or as still others put it, matter and consciousness.
Most religions of the world teach a dualist account of human nature. Each human being, they generally claim, is composed of an immaterial mind or soul joined to a material body. On the religious view, the mind, or soul, rather than the material body is the part that will be judged by God in the end. As the basis of moral responsibility, the soul is the root of one’s identity as a person. In other words, the soul is the true self; the material body is merely the soul’s temporary lodging place during its journey on earth. Most religions also teach a doctrine of immortality, or survival—the claim that the immaterial soul lives on in a higher realm after the death and disintegration of the material body.
If dualism is true and your immaterial mind, or soul, is the seat of your identity—the real you–then your soul, not your brain or any part of your body, is what you refer to when you use the word I. If each of us is an immaterial soul, then we are not what we initially appear to be from the outside—a merely physical being composed of nothing but matter.
Although dualism has been the common view throughout history, more and more people today reject dualism and accept “materialism” (also called “naturalism” and sometimes “physicalism”). Essentially this is the view that nothing but matter exists, with matter defined as that which science in principle recognizes—atoms, subatomic particles, molecules, quanta of energy, forces, fields, and everything composed of such things. Some opponents of dualism put the claim this way: Nothing exists outside the system of nature recognized by science. Still others put it this way: Nothing but physical objects exist. According to materialism (or naturalism or physicalism), nothing supernatural exists: There is no such being as God; and heaven, immaterial souls, spirits, angels and such things do not exist. On the materialist view, the mind is nothing more than the physical brain or (as some materialists put it) the functioning of the brain or (as still others claim) observable behavior caused by the brain.
Many materialists today identify the self with the brain. On this view, when we say “I,” we are referring to our physical brains. When we say, “I did it,” we are in effect saying, “My brain did it.” (But notice that the very word My in the sentence “My brain did it” implies that the self is not the brain but rather is something distinct from the brain that “owns” the brain, which reflects a dualist view of the self.)
Our discussion will begin with the dualist position. Socrates and Plato gave philosophical arguments for mind-body dualism, and for survival (the immortality of the soul). But the big arguments under discussion today in universities across the world originated in Europe during the early modern period (i.e., the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The first historically significant modern argument for dualism was given by the French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of modern philosophy.
2. The Case for Dualism
In his Meditations—the book that broke with the past and launched the modern era in philosophy–Descartes observes that
there is a great difference between a mind and a body, because the body, by its very nature, is something divisible, whereas the mind is plainly indivisible. For in truth, when I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind; nor can the faculties of willing, perceiving, conceiving, etc., properly be called its parts, for it is the same mind that is exercised in willing, in perceiving, and in conceiving, etc. But quite the opposite holds in corporeal or extended things; for I cannot imagine any one of them which I cannot easily sunder in thought. This would be sufficient to teach me that the mind, or soul, of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already been apprised of it on other grounds.
This famous line of reasoning, known today as “Descartes’s divisibility argument,” makes more sense once it has been fleshed out in contemporary terms.
Descartes’s Divisibility Argument
1. The human mind has a property (an attribute or characteristic) that the human brain—and any other physical or material object—lacks.
2. Necessarily, for any x and for any y, if x has a property that y lacks, then x and y are not one and the same entity; rather, they must be two distinct entities.
3. Therefore, the human mind and the human brain are not one and the same entity; rather, they must be two distinct entities.
4. It also follows that the human mind is not identical to any physical or material part of the brain, the body, or the material world.
5. Therefore, mind-body dualism is certainly true.
The presence of the word certainly indicates that Descartes’s argument is deductive. His claim is therefore that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. In addition, the argument is clearly valid. That is, its conclusion must indeed be true if all its premises are true. The only way to attack Descartes’s argument, then, is to give an argument against one of its premises, that is, an argument for the conclusion that one of his premises is false. But before we proceed, each premise can be supported by a subargument.
Argument for premise 1
I am assuming here that by “part” Descartes means a “stand-alone” part—a part of a whole that can be detached so as to stand apart from the whole.
1a. Every macroscopic part of the human body—including every part of the human brain—is divisible into stand-alone parts.
1b. The human mind is not divisible into stand-alone parts.
1c. Therefore, premise 1 is true.
Argument for premise 2
2a. Necessarily, for any x and for any y, if x and y are numerically identical (are one and the same entity), then every property of x is a property of y, and every property of y is a property of x.
2b. Therefore, premise 2 is true.
Argument for premise 1a
This premise is not controversial. Each cell in the brain, like every cell in the rest of the body, can be removed and placed on a microscope slide to be viewed at high magnification. The same can be said for each subcellular part of the brain and each subcellular part of the rest of the body.
Argument for premise 1b
The ordinary parts of the mind—thoughts, beliefs, hopes, images, ideas, wishes, sensations, and the like—have never been surgically removed from the mind and placed on a lab bench or microscope slide to be viewed apart from the mind. No scientist has ever claimed to have removed a patient’s belief—for instance a belief that 1 + 1 =2–from the patient’s mind and placed it on a microscope slide. No scientist has ever claimed to have removed a patient’s hope—for instance a hope that tomorrow will be sunny–from the patient’s mind and placed it in a test tube. Indeed, the very idea of such a thing happening is conceptually incoherent. Therefore, conscious mental states cannot possibly be physically removed from the mind, mounted, and studied using scientific instruments. The mind’s parts are not stand-alone parts.
Before we assess this argument, the term numerical identity needs to be clarified and the second premise needs an explanation. As many people know, Bob Dylan (born in Duluth, Minnesota, on May 24, 1941) and Robert Zimmerman (born in Duluth, Minnesota, on May 24, 1941) are one and the same person; they are not two different people. In logic, x and y are numerically (or quantitatively) identical if they are one and the same entity and not two different entities. Bob Dylan and Robert Zimmerman are thus numerically identical, for they are one and the same entity.
Contrasts are always important when learning an abstract concept. Be careful not to confuse numerical identity with qualitative identity. Two things x and y are qualitatively identical if they have exactly the same properties, or qualities. Two separate whiteboard dry erase markers that look exactly alike (same color, same shape, same brand, etc.) are qualitatively identical, although they are not numerically identical (because they are two distinct markers, not one and the same marker).
Now to Premise 2. This premise is a theorem of the branch of logic called “quantificational logic with identity.” An application will help make the premise clear. Suppose that the police claim that Joe Doakes robbed the local bank and they offer video surveillance footage to prove it. Now suppose that upon further investigation, the police determine that the robber in the video is six feet tall, while Joe Doakes is only five feet tall. In this case, Doakes has a property or attribute that the robber lacks, namely, the property of being five feet tall. Common sense says that if the robber has an attribute (being six feet tall) that Joe Doakes lacks (he is only five feet tall), the robber and Joe Doakes must be two different people, not one and the same. Despite its technical appearance, premise 2 is simply a formal logical expression of a commonsense idea employed in everyday life.
The supporting premise 2a is an axiom of logic known as “Leibniz’s law” (it is also known as the “principle of the indiscernibility of identicals”). The name sounds forbidding, but the principle is actually common sense. In plain terms, Leibniz’s law states that if x and y are numerically identical (are one and the same thing), then any property possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa. The claim sounds self-evident, doesn’t it? For a fictional example, since Clark Kent and Superman are numerically identical (one and the same person), then any property possessed by one is possessed by the other. So, if Clark Kent is standing, then Superman is standing, if Clark Kent has black hair, then Superman has black hair, and so forth. It can be proved using modern symbolic logic that premise 2 is logically implied by Leibniz’s law.
The second premise is on very solid logical ground. Descartes’s argument is complete.
Objections from Cognitive Scientists
Some cognitive scientists challenge the supporting premise 1b–the claim that the mind cannot be divided into stand-alone parts. Their argument goes like this:
1. The mind contains ideas, memories, thoughts, and sensations.
2. Each of these can be thought of or imagined (and then studied) in some sense apart from the mind itself.
3. Therefore, the mind, too, contains stand-alone parts, and 1b is false.
4. But if 1b is false, then premise 1 lacks support.
5. Therefore, Descartes’s first premise lacks support, and his argument fails.
This line of reasoning sounds promising until it is examined. It is true that the parts of the mind cited—thoughts, ideas, memories, feelings, hopes, and the like—can be thought of and studied analytically. However, thoughts, hopes, memories, and such cannot be surgically removed from a mind and physically placed on microscope slides to be viewed outside that mind. Your memory of last Christmas cannot be surgically removed from your mind and placed in a test tube. The very idea of a hope or a belief separated from a mind and sitting all by itself on a lab bench or mounted on a microscope slide is conceptually incoherent. The reason for this is intriguing. It makes no sense at all to imagine an ownerless thought standing completely apart from a mind currently thinking it. A thought that is not part of a mind, sitting alone by itself on a table, makes no sense at all.
So, if the mind has parts, the way in which it has parts is radically different from the way in which the brain has parts, in which case it still follows that the mind has properties the brain lacks. If so, then the mind and the brain must be two distinct entities. It also follows that the mind is not numerically identical to any other part of the body or to any material, natural, or physical object.
Descartes’s central claim–that the mind cannot be divided into stand-alone parts–has also been challenged by scientists who put forward dissociative identity disorder (multiple personality disorder) and split-brain syndrome as counterexamples. They argue that in these cases, the mind appears to split into separate parts that can be studied individually. Does this imply that 1b is false? Let’s examine.
Split-brain syndrome occurs when the corpus collosum (a bundle of nerve fibers connecting the two hemispheres of a person’s brain) is damaged or severed and the individual experiences what seem to be two separate streams of consciousness, each wholly or partly unaware of the other. In a case of dissociative identity disorder, the mind appears to divide into two or more separate personalities, or streams of consciousness, each wholly or partly unaware of the other. According to these critics, both disorders are cases in which the mind breaks down into stand-alone parts—contrary to Descartes’s claim. Their argument goes about like this:
1. In cases of dissociative identity disorder, the mind appears to divide into two or more separate personalities, or streams of consciousness, each wholly or partly unaware of the other;
2. In cases of split-brain syndrome, the mind appears to divide into two separate streams of consciousness;
3. Both disorders are therefore cases where the mind breaks down into stand-alone parts;
4. If the mind can break down into stand-alone parts, then Descartes’s premise 1b is false;
5. Therefore, Descartes’s premise 1b is false.
Not so fast, reply Descartes’s defenders. In the split-brain cases, the two streams of consciousness cannot be physically removed, separated, stained, and placed on different microscope slides; nor can they be mounted side by side on a lab bench. Indeed, it makes no sense to think of a stream of consciousness physically sitting on a table like a beaker full of chemicals. If there are two separate streams of consciousness within one mind, they cannot physically stand alone in isolation from the mind they belong to. Likewise, for cases of multiple personality disorder: the different personalities cannot be physically removed from the mind they belong to and placed side by side in separate test tubes on a lab bench for close viewing. The very idea of a personality, or even a part of a personality, sitting on a table apart from a mind, makes no sense at all.
It follows, again, that the way in which the mind has parts is radically different from the way in which a material object such as the brain has parts. Therefore, the mind has properties the brain lacks. But if so, it logically follows, by the deductive reasoning we have examined, that the mind and the brain are two distinct substances, and mind-body dualism must be true.
Princess Elisabeth’s Famous Question
Shortly after Descartes’s Meditations was published, he received a letter from an avocational philosopher who was also a member of the royalty. “Tell me please,” wrote Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680), “how the
soul
of a human being (it being only a thinking substance) can [move] the bodily spirits and so bring about voluntary actions.” In other words, how can two substances interact if they are as radically different as mind and body are said to be? How can an immaterial soul possessing no solidity shape, or weight move a solid physical object such as the brain? What great questions!
4. Five More Aspects of Consciousness That Defy Materialist Explanation
During the twentieth century philosophers identified many additional aspects of consciousness that cannot in principle be explained materialistically, that is, in terms of nothing but particles of matter and quanta of energy in motions governed by the laws of physics and chemistry. The following are five being discussed by experts in the philosophy of mind today, including such leading researchers as Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, and Frank Jackson.
e “Mental-Image Argument” Qualia
Close your eyes and imagine a stop sign. What color is the experienced image? If you imagined an ordinary stop sign, the image in your mind is experienced as red (and white). You are aware of its color directly, from the inside of your consciousness. Philosophers call experiential mental states such as the experienced color of a sunset, the taste of chocolate, the smell of a rose, the sound of a bell, and the feel of velvet “qualia” (singular: “quale”). Now, as you experience this red image in your mind—this quale–certain physical things are occurring in your brain at the same time. However, if a brain surgeon were to open your brain at the moment you are experiencing the red image, she would not see a red spot shaped like a stop sign physically in, or on, some part of your brain like an image on a movie screen. Your brain is normally gray. Nothing in your brain turns from gray to red when you form and experience a red image in your mind. It follows, by the theorem of logic which states that if x has a property that y does not have, then x and y are two different entities, that the quale—the red image you directly experience inside your consciousness—is not numerically identical to any physical part of your brain. The image is a part of your mind but not a part of your brain. Therefore, your mind has a property that your brain does not have. It follows that your mind and your brain are two different entities, not one and the same thing. It follows, in short, that mind-body dualism is true. More formally:
The Qualia Argument against Materialism and for Dualism
1. When I form an image in my mind of a red stop sign, I directly experience within my consciousness an image of a red stop sign.
2. But a red stop sign that can be observed by scientists does not appear visibly on the surface of my brain or anywhere inside my brain.
3. Therefore, when I form an image in my mind of a red stop sign, my mental image has properties (experienced redness and the experienced shape of a stop sign) that no part of my brain possesses and that no other part of my body possesses.
4. Therefore, my mind has properties that my brain lacks and that any other part of my body lacks.
5. If x has a property that y lacks, then x and y are two different entities and not one and the same thing.
6. Therefore, my mind and my brain must be two different entities.
7. Furthermore, it also follows that my mind is not identical to any other physical part of my body.
8. If the mind is not identical to the brain or to any part of the body, then mind-body dualism is true.
9. Therefore, dualism is most certainly true.
In What Does It All Mean?, Thomas Nagel argues that science will never show, and cannot possibly show, that mental images and other mental states are numerically identical to brain states or that the mind simply is the brain.
When we discover the chemical composition of water, for instance, we are dealing with something that is clearly out there in the physical world . . . When we find out it is made up of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, we’re just breaking down an external physical substance into smaller physical parts. It is an essential feature of this kind of analysis that we are not giving a chemical breakdown of the way water looks, feels, and tastes to us. Those things go on in our inner experience, not in the water that we have broken down into atoms. The physical or chemical analysis of water leaves them aside. But to discover that tasting chocolate was really just a brain process, we would have to analyze something mental—not an externally observed physical substance but an inner taste sensation—in terms of parts that are physical. And there is no way that a large number of physical events in the brain, however complicated, could be the parts out of which a taste sensation was composed. A physical whole can be analyzed into smaller physical parts, but a mental process can’t be. Physical parts just can’t add up to a mental whole.
Intentionality
Some kinds of mental states possess a property that philosophers of mind call “intentionality.” (This property is also called “aboutness.”) This is a very difficult notion to understand. A mental state is intentional if it is about something. That which an intentional mental state is about is called that state’s “intentional object.” For instance, my belief that Sir Paul McCartney lives in Scotland is about Paul McCartney, and Sir Paul is the intentional object of my belief. My hope that tomorrow will be sunny is about tomorrow’s weather. The aboutness of thought is a directly experienced mental property that is hard to deny. The problem for materialists is that for a number of reasons it seems certain that intentionality, or aboutness, cannot possibly be a property of a purely material, or physical, object. Why?
First, the aboutness, or intentionality, of a thought is not a property recognized within current physics. Aboutness does not appear in any of the physics manuals listing measured physical properties. Furthermore, the latest science indicates that the physical nature of any material object will one day be fully explained in terms of standard physical properties without mentioning intentionality at all or anything remotely like it. Think about it: an atom, or clump of atoms, or a quanta of energy, or a force field, considered merely as a physical object, isn’t about anything; it just is.
A word of caution is called for here. The word “intentional” in philosophy of mind has nothing to do with “intending” to do something or with having a “purpose.” The intentionality of the mental is merely the property of being about something, as in “My thoughts are about you at the moment” or “I was thinking about last week.”
The question dualists put to materialists is therefore this: How can an atom, or a neuron, or a chemical in someone’s brain, or a clump of nerve fibers in a person’s frontal lobe, be about Paul McCartney? Or about tomorrow? Which physical properties would make a bundle of neurons a belief about McCartney rather than about Ringo Starr? About tomorrow rather than about next week? No one in neuroscience has the slightest idea. No one in neuroscience has ever successfully explained how intentionality can be reduced to (explained solely in terms of) neurons, electrochemical brain signals, molecules, chemicals, or any other purely physical objects. Laurence BonJour writes:
There is no reason at all to think that the internal structure of my physical and neurophysiological states could somehow by itself determine that I am thinking about the weather rather than about the Middle East or the stock market.
These thoughts give rise to another argument for dualism:
The Intentionality Argument Against Materialism and for Dualism
1. Some mental states possess intentionality but nothing in the brain or body possesses intentionality.
2. If x has a property not possessed by y, then x and y are not numerically identical.
3. Therefore, the mind is not the brain or any part of the brain or body.
4. If so, then mind-body dualism is true.
5. Therefore, mind-body dualism is certainly true.
Argument for premise 1:
1a. Many kinds of mental states are intentional—they are about something.
1b. No physical states are intentional.
1c. Therefore, premise 1 is true.
Materialists agree that science has not yet explained intentionality. However, they argue, hopefully scientists will someday succeed, and we will then see that the supporting premise 1b is false. BonJour replies:
Here we have a piece of materialist doctrine that again has a status very similar to that of a claim of theology. It is obvious that no one has even the beginnings of an idea of how to actually carry out an investigation that would yield a result of this kind—that the only reason for thinking that this could be done is the overriding assumption, for which we have found no cogent basis, that materialism must be true.
Subjectivity
In recent years, Nagel, Jackson, and other prominent philosophers specializing in the study of consciousness have put forward a new argument for dualism. Their case begins with the claim that mental states have a directly experienced, subjective quality that cannot be fully expressed quantitatively, that is, objectively in the language of any of the physical sciences. In the case of any conscious mental state, they argue, there is something it is like to be in that state. For instance, there is something it is like to feel nostalgic, to taste chocolate, to remember last summer fondly, to hope for snow, to be in love. Nagel calls this subjective aspect of consciousness the “what it is like” quality of the mental.
However, these contemporary dualists argue, this subjective, experienced aspect of consciousness cannot possibly be reduced to (explained without remainder in terms of) particles of matter and quanta of energy moving in space and time under the governance of the laws of physics and chemistry alone. It follows, they argue, that the conscious mind and the physical brain are not one and the same thing. It also follows that the mind is not identical to any physical object.
Nagel argues that the reason why science has not, and never will, explain the subjective nature of consciousness is that science, by its very nature, explains everything from an objective or third-person, public perspective. But the subjectivity of consciousness can only be understood from within a first-person perspective.
Contemporary dualists describe the subjectivity of the mental in depth in their philosophical writings; one must read their books and scholarly articles to get the full idea. There is no doubt that they are right on one crucial point: The subjective or “what it is like” quality of the mental is not one of the recognized properties of matter. It does not appear in any of the handbooks of physics or chemistry. This makes sense: How can a physical pile of atoms, or a quark or field, have a subjective, qualitative awareness? How can there possibly be “something it is like” to be a proton, an atom, a sugar molecule, or a potassium ion? Scientists haven’t the foggiest idea. The subjective aspect of consciousness appears to be yet another mental property that cannot be reduced to matter in motion governed by the laws of physics and chemistry as they apply to the brain. More formally:
The Subjectivity Argument against Materialism and for Dualism
1. Conscious mental states have a subjective, qualitative, first-person aspect.
2. No atom, clump of atoms, material object, or physical part of the body has this subjective or qualitative aspect.
3. If x has a property not possessed by y, then x and y are not quantitatively identical.
4. Therefore, the mind is not the brain or any part of the body.
5. If so, then mind-body dualism is certainly true.
6. Therefore, mind-body dualism is true.
Privacy
It is common sense that our mental states are private while our brain states are publicly observable. I am the only one who has immediate access to my thoughts, feelings, sensations, and other mental states; and you are the only one who has immediate access to your thoughts and other mental states. More specifically, no one can literally have my thoughts, although others can ask me what I am thinking. And no one can literally have your thoughts. If I take a bite of a Hershey bar, I taste chocolate. No one else can literally have or experience my taste of chocolate, although they can take a bite of my candy bar and experience their own taste of chocolate. Some philosophers sum up the point this way: Each of us has private, or privileged, access to the directly experienced contents of our mind. Brain scientists can ask us what we are thinking about as they stimulate one of our brain cells, but they must take our word for it; they cannot literally experience our thoughts and sensations.
However, each physical part of the brain can be publicly examined in a lab by a team of scientists. Every physical aspect of the brain can be observed and fully described publicly, in the third person—in the language of science—without using the word I.
Now, if the mind is private, in the sense defined, while the brain is public, in the sense defined, then the mind and the brain have differing properties. It follows that the mind and the brain must be two distinct substances, and dualism in one form or another is true.
The Privacy Argument against Materialism and for Dualism
1. The brain (like every material object and physical part of the body) is publicly accessible.
2. The mind is private–not publicly accessible.
3. If x has a property not possessed by y, then x and y are not quantitatively identical.
4. Therefore, the mind is not the brain or any part of the body.
5. If so, then mind-body dualism is true.
6. Therefore, mind-body dualism is certainly true.
***
Time to sum up. The arguments we’ve examined indicate that the physical brain, a part of the brain, a part of the body, or anything material, simply cannot possibly possess the fundamental properties of consciousness—the experienced color of a mental image, the essential aboutness of the mental, the subjective nature of consciousness, or the privacy of the mental. The main arguments for dualism considered here remain standing despite numerous attempts to knock them down. No scientific experiment, or series of experiments, has ever proved that dualism is false and that materialism is true.
In the rest of this chapter, we’ll consider the three most recent attempts to explain consciousness materialistically, that is, in terms of matter in motion governed by the laws of physics and chemistry alone, without reference to anything immaterial such as a soul or immaterial mind. Although each theory failed to explain consciousness, the way each failed teaches us about the nature of the mind. The first of these theories was proposed by a group of psychologists. The mind, argued the behaviorists, is not an immaterial soul. It is not something inside us. It is not an object at all. Rather, the mind is nothing more than (observable) behavior caused by the brain. When we talk about our thoughts and feelings, these scientists claimed, we are really only talking about our observable behavior.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 7.1
1. State the mind-body problem in your own words.
2. What does mind-body dualism claim?
3. What does materialism claim with respect to the mind?
4. Does Descartes’s argument make a good case for mind-body dualism? Discuss.
5. Explain the causal interaction objection. How might a dualist reply?
6. Explain the ghost objection. How might a dualist reply?
7. At this point in the discussion, what is your position on the mind-body problem? Argue for your view.
8. In your own words, explain the mental image argument.
9. In your own words, explain the subjectivity of the mental.
10. In your own words, explain the privacy of the mental.
11. In your own words, explain the unity of the mental.
5. Behaviorism, the First Modern Materialist Attempt to Explain Consciousness
Modern psychology as an academic subject emerged in Europe during the nineteenth century. The behaviorists were an early group of psychologists who sought to turn the new subject into a physical science complete with lab experiments, precise measurements, and empirical tests. But to be empirically testable, a hypothesis must make predictions about entities that can be observed. The problem, as the first behaviorists saw it, was that the inner mental states referred to by existing psychological theories—mental images, thoughts, feelings, the id, the ego, repressed desires, wish-fulfillment complexes, and so on—are not publicly observable. If psychology is going to become a science, they reasoned, its theories must refer only to publicly observable entities.
What, then, should a scientific psychology study? Behavior, they answered. This made sense, for behavior is public in the required sense, and it can be measured, predicted, and so forth. The new methodology for psychology would therefore be this: explain consciousness solely by reference to measurable patterns of observable behavior.
Now, as we all know, science attempts to discover the causes of things. The behaviorists therefore asked, “What are the ultimate causes of human behavior?” Since behaviorist theories can refer only to observable things, it followed that the ultimate causes of a person’s behavior must be observable, at least in principle. The cause of a person’s behavior thus cannot be allegedly invisible mental events occurring inside consciousness—events such as choices, beliefs, desires, or the activity of something called “the will,” for these are not publicly observable. Where else should the scientist look for the ultimate causes of human behavior? The answer was obvious: (a) the individual’s physical and genetic structure, and (b) the individual’s external environment. The behaviorist methodology thus suggested the hypothesis that a human being is simply a material object moved here and there by the external and internal physical forces acting on it, like a puppet on strings.
In the beginning, classical behaviorism was nothing more than a research program—a thesis about the proper way to conduct psychological research. All psychological research, according to the behaviorist methodology, should be conducted by observing behavior while avoiding all mention of invisible inner mental states such as thoughts, desires, and the will. In line with this program, behaviorists talked only about behavior and made no claims about the fundamental nature of consciousness. This form of behaviorism is called methodological behaviorism because it is a thesis solely about the methodology or practice of psychological science.
However, according to Jerry Fodor, professor of philosophy at MIT and a major researcher in the philosophy of mind, the behaviorists eventually added three philosophical theses that went well beyond their data:
1. Human behavior has no inner mental causes (such as thoughts, beliefs, hopes, acts of will, and choices).
2. Inner mental causes do not even exist.
3. All human behavior is ultimately caused by external and internal physical conditions.
Let us call behaviorism supplemented with these three claims philosophical behaviorism. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then there is no such thing as an immaterial “mind” inside your head. Whether you realize it or not, when you refer to your (alleged) mind, you are really only referring to your outward behavior. And your behavior is fully caused by your genes and external physical factors. Your actions are therefore not caused by something inside you called your “will,” your “mind,” your “soul” or “self.” There is no “self,” there is no “mind.” There is only behavior caused ultimately by genes, environment, and other material causes and effects stretching in a causal regress that goes back billions of years before you were born.
Consider what this implies. Your actions are not directed or influenced by things in your mind called “beliefs,” “desires,” “intentions,” and so forth, for these literally do not exist. You are not the cause of your actions. Rather, you are a physical input-output mechanism that takes in inputs from its environment, processes them in accord with internal (physical) hardwiring, and then outputs predictable behavioral responses, with no invisible mental states such as beliefs and desires and acts of will intervening between the inputs and outputs.
Notice how radically these implications of behaviorism conflict with our commonsense understanding of ourselves. We naturally speak of our beliefs and desires, intentions and plans. And we routinely suppose these cause or at least guide our behavior. We say things like this: “She moved to Seattle because she wanted to pursue a career in technology, and she believed that Seattle had more opportunities.” But if philosophical behaviorism is true, our behavior is not influenced by our beliefs and desires, for they do not exist. Rather, our behavior is completely caused by physical factors acting on our internal wiring. The point deserves emphasis: If philosophical behaviorism is true, there is no such thing as a self. Rather, each human being is a puppet on strings that are attached to its physical environment. For some reason, this view is attractive to many people today.
Philosophical behaviorism was the first modern materialist theory of the mind. The philosophical behaviorists sought to explain consciousness without reference to anything but material factors that ultimately reduce to atoms moving in accord with the abstract laws of physics and chemistry. These behaviorists simply assumed materialism is true—not one behaviorist psychologist ever gave a serious argument for materialism. Yet on that unargued basis, they rejected Descartes’s mind-body dualism.
During the twentieth century, as philosophical behaviorism and other scientific explanations of human behavior grew in popularity, support for mind-body dualism declined. The new “scientific” explanations led many intellectuals to believe that the individual is not the cause of his own actions. A human being is a complex machine whose behavior is determined by its genes and the external forces of the universe.
Taking this a step further, some behaviorists reasoned that since the individual does not cause his own actions, he does not have free will. And if the individual does not have free will then he is not morally responsible for anything he does. The implication was obvious: Human behavior can be manipulated and channeled in the right direction by external factors controlled by behaviorist experts armed with sufficient power. No wonder B. F. Skinner, one of the most famous of the behaviorists, titled his 1971 best seller Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Skinner argued that free will is an illusion and that no one possesses the dignity of moral autonomy or responsibility. Previsioning the movie The Matrix by three decades, Skinner proposed that the government—with advice from behaviorist psychologists, of course—should set up a totalitarian system of behavior control to channel human behavior in the right direction so as to create a happy future for all mankind. We’ll examine questions of free will and moral responsibility in the next chapter.
Gilbert Ryle Attacks Dualism’s “Ghost in the Machine”
In 1949, Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), professor of philosophy at Oxford University, published one of the most influential philosophical books of the 1950s—The Concept of Mind. In this book, Ryle attacks Descartes’s mind-body dualism and argues for philosophical behaviorism. Cartesian dualists, he claims, believe that the mind is an invisible, immaterial soul mysteriously located inside the body or brain like a ghost inside a machine. But this view—the idea that our bodies are activated by an invisible and therefore “ghostly” soul–is literally nonsense. Belief in ghosts is for children. Dualism is a fairy tale, it is the “myth of the ghost in the machine.”
However, this left Ryle with a problem: If an immaterial mind or soul does not exist, then what are we referring to when we talk about our thoughts, beliefs, hopes, feelings, and other mental states? We ordinarily assume we are referring to internal mental states. Ryle gave the usual behaviorist answer. When we talk about our thoughts, feelings, and minds, we are merely referring to our external behavior. Mental statements such as “I feel happy” and “I believe in democracy” are simply indirect ways of talking about publicly expressed behavior.
But this claim faced an obvious objection. I can talk about my hope that the sun will come out without saying anything about my publicly observable behavior. In addition, I can hope it will be sunny without exhibiting any actual “hoping-for-sun” behavior. I can describe my toothache as “dull,” “throbbing,” or “intense” without saying anything about my behavior. And I can feel a toothache inside my consciousness without behaving as if I am in pain. So, how can talking about my mental states and sensations really be nothing more than talking about my outward behavior?
These thoughts led Ryle to modify his theory. After applying logical analysis to mental statements, he claimed to have made a startling philosophical discovery: statements about our allegedly internal mental states are not about actual behavior, as behaviorists before him had asserted. Rather, when properly analyzed, they are about tendencies to behave in certain ways, which he called “dispositions.” To say you have a toothache is merely to say you have a tendency or disposition to behave as if your tooth hurts. Notice that you can have a tendency to behave in a certain way without actually behaving in that way at the moment.
Thus, according to Ryle’s theory, to say that I feel happy is just to say that I have a tendency to smile, a tendency to say that I feel happy, a tendency to laugh, and so forth—whether or not I am smiling, laughing, or talking at the moment. Mental statements such as “I am happy” and “I have a sore tooth” are thus nothing more than statements about potential or possible patterns of future behavior.
By the end of the 1950s, Ryle’s philosophical behaviorism was the dominant theory of the mind among academic philosophers specializing in the study of consciousness. Proponents claimed that three major considerations favored Ryle’s theory. First, adopting Ryle’s theory allowed them to reject mind-body dualism. Second, Ryle’s theory could be integrated with natural science. Third, philosophical behaviorism was consistent with materialism. Ryle’s theory certainly does contradict mind-body dualism. It is indeed a materialist theory of the mind. But is it true?
6. Arguments That Sank Behaviorism
The Perfect Pretenders and Tough Guys Thought Experiments
The philosopher Ian Ravenscroft offers two counterexamples to Ryle’s theory and to behaviorism in general. First, we are asked to imagine a community of “perfect pretenders”—people who have been taught from birth to pretend they are in pain when they really are not in pain. These people are experts at behaving as if they are in pain when they actually feel no pain. This is a coherent possibility. According to Ryle’s behaviorism, the perfect pretenders actually feel pain because their tendency to behave as if they feel pain is pain. Remember that according to Ryle, there is nothing more to being in pain than having a tendency to behave as if you are in pain. Yet these pretenders feel no pain (when they pretend to feel pain). The coherent possibility of perfect pretenders is in itself a counterexample to behaviorism. The very possibility of the perfect pretenders implies that a tendency, or disposition, to behave as if you are in pain is not the same thing as being in pain. Thus:
1. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then the case of the perfect pretenders is not a coherent possibility;
2. But the case of the perfect pretenders is a coherent possibility;
3. Therefore, philosophical behaviorism is most certainly false.
Ravenscroft next reverses the thought experiment and asks us to imagine a community of “tough guys” who have been trained from birth to act as if they feel no pain when, in fact, they do feel pain. These people feel pain but never exhibit any pain behavior. This too seems to be a coherent possibility. According to Ryle’s behaviorism, the tough guys never feel any pain, since pain is nothing more than a tendency to behave as if a person feels pain. Yet the tough guys do feel pain—they simply never show it. The mere possibility of the tough guys implies that behaving as if you are not in pain is not the same thing as not being in pain. In general, then, a behavior pattern, even a lifelong one, is not the same as the corresponding mental state. But if one can be in a mental state and at the same time not have any tendency to behave in any particular way, then philosophical behaviorism is false.
1. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then the case of the tough guys is not a coherent possibility.
2. But the case of the tough guys is a coherent possibility.
3. Therefore, philosophical behaviorism is certainly false.
Counterarguments like these convinced most philosophers that philosophical behaviorism is simply a false theory of mind. (I know of no serious researcher in philosophy of mind today who defends philosophical behaviorism.)
The Qualia Objection
Think about what is going on in your consciousness when you have a toothache. Aren’t you directly aware of a very real sensation occurring within your mind? Isn’t this sensation real as well as private? Yet doesn’t it exist prior to, and apart from, any pattern of outward behavior? In short, can’t you have a toothache without exhibiting any toothache behavior?
Furthermore, this inner sensation we call a “toothache” certainly seems to have its own intrinsic qualities. For instance, a toothache can be mild, intense, dull, or throbbing. Nagel makes this point by saying, “There is something it is like to have a toothache.” We can take this further by thinking about what is going on inside us when we taste chocolate, experience the smell of a rose, or hear the sound of a bell ringing. In each case, we are experiencing a real something inside our consciousness—a definite something that possesses its own intrinsic qualities apart from any present or future behavior.
As we have seen, philosophers call these experienced sensations “qualia.” The existence of qualia, such as toothaches and headaches, is a matter of common sense. The problem for philosophical behaviorism is that if behaviorism is true then qualia do not exist. For qualia cannot be reduced to behavior patterns or to anything quantitatively measurable or expressible in the language of physics or neurophysiology. The arguments for nonbehavioral qualia have stood the test of time—none has been decisively answered. But if qualia do exist, as they most certainly do, then philosophical behaviorism is false.
Let’s look at this one more way. Suppose you have a sore elbow. According to behaviorism, a sore elbow is nothing more than a tendency, or disposition, to behave in certain ways. But as Ravenscroft observes, a sore elbow hurts. How, he asks, can a potential pattern of behavior (that has not even occurred yet) hurt?
Based on such observations, critics of behaviorism argue as follows:
The Qualia Argument against Philosophical Behaviorism
1. Qualia (mental images, pains, tastes, smells, and so forth) are real but private mental states occurring inside our stream of consciousness.
2. If philosophical behaviorism is true, then qualia do not exist.
3. Therefore, philosophical behaviorism is certainly false.
Support for 1:
a. We directly and vividly experience qualia from inside our subjectivity, and they seem to have their own intrinsic qualities, apart from all present and future behavior.
b. Therefore, premise 1 is true.
Downfall of Philosophical Behaviorism
The philosophical behaviorists rejected dualism and sought to explain consciousness in materialistic terms alone, in terms of observable behavior. Although their approach was popular among academics in the 1950s, it fell out of favor during the 1960s for two reasons: first, the philosophical behaviorists never successfully showed that even one mental state can be specified accurately as a mere behavior pattern or tendency to behave in a certain way; second, psychologists found that they could not explain consciousness without reference to unobservable internal mental states existing apart from behavior.
The first materialist attempt to explain the mind was thus a failure. It is worth studying the arguments that sank behaviorism, though, for in seeing why they failed, we learn important things about the mind.
The failure of philosophical behaviorism coincided with the rise of the next important materialist attempt to explain consciousness, the mind-brain identity theory.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 7.2
1. Why did the behaviorists believe that psychology, as it was practiced before behaviorism, was unscientific?
2. Explain the basic theory of behaviorism and an argument for it.
3. Why is behaviorism compatible with naturalism?
4. Why is behaviorism incompatible with mind-body dualism?
5. How does behaviorism explain consciousness?
6. Is behaving as if you are conscious all there is to being conscious? Discuss.
7. When you talk about your mind, are you really just talking about your behavior? Discuss.
8. Explain an argument against the behaviorist theory.
9. What is a quale?
10. In what way does behaviorism conflict with belief in qualia?
11. Is belief in qualia part of our commonsense view of ourselves? Discuss.
12. Would the existence of qualia prove that behaviorism is false? Discuss.
13. What thoughts led to the demise of behaviorism?
7. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory—The Second Modern Materialist Attempt to Explain Consciousness
During the 1960s, a second attempt was made to explain the mind in terms consistent with materialism.
While philosophical behaviorism had denied the existence of inner mental events and states, advocates of the mind-brain identity theory (the “identity theory” for short) affirmed their existence: Inner mental events do exist inside us, they argued. However, they do not occur within an immaterial mind, or soul, as Descartes believed. Rather, they are nothing more than physical events and physical states of the brain. (From here on, mental events will be shorthand for “mental events, states, and processes,” and brain events will abbreviate “brain events, states, and processes.”) The mind, in other words, is numerically identical with the physical brain.
Keep in mind, as we discuss this theory, the precise logical meaning of numerically identical. To claim that the mind and the brain are numerically identical is to claim that they are one and the same thing, not two different things. Again, Bob Dylan is numerically identical to Robert Zimmerman—they are one and the same person. Ringo Starr is numerically identical to Richard Starkey—they are one and the same drummer. Of course, if the mind and the brain are numerically identical, then any property of the mind is a property of the brain, and any property of the brain is a property of the mind—that follows from the axiom of logic we examined earlier in this chapter.
Two major arguments for the new theory of mind were given: one based on neuroscience, a second based on Ockham’s Razor. Turning to the first argument, it is commonly believed today that neuroscience has proved the identity theory true. The argument from neuroscience relies on laboratory studies that reveal correlations between observed brain events and reported mental events.
The Argument from Neuroscience
1. Brain science has discovered correlations between reported mental events and observed brain events. For instance, every time a patient reports feeling a pain in the arm, neurons x, y, and z light up at the same time; every time a patient reports seeing red, neurons x,’ y,’ and z’ activate at the same time, and so forth.
2. In addition, when one part of the brain is damaged, a specific mental function is lost.
3. If reported mental events can be correlated with observed brain events occurring at the same time, and if the loss of a mental function can be correlated with the loss of a physical function, then each mental event is (numerically) identical to a brain event, and the mind simply is the brain.
4. Therefore, the mind-brain identity theory must be true (and dualism is false).
This popular argument may seem compelling at first glance, but it has severe problems. To begin with, the third premise is false. Here is why. First, correlation is not the same as, and certainly does not prove, numerical identity. The mere fact that A and B occur at the same time within a complex system does not prove that A and B are one and the same thing!
Second, the two sides of the correlation—reported mental events and observed brain events—have radically different properties, for (as we have seen) mental states are subjective, private, qualitative, and intentional, while brain states are none of the above. But if the two sides of a correlation have radically different properties, then the correlation most certainly does not establish numerical identity. Thus, the philosophers Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato note that it is one thing to show that
a neural process plays a role in tuning, enabling, and modifying a moment of consciousness. In this regard, any empirical evidence of this kind is scientifically of high interest . . . But, per se, it does not tell us anything about the nature of conscious experience itself. Consider the heating system in Jane’s flat. . . . [I]n the basement, Jane discovers a control device that allows her to enable and tune heating. Jane also discovers that there are reliable correlations between the state of the control device switches and the resulting heating. Is the control device actually doing the heating? Of course not. Right now, most of neuroscientific data about consciousness are akin to the relation between Jane’s control device and heating. There is a correlation, but scientists do not have a clue as to why such neural activity should [correlate with] conscious experience.
In short, brain studies that correlate reported mental states and observed brain states do not rule out the possibility that the mental state and the physical state are distinct entities occurring at the same time within a bigger system.
The third reason the laboratory correlations do not establish the identity theory is that mind-body dualism actually predicts the mental state-brain state correlations discovered in the lab. Thus, dualism and materialism both predict the same experimental data. The point is so important that some elaboration is called for.
Mind-body dualism claims that brain and the mind causally interact: minds cause changes in brains and brains cause changes in minds. Therefore, if mind body dualism is true, we should logically expect that a brain event will occur each time a mental event occurs, and vice versa. Thus, if dualism is true, then, a mental event—such as experiencing the taste of chocolate while eating a candy bar—will always be found to be correlated with a predictable set of physical events occurring in the brain at the same time. If this sounds wrong, consider that on the dualist view, the brain is the cause and effect interface between the immaterial mind and the physical world. Mind and brain, according to dualism, are constantly interacting, each causing changes in the other.
The upshot is that the correlations between reported mental events and observed brain events discovered in the lab are expected if materialism is true, but they are also expected if dualism is true. If the correlations are predicted equally by both theories, then they neither prove nor disprove either theory. This popular argument for materialism fails. The next argument is a slight improvement.
The Ockham’s Razor Argument
The philosopher J. J. C. Smart, one of the most prominent defenders of the identity theory during the 1960s, wrote, “Why do I wish to resist [dualism] [and accept the identity theory]? Mainly because of Ockham’s razor.”
Here is his argument:
1. Both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory explain the same data.
2. But the identity theory is simpler than dualism.
3. Ockham’s razor recommends adopting the simpler of two theories when both theories explain the same data.
4. Therefore, the identity theory is probably true.
Smart doesn’t give an argument for premise 1; he simply assumes it. Here is an argument for premise 2:
2a. The identity theory explains the mind in terms of one ultimate kind of substance (matter), while dualism posits two radically different kinds of substances (an immaterial mind and a physical brain).
2b. Therefore, premise 2 is true.
Smart is right: the identity theory is theoretically simpler than dualism, at least in the sense that it posits only one kind of substance—matter—while dualism posits two radically different kinds of substances (mind and matter).
However, dualists have a response. They argue that their theory explains many aspects of consciousness that the identity theory cannot explain, including qualia, intentionality, subjectivity, and the privacy of the mental. (We have already examined the arguments for this claim.) If the dualists are right and their theory explains more data than materialism explains, then premise 1 is false. But if so, then Ockham’s razor does not favor the identity theory, for Ockham’s razor only favors the simpler of two theories when both theories explain the very same data. The reader can draw his or her own conclusion.
8. Arguments That Sank the Identity Theory
Recall the mental image, intentionality, and subjectivity arguments for dualism. If either argument is sound, the identity theory is false. Therefore, each argument can be reconfigured as an argument against the identity theory.
The e “Mental-Image Argument” Mental Image Argument against the Identity Theory
1. When we form an image in our mind of a red stop sign, the image has an experienced property (redness) that our physical brain states lack.
2. If x has a property that y lacks, then x is not numerically identical with y.
3. Therefore, the mental image is not identical with any physical state of our brain.
4. If the identity theory is true, each mental state is numerically identical with a brain state.
5. Therefore, the identity theory is certainly false.
Argument for premise 1
1a. When we form an image in our mind of a red stop sign, we directly experience the image’s redness and shape, but no physically observable part of our brain turns red or takes on the shape of a stop sign.
1b. Therefore, premise 1 is true.
The Intentionality Argument against the Identity Theory
1. Mental states are essentially intentional, but no brain state is essentially intentional.
2. If x has a property not possessed by y, then x and y are not numerically identical.
3. Therefore, the mind is not the brain.
4. If the identity theory is true, the mind and the brain are one and the same thing.
5. Therefore, the identity theory is certainly false.
The Subjectivity Argument against the Identity Theory
1. Mental states have a directly experienced subjective, or qualitative, aspect.
2. No atom or clump of atoms or any part of the brain has a subjective, or qualitative, aspect.
3. If x has a property not possessed by y, then x and y are not quantitatively identical.
4. Therefore, the mind is not the brain.
5. If the identity theory is true, the mind and the brain are one and the same thing.
6. Therefore, the identity theory is surely false.
Downfall
Like its predecessor, behaviorism, the identity theory, the second materialist attempt to explain the mind, also ended in failure. Although the identity theory was popular in philosophy during the 1960s and 1970s, it fell out of favor and has now been abandoned by most academic philosophers of mind, for reasons we’ve examined. A better theory was needed.
The next big theory of the mind, the one currently favored by many if not most materialists, likens mental states to the programmed states of a digital computer. What makes something a mind is not the material it is made of nor the way it is structured. What makes something a mind is simply the way it functions. According to the next theory, sometimes called “functionalism,” if a machine such as a computer behaves, or functions, the way a conscious being behaves, it is conscious, and it has a mind. For a mind is simply a function.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 7.3
1. Explain the basic claim of the identity theory.
2. What do identity theorists mean by identity?
3. Why did many philosophers initially see the theory as an improvement over behaviorism?
4. Explain one of the arguments for the identity theory.
5. Explain one of the objections to the identity theory.
6. Do brain studies prove that the identity theory is true? Argue for your answer.
7. Can you think of a case in which A and B are correlated but are not quantitatively identical? Does correlation alone prove identity? Discuss.
8. Could a space alien with a radically different physical design plan and inner constitution have a mind and think and reason? Discuss.
9. Why have most philosophers rejected the identity theory?
10. Is the identity theory a metaphysical theory? Discuss.
11. At this point in the discussion, are you a dualist or a materialist? Support your view with a philosophical argument.
9. Functionalism–The Third Modern Materialist Attempt to Explain Consciousness
The initial idea underlying the latest materialism-friendly theory of the mind—a theory logically consistent with materialism–can be introduced with a question. What is a clock? Upon reflection, it is clear that the concept of a clock cannot be defined in terms of the materials out of which a clock is constructed, for some clocks are made of metal, others of wood, or plastic; some are even made of paper. The concept of a clock also cannot be defined in terms of how a clock is structured. Some contain gears and springs, wheels, cogs, hands and numbers; others do not. (Digital clocks have circuits but neither cogs nor gears; water clocks have basins and tubes, and so forth.) Upon reflection, then, the only thing all clocks have in common is the way they function. No matter what they are made of or how they are structured, clocks are devices that tell time. So, although a clock cannot be defined in terms of any one type of physical substance (wood or metal) or physical organization (gears or silicon chips), it can be defined in terms of the way it functions, that is, the way it behaves.
Now think about the behavior, or function, of a clock, apart from any material embodiment or physical structure. The clock function, like a computer program, is typically “realized within,” or “run on,” a physical medium or platform. If a clock is constructed of metal and glass with gears and springs, its function is realized within the medium of metal, glass, gears, and springs. If a clock is constructed of wooden parts, its function is being run on a wooden platform, and so on. The clock function is thus “multiply realizable”—it can be realized or run on many different material substances. Put another way, it can be run on many different platforms.
Functionalism’s big idea—put somewhat crudely—is that the mind is not any particular substance, nor is it a particular organization of stuff. It is simply a function. Like a clock, the conscious mind cannot be defined in terms of the material out of which it is composed or the way that material is put together; it can only be defined in terms of its function. The mind is simply an abstract function running on an underlying platform.
Big consequences follow. If the mind, like a clock, is nothing more than an abstract function, then the mind function can be realized on many different kinds of media, or platforms. Thought of in this way, there is no reason why the consciousness function can’t be realized on, or run upon, a purely physical platform such as a digital computer. Thus, if a computer functions the way a conscious mind functions, the computer is a conscious mind. If a computer-controlled robot behaves the way a conscious person behaves, the robot is conscious. In the computer’s case, the mind function is being run on a silicon chip. In the human case, functionalists who are materialists believe that the mind function is realized on the medium of a physical brain. This gives us the following argument:
1. Consciousness is a function that can be realized or run on many different media.
2. To be conscious is to function or behave like a conscious being functions or behaves.
3. Therefore, if a machine functions or behaves the way a conscious being functions or behaves, then it is conscious, no matter what it is composed of and no matter how it is structured.
4. Many computers function as if they are conscious and thinking.
5. Therefore, many computers are conscious and possess conscious minds.
The functionalist idea can also be broken down and applied to specific mental states. On the functionalist view, a mental state such as a belief or a wish is constituted solely by its functional role within a larger system of functions of which it is a part. So, if a computer functions the way a human being functions when the person believes in Santa, then the computer is conscious and actually believes in Santa. The computer is not simply behaving as if it believes in Santa, it actually does believe in Santa. If a computer functions the way a person functions when he or she is in love, then the computer is conscious and is actually in love. The computer is not just simulating loving behavior; it really is in love. If a computer functions the way a person functions when the person has an itch, the computer actually feels an itch.
The computer scientist John McCarthy (1927–2011), recipient of the prestigious Turing Award for research in artificial intelligence, illustrated the idea using his thermostat. His thermostat, he claimed, is a conscious mind that has three alternating beliefs:
· It’s too hot in here, so I had better turn off the furnace.
· It’s too cold in here, so I had better turn on the furnace.
· It’s just right so better not do anything.
His reasoning is simple: since his thermostat behaves as if it believes, it really does believe (and is therefore conscious since a belief is a conscious mental state). The fact that it is a strip of copper inside a plastic housing with a few wires attached is irrelevant—all that matters is the way the device behaves.
This will sound surprising at first: Functionalism is actually logically consistent with both mind body dualism and materialism. Functionalists who are mind body dualists say that in the human case the mind function is being run on an immaterial platform (the soul or immaterial mind). Functionalists who are materialists may claim that the mind function is realized on the medium of a physical brain. Most functionalists, however, are materialists.
Functionalism is attractive to modern materialists for two reasons. First, it is logically consistent with materialism even though it does not imply materialism. Second, functionalism holds out hope that consciousness will someday be explained in scientific or materialistic terms alone. An intriguing theory. But is it true?
10. Problems for Functionalism
Searle’s Chinese Room
In a now famous article, “Minds, Brains, Programs,” in the journal Brain and Behavioral Science, John Searle, professor of philosophy at the University of California at Berkeley, proposed a thought experiment that he claimed shows vividly that functionalism is false.
Imagine that someone who does not understand Chinese is placed in a windowless room with one door. Inside the room is a large pile of instructions written in English, which the person understands. Each instruction states that when a piece of paper with a symbol of such and such a shape is passed into the room through a thin slot in the door, a piece of paper with a symbol of a different shape is to be passed back. The instructions are phrased solely in terms of the physical shapes of the symbols, described in English, not in terms of the meanings of the symbols. Unbeknownst to the person inside the room, the shapes are Chinese characters.
With everything set to go, pieces of paper containing Chinese characters are passed into the room through the slit in the door, and the person returns pieces of paper containing other Chinese characters, following the instruction book, which is written in English. To an observer outside the room who speaks Chinese, the flow of characters in and out of the room is indistinguishable from what it would be if the person inside the room understood Chinese. The flow of characters exactly simulates an intelligible conversation in Chinese.
From the outside, then, the behavior of the person in the room is indistinguishable from that of a Chinese speaker. Therefore, if functionalism is true, the person inside the room understands Chinese. For the person in the room behaves or functions exactly as if he understands Chinese. However, the person inside the room (by hypothesis) does not speak a word of the language. It follows that functionalism is false. It also follows that there is more to consciousness than merely following a program or rule book that makes one function (or behave) in a certain way. Thus:
1. If functionalism is true, the person in the Chinese room understands Chinese.
2. But the person in the room does not understand Chinese.
3. Therefore, functionalism is false.
In Searle’s analogy, the room as a whole corresponds to a computer, the person inside the room corresponds to the central processing unit (CPU) of the computer, and the pile of instructions written in English corresponds to the computer’s program (software).
Searle’s thought experiment raises an important question: What is the difference between a conscious mind processing information and a computer that is behaving like a conscious mind that is processing information? Both process symbols: computers take in electrical impulses and output electrical impulses; minds process words and other kinds of linguistic symbols and output words and other kinds of linguistic symbols.
The difference, Searle argues, is that a real mind processes symbols by reference to what they mean, which it accomplishes by knowing what they are about. The symbols processed by a real mind thus mean something to the mind. Although a computer also processes symbols, the items it crunches (electrical impulses) mean nothing to it, for it manipulates them in terms of their physical properties alone, not by reference to their meanings or what they are about.
To elaborate, the symbols being processed by a digital computer are streams of electrons flowing through logic circuits. They are processed as electrical impulses, not as bits of meaning. Put another way, the electrical pulses processed by a computer are not processed as symbols standing intentionally for something. To the computer, the electrons passing through its circuits are not about anything at all.
If Searle is right, then, no digital computer will ever be a conscious mind, no matter how closely it mimics conscious behavior, because all computers ever do is process electrical impulses on the basis of the physical properties of those signals, with no reference to any meanings, while real minds process symbols by reference to what they mean and are about.
Ned Block’s Gigantic Minde “China-Mind Argument”
Ned Block, professor of philosophy at MIT, proposed another famous counterexample to functionalism, which I will simplify and condense. According to functionalism, if a system behaves, or functions, exactly the way someone who believes in Santa Claus behaves, then the system (no matter what it is made of) is conscious and actually believes in Santa. With this in mind, Block asks us to imagine a program that causes any system running it to behave exactly like someone who believes in Santa Claus behaves. Call this the “belief in Santa program.” If functionalism is true, it is theoretically possible to write such a program. The pattern of inputs and outputs of any platform running this program will exactly match the input-output pattern (behavior) of a human believer in Santa. If functionalism is true, any system running this program is actually a conscious mind that believes in Santa.
This is a simplification, but a computer chip consists of millions of tiny circuits (called “logic gates”) that open and close corresponding to the (millions of) 1’s and 0’s produced by a computer program. Block asks us to suppose that a billion people have been choreographed to stand and sit in a sequence that exactly mimics, in the right order, the 1’s and 0’s of a belief in Santa program. In other words, these people have been choreographed to stand and sit in a way that functionally imitates the opening and closing of the logic gates of a computer running a belief in Santa program. This is in theory possible. Standing might correspond to 1, sitting to 0. This group of one billion people would then constitute a platform realizing the belief in Santa program.
If functionalism is true, this group of people standing and sitting in accord with the 1’s and 0’s of the Santa program constitutes a giant mind that actually believes in Santa—even though no individual in the group actually believes in Santa.
Block asks: Is it reasonable to believe that if a billion people were to behave in this way, a giant mind that believes in Santa would suddenly come into existence? This implication of functionalism, he argues, is simply absurd. But if a theory has an absurd consequence, that is a good reason to reject the theory. Thus:
1. If functionalism is true, then a giant mind that believes in Santa Claus suddenly comes into existence when a billion people stand up and sit down so as to realize, or run, a belief in Santa program.
2. It is absurd to suppose that a giant mind could come into existence in this way.
3. Therefore, functionalism is clearly false.
Chalmers’s Philosophical Zombies
The Australian philosopher David Chalmers, a leading figure in the philosophy of mind today, proposed an influential argument against functionalism based on the philosophical concept of a zombie. In philosophy, a zombie is defined as a being who functions exactly like a conscious person but who nevertheless has no conscious internal mental states whatsoever. Zombies, he argues, are conceivable without self-contradiction. But if they are conceivable without self-contradiction, then they are logically possible. (One standard principle of modern logic and mathematics is the idea that if something is conceivable without self-contradiction then it is logically possible.) However, if functionalism is true, zombies are not logically possible, for according to functionalism, if something functions exactly like a conscious being, it necessarily is conscious. Put another way, according to functionalism, it is impossible that something is not conscious and yet functions exactly like it is conscious. Thus,
1. Let a zombie be defined as a being who functions exactly like a conscious person but who nevertheless has no conscious mental states whatsoever.
2. It is logically possible that a being that has no conscious mental states nevertheless functions exactly like a conscious being functions.
3. Zombies are therefore conceivable without self-contradiction.
4. Therefore, zombies are logically possible.
5. If functionalism is true, zombies are not logically possible.
6. Therefore, functionalism is false.
Applied to neuroscience, Chalmers’s zombie argument raises a difficult question: Why is the neurological functioning of a living human brain accompanied by conscious experiences, rather than by no consciousness at all? As Chalmers puts it, why doesn’t all the neurological functioning inside the brain go on in the dark, so to speak, without any attendant conscious mental states? Why is neurological functioning accompanied by a stream of consciousness containing experienced smells, tastes, colors, images, the inner movie, and other qualia? Chalmers calls this question the “hard problem of consciousness.”
Neuroscientists have no scientifically confirmed answer.
Mind-body dualism, of course, supplies an answer. The neural functioning of a living human brain is accompanied by conscious states because a human being is an immaterial mind, or soul, interacting with the physical brain, and the soul brings the conscious, subjective side of life to the equation. Zombies would lack conscious mental states because they would lack a soul. Materialists have no answer to date.
Chalmers’s question can be generalized. The Japanese are leaders in creating robots that behave in very humanlike ways. Why is the functioning of one of these life-like robots not accompanied by consciousness, while the functioning of a human being is accompanied by consciousness? Mind-body dualists have a ready answer. The functioning of a human being is accompanied by conscious experiences because a human being has an immaterial mind or soul that is the seat of consciousness, while no conscious mind or soul is present in the metal robot.
Considerations based on Ockham’s razor raise another problem for functionalism. The behavior of a computer or metal robot, no matter how humanlike it is—can be fully explained in terms of matter in motion, that is, in terms of physical objects such as electrical signals, circuits firing according to a program, and logic gates opening and closing. In other words, the functioning can be explained purely in material terms without any reference to consciousness. If so, then why does the functionalist attribute consciousness to the machine or robot? Doesn’t the addition of consciousness make the explanation more complex than it needs to be (and thus less likely according to Ockham’s razor)? Wouldn’t the functionalist explanation be simpler if we dropped consciousness from the account altogether? Isn’t the consciousness part of functionalism a spinning wheel doing no explanatory work? Ockham’s razor, it seems, requires that we shave the functionalist explanation of the robot and the computer down to purely physical processing and thus drop all reference to consciousness. Does functionalism violate Ockham’s razor? Does Ockham’s razor rule out attributing consciousness to computers? Does functionalism rule out attributing consciousness to human beings?
BOX: The Hard Problem of Consciousness
David Chalmers puts the hard problem this way in his TED Talk:
Right now you have a movie playing inside your head. It’s an amazing multitrack movie. It has 3-D vision and surround sound for what you are seeing and hearing right now. But that’s just the start of it. Your movie has smell, and taste, and touch. It has a sense of your body, pain, hunger. . . . it has emotions, anger, happiness. . . . And it has this constant voice-over narrative, in your stream of conscious thinking. At the heart of this movie is you experiencing all of this directly. This movie is your stream of consciousness. Consciousness is one of the fundamental facts of human existence. Each of us is conscious. We all have our own inner movie. . . . There is nothing we know about more directly. At least, I know about my consciousness directly. I can’t be certain you guys are conscious. . . . But at the same time it’s the most mysterious phenomenon in the universe. Why are we conscious? Why do we have these inner movies? Why aren’t we just robots who process all this input, produce all that output, without experiencing the inner movie at all. Right now, nobody knows the answer.
The Inverted-Spectrum Argument
Suppose two individuals, Ann and Bob, have qualitatively different internal color experiences, or color sensations, when viewing the same object. When Ann looks at a ripe Red Delicious apple, she has the same kind of color experience or quale that Bob has when he looks at a ripe Golden Delicious apple. When she looks at a ripe Golden Delicious apple, she has the same kind of color experience Bob has when he looks at a ripe Red Delicious apple. In short, red things look to Ann the way yellow things look to Bob, and vice versa. If we place a red apple in front of both Ann and Bob, Ann experiences what is really a sensation of yellow, while Bob experiences what is really a sensation of red.
However, in learning to speak the English language, both Ann and Bob have been taught since they were young to use the word red for this color experience. So, Ann calls the color she experiences when she looks at a red delicious apple “red,” and Bob also calls the color he experiences looking at the same apple “red.” They have also been taught since birth to call fire trucks, Valentine hearts, and Santa Claus’s coat “red.”
Thus, although Ann and Bob have differing internal, color qualia, both behave or function the same way with respect to colored objects. Viewed from the outside—from the third person perspective—both exhibit the same behavior or functioning with respect to color. Yet from the inside, each has qualitatively different internal experiences, or qualia. This is called an “inverted-spectrum case.”
If an inverted-spectrum case is logically possible—describable without self-contradiction—then functionalism is false, for according to functionalism, inverted-spectrum cases are logically impossible. An inverted spectrum case is logically impossible if functionalism is true since the two people in the case would be e “Functionally isomorphic”functionally isomorphic (their behavior patterns with respect to color would be functionally indistinguishable) yet they would be undergoing qualitatively differing internal mental states. Functionalism claims this is impossible. Thus
1. If functionalism is true, spectrum inversion is logically impossible.
2. But a spectrum-inversion case is conceivable without contradiction.
3. Therefore, spectrum inversion is logically possible.
4. Therefore, functionalism is false.
Does Functionalism Explain Consciousness?
The arguments we’ve just examined indicate that there is much more to consciousness than merely functioning, or behaving, the way a conscious being behaves. Critics of functionalism, such as Nagel, Searle, Block, Chalmers, argue that functionalists, by focusing solely on outward behavior, miss something important about consciousness. They miss what goes on inside our stream of consciousness, namely, the private, subjective process experienced only from the inside: Functionalism ignores (and can’t explain) the subjective nature of thought—the part we experience privately.
Nagel puts the idea this way: a conscious being has an inner mental life. If a being has an inner mental life, there’s something it is like to be that individual—something that is not simply an outward pattern of behavior.
However, since this inner life is nonpublic and subjective, it cannot be “functionalized” (explained solely in external, public, functional terms). This, the critics argue, is why functionalism fails to explain consciousness. But if consciousness is subjective and private in this way, while functioning is entirely a public phenomenon, then the mind is not simply a function that can be run on a platform, material or otherwise.
Each of us knows by personal experience that qualia are real. We know by experience that the mind has the private, subjective, and nonfunctional aspects described by the critics of functionalism. We verify these facts every time we directly experience our own consciousness. Functionalism stands in conflict with our common human experience.
11. Summing Up
During the twentieth century, many philosophers and psychologists rejected dualism, assumed without proof that materialism is true, and attempted to explain the mind in terms consistent with materialism. First they tried to explain consciousness by hypothesizing that mental states are nothing but behavior. When behaviorism fizzled out, they proposed that the mind is identical to the physical brain. After the identity theory failed, they resurrected behaviorism in the form of functionalism, and tried to explain consciousness as if it is an abstract function that can be run on any suitable platform—including the operating system of a digital computer. However, none of the major materialist attempts to explain the mind in material terms alone—behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism—succeeded. In particular, no materialist theory of the mind successfully explained
· the directly experienced, subjective, internal mental states called “qualia;”
· the aboutness of many of our conscious mental states;
· the subjectivity of the mental;
· the privacy of the mental;
· why the person in the Chinese room does not understand Chinese;
· why the group of one billion people realizing the belief in Santa program does not constitute a giant mind that believes in Santa.
· Why humans experience consciousness while zombies would not.
After twenty-five hundred years of the rational investigation of the system of nature and the nature of matter, and nearly five hundred years of modern science, scientists still have no answer at all, not even the beginnings of a good answer, to the following questions:
1. How can any purely material object possess intrinsic intentionality?
2. How can a purely material object have as part of its essence an essential relation to an intentional object?
3. How can any purely material object possess subjectivity?
4. How can any purely material object have a point of view?
5. How can any purely material object possess consciousness?
6. How can any purely material object intentionally follow the objective laws of logic?
7. How can any purely material object have qualitative content?
And two questions that will arise in the next chapter:
8. How can a purely material object whose operations are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry bear moral responsibility?
9. How can a purely material object whose operations are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry have free will?
If materialism and the three major theories of mind compatible with it cannot account for consciousness, subjectivity, the privacy of the mental, and rationality, perhaps mind-body dualism—the common view held by most human beings and most religions of the world throughout history—deserves a second look. Perhaps the only barrier to taking dualism seriously is a materialist bias that blocks some people from thinking outside the scientific box. If dualism is true, there is more to consciousness than meets the scientific eye.
Questions for Reflection and Discussion 7.4
1. In your own words, explain functionalism’s basic claim.
2. Give an argument for functionalism.
3. Does Searle’s Chinese room actually understand Chinese? Does anything within the room understand Chinese? What follows if it does not?
4. Critically evaluate Ned Block’s thought experiment. Does a giant mind come into existence? Does his argument raise troubles for functionalism?
5. Would the existence of qualia contradict functionalism? Discuss.
6. In your own words, explain one of the arguments presented against functionalism.
7. Is functionalism an adequate theory of consciousness? Discuss.
8. Are you a materialist or a dualist with respect to the mind? What is the basis for your answer?
Appendix
From Dualism to Theism
Anyone who accepts mind-body dualism faces the following question: How do immaterial minds, or souls, become joined to physical bodies when a new human being first comes into existence? What process or agent brings the two together? If dualism is true and if our modern understanding of science is correct, the process cannot be a purely material one, for several reasons. First, purely material processes are mindless. They are also completely governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology. But no law of physics, chemistry, or biology refers to, or ever will refer to, immaterial entities such as souls, for standard science restricts itself to the material realm. It follows that no law of physics, chemistry, or biology relates mind and body. It also follows that the process that joins mind and body is not a material process governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, or biology. The union of mind and body therefore cannot in principle be explained by science.
How, then, does the soul get joined to the body, given that dualism is true? Theism offers one plausible explanation. If God exists, and if God creates each individual soul and joins it to a physical body each time a new human being comes into existence, then we have an explanation, albeit a philosophical one, for the union of body and soul. Is any other explanation available? This is one of many areas where theism helps us make sense of a phenomenon that would otherwise be unexplained. Many dualists are theists as the result of a best explanation argument that runs something like this.
A Dualistic Argument for God’s Existence
1. Mind-body dualism is true.
2. Some agent or process unites the physical body and the immaterial soul each time a new human being comes into existence. (This is the data to be explained.)
3. This agent or process cannot possibly be a purely material agent or process.
4. Therefore, an immaterial agent or process existing above or outside the system of matter unites body and soul when a new human being comes into existence.
5. The most plausible candidate is God or a supreme being: God creates each individual mind, or soul, and unites it with a physical body when a new human being comes into existence.
6. Therefore, theism is the best explanation of the data.
7. It is therefore reasonable to believe that God or a supreme being exists.
Argument for 3:
If dualism is true, and if our modern understanding of science is correct, the agent or process that unites body and soul cannot be a purely material being or process, for material processes are (a) mindless; (b) they are completely governed by the laws of physics and chemistry, and (c) no law of physics or chemistry relates mind and body, for no law of science refers to, or ever will refer to, immaterial entities such as souls.
Theism and dualism are related in many complex ways. The following is a deductive argument from mind- body dualism to theism. The first premise reflects the fact that theism and materialism are the two great worldviews competing for allegiance today.
1. Either (a) materialism is true and the first cause of all things is pure mindless matter, or (b) theism is true and God is the first cause of all things.
2. Mind-body dualism is true.
3. If mind-body dualism is true, a mind cannot be produced by a purely material agent or process.
4. Therefore, a mind cannot be produced by a purely material agent or process.
5. Minds exist.
6. If materialism is true and the first cause of all things is pure, mindless matter, then minds do not exist.
7. Therefore, materialism is false.
8. Therefore, theism is true and God is the first cause of all things.
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) observed that each philosophical position is logically linked to other philosophical positions so that the view we adopt on one issue influences the views we hold on other issues. All philosophical topics, he suggested, are logically interrelated. Does mind-body dualism make the most sense within a theistic framework? Does mind-body dualism logically point to theism? If you believe that dualism is true, should you also believe that God exists? In short, is mind-body dualism evidence for God’s existence? You decide.
Notes
� Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Laurence J. Lafleur (trans)(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Educational Publishings), 81.
� For the purposes of this introductory level argument, I am assuming that a “part” of the body contains at least two atomic particles.
� For logic purists, technically, premise 2 is the contrapositive of Leibniz’s law. (The contrapositive of “If P, then Q” is “If not Q, then not P.”) Every conditional, or “if, then,” proposition is logically equivalent to its contrapositive and therefore implies (and is implied by) its contrapositive.
� Thomas Nagel, What Does It All Mean? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 ), 33.
� Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, eds. The Waning of Materialism. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.
� Robert C. Koons and George Bealer, eds. The Waning of Materialism, 18.
� Jerry Fodor, “The Mind-Body Problem,” in Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka, eds, The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 25.
� Edward Feser, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginners Guide (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005).
� John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004).
� For more on this, see Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), chap. 2, and Fodor, “The Mind-Body Problem,” in Warner and Szubka, Mind-Body Problem.
� For further exploration of the identity theory, see Cynthia Macdonald, Mind-Body Identity Theories (London: Routledge, 1989). See also Warner and Szubka, eds., Mind-Body Problem, part 1; Keith Campbell, Body and Mind (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970); and Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, 26–36. Two important early defenses of the identity theory are U. T. Place, “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?,” reprinted in V. C. Chappell, ed., Philosophy of Mind; and J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” reprinted in the same volume. See also David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).
� The case of Phineas Gage is often mentioned. In the 1840s, Gage was working on a railroad construction crew, setting dynamite charges, when a horrible accident occurred. A stick of dynamite exploded prematurely, sending a three-foot-long iron tamping rod through his left cheek and out the top of his skull. Amazingly, Gage survived, but the rod destroyed part of the front of his brain (his prefrontal cortex). After he recovered, his friends and associates noticed a drastic change in his personality. The philosophy professor Steve Duncan in correspondence suggested one way to interpret this case: perhaps Gage’s personality change was his real self coming out after damage to his frontal cortex made it impossible for him to disguise his true nature.
� From “Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise,” in Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson, eds., Contemporary Dualism: A Defense (New York, Routledge, 2014), 87.
� See J. J. C. Smart. “Sensations and Brain Processes” in David Rosenthal, ed., Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 54.
� In framing my explanation, I am indebted to Anthony Appiah’s account in Necessary Questions (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 22.
� For further development of this line of reasoning, see John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
� Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Ned Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 276.
� Chalmers, Character of Consciousness.
� David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, 2010).
� For further exploration of this interesting point, see Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
� The neuroscientist John C. Eccles, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, defends a dualist account of the mind-brain relationship in Karl Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism (New York: Routledge, 1984). Dualism is also defended in John Foster, The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (New York: Routledge, 1991). See John C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994). Eccles develops a dualistic account of the brain that incorporates the latest scientific understanding of the brain’s structure while offering an account of how a nonmaterial mind might act on the physical brain to bring about voluntary action.
� I am using the word material to refer to the entities and forces studied by science, namely, subatomic particles, atoms, molecules, quanta of energy, the forces of nature, and so forth.
� Of course, all theists are mind-body dualists in the minimal sense that they believe that at least one immaterial mind exists, namely, God’s mind.
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