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 Feist and Feist book Chapter 13th  

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PSYC 341

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Overview

Throughout this course, you will complete three essays. These essays will focus on three different theories of personality and will include biblical integration and scholarly references. Understanding the connection between the theories you are studying, and the Scriptures is vital.

Instructions

In each essay you will:

· Answer the prompt with at least 500 words of content.

· Be sure to use current APA formatting through the assignment.

· A title page is not required, but a reference page is required.

· Please use third person writing.

· There should be at least three references in total.

· Two scholarly journal articles are required (published within the last 5 years)

· The Bible must also be included as a reference

· Be sure to use in-text citations throughout the essay.

· The in-text citations should match the references listed on the reference page and vice versa.

Essay Prompt:

Essay: Costa and McCrae: Review the section in Chapter 13 titled “In Search of the Big Five” and the article “Big Five Personality Factors and Facets as Predictors of Openness to Diversity” (Han & Pistole, 2017). Select one of the Five-Factors and discuss how this factor relates to an open attitude toward diversity as related to Costa and McCrae’s Five-Factor Model of Personality? Make sure to incorporate Han and Pistole (2017)’s discussion of openness to diversity in your essay.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

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The Journal of Psychology
Interdisciplinary and Applied

ISSN: 0022-3980 (Print) 1940-1019 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vjrl20

Big Five Personality Factors and Facets as
Predictors of Openness to Diversity

Suejung Han & M. Carole Pistole

To cite this article: Suejung Han & M. Carole Pistole (2017) Big Five Personality Factors and
Facets as Predictors of Openness to Diversity, The Journal of Psychology, 151:8, 752-766, DOI:
10.1080/00223980.2017.1393377

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Published online: 22 Nov 2017.

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Big Five Personality Factors and Facets as Predictors
of Openness to Diversity

Suejung Hana and M. Carole Pistoleb

aIllinois State University; bPurdue University

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 23 January 2017
Accepted 11 September 2017

ABSTRACT
Openness to diversity is a crucial component of cultural competence
needed in the increasingly diversified modern society and a necessary
condition for benefitting from diversity contacts and interventions
(e.g., diversity training, cultural courses). Responding to the recent call
for more research on personality and its relation to diversity outcomes,
we examined the associations between Big Five personality (i.e.,
Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, Extraversion, Neuroticism,
and Conscientiousness) higher order factors and lower order facets
and universal-diverse orientation (i.e., open attitude of appreciating
human universality and diversity; Miville et al., 1999). In the

  • Study 1

    • (N D 338) web survey on Big Five factors, Openness to Experience and
    Agreeableness were associated with universal-diverse orientation
    significantly. In the

  • Study 2

    • (N D 176) paper survey on both Big Five
    factors and facets, Openness to Experience, low Neuroticism, and
    Conscientiousness, and various lower-order facets of all the Big Five
    personality were associated with universal-diverse orientation
    significantly. Practical implications were suggested on how personality
    facets could be incorporated into current diversity interventions to
    enhance their effectiveness of promoting openness to diversity.

    KEYWORDS
    Big Five personality; diversity
    interventions; openness to
    diversity; universal-diverse
    orientation

    With the increased exposure to cultural differences in the 21st century diversified and global-
    ized society, cultural competence—the ability to interact and negotiate effectively with such
    differences is essential for successful adjustment (Engberg, 2004; Jackson & Ruderman,
    1995). Because increased diversity exposure itself does not enhance cultural competence
    automatically (Gottfredson et al., 2008) but rather may cause conflicts and discomfort
    (Strauss, Connerly, & Ammermann, 2003), diversity interventions for reducing cultural ten-
    sions and promoting cultural competence have been increasingly provided at various sectors
    such as college campuses (i.e., culture focused courses, workshops; Engberg, 2004) and
    industries (i.e., diversity training; Strauss et al., 2003).

    Among various components of cultural competence, openness to diversity may be cru-
    cial as a key expected outcome of diversity interventions, and also as a necessary condition
    for benefitting from diversity contacts and interventions (Chang, 2001). In other words,
    without openness to diversity, diversity contacts or interventions may increase defensive

    CONTACT Suejung Han shan3@ilstu.edu Department of Psychology, Illinois State University, Campus Box 4620,
    Normal, IL 61790–4620, USA.
    © 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY
    2017, VOL. 151, NO. 8, 752–766
    https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2017.1393377

    https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/00223980.2017.1393377&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-11-17

    mailto:shan3@ilstu.edu

    https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2017.1393377

    reactance or strengthen negative stereotypes (e.g., Hemphill & Haines, 1997). Research also
    shows that openness to diversity is an important moderator in fostering benefits from
    diversity contacts and interventions (e.g., Chang, 2001) such as enhanced critical/reflective
    thinking (Baxter Magolda, 2001) and creativity and originality in work performances (e.g.,
    Muhr, 2006).

    Therefore, it would be useful to understand what psychological factors, such as per-
    sonality, could promote or inhibit openness to diversity. Personality is a consistent pat-
    tern of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (McAdams & Pals, 2006), and thus may
    predispose a person to think about, feel toward, and act on diversity contacts and inter-
    ventions in a certain way, thereby affecting openness to diversity. In fact, diversity schol-
    ars recently have called for more research on personality and recommended
    incorporating personality factors into diversity interventions to enhance their effective-
    ness (Bezrukova, Jehn, & Spell, 2008; Bowman & Brandenberger, 2012), noting the small
    effect sizes of and sometimes mixed findings on the effectiveness of current diversity
    interventions (e.g., see Engberg, 2004). Thus, we examined the association between per-
    sonality and openness to diversity.

  • Universal-Diverse Orientation as Openness to Diversity

    • In this study, we operationally defined openness to diversity as higher level of universal-
    diverse orientation (UDO)—“an attitude toward all other persons that is inclusive yet
    differentiating in that similarities and differences are both recognized and accepted
    (Miville et al., 1999, p. 292).” With UDO, people appreciate both the common aspects of
    being human and unique or diverse aspects of each person, as based on cultural factors
    such as race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation, and individual factors such as
    worldviews and values (Miville et al., 1999). UDO consists of a behavioral component of
    one’s past and intended future behavior with respect to cultural diversity (Diversity of
    Contact), a cognitive component of acknowledging cultural dimensions and differences
    in oneself and others (Relativistic Appreciation), and an emotional component of a sense
    of connectedness and comfort with both humanity and diverse individuals (Comfort
    with Differences; Miville et al., 1999).

    As an attitude, UDO was associated with other diversity-related attitudes such as racial
    identity, feminism, homophobia, dogmatism (Miville et al., 1999), and ethnocultural empa-
    thy (Wang et al., 2003) in a conceptually consistent way. Research also showed that UDO
    predicted diversity outcomes including intention to seek multicultural experiences (Fuertes,
    Sedlacek, Roger, & Mohr, 2000), willingness to see counselors with Spanish accent (Fuertes
    & Gelso, 2000), and multicultural awareness and knowledge (Constantine et al., 2001).
    Moreover, UDO predicted general positive outcomes such as academic performance (Singley
    & Sedlacek, 2004), functional coping skills (Fuertes, Miville, Mohr, Sedlacek, & Gretchen,
    2000), and prosocial interpersonal functioning (Brummett, Wade, Ponterotto, Thombs, &
    Lewis, 2007). These results suggest that UDO could potentially promote both cultural com-
    petence and general functioning, highlighting its contribution to overall adjustment. On the
    other hand, some personality predictors of UDO were examined including healthy narcis-
    sism, personal and collective self-esteem (Miville et al., 1999), and optimism (Miville,
    Romans, Johnson, & Lone, 2004), but comprehensive personality characteristics have not
    been examined as a predictor of UDO sufficiently.

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 753

  • Big Five Personality and Universal-Diverse Orientation

    • Thus, the five factor model—a widely accepted and comprehensive personality trait model
    (McCrae & Costa, 2005)—was examined in relation to UDO. The five factor model proposes
    “Big Five” personality factors of Openness to Experience, being intellectually curious and
    imaginative; Agreeableness, being cooperative and interpersonally warm and amicable;
    Extraversion, being social and outgoing; Neuroticism, being emotionally unstable; and Con-
    scientiousness, being dependable and organized, as general personality traits (McCrae &
    Costa, 2005). These Big Five personality factors are an empirically derived higher-order tax-
    onomy of individual differences, with six connected yet distinct lower-order facets. For
    example, the six lower order Openness to Experience facets include Aesthetics, deeply appre-
    ciating art and beauty; Actions, trying different activities and going to new places; Ideas,
    being intellectually curious and open minded; Values, being ready to reexamine social, polit-
    ical, and religious values; Fantasy, tending to have an active imagination; and Feelings,
    acknowledging and valuing the self’s feelings (see Table 1 for facet descriptions). The Big
    Five higher order factors, with their lower-order facets that account for trait-related

    Table 1. Facets of Big Five Personality Factors.

    Factors Facets Descriptions

    Openness to
    Experience

    O1: Fantasy The tendency of a vivid and creative imagination

    O2: Aesthetics A deep appreciation for art and beauty
    O3: Feelings Receptivity to one’s own inner feelings and emotions and the evaluation of

    emotion as an important part of life
    O4: Actions The willingness to try different activities and go to new places
    O5: Ideas The intellectual curiosity and open-mindedness
    O6: Values The readiness to reexamine social, political, and religious values

    Agreeableness A1: Trust The tendency to believe that others are honest and well-intentioned
    A2: Straightforwardness The tendency to be frank, sincere, and ingenuous
    A3: Altruism, An active concern for others’ welfare
    A4: Compliance The tendency to defer to others, to inhibit aggression, and to forgive and forget
    A5: Modesty Tendency to be humble and self-effacing
    A6: Tender-Mindedness Sympathy and concern for others

    Extraversion E1: Warmth Being affectionate and friendly
    E2: Gregariousness The preference for other people’s company
    E3: Assertiveness The tendency to be dominant, forceful, and socially ascendant
    E4: Activity The tendency of vigorous movement, a sense of energy
    E5: Excitement-Seeking The tendency for craving excitement and stimulation
    E6: Positive Emotions The tendency to experience positive emotions and be cheerful

    Neuroticism N1: Anxiety The tendency for free-floating anxiety or fears
    N2: Angry Hostility The tendency to experience anger, frustration, and bitterness
    N3: Depression The tendency to experience feelings of guilt, sadness, hopelessness, and

    loneliness
    N4: Self-Consciousness The tendency to experience shame and embarrassment
    N5: Impulsiveness The inability to control cravings and urges
    N6: Vulnerability The tendency to feel overwhelmed or panicked by stress

    Conscientiousness C1: Competence The sense that one is capable, sensible, prudent, and effective
    C2: Order The tendency to be neat, tidy, and well-organized
    C3: Dutifulness The tendency to adhere to their ethical principles and scrupulously fulfill their

    moral obligations
    C4: Achievement

    Striving
    High aspiration and working hard to achieve their goals

    C5: Self-Discipline The ability to begin tasks and carry them through to completion, despite
    boredom or other distractions

    C6: Deliberation The tendency to think carefully before acting

    Note. Adapted from McCrae & Costa (2010) NEO-PI-3 Manual, pp. 21–24.

    754 S. HAN AND M. C. PISTOLE

    individuality, influence more malleable and situation-specific psychosocial processes such as
    attitudes, motivation, and socio-cognitive understandings (McAdams & Pals, 2006). Thus,
    the person’s personality is meaningfully described as a general predisposition that influences
    behavior, cognition, and emotion in specific situations, such as encounters with cultural
    diversity.

    As such, the Big Five personality factors, at least some of their facets, may be associated
    with UDO. Specifically, people with high Openness to Experience may be open to diversity.
    They may feel curious about different culture intellectually or aesthetically (O2: Aesthetics,
    O5: Ideas) (Thompson, Brossart, Carlozzi, & Miville, 2002) and be willing to re-evaluate
    their values (O6: Values). Agreeableness aspects of optimistic and friendly view of others
    (A1: Trust), and care (A3: Altruism) and sympathy (A6: Tender-mindedness) for others’
    well-being may be associated with open and empathic attitude toward cultural diversity
    (Wang et al., 2003). People with high Extraversion may be more welcoming of cultural diver-
    sity with their general friendliness (E1: warmth). On the other hand, people with high Neu-
    roticism may feel easily anxious (N1: Anxiety), angry (N2: Angry Hostility), or vulnerable
    (N6: Vulnerability), and thus may feel more threatened from and negative toward cultural
    diversity (Strauss et al., 2003). Relatedly, Conscientiousness aspect of sense of competence
    (C1: Competence) may mitigate such felt threat from diversity (Greenberg et al., 1990),
    thereby promoting open attitude to it.

    However, the associations between Big Five personality and UDO have not been clarified
    in empirical studies. To our knowledge, only two studies examined the relationship between
    Big Five personality and UDO. They found that Openness to Experience and Agreeableness
    were associated with UDO among college students (Strauss & Connerly, 2003) and coun-
    selor trainees (Thompson et al., 2002). The study with college students (Strauss & Connerly,
    2003), however, did not include the other three Big Five factors in their study. The other
    study with counselor trainees found that Neuroticism and Extraversion, but not Conscien-
    tiousness, were also associated with UDO, although not as strongly as was Openness to
    Experience.

    Despite the dearth of study on personality-UDO associations, research on personality-
    prejudice associations could be relevant, because prejudice—the negative attitude toward dif-
    ferent groups or their members—is conceptually similar to low level of UDO and empirically
    associated with it negatively (Fuertes et al., 2000; Miville et al., 1999). In a meta-analysis,
    Sibley and Duckitt (2008) found that Openness to Experience and Agreeableness were linked
    to prejudice negatively. Openness to Experience also was strongly and negatively related to
    negative attitudes toward racial diversity and gender equity (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Yang-
    Wallentin, 2011) and homophobia (Cullen, Wright, & Alessandri, 2002). In addition, Agree-
    ableness was negatively related to sexism (Akrami et al., 2011). These results are consistent
    with the findings on Openness to Experience and Agreeable association with UDO (Strauss
    & Connerly, 2003). For the other three personality factors, Ekehammer, Akrami, Gylje, and
    Zakrisson (2004)) found that Extraversion and Conscientiousness were associated with prej-
    udice but only indirectly through right-wing authoritarianism—the tendency to favor tradi-
    tional values, be submissive to authority, and act aggressively toward outgroups (Altemeyer,
    1998). Research findings are mixed on the link between Neuroticism and prejudice (e.g.,
    Saucier & Goldberg, 1998 vs. Ekehammer et al., 2004).

    In summary, Openness to Experience and Agreeableness appear to be related to UDO,
    but the associations between the other personality factors and UDO are not conclusive.

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 755

    Also, no studies have examined the Big Five lower order facets and their relations to UDO,
    although Thompson et al. (2002) examined facets of Openness to Experience only, finding
    O2: Aesthetics and O6: Values associated with UDO.

    Therefore, in Study 1, we examined the relationship between all Big Five personality
    higher-order factors and UDO. In study 2, we aimed to cross-validate the Study 1 finding
    with a different sample, and examined specific relationships between Big Five lower-order
    facets and the behavioral, cognitive, and emotional components of UDO.

    Study 1

    Method

    Participants and Procedure
    Undergraduates enrolled at a regional Midwestern university were recruited via a mass invi-
    tation email sent out from the university research office and through the department of Psy-
    chology research participation management system for credits. From the initial 398
    participants, we deleted 60 responses who did not complete more than half of the survey.
    The resulting sample (N D 338) included 136 males (40.2%) and 198 females (58.6%). Mean
    age was 21.18 years (SD D 5.13; range D 18 to 54). Participants were mostly European
    Americans (300, 88.8%), with 2 African Americans, 3 Latino/as, 10 Asian Americans, 5
    multi-racial, and 14 others.

    Instruments

    Personality
    The 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) measured the Big Five per-
    sonality factors. All items following a stem, “I see myself as someone like who….”, measured
    Openness to Experience (10 items; e.g., “is original, comes up with new ideas”), Agreeable-
    ness (9 items; e.g., “has a forgiven nature”), Extraversion (8 items; e.g., “is talkative”),
    Neuroticism (8 items; e.g., “is depressed, blue”), and Conscientiousness (9 items; e.g., “does
    a thorough job”). Items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 D disagree strongly, 5 D
    agree strongly). Higher scores indicated a higher level of each personality factor. Internal
    consistency and construct validity have been established (John & Srivastava, 1999). The
    internal consistency coefficients for the five factors were .76 for Openness to Experience, .75
    for Agreeableness, .87 for Extraversion, .80 for Neuroticism, and .78 for Conscientiousness
    in our sample.

    Universal-Diverse Orientation
    The 15-item Miville-Guzman Universal-Diverse Scale-Short Form (MGUDS-S; Fuertes
    et al., 2000) measured UDO (Miville et al., 1999). The three 5-item subscales were: (a) Diver-
    sity of Contact (e.g., “I attend events where I might get to know people from different racial
    backgrounds”), (b) Relativistic Appreciation (e.g., “Persons with disabilities can teach me
    things I could not learn elsewhere”), and (c) Comfort with Differences (e.g., “I am only at
    ease with people of my own race” [reverse coded]). Items were rated on a 6-point Likert-
    type scale (1 D strongly disagree, 6 D strongly agree). Higher scores indicated higher level of
    UDO. As for psychometric information, the MGUDS-S items had higher factor loadings on

    756 S. HAN AND M. C. PISTOLE

    the original 45-item scale (M-GUDS; Miville et al., 1999). Internal consistency and construct
    validity of M-GUDS scores have been established (Fuertes et al., 2000; Miville et al., 1999).
    Internal consistency and validity of the M-GUDS short form also were reported to be ade-
    quate in various studies (e.g., Fuertes et al., 2000; Han, 2017; Stracuzzi, Mohr, & Fuertes,
    2011). The internal consistency coefficients in our sample were .79 for Diversity of Contact,
    .72 for Relativistic Appreciation, and .81 for Comfort with Differences.

    Results

    The sample size, N D 338, was adequate for a medium effect size expected in the regression
    analysis (minimum sample size required D 91; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Miss-
    ing values were less than 4.3% of the data points and at complete random, Little’s MCAR x2

    (65, N D 348) D 64.03, p D .55, and therefore were not imputed. Skewness and kurtosis sta-
    tistics demonstrated univariate normality of variable scores. Significant correlation coeffi-
    cient absolute values ranged from .12 to .49 (Table 2, above diagonal).

    A multiple regression analysis with UDO as the dependent variable and the Big Five per-
    sonality factors as the independent variables revealed that Openness to Experience and
    Agreeableness predicted UDO significantly, personality explaining 20% of the variance of
    UDO, R2 D .20, F (5, 267) D 13.18, p <.001, b D .38, p < .001 for Openness to Experience, b D .18, p D .003 for Agreeableness (Table 3).

    Study 2

    In Study 2, we aimed to cross-validate the Study 1 finding and examine specific relationships
    between Big Five personality facets and UDO components (i.e., behavioral, cognitive, emo-
    tional). First, consistent with Study 1, we hypothesized that Openness to Experience and
    Agreeableness would predict UDO (H1). Second, based on the conceptual descriptions of
    facets, we developed five hypotheses regarding personality facets and UDO associations.
    Because intellectual and cultural curiosity, trying something new, and willingness to reevalu-
    ate one’s values would encourage people to approach cultural differences as something novel
    and aesthetic, and willingly negotiate their worldviews, Openness to Experience O2: Aes-
    thetics, O4: Activities, O5: Ideas, and O6: Values would be associated with UDO (H2).
    Because trust in and empathic care for others would be related to empathic attitude toward

    Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficients of Big Five Personality and Universal-
    Diverse Orientation Components.

    M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

    1 Openness to Experience 3.54 (54.59) .52 (10.68) — .12* .17*** .05 .01 .35*** .32*** .31***

    2 Agreeableness 3.77 (47.25) .50 (9.48) .14 — .20*** ¡.31*** .40*** .09 .24*** .25***
    3 Extraversion 3.37 (57.28) .69 (10.99) .32** .14 — ¡.19** .21*** ¡.01 .18** .20***
    4 Neuroticism 2.92 (52.88) .63 (9.59) ¡.15 ¡.27** ¡.34** — ¡.21*** .08 .11 ¡.11
    5 Conscientiousness 3.58 (48.73) .54 (11.54) ¡.02 .26** .19* ¡.45** — ¡.03 ¡.07 .15**
    6 Diversity of Contact 3.72 (29.73) 1.00 (5.66) .46** .21** .22** ¡.21** .15 — .49*** .32***
    7 Relativistic Appreciation 4.49 (19.54) .68 (4.48) .51** .13 .20** ¡.26** .13 .56** — .32***
    8 Comfort with Differences 4.57 (23.78) .89 (3.13) .36** .14 .24** ¡.21** .16 .51** .33** —

    Note. M D Mean scores, SD D Standard Deviations of scores of Study 1 (Study 2); Above diagonal D Study 1 correlation
    coefficients, Below diagonal D Study 2 correlation coefficients.

    �p < .05, ��p < .01, ���p < .001.

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 757

    the culturally different, Agreeableness A1: Trust, A3: Altruism, and A6: Tender-Mindedness
    would be associated with UDO (H3). Because general friendliness and positivity would be
    related to interpersonal and emotional positivity toward the culturally different, Extraversion
    E1: Warmth and E6: Positive Emotions would be associated with UDO (H4). Because the
    tendency to experience negative emotions may make people feel more threatened by diver-
    sity, Neuroticism N1: Anxiety, N2: Angry Hostility, and N6: Vulnerability would predict low
    level of UDO (H5). Lastly, because the sense of self-confidence may mitigate potential felt
    threat from diversity, Conscientiousness C1: Competence would predict UDO (H6).

    Method

    Participants and Procedure
    Undergraduates enrolled in various Psychology classes at a regional Mid-western university
    were recruited for extra credits. From the initial 198 responses, 22 responses that did not
    complete more than half of the survey were deleted. The sample (N D 176) included male
    (47, 26.7%) and female (127, 72.2%) undergraduates. The mean age was 21.01 years
    (SD D 3.93; range D 18 to 51). Participants were mostly European Americans (162, 92.0%),
    with 1 African American, 1 Latino/a, 5 Asian Americans, 2 others, and 5 not reporting.

    Instruments
    The MGUDS-S from Study 1 was used to measure UDO. The internal consistency coeffi-
    cients in our sample were .75 for Diversity of Contact, .71 for Relativistic Appreciation, and
    .70 for Comfort with Differences.

    The 240-item NEO-PI-3 (McCrae & Costa, 2005) measured the Big Five personality fac-
    tors and 30 facets (i.e., six 8-item facets under each factor). Respondents rated each item on
    a 5-point Likert scale (1 D disagree strongly, 5 D agree strongly). Facet items were summed.
    Higher scores indicated higher level of the personality factors and facets. Internal consis-
    tency and validity of NEO-PI-E are well established (for a review, see McCrae & Costa,
    2005). The internal consistency coefficients in our sample were .76 for Openness to Experi-
    ence, .72 for Agreeableness, .82 for Extraversion, .85 for Neuroticism, and .87 for Conscien-
    tiousness factors, and ranged from .59 to .85 for the 30 facets.

    Table 3. Multiple Regression Analyses in Studies 1 & 2 with Big Five Factors as Predictors of Universal-
    Diverse Orientation.

    Personality Factors B SE B b T

    Study 1 Openness to experience 7.10 7.04 .38 6.85***

    Agreeableness 3.56 1.03 .18 2.99**

    Extraversion .35 .80 .03 .43
    Neuroticism .78 .90 .05 .87
    Conscientiousness ¡.16 1.07 ¡.01 ¡.15

    R2 D .20, F (5,267) D 13.18***
    Study 2 Openness to experience .41 .05 .50 7.58***

    Agreeableness .05 .06 .06 .85
    Extraversion .01 .05 .01 .20
    Neuroticism ¡.15 .07 ¡.17 ¡2.30*
    Conscientiousness .12 .05 .16 2.29*

    R2 D .37, F (5,168) D 19.56***
    �p < .05, ��p < .01, ���p < .001.

    758 S. HAN AND M. C. PISTOLE

    Data Analytic Plan
    To test H1 of cross-validating the Study 1 finding, we conducted the same multiple regres-
    sion analysis. To test H2-H6 hypotheses, we conducted five canonical correlation analyses
    that examined the multivariate relationships between the two variates (i.e., variable sets) of
    personality facets and UDO components (Sherry & Henson, 2005). Following Thompson
    (2000)’s two-stage contingency model, we first examined whether the two variates were sig-
    nificantly related. The analysis yields functions or squared conical correlations (Rc

    2)—the
    squared Pearson r between the two variates—that indicate the variance explained by the
    relatedness of the variates. In addition, Wilk’s λ represents the variance unexplained by
    the model; so 1 – λ yields the full model effect size. Functions explaining 10% or more of the
    shared variance were considered meaningful (Sherry & Henson, 2005). The nature of the
    functions then was interpreted and labeled accordingly, similar to factor labeling process in
    exploratory factor analysis. Second, we determined the origin of the significant relationships
    by examining structure coefficients and standardized canonical function coefficients of the
    variables in the meaningful functions (Sherry & Henson, 2005). A structure coefficient is a
    bivariate correlation between a variable and its variate (e.g., the correlation between Neuroti-
    cism factor and its facet N1: Anxiety) and can be interpreted like factor loadings in factor
    analysis. Absolute values of structure coefficients over .45 are considered meaningful (Sherry
    & Hansen, 2005). Standardized canonical function coefficients—coefficients in the linear
    equations to combine the observed variables into variates—can be interpreted as regression
    beta weights (Sherry & Henson, 2005).

    Results

    The sample size of N D 176 is adequate for a medium effect size expected (minimum sample
    size required for correlation D 81; Cohen et al., 2003). Missing data was less than 1% of the
    data points and at complete random, Little’s MCAR test x2 (143, N D 176) D 155.39,
    p D .23, and thus were not imputed. Skewness and kurtosis statistics demonstrated univari-
    ate normality of the variables. Absolute values of significant positive and negative Pearson
    correlation coefficients ranged from .19 to .56 (Table 2, below diagonal).

    A multiple regression analysis with UDO as the dependent variable and personality fac-
    tors as the independent variables revealed that high Openness to Experience, low Neuroti-
    cism, and high Conscientiousness were associated with UDO significantly, explaining 37%
    of its variance, R2 D .37, F (5, 168) D 19.56, p <.001, b D .50, p < .001 for Openness to Experience, b D ¡.17, p D .02 for Neuroticism, b D .16, p D .02 for Conscientiousness (Table 3). This result supported H1 only partially in that, although Openness to Experience commonly was associated with UDO as was in Study 1, Neuroticism and Conscientiousness, instead of Agreeableness, were associated with UDO.

    Canonical correlation analyses between personality facets and UDO components revealed
    that at least some facets of all the Big Five personality factors were associated with UDO
    components. For Openness to Experience, H2 that O2: Aesthetics, O4: Actions, O5: Ideas,
    and O6: Values would predict UDO was supported. The full model with three functions
    with Rc

    2 of .35, .17, and .05 was significant, Wilk’s λ D .51, F (18, 467.18) D 6.99, p < .001, explaining 49% of the shared variance. Functions 1 and 2 were meaningful, explaining 35% and 17% of the shared variance respectively. Function 1 structure coefficients (Table 4) of all the facets and UDO components were above .45, but O1: Fantasy, O3: Feelings, and Comfort

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 759

    with Difference showed very low canonical coefficients, reflecting potential multicollinearity
    with the other variables in each variate (Sherry & Hansen, 2005). Based on the facet contents,
    we labeled Function 1 Intellectual Appreciation of Diversity. In Function 2, O3: Feelings and
    O6: Values contributed to the personality variate; Relativistic Appreciation contributed to
    the UDO variate, as indicated by structure and canonical coefficients (Table 4). We labeled
    Function 2 Valuing Culturally Diverse Perspectives.

    For Agreeableness, H3 that A1: Trust, A3: Altruism, and A6: Tender-mindedness would
    predict UDO was supported. The full model with three functions with Rc

    2 of .18, .04, and .01
    was significant, Wilk’s λ D .78, F (18, 467.18) D 2.34, p D .002, explaining 22% of the shared
    variance. Function 1 structure and canonical function coefficients revealed that all the three
    proposed facets were associated with all the three components of UDO (Table 4). We labeled
    Function 1 Trust and Care for Culturally Different Individuals.

    For Extraversion, H4 that E1: Warmth and E6: Positive Emotions would predict UDO
    was partially supported, because E3: Assertiveness also contributed. The full model with

    Table 4. Structure and Standardized Canonical Function Coefficients of Canonical Correlation Analyses
    with Big Five facets as Predictors of Universal-Diverse Orientation Components.

    Variables rs b rs b

    Openness to Experience
    F1 O1: Fantasy .47 .06 F2 .25 .37

    O2: Aesthetics .77 .39 .16 .27
    O3: Feeling .49 .04 ¡.51 ¡.66
    O4: Actions .77 .42 .21 .45
    O5: Ideas .72 .24 ¡.03 .15
    O6: Values .66 .24 ¡.57 ¡.79
    Rc

    2 D .49
    Diversity .93 .79 .35 .80
    Relativistic .65 .37 ¡.74 ¡.92
    Comfort .57 .04 ¡.15 ¡.27

    Agreeableness Extraversion
    A1: Trust .56 .38 E1: Warmth .69 .33
    A2: Straightforward .01 ¡.34 E2: Gregarious .10 ¡.47
    A3: Altruism .69 .47 E3: Assertive .57 .22
    A4: Compliance .03 ¡.34 E4: Activity .53 .04
    A5: Modesty .26 .25 E5: Excite .33 .09
    A6: Tender .74 .56 E6: Positive .90 .71

    Rc
    2 D .22 Rc2 D .24

    Diversity .55 .07 Diversity .73 .43
    Relativistic .86 .68 Relativistic .87 .68
    Comfort .75 .50 Comfort .59 .14

    Neuroticism Conscientiousness
    N1: Anxiety .52 ¡.00 C1: Competence .77 .34
    N2: Angry .25 ¡.24 C2: Order .25 ¡.22
    N3: Depression .44 ¡.39 C3: Dutifulness .83 .56
    N4: Conscious .73 .62 C4: Achieve .70 .12
    N5: Impulsivity .27 ¡.11 C5:Discipline .74 .39
    N6: Vulnerability .87 .92 C6: Deliberate .10 ¡.47

    Rc
    2 D .24 Rc2 D .23

    Diversity ¡.32 .22 Diversity .41 ¡.15
    Relativistic ¡.83 ¡.70 Relativistic .82 .66
    Comfort ¡.75 ¡.64 Comfort .79 .66

    Note. Diversity D Diversity of Contact, Relativistic D Relativistic Appreciation, Comfort D Comfort with Differences of Universal-
    Diverse Orientation; A2: Straight D Straightfowardness, A6: Tender D Tender-Mindedness; E2: Gregarious D Gregariousness,
    E3: Assertive D Assertiveness, E5: Excite D Excitement Seeking, E6: Positive D Positive Emotions; N2: Angry D Angry Hostility,
    N4: Conscious D Self-Consciousness, C4: Achieve D Achievement Strivings, C5: Discipline D Self-Discipline, C6: Deliberate D
    Deliberateness; rs D structure coefficient, over j.45j were bolded, b D standardized canonical function coefficient; F1 D Func-
    tion 1, F2 D Function 2.

    760 S. HAN AND M. C. PISTOLE

    three functions with Rc
    2 of .20, .04, and .01 was significant, Wilk’s λ D .76, F (18, 464.35) D

    2.63, p < .001, explaining 24% of the shared variance. Function 1 structure coefficients revealed that E1: Warmth, E3: Assertiveness, and E6 were associated with all the three UDO components. We labeled Function 1 General positivity toward Diversity.

    For Neuroticism, H5 that N1: Anxiety, N2: Anger, and N6: Vulnerability would predict
    UDO was partially supported. Instead of N1: Anxiety and N2: Anger, N4: Self-Conscious-
    ness contributed. The full model with three functions with Rc

    2 of .19, .04, and .02 was signifi-
    cant, Wilk’s λ D .76, F (18, 444.55) D 2.55, p D .001, explaining 24% of the shared variance.
    Function 1 structure coefficients revealed that N4: Self-Consciousness and N6: Vulnerability
    were associated with Relativistic Appreciation and Comfort with Differences components of
    UDO (Table 4). We labeled Function 1 Feeling Threatened by Diversity.

    For Conscientiousness, H6 that C1: Competence would predict UDO was partially sup-
    ported, because C3: Dutifulness and C5: Self-Discipline also contributed. The full model
    with three functions with Rc

    2 of .14, .08, and .03 was significant, Wilk’s λ D .77, F (18,
    467.18) D 2.49, p D .001, explaining 23% of the shared variance. Function 1 structure and
    canonical function coefficients revealed that C1: Competence, C3: Dutifulness, and C5: Dis-
    cipline were associated with Relativistic Appreciation and Comfort with Differences
    (Table 4). We labeled Function 1 Ethically Motivated Openness to Diversity.

  • Discussion

    • By examining Big Five personality both at factor and facet levels, we clarified the nature of
    the relationship between personality and UDO, an open attitude toward diversity. Our result
    suggested that the personality-UDO relationship was characterized by the Openness to
    Experience intellectual appreciation of cultural diversity and values on diverse perspectives;
    the Agreeableness trust and care for culturally diverse individuals; the Extraversion general
    positivity toward diversity; the Neuroticism feeling threatened by diversity, as a negative
    contribution; and the Conscientiousness ethnical motivation for openness to diversity. In
    sum, when examined at a facet level, selected aspects of all the Big Five personality were
    associated with UDO.

    Specifically, in previous studies, Openness to Experience was consistently found as a
    strong predictor of UDO and also lower prejudice (Sibley & Duckett, 2008; Strauss &
    Connerly, 2003; Thompson et al., 2002). Our results clarified the nature of the association:
    the view of cultural differences as something to appreciate like art or beauty (O2: Aesthetics),
    intellectual curiosity about cultural differences (O4: Actions & O5: Ideas), and willingness
    and flexibility to reevaluate one’s own cultural values (O6: Values) may be what contributes
    to UDO. This result is partially consistent with Thompson et al. (2002))’s finding on O2:
    Aesthetics and O6: Values contribution to the UDO total scores.

    Likewise, it was suggested that Agreeableness trust in others’ good intention (A1: Trust)
    and empathic care for others’ well-being (A3: Altruism, A6: Tender-Mindedness) might
    enhance the empathic understanding of the culturally different people. This result is consis-
    tent with the previous findings that (a) Agreeableness was strongly associated with empathy
    (Barrio, Aluja, & Garcia, 2004), (b) general empathy was associated with ethnocultural
    empathy—the empathy for culturally different people—which in turn was associated with
    all the UDO components (Wang et al., 2003), (c) empathy was associated with perspective
    taking of culturally diverse individuals (Van der Zee & Van Oudenhoven, 2000), and (d)

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 761

    empathy was one of the mediating mechanisms through which intergroup contact reduced
    prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000).

    On the other hand, the association between Extraversion and openness to diversity or
    prejudice has been controversial. Our study showed that some aspects of Extraversion,
    friendliness (E1: Warmth), interpersonal confidence and (E3: Assertiveness), and general
    positive moods (E6: Positive Emotions) may promote friendly approach toward and mitigate
    felt threat from cultural diversity (Strauss et al., 2003). Previous research reported that Extra-
    version was related to both advanced level of White racial identity (i.e., open to cultural dif-
    ferences due to acknowledgement and appreciation of diversity) and its lowest level (i.e.,
    friendly to the culturally different people due to obliviousness to diversity issues and color-
    blind ideology) (Silvestri &Richardson, 2001). Our result supported the association between
    Extraversion and appreciation of diversity (vs. obliviousness to diversity), although future
    research could examine a potential moderator for this relationship.

    Consistent with various theories (e.g., intergroup threat theory, Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios
    Morrison, 2009) and research findings that suggest prejudice as a result of felt threat from
    diversity (e.g., Strauss et al., 2003), our result showed that the Neuroticism tendency to feel
    easily threatened and vulnerable might be associated with felt threat by diversity. Although a
    meta-analysis did not find Neuroticism to be linked to prejudice (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008),
    this might be because only the lower-order facets of sense of insecurity (N3: Self-Conscious-
    ness) and vulnerability (N6) were associated with prejudice.

    Conscientiousness relation to UDO was not supported in the previous research (Thomp-
    son et al., 2002), and its relation to prejudice was also controversial (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).
    When examined at a facet level, the tendency to feel dutiful and be disciplined (C3: Duti-
    fulness, C5: Self-Discipline) was related to UDO. Perhaps, people with high levels on these
    facets may feel obligated to be open to diversity and advocate for social justice (Fowers &
    Davidov, 2006). Self-confidence (C1: competence) may also be related to better regulation of
    diversity-related threat (Strauss et al., 2003). In summary, our results demonstrated that var-
    ious aspects of the Big Five personality distinctively were linked to UDO in a theoretically
    consistent way, indicating multiple possible ways of promoting UDO by personality-
    informed interventions.

    Practical Implication

    In keeping with the recent call for more research on personality to inform diversity interven-
    tions to minimize personal reactance (e.g., defensiveness) and maximize their effectiveness
    (Bezrukova et al., 2008; Bowman & Brandenberger, 2012), this study findings could be incor-
    porated into current diversity interventions such as diversity courses, workshops, or training.
    This claim is supported by the findings that theory and research-based multicultural educa-
    tion in mental health fields has been shown to be almost twice as effective as that with no
    such background (Smith, Constantine, Dunn, Dinehart, & Montoya, 2006).

    For example, in the beginning phase of diversity training, ice-breakers or self-affirming
    activities (e.g., reflecting on one’s own values, Cohen & Sherman, 2014) may induce positive
    emotions (E6) and help participants feel more empowered (C1: Competence) and less
    threatened by cultural differences (N6: Vulnerability). Also in the beginning, experiential
    activities that provide opportunities to appreciate arts and beauties of diverse cultures may
    be useful to facilitate the intellectual and aesthetic curiosity of different culture (O2:

    762 S. HAN AND M. C. PISTOLE

    Aesthetics). People might be less defensive about cultural arts or beauty customs, which is
    less self-relevant (N3: Self-Consciousness) and thus less threating (N6: Vulnerability) than
    directly discussing personal values or worldviews from the beginning. Normalizing and vali-
    dating defensiveness toward diversity (e.g., educating evolutionarily developed neurobiologi-
    cal basis for discomfort with diversity, Confer et al., 2010) could counter felt shame/guilt
    about discomfort with and resulting avoidance of diversity (N3: self-consciousness). After
    participants become more engaged in the courses or workshops, having them participate in
    experiential activities to take the perspective of culturally different people (e.g., actual or
    imaginary role reversal activity) may be useful to promote empathy for diverse individuals
    (A3: Altruism, A6: Tendermindedness) and to reevaluate their assumptions and worldviews
    (O6: Values). Education about historical background and various detrimental impact of
    oppression on underprivileged people may enhance a person’s ethical sense of obligation
    (C3: Dutifulness) to promote openness to diversity and advocate social justice.

    Although we did not develop hypotheses regarding specific UDO components for parsi-
    mony, noteworthy is some differential associations found between personality and UDO
    components that may have some practical implications. Specifically, all the Big Five person-
    ality facets predicted its cognitive component, suggesting that cognitive appreciation of
    diversity might be most malleable with personality-informed diversity interventions. On the
    other hand, only Openness to Experience and Extraversion facets predicted the behavioral
    component. Perhaps, capitalizing on these two may be useful in encouraging people to
    approach and seek out diversity contact, which then could provide opportunities for discon-
    firming stereotypes and reducing anxiety that comes from unfamiliarity (Gottfredson et al.,
    2008). Also, all the Big Five personality facets except for Openness to Experience predicted
    the emotional component. Promoting Agreeableness empathy and Conscientiousness sense
    of justice for the underprivileged, and addressing Neuroticism felt threat from the culturally
    different may be useful for mitigating negative emotional reactions to diversity that may
    deter people from cultural contacts thereby perpetuating close-mindedness to diversity.

    Limitations and Future Research

    This study has several limitations. First, although we conducted two studies and obtained a
    robust finding on Openness to Experience, the Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neu-
    roticism links to UDO were not supported at the factor level by both studies, perhaps due to
    sample-specificity or our use of the BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999) in Study 1 and the NEO-
    PI-3 (McCrae & Costa, 2005) in Study 2. We could not partial out sample versus measure
    effects in the discrepancies; there may be moderating effects associated with the instruments
    (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), although it is not clear how the measure differences affected the
    result and BFI and NEO-PI scores are highly correlated (McCrae & Costa, 2010). Second,
    some potential multicollinearity among variables was noted by high structural and low
    canonical function coefficients on some variables (Sherry & Henson, 2005), although vari-
    ance inflating factors of all Big Five facet scores were low (i.e., below 3.43 < 5.0, which is a customary criteria that may indicate concerning level of multicollinearity, O’Brien, 2007) and all the Pearson correlation coefficients were below .80 indicating potentially no multicol- linearity issues (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Third, our results cannot be generalized to other population than our samples, mostly European American undergraduates on a predomi- nantly White campus in a culturally homogeneous area. Future research with ethnic

    THE JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 763

    minority samples or individuals from a culturally diverse area may support the generalizabil-
    ity of the findings and illuminate potential cultural moderating effects. Future studies also
    could examine interaction effects of personality of participants and diversity interventions
    on the intended outcomes, and effectiveness of diversity training that incorporates personal-
    ity facets suggested by this study.

  • Conclusion

    • This study identified multivariate relationships between Big Five personality factors and fac-
    ets and UDO, an open attitude toward diversity. Selected facets of all the Big Five personality
    traits were associated with UDO components. This result could be incorporated into diver-
    sity interventions (e.g., courses, training) contents and delivery to improve their outcome of
    enhancing openness to diversity.

  • Author Notes

    • Suejung Han is an assistant professor of clinical and counseling psychology at Illinois State University.
    Her research focuses on applying personality, attachment, and motivational theories to diversity issues
    and disordered eating behaviors.

    M. Carole Pistole is an emeritus professor of counseling psychology at Purdue University. Her
    research focuses on attachment theory and its application to various relationships (e.g., romantic,
    counseling, supervision) and psychological outcomes (e.g., international student adjustments).

  • Funding

    • This study was supported by Faculty Diversity Research Award granted to the first author by the Uni-
    versity of Wisconsin System Institute on Race and Ethnicity.

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    van der Zee, K. I., & van Oudenhoven, J. P. (2000). The multicultural personality questionnaire: A
    multidimensional instrument of multicultural effectiveness. European Journal of Personality, 14,
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    Wang, Y-W., Davidson, M. M., Yakushko, O. F., Savoy, H. B., Tan, J. A., & Bleier, J. K. (2003). The
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    766 S. HAN AND M. C. PISTOLE

    • Abstract

      • Universal-Diverse Orientation as Openness to Diversity
      Big Five Personality and Universal-Diverse Orientation
      Study 1
      Method
      Participants and Procedure
      Instruments
      Personality
      Universal-Diverse Orientation
      Results
      Study 2
      Method
      Participants and Procedure
      Instruments
      Data Analytic Plan
      Results
      Discussion
      Practical Implication
      Limitations and Future Research
      Conclusion
      Author Notes
      Funding
      References

    Theories of
    PERSONALITY
    NINTH EDITION
    Jess Feist
    Gregory J. Feist
    Tomi-Ann Roberts

    Ninth Edition
    Theories of Personality
    Jess Feist
    McNeese State University
    Gregory J. Feist
    San Jose State University
    Tomi-Ann Roberts
    Colorado College

    THEORIES OF PERSONALITY, NINTH EDITION
    Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2018 by McGraw-Hill Education.
    All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Previous editions © 2013, 2009, and 2006. No part of this
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    ISBN: 978-0-07-786192-6
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    Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
    Names: Feist, Jess, author. | Feist, Gregory J., author. | Roberts, Tomi-Ann, author.
    Title: Theories of personality / Jess Feist, McNeese State University, Gregory J. Feist, San Jose State University,
    Tomi-Ann Roberts, Colorado College.
    Description: Ninth Edition. | Dubuque : McGraw-Hill Education, [2018] | Revised edition of the authors’
    Theories of personality, c2013. | Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
    Identifiers: LCCN 2016050779 | ISBN 9780077861926 (alk. paper) | ISBN 0077861922 (alk. paper)
    Subjects: LCSH: Personality—Textbooks.
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    endorsement by the authors or McGraw-Hill Education, and McGraw-Hill Education does not guarantee the accuracy of the
    information presented at these sites.
    mheducation.com/highered

    About the Authors
    Jess Feist was Professor of Psychology at McNeese State
    University in Lake Charles, Louisiana from 1964 until his
    death in 2015. Besides coauthoring Theories of Personality,
    he coauthored with Linda Brannon, Health Psychology: An
    Introduction to Behavior and Health. He earned his under-
    graduate degree from St. Mary of the Plains and graduate de-
    grees from Wichita State University and the University of Kan-
    sas. His research interest was in early childhood recollections.
    Gregory J. Feist is a Professor of Psychology in the Department
    of Psychology at San Jose State University. He has also taught at
    the College of William & Mary and University of California,
    Davis. He received his PhD in personality psychology in 1991
    from the University of California at Berkeley and his under-
    graduate degree in 1985 from the University of Massachusetts–
    Amherst. He is widely published in the psychology of creativity,
    the psychology of science, and the development of scientific tal-
    ent. His recent book, The Psychology of Science and the Origins
    of the Scientific Mind, was awarded the William James Book
    Award from the American Psychological Association (APA). He
    is founding president of the International Society for the Psy-
    chology of Science & Technology and founding editor-in-chief
    of the Journal of Psychology of Science & Technology. His re-
    search in creativity has been recognized by an Early Career
    Award from the Division for Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity
    and the Arts (Division 10) of APA, and he is former president of
    Division 10. Finally, he is co-author of Psychology: Perspectives
    and Connections (McGraw-Hill) with Erika Rosenberg.
    iii

    About the Authorsiv
    Tomi-Ann Roberts is a Professor of Psychology at Colorado
    College. She received her PhD in social and personality psy-
    chology in 1990 from Stanford University, and her BA in
    psychology from Smith College in 1985. Her publications in
    the areas of gender, personality, and emotion psychology
    include “Objectification Theory,” an original theory that has
    generated a great deal of research into the causes and conse-
    quences of the sexual objectification of girls and women. The
    first paper she co-authored on this topic is the most cited ar-
    ticle in the 35-year history of the journal Psychology of
    Women Quarterly. She served on the American Psychologi-
    cal Association’s Task Force on the Sexualization of Girls, is
    coauthor of the Sexualization of Girls and Girlhood: Causes,
    Consequences and Resistance (2012), and continues to work
    on empirical research, applied consulting work, and media
    efforts in this area. In addition to her teaching in both psy-
    chology and gender studies at Colorado College, she cur-
    rently serves on the executive committee of APA’s Division
    35, chairs a Task Force on Educating Through Feminist Re-
    search, and is a certified Laughter Yoga Leader.

    v
    PART I Introduction 1
    CHAPTER 1 Introduction to Personality
    Theory 2
    What Is Personality? 3
    What Is a Theory? 5
    Theory Defined 5
    Theory and Its Relatives 5
    Philosophy 5
    Speculation 6
    Hypothesis 6
    Taxonomy 7
    Why Different Theories? 7
    Perspectives in Theories of Personality 7
    Psychodynamic Theories 8
    Humanistic-Existential Theories 8
    Dispositional Theories 8
    Biological-Evolutionary Theories 8
    Learning-(Social) Cognitive Theories 8
    Theorists’ Personalities and Their Theories
    of Personality 10
    What Makes a Theory Useful? 11
    Generates Research 12
    Is Falsifiable 12
    Organizes Data 13
    Guides Action 13
    Is Internally Consistent 14
    Is Parsimonious 14
    Dimensions for a Concept
    of Humanity 14
    Research in Personality
    Theory 16
    Contents
    PART II Psychodynamic
    Theories 19
    CHAPTER 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 20
    Overview of Psychoanalytic Theory 21
    Biography of Sigmund Freud 22
    Levels of Mental Life 28
    Unconscious 28
    Preconscious 29
    Conscious 30
    Provinces of the Mind 31
    The Id 32
    The Ego 33
    The Superego 34
    Dynamics of Personality 36
    Drives 36
    Sex 36
    Aggression 37
    Anxiety 38
    Defense Mechanisms 39
    Repression 39
    Reaction Formation 40
    Displacement 40
    Fixation 41
    Regression 41
    Projection 41
    Introjection 42
    Sublimation 42
    Stages of Development 43
    Infantile Period 43
    Oral Phase 43

    vi Contents
    Anal Phase 44
    Phallic Phase 45
    Male Oedipus Complex 45
    Female Oedipus Complex 47
    Latency Period 50
    Genital Period 50
    Maturity 51
    Applications of Psychoanalytic Theory 52
    Freud’s Early Therapeutic Technique 52
    Freud’s Later Therapeutic Technique 53
    Dream Analysis 54
    Freudian Slips 56
    Related Research 57
    Unconscious Mental Processing 58
    Pleasure and the Id, Inhibition and the Ego 59
    Repression, Inhibition, and Defense
    Mechanisms 60
    Research on Dreams 61
    Critique of Freud 63
    Did Freud Understand Women, Gender,
    and Sexuality? 63
    Was Freud a Scientist? 65
    Concept of Humanity 67
    CHAPTER 3 Adler: Individual
    Psychology 70
    Overview of Individual Psychology 71
    Biography of Alfred Adler 72
    Introduction to Adlerian Theory 75
    Striving for Success or Superiority 76
    The Final Goal 76
    The Striving Force as Compensation 77
    Striving for Personal Superiority 78
    Striving for Success 78
    Subjective Perceptions 79
    Fictionalism 79
    Physical Inferiorities 79
    Unity and Self-Consistency of Personality 80
    Organ Dialect 80
    Conscious and Unconscious 81
    Social Interest 81
    Origins of Social Interest 82
    Importance of Social Interest 83
    Style of Life 84
    Creative Power 85
    Abnormal Development 85
    General Description 86
    External Factors in Maladjustment 86
    Exaggerated Physical Deficiencies 86
    Pampered Style of Life 87
    Neglected Style of Life 87
    Safeguarding Tendencies 87
    Excuses 88
    Aggression 88
    Withdrawal 89
    Masculine Protest 90
    Origins of the Masculine Protest 90
    Adler, Freud, and the Masculine Protest 90
    Applications of Individual Psychology 91
    Family Constellation 91
    Early Recollections 92
    Dreams 94
    Psychotherapy 95
    Related Research 96
    Birth Order Effects 96
    Early Recollections and Career Choice 98
    Distinguishing Narcissism as Striving for
    Superiority, versus Self-Esteem as Striving
    for Success 100
    Critique of Adler 101
    Concept of Humanity 102
    CHAPTER 4 Jung: Analytical
    Psychology 104
    Overview of Analytical Psychology 105
    Biography of Carl Jung 106
    Levels of the Psyche 110
    Conscious 110
    Personal Unconscious 111
    Collective Unconscious 111
    Archetypes 112

    viiContents
    Persona 113
    Shadow 114
    Anima 115
    Animus 116
    Great Mother 116
    Wise Old Man 117
    Hero 117
    Self 118
    Dynamics of Personality 121
    Causality and Teleology 121
    Progression and Regression 121
    Psychological Types 122
    Attitudes 122
    Introversion 122
    Extraversion 123
    Functions 124
    Thinking 124
    Feeling 124
    Sensing 125
    Intuiting 125
    Development of Personality 127
    Stages of Development 127
    Childhood 127
    Youth 128
    Middle Life 128
    Old Age 129
    Self-Realization 129
    Jung’s Methods of
    Investigation 130
    Word Association Test 130
    Dream Analysis 131
    Active Imagination 133
    Psychotherapy 134
    Related Research 135
    Personality Type and
    Leadership 135
    Personality Type Among Clergy and
    Churchgoers 136
    A Critical Look at the Myers-Briggs Type
    Indicator (MBTI) 138
    Critique of Jung 138
    Concept of Humanity 140
    CHAPTER 5 Klein: Object Relations
    Theory 142
    Overview of Object Relations Theory 143
    Biography of Melanie Klein 144
    Introduction to Object Relations
    Theory 146
    Psychic Life of the Infant 147
    Phantasies 147
    Objects 148
    Positions 148
    Paranoid-Schizoid Position 148
    Depressive Position 150
    Psychic Defense Mechanisms 150
    Introjection 150
    Projection 151
    Splitting 151
    Projective Identification 152
    Internalizations 152
    Ego 152
    Superego 153
    Oedipus Complex 154
    Female Oedipal Development 154
    Male Oedipal Development 155
    Later Views on Object Relations 155
    Margaret Mahler’s View 156
    Heinz Kohut’s View 158
    John Bowlby’s Attachment Theory 159
    Mary Ainsworth and the Strange Situation 160
    Psychotherapy 162
    Related Research 162
    Childhood Trauma and Adult Object
    Relations 162
    Attachment Theory and Adult Relationships 163
    Critique of Object Relations Theory 166
    Concept of Humanity 167
    CHAPTER 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic
    Social Theory 170
    Overview of Psychoanalytic Social
    Theory 171

    viii
    Biography of Karen Horney 172
    Introduction to Psychoanalytic Social
    Theory 174
    Horney and Freud Compared 174
    The Impact of Culture 174
    The Importance of Childhood Experiences 175
    Basic Hostility and Basic Anxiety 175
    Compulsive Drives 177
    Neurotic Needs 177
    Neurotic Trends 178
    Moving Toward People 180
    Moving Against People 180
    Moving Away From People 181
    Intrapsychic Conflicts 182
    The Idealized Self-Image 183
    The Neurotic Search for Glory 183
    Neurotic Claims 184
    Neurotic Pride 185
    Self-Hatred 185
    Feminine Psychology 186
    Psychotherapy 189
    Related Research 190
    Developing and Validating a New Measure
    of Horney’s Neurotic Trends 190
    Can Neuroticism Ever Be a Good Thing? 191
    Critique of Horney 193
    Concept of Humanity 194
    CHAPTER 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian
    Theory 196
    Overview of Post-Freudian Theory 197
    Biography of Erik Erikson 198
    The Ego in Post-Freudian Theory 200
    Society’s Influence 201
    Epigenetic Principle 201
    Stages of Psychosocial Development 203
    Infancy 205
    Oral-Sensory Mode 205
    Basic Trust Versus Basic Mistrust 205
    Hope: The Basic Strength of Infancy 206
    Early Childhood 206
    Anal-Urethral-Muscular Mode 206
    Autonomy Versus Shame and Doubt 207
    Will: The Basic Strength of Early Childhood 207
    Play Age 208
    Genital-Locomotor Mode 208
    Initiative Versus Guilt 208
    Purpose: The Basic Strength
    of the Play Age 209
    School Age 209
    Latency 209
    Industry Versus Inferiority 209
    Competence: The Basic Strength of
    the School Age 210
    Adolescence 210
    Puberty 210
    Identity Versus Identity Confusion 210
    Fidelity: The Basic Strength
    of Adolescence 212
    Young Adulthood 212
    Genitality 213
    Intimacy Versus Isolation 213
    Love: The Basic Strength
    of Young Adulthood 213
    Adulthood 214
    Procreativity 214
    Generativity Versus Stagnation 214
    Care: The Basic Strength of Adulthood 215
    Old Age 215
    Generalized Sensuality 216
    Integrity Versus Despair 216
    Wisdom: The Basic Strength
    of Old Age 216
    Summary of the Life Cycle 217
    Erikson’s Methods of Investigation 218
    Anthropological Studies 218
    Psychohistory 218
    Related Research 221
    Ego Identity Status in Adolescents
    Across Cultures 221
    Does Identity Precede Intimacy? 222
    Critique of Erikson 223
    Concept of Humanity 224
    Contents

    ix
    CHAPTER 8 Fromm: Humanistic
    Psychoanalysis 227
    Overview of Humanistic Psychoanalysis 228
    Biography of Erich Fromm 229
    Fromm’s Basic Assumptions 231
    Human Needs 232
    Relatedness 232
    Transcendence 233
    Rootedness 234
    Sense of Identity 235
    Frame of Orientation 235
    Summary of Human Needs 236
    The Burden of Freedom 236
    Mechanisms of Escape 237
    Authoritarianism 237
    Destructiveness 237
    Conformity 238
    Positive Freedom 238
    Character Orientations 238
    Nonproductive Orientations 239
    Receptive 239
    Exploitative 239
    Hoarding 239
    Marketing 240
    The Productive Orientation 241
    Personality Disorders 241
    Necrophilia 242
    Malignant Narcissism 242
    Incestuous Symbiosis 242
    Psychotherapy 244
    Fromm’s Methods of Investigation 244
    Social Character in a Mexican Village 244
    A Psychohistorical Study of Hitler 246
    Related Research 247
    Testing the Assumptions of Fromm’s
    Marketing Character 247
    Estrangement From Culture and Well-Being 248
    Authoritarianism and Fear 249
    Critique of Fromm 251
    Concept of Humanity 252
    PART III Humanistic/Existential
    Theories 255
    CHAPTER 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic
    Theory 256
    Overview of Holistic-Dynamic Theory 257
    Biography of Abraham H. Maslow 258
    Maslow’s View of Motivation 261
    Hierarchy of Needs 262
    Physiological Needs 263
    Safety Needs 263
    Love and Belongingness Needs 264
    Esteem Needs 265
    Self-Actualization Needs 265
    Aesthetic Needs 266
    Cognitive Needs 266
    Neurotic Needs 267
    General Discussion of Needs 267
    Reversed Order of Needs 267
    Unmotivated Behavior 268
    Expressive and Coping Behavior 268
    Deprivation of Needs 268
    Instinctoid Nature of Needs 268
    Comparison of Higher and Lower Needs 269
    Self-Actualization 270
    Maslow’s Quest for the Self-Actualizing
    Person 270
    Criteria for Self-Actualization 271
    Values of Self-Actualizers 272
    Characteristics of Self-Actualizing People 273
    More Efficient Perception of Reality 273
    Acceptance of Self, Others, and Nature 273
    Spontaneity, Simplicity, and Naturalness 273
    Problem-Centering 274
    The Need for Privacy 274
    Autonomy 274
    Continued Freshness of Appreciation 275
    The Peak Experience 275
    Gemeinschaftsgefühl 276
    Profound Interpersonal Relations 276
    The Democratic Character Structure 277
    Discrimination Between Means and Ends 277
    Contents

    x
    Process 307
    Stages of Therapeutic Change 307
    Theoretical Explanation for Therapeutic
    Change 308
    Outcomes 308
    The Person of Tomorrow 309
    Philosophy of Science 311
    The Chicago Studies 312
    Hypotheses 312
    Method 312
    Findings 313
    Summary of Results 315
    Related Research 315
    Self-Discrepancy Theory 315
    Motivation and Pursuing
    One’s Goals 316
    Critique of Rogers 319
    Concept of Humanity 320
    CHAPTER 11 May: Existential
    Psychology 323
    Overview of Existential Psychology 324
    Biography of Rollo May 325
    Background of Existentialism 328
    What Is Existentialism? 328
    Basic Concepts 329
    Being-in-the-World 329
    Nonbeing 330
    The Case of Philip 332
    Anxiety 332
    Normal Anxiety 333
    Neurotic Anxiety 333
    Guilt 334
    Intentionality 335
    Care, Love, and Will 336
    Union of Love and Will 336
    Forms of Love 337
    Sex 337
    Eros 337
    Philia 337
    Agape 338
    Philosophical Sense of Humor 277
    Creativeness 277
    Resistance to Enculturation 278
    Love, Sex, and Self-Actualization 278
    Maslow’s Psychology and Philosophy
    of Science 279
    Measuring Self-Actualization 280
    The Jonah Complex 281
    Psychotherapy 282
    Related Research 283
    Mindfulness and Self-Actualization 283
    Positive Psychology 284
    Critique of Maslow 286
    Concept of Humanity 287
    CHAPTER 10 Rogers: Person-Centered
    Theory 290
    Overview of Client-Centered Theory 291
    Biography of Carl Rogers 292
    Person-Centered Theory 295
    Basic Assumptions 295
    Formative Tendency 295
    Actualizing Tendency 296
    The Self and Self-Actualization 297
    The Self-Concept 297
    The Ideal Self 298
    Awareness 298
    Levels of Awareness 299
    Denial of Positive Experiences 299
    Becoming a Person 299
    Barriers to Psychological Health 300
    Conditions of Worth 300
    Incongruence 301
    Vulnerability 301
    Anxiety and Threat 301
    Defensiveness 302
    Disorganization 302
    Psychotherapy 303
    Conditions 303
    Counselor Congruence 304
    Unconditional Positive Regard 305
    Empathic Listening 306
    Contents

    xi
    Freedom and Destiny 338
    Freedom Defined 338
    Forms of Freedom 339
    Existential Freedom 339
    Essential Freedom 339
    What Is Destiny? 339
    Philip’s Destiny 340
    The Power of Myth 340
    Psychopathology 342
    Psychotherapy 342
    Related Research 344
    Threats in the Umwelt: Mortality Salience and
    Denial of Our Animal Nature 345
    Finding Meaning in the Mitwelt: Attachment
    and Close Relationships 346
    Growth in the Eigenwelt: There Is an Upside
    to Mortality Awareness 348
    Critique of May 349
    Concept of Humanity 350
    PART IV Dispositional Theories 353
    CHAPTER 12 Allport: Psychology
    of the Individual 354
    Overview of Allport’s Psychology
    of the Individual 355
    Biography of Gordon Allport 356
    Allport’s Approach to
    Personality Theory 358
    What Is Personality? 358
    What Is the Role of Conscious
    Motivation? 359
    What Are the Characteristics of
    a Healthy Person? 359
    Structure of Personality 361
    Personal Dispositions 361
    Levels of Personal Dispositions 362
    Cardinal Dispositions 362
    Central Dispositions 362
    Secondary Dispositions 362
    Motivational and Stylistic Dispositions 363
    Proprium 363
    Motivation 364
    A Theory of Motivation 364
    Functional Autonomy 365
    Perseverative Functional Autonomy 366
    Propriate Functional Autonomy 367
    Criterion for Functional Autonomy 367
    Processes That Are Not Functionally
    Autonomous 368
    The Study of the Individual 368
    Morphogenic Science 368
    The Diaries of Marion Taylor 369
    Letters From Jenny 370
    Related Research 372
    Understanding and Reducing Prejudice 372
    Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation 375
    Religious Motivation and Mental Health 376
    Religious Motivation and Physical Health 377
    Critique of Allport 378
    Concept of Humanity 379
    CHAPTER 13 McCrae and Costa’s
    Five-Factor Trait Theory 382
    Overview of Trait and Factor Theories 383
    The Pioneering Work of Raymond
    B. Cattell 384
    Basics of Factor Analysis 385
    The Big Five: Taxonomy or Theory? 387
    Biographies of Robert R. McCrae and
    Paul T. Costa, Jr. 387
    In Search of the Big Five 389
    Five Factors Found 389
    Description of the Five Factors 390
    Evolution of the Five-Factor Theory 392
    Units of the Five-Factor Theory 393
    Core Components of Personality 393
    Basic Tendencies 393
    Characteristic Adaptations 394
    Self-Concept 395
    Peripheral Components 395
    Biological Bases 395
    Objective Biography 396
    External Influences 396
    Contents

    xii Contents
    Basic Postulates 396
    Postulates for Basic Tendencies 396
    Postulates for Characteristic Adaptations 398
    Related Research 398
    Personality and Academic Performance 398
    Traits, Internet Use, and Well-Being 400
    Traits and Emotions 401
    Critique of Trait and Factor Theories 404
    Concept of Humanity 405
    PART V Biological/Evolutionary
    Theories 407
    CHAPTER 14 Eysenck’s Biologically
    Based Factor Theory 408
    Overview of Biologically Based
    Trait Theory 409
    Biography of Hans J. Eysenck 411
    Eysenck’s Factor Theory 413
    Criteria for Identifying Factors 414
    Hierarchy of Behavior Organization 414
    Dimensions of Personality 415
    Extraversion 417
    Neuroticism 418
    Psychoticism 419
    Measuring Personality 421
    Biological Bases of Personality 421
    Personality as a Predictor 422
    Personality and Behavior 422
    Personality and Disease 423
    Related Research 424
    The Biological Basis of Extraversion 424
    The Biological Basis of Neuroticism 426
    Critique of Eysenck’s Biologically
    Based Theory 428
    Concept of Humanity 429
    CHAPTER 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory
    of Personality 430
    Overview of Evolutionary Theory 431
    Biography of David Buss 433
    Principles of Evolutionary Psychology 435
    Evolutionary Theory of Personality 435
    The Nature and Nurture of Personality 437
    Adaptive Problems and their Solutions
    (Mechanisms) 437
    Evolved Mechanisms 439
    Motivation and Emotion as Evolved
    Mechanisms 440
    Personality Traits as Evolved Mechanisms 440
    Origins of Individual Differences 442
    Environmental Sources 443
    Heritable/Genetic Sources 443
    Nonadapative Sources 444
    Maladaptive Sources 444
    Neo-Bussian Evolutionary Theories
    of Personality 444
    Common Misunderstandings
    in Evolutionary Theory 446
    Evolution Implies Genetic Determinism
    (Behavior as Set in Stone and Void of
    Influence From the Environment) 446
    Executing Adaptations Requires Conscious
    Mechanisms 446
    Mechanisms Are Optimally Designed 447
    Related Research 447
    Temperament and the Pre- and Post-Natal
    Environment 447
    Genetics and Personality 449
    Animal Personality 450
    Critique of Evolutionary Theory
    of Personality 453
    Concept of Humanity 454
    PART VI Learning-Cognitive Theories 457
    CHAPTER 16 Skinner: Behavioral
    Analysis 458
    Overview of Behavioral Analysis 459
    Biography of B. F. Skinner 460
    Precursors to Skinner’s Scientific
    Behaviorism 463

    xiii
    Scientific Behaviorism 464
    Philosophy of Science 465
    Characteristics of Science 465
    Conditioning 466
    Classical Conditioning 467
    Operant Conditioning 468
    Shaping 468
    Reinforcement 470
    Positive Reinforcement 470
    Negative Reinforcement 470
    Punishment 471
    Effects of Punishment 471
    Punishment and Reinforcement Compared 472
    Conditioned and Generalized Reinforcers 472
    Schedules of Reinforcement 473
    Fixed-Ratio 473
    Variable-Ratio 473
    Fixed-Interval 474
    Variable-Interval 474
    Extinction 475
    The Human Organism 475
    Natural Selection 476
    Cultural Evolution 476
    Inner States 477
    Self-Awareness 477
    Drives 478
    Emotions 478
    Purpose and Intention 478
    Complex Behavior 479
    Higher Mental Processes 479
    Creativity 479
    Unconscious Behavior 480
    Dreams 480
    Social Behavior 481
    Control of Human Behavior 481
    Social Control 481
    Self-Control 482
    The Unhealthy Personality 483
    Counteracting Strategies 483
    Inappropriate Behaviors 484
    Psychotherapy 484
    Related Research 485
    How Conditioning Affects Personality 485
    How Personality Affects Conditioning 486
    Mutual Influence Between Personality
    and Conditioning 487
    Critique of Skinner 489
    Concept of Humanity 490
    CHAPTER 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive
    Theory 494
    Overview of Social Cognitive Theory 495
    Biography of Albert Bandura 496
    Learning 497
    Observational Learning 498
    Modeling 498
    Processes Governing Observational
    Learning 499
    Attention 499
    Representation 499
    Behavioral Production 499
    Motivation 500
    Enactive Learning 500
    Triadic Reciprocal Causation 501
    An Example of Triadic Reciprocal
    Causation 502
    Chance Encounters and Fortuitous Events 503
    Human Agency 504
    Core Features of Human Agency 504
    Self-Efficacy 505
    What Is Self-Efficacy? 505
    What Contributes to Self-Efficacy? 507
    Mastery Experiences 507
    Social Modeling 507
    Social Persuasion 508
    Physical and Emotional States 508
    Proxy Agency 509
    Collective Efficacy 509
    Self-Regulation 510
    External Factors in Self-Regulation 511
    Internal Factors in Self-Regulation 511
    Self-Observation 511
    Judgmental Process 512
    Self-Reaction 513
    Contents

    xiv
    Self-Regulation Through Moral Agency 513
    Redefine the Behavior 514
    Disregard or Distort the Consequences
    of Behavior 515
    Dehumanize or Blame the Victims 515
    Displace or Diffuse Responsibility 516
    Dysfunctional Behavior 516
    Depression 516
    Phobias 516
    Aggression 517
    Therapy 519
    Related Research 520
    Self-Efficacy and Diabetes 520
    Moral Disengagement and Bullying 521
    Social Cognitive Theory “Goes Global” 523
    Critique of Bandura 523
    Concept of Humanity 524
    CHAPTER 18 Rotter and Mischel:
    Cognitive Social Learning Theory 528
    Overview of Cognitive Social Learning
    Theory 529
    Biography of Julian Rotter 530
    Introduction to Rotter’s Social Learning
    Theory 531
    Predicting Specific Behaviors 532
    Behavior Potential 532
    Expectancy 533
    Reinforcement Value 533
    Psychological Situation 534
    Basic Prediction Formula 535
    Predicting General Behaviors 536
    Generalized Expectancies 536
    Needs 536
    Categories of Needs 537
    Recognition-Status 537
    Dominance 537
    Independence 537
    Protection-Dependency 538
    Love and Affection 538
    Physical Comfort 538
    Need Components 538
    Need Potential 538
    Freedom of Movement 539
    Need Value 539
    General Prediction Formula 539
    Internal and External Control
    of Reinforcement 541
    Interpersonal Trust Scale 543
    Maladaptive Behavior 544
    Psychotherapy 545
    Changing Goals 545
    Eliminating Low Expectancies 546
    Introduction to Mischel’s Personality
    Theory 548
    Biography of Walter Mischel 548
    Background of the Cognitive-Affective
    Personality System 550
    Consistency Paradox 550
    Person-Situation Interaction 551
    Cognitive-Affective Personality System 552
    Behavior Prediction 553
    Situation Variables 553
    Cognitive-Affective Units 555
    Encoding Strategies 555
    Competencies and Self-Regulatory
    Strategies 555
    Expectancies and Beliefs 556
    Goals and Values 557
    Affective Responses 558
    Related Research 559
    Locus of Control and Holocaust Heroes 559
    Person-Situation Interaction 560
    Marshmallows and Self-Regulation
    Across the Lifespan 561
    Critique of Cognitive Social Learning
    Theory 563
    Concept of Humanity 564
    CHAPTER 19 Kelly: Psychology
    of Personal Constructs 567
    Overview of Personal Construct Theory 568
    Contents

    xv
    Biography of George Kelly 569
    Kelly’s Philosophical Position 570
    Person as Scientist 571
    Scientist as Person 571
    Constructive Alternativism 571
    Personal Constructs 572
    Basic Postulate 573
    Supporting Corollaries 574
    Similarities Among Events 574
    Differences Among People 575
    Relationships Among Constructs 575
    Dichotomy of Constructs 576
    Choice Between Dichotomies 577
    Range of Convenience 577
    Experience and Learning 578
    Adaptation to Experience 578
    Incompatible Constructs 579
    Similarities Among People 579
    Social Processes 580
    Applications of Personal Construct
    Theory 581
    Abnormal Development 581
    Threat 582
    Fear 582
    Anxiety 582
    Guilt 583
    Psychotherapy 583
    The Rep Test 584
    Related Research 586
    Gender as a Personal Construct 586
    Applying Personal Construct Theory to
    Intra-Personal Questions of Identity 587
    Understanding Internalized Prejudice
    Through Personal Construct Theory 588
    Reducing the Threat to Feminist
    Identification 589
    Personal Constructs and the Big Five 590
    Critique of Kelly 591
    Concept of Humanity 592
    Glossary G-1
    References R-1
    Name Index N-1
    Subject Index S-1
    Contents

    xvi
    What makes people behave as they do? Are people ordinarily aware of what they are doing, or are their
    behaviors the result of hidden, unconscious motives? Are some people naturally good and others basically
    evil? Or do all people have potential to be either good or evil? Is human conduct largely a product of
    nature, or is it shaped mostly by environmental influences? Can people freely choose to mold their per-
    sonality, or are their lives determined by forces beyond their control? Are people best described by their
    similarities, or is uniqueness the dominant characteristic of humans? What causes some people to develop
    disordered personalities whereas others seem to grow toward psychological health?
    These questions have been asked and debated by philosophers, scholars, and religious thinkers for
    several thousand years; but most of these discussions were based on personal opinions that were colored
    by political, economic, religious, and social considerations. Then, near the end of the 19th century, some
    progress was made in humanity’s ability to organize, explain, and predict its own actions. The emergence
    of psychology as the scientific study of human behavior marked the beginning of a more systematic ap-
    proach to the study of human personality.
    Early personality theorists, such as Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and Carl Jung, relied mostly on
    clinical observations to construct models of human behavior. Although their data were more systematic
    and reliable than those of earlier observers, these theorists continued to rely on their own individualized
    way of looking at things, and thus they arrived at different conceptions of the nature of humanity.
    Later personality theorists tended to use more empirical studies to learn about human behavior. These
    theorists developed tentative models, tested hypotheses, and then reformulated their models. In other words, they
    applied the tools of scientific inquiry and scientific theory to the area of human personality. Science, of course,
    is not divorced from speculation, imagination, and creativity, all of which are needed to formulate theories. Each
    of the personality theorists discussed in this book has evolved a theory based both on empirical observations
    and on imaginative speculation. Moreover, each theory is a reflection of the personality of its creator.
    Thus, the different theories discussed in these pages are a reflection of the unique cultural back-
    ground, family experiences, and professional training of their originators. The usefulness of each theory,
    however, is not evaluated on the personality of its author but on its ability to (1) generate research, (2) offer
    itself to falsification, (3) integrate existing empirical knowledge, and (4) suggest practical answers to
    everyday problems. Therefore, we evaluate each of the theories discussed in this book on the basis of
    these four criteria as well as on (5) its internal consistency and (6) its simplicity. In addition, some per-
    sonality theories have fertilized other fields, such as sociology, education, psychotherapy, advertising,
    management, mythology, counseling, art, literature, and religion.
    The Ninth Edition
    The ninth edition of Theories of Personality continues to emphasize the strong and unique features of
    earlier editions, namely the overviews near the beginning of each chapter, a lively writing style, the
    thought- provoking concepts of humanity as seen by each theorist, and the structured evaluations of each
    theory. Annotated suggested readings are now available online with Connect®, McGraw-Hill Education’s
    integrated assignment and assessment platform. As were the previous editions, the ninth edition is based
    on original sources and the most recent formulation of each theory. Early concepts and models are included
    only if they retained their importance in the later theory or if they provided vital groundwork for
    understanding the final theory.
    For select chapters, we have developed a Web-enhanced feature titled Beyond Biography, which
    is available through Connect.
    Preface

    xviiPreface
    The ninth edition of Theories of Personality uses clear, concise, and comprehensible language as
    well as an informal writing style. The book is designed for undergraduate students and should be under-
    stood by those with a minimum background in psychology. However, we have tried not to oversimplify
    or violate the theorist’s original meaning. We have made ample comparisons between and among theorists
    where appropriate and have included many examples to illustrate how the different theories can be applied
    to ordinary day-to-day situations. A glossary at the end of the book contains definitions of technical terms.
    These same terms also appear in boldface within the text.
    The present edition continues to provide comprehensive coverage of the most influential theorists of
    personality. It emphasizes normal personality, although we have also included brief discussions on abnor-
    mality, as well as methods of psychotherapy, when appropriate. Because each theory is an expression of its
    builder’s unique view of the world and of humanity, we include ample biographical information of each
    theorist so that readers will have an opportunity to become acquainted with both the theory and the theorist.
    What’s New?
    In the ninth edition, we have made changes that both add to and build upon previous editions. In order to
    provide a more integrative and broad overview of the book, we have added a new section in Chapter 1 that
    describes and summarizes the five major theoretical perspectives: psychodynamic, humanistic-existential,
    dispositional, biological-evolutionary, and learning (social)-cognitive. This overview provides a roadmap
    for the book but also helps students with the “big picture” of what theories of personality are and how they
    differ on fundamental assumptions. The psychodynamic theorists are Freud, Adler, Jung, Klein, Horney,
    Fromm, and Erikson. Humanistic-existential theorists include Maslow, Rogers, and May. Next, the dispo-
    sitional theorists covered are Allport, and McCrae and Costa, followed by the biological-evolutionary the-
    orists Eysenck and Buss. Finally, the last perspective is the learning (social)-cognitive theorists Skinner,
    Bandura, Rotter, Mischel, and Kelly. We arrange the five perspectives in this sequence for historical reasons,
    moving generally from the oldest to the newest to also provide students with a sense of change and pro-
    gression in personality theory.
    As with each new edition, we have also up-dated the “Recent Research” sections of each of the
    theories. For example, one study examined whether the Buddhist concept of mindfulness is associated
    with self-actualization and found that the ability to be nonjudgmental and non-self-critical ( components
    of mindfulness) predicted scores on self-actualization. Moreover, recent research has lent support to
    Eysenck’s theory that there are systematic differences in the limbic system (especially the amygdala)
    between people who are high compared to low in neuroticism. Finally, Bandura’s theory has stimulated
    research reporting that children who bully are most likely to engage in “moral disengagement”—that
    is, they minimize the consequences of their actions and do not consider what they are doing as harmful.
    The ninth edition of Theories of Personality is now available online with Connect, McGraw-Hill
    Education’s integrated assignment and assessment platform. Connect also offers SmartBook for the
    new edition, which is the first adaptive reading experience proven to improve grades and help students
    study more effectively. All of the title’s website and ancillary content is also available through Con-
    nect, including:
    ∙ A full Test Bank of multiple choice questions that test students on central concepts and ideas in
    each chapter.
    ∙ An Instructor’s Manual for each chapter with full chapter outlines, sample test questions, and
    discussion topics.
    ∙ A Study Guide which includes learning objectives and chapter summaries. In addition, it
    contains a variety of test items, including fill-in-the-blanks, true-false, multiple-choice, and
    short-answer questions.

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    and instructors flexible and convenient, anytime–anywhere
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    xx Preface
    Acknowledgments
    Finally, we wish to acknowledge our gratitude to the many people who have contributed to the completion
    of this book. First of all, we are grateful for the valuable help given by those people who reviewed earlier
    editions of Theories of Personality. Their evaluations and suggestions helped greatly in the preparation of
    this new edition. These reviewers include the following: Robert J. Drummond, University of North Florida;
    Lena K. Ericksen, Western Washington University; Charles S. Johnson, William Rainey Harper College; Alan
    Lipman, George Washington University; John Phelan, Eric Rettinger, Elizabeth Rellinger, Evert Community
    College; Linda Sayers, Richard Stockton College of New Jersey; Mark E. Sibicky, Marietta College; Connie
    Veldink, Illinois College; Dennis Wanamaker; Kevin Simpson, Concordia University; Lisa Lockhart, Texas
    A&M University–Kingsville; Natalie Denburg, University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics; Kristine Anthis,
    Southern Connecticut State University; Eros DeSouza, Illinois State University; Yozan D. Mosig, University
    of Nebraska–Kearney; Angie Fournier, Virginia Wesleyan College; Atara Mcnamara, Boise State University;
    Randi Smith, Metro State College of Denver; and Myra Spindel, Florida International University–Miami.
    Carrie Hall, Miami University of Ohio; Kenneth Walters, State University of New York at Oneonta; and
    Melissa Wright, Northwest Vista College. Thanks also to Colorado College students Jenny Wool and Emma
    Agnew for their help with the updated related research sections on the humanist theorists.
    In addition we are also grateful to the following reviewers whose feedback helped to shape the ninth
    edition: Jennifer Cosgrove, Concordia University–CA; Kylie G. Cole, University of Maine; David Devonis,
    Graceland University–Iowa; William Bradley Goeltz, Young Harris College–Georgia; Prof. John Hays,
    Southside Virginia Community College; Cameron John, Utah Valley University; Stephen P. Joy, Albertus
    Magnus College–Connecticut; William Price, North Country Community College–New York; Grace Srigley,
    North Carolina State University; William G. Vasquez, Palo Alto College–Texas; Christopher VerWys,
    Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute–New York.
    We appreciate the strong support we have had from our publisher. We would like to express our
    special thanks to Jamie Laferrera, brand manager; Jasmine Staton, editorial coordinator; and the ansrsource
    developmental editing team led by Anne Sheroff and Reshmi Rajeesh.
    We are also indebted to Albert Bandura for his helpful comments on the chapter dealing with social
    cognitive theory. We also wish to thank these other personality theorists for taking time to discuss ap-
    propriate sections of earlier editions of this book: Albert Bandura, Hans J. Eysenck (deceased), Robert
    McCrae, Paul T. Costa, Jr., Carl R. Rogers (deceased), Julian B. Rotter (deceased), and B. F. Skinner
    (deceased).
    Finally, JJF and GJF thank Mary Jo Feist (deceased), Linda Brannon, and Erika Rosenberg, and
    T-AR thanks Annika and Mia Davis for their emotional support and other important contributions.
    As always, we welcome and appreciate comments from readers, which help us continue to improve
    Theories of Personality.
    Jess Feist
    Lake Charles, LA
    Gregory J. Feist
    Oakland, CA
    Tomi-Ann Roberts
    Colorado Springs, CO

    1
    Introduction
    C h a p t e r 1 Introduction to Personality
    Theory 2
    P A R T O N E

    2
    Introduction to
    Personality Theory
    ⬥ What Is Personality?
    ⬥ What Is a Theory?
    Theory Defined
    Theory and Its Relatives
    Why Different Theories?
    Theorists’ Personalities and Their Theories
    of Personality
    What Makes a Theory Useful?
    ⬥ Dimensions for a Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Research in Personality Theory
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    C H A P T E R 1
    © Purestock/SuperStock

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 3
    Why do people behave as they do? Do people have some choice in shaping their own personality? What accounts for similarities and differences among
    people? What makes people act in predictable ways? Why are they unpredictable?
    Do hidden, unconscious forces control people’s behavior? What causes mental
    disturbances? Is human behavior shaped more by heredity or by environment?
    For centuries, philosophers, theologians, and other thinkers have asked these
    questions as they pondered the nature of human nature—or even wondered
    whether humans have a basic nature. Until relatively recent times, great thinkers
    made little progress in finding satisfactory answers to these questions. More than
    100 years ago, however, Sigmund Freud began to combine philosophical specula-
    tions with a primitive scientific method. As a neurologist trained in science, Freud
    began to listen to his patients to find out what hidden conflicts lay behind their
    assortment of symptoms. “Listening became, for Freud, more than an art; it
    became a method, a privileged road to knowledge that his patients mapped out
    for him” (Gay, 1988, p. 70).
    Freud, in fact, was the first to develop a truly modern theory of personality,
    based mostly on his clinical observations. He developed a “Grand Theory,” that is,
    one that attempted to explain all personality for all people. As we see throughout the
    course of this book, many other theorists from different points of view have devel-
    oped alternative grand theories. The general trend over the course of the 20th century
    was to base theories more and more on scientific observations rather than on clinical
    ones. Both sources, however, are valid foundations for theories of personality.
    What Is Personality?
    Humans are not alone in their uniqueness of and variability between individual
    members of the species. Individuals within every living species exhibit differ-
    ences or variability. Indeed, animals such as octopi, birds, pigs, horses, cats, and
    dogs have consistent individual differences in behavior, otherwise known as per-
    sonality, within their species (Dingemanse, Both, Drent, Van Oers, & Van Noord-
    wijk, 2002; Gosling & John, 1999; Weinstein, Capitanio, & Gosling, 2008). But
    the degree to which individual humans vary from one another, both physically
    and psychologically, is quite astonishing and somewhat unique among species.
    Some of us are quiet and introverted, others crave social contact and stimulation;
    some of us are calm and even-keeled, whereas others are high-strung and per-
    sistently anxious. In this book, we explore the explanations and ideas that various
    men and women have had concerning how these differences in human personal-
    ity come about.
    Psychologists differ among themselves as to the meaning of personality.
    Most agree that the word “personality” originated from the Latin persona, which
    referred to a theatrical mask worn by Roman actors in Greek dramas. These ancient
    Roman actors wore a mask (persona) to project a role or false appearance. This
    surface view of personality, of course, is not an acceptable definition. When psy-
    chologists use the term “personality,” they are referring to something more than
    the role people play.

    Part I Introduction4
    However, personality theorists have not agreed on a single definition of person-
    ality. Indeed, they evolved unique and vital theories because they lacked agreement
    as to the nature of humanity, and because each saw personality from an individual
    reference point. The personality theorists discussed in this book have had a variety of
    backgrounds. Some were born in Europe and lived their entire lives there; others were
    born in Europe, but migrated to other parts of the world, especially the United States;
    still others were born in North America and remained there. Many were influenced
    by early religious experiences; others were not. Most, but not all, have been trained
    in either psychiatry or psychology. Many have drawn on their experiences as psycho-
    therapists; others have relied more on empirical research to gather data on human
    personality. Although they have all dealt in some way with what we call personality,
    each has approached this global concept from a different perspective. Some have tried
    to construct a comprehensive theory; others have been less ambitious and have dealt
    with only a few aspects of personality. Few personality theorists have formally defined
    personality, but all have had their own view of it.
    Although no single definition is acceptable to all personality theorists, we
    can say that personality is a pattern of relatively permanent traits and unique
    characteristics that give both consistency and individuality to a person’s behavior
    (Roberts & Mroczek, 2008). Traits contribute to individual differences in behavior,
    consistency of behavior over time, and stability of behavior across situations. Traits
    may be unique, common to some group, or shared by the entire species, but their
    pattern is different for each individual. Thus each person, though like others in
    some ways, has a unique personality. Characteristics are unique qualities of an
    individual that include such attributes as temperament, physique, and intelligence.
    No two people, not even identical twins, have exactly the same personalities.
    © by golf9c9333/Getty Images

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 5
    What Is a Theory?
    The word “theory” has the dubious distinction of being one of the most misused and
    misunderstood words in the English language. Some people contrast theory to truth
    or fact, but such an antithesis demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of
    all three terms. In science, theories are tools used to generate research and organize
    observations, but neither “truth” nor “fact” has a place in scientific terminology.
    Theory Defined
    A scientific theory is a set of related assumptions that allows scientists to use logical
    deductive reasoning to formulate testable hypotheses. This definition needs further
    explanation. First, a theory is a set of assumptions. A single assumption can never fill
    all the requirements of an adequate theory. A single assumption, for example, could
    not serve to integrate several observations, something a useful theory should do.
    Second, a theory is a set of related assumptions. Isolated assumptions can
    neither generate meaningful hypotheses nor possess internal consistency—two cri-
    teria of a useful theory.
    A third key word in the definition is assumptions. The components of a
    theory are not proven facts in the sense that their validity has been absolutely
    established. They are, however, accepted as if they were true. This is a practical
    step, taken so that scientists can conduct useful research, the results of which
    continue to build and reshape the original theory.
    Fourth, logical deductive reasoning is used by the researcher to formulate
    hypotheses. The tenets of a theory must be stated with sufficient precision and
    logical consistency to permit scientists to deduce clearly stated hypotheses. The
    hypotheses are not components of the theory, but flow from it. It is the job of an
    imaginative scientist to begin with the general theory and, through deductive rea-
    soning, arrive at a particular hypothesis that can be tested. If the general theoreti-
    cal propositions are illogical, they remain sterile and incapable of generating
    hypotheses. Moreover, if a researcher uses faulty logic in deducing hypotheses, the
    resulting research will be meaningless and will make no contribution to the ongo-
    ing process of theory construction.
    The final part of the definition includes the qualifier testable. Unless a
    hypothesis can be tested in some way, it is worthless. The hypothesis need not be
    tested immediately, but it must suggest the possibility that scientists in the future
    might develop the necessary means to test it.
    Theory and Its Relatives
    People sometimes confuse theory with philosophy, or speculation, or hypothesis,
    or taxonomy. Although theory is related to each of these concepts, it is not the
    same as any of them.
    Philosophy
    First, theory is related to philosophy, but it is a much narrower term. Philosophy
    means love of wisdom, and philosophers are people who pursue wisdom through

    Part I Introduction6
    thinking and reasoning. Philosophers are not scientists; they do not ordinarily con-
    duct controlled studies in their pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy encompasses several
    branches, one of which is epistemology, or the nature of knowledge. Theory relates
    most closely to this branch of philosophy, because it is a tool used by scientists
    in their pursuit of knowledge.
    Theories do not deal with “oughts” and “shoulds.” Therefore, a set of prin-
    ciples about how one should live one’s life cannot be a theory. Such principles
    involve values and are the proper concern of philosophy. Although theories are not
    free of values, they are built on scientific evidence that has been obtained in a
    relatively unbiased fashion. Thus, there are no theories on why society should help
    homeless people or on what constitutes great art.
    Philosophy deals with what ought to be or what should be; theory does not.
    Theory deals with broad sets of if-then statements, but the goodness or badness of
    the outcomes of these statements is beyond the realm of theory. For example, a
    theory might tell us that if children are brought up in isolation, completely sepa-
    rated from human contact, then they will not develop human language, exhibit
    parenting behavior, and so on. But this statement says nothing about the morality
    of such a method of child rearing.
    Speculation
    Second, theories rely on speculation, but they are much more than mere armchair
    speculation. They do not flow forth from the mind of a great thinker isolated from
    empirical observations. They are closely tied to empirically gathered data and to
    science.
    What is the relationship between theory and science? Science is the branch
    of study concerned with observation and classification of data and with the veri-
    fication of general laws through the testing of hypotheses. Theories are useful tools
    employed by scientists to give meaning and organization to observations. In addi-
    tion, theories provide fertile ground for producing testable hypotheses. Without
    some kind of theory to hold observations together and to point to directions of
    possible research, science would be greatly handicapped.
    Theories are not useless fantasies fabricated by impractical scholars fearful
    of soiling their hands in the machinery of scientific investigation. In fact, theo-
    ries themselves are quite practical and are essential to the advancement of any
    science. Speculation and empirical observation are the two essential cornerstones
    of theory building, but speculation must not run rampantly in advance of con-
    trolled observation.
    Hypothesis
    Although theory is a narrower concept than philosophy, it is a broader term than
    hy pothesis. A good theory is capable of generating many hypotheses. A hypothesis
    is an educated guess or prediction specific enough for its validity to be tested through
    the use of the scientific method. A theory is too general to lend itself to direct
    verification, but a single comprehensive theory is capable of generating thousands
    of hypotheses. Hypotheses, then, are more specific than the theories that give them
    birth. The offspring, however, should not be confused with the parent.

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory
    Of course, a close relationship exists between a theory and a hypothesis.
    Using deductive reasoning (going from the general to the specific), a scientific
    investigator can derive testable hypotheses from a useful theory and then test these
    hypotheses. The results of these tests-whether they support or contradict the
    hypotheses-feed back into the theory. Using inductive reasoning (going from
    the specific to the general), the investigator then alters the theory to reflect these
    results. As the theory grows and changes, other hypotheses can be drawn from it,
    and when tested they in turn reshape the theory.
    Taxonomy
    A taxonomy is a classification of things according to their natural relationships.
    Taxonomies are essential to the development of a science because without clas-
    sification of data science could not grow. Mere classification, however, does not
    constitute a theory. However, taxonomies can evolve into theories when they begin
    to generate testable hypotheses and to explain research findings. For exanwl~,
    Robert McCrae and Paul Costa began their research by classifying people into five
    stable personality traits. Eventually, this research on the Big Bi e taxonom ed to
    more than a mere classification; it became a theory, capable of suggesting hypoth-
    eses and offering explanations for research results.
    Why Different Theories?
    If theories of personality are truly scientific, why de we have so many different
    ones? Alternate theories exist because the very nature of a theory allows the theo-
    rist to make speculations from a particular point of view. Theorists must be as
    objective as possible when gathering data, but tneir decisions as to what data are
    collected and how these data are inte reted are personal ones. Theories are not
    immutable laws; they are built, not on proven facts, but on assumptions that are
    subject to individual interpreta ion.
    All theories are a reflection of r eir authors’ personal backgrounds, childhood
    experiences, philosophy 0£ life, interpersonal relationships, and unique manner of
    looking at the world. BeGause observations are colored by the individual observer’s
    frame of reference, it follows that there may be many diverse theories. Nevertheless,
    divergent theories can be useful. The usefulness of a theory does not depend on its
    commonsense value or on its agreement with other theories; rather, it depends on
    its ability to generate research and to explain research data and other observations.
    Perspectives in Theories of Personality
    One of the primary functions of scientific theory is to describe and explain how
    the world works. Psychologists attempt to explain how human thought, emotion,
    motivation, and behavior work. Yet human personality is so complex that many
    different perspectives have developed on how to best explain it. These perspectives
    make different assumptions and focus on different aspects of behavior. In psychol-
    ogy, there are at least five major theoretical perspectives on what personality is
    and how it develops. We have organized the book around these five perspectives,
    one for each section of the book (see Table 1.1).
    7

    Part I Introduction8
    Psychodynamic Theories
    Beginning with Freud, psychoanalytic and then the more general psychodynamic
    approaches have focused on the importance of early childhood experience and on
    relationships with parents as guiding forces that shape personality development.
    Additionally, this view sees the unconscious mind and motives as much more pow-
    erful than the conscious awareness. Psychoanalysis traditionally used dream inter-
    pretation to uncover the unconscious thoughts, feelings, and impulses as a main
    form of treatment of neurosis and mental illness. After Freud, these theorists moved
    away from the importance of sexuality and more toward social and cultural forces.
    Humanistic-Existential Theories
    The primary assumption of the humanistic (currently known as “positive psychol-
    ogy”) approach is that people strive toward meaning, growth, well-being, happi-
    ness, and psychological health. States of positive emotion and happiness foster
    psychological health and pro-social behavior. Understanding these evolved positive
    aspects of human behavior provides just as much insight into human nature as does
    understanding the pathological aspects. Existential theorists assume that not only
    are we driven by a search for meaning, but also that negative experiences such as
    failure, awareness of death, death of a loved one, and anxiety, are part of the human
    condition and can foster psychological growth.
    Dispositional Theories
    Dispositional theorists argue that the unique and long-term tendencies to behave
    in particular ways are the essence of our personality. These unique dispositions,
    such as extraversion or anxiety, are called traits. The field has converged on the
    understanding that there are five main trait dimensions in human personality. Traits
    serve the function of making certain behaviors more likely in some people.
    Biological-Evolutionary Theories
    Behavior, thought, feelings, and personality are influenced by differences in basic
    genetic, epigenetic, and neurological systems between individuals. The reason
    some people have different traits, dispositions, and ways of thinking stems from
    differences in their genotype and central nervous system (brain structures and
    neurochemistry).
    Because they are based on evolved brain systems, human thought, behavior,
    and personality have been shaped by forces of evolution (natural and sexual selec-
    tion) over millions of years. The body, brain, and environment co-exist and co-
    evolve, and so more than any other psychological perspective, this one emphasizes
    that what we think, feel, and do is always an interaction between nature (biological)
    and nurture (environment).
    Learning-(Social) Cognitive Theories
    If you want to understand behavior, then focus only on behavior, not on hypo-
    thetical and unobservable internal states such as thoughts, feelings, drives, or
    motives. All behaviors are learned through association and/or its consequences

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 9
    (whether it is reinforced or punished). To shape desired behavior we have to
    understand and then establish the conditions that bring about those particular
    behaviors.
    The cognitive perspective argues that how we think about ourselves and other
    people, as well as the assumptions we make and the strategies we use for solving
    problems, are the keys to understanding differences between people. Whether we
    believe we can do something successfully or not influences our behavior as well as
    our personality. In short, what personality we have is shaped by how we think and
    perceive the world.
    T A B L E 1 . 1
    Overview of Five Major Theoretical Perspectives in Personality Psychology
    Perspective Primary Assumptions Focus/Key Terms Key Figures
    Psychodynamic ∙ First 5 years of life most shape
    personality
    ∙ Unconscious forces are most
    important
    ∙ Neurosis results from
    unhealthy moving toward,
    against, or away from others
    Unconscious
    Early recollections
    Collective unconscious
    Archetypes
    Object-relations
    Identity crises
    Relatedness
    Freud
    Adler
    Jung
    Klein
    Horney
    Erikson
    Fromm
    Humanistic-
    Existential
    ∙ People strive to live
    meaningful, happy lives
    ∙ People are motivated by growth
    and psychological health
    ∙ Personality is shaped by
    freedom of choice, response
    to anxiety, and awareness
    of death
    Meaningful life,
    psychological well-being
    and growth
    Maslow
    Rogers
    May
    Dispositional ∙ People are predisposed to
    behave in unique and
    consistent ways; they have
    unique traits
    ∙ There are five trait dimensions
    in human personality
    Traits
    Motives
    Allport
    McCrae & Costa
    Biological-
    Evolutionary
    ∙ The foundation for thought
    and behavior is biological and
    genetic forces
    ∙ Human thought and behavior
    have been shaped by
    evolutionary forces (natural
    and sexual selection)
    Brain structures,
    neurochemicals, and
    genes
    Adaptive mechanisms
    Eysenck
    Buss
    (Continued)

    Part I Introduction10
    Theorists’ Personalities and Their Theories of Personality
    Because personality theories grow from theorists’ own personalities, a study of
    those personalities is appropriate. In recent years a subdiscipline of psychology
    called psychology of science has begun to look at personal traits of scientists. The
    psychology of science studies both science and the behavior of scientists; that is,
    it investigates the impact of an individual scientist’s psychological processes and
    personal characteristics on the development of her or his scientific theories and
    research (Feist, 1993, 1994, 2006; Feist & Gorman, 1998; Gholson, Shadish,
    Neimeyer, & Houts, 1989). In other words, the psychology of science examines
    how scientists’ personalities, cognitive processes, developmental histories, and
    social experience affect the kind of science they conduct and the theories they
    create. Indeed, a number of investigators (Hart, 1982; Johnson, Germer, Efran, &
    Overton, 1988; Simonton, 2000; Zachar & Leong, 1992) have demonstrated that
    personality differences influence one’s theoretical orientation as well as one’s incli-
    nation to lean toward the “hard” or “soft” side of a discipline.
    An understanding of theories of personality rests on information regarding
    the historical, social, and psychological worlds of each theorist at the time of his
    or her theorizing. Because we believe that personality theories reflect the theorist’s
    personality, we have included a substantial amount of biographical information on
    each major theorist. Indeed, personality differences among theorists account for
    fundamental disagreements between those who lean toward the quantitative side
    Perspective Primary Assumptions Focus/Key Terms Key Figures
    Learning-
    (Social) Cognitive
    ∙ Only explanation for behavior
    is the conditions that create
    behavior
    ∙ Learning occurs through
    association and consequences
    of our behavior
    ∙ Learning also occurs through
    succeeding or failing and
    watching other people succeed
    or fail at tasks
    ∙ Personality develops as an
    interaction between internal
    and external characteristics of
    the person
    ∙ The cognitive constructs we
    develop to perceive the world
    and others mold our
    personalities
    Conditioned responses
    Shaping
    Reinforcement
    Observational learning
    Modeling
    Self-efficacy
    Cognitive-affective units
    Constructs
    Skinner
    Bandura
    Rotter
    Mischel
    Kelly
    T A B L E 1 . 1 C o n t i n u e d

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 11
    of psychology (behaviorists, social learning theorists, and trait theorists) and those
    inclined toward the clinical and qualitative side of psychology (psychoanalysts,
    humanists, and existentialists).
    Although a theorist’s personality partially shapes his or her theory, it should
    not be the sole determinant of that theory. Likewise, your acceptance of one or
    another theory should not rest only on your personal values and predilections.
    When evaluating and choosing a theory, you should acknowledge the impact of
    the theorist’s personal history on the theory, but you should ultimately evaluate it
    on the basis of scientific criteria that are independent of that personal history. Some
    observers (Feist, 2006; Feist & Gorman, 1998) have distinguished between science
    as process and science as product. The scientific process may be influenced by
    the personal characteristics of the scientist, but the ultimate usefulness of the sci-
    entific product is and must be evaluated independently of the process. Thus, your
    evaluation of each of the theories presented in this book should rest more on
    objective criteria than on your subjective likes and dislikes.
    What Makes a Theory Useful?
    A useful theory has a mutual and dynamic interaction with research data. First, a
    theory generates a number of hypotheses that can be investigated through research,
    thus yielding research data. These data flow back into the theory and restructure it.
    From this newly contoured theory, scientists can extract other hypotheses, leading to
    more research and additional data, which in turn reshape and enlarge the theory even
    more. This cyclic relationship continues for as long as the theory proves useful.
    Second, a useful theory organizes research data into a meaningful structure
    and provides an explanation for the results of scientific research. This relationship
    between theory and research data is shown in Figure 1.1. When a theory is no
    Theory gives
    meaning to data
    Theory
    Hypothesis
    Research
    Research
    data
    Da
    ta
    res
    ha
    pe
    th
    eo
    ry

    FIGURE 1.1 The Interaction among Theory, Hypotheses, Research, and Research Data.

    Part I Introduction12
    longer able to generate additional research or to explain related research data, it
    loses its usefulness and is set aside in favor of a more useful one.
    In addition to sparking research and explaining research data, a useful theory
    must lend itself to confirmation or disconfirmation, provide the practitioner with a
    guide to action, be consistent with itself, and be as simple as possible. Therefore, we
    have evaluated each of the theories presented in this book on the basis of six criteria:
    A useful theory (1) generates research, (2) is falsifiable, (3) organizes data, (4) guides
    action, (5) is internally consistent, and (6) is parsimonious.
    Generates Research
    The most important criterion of a useful theory is its ability to stimulate and guide
    further research. Without an adequate theory to point the way, many of science’s
    present empirical findings would have remained undiscovered. In astronomy, for
    example, the planet Neptune was discovered because the theory of motion gener-
    ated the hypothesis that the irregularity in the path of Uranus must be caused by
    the presence of another planet. Useful theory provided astronomers with a road
    map that guided their search for and discovery of the new planet.
    A useful theory will generate two different kinds of research: descriptive
    research and hypothesis testing. Descriptive research, which can expand an exist-
    ing theory, is concerned with the measurement, labeling, and categorization of the
    units employed in theory building. Descriptive research has a symbiotic relation-
    ship with theory. On one hand, it provides the building blocks for the theory, and
    on the other, it receives its impetus from the dynamic, expanding theory. The more
    useful the theory, the more research generated by it; the greater the amount of
    descriptive research, the more complete the theory.
    The second kind of research generated by a useful theory, hypothesis testing,
    leads to an indirect verification of the usefulness of the theory. As we have noted,
    a useful theory will generate many hypotheses that, when tested, add to a database
    that may reshape and enlarge the theory. (Refer again to Figure 1.1.)
    Is Falsifiable
    A theory must also be evaluated on its ability to be confirmed or disconfirmed;
    that is, it must be falsifiable. To be falsifiable, a theory must be precise enough
    to suggest research that may either support or fail to support its major tenets. If a
    theory is so vague and nebulous that both positive and negative research results
    can be interpreted as support, then that theory is not falsifiable and ceases to be
    useful. Falsifiability, however, is not the same as false; it simply means that neg-
    ative research results will refute the theory and force the theorist to either discard
    it or modify it.
    A falsifiable theory is accountable to experimental results. Figure 1.1 depicts
    a circular and mutually reinforcing connection between theory and research; each
    forms a basis for the other. Science is distinguished from nonscience by its ability
    to reject ideas that are not supported empirically even though they seem logical
    and rational. For example, Aristotle used logic to argue that lighter bodies fall at
    slower rates than heavier bodies. Although his argument may have agreed with
    “common sense,” it had one problem: It was empirically wrong.

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 13
    Theories that rely heavily on unobservable transformations in the uncon-
    scious are exceedingly difficult to either verify or falsify. For example, Freud’s
    theory suggests that many of our emotions and behaviors are motivated by uncon-
    scious tendencies that are directly opposite the ones we express. For instance,
    unconscious hate might be expressed as conscious love, or unconscious fear of
    one’s own homosexual feelings might take the form of exaggerated hostility toward
    homosexual individuals. Because Freud’s theory allows for such transformations
    within the unconscious, it is nearly impossible to either verify or falsify. A theory
    that can explain everything explains nothing.
    Organizes Data
    A useful theory should also be able to organize those research data that are not
    incompatible with each other. Without some organization or classification, research
    findings would remain isolated and meaningless. Unless data are organized into
    some intelligible framework, scientists are left with no clear direction to follow in
    the pursuit of further knowledge. They cannot ask intelligent questions without a
    theoretical framework that organizes their information. Without intelligent ques-
    tions, further research is severely curtailed.
    A useful theory of personality must be capable of integrating what is cur-
    rently known about human behavior and personality development. It must be able
    to shape as many bits of information as possible into a meaningful arrangement.
    If a personality theory does not offer a reasonable explanation of at least some
    kinds of behavior, it ceases to be useful.
    Guides Action
    A fourth criterion of a useful theory is its ability to guide the practitioner over the
    rough course of day-to-day problems. For example, parents, teachers, business
    managers, and psychotherapists are confronted continually with an avalanche of
    questions for which they try to find workable answers. Good theory provides a
    structure for finding many of those answers. Without a useful theory, practitioners
    would stumble in the darkness of trial and error techniques; with a sound theo-
    retical orientation, they can discern a suitable course of action.
    For the Freudian psychoanalyst and the Rogerian counselor, answers to the
    same question would be very different. To the question “How can I best treat this
    patient?” the psychoanalytic therapist might answer along these lines: If psycho-
    neuroses are caused by childhood sexual conflicts that have become unconscious,
    then I can help this patient best by delving into these repressions and allowing the
    patient to relive the experiences in the absence of conflict. To the same question,
    the Rogerian therapist might answer: If, in order to grow psychologically, people
    need empathy, unconditional positive regard, and a relationship with a congruent
    therapist, then I can best help this client by providing an accepting, nonthreatening
    atmosphere. Notice that both therapists constructed their answers in an if-then
    framework, even though the two answers call for very different courses of action.
    Also included in this criterion is the extent to which the theory stimulates
    thought and action in other disciplines, such as art, literature (including movies
    and television dramas), law, sociology, philosophy, religion, education, business

    Part I Introduction14
    administration, and psychotherapy. Most of the theories discussed in this book have
    had some influence in areas beyond psychology. For example, Freud’s theory has
    prompted research on recovered memories, a topic very important to the legal
    profession. Also, Carl Jung’s theory is of great interest to many theologians and
    has captured the imagination of popular writers such as Joseph Campbell and oth-
    ers. Similarly, the ideas of Alfred Adler, Erik Erikson, B. F. Skinner, Abraham
    Maslow, Carl Rogers, Rollo May, and other personality theorists have sparked
    interest and action in a broad range of scholarly fields.
    Is Internally Consistent
    A useful theory need not be consistent with other theories, but it must be consistent
    with itself. An internally consistent theory is one whose components are logically
    compatible. Its limitations of scope are carefully defined and it does not offer
    explanations that lie beyond that scope. Also, an internally consistent theory uses
    language in a consistent manner; that is, it does not use the same term to mean
    two different things, nor does it use two separate terms to refer to the same concept.
    A good theory will use concepts and terms that have been clearly and oper-
    ationally defined. An operational definition is one that defines units in terms of
    observable events or behaviors that can be measured. For example, an extravert
    can be operationally defined as any person who attains a predetermined score on
    a particular personality inventory.
    Is Parsimonious
    When two theories are equal in their ability to generate research, be falsified, give
    meaning to data, guide the practitioner, and be self-consistent, the simpler one is
    preferred. This is the law of parsimony. In fact, of course, two theories are never
    exactly equal in these other abilities, but in general, simple, straightforward theo-
    ries are more useful than ones that bog down under the weight of complicated
    concepts and esoteric language.
    Dimensions for a Concept
    of Humanity
    Personality theories differ on basic issues concerning the nature of humanity.
    Each personality theory reflects its author’s assumptions about humanity.
    These assumptions rest on several broad dimensions that separate the
    various personality theorists. We use six of these dimensions as a framework
    for viewing each theorist’s concept of humanity.
    The first dimension is determinism versus free choice. Are people’s
    behaviors determined by forces over which they have no control, or can peo-
    ple choose to be what they wish to be? Can behavior be partially free and

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 15
    partially determined at the same time? Although the dimension of determinism
    versus free will is more philosophical than scientific, the position theorists take
    on this issue shapes their way of looking at people and colors their concept
    of humanity.
    A second issue is one of pessimism versus optimism. Are people
    doomed to live miserable, conflicted, and troubled lives, or can they change
    and grow into psychologically healthy, happy, fully functioning human
    beings? In general, personality theorists who believe in determinism tend to
    be pessimistic (Skinner was a notable exception), whereas those who believe
    in free choice are usually optimistic.
    A third dimension for viewing a theorist’s concept of humanity is cau-
    sality versus teleology. Briefly, causality holds that behavior is a function of
    past experiences, whereas teleology is an explanation of behavior in terms
    of future goals or purposes. Do people act as they do because of what has
    happened to them in the past, or do they act as they do because they have
    certain expectations of what will happen in the future?
    A fourth consideration that divides personality theorists is their attitude
    toward conscious versus unconscious determinants of behavior. Are people
    ordinarily aware of what they are doing and why they are doing it, or do
    unconscious forces impinge on them and drive them to act without aware-
    ness of these underlying forces?
    The fifth question is one of biological versus social influences on per-
    sonality. Are people mostly creatures of biology, or are their personalities
    shaped largely by their social relationships? A more specific element of this
    issue is heredity versus environment; that is, are personal characteristics
    more the result of heredity, or are they environmentally determined?
    A sixth issue is uniqueness versus similarities. Is the salient feature of
    people their individuality, or is it their common characteristics? Should the
    study of personality concentrate on those traits that make people alike, or
    should it look at those traits that make people different?
    These and other basic issues that separate personality theorists
    have resulted in truly different personality theories, not merely differences
    in terminology. We could not erase the differences among personality
    theories by adopting a common language. The differences are philosoph-
    ical and deep-seated. Each personality theory reflects the individual per-
    sonality of its creator, and each creator has a unique philosophical
    orientation, shaped in part by early childhood experiences, birth order,
    gender, training, education, and pattern of interpersonal relationships.
    These differences help determine whether a theorist will be deterministic
    or a believer in free choice, will be pessimistic or optimistic, will adopt a
    causal explanation or a teleological one. They also help determine whether
    the theorist emphasizes consciousness or unconsciousness, biological or
    social factors, uniqueness or similarities of people. These differences do
    not, however, negate the possibility that two theorists with opposing views
    of humanity can be equally scientific in their data gathering and theory
    building.

    In building a theory of personality, psychologists should begin on a limited
    scale and avoid sweeping generalizations that attempt to explain all of human
    behavior. That course of action was followed by most of the theorists discussed in
    this book. For example, Freud began with a theory based largely on hysterical
    neuroses and, over a period of years, gradually expanded it to include more and
    more of the total personality.
    Research in Personality Theory
    As we pointed out earlier, the primary criterion for a useful theory is its ability
    to generate research. We also noted that theories and research data have a cyclic
    relationship: Theory gives meaning to data, and data result from experimental
    research designed to test hypotheses generated by the theory. Not all data, how-
    ever, flow from experimental research. Much of it comes from observations that
    each of us make every day. To observe simply means to notice something, to pay
    attention.
    You have been observing human personalities for nearly as long as you have
    been alive. You notice that some people are talkative and outgoing; others are quiet
    and reserved. You may have even labeled such people as extraverts and introverts.
    Are these labels accurate? Is one extraverted person like another? Does an extravert
    always act in a talkative, outgoing manner? Can all people be classified as either
    introverts or extraverts?
    In making observations and asking questions, you are doing some of the same
    things psychologists do, that is, observing human behaviors and trying to make
    sense of these observations. However, psychologists, like other scientists, try to be
    systematic so that their predictions will be consistent and accurate.
    To improve their ability to predict, personality psychologists have developed
    a number of assessment techniques, including personality inventories. Much of the
    research reported in the remaining chapters of this book has relied on various
    assessment procedures, which purport to measure different dimensions of personal-
    ity. For these instruments to be useful they must be both reliable and valid. The
    reliability of a measuring instrument is the extent to which it yields consistent
    results.
    Personality inventories may be reliable and yet lack validity or accuracy.
    Validity is the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to
    measure. Personality psychologists are primarily concerned with two types of
    validity—construct validity and predictive validity. Construct validity is the extent
    to which an instrument measures some hypothetical construct. Constructs such as
    extraversion, aggressiveness, intelligence, and emotional stability have no physi-
    cal existence; they are hypothetical constructs that should relate to observable
    behavior. Three important types of construct validity are convergent validity,
    divergent validity, and discriminant validity. A measuring instrument has conver-
    gent construct validity to the extent that scores on that instrument correlate highly
    (converge) with scores on a variety of valid measures of that same construct. For
    Part I Introduction16

    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory 17
    example, a personality inventory that attempts to measure extraversion should
    correlate with other measures of extraversion or other factors such as sociability
    and assertiveness that are known to cluster together with extraversion. An inven-
    tory has divergent construct validity if it has low or insignificant correlations with
    other inventories that do not measure that construct. For example, an inventory
    purporting to measure extraversion should not be highly correlated with social
    desirability, emotional stability, honesty, or self-esteem. Finally, an inventory has
    discriminant validity if it discriminates between two groups of people known to
    be different. For example, a personality inventory measuring extraversion should
    yield higher scores for people known to be extraverted than for people known to
    be introverted.
    A second dimension of validity is predictive validity, or the extent that a test
    predicts some future behavior. For example, a test of extraversion has predictive
    validity if it correlates with future behaviors, such as smoking cigarettes, perform-
    ing well on scholastic achievement tests, taking risks, or any other independent
    criterion. The ultimate value of any measuring instrument is the degree to which
    it can predict some future behavior or condition.
    Most of the early personality theorists did not use standardized assess-
    ment inventories. Although Freud, Adler, and Jung all developed some form
    of projective tool, none of them used the technique with sufficient precision to
    establish its reliability and validity. However, the theories of Freud, Adler, and
    Jung have spawned a number of standardized personality inventories as
    researchers and clinicians have sought to measure units of personality proposed
    by those theorists. Later personality theorists, especially Julian Rotter, Hans
    Eysenck, and the Five-Factor Theorists have developed and used a number of
    personality measures and have relied heavily on them in constructing their
    theoretical models.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ The term “personality” comes from the Latin persona, or the mask that
    people present to the outside world, but psychologists see personality as
    much more than outward appearances.
    ∙ Personality includes all those relatively permanent traits or characteristics
    that render some consistency to a person’s behavior.
    ∙ A theory is a set of related assumptions that allows scientists to
    formulate testable hypotheses.
    ∙ Theory should not be confused with philosophy, speculation, hypothesis,
    or taxonomy, although it is related to each of these terms.
    ∙ Personality theories cover at least five distinct perspectives: psychodynamic,
    humanistic-positive, dispositional, biological-evolutionary, and learning/
    social-cognitive

    Part I Introduction18
    ∙ Six criteria determine the usefulness of a scientific theory: (1) Does the
    theory generate research? (2) Is it falsifiable? (3) Does it organize and
    explain knowledge? (4) Does it suggest practical solutions to everyday
    problems? (5) Is it internally consistent? and (6) Is it simple or
    parsimonious?
    ∙ Each personality theorist has had either an implicit or explicit concept of
    humanity.
    ∙ Concepts of human nature can be discussed from six perspectives:
    (1) determinism versus free choice, (2) pessimism versus optimism,
    (3) causality versus teleology, (4) conscious versus unconscious
    determinants, (5) biological versus social factors, and (6) uniqueness
    versus similarities in people.

    19
    Psychodynamic
    Theories
    C h a p t e r 2 Freud
    Psychoanalysis 20
    C h a p t e r 3 Adler
    Individual Psychology 70
    C h a p t e r 4 Jung
    Analytical Psychology 104
    C h a p t e r 5 Klein
    Object Relations Theory 142
    C h a p t e r 6 Horney
    Psychoanalytic Social Theory 170
    C h a p t e r 7 Erikson
    Post-Freudian Theory 196
    C h a p t e r 8 Fromm
    Humanistic Psychoanalysis 227
    P A R T T W O

    20
    Freud:
    Psychoanalysis
    ⬥ Overview of Psychoanalytic Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Sigmund Freud
    ⬥ Levels of Mental Life
    Unconscious
    Preconscious
    Conscious
    ⬥ Provinces of the Mind
    The Id
    The Ego
    The Superego
    ⬥ Dynamics of Personality
    Drives
    Sex
    Aggression
    Anxiety
    ⬥ Defense Mechanisms
    Repression
    Reaction Formation
    Displacement
    Fixation
    Regression
    Projection
    Introjection
    Sublimation
    ⬥ Stages of Development
    Infantile Period
    Oral Phase
    Anal Phase
    Phallic Phase
    Male Oedipus Complex
    Female Oedipus Complex
    Latency Period
    Genital Period
    Maturity
    C H A P T E R 2
    ⬥ Applications of Psychoanalytic Theory
    Freud’s Early Therapeutic Technique
    Freud’s Later Therapeutic Technique
    Dream Analysis
    Freudian Slips
    ⬥ Related Research
    Unconscious Mental Processing
    Pleasure and the Id, Inhibition and the Ego
    Repression, Inhibition, and Defense Mechanisms
    Research on Dreams
    ⬥ Critique of Freud
    Did Freud Understand Women, Gender, and
    Sexuality?
    Was Freud a Scientist?
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Freud © Ingram Publishing

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 21
    From ancient history to the present time, people have searched for some magic panacea or potion to lessen pain or to enhance performance. One such search
    was conducted by a young, ambitious physician who came to believe that he had
    discovered a drug that had all sorts of wonderful properties. Hearing that the
    drug had been used successfully to energize soldiers suffering from near exhaus-
    tion, this physician decided to try it on patients, colleagues, and friends. If the
    drug worked as well as he expected, he might gain the fame to which he aspired.
    After learning of the drug’s successful use in heart disease, nervous exhaus-
    tion, addiction to alcohol and morphine, and several other psychological and phys-
    iological problems, the doctor decided to try the drug on himself. He was quite
    pleased with the results. To him, the drug had a pleasant aroma and an unusual
    effect on the lips and mouth. More importantly, however, was the drug’s therapeu-
    tic effect on his serious depression. In a letter to his fiancée, whom he had not
    seen in a year, he reported that during his last severe depression, he had taken
    small quantities of the drug with marvelous results. He wrote that the next time
    he saw her he would be like a wild man, feeling the effects of the drug. He also
    told his fiancée that he would give her small amounts of the drug, ostensibly to
    make her strong and to help her gain weight.
    The young doctor wrote a pamphlet extolling the benefits of the drug, but
    he had not yet completed the necessary experiments on the drug’s value as an
    analgesic. Impatient to be near his fiancée, he delayed completion of his experi-
    ments and went off to see her. During that visit, a colleague—and not he—
    completed the experiments, published the results, and gained the recognition the
    young doctor had hoped for himself.
    These events took place in 1884; the drug was cocaine; the young doctor
    was Sigmund Freud.
    Overview of Psychoanalytic Theory
    Freud, of course, was fortunate that his name did not become indelibly tied to
    cocaine. Instead, his name has become associated with psychoanalysis, the most
    famous of all personality theories.
    What makes Freud’s theory so interesting? First, the twin cornerstones of
    psychoanalysis, sex and aggression, are two subjects of continuing popularity.
    Second, the theory was spread beyond its Viennese origins by an ardent and ded-
    icated group of followers, many of whom romanticized Freud as a nearly mytho-
    logical and lonely hero. Third, Freud’s brilliant command of language enabled him
    to present his theories in a stimulating and exciting manner.
    Freud’s understanding of human personality was based on his experiences
    with patients, his analysis of his own dreams, and his vast readings in the various
    sciences and humanities. These experiences provided the basic data for the evolu-
    tion of his theories. To him, theory followed observation, and his concept of per-
    sonality underwent constant revisions during the last 50 years of his life.
    Evolutionary though it was, Freud insisted that psychoanalysis could not be sub-
    jected to eclecticism, and disciples who deviated from his basic ideas soon found
    themselves personally and professionally ostracized by Freud.

    22 Part II Psychodynamic Theories
    Although Freud regarded himself primarily as a scientist, his definition of
    science would be somewhat different from that held by most psychologists today.
    Freud relied more on deductive reasoning than on rigorous research methods, and
    he made observations subjectively and on a relatively small sample of patients,
    most of whom were from the upper-middle and upper classes. He did not quantify
    his data, nor did he make observations under controlled conditions. He utilized the
    case study approach almost exclusively, typically formulating hypotheses after the
    facts of the case were known.
    Biography of Sigmund Freud
    Sigismund (Sigmund) Freud was born either on March 6 or May 6, 1856, in Freiberg,
    Moravia, which is now part of the Czech Republic. (Scholars disagree on his birth
    date-the first date was but 8 months after the marriage of his parents.) Freud was
    the firstborn child of Jacob and Amalie Nathanson Freud, although his father had
    two grown sons, Emanuel and Philipp, from a previous marriage. Jacob and Amalie
    Freud had seven other children within 10 years, but Sigmund remained the favor-
    ite of his young, indulgent mother, which may have partially contributed to his
    lifelong self-confidence (E. Jones, 1953). A scholarf°y , serious-minded youth, Freud
    did not have a close friendship with any of his younger siblings. He did, however,
    enjoy a warm, indulgent relationship with fiis mother, leading him in later years
    to observe that the mother/son relationship was the most perfect, the most free
    from ambivalence of all human elations ·ps (Freud, 1933/1964).
    When Sigmund was three, the two Freud families left Freiberg. Emanuel’s
    family and Philipp moved to England, and the Jacob Freud family moved first to
    Leipzig and then to Vienna. The Austrian capital remained Sigmund Freud’s home
    for nearly 80 years, until 1938 when the Nazi invasion forced him to emigrate to
    London, where h died on September 23, 1939.
    When Freud was about a year and a half old, his mother gave birth to a
    second son, Julius, an event that was to have a significant impact on Freud’s psy-
    chic development. Sigmund was filled with hostility toward his younger brother
    and harbored an unconscious wish for his death. When Julius died at 6 months of
    age, Sigmund was left with feelings of guilt at having caused his brother’s death.
    When Freud reached middle age, he began to understand that his wish did not
    actually cause his brother’s death and that children often have a death wish for a
    younger sibling. This discovery purged Freud of the guilt he had carried into adult-
    hood and, by his own analysis, contributed to his later psychic development (Freud,
    1900/1953).
    Freud was drawn into medicine, not because he loved medical practice, but
    because he was intensely curious about human nature (Ellenberger, 1970). He
    entered the University of Vienna Medical School with no intention of practicing
    medicine. Instead, he preferred teaching and doing research in physiology, which
    he continued even after he graduated from the university’s Physiological Institute.
    Freud might have continued this work indefinitely had it not been for two
    factors. First, he believed (probably with some justification) that, as a Jew, his
    opportunities for academic advancement would be limited. Second, his father, who
    helped finance his medical school expense, became less able to provide monetary

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 23
    aid. Reluctantly, Freud turned from his laboratory to the practice of medicine. He
    worked for 3 years in the General Hospital of Vienna, becoming familiar with the
    practice of various branches of medicine, including psychiatry and nervous diseases
    (Freud, 1925/1959).
    In 1885, he received a traveling grant from the University of Vienna and
    decided to study in Paris with the famous French neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot.
    He spent 4 months with Charcot, from whom he learned the hypnotic technique
    for treating hysteria, a disorder typically characterized by paralysis or the improper
    functioning of certain parts of the body. Through hypnosis, Freud became con-
    vinced of a psychogenic and sexual origin of hysterical symptoms.
    While still a medical student, Freud developed a close professional associa-
    tion and a personal friendship with Josef Breuer, a well-known Viennese physician
    14 years older than Freud and a man of considerable scientific reputation (Ferris,
    1997). Breuer taught Freud about catharsis, the process of removing hysterical
    symptoms through “talking them out.” While using catharsis, Freud gradually and
    laboriously discovered the free association technique, which soon replaced hypno-
    sis as his principal therapeutic technique.
    From as early as adolescence, Freud literally dreamed of making a monu-
    mental discovery and achieving fame (Newton, 1995). On several occasions during
    the 1880s and 1890s he believed he was on the verge of such a discovery. His first
    opportunity to gain recognition came in 1884–1885 and involved his experiments
    with cocaine, which we discussed in the opening vignette.
    Freud’s second opportunity for achieving some measure of fame came in 1886
    after he returned from Paris, where he had learned about male hysteria from Char-
    cot. He assumed that this knowledge would gain him respect and recognition from
    Sigmund Freud with his daughter, Anna, who was a psychoanalyst in her own right.
    © Mary Evans Picture Library/Alamy Stock Photo

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories24
    the Imperial Society of Physicians of Vienna, whom he mistakenly believed would
    be impressed by the young Dr. Freud’s knowledge of male hysteria. Early physi-
    cians had believed that hysteria was strictly a female disorder because the very word
    had the same origins as uterus and was the result of a “wandering womb,” with the
    uterus traveling throughout women’s bodies and causing various parts to malfunc-
    tion. However, by 1886, when Freud presented a paper on male hysteria to the
    Society, most physicians present were already familiar with the illness and knew
    that it could also be a male disorder. Because originality was expected and because
    Freud’s paper was a rehash of what was already known, the Viennese physicians
    did not respond well to the presentation. Also, Freud’s constant praise of Charcot,
    a Frenchman, cooled the Viennese physicians to his talk. Unfortunately, in his
    autobiographical study, Freud (1925/1959) told a very different story, claiming that
    his lecture was not well received because members of the learned society could not
    fathom the concept of male hysteria. Freud’s account of this incident, now known
    to be in error, was nevertheless perpetuated for years, and as Sulloway (1992)
    argued, it is but one of many fictions created by Freud and his followers to mythol-
    ogize psychoanalysis and to make a lonely hero of its founder.
    Disappointed in his attempts to gain fame and afflicted with feelings (both
    justified and otherwise) of professional opposition due to his defense of cocaine
    and his belief in the sexual origins of neuroses, Freud felt the need to join with
    a more respected colleague. He turned to Breuer, with whom he had worked
    while still a medical student and with whom he enjoyed a continuing personal
    and professional relationship. Breuer had discussed in detail with Freud the case
    of Anna O, a young woman Freud had never met, but whom Breuer had spent
    many hours treating for hysteria several years earlier. Because of his rebuff by
    the Imperial Society of Physicians and his desire to establish a reputation for
    himself, Freud urged Breuer to collaborate with him in publishing an account
    of Anna O and several other cases of hysteria. Breuer, however, was not as
    eager as the younger and more revolutionary Freud to publish a full treatise on
    hysteria built on only a few case studies. He also could not accept Freud’s
    notion that childhood sexual experiences were the source of adult hysteria.
    Finally, and with some reluctance, Breuer agreed to publish with Freud Studies
    on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1955). In this book, Freud introduced the
    term “psychical analysis,” and during the following year, he began calling his
    approach “psycho-analysis.”
    At about the time Studies on Hysteria was published, Freud and Breuer had
    a professional disagreement and became estranged personally. Freud then turned
    to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, a Berlin physician who served as a sounding board
    for Freud’s newly developing ideas. Freud’s letters to Fliess (Freud, 1985) consti-
    tute a firsthand account of the beginnings of psychoanalysis and reveal the embry-
    onic stage of Freudian theory. Freud and Fliess had become friends in 1887, but
    their relationship became more intimate following Freud’s break with Breuer.
    During the late 1890s, Freud suffered both professional isolation and personal
    crises. He had begun to analyze his own dreams, and after the death of his father
    in 1896, he initiated the practice of analyzing himself daily. Although his self-
    analysis was a lifetime labor, it was especially difficult for him during the late
    1890s. During this period, Freud regarded himself as his own best patient. In

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 25
    August of 1897, he wrote to Fliess, “the chief patient I am preoccupied with is
    myself. . . . The analysis is more difficult than any other. It is, in fact what para-
    lyzes my psychic strength” (Freud, 1985, p. 261).
    A second personal crisis was his realization that he was now middle-aged
    and had yet to achieve the fame he so passionately desired. During this time he
    had suffered yet another disappointment in his attempt to make a major scientific
    contribution. Again he believed himself to be on the brink of an important break-
    through with his “discovery” that neuroses have their etiology in a child’s seduc-
    tion by a parent. Freud likened this finding to the discovery of the source of the
    Nile. However, in 1897 he abandoned the seduction theory and once again had to
    postpone the discovery that would propel him to greatness.
    Why did Freud abandon his once-treasured seduction theory? In a letter dated
    September 21, 1897, to Wilhelm Fliess, he gave four reasons why he could no longer
    believe in his seduction theory. First, he said, the seduction theory had not enabled
    him to successfully treat even a single patient. Second, a great number of fathers,
    including his own, would have to be accused of sexual perversion because hysteria
    was quite common even among Freud’s siblings. Third, Freud believed that the uncon-
    scious mind could probably not distinguish reality from fiction, a belief that later
    evolved into the Oedipus complex. And fourth, he found that the unconscious mem-
    ories of advanced psychotic patients almost never revealed early childhood sexual
    experiences (Freud, 1985). After abandoning his seduction theory and with no Oedi-
    pus complex to replace it, Freud sank even more deeply into his midlife crisis.
    Freud’s official biographer, Ernest Jones (1953, 1955, 1957), believed that
    Freud suffered from a severe psychoneurosis during the late 1890s, although Max
    Schur (1972), Freud’s personal physician during the final decade of his life, contended
    that his illness was due to a cardiac lesion, aggravated by addiction to nicotine. Peter
    Gay (1988) suggested that during the time immediately after his father’s death, Freud
    “relived his oedipal conflicts with peculiar ferocity” (p. 141). But Henri Ellenberger
    (1970) described this period in Freud’s life as a time of “creative illness,” a condition
    characterized by depression, neurosis, psychosomatic ailments, and an intense preoc-
    cupation with some form of creative activity. In any event, at midlife, Freud was
    suffering from self-doubts, depression, and an obsession with his own death.
    Despite these difficulties, Freud completed his greatest work, Interpretation
    of Dreams (1900/1953), during this period. This book, finished in 1899, was an
    outgrowth of his self-analysis, much of which he had revealed to his friend Wilhelm
    Fliess. The book contained many of Freud’s own dreams, some disguised behind
    fictitious names.
    Almost immediately after the publication of Interpretation of Dreams, his
    friendship with Fliess began to cool, eventually to rupture in 1903. This breakup
    paralleled Freud’s earlier estrangement from Breuer, which took place almost
    immediately after they had published Studies on Hysteria together. It was also a
    harbinger of his breaks with Alfred Adler, Carl Jung, and several other close asso-
    ciates. Why did Freud have difficulties with so many former friends? Freud himself
    answered this question, stating that “it is not the scientific differences that are so
    important; it is usually some other kind of animosity, jealousy or revenge, that
    gives the impulse to enmity. The scientific differences come later” (Wortis, 1954,
    p. 163).

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories26
    Although Interpretation of Dreams did not create the instant international stir
    Freud had hoped, it eventually gained for him the fame and recognition he had
    sought. In the 5-year period following its publication, Freud, now filled with
    renewed self-confidence, wrote several important works that helped solidify the
    foundation of psychoanalysis, including On Dreams (1901/1953), written because
    Interpretation of Dreams had failed to capture much interest; Psychopathology of
    Everyday Life (1901/1960), which introduced the world to Freudian slips; Three
    Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905/1953b), which established sex as the
    cornerstone of psychoanalysis; and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious
    (1905/1960), which proposed that jokes, like dreams and Freudian slips, have an
    unconscious meaning. These publications helped Freud attain some local promi-
    nence in scientific and medical circles.
    In 1902, Freud invited a small group of somewhat younger Viennese physi-
    cians to meet in his home to discuss psychological issues. Then, in the fall of that
    year, these five men—Freud, Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Stekel, Max Kahane, and
    Rudolf Reitler—formed the Wednesday Psychological Society, with Freud as dis-
    cussion leader. In 1908, this organization adopted a more formal name—the Vienna
    Psychoanalytic Society.
    In 1910, Freud and his followers founded the International Psychoanalytic
    Association with Carl Jung of Zürich as president. Freud was attracted to Jung
    because of his keen intellect and also because he was neither Jewish nor Viennese.
    Between 1902 and 1906, all 17 of Freud’s disciples had been Jewish (Kurzweil,
    1989), and Freud was interested in giving psychoanalysis a more cosmopolitan
    flavor. Although Jung was a welcome addition to the Freudian circle and had been
    designated as the “Crown Prince” and “the man of the future,” he, like Adler and
    Stekel before him, eventually quarreled bitterly with Freud and left the psycho-
    analytic movement. The seeds of disagreement between Jung and Freud were prob-
    ably sown when the two men, along with Sandor Ferenczi, traveled to the United
    States in 1909 to deliver a series of lectures at Clark University near Boston. To
    pass the time during their travels, Freud and Jung interpreted each other’s dreams,
    a potentially explosive practice that eventually led to the end of their relationship
    in 1913 (McGuire, 1974).
    The years of World War I were difficult for Freud. He was cut off from
    communication with his faithful followers, his psychoanalytic practice dwindled,
    his home was sometimes without heat, and he and his family had little food. After
    the war, despite advancing years and pain suffered from 33 operations for cancer
    of the mouth, he made important revisions in his theory. The most significant
    of these were the elevation of aggression to a level equal to that of the sexual
    drive, the inclusion of repression as one of the defenses of the ego; and his attempt
    to clarify the female Oedipus complex, which he was never able to completely
    accomplish.
    What personal qualities did Freud possess? A more complete insight into his
    personality can be found in Breger (2000), Clark (1980), Ellenberger (1970), Ferris
    (1997), Gay (1988), Handlbauer (1998), Isbister (1985), E. Jones (1953, 1955, 1957),
    Newton (1995), Noland (1999), Roazen (1993, 1995, 2001), Silverstein (2003),
    Sulloway (1992), Vitz (1988), and dozens of other books on Freud’s life. Above all,
    Freud was a sensitive, passionate person who had the capacity for intimate, almost

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 27
    secretive friendships. Most of these deeply emotional relationships came to an
    unhappy end, and Freud often felt persecuted by his former friends and regarded
    them as enemies. He seemed to have needed both types of relationship. In
    Interpretation of Dreams, Freud both explained and predicted this succession of
    interpersonal ruptures: “My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an
    intimate friend and a hated enemy. I have always been able to provide myself afresh
    with both” (Freud, 1900/1953, p. 483). Until he was well past 50, all these relation-
    ships were with men. Interestingly, Freud, the man who seemed to be constantly
    thinking of sex, had a very infrequent sex life himself. After Anna, his youngest
    child, was born in 1895, Freud, not yet 40 years old, had no sexual intercourse for
    several years. Much of his sparse sexual life stemmed from his belief that use of a
    condom, coitus interruptus, as well as masturbation were unhealthy sexual practices.
    Because Freud wanted no more children after Anna was born, sexual abstinence was
    his only alternative (Breger, 2000; Freud, 1985).
    In addition to balancing his emotional life between an intimate friend and
    a hated enemy, Freud possessed an outstanding talent as a writer, a gift that helped
    him become a leading contributor to 20th-century thought. He was a master of
    the German tongue and knew several other languages. Although he never won the
    coveted Nobel prize for science, he was awarded the Goethe prize for literature
    in 1930.
    Freud also possessed intense intellectual curiosity; unusual moral courage
    (demonstrated by his daily self-analysis); extremely ambivalent feelings toward his
    father and other father figures; a tendency to hold grudges disproportionate to the
    alleged offense; a burning ambition, especially during his earlier years; strong
    feelings of isolation even while surrounded by many followers; and an intense and
    somewhat irrational dislike of America and Americans, an attitude that became
    more intense after his trip to the United States in 1909.
    Why did Freud have such a disdain for Americans? Perhaps the most impor-
    tant reason is that he rightly believed Americans would trivialize psychoanalysis
    by trying to make it popular. In addition, he had several experiences during his
    trip to the United States that were foreign to a proper bourgeois Viennese gentle-
    man. Even before he embarked on the George Washington, he saw his name mis-
    spelled as “Freund” on the passenger list (Ferris, 1997). A number of other
    events—some of which seem almost humorous—made Freud’s visit more unpleas-
    ant than it might have been. First, Freud experienced chronic indigestion and diar-
    rhea throughout his visit, probably because the drinking water did not agree with
    him. In addition, he found it both peculiar and problematic that American cities
    did not provide public restrooms on street corners, and with his chronic indigestion
    he was frequently in search of a public lavatory. Also, several Americans addressed
    him as Doc or Sigmund while challenging him to defend his theories, and one
    person tried—unsuccessfully, of course—to prevent him from smoking a cigar in
    a nonsmoking area. Moreover, when Freud, Ferenczi, and Jung went to a private
    camp in western Massachusetts, they were greeted by a barrage of flags of Impe-
    rial Germany, despite the fact that none of them was German and each had reasons
    to dislike Germany. Also at camp, Freud, along with the others, sat on the ground
    while the host grilled steaks over charcoal, a custom Freud deemed to be both
    savage and uncouth (Roazen, 1993).

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories28
    Levels of Mental Life
    Freud’s greatest contribution to personality theory is his exploration of the uncon-
    scious and his insistence that people are motivated primarily by drives of which
    they have little or no awareness. To Freud, mental life is divided into two levels,
    the unconscious and the conscious. The unconscious, in turn, has two different
    levels, the unconscious proper and the preconscious. In Freudian psychology the
    three levels of mental life are used to designate both a process and a location. The
    existence as a specific location, of course, is merely hypothetical and has no real
    existence within the body. Yet, Freud spoke of the unconscious as well as uncon-
    scious processes.
    Unconscious
    The unconscious contains all those drives, urges, or instincts that are beyond our
    awareness but that nevertheless motivate most of our words, feelings, and actions.
    Although we may be conscious of our overt behaviors, we often are not aware of
    the mental processes that lie behind them. For example, a man may know that he
    is attracted to a woman but may not fully understand all the reasons for the attrac-
    tion, some of which may even seem irrational.
    Because the unconscious is not available to the conscious mind, how can one
    know if it really exists? Freud felt that its existence could be proved only indirectly.
    To him the unconscious is the explanation for the meaning behind dreams, slips
    of the tongue, and certain kinds of forgetting, called repression. Dreams serve as
    a particularly rich source of unconscious material. For example, Freud believed
    that childhood experiences can appear in adult dreams even though the dreamer
    has no conscious recollection of these experiences.
    Unconscious processes often enter into consciousness but only after being
    disguised or distorted enough to elude censorship. Freud (1917/1963) used the
    analogy of a guardian or censor blocking the passage between the unconscious and
    preconscious and preventing undesirable anxiety-producing memories from enter-
    ing awareness. To enter the conscious level of the mind, these unconscious images
    first must be sufficiently disguised to slip past the primary censor, and then they
    must elude a final censor that watches the passageway between the preconscious
    and the conscious. By the time these memories enter our conscious mind, we no
    longer recognize them for what they are; instead, we see them as relatively pleas-
    ant, nonthreatening experiences. In most cases, these images have strong sexual or
    aggressive motifs, because childhood sexual and aggressive behaviors are fre-
    quently punished or suppressed. Punishment and suppression often create feelings
    of anxiety, and the anxiety in turn stimulates repression, that is, the forcing of
    unwanted, anxiety-ridden experiences into the unconscious as a defense against the
    pain of that anxiety.
    Not all unconscious processes, however, spring from repression of childhood
    events. Freud believed that a portion of our unconscious originates from the expe-
    riences of our early ancestors that have been passed on to us through hundreds of
    generations of repetition. He called these inherited unconscious images our

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 29
    phylogenetic endowment (Freud, 1917/1963, 1933/1964). Freud’s notion of
    phylogenetic endowment is quite similar to Carl Jung’s idea of a collective uncon-
    scious (see Chapter 4). However, one important difference exists between the two
    concepts. Whereas Jung placed primary emphasis on the collective unconscious,
    Freud relied on the notion of inherited dispositions only as a last resort. That is,
    when explanations built on individual experiences were not adequate, Freud would
    turn to the idea of collectively inherited experiences to fill in the gaps left by
    individual experiences. Later we will see that Freud used the concept of phyloge-
    netic endowment to explain several important concepts, such as the Oedipus com-
    plex and castration anxiety.
    Unconscious drives may appear in consciousness, but only after undergo-
    ing certain transformations. A person may express either erotic or hostile urges,
    for example, by teasing or joking with another person. The original drive (sex
    or aggression) is thus disguised and hidden from the conscious minds of both
    persons. The unconscious of the first person, however, has directly influenced
    the unconscious of the second. Both people gain some satisfaction of either
    sexual or aggressive urges, but neither is conscious of the underlying motive
    behind the teasing or joking. Thus the unconscious mind of one person can
    communicate with the unconscious of another without either person being
    aware of the process.
    Unconscious, of course, does not mean inactive or dormant. Forces in
    the unconscious constantly strive to become conscious, and many of them
    succeed, although they may no longer appear in their original form. Uncon-
    scious ideas can and do motivate people. For example, a son’s hostility
    toward his father may masquerade itself in the form of ostentatious affection.
    In an undisguised form, the hostility would create too much anxiety for the
    son. His unconscious mind, therefore, motivates him to express hostility indi-
    rectly through an exaggerated show of love and flattery. Because the disguise
    must successfully deceive the person, it often takes an opposite form from
    the original feelings, but it is almost always overblown and ostentatious.
    (This mechanism, called a reaction formation, is discussed later in the section
    titled Defense Mechanisms.)
    Preconscious
    The preconscious level of the mind contains all those elements that are not
    conscious but can become conscious either quite readily or with some difficulty
    (Freud, 1933/1964).
    The contents of the preconscious come from two sources, the first of which
    is conscious perception. What a person perceives is conscious for only a transitory
    period; it quickly passes into the preconscious when the focus of attention shifts
    to another idea. These ideas that alternate easily between being conscious and
    preconscious are largely free from anxiety and in reality are much more similar to
    the conscious images than to unconscious urges.
    The second source of preconscious images is the unconscious. Freud believed
    that ideas can slip past the vigilant censor and enter into the preconscious in a

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories30
    disguised form. Some of these images never become conscious because if we
    recognized them as derivatives of the unconscious, we would experience increased
    levels of anxiety, which would activate the final censor to repress these anxiety-
    loaded images, forcing them back into the unconscious. Other images from the
    unconscious do gain admission to consciousness, but only because their true nature
    is cleverly disguised through the dream process, a slip of the tongue, or an elabo-
    rate defensive measure.
    Conscious
    Consciousness, which plays a relatively minor role in psychoanalytic theory,
    can be defined as those mental elements in awareness at any given point in time.
    It is the only level of mental life directly available to us. Ideas can reach con-
    sciousness from two different directions. The first is from the perceptual
    conscious system, which is turned toward the outer world and acts as a medium
    for the perception of external stimuli. In other words, what we perceive through
    our sense organs, if not too threatening, enters into consciousness (Freud,
    1933/1964).
    The second source of conscious elements is from within the mental structure
    and includes nonthreatening ideas from the preconscious as well as menacing but
    well-disguised images from the unconscious. As we have seen, these latter images
    escaped into the preconscious by cloaking themselves as harmless elements and
    evading the primary censor. Once in the preconscious, they avoid a final censor
    and come under the eye of consciousness. By the time they reach the conscious
    system, these images are greatly distorted and camouflaged, often taking the form
    of defensive behaviors or dream elements.
    In summary, Freud (1917/1963, pp. 295–296) compared the unconscious
    to a large entrance hall in which many diverse, energetic, and disreputable peo-
    ple are milling about, crowding one another, and striving incessantly to escape
    to a smaller adjoining reception room. However, a watchful guard protects the
    threshold between the large entrance hall and the small reception room. This
    guard has two methods of preventing undesirables from escaping from the
    entrance hall—either turn them back at the door or throw out those people who
    earlier had clandestinely slipped into the reception room. The effect in either
    case is the same; the menacing, disorderly people are prevented from coming
    into view of an important guest who is seated at the far end of the reception
    room behind a screen. The meaning of the analogy is obvious. The people in
    the entrance hall represent unconscious images. The small reception room is the
    preconscious and its inhabitants represent preconscious ideas. People in the
    reception room (preconscious) may or may not come into view of the important
    guest who, of course, represents the eye of consciousness. The doorkeeper who
    guards the threshold between the two rooms is the primary censor that prevents
    unconscious images from becoming preconscious and renders preconscious
    images unconscious by throwing them back. The screen that guards the impor-
    tant guest is the final censor, and it prevents many, but not all, preconscious
    elements from reaching consciousness. The analogy is presented graphically in
    Figure 2.1.

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 31
    Provinces of the Mind
    For nearly 2 decades, Freud’s only model of the mind was the topographic one we
    have just outlined, and his only portrayal of psychic strife was the conflict between
    conscious and unconscious forces. Then, during the 1920s, Freud (1923/1961a)
    introduced a three-part structural model. This division of the mind into three prov-
    inces did not supplant the topographic model, but it helped Freud explain mental
    images according to their functions or purposes.
    To Freud, the most primitive part of the mind was das Es, or the “it,” which
    is almost always translated into English as id; a second division was das Ich, or
    the “I,” translated as ego; and a final province was das Uber-Ich, or the “over-I,”
    which is rendered into English as superego. These provinces or regions have no
    King
    Reception
    room
    Anteroom
    Screen
    Eye of consciousness
    Final censorship
    Preconscious
    Censorship
    Unconscious
    Doorkeeper
    FIGURE 2.1 Levels of Mental Life.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories32
    territorial existence, of course, but are merely hypothetical constructs. They interact
    with the three levels of mental life so that the ego cuts across the various topographic
    levels and has conscious, preconscious, and unconscious components, whereas the
    superego is both preconscious and unconscious and the id is completely unconscious.
    Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the provinces of the mind and the levels
    of mental life.
    The Id
    At the core of personality and completely unconscious is the psychical region
    called the id, a term derived from the impersonal pronoun meaning “the it,” or the
    not-yet-owned component of personality. The id has no contact with reality, yet it
    strives constantly to reduce tension by satisfying basic desires. Because its sole
    function is to seek pleasure, we say that the id serves the pleasure principle.
    Eye of consciousness
    Final censorship
    Preconscious
    Censorship
    Unconscious
    Id
    Ego
    Superego
    Open to
    somatic influences
    FIGURE 2.2 Levels of Mental Life and Provinces of the Mind.

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 33
    A newborn infant is the personification of an id unencumbered by restrictions
    of ego and superego. The infant seeks gratification of needs without regard for
    what is possible (that is, demands of the ego) or what is proper (that is, restraints
    of the superego). Instead, it sucks when the nipple is either present or absent and
    gains pleasure in either situation. Although the infant receives life-sustaining food
    only by sucking a nurturing nipple, it continues to suck because its id is not in
    contact with reality. The infant fails to realize that thumb-sucking behavior cannot
    sustain life. Because the id has no direct contact with reality, it is not altered by
    the passage of time or by the experiences of the person. Childhood wish impulses
    remain unchanged in the id for decades (Freud, 1933/1964).
    Besides being unrealistic and pleasure seeking, the id is illogical and can
    simultaneously entertain incompatible ideas. For example, a woman may show
    conscious love for her mother while unconsciously wishing to destroy her. These
    opposing desires are possible because the id has no morality; that is, it cannot make
    value judgments or distinguish between good and evil. However, the id is not
    immoral, merely amoral. All of the id’s energy is spent for one purpose—to seek
    pleasure without regard for what is proper or just (Freud, 1923/1961a, 1933/1964).
    In review, the id is primitive, chaotic, inaccessible to consciousness,
    unchangeable, amoral, illogical, unorganized, and filled with energy received from
    basic drives and discharged for the satisfaction of the pleasure principle.
    As the region that houses basic drives (primary motivates), the id operates
    through the primary process. Because it blindly seeks to satisfy the pleasure
    principle, its survival is dependent on the development of a secondary process to
    bring it into contact with the external world. This secondary process functions
    through the ego.
    The Ego
    The ego, or I, is the only region of the mind in contact with reality. It grows out
    of the id during infancy and becomes a person’s sole source of communication
    with the external world. It is governed by the reality principle, which it tries to
    substitute for the pleasure principle of the id. As the sole region of the mind in
    contact with the external world, the ego becomes the decision-making or executive
    branch of personality. However, because it is partly conscious, partly preconscious,
    and partly unconscious, the ego can make decisions on each of these three levels.
    For instance, a woman’s ego may consciously motivate her to choose excessively
    neat, well-tailored clothes because she feels comfortable when well dressed. At the
    same time, she may be only dimly (i.e., preconsciously) aware of previous experi-
    ences of being rewarded for choosing nice clothes. In addition, she may be uncon-
    sciously motivated to be excessively neat and orderly due to early childhood
    experiences of toilet training. Thus, her decision to wear neat clothes can take place
    in all three levels of mental life.
    When performing its cognitive and intellectual functions, the ego must take
    into consideration the incompatible but equally unrealistic demands of the id and
    the superego. In addition to these two tyrants, the ego must serve a third master—
    the external world. Thus, the ego constantly tries to reconcile the blind, irrational
    claims of the id and the superego with the realistic demands of the external world.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories34
    Finding itself surrounded on three sides by divergent and hostile forces, the ego
    reacts in a predictable manner—it becomes anxious. It then uses repression and
    other defense mechanisms to defend itself against this anxiety (Freud, 1926/1959a).
    According to Freud (1933/1964), the ego becomes differentiated from the id
    when infants learn to distinguish themselves from the outer world. While the id
    remains unchanged, the ego continues to develop strategies for handling the id’s
    unrealistic and unrelenting demands for pleasure. At times the ego can control the
    powerful, pleasure-seeking id, but at other times it loses control. In comparing the
    ego to the id, Freud used the analogy of a person on horseback. The rider checks
    and inhibits the greater strength of the horse but is ultimately at the mercy of the
    animal. Similarly, the ego must check and inhibit id impulses, but it is more or
    less constantly at the mercy of the stronger but more poorly organized id. The ego
    has no strength of its own but borrows energy from the id. In spite of this depen-
    dence on the id, the ego sometimes comes close to gaining complete control, for
    instance, during the prime of life of a psychologically mature person.
    As children begin to experience parental rewards and punishments, they learn
    what to do in order to gain pleasure and avoid pain. At this young age, pleasure
    and pain are ego functions because children have not yet developed a conscience
    and ego-ideal: that is, a superego. As children reach the age of 5 or 6 years, they
    identify with their parents and begin to learn what they should and should not do.
    This is the origin of the superego.
    The Superego
    In Freudian psychology, the superego, or above-I, represents the moral and ideal aspects
    of personality and is guided by the moralistic and idealistic principles as opposed to
    the pleasure principle of the id and the realistic principle of the ego. The superego grows
    out of the ego, and like the ego, it has no energy of its own. However, the superego
    differs from the ego in one important respect—it has no contact with the outside world
    and therefore is unrealistic in its demands for perfection (Freud, 1923/1961a).
    The superego has two subsystems, the conscience and the ego-ideal. Freud
    did not clearly distinguish between these two functions, but, in general, the con-
    science results from experiences with punishments for improper behavior and tells
    us what we should not do, whereas the ego-ideal develops from experiences with
    rewards for proper behavior and tells us what we should do. A primitive conscience
    comes into existence when a child conforms to parental standards out of fear of
    loss of love or approval. Later, during the Oedipal phase of development, these
    ideals are internalized through identification with the mother and father. (We dis-
    cuss the Oedipus complex in a later section titled Stages of Development.)
    A well-developed superego acts to control sexual and aggressive impulses
    through the process of repression. It cannot produce repressions by itself, but it can
    order the ego to do so. The superego watches closely over the ego, judging its actions
    and intentions. Guilt is the result when the ego acts—or even intends to act—contrary
    to the moral standards of the superego. Feelings of inferiority arise when the ego is
    unable to meet the superego’s standards of perfection. Guilt, then, is a function of
    the conscience, whereas inferiority feelings stem from the ego-ideal (Freud,
    1933/1964).

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 35
    The superego is not concerned with the happiness of the ego. It strives
    blindly and unrealistically toward perfection. It is unrealistic in the sense that it
    does not take into consideration the difficulties or impossibilities faced by the ego
    in carrying out its orders. Not all its demands, of course, are impossible to fulfill,
    just as not all demands of parents and other authority figures are impossible to
    fulfill. The superego, however, is like the id in that it is completely ignorant of,
    and unconcerned with, the practicability of its requirements.
    Freud (1933/1964) pointed out that the divisions among the different regions
    of the mind are not sharp and well defined. The development of the three divisions
    varies widely in different individuals. For some people, the superego does not
    grow after childhood; for others, the superego may dominate the personality at the
    cost of guilt and inferiority feelings. For yet others, the ego and superego may
    take turns controlling personality, which results in extreme fluctuations of mood
    and alternating cycles of self-confidence and self-deprecation. In the healthy indi-
    vidual, the id and superego are integrated into a smooth functioning ego and
    operate in harmony and with a minimum of conflict. Figure 2.3 shows the relation-
    ships among id, ego, and superego in three hypothetical persons. For the first
    person, the id dominates a weak ego and a feeble superego, preventing the ego
    from counterbalancing its incessant demands of the id and leaving the person
    nearly constantly striving for pleasure regardless of what is possible or proper. The
    second person, with strong feelings of either guilt or inferiority and a weak ego,
    will experience many conflicts because the ego cannot arbitrate the strong but
    opposing demands of the superego and the id. The third person, with a strong ego
    that has incorporated many of the demands of both the id and the superego, is
    psychologically healthy and in control of both the pleasure principle and the
    moralistic principle.
    A pleasure-seeking person
    dominated by the id
    A guilt-ridden or inferior-
    feeling person dominated
    by the superego
    A psychologically healthy
    person dominated by
    the ego
    Id Ego Superego
    FIGURE 2.3 The Relationship among Id, Ego, and Superego in Three Hypothetical
    Persons.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories36
    Dynamics of Personality
    Levels of mental life and provinces of the mind refer to the structure or composi-
    tion of personality; but personalities also do something. Thus, Freud postulated a
    dynamic, or motivational principle, to explain the driving forces behind people’s
    actions. To Freud, people are motivated to seek pleasure and to reduce tension and
    anxiety. This motivation is derived from psychical and physical energy that springs
    from their basic drives.
    Drives
    Freud used the German word Trieb to refer to a drive or a stimulus within the
    person. Freud’s official translators rendered this term as instinct, but more accu-
    rately the word should be “drive” or “impulse.” Drives operate as a constant moti-
    vational force. As an internal stimulus, drives differ from external stimuli in that
    they cannot be avoided through flight.
    According to Freud (1933/1964), the various drives can all be grouped under
    two major headings: sex or Eros and aggression, distraction, or Thanatos. These
    drives originate in the id, but they come under the control of the ego. Each drive
    has its own form of psychic energy: Freud used the word libido for the sex drive,
    but energy from the aggressive drive remains nameless.
    Every basic drive is characterized by an impetus, a source, an aim, and an
    object. A drive’s impetus is the amount of force it exerts; its source is the region
    of the body in a state of excitation or tension; its aim is to seek pleasure by
    removing that excitation or reducing the tension; and its object is the person or
    thing that serves as the means through which the aim is satisfied (Freud,
    1915/1957a).
    Sex
    The aim of the sexual drive is pleasure, but this pleasure is not limited to genital
    satisfaction. Freud believed that the entire body is invested with libido. Besides
    the genitals, the mouth and anus are especially capable of producing sexual plea-
    sure and are called erogenous zones. The ultimate aim of the sexual drive (reduc-
    tion of sexual tension) cannot be changed, but the path by which the aim is reached
    can be varied. It can take either an active or a passive form, or it can be temporar-
    ily or permanently inhibited (Freud, 1915/1957a). Because the path is flexible and
    because sexual pleasure stems from organs other than the genitals, much behavior
    originally motivated by Eros is difficult to recognize as sexual behavior. To Freud,
    however, all pleasurable activity is traceable to the sexual drive.
    The flexibility of the sexual object or person can bring about a further dis-
    guise of Eros. The erotic object can easily be transformed or displaced. Libido can
    be withdrawn from one person and placed in a state of free-floating tension, or it
    can be reinvested in another person, including the self. For example, an infant
    prematurely forced to give up the nipple as a sexual object may substitute the
    thumb as an object of oral pleasure.
    Sex can take many forms, including narcissism, love, sadism, and masoch-
    ism. The latter two also possess generous components of the aggressive drive.

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 37
    Infants are primarily self-centered, with their libido invested almost exclu-
    sively on their own ego. This condition, which is universal, is known as primary
    narcissism. As the ego develops, children usually give up much of their primary
    narcissism and develop a greater interest in other people. In Freud’s language,
    narcissistic libido is then transformed into object libido. During puberty, however,
    adolescents often redirect their libido back to the ego and become preoccupied with
    personal appearance and other self-interests. This pronounced secondary narcis-
    sism is not universal, but a moderate degree of self-love is common to nearly
    everyone (Freud, 1914/1957).
    A second manifestation of Eros is love, which develops when people invest
    their libido on an object or person other than themselves. Children’s first sexual
    interest is the person who cares for them, generally the mother. During infancy
    children of either sex experience sexual love for the mother. Overt sexual love for
    members of one’s family, however, ordinarily is repressed, which brings a second
    type of love into existence. Freud called this second kind of love aim-inhibited
    because the original aim of reducing sexual tension is inhibited or repressed. The
    kind of love people feel for their siblings or parents is generally aim-inhibited.
    Obviously, love and narcissism are closely interrelated. Narcissism involves
    love of self, whereas love is often accompanied by narcissistic tendencies, as when
    people love someone who serves as an ideal or model of what they would like to be.
    Two other drives that are also intertwined are sadism and masochism. Sadism
    is the need for sexual pleasure by inflicting pain or humiliation on another person.
    Carried to an extreme, it is considered a sexual perversion, but in moderation,
    sadism is a common need and exists to some extent in all sexual relationships. It
    is perverted when the sexual aim of erotic pleasure becomes secondary to the
    destructive aim (Freud, 1933/1964).
    Masochism, like sadism, is a common need, but it becomes a perversion
    when Eros becomes subservient to the destructive drive. Masochists experience
    sexual pleasure from suffering pain and humiliation inflicted either by themselves
    or by others. Because masochists can provide self-inflicted pain, they do not
    depend on another person for the satisfaction of masochistic needs. In contrast,
    sadists must seek and find another person on whom to inflict pain or humiliation.
    In this respect, they are more dependent than masochists on other people.
    Aggression
    Partially as a result of his unhappy experiences during World War I and partially
    as a consequence of the death of his beloved daughter Sophie, Freud (1920/1955a)
    wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle, a book that elevated aggression to the level
    of the sexual drive. As he did with many of his other concepts, Freud set forth his
    ideas tentatively and with some caution. With time, however, aggression, like sev-
    eral other tentatively proposed concepts, became dogma.
    The aim of the destructive drive, according to Freud, is to return the organ-
    ism to an inorganic state. Because the ultimate inorganic condition is death, the
    final aim of the aggressive drive is self-destruction. As with the sexual drive,
    aggression is flexible and can take a number of forms, such as teasing, gossip,
    sarcasm, humiliation, humor, and the enjoyment of other people’s suffering. The

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories38
    aggressive tendency is present in everyone and is the explanation for wars, atroc-
    ities, and religious persecution.
    The aggressive drive also explains the need for the barriers that people have
    erected to check aggression. For example, commandments such as “Love thy
    neighbor as thyself” are necessary, Freud believed, to inhibit the strong, though
    usually unconscious, drive to inflict injury on others. These precepts are actually
    reaction formations. They involve the repression of strong hostile impulses and the
    overt and obvious expression of the opposite tendency.
    Throughout our lifetime, life and death impulses constantly struggle against
    one another for ascendancy, but at the same time, both must bow to the reality
    principle, which represents the claims of the outer world. These demands of the
    real world prevent a direct, covert, and unopposed fulfillment of either sex or
    aggression. They frequently create anxiety, which relegates many sexual and
    aggressive desires to the realm of the unconscious.
    Anxiety
    Sex and aggression share the center of Freudian dynamic theory with the concept
    of anxiety. In defining anxiety, Freud (1933/1964) emphasized that it is a felt,
    affective, unpleasant state accompanied by a physical sensation that warns the
    person against impending danger. The unpleasantness is often vague and hard to
    pinpoint, but the anxiety itself is always felt.
    Only the ego can produce or feel anxiety, but the id, superego, and external
    world each are involved in one of three kinds of anxiety—neurotic, moral, and
    realistic. The ego’s dependence on the id results in neurotic anxiety; its dependence
    on the superego produces moral anxiety; and its dependence on the outer world
    leads to realistic anxiety.
    Neurotic anxiety is defined as apprehension about an unknown danger. The
    feeling itself exists in the ego, but it originates from id impulses. People may
    experience neurotic anxiety in the presence of a teacher, employer, or some other
    authority figure because they previously experienced unconscious feelings of
    destruction against one or both parents. During childhood, these feelings of hostil-
    ity are often accompanied by fear of punishment, and this fear becomes generalized
    into unconscious neurotic anxiety.
    A second type of anxiety, moral anxiety, stems from the conflict between
    the ego and the superego. After children establish a superego—usually by the age
    of 5 or 6—they may experience anxiety as an outgrowth of the conflict between
    realistic needs and the dictates of their superego. Moral anxiety, for example,
    would result from sexual temptations if a child believes that yielding to the temp-
    tation would be morally wrong. It may also result from the failure to behave
    consistently with what they regard as morally right, for example, failing to care
    for aging parents.
    A third category of anxiety, realistic anxiety, is closely related to fear. It is
    defined as an unpleasant, nonspecific feeling involving a possible danger. For
    example, we may experience realistic anxiety while driving in heavy, fast-moving
    traffic in an unfamiliar city, a situation fraught with real, objective danger. How-
    ever, realistic anxiety is different from fear in that it does not involve a specific

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 39
    fearful object. We would experience fear, for example, if our motor vehicle sud-
    denly began sliding out of control on an icy highway.
    These three types of anxiety are seldom clear-cut or easily separated. They often
    exist in combination, as when fear of water, a real danger, becomes disproportionate
    to the situation and hence precipitates neurotic anxiety as well as realistic anxiety.
    This situation indicates that an unknown danger is connected with the external one.
    Anxiety serves as an ego-preserving mechanism because it signals us that
    some danger is at hand (Freud, 1933/1964). For example, an anxiety dream signals
    our censor of an impending danger, which allows us to better disguise the dream
    images. Anxiety allows the constantly vigilant ego to be alert for signs of threat
    and danger. The signal of impending danger stimulates us to mobilize for either
    flight or defense.
    Anxiety is also self-regulating because it precipitates repression, which in
    turn reduces the pain of anxiety (Freud, 1933/1964). If the ego had no recourse to
    defensive behavior, the anxiety would become intolerable. Defensive behaviors,
    therefore, serve a useful function by protecting the ego against the pain of anxiety.
    Defense Mechanisms
    Freud first elaborated on the idea of defense mechanisms in 1926 (Freud,
    1926/1959a), and his daughter Anna further refined and organized the concept
    (A. Freud, 1946). Although defense mechanisms are normal and universally used,
    when carried to an extreme they lead to compulsive, repetitive, and neurotic behavior.
    Because we must expend psychic energy to establish and maintain defense mecha-
    nisms, the more defensive we are, the less psychic energy we have left to satisfy id
    impulses. This, of course, is precisely the ego’s purpose in establishing defense
    mechanisms—to avoid dealing directly with sexual and aggressive implosives and
    to defend itself against the anxiety that accompanies them (Freud, 1926/1959a).
    The principal defense mechanisms identified by Freud include repression,
    reaction formation, displacement, fixation, regression, projection, introjection, and
    sublimation.
    Repression
    The most basic defense mechanism, because it is involved in each of the others,
    is repression. Whenever the ego is threatened by undesirable id impulses, it pro-
    tects itself by repressing those impulses; that is, it forces threatening feelings into
    the unconscious (Freud, 1926/1959a). In many cases the repression is then per-
    petuated for a lifetime. For example, a young girl may permanently repress her
    hostility for a younger sister because her hateful feelings create too much anxiety.
    No society permits a complete and uninhibited expression of sex and aggres-
    sion. When children have their hostile or sexual behaviors punished or otherwise
    suppressed, they learn to be anxious whenever they experience these impulses.
    Although this anxiety seldom leads to a complete repression of aggressive and
    sexual drives, it often results in their partial repression.
    What happens to these impulses after they have become unconscious? Freud
    (1933/1964) believed that several possibilities exist. First, the impulses may remain

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories40
    unchanged in the unconscious. Second, they could force their way into conscious-
    ness in an unaltered form, in which case they would create more anxiety than the
    person could handle, and the person would be overwhelmed with anxiety. A third
    and much more common fate of repressed drives is that they are expressed in
    displaced or disguised forms. The disguise, of course, must be clever enough to
    deceive the ego. Repressed drives may be disguised as physical symptoms, for
    example, sexual impotency in a man troubled by sexual guilt. The impotency
    prevents the man from having to deal with the guilt and anxiety that would result
    from normal enjoyable sexual activity. Repressed drives may also find an outlet
    in dreams, slips of the tongue, or one of the other defense mechanisms.
    Reaction Formation
    One of the ways in which a repressed impulse may become conscious is through
    adopting a disguise that is directly opposite its original form. This defense mecha-
    nism is called a reaction formation. Reactive behavior can be identified by its
    exaggerated character and by its obsessive and compulsive form (Freud, 1926/1959a).
    An example of a reaction formation can be seen in a young woman who deeply
    resents and hates her mother. Because she knows that society demands affection
    toward parents, such conscious hatred for her mother would produce too much
    anxiety. To avoid painful anxiety, the young woman concentrates on the opposite
    impulse—love. Her “love” for her mother, however, is not genuine. It is showy,
    exaggerated, and overdone. Other people may easily see the true nature of this love,
    but the woman must deceive herself and cling to her reaction formation, which helps
    conceal the anxiety-arousing truth that she unconsciously hates her mother.
    Displacement
    Freud (1926/1959a) believed that reaction formations are limited to a single
    object; for example, people with reactive love shower affection only on the per-
    son toward whom they feel unconscious hatred. In displacement, however,
    people can redirect their unacceptable urges onto a variety of people or objects
    so that the original impulse is disguised or concealed. For example, a woman
    who is angry at her roommate may displace her anger onto her employees, her
    pet cat, or a stuffed animal. She remains friendly to her roommate, but unlike
    the workings of a reaction formation, she does not exaggerate or overdo her
    friendliness.
    Throughout his writings, Freud used the term “displacement” in several
    ways. In our discussion of the sexual drive, for example, we saw that the sexual
    object can be displaced or transformed onto a variety of other objects, including
    one’s self. Freud (1926/1959a) also used displacement to refer to the replacement of
    one neurotic symptom for another; for example, a compulsive urge to masturbate may
    be replaced by compulsive hand washing. Displacement also is involved in dream
    formation, as when the dreamer’s destructive urges toward a parent are placed onto
    a dog or wolf. In this event, a dream about a dog being hit by a car might reflect the
    dreamer’s unconscious wish to see the parent destroyed. (We discuss dream
    formation more completely in the section on dream analysis.)

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 41
    Fixation
    Psychical growth normally proceeds in a somewhat continuous fashion through the
    various stages of development. The process of psychologically growing up, how-
    ever, is not without stressful and anxious moments. When the prospect of taking
    the next step becomes too anxiety provoking, the ego may resort to the strategy
    of remaining at the present, more comfortable psychological stage. Such a defense
    is called fixation. Technically, fixation is the permanent attachment of the libido
    onto an earlier, more primitive stage of development (Freud, 1917/1963). Like
    other defense mechanisms, fixations are universal. People who continually derive
    pleasure from eating, smoking, or talking may have an oral fixation, whereas those
    who are obsessed with neatness and orderliness may possess an anal fixation.
    Regression
    Once the libido has passed a developmental stage, it may, during times of stress
    and anxiety, revert back to that earlier stage. Such a reversion is known as regres-
    sion (Freud, 1917/1963). Regressions are quite common and are readily visible in
    children. For example, a completely weaned child may regress to demanding a
    bottle or nipple when a baby brother or sister is born. The attention given to the
    new baby poses a threat to the older child. Regressions are also frequent in older
    children and in adults. A common way for adults to react to anxiety-producing
    situations is to revert to earlier, safer, more secure patterns of behavior and to
    invest their libido onto more primitive and familiar objects. Under extreme stress
    one adult may adopt the fetal position, another may return home to mother, and
    still another may react by remaining all day in bed, well covered from the cold
    and threatening world. Regressive behavior is similar to fixated behavior in that it
    is rigid and infantile. Regressions, however, are usually temporary, whereas fixa-
    tions demand a more or less permanent expenditure of psychic energy.
    Projection
    When an internal impulse provokes too much anxiety, the ego may reduce that
    anxiety by attributing the unwanted impulse to an external object, usually another
    person. This is the defense mechanism of projection, which can be defined as see-
    ing in others unacceptable feelings or tendencies that actually reside in one’s own
    unconscious (Freud, 1915/1957b). For example, a man may consistently interpret
    the actions of older women as attempted seductions. Consciously, the thought of
    sexual intercourse with older women may be intensely repugnant to him, but buried
    in his unconscious is a strong erotic attraction to these women. In this example, the
    young man deludes himself into believing that he has no sexual feelings for older
    women. Although this projection erases most of his anxiety and guilt, it permits
    him to maintain a sexual interest in women who remind him of his mother.
    An extreme type of projection is paranoia, a mental disorder characterized
    by powerful delusions of jealousy and persecution. Paranoia is not an inevitable
    outcome of projection but simply a severe variety of it. According to Freud
    (1922/1955), a crucial distinction between projection and paranoia is that paranoia

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories42
    is always characterized by repressed homosexual feelings toward the persecutor.
    Freud believed that the persecutor is inevitably a former friend of the same sex,
    although sometimes people may transfer their delusions onto a person of the oppo-
    site sex. When homosexual impulses become too powerful, persecuted paranoiacs
    defend themselves by reversing these feelings and then projecting them onto their
    original object. For men, the transformation proceeds as follows. Instead of saying,
    “I love him,” the paranoid person says, “I hate him.” Because this also produces
    too much anxiety, he says, “He hates me.” At this point, the person has disclaimed
    all responsibility and can say, “I like him fine, but he’s got it in for me.” The
    central mechanism in all paranoia is projection with accompanying delusions of
    jealousy and persecution.
    Introjection
    Whereas projection involves placing an unwanted impulse onto an external object,
    introjection is a defense mechanism whereby people incorporate positive qualities
    of another person into their own ego. For example, an adolescent may introject or
    adopt the mannerisms, values, or lifestyle of a movie star. Such an introjection
    gives the adolescent an inflated sense of self-worth and keeps feelings of inferior-
    ity to a minimum. People introject characteristics that they see as valuable and that
    will permit them to feel better about themselves.
    Freud (1926/1959a) saw the resolution of the Oedipus complex as the prototype
    of introjection. During the Oedipal period, the young child introjects the authority
    and values of one or both parents—an introjection that sets into motion the beginning
    of the superego. When children introject what they perceive to be their parents’
    values, they are relieved from the work of evaluating and choosing their own beliefs
    and standards of conduct. As children advance through the latency period of devel-
    opment (approximately ages 6 to 12), their superego becomes more personalized;
    that is, it moves away from a rigid identification with parents. Nevertheless, people
    of any age can reduce the anxiety associated with feelings of inadequacy by adopt-
    ing or introjecting the values, beliefs, and mannerisms of other people.
    Sublimation
    Each of these defense mechanisms serves the individual by protecting the ego from
    anxiety, but each is of dubious value from society’s viewpoint. According to Freud
    (1917/1963), one mechanism—sublimation—helps both the individual and the social
    group. Sublimation is the repression of the genital aim of Eros by substituting a
    cultural or social aim. The sublimated aim is expressed most obviously in creative
    cultural accomplishments such as art, music, and literature, but more subtly, it is part
    of all human relationships and all social pursuits. Freud (1914/1953) believed that
    the art of Michelangelo, who found an indirect outlet for his libido in painting and
    sculpting, was an excellent example of sublimation. In most people, sublimations
    combine with direct expression of Eros and result in a kind of balance between social
    accomplishments and personal pleasures. Most of us are capable of sublimating a
    part of our libido in the service of higher cultural values, while at the same time
    retaining sufficient amounts of the sexual drive to pursue individual erotic pleasure.

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 43
    In summary, all defense mechanisms protect the ego against anxiety. They
    are universal in that everyone engages in defensive behavior to some degree. Each
    defense mechanism combines with repression, and each can be carried to the point
    of psychopathology. Normally, however, defense mechanisms are beneficial to the
    individual and harmless to society. In addition, one defense mechanism—sublima-
    tion—usually benefits both the individual and society.
    Stages of Development
    Although Freud had little firsthand experience with children (including his own),
    his developmental theory is almost exclusively a discussion of early childhood. To
    Freud, the first 4 or 5 years of life, or the infantile stage, are the most crucial for
    personality formation. This stage is followed by a 6- or 7-year period of latency
    during which time little or no sexual growth takes place. Then at puberty, a renais-
    sance of sexual life occurs, and the genital stage is ushered in. Psychosexual
    development eventually culminates in maturity.
    Infantile Period
    One of Freud’s (1905/1953b, 1923/1961b) most important assumptions is that
    infants possess a sexual life and go through a period of pregenital sexual develop-
    ment during the first 4 or 5 years after birth. At the time Freud originally wrote
    about infantile sexuality, the concept, though not new, was met with some resis-
    tance. Today, however, nearly all close observers accept the idea that children show
    an interest in the genitals, delight in sexual pleasure, and manifest sexual excitement.
    Childhood sexuality differs from adult sexuality in that it is not capable of reproduc-
    tion and is exclusively autoerotic. With both children and adults, however, the
    sexual impulses can be satisfied through organs other than the genitals. The mouth
    and anus are particularly sensitive to erogenous stimulation (Freud, 1933/1964).
    Freud (1917/1963) divided the infantile stage into three phases according to
    which of the three primary erogenous zones is undergoing the most salient devel-
    opment. The oral phase begins first and is followed in order by the anal phase and
    the phallic phase. The three infantile stages overlap with one another and each
    continues after the onset of later stages.
    Oral Phase
    Because the mouth is the first organ to provide an infant with pleasure, Freud’s
    first infantile stage of development is the oral phase. Infants obtain life-sustaining
    nourishment through the oral cavity, but beyond that, they also gain pleasure
    through the act of sucking.
    The sexual aim of early oral activity is to incorporate or receive into one’s
    body the object-choice, that is, the nipple. During this oral-receptive phase, infants
    feel no ambivalence toward the pleasurable object and their needs are usually
    satisfied with a minimum of frustration and anxiety. As they grow older, however,
    they are more likely to experience feelings of frustration and anxiety as a result of
    scheduled feedings, increased time lapses between feedings, and eventual weaning.

    44 Part II Psychodynamic Theories
    These anxieties are generally accompanied by feelings of ambiva-
    lence toward their love object (mother), and by the increased abil-
    ity of their budding ego to defend itself against the environment
    and against anxiety (Freud, 1933/1964).
    Infants’ defense against the environment is greatly aided by
    the emergence of teeth. At this point, they pass into a second oral
    phase, which Freud (1933/1964) called the oral-sadistic period.
    During this phase, infants respond to others through biting, cooing,
    closing their mouth, smiling, and crying. Their first autoerotic
    experience is thumb sucking, a defense against anxiety that satis-
    fies their sexual but not their nutritional needs.
    As children grow older, the mouth continues to be an erog-
    enous zone, and by the time they become adults, they are capable
    of gratifying their oral needs in a variety o~ ays, including suck-
    ing candy, chewing gum, biting pencils, overeating, smoking
    cigarettes, pipes and cigars, and making biting, sarcastic remarks.
    Anal Phase
    The aggressive drive, which during the first year of life takes the
    Infants satisfy oral needs one way or another.
    form of oral sadism, readies fu nler development during the second
    © Ingram Publishing/ AGE Fotostock /
    year when the anu emerges as a sexually pleasurable zone. Because
    this period is characterized by satisfaction gained through aggressive behavior and
    through the excretory function, Freutl (1933/1964) called it the sadistic-anal phase
    or, more briefly, the anal P.hase of development. This phase is divided into two
    subphases, the early anal and t e late anal.
    During the early a al period, children receive satisfaction by destroying or
    losing objects. At this time, the destructive nature of the sadistic drive is stronger
    than the erotic one, and children often behave aggressively toward their parents
    for frustrating them with toilet training.
    Then, when children enter the late anal period, they sometimes take a friendly
    interest toward their feces, an interest that stems from the erotic pleasure of defecat-
    ing. requently, children will present their feces to the parents as a valued prize
    (Freu , 1933/1964). If their behavior is accepted and praised by their parents, then
    children are likely to grow into generous and magnanimous adults. However, if their
    “gift” is rejected in a punitive fashion, children may adopt another method of obtain-
    ing anal pleasure-withholding the feces until the pressure becomes both painful
    and erotically stimulating. This mode of narcissistic and masochistic pleasure lays
    the foundation for the anal character-people who continue to receive erotic sat-
    isfaction by keeping and possessing objects and by arranging them in an excessively
    neat and orderly fashion. Freud (1933/1964) hypothesized that people who grow
    into anal characters were, as children, overly resistant to toilet training, often hold-
    ing back their feces and prolonging the time of training beyond that usually required.
    This anal eroticism becomes transformed into the anal triad of orderliness, stingi-
    ness, and obstinacy that typifies the adult anal character.
    Freud (1933/1964) believed that, for girls, anal eroticism is carried over into
    penis envy during the phallic stage and can eventually be expressed by giving birth

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 45
    to a baby. He also believed that in the unconscious the concepts of penis and
    baby—because both are referred to as a “little one”—mean the same thing. Also,
    feces, because of its elongated shape and because it has been removed from the
    body, is indistinguishable from baby, and all three concepts—penis, baby, and
    feces—are represented by the same symbols in dreams.
    During the oral and anal stages, no basic distinction exists between male and
    female psychosexual growth. Children of either gender can develop an active or a
    passive orientation. The active attitude often is characterized by what Freud
    (1933/1964) considered the masculine qualities of dominance and sadism, whereas
    the passive orientation is usually marked by the feminine qualities of voyeurism
    and masochism. However, either orientation, or any combination of the two, can
    develop in both girls and boys.
    Phallic Phase
    At approximately 3 or 4 years of age, children begin a third stage of infantile
    development—the phallic phase, a time when the genital area becomes the leading
    erogenous zone. This stage is marked for the first time by a dichotomy between
    male and female development, a distinction that Freud (1925/1961) believed to be
    due to the anatomical differences between the sexes. Freud (1924/1961, p. 178) took
    Napoleon’s remark that “History is destiny” and changed it to “Anatomy is destiny.”
    This dictum underlies Freud’s belief that physical differences between males and
    females account for many important psychological differences.
    Masturbation, which originated during the oral stage, now enters a second,
    more crucial phase. During the phallic stage, masturbation is nearly universal, but
    because parents generally suppress these activities, children usually repress their
    conscious desire to masturbate by the time their phallic period comes to an end.
    Just as children’s earlier experiences with weaning and toilet training helped shape
    the foundation of their psychosexual development, so too does their experience
    with the suppression of masturbation (Freud, 1933/1964). However, their experi-
    ence with the Oedipus complex plays an even more crucial role in their person-
    ality development.
    Male Oedipus Complex Freud (1925/1961) believed that preceding the phallic
    stage an infant boy forms an identification with his father; that is, he wants to be
    his father. Later he develops a sexual desire for his mother; that is, he wants to
    have his mother. These two wishes do not appear mutually contradictory to the
    underdeveloped ego, so they are able to exist side by side for a time. When the boy
    finally recognizes their inconsistency, he gives up his identification with his father
    and retains the stronger feeling—the desire to have his mother. The boy now sees
    his father as a rival for the mother’s love. He desires to do away with his father
    and possess his mother in a sexual relationship. This condition of rivalry toward
    the father and incestuous feelings toward the mother is known as the simple male
    Oedipus complex. The term is taken from the Greek tragedy by Sophocles in which
    Oedipus, King of Thebes, is destined by fate to kill his father and marry his mother.
    Freud (1923/1961a) believed that the bisexual nature of the child (of either
    gender) complicates this picture. Before a young boy enters the Oedipus stage,

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories46
    The onset of gender awareness is an important part of the Oedipal complex.
    he develops some amount of a feminine disposition. During the Oedipal period,
    therefore, his feminine nature may lead him to display affection toward his father
    and express hostility toward his mother, while at the same time his masculine
    tendency disposes him toward hostility for father and lust for mother. During this
    ambivalent condition, known as the complete Oedipus complex, affection and
    hostility coexist because one or both feelings may be unconscious. Freud believed
    that these feelings of ambivalence in a boy play a role in the evolution of the
    castration complex, which for boys takes the form of castration anxiety or the
    fear of losing the penis.
    To Freud (1905/1953b, 1917/1963, 1923/1961b), the castration complex
    begins after a young boy (who has assumed that all other people, including girls,
    have genitals like his own) becomes aware of the absence of a penis on girls. This
    awareness becomes the greatest emotional shock of his life. After a period of
    mental struggle and attempts at denial, the young boy is forced to conclude that
    the girl has had her penis cut off. This belief may be reinforced by parental threats
    to punish the boy for his sexual behaviors. The boy is then forced to conclude that
    the little girl has been punished by having her penis removed because she mastur-
    bated or because she seduced her mother. For the boy, the threat of castration now
    becomes a dreaded possibility. Because this castration anxiety cannot long be tol-
    erated, the boy represses his impulses toward sexual activity, including his fantasies
    of carrying out a seduction of his mother.
    Prior to his sudden experience of castration anxiety, the little boy may have
    “seen” the genital area of little girls or his mother, but this sight does not automatically

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 47
    instigate the castration complex. Castration anxiety bursts forth only when the
    boy’s ego is mature enough to comprehend the connection between sexual desires
    and the removal of the penis.
    Freud believed that castration anxiety was present in all boys, even those not
    personally threatened with the removal of their penis or the stunting of its growth.
    According to Freud (1933/1964), a boy does not need to receive a clear threat of
    castration. Any mention of injury or shrinkage in connection with the penis is suf-
    ficient to activate the child’s phylogenetic endowment. Phylogenetic endowment is
    capable of filling the gaps of our individual experiences with the inherited experi-
    ences of our ancestors. Ancient man’s fear of castration supports the individual
    child’s experiences and results in universal castration anxiety. Freud stated: “It is
    not a question of whether castration is really carried out; what is decisive is that
    the danger threatens from the outside and that the child believes in it.” He went
    on to say that
    hints at . . . punishment must regularly find a phylogenetic reinforcement in him.
    It is our suspicion that during the human family’s primaeval period castration
    used actually to be carried out by a jealous and cruel father upon growing boys,
    and that circumcision, which so frequently plays a part in puberty rites among
    primitive peoples, is a clearly recognizable relic of it. (pp. 86–87)
    Once his Oedipus complex is dissolved or repressed, the boy surrenders his
    incestuous desires, changes them into feelings of tender love, and begins to develop
    a primitive superego. He may identify with either the father or the mother, depend-
    ing on the strength of his feminine disposition. Normally identification is with the
    father, but it is not the same as pre-Oedipal identification. The boy no longer wants
    to be his father; instead, he uses his father as a model for determining right and
    wrong behavior. He introjects or incorporates his father’s authority into his own
    ego, thereby sowing the seeds of a mature superego. The budding superego takes
    over his father’s prohibitions against incest and ensures the continued repression
    of the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1933/1964).
    Female Oedipus Complex The phallic phase takes a more complicated path for
    girls than for boys, and these differences are due to anatomical differences between
    the sexes (Freud, 1925/1961). Like boys, pre-Oedipal girls assume that all other
    children have genitals similar to their own. Soon they discover that boys not only
    possess different genital equipment, but apparently something extra. Girls then
    become envious of this appendage, feel cheated, and desire to have a penis. This
    experience of penis envy is a powerful force in the formation of girls’ personality.
    Unlike castration anxiety in boys, which is quickly repressed, penis envy may last
    for years in one form or another. Freud (1933/1964) believed that penis envy is
    often expressed as a wish to be a boy or a desire to have a man. Almost universally,
    it is carried over into a wish to have a baby, and eventually it may find expression
    in the act of giving birth to a baby, especially a boy.
    Preceding the castration complex, a girl establishes an identification with her
    mother similar to that developed by a boy; that is, she fantasizes being seduced by
    her mother. These incestuous feelings, according to Freud (1933/1964), are later

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories48
    turned into hostility when the girl holds her mother responsible for bringing her
    into the world without a penis. Her libido is then turned toward her father, who
    can satisfy her wish for a penis by giving her a baby, an object that to her has
    become a substitute for the phallus. The desire for sexual intercourse with the
    father and accompanying feelings of hostility for the mother are known as the
    simple female Oedipus complex. Incidentally, Freud (1920/1955b, 1931/1961)
    objected to the term Electra complex, sometimes used by others when referring to
    the female Oedipus complex, because it suggests a direct parallel between male
    and female development during the phallic stage. Freud believed that no such
    parallel exists and that differences in anatomy determine different courses in male
    and female sexual development after the phallic stage.
    Not all girls, however, transfer their sexual interest onto their father and
    develop hostility toward their mother. Freud (1931/1961, 1933/1964) suggested
    that when pre-Oedipal girls acknowledge their castration and recognize their infe-
    riority to boys, they will rebel in one of three ways. First, they may give up their
    sexuality—both the feminine and the masculine dispositions—and develop an
    intense hostility toward their mother; second, they may cling defiantly to their
    masculinity, hoping for a penis and fantasizing being a man; and third, they may
    develop normally: that is, they may take their father as a sexual choice and
    undergo the simple Oedipus complex. A girl’s choice is influenced in part by her
    inherent bisexuality and the degree of masculinity she developed during the pre-
    Oedipal period.
    The simple female Oedipus complex is resolved when a girl gives up
    masturbatory activity, surrenders her sexual desire for her father, and identifies
    once again with her mother. However, the female Oedipus complex is usually
    broken up more slowly and less completely than is the male’s. Because the
    superego is built from the relics of the shattered Oedipus complex, Freud
    (1924/1961, 1933/1964) believed that the girl’s superego is usually weaker,
    more flexible, and less severe than the boy’s. The reason the girl’s superego is
    not as strict as the boy’s is traceable to the difference between the sexes during
    their Oedipal histories. For boys, castration anxiety follows the Oedipus com-
    plex, breaks it up nearly completely, and renders unnecessary the continued
    expenditure of psychic energy on its remnants. Once the Oedipus complex is
    shattered, energy used to maintain it is free to establish a superego. For girls,
    however, the Oedipus complex follows the castration complex (penis envy), and
    because girls do not experience a threat of castration, they experience no trau-
    matic sudden shock. The female Oedipus complex is only incompletely resolved
    by the girl’s gradual realization that she may lose the love of her mother and
    that sexual intercourse with her father is not forthcoming. Her libido thus
    remains partially expended to maintain the castration complex and its relics,
    thereby blocking some psychic energy that might otherwise be used to build a
    strong superego (Freud, 1931/1961).
    In summary, the female and male phallic stages take quite different routes.
    First, the castration complex for girls takes the form of penis envy—not castration
    anxiety. Second, penis envy precedes the female Oedipus complex, whereas for
    boys the opposite is true; that is, the castration anxiety follows the male Oedipus
    complex. Third, because penis envy takes place prior to the female Oedipus com-

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 49
    plex, little girls do not experience a traumatic event comparable to boys’ castration
    anxiety. Fourth, because girls do not experience this traumatic event, the female
    Oedipus complex is more slowly and less completely dissolved than the male
    Oedipus complex.
    The simple male and female Oedipus complexes are summarized in Table 2.1.
    Freud presented his views on the female Oedipus complex more tentatively
    than he did his ideas regarding the male phallic stage. Although he framed these
    views on femininity in a tentative and provisional manner, he soon began to vigor-
    ously defend them. When some of his followers objected to his harsh view of
    women, Freud became even more adamant in his position and insisted that psycho-
    logical differences between men and women could not be erased by culture because
    they were the inevitable consequences of anatomical differences between the sexes
    (Freud, 1925/1961). This rigid public stance on feminine development has led some
    writers (Brannon, 2005; Breger, 2000; Chodorow, 1989, 1991, 1994; Irigaray, 1986;
    Krausz, 1994) to criticize him as being sexist and uncomplimentary to women.
    Despite his steadfast public position, Freud privately was uncertain that his views
    on women represented a final answer. One year after his pronouncement that “anatomy
    is destiny,” he expressed some doubts, admitting that his understanding of girls and
    women was incomplete. “We know less about the sexual life of little girls than of boys.
    But we need not feel ashamed of this distinction; after all, the sexual life of adult
    women is a ‘dark continent’ for psychology” (Freud 1926/1959b, p. 212).
    Throughout his career, Freud often proposed theories without much clinical
    or experimental evidence to support them. He would later come to see most of
    these theories as established facts, even though he possessed no intervening sub-
    stantiating evidence. For as long as he lived, however, he remained doubtful of the
    absolute validity of his theories on women. Freud once admitted to his friend Marie
    Bonaparte that he did not understand women: “The great question that has never
    been answered and which I have not yet been able to answer, despite my thirty
    T A B L E 2 . 1
    Parallel Paths of the Simple Male and Female Phallic Phases
    Male Phallic Phase
    1. Oedipus complex (sexual desires for
    the mother/hostility for the father)
    2. Castration complex in the form of
    castration anxiety shatters the
    Oedipus complex
    3. Identification with the father
    4. Strong superego replaces the nearly
    completely dissolved Oedipus
    complex
    Female Phallic Phase
    1. Castration complex in the form of
    penis envy
    2. Oedipus complex develops as an
    attempt to obtain a penis (sexual
    desires for the father; hostility for
    the mother)
    3. Gradual realization that the Oedipal
    desires are self-defeating
    4. Identification with the mother
    5. Weak superego replaces the partially
    dissolved Oedipus complex

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories50
    years of research into the feminine soul is ‘What does a woman want?’ ” (E. Jones,
    1955, p. 421). Such a question posed after many years of theorizing suggests that
    Freud regarded women not only as quite different from men, but as enigmas, not
    comprehensible to the male gender.
    Latency Period
    Freud believed that, from the 4th or 5th year until puberty, both boys and girls
    usually, but not always, go through a period of dormant psychosexual development.
    This latency stage is brought about partly by parents’ attempts to punish or discour-
    age sexual activity in their young children. If parental suppression is successful,
    children will repress their sexual drive and direct their psychic energy toward
    school, friendships, hobbies, and other nonsexual activities.
    However, the latency stage may also have roots in our phylogenetic endow-
    ment. Freud (1913/1953, 1926/1951b) suggested that the Oedipus complex and
    the subsequent period of sexual latency might be explained by the following
    hypothesis. Early in human development, people lived in families headed by a
    powerful father who reserved all sexual relationships to himself and who killed
    or drove away his sons, whom he saw as a threat to his authority. Then one day
    the sons joined together, overwhelmed, killed, and devoured (ate) their father.
    However, the brothers were individually too weak to take over their father’s her-
    itage, so they banded together in a clan or totem and established prohibitions
    against what they had just done; that is, they outlawed both killing one’s father
    and having sexual relations with female members of one’s family. Later, when
    they became fathers, they suppressed sexual activity in their own children when-
    ever it became noticeable, probably around 3 or 4 years of age. When suppression
    became complete, it led to a period of sexual latency. After this experience was
    repeated over a period of many generations, it became an active though uncon-
    scious force in an individual’s psychosexual development. Thus, the prohibition
    of sexual activity is part of our phylogenetic endowment and needs no personal
    experiences of punishment for sexual activities to repress the sexual drive. Freud
    (1926/1951b) merely suggested this hypothesis as one possible explanation for
    the latency period, and he was careful to point out that it was unsupported by
    anthropological data.
    Continued latency is reinforced through constant suppression by parents and
    teachers and by internal feelings of shame, guilt, and morality. The sexual drive,
    of course, still exists during latency, but its aim has been inhibited. The sublimated
    libido now shows itself in social and cultural accomplishments. During this time
    children form groups or cliques, an impossibility during the infantile period when
    the sexual drive was completely autoerotic.
    Genital Period
    Puberty signals a reawakening of the sexual aim and the beginning of the genital
    period. During puberty, the diphasic sexual life of a person enters a second stage,
    which has basic differences from the infantile period (Freud, 1923/1961b). First,
    adolescents give up autoeroticism and direct their sexual energy toward another

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 51
    person instead of toward themselves. Second, reproduction is now possible. Third,
    although penis envy may continue to linger in girls, the vagina finally obtains the
    same status for them that the penis had for them during infancy. Parallel to this,
    boys now see the female organ as a sought-after object rather than a source of
    trauma. Fourth, the entire sexual drive takes on a more complete organization, and the
    component drives that had operated somewhat independently during the early infan-
    tile period gain a kind of synthesis during adolescence; thus, the mouth, anus, and
    other pleasure-producing areas take an auxiliary position to the genitals, which now
    attain supremacy as an erogenous zone.
    This synthesis of Eros, the elevated status of the vagina, the reproductive
    capacity of the sexual drive, and ability of people to direct their libido outward
    rather than onto the self represent the major distinctions between infantile and adult
    sexuality. In several other ways, however, Eros remains unchanged. It may con-
    tinue to be repressed, sublimated; or expressed in masturbation or other sexual acts.
    The subordinated erogenous zones also continue as vehicles of erotic pleasure. The
    mouth, for example, retains many of its infantile activities; a person may discon-
    tinue thumb sucking but may add smoking or prolonged kissing.
    Maturity
    The genital period begins at puberty and continues throughout the individual’s life-
    time. It is a stage attained by everyone who reaches physical maturity. In addition
    to the genital stage, Freud alluded to but never fully conceptualized a period of
    psychological maturity, a stage attained after a person has passed through the earlier
    developmental periods in an ideal manner. Unfortunately, psychological maturity
    seldom happens, because people have too many opportunities to develop patho-
    logical disorders or neurotic predispositions.
    Although Freud never fully conceptualized the notion of psychological
    maturity, we can draw a sketch of psychoanalytically mature individuals. Such
    people would have a balance among the structures of the mind, with their ego
    controlling their id and superego but at the same time allowing for reasonable
    desires and demands (see Figure 2.3). Therefore, their id impulses would be
    expressed honestly and consciously with no traces of shame or guilt, and their
    superego would move beyond parental identification and control with no remnants
    of antagonism or incest. Their ego-ideal would be realistic and congruent with
    their ego, and in fact, the boundary between their superego and their ego would
    become nearly imperceptible.
    Consciousness would play a more important role in the behavior of mature
    people, who would have only a minimal need to repress sexual and aggressive urges.
    Indeed, most of the repressions of psychologically healthy individuals would emerge
    in the form of sublimations rather than neurotic symptoms. Because the Oedipus
    complex of mature people is completely or nearly completely dissolved, their libido,
    which formerly was directed toward parents, would be released to search for both
    tender and sensual love. In short, psychologically mature people would come
    through the experiences of childhood and adolescence in control of their psychic
    energy and with their ego functioning in the center of an ever-expanding world of
    consciousness.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories52
    Applications of Psychoanalytic Theory
    Freud was an innovative speculator, probably more concerned with theory build-
    ing than with treating sick people. He spent much of his time conducting therapy
    not only to help patients but to gain the insight into human personality necessary
    to expound psychoanalytic theory. This section looks at Freud’s early therapeu-
    tic technique, his later technique, and his views on dreams and unconscious slips.
    Freud’s Early Therapeutic Technique
    Prior to his use of the rather passive psychotherapeutic technique of free associa-
    tion, Freud had relied on a much more active approach. In Studies on Hysteria
    (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1955), Freud described his technique of extracting repressed
    childhood memories:
    I placed my hand on the patient’s forehead or took her head between my hands
    and said: “You will think of it under the pressure of my hand. At the moment
    at which I relax my pressure you will see something in front of you or
    something will come into your head. Catch hold of it. It will be what we are
    looking for.—Well, what have you seen or what has occurred to you?”
    On the first occasions on which I made use of this procedure . . . I myself
    was surprised to find that it yielded me the precise results that I needed.
    (pp. 110–111)
    Indeed, such a highly suggestive procedure was very likely to yield the precise
    results Freud needed, namely, the confession of a childhood seduction. Moreover,
    Freud’s consulting room. © Heeb Christian/Prisma Bildagentur AG/Alamy Stock Photo

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 53
    while using both dream interpretation and hypnosis, Freud told his patients to expect
    that scenes of childhood sexual experiences would come forth (Freud, 1896/1962).
    In his autobiography written nearly 30 years after he abandoned his seduction
    theory, Freud (1925/1959) stated that under the pressure technique, a majority of his
    patients reproduced childhood scenes in which they were sexually seduced by some
    adult. When he was obliged to recognize that “these scenes of seduction had never
    taken place, and that they were only phantasies which my patients had made up or
    which I myself had perhaps forced upon them [italics added], I was for some time
    completely at a loss” (p. 34). He was at a loss, however, for a very short time. Within
    days after his September 21, 1897, letter to Fliess, he concluded that “the neurotic
    symptoms were not related directly to actual events but to phantasies. . . . I had in
    fact stumbled for the first time upon the Oedipus complex” (Freud, 1925/1959, p. 34).
    In time, Freud came to realize that his highly suggestive and even coercive
    tactics may have elicited memories of seduction from his patients and that he lacked
    clear evidence that these memories were real. Freud became increasingly convinced
    that neurotic symptoms were related to childhood fantasies rather than to material
    reality, and he gradually adopted a more passive psychotherapeutic technique.
    Freud’s Later Therapeutic Technique
    The primary goal of Freud’s later psychoanalytic therapy was to uncover repressed
    memories through free association and dream analysis. “Our therapy works by
    transforming what is unconscious into what is conscious, and it works only in so
    far as it is in a position to effect that transformation” (Freud, 1917/1963, p. 280).
    More specifically, the purpose of psychoanalysis is “to strengthen the ego, to make
    it more independent of the superego, to widen its field of perception and enlarge
    its organization, so that it can appropriate fresh portions of the id. Where id was,
    there ego shall be” (Freud, 1933/1964, p. 80).
    With free association, patients are required to verbalize every thought that
    comes to their mind, no matter how irrelevant or repugnant it may appear. The
    purpose of free association is to arrive at the unconscious by starting with a pres-
    ent conscious idea and following it through a train of associations to wherever it
    leads. The process is not easy and some patients never master it. For this reason,
    dream analysis remained a favorite therapeutic technique with Freud. (We discuss
    dream analysis in the next section.)
    In order for analytic treatment to be successful, libido previously expended
    on the neurotic symptom must be freed to work in the service of the ego. This
    takes place in a two-phase procedure. “In the first, all the libido is forced from the
    symptoms into the transference and concentrated there; in the second, the struggle
    is waged around this new object and the libido is liberated from it” (Freud,
    1917/1963, p. 455).
    The transference situation is vital to psychoanalysis. Transference refers to
    the strong sexual or aggressive feelings, positive or negative, that patients develop
    toward their analyst during the course of treatment. Transference feelings are unearned
    by the therapist and are merely transferred to her or him from patients’ earlier expe-
    riences, usually with their parents. In other words, patients feel toward the analyst
    the same way they previously felt toward one or both parents. As long as these

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories54
    feelings manifest themselves as interest or love, transference does not interfere with
    the process of treatment but is a powerful ally to the therapeutic progress. Positive
    transference permits patients to more or less relive childhood experiences within the
    nonthreatening climate of the analytic treatment. However, negative transference in
    the form of hostility must be recognized by the therapist and explained to patients
    so that they can overcome any resistance to treatment (Freud, 1905/1953a,
    1917/1963). Resistance, which refers to a variety of unconscious responses used by
    patients to block their own progress in therapy, can be a positive sign because it
    indicates that therapy has advanced beyond superficial material.
    Freud (1933/1964) noted several limitations of psychoanalytic treatment.
    First, not all old memories can or should be brought into consciousness. Second,
    treatment is not as effective with psychoses or with constitutional illnesses as it is
    with phobias, hysterias, and obsessions. A third limitation, by no means peculiar
    to psychoanalysis, is that a patient, once cured, may later develop another psychic
    problem. Recognizing these limitations, Freud felt that psychoanalysis could be
    used in conjunction with other therapies. However, he repeatedly insisted that it
    could not be shortened or modified in any essential way.
    Ideally, when analytic treatment is successful, patients no longer suffer from
    debilitating symptoms, they use their psychic energy to perform ego functions, and
    they have an expanded ego that includes previously repressed experiences. They
    do not experience a major personality change, but they do become what they might
    have been under the most favorable conditions.
    Dream Analysis
    Freud used dream analysis to transform the manifest content of dreams to the
    more important latent content. The manifest content of a dream is the surface
    meaning or the conscious description given by the dreamer, whereas the latent
    content refers to its unconscious material.
    The basic assumption of Freud’s dream analysis is that nearly all dreams are
    wish fulfillments. Some wishes are obvious and are expressed through the manifest
    content, as when a person goes to sleep hungry and dreams of eating large quanti-
    ties of delicious food. Most wish fulfillments, however, are expressed in the latent
    content and only dream interpretation can uncover that wish. An exception to the
    rule that dreams are wish fulfillments is found in patients suffering from a traumatic
    experience. Dreams of these people follow the principle of repetition compulsion
    rather than wish fulfillment. These dreams are frequently found in people with
    posttraumatic stress disorder who repeatedly dream of frightening or traumatic
    experiences (Freud, 1920/1955a, 1933/1964).
    Freud believed that dreams are formed in the unconscious but try to work their
    way into the conscious. To become conscious, dreams must slip past both the primary
    and the final censors (refer again to Figure 2.1). Even during sleep these guardians
    maintain their vigil, forcing unconscious psychic material to adopt a disguised form.
    The disguise can operate in two basic ways—condensation and displacement.
    Condensation refers to the fact that the manifest dream content is not as
    extensive as the latent level, indicating that the unconscious material has been
    abbreviated or condensed before appearing on the manifest level. Displacement

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 55
    means that the dream image is replaced by some other idea only remotely related
    to it (Freud, 1900/1953). Condensation and displacement of content both take place
    through the use of symbols. Certain images are almost universally represented by
    seemingly innocuous figures. For example, the phallus may be symbolized by
    elongated objects such as sticks, snakes, or knives; the vagina often appears as any
    small box, chest, or oven; parents appear in the form of the president, a teacher,
    or one’s boss; and castration anxiety can be expressed in dreams of growing bald,
    losing teeth, or any act of cutting (Freud, 1900/1953, 1901/1953, 1917/1963).
    Dreams can also deceive the dreamer by inhibiting or reversing the dreamer’s
    affect. For example, a man with homicidal feelings for his father may dream that
    his father has died, but in the manifest dream content, he feels neither joy nor
    sorrow; that is, his affect is inhibited. Unpleasant feelings can also be reversed at
    the manifest dream level. For example, a woman who unconsciously hates her
    mother and would unconsciously welcome her extinction may dream of her moth-
    er’s death, but the unconscious joy and hatred she feels is expressed as sorrow and
    love during the manifest level of the dream. Thus, she is fooled into believing that
    hate is love and that joy is sorrow (Freud, 1900/1953, 1901/1953, 1915/1957a).
    After the dream’s latent (unconscious) content has been distorted and its
    affect inhibited or reversed, it appears in a manifest form that can be recalled by
    the dreamer. The manifest content, which nearly always relates to conscious or
    preconscious experience of the previous day, has little or no psychoanalytic sig-
    nificance; only the latent content has meaning (Freud, 1900/1953).
    In interpreting dreams, Freud (1917/1963) ordinarily followed one of two
    methods. The first was to ask patients to relate their dream and all their associations
    to it, no matter how unrelated or illogical these associations seemed. Freud believed
    that such associations revealed the unconscious wish behind the dream. If the dreamer
    was unable to relate association material, Freud used a second method—dream
    symbols—to discover the unconscious elements underlying the manifest content. The
    purpose of both methods (associations and symbols) was to trace the dream formation
    backward until the latent content was reached. Freud (1900/1953, p. 608) believed
    that dream interpretation was the most reliable approach to the study of unconscious
    processes and referred to it as the “royal road” to knowledge of the unconscious.
    Anxiety dreams offer no contradiction to the rule that dreams are wish fulfill-
    ments. The explanation is that anxiety belongs to the preconscious system, whereas
    the wish belongs to the unconscious. Freud (1900/1953) reported three typical
    anxiety dreams: the embarrassment dream of nakedness, dreams of the death of a
    beloved person, and dreams of failing an examination.
    In the embarrassment dream of nakedness, the dreamer feels shame or embar-
    rassment at being naked or improperly dressed in the presence of strangers. The
    spectators usually appear quite indifferent, although the dreamer is very much
    embarrassed. The origin of this dream is the early childhood experience of being
    naked in the presence of adults. In the original experience, the child feels no embar-
    rassment but the adults often register disapproval. Freud believed that wish fulfill-
    ment is served in two ways by this dream. First, the indifference of the spectators
    fulfills the infantile wish that the witnessing adults refrain from scolding. Second,
    the fact of nakedness fulfills the wish to exhibit oneself, a desire usually repressed
    in adults but present in young children.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories56
    Dreams of the death of a beloved person also originate in childhood and are
    wish fulfillments. If a person dreams of the death of a younger person, the uncon-
    scious may be expressing the wish for the destruction of a younger brother or
    sister who was a hated rival during the infantile period. When the deceased is an
    older person, the dreamer is fulfilling the Oedipal wish for the death of a parent.
    If the dreamer feels anxiety and sorrow during the dream, it is because the affect
    has been reversed. Dreams of the death of a parent are typical in adults, but they
    do not mean that the dreamer has a present wish for the death of that parent. These
    dreams were interpreted by Freud as meaning that, as a child, the dreamer longed
    for the death of the parent, but the wish was too threatening to find its way into
    consciousness. Even during adulthood the death wish ordinarily does not appear
    in dreams unless the affect has been changed to sorrow.
    A third typical anxiety dream is failing an examination in school. According
    to Freud (1900/1953), the dreamer always dreams of failing an examination that
    has already been successfully passed, never one that was failed. These dreams
    usually occur when the dreamer is anticipating a difficult task. By dreaming of
    failing an examination already passed, the ego can reason, “I passed the earlier test
    that I was worried about. Now I’m worried about another task, but I’ll pass it too.
    Therefore, I need not be anxious over tomorrow’s test.” The wish to be free from
    worry over a difficult task is thus fulfilled.
    With each of these three typical dreams, Freud had to search for the wish
    behind the manifest level of the dream. Finding the wish fulfillment required great
    creativity. For example, one clever woman told Freud that she had dreamed that
    her mother-in-law was coming for a visit. In her waking life, she despised her
    mother-in-law and dreaded spending any amount of time with her. To challenge
    Freud’s notion that dreams are wish fulfillments, she asked him, “Where was the
    wish?” Freud’s (1900/1953) explanation was that this woman was aware of Freud’s
    belief that a wish lies behind every nontraumatic dream. Thus, by dreaming of
    spending time with a hated mother-in-law, the woman fulfilled her wish to spite
    Freud and to disprove his wish fulfillment hypothesis!
    In summary, Freud believed that dreams are motivated by wish fulfillments.
    The latent content of dreams is formed in the unconscious and usually goes back
    to childhood experiences, whereas the manifest content often stems from experi-
    ences of the previous day. The interpretation of dreams serves as the “royal road”
    to knowledge of the unconscious, but dreams should not be interpreted without the
    dreamer’s associations to the dream. Latent material is transformed into manifest
    content through the dream work. The dream work achieves its goal by the pro-
    cesses of condensation, displacement, and inhibition of affect. The manifest dream
    may have little resemblance to the latent material, but Freud believed that an
    accurate interpretation will reveal the hidden connection by tracing the dream work
    backward until the unconscious images are revealed.
    Freudian Slips
    Freud believed that many everyday slips of the tongue or pen, misreading, incorrect
    hearing, misplacing objects, and temporarily forgetting names or intentions are not
    chance accidents but reveal a person’s unconscious intentions. In writing of these

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 57
    faulty acts, Freud (1901/1960) used the German Fehlleistung, or “faulty function,”
    but James Strachey, one of Freud’s translators, invented the term parapraxes to
    refer to what many people now simply call “Freudian slips.”
    Parapraxes or unconscious slips are so common that we usually pay little
    attention to them and deny that they have any underlying significance. Freud,
    however, insisted that these faulty acts have meaning; they reveal the unconscious
    intention of the person: “They are not chance events but serious mental acts; they
    have a sense; they arise from the concurrent actions—or perhaps rather, the mutu-
    ally opposing action—of two different intentions” (Freud, 1917/1963, p. 44). One
    opposing action emanates from the unconscious; the other, from the preconscious.
    Unconscious slips, therefore, are similar to dreams in that they are a product of
    both the unconscious and the preconscious, with the unconscious intention being
    dominant and interfering with and replacing the preconscious one.
    The fact that most people strongly deny any meaning behind their parapraxes
    was seen by Freud as evidence that the slip, indeed, had relevance to unconscious
    images that must remain hidden from consciousness. A young man once walked
    into a convenience store, became immediately attracted to the young female clerk,
    and asked for a “sex-pack of beer.” When the clerk accused him of improper behav-
    ior, the young man vehemently protested his innocence. Examples such as this can
    be extended almost indefinitely. Freud provided many in his book Psychopathology
    of Everyday Life (1901/1960), and many of them involved his own faulty acts. One
    day after worrying about monetary matters, Freud strolled the tobacco store that he
    visited every day. On this particular day, he picked up his usual supply of cigars
    and left the store without paying for them. Freud attributed his neglect to earlier
    thoughts about budgetary issues. In all Freudian slips, the intentions of the uncon-
    scious supplant the weaker intentions of the preconscious, thereby revealing a per-
    son’s true purpose.
    Related Research
    The scientific status of Freud’s theory is one of the more hotly contested and
    disputed questions in all Freudian theory. Was it science or mere armchair specu-
    lation? Did Freud propose testable hypotheses? Are his ideas experimentally veri-
    fiable, testable, or falsifiable?
    Karl Popper, the philosopher of science who proposed the criterion of falsi-
    fiability, contrasted Freud’s theory with Einstein’s and concluded that the former
    was not falsifiable and therefore not science. It would be fair to say that for much
    of the 20th century, most academic psychologists dismissed Freudian ideas as
    fanciful speculations that may have contained insights into human nature but were
    not science.
    During the last 5 to 10 years, the scientific status of Freudian theory has begun
    to change, at least among certain circles of cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists.
    Neuroscience is currently experiencing an explosive growth through its investigations
    of brain activity during a variety of cognitive and emotional tasks. Much of this growth
    has been due to brain imaging technology afforded by functional magnetic resonance
    imaging (MRI) that maps regions of the brain that are active during particular tasks.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories58
    At about the same time, certain groups of cognitive psychologists began doing research
    on the importance of nonconscious processing of information and memory, or what
    they called “implicit” cognition. John Bargh, one of the leaders in the field of social-
    cognitive psychology, reviewed the literature on the “automaticity of being” and con-
    cluded that roughly 95% of our behaviors are unconsciously determined (Bargh &
    Chartrand, 1999). This conclusion is completely consistent with Freud’s metaphor that
    consciousness is merely the “tip of the iceberg.”
    By the late 1990s, the findings from neuroscience and cognitive psychology
    began to converge on many cognitive and affective processes that were very con-
    sistent with basic Freudian theory. These commonalities have become the founda-
    tion for a movement started by some cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, and
    psychiatrists who are convinced that Freud’s theory is one of the more compelling
    integrative theories—one that could explain many of these findings. In 1999, a
    group of scientists began a society called Neuro-Psychoanalysis and a scientific
    journal by the same name. For the first time, some eminent cognitive and neurosci-
    ence psychologists such as Nobel laureate for physiology, Eric Kandel, along with
    Joseph LeDoux, Antonio Damasio, Daniel Schacter, and Vilayanur Ramachandran,
    were publicly declaring the value of Freud’s theory and contending that “psycho-
    analysis is still the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind”
    (as cited in Solms, 2004, p. 84). Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio wrote: “I believe
    we can say that Freud’s insights on the nature of consciousness are consonant with
    the most advanced contemporary neuroscience views” (as cited in Solms & Turnbull,
    2002, p. 93). Twenty years ago, such pronouncements from neuroscientists would
    have been nearly unthinkable.
    Mark Solms is probably the most active person involved in integrating psycho-
    analytic theory and neuroscientific research (Solms, 2000, 2004; Solms & Panksepp,
    2012; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). He argued, for instance, that the following Freudian
    concepts have support from modern neuroscience: unconscious motivation, repres-
    sion, the pleasure principle, primitive drives, and dreams (Solms, 2004). Similarly,
    Kandel (1999) argued that psychoanalysis and neuroscience together could make use-
    ful contributions in these eight domains: the nature of unconscious mental processes;
    the nature of psychological causality; psychological causality and psychopathology;
    early experience and the predisposition to mental illness; the preconscious, the uncon-
    scious, and the prefrontal cortex; sexual orientation; psychotherapy and structural
    changes in the brain; and psychopharmacology as an adjunct to psychoanalysis.
    Although there are some gaps in the evidence (Hobson, 2004), and in fact some
    psychoanalysts reject neuroscience as irrelevant and harmful to psychoanalysis (Blass
    & Carmeli, 2007), the overlap between Freud’s theory and neuroscience is sufficient
    to make at least a suggestive, if not compelling, case for their integration (Yovell,
    Solms, & Fotopoulou, 2015). We have reviewed some of the empirical evidence for
    unconscious mental processing, the id and the pleasure principle and the ego and the
    reality principle, repression and defense mechanisms, and dreams.
    Unconscious Mental Processing
    Many scientists and philosophers have recognized two different forms of con-
    sciousness. First is the state of not being aware or awake, and second is the state

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 59
    of being aware. The former is referred to as “core consciousness,” whereas the
    latter is referred to as “extended consciousness.” The brain stem, and the ascending
    activating system in particular, is the part of the brain most directly associated with
    core consciousness, or unconsciousness in the sense of not being awake. For
    instance, comas come from damage to this region of the brain stem and render a
    person unconscious. In contrast, being aware and able to reflect on one’s knowl-
    edge and self is more a function of activity in the prefrontal cortex (the dorsal
    frontal cortex) (Solms, 2004; Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
    Moreover, a major theme of cognitive psychology over the last 20 years has
    been the phenomenon of nonconscious mental processing, or what is referred to
    as “implicit,” “nonconscious,” or “automatic” thought and memory (Bargh &
    Chartrand, 1999; Schacter, 1987). By this, cognitive psychologists are referring to
    mental processes that are neither in awareness nor under intentional control, and
    thereby come close to Freud’s definition of unconscious. Of course, Freud’s con-
    cept of the unconscious was more dynamic, repressive, and inhibiting, but—as we
    see next—cognitive neuroscience is uncovering a similar kind of unconscious.
    Pleasure and the Id, Inhibition and the Ego
    Findings from many different neuroscientific programs of research have established
    that the pleasure-seeking drives have their neurological origins in two brain
    structures, namely the brain stem and the limbic system (Solms, 2004; Solms &
    Panksepp, 2012; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Moreover, the neurotransmitter dopa-
    mine is most centrally involved in most pleasure-seeking behaviors. In Freud’s
    language, these are the drives and instincts of the id.
    More recent research is providing fascinating nuance to our understanding
    of how the brain experiences the drives and instincts of the id. Neuroscientist Jaak
    Panksepp (2004) and psychologist Kent Berridge (2009) have spent decades explor-
    ing the reward programs in our brains. This work has pinpointed two important
    neurotransmitters that are involved in the id’s perpetual pleasure seeking: dopamine
    and the opioids (such as endorphins). The dopamine system is associated with the
    id’s seeking or wanting tendencies (gimme!), whereas the opioid system is involved
    in the pleasure we experience when the id is satisfied (ahhh!). The two systems
    work in tandem. The seeking system not only gets us up and going in the morning,
    and urges us to go find food and friends, but also draws us to our computer to
    google endlessly various curiosities, or our smart phone to check whether our
    Facebook update has received commentary. The liking system allows us to experi-
    ence satisfaction when we’ve found what we sought. But even though they work
    in tandem, Berridge argues that these are unbalanced systems. Our brain is more
    “stingy” when it comes to pleasure than desire, which makes evolutionary sense.
    If the id were easily satisfied, we would all be lying around happily unmotivated,
    but probably soon dead. This is why Panksepp says that seeking is the master
    motivator, confirming Freud’s notion of the id’s primeval force, driving us to keep
    seeking after that small dose of pleasure. Twitter anyone?
    In 1923, when Freud modified his view of how the mind works and proposed
    the structural view of id, ego, and superego, the ego became a structure that was
    mostly unconscious, but whose main function was to inhibit drives. If the part of the

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories60
    brain that functions to inhibit impulses and drives is damaged, we should see an
    increase in the id-based pleasure-seeking impulses. That is precisely what happens
    when the frontal-limbic system is damaged. Many case studies and more systematic
    brain-imaging research have demonstrated the connection between the frontal-limbic
    system and impulse regulation (Chow & Cummings, 1999; Pincus, 2001; Raine,
    Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 1997). The first reported and best-known case of this was
    the 19th-century railroad worker Phineas Gage. While working on the railroad, an
    explosion caused a metal rod to shoot upward and through the bottom of his jaw up
    and out the top of his forehead, damaging his frontal lobes. Amazingly, perhaps
    because the speed of the rod cauterized brain tissue, Gage never lost consciousness
    and survived. Physically (except for loss of brain tissue) he was relatively fine, but
    his personality changed. By all accounts, this rather mild-mannered, responsible, and
    reliable worker became, in the words of his doctor, “fitful, irreverent, indulging at
    times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his custom), manifesting
    but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when it conflicts
    with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating” (as
    cited in Solms & Turnbull, 2002, p. 3). In other words, he became hostile, impulsive,
    and not at all concerned with social norms and appropriateness. In Freudian lingo, his
    ego no longer could inhibit basic drives and instincts and he became very id-driven.
    According to Solms, the underlying theme in the frontal lobe-injured
    patients is their inability to stay “reality-bound” (ego) and their propensity to
    interpret events much more through “wishes” (id); that is, they create the real-
    ity they wanted or wished for. All of this, according to Solms, provides support
    for Freud’s ideas concerning the pleasure principle of the id and the reality
    principle of the ego.
    Repression, Inhibition, and Defense Mechanisms
    Another core component of Freud’s theory involved the defense mechanisms, espe-
    cially repression. The unconscious actively (dynamically) keeps ideas, feelings, and
    unpleasant or threatening impulses out of consciousness. The area of defense
    mechanisms remains an active area of study for personality researchers. Some of
    this research has focused on the use of projection and identification in childhood
    and adolescence (Cramer, 2007), whereas other work has investigated who is more
    likely to be a target of projection (Govorun, Fuegen, & Payne, 2006).
    From the neuropsychological perspective, Solms (2004) reports cases that
    explore the areas of the brain that may be implicated in the use and perseverance
    of defense mechanisms. Specifically, Solms (2004) describes cases demonstrat-
    ing repression of unpalatable information when damage occurs to the right hemi-
    sphere and, if this damaged region becomes artificially stimulated, the repression
    goes away; that is, awareness returns. Additionally, these patients frequently
    rationalize away unwelcome facts by fabricating stories. In other words, they
    employ Freudian wish- fulfilling defense mechanisms. For instance, one patient,
    when asked about the scar on his head, confabulated a story about its being a
    result of dental surgery or a coronary bypass, both of which he had had years
    before. Furthermore, when the doctor asked this patient who he was, the patient
    would variously respond that he (the doctor) was either a colleague, a drinking

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 61
    partner, or a teammate from college. All of these interpretations were more wish
    than reality.
    A study by Howard Shevrin and colleagues (Shevrin, Ghannam, & Libet,
    2002) examined the neurophysiological underpinnings of repression. More spe-
    cifically, they addressed the question of whether people with repressive personality
    styles actually require longer periods of stimulation for a brief stimulus to be
    consciously perceived. Prior research had established that people in general vary
    from 200 ms to 800 ms in how long a stimulus needs to be present before being
    consciously perceived. The study by Shevrin et al. included six clinical participants
    between the ages of 51 and 70, all of whom years prior had undergone surgical
    treatment for motoric problems (mainly parkinsonism). During these surgeries, a
    procedure had been performed in which electrodes stimulated parts of the motor
    cortex, and the length of time it took for the stimulus to be consciously perceived
    was recorded. The results of this procedure showed that these six participants also
    ranged from 200 ms to 800 ms in how long they took to consciously perceive the
    stimulus. For this, four psychological tests were administered at the patients’ homes
    and then scored on their degree of repressive tendencies. These tests were the
    Rorschach Inkblot Test, the Early Memories Test, the Vocabulary Test of the
    WAIS (an IQ test), and the Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire. The first three tests
    were rated by three “blind” clinical judges on their degree of repression, and the
    fourth test was scored objectively for its degree of repression.
    The results showed that the combined ratings from the three judges were
    significantly and positively associated with the time it took for a stimulus to be
    consciously perceived. Moreover, the objectively scored Hysteroid-Obsessoid
    Questionnaire confirmed the result. In other words, the more repressive style
    people have, the longer it takes them to consciously perceive a stimulus. Neither
    age nor IQ is related to the length of time it takes for the stimulus to be per-
    ceived. As the authors acknowledge, this finding is but a first step in demonstrat-
    ing how repression might operate to keep things out of conscious awareness, but
    it is the first study to report the neurophysiological underpinnings of repression.
    Research on Dreams
    In the 1950s, when the phenomenon of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep was first
    discovered and found to be strongly associated with dreaming, many scientists
    began to discount Freud’s theory of dreams, which was based on the idea that
    dreams have meaning and are attempts at fulfilling unconscious wishes. Moreover,
    the REM research showed that only brain-stem regions and not higher cortical
    regions were involved with REM states. If these cortical structures were not
    involved in REM sleep and yet they were where higher level thinking took place,
    then dreams are simply random mental activity and could not have any inherent
    meaning. From the perspective of this so-called activation-synthesis theory, mean-
    ing is what the waking mind gives to these more or less random brain activities, but
    meaning is not inherent in the dream.
    Solms’s primary research area is dreams and, based on current dream
    research, including his own, he takes issue with each of the assumptions of the
    activation- synthesis theory of dreams (Solms, 2000, 2004). Most importantly,

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories62
    Solms argued that dreaming and REM are not one and the same. First, in about
    5% to 30% of the wakings during REM sleep, patients report no dreams, and
    during about 5% to 10% of non-REM wakings patients do report dreaming. So
    there is no one-to-one correspondence between REM and dreaming. Second,
    lesions (due to injury or surgery) to the brain stem do not completely eliminate
    dreaming, whereas lesions to the forebrain regions (in the frontal lobes and
    parietal- temporal-occipital juncture) have eliminated dreaming and yet preserved
    REM sleep.
    In addition, as Freud argued, dreams appear not to be random in content.
    Several empirical studies have confirmed Freud’s claim in Interpretation of Dreams
    that “wishes suppressed during the day assert themselves in dreams” (1900/1953,
    p. 590). This has come to be known in the empirical literature as the “dream
    rebound effect,” wherein attempts to suppress unwanted thoughts prior to sleep
    lead to increased dreaming about that very target (e.g., Schmidt & Gendolla, 2008;
    Taylor & Bryant, 2007; Wegner, Wenzlaff, & Kozak, 2004). For example, insom-
    nia patients report having insomnia-related dreams after trying to suppress their
    worry about getting enough sleep prior to falling asleep (Riemann et al., 2012).
    Furthermore, those who score high on the trait of thought-suppression (e.g., “Some-
    times I really wish I could stop thinking so much”) report dreaming more waking-
    life emotions than those who are not habitual active thought suppressors
    (Malinowski, 2015).
    The first study to demonstrate this “rebound” of suppressed thoughts in
    dreams was conducted by Daniel Wegner and colleagues (2004). In the study, 300
    college students were instructed to think right before going to sleep of two people:
    one whom they had a “crush” on, and one whom they were “fond of” but did not
    have a crush on. Next, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: sup-
    pression, expression, and mention. Students asked to suppress were instructed not
    to think of a target person (either the “crush” or the “fond of”) for five minutes.
    Expression participants were told to think about one target person or the other for
    five minutes. In the mention condition, participants were told to think about any-
    thing at all for five minutes after mentioning the target person’s initials. Results
    showed, consistent with Freud’s view, that students dreamed more about the sup-
    pressed targets than the nonsuppressed targets. They also dreamed more about
    suppressed targets than suppressed nontargets. In other words, students were more
    likely to dream about people they spend some time thinking about (targets), but
    especially those targets they actively try not to think about.
    Kröner-Borowik and colleagues (2013) confirmed and extended Wegner and
    colleagues’ work on the dream-rebound effect in two interesting ways. They asked
    participants to identify a unique distressing intrusive thought (defined as a thought
    that one does not intend to think about, but which “pops up” sometimes without
    one wanting it to). Then they were assigned randomly to either the suppression or
    control group, and read their instructions, just as in the Wegner et al. (2004) study,
    immediately prior to going to sleep. They followed these instructions not just for
    one night, but every evening for a week. Suppression condition participants were
    told to focus their minds deliberately on the intrusive thought they had previously
    identified, along with its associated negative feelings. Then, for the next five min-
    utes, they were told to think about anything but the intrusive thought. The instructions

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 63
    read: “Do not think about it, even for a fleeting moment, not even for a second,
    and do whatever it takes to keep that thought out of your mind. Then, go to bed.”
    The control group were also told to begin by focusing their mind on the intrusive
    thought, and then told to think about whatever they wanted for five minutes prior
    to sleep. Results replicated previous studies on dream rebound: those who sup-
    pressed had increased dreaming about the target thoughts, compared to those who
    did not suppress. Furthermore, the suppressors also had higher dream distress (the
    dreams were “bad dreams” or nightmares), and this effect lasted over the week-
    long period of the study.
    Other studies show that exposure to nightmare content and imaginary modi-
    fication of bad dream storylines reduces nightmares (Hansen et al., 2013). Consistent
    with Freud’s theorizing, then, and particularly relevant to nightmares, this line of
    research suggests that concentrating on and then actively avoiding or trying to sup-
    press negative thoughts lends itself to rebound in dreams, which are likely to take
    on a distressing and even recurring quality. These researchers suggest that relaxing
    and letting go of thought suppression is one way to reduce the occurrence of night-
    mares. This certainly supports the psychoanalytic tool of dream analysis as an
    anxiety-reduction technique. The benefits of talking about one’s dreams may have
    little to do with the specific content (latent or manifest), but rather with simply
    speaking aloud distressing cognitions and therefore letting go of the active thought
    suppression that may be fueling the dream rebound in the first place.
    Critique of Freud
    In criticizing Freud, we must first ask two questions: (1) Did Freud understand
    women, gender, and sexuality? (2) Was Freud a scientist?
    Did Freud Understand Women, Gender, and Sexuality?
    A frequent criticism of Freud is that he did not understand women and that his
    theory of personality was strongly oriented toward men. There is a large measure
    of truth to this criticism, and Freud acknowledged that he lacked a complete under-
    standing of the female psyche.
    Why didn’t Freud have a better understanding of the feminine psyche? One
    answer is that he was a product of his times, and society was dominated by men
    during those times. In 19th-century Austria, women were second-class citizens, with
    few rights or privileges. They had little opportunity to enter a profession or to be
    a member of a professional organization—such as Freud’s Wednesday Psycho-
    logical Society.
    Thus, during the first quarter century of psychoanalysis, the movement was
    an all-men’s club. After World War I, women gradually became attracted to psy-
    choanalysis and some of these women, such as Marie Bonaparte, Ruth Mack
    Brunswick, Helene Deutsch, Melanie Klein, Lou Andreas-Salomé, and Anna
    Freud, were able to exercise some influence on Freud. However, they were never
    able to convince him that similarities between the genders outweighed differences.
    Freud himself was a proper bourgeois Viennese gentleman whose sexual
    attitudes were fashioned during a time when women were expected to nurture their

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories64
    husbands, manage the household, care for the children, and stay out of their hus-
    band’s business or profession. Freud’s wife, Martha, was no exception to this rule
    (Gay, 1988).
    Freud, as the oldest and most favored child, ruled over his sisters, advising
    them on books to read and lecturing to them about the world in general. An inci-
    dent with a piano reveals further evidence of Freud’s favored position within his
    family. Freud’s sisters enjoyed music and found pleasure in playing a piano. When
    music from their piano annoyed Freud, he complained to his parents that he
    couldn’t concentrate on his books. The parents immediately removed the piano
    from the house, leaving Freud to understand that the wishes of five girls did not
    equal the preference of one boy.
    Like many other men of his day, Freud regarded women as the “tender sex,”
    suitable for caring for the household and nurturing children but not equal to men in
    scientific and scholarly affairs. His love letters to his future wife Martha Bernays are
    filled with references to her as “my little girl,” “my little woman,” or “my princess”
    (Freud, 1960). Freud undoubtedly would have been surprised to learn that 130 years
    later these terms of endearment are seen by many as disparaging to women.
    Freud continually grappled with trying to understand women, and his views
    on femininity changed several times during his lifetime. As a young student, he
    exclaimed to a friend, “How wise our educators that they pester the beautiful sex
    so little with scientific knowledge” (quoted in Gay, 1988, p. 522).
    During the early years of his career, Freud viewed male and female psycho-
    sexual growth as mirror images of each other, with different but parallel lines of
    development. However, he later proposed the notion that little girls are failed boys
    and that adult women are akin to castrated men. Freud originally proposed these
    ideas tentatively, but as time passed, he defended them adamantly and refused to
    compromise his views. When people criticized his notion of femininity, Freud
    responded by adopting an increasingly more rigid stance. By the 1920s, he was
    insisting that psychological differences between men and women were due to ana-
    tomical differences and could not be explained by different socialization experi-
    ences (Freud, 1924/1961). Nevertheless, he always recognized that he did not
    understand women as well as he did men. He called them the “dark continent for
    psychology” (Freud, 1926/1959b, p. 212). In his final statement on the matter,
    Freud (1933/1964) suggested that “if you want to know more about femininity,
    enquire from your own experiences of life or turn to the poets” (p. 135). The depth
    (and unconscious nature?) of his sexism is revealed in this statement. “You” refers,
    of course, not to any person, but a man. Considering that Freud based nearly all
    his theorizing on case studies of women, it’s astonishing that he never thought to
    ask them directly about their experiences.
    Although some of Freud’s close associates inhabited the “dark continent” of
    womanhood, his most intimate friends were men. Moreover, women such as Marie
    Bonaparte, Lou Andreas-Salomé, and Minna Bernays (his sister-in-law), who did
    exert some influence on Freud, were mostly cut from a similar pattern. Ernest Jones
    (1955) referred to them as intellectual women with a “masculine cast” (p. 421).
    These women were quite apart from Freud’s mother and wife, both of whom were
    proper Viennese wives and mothers whose primary concerns were for their
    husbands and children. Freud’s female colleagues and disciples were selected for

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 65
    their intelligence, emotional strength, and loyalty—the same qualities Freud found
    attractive in men. But none of these women could substitute for an intimate male
    friend. In August of 1901, Freud (1985) wrote to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, “In
    my life, as you know, woman has never replaced the comrade, the friend” (p. 447).
    Why was Freud unable to understand women? Given his upbringing during
    the middle of the 19th century, parental acceptance of his domination of his sisters,
    a tendency to exaggerate differences between women and men, and his belief that
    women inhabited the “dark continent” of humanity, it seems unlikely that Freud
    possessed the necessary experiences to understand women. Toward the end of his
    life, he still had to ask, “What does a woman want?” (E. Jones, 1955, p. 421). The
    question itself reveals Freud’s gender bias because it assumes that women all want
    the same things and that their wants are somehow different from those of men.
    Feminist theorists like Judith Butler (1995) have critiqued the gender norma-
    tivity (after the Oedipus complex is resolved, boys become masculine men and
    girls become feminine women) and heterosexism of Freud’s theorizing. In two of
    Freud’s works, “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917) and The Ego and the Id
    (1923), he argued that part of the process of forming our character (our ego) is
    first the grieving, and then the substitution of lost love objects with other objects.
    That is, the boy must grieve the “loss” of his mother as a love object, and substi-
    tute it with erotic love for a woman. Conversely, the girl must grieve the loss of
    her father and eventually substitute this with love for a male romantic partner.
    In her essay “Melancholy Gender—Refused Identification” (1995), Butler
    takes Freud’s original ideas and turns them upside down, asking the question:
    “What does the ego do with lost same-sex attachment?” Obviously as young
    children we also form strong attachments to our same-sex parent. She argues the
    superego will not easily allow the ego to form compensatory attachments to stand
    in for lost same-sex objects, however. Why not? Freud’s idea is that these lost
    objects are invested with libido. Society disapproves of same-sex libidinal attach-
    ment, and so the ego is unable, or struggles, to produce appropriate and satisfying
    substitutes for lost same-sex objects that might help the id feel better. In this case,
    the id becomes trapped in “melancholia.” The id can never fully resolve the grief.
    If, in Freud’s gender normative/heterosexual theory, girls and boys must
    repress their desire for their opposite sex parent, in Butler’s refiguring, the psychic
    action is even harsher. Children must repudiate feelings of same-sex love. Indeed,
    she argues, cultural prohibitions against homosexuality operate as a foundation for
    gender and heterosexuality. This is especially true for boys and men. Masculine
    heterosexual gender identity, she argues, is a kind of melancholy, reflecting the
    utter disavowal of their attraction to other men, and the unfinished business of
    grieving the loss of their same-sex parent. In this way, Butler provides a fascinat-
    ing critical engagement of Freudian theory to understand gender and sexuality.
    Was Freud a Scientist?
    A second area of criticism of Freud centers around his status as a scientist. Although
    he repeatedly insisted that he was primarily a scientist and that psychoanalysis was
    a science, Freud’s definition of science needs some explanation. When he called
    psychoanalysis a science, he was attempting to separate it from a philosophy or an

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories66
    ideology. He was not claiming that it was a natural science. The German language
    and culture of Freud’s day made a distinction between a natural science (Naturwis-
    senschaften) and a human science (Geisteswissenschaften). Unfortunately, James
    Strachey’s translations in the Standard Edition make Freud seem to be a natural
    scientist. However, other scholars (Federn, 1988; Holder, 1988) believe that Freud
    clearly saw himself as a human scientist, that is, a humanist or scholar and not a
    natural scientist. In order to render Freud’s works more accurate and more human-
    istic, a group of language scholars are currently producing an updated translation
    of Freud. (See, for example, Freud, 1905/2002.)
    Bruno Bettelheim (1982, 1983) was also critical of Strachey’s translations.
    He contended that the Standard Edition used precise medical concepts and mislead-
    ing Greek and Latin terms instead of the ordinary, often ambiguous, German words
    that Freud had chosen. Such precision tended to render Freud more scientific and
    less humanistic than he appears to the German reader. For example, Bettelheim,
    whose introduction to Freud was in German, believed that Freud saw psychoana-
    lytic therapy as a spiritual journey into the depths of the soul (translated by Strachey
    as “mind”) and not a mechanistic analysis of the mental apparatus.
    As a result of Freud’s 19th-century German view of science, many contempo-
    rary writers regard his theory-building methods as untenable and rather unscientific
    (Breger, 2000; Crews, 1995, 1996; Sulloway, 1992; Webster, 1995). His theories
    were not based on experimental investigation but rather on subjective observations
    that Freud made of himself and his clinical patients. These patients were not repre-
    sentative of people in general but came mostly from the middle and upper classes.
    Apart from this widespread popular and professional interest, the question
    remains: Was Freud scientific? Freud’s (1915/1957a) own description of science
    permits much room for subjective interpretations and indefinite definitions:
    We have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built up on clear and
    sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most
    exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity
    consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group,
    classify and correlate them. Even at the stage of description it is not possible to
    avoid applying certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from
    somewhere or other but certainly not from the new observations alone. (p. 117)
    Perhaps Freud himself left us with the best description of how he built his
    theories. In 1900, shortly after the publication of Interpretation of Dreams, he
    wrote to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, confessing that “I am actually not at all a man
    of science, not an observer, not an experimenter, not a thinker. I am by  tempera-
    ment nothing but a conquistador—an adventurer . . . with all the curiosity, daring,
    and tenacity characteristic of a man of this sort” (Freud, 1985, p.  398).
    Although Freud at times may have seen himself as a conquistador, he also
    believed that he was constructing a scientific theory. How well does that theory
    meet the six criteria for a useful theory that we identified in Chapter 1?
    Despite serious difficulties in testing Freud’s assumptions, researchers have
    conducted studies that relate either directly or indirectly to psychoanalytic theory.
    Thus, we rate Freudian theory about average in its ability to generate research.
    Second, a useful theory should be falsifiable. Because much of the research
    evidence consistent with Freud’s ideas can also be explained by other models,

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 67
    Freudian theory is nearly impossible to falsify. A good example of the difficulty
    of falsifying psychoanalysis is the story of the woman who dreamed that her
    mother-in-law was coming for a visit. The content of his dream could not be a
    wish fulfillment because the woman hated her mother-in-law and would not wish
    for a visit from her. Freud escaped this conundrum by explaining that the woman
    had the dream merely to spite Freud and to prove to him that not all dreams are
    wish fulfillments. This kind of reasoning clearly gives Freudian theory a very low
    rating on its ability to generate falsifiable hypotheses.
    A third criterion of any useful theory is its ability to organize knowledge into
    a meaningful framework. Unfortunately, the framework of Freud’s personality the-
    ory, with its emphasis on the unconscious, is so loose and flexible that seemingly
    inconsistent data can coexist within its boundaries. Compared with other theories of
    personality, psychoanalysis ventures more answers to questions concerning why
    people behave as they do. But only some of these answers come from scientific
    investigations—most are simply logical extensions of Freud’s basic assumptions.
    Thus, we rate psychoanalysis as having only moderate ability to organize knowledge.
    Fourth, a useful theory should serve as a guide for the solution of practical
    problems. Because Freudian theory is unusually comprehensive, many psycho-
    analytically trained practitioners rely on it to find solutions to practical day-to-day
    problems. However, psychoanalysis no longer dominates the field of psychother-
    apy, and most present-day therapists use other theoretical orientations in their
    practice. Thus, we give psychoanalysis a low rating as a guide to the practitioner.
    The fifth criterion of a useful theory deals with internal consistency, includ-
    ing operationally defined terms. Psychoanalysis is an internally consistent theory,
    if one remembers that Freud wrote over a period of more than 40 years and grad-
    ually altered the meaning of some concepts during that time. However, at any
    single point in time, the theory generally possessed internal consistency, although
    some specific terms were used with less than scientific rigor.
    Does psychoanalysis possess a set of operationally defined terms? Here the
    theory definitely falls short. Such terms as id, ego, superego, conscious, precon-
    scious, unconscious, oral stage, sadistic-anal stage, phallic stage, Oedipus com-
    plex, latent level of dreams, and many others are not operationally defined; that
    is, they are not spelled out in terms of specific operations or behaviors. Research-
    ers must originate their own particular definition of most psychoanalytic terms.
    Sixth, psychoanalysis is not a simple or parsimonious theory, but considering
    its comprehensiveness and the complexity of human personality, it is not needlessly
    cumbersome.
    Concept of Humanity
    In Chapter 1, we outlined several dimensions for a concept of humanity.
    Where does Freud’s theory fall on these various dimensions?
    The first of these is determinism versus free choice. On this dimension
    Freud’s views on the nature of human nature would easily fall toward
    determinism. Freud believed that most of our behavior is determined by past

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories68
    events rather than molded by present goals. Humans have little control over
    their present actions because many of their behaviors are rooted in uncon-
    scious strivings that lie beyond present awareness. Although people usually
    believe that they are in control of their own lives, Freud insisted that such
    beliefs are illusions.
    Adult personality is largely determined by childhood experiences—
    especially the Oedipus complex—that have left their residue in the uncon-
    scious mind. Freud (1917/1955a) held that humanity in its history has
    suffered three great blows to its narcissistic ego. The first was the rediscov-
    ery by Copernicus that the earth is not the center of the universe; the sec-
    ond was Darwin’s discovery that humans are quite similar to other animals;
    the third, and most damaging blow of all, was Freud’s own discovery that
    we are not in control of our own actions or, as he stated it, “the ego is not
    master in its own house” (p. 143).
    A second and related issue is pessimism versus optimism. According
    to Freud, we come into the world in a basic state of conflict, with life and
    death forces operating on us from opposing sides. The innate death wish
    drives us incessantly toward self-destruction or aggression, while the sexual
    drive causes us to seek blindly after pleasure. The ego experiences a more
    or less permanent state of conflict, attempting to balance the contradictory
    demands of the id and superego while at the same time making concessions
    to the external world. Underneath a thin veneer of civilization, we are savage
    beasts with a natural tendency to exploit others for sexual and destructive
    satisfaction. Antisocial behavior lies just underneath the surface of even the
    most peaceful person, Freud believed. Worse yet, we are not ordinarily
    aware of the reasons for our behavior nor are we conscious of the hatred
    we feel for our friends, family, and lovers. For these reasons, psychoanalytic
    theory is essentially pessimistic.
    A third approach for viewing humanity is the dimension of causality
    versus teleology. Freud believed that present behavior is mostly shaped by
    past causes rather than by people’s goals for the future. People do not move
    toward a self-determined goal; instead, they are helplessly caught in the
    struggle between Eros and Thanatos. These two powerful drives force peo-
    ple to compulsively repeat primitive patterns of behavior. As adults, their
    behavior is one long series of reactions. People constantly attempt to reduce
    tension; to relieve anxieties; to repress unpleasant experiences; to regress
    to earlier, more secure stages of development; and to compulsively repeat
    behaviors that are familiar and safe. Therefore, we rate Freud’s theory very
    high on causality.
    On the dimension of conscious versus unconscious, psychoanalytic
    theory obviously leans heavily in the direction of unconscious motivation.
    Freud believed that everything from slips of the tongue to religious experi-
    ences is the result of a deep-rooted desire to satisfy sexual or aggressive
    drives. These motives make us slaves to our unconscious. Although we are
    aware of our actions, Freud believed that the motivations underlying those
    actions are deeply embedded in our unconscious and are frequently quite
    different from what we believe them to be.

    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis 69
    A fifth dimension is social versus biological influences. As a physician,
    Freud’s medical training disposed him to see human personality from a bio-
    logical viewpoint. Yet Freud (1913/1953, 1985) frequently speculated about
    the consequences of prehistoric social units and about the consequences
    of an individual’s early social experiences. Because Freud believed that
    many infantile fantasies and anxieties are rooted in biology, we rate him low
    on social influences.
    Sixth is the issue of uniqueness versus similarities. On this dimension,
    psychoanalytic theory takes a middle position. Humanity’s evolutionary past
    gives rise to a great many similarities among people. Nevertheless, individual
    experiences, especially those of early childhood, shape people in a somewhat
    unique manner and account for many of the differences among personalities.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Freud identified three levels of mental life—unconscious, preconscious,
    and conscious.
    ∙ Early childhood experiences that create high levels of anxiety are
    repressed into the unconscious, where they may influence behavior,
    emotions, and attitudes for years.
    ∙ Events that are not associated with anxiety but are merely forgotten
    make up the contents of the preconscious.
    ∙ Conscious images are those in awareness at any given time.
    ∙ Freud recognized three provinces of the mind—id, ego, and superego.
    ∙ The id is unconscious, chaotic, out of contact with reality, and in service
    of the pleasure principle.
    ∙ The ego is the executive of personality, in contact with the real world,
    and in service of the reality principle.
    ∙ The superego serves the moral and idealistic principles and begins to
    form after the Oedipus complex is resolved.
    ∙ All motivation can be traced to sexual and aggressive drives. Childhood
    behaviors related to sex and aggression are often punished, which leads
    to either repression or anxiety.
    ∙ To protect itself against anxiety, the ego initiates various defense
    mechanisms, the most basic of which is repression.
    ∙ Freud outlined three major stages of development—infancy, latency, and
    a genital period—but he devoted most attention to the infantile stage.
    ∙ The infantile stage is divided into three substages—oral, anal, and
    phallic, the last of which is accompanied by the Oedipus complex.
    ∙ During the simple Oedipal stage, a child desires sexual union with one
    parent while harboring hostility for the other.
    ∙ Freud believed that dreams and Freudian slips are disguised means of
    expressing unconscious impulses.

    70
    C H A P T E R 3
    Adler: Individual
    Psychology
    ⬥ Overview of Individual Psychology
    ⬥ Biography of Alfred Adler
    ⬥ Introduction to Adlerian Theory
    ⬥ Striving for Success or Superiority
    The Final Goal
    The Striving Force as Compensation
    Striving for Personal Superiority
    Striving for Success
    ⬥ Subjective Perceptions
    Fictionalism
    Physical Inferiorities
    ⬥ Unity and Self-Consistency of Personality
    Organ Dialect
    Conscious and Unconscious
    ⬥ Social Interest
    Origins of Social Interest
    Importance of Social Interest
    ⬥ Style of Life
    ⬥ Creative Power
    ⬥ Abnormal Development
    General Description
    External Factors in Maladjustment
    Exaggerated Physical Deficiencies
    Pampered Style of Life
    Neglected Style of Life
    Safeguarding Tendencies
    Excuses
    Aggression
    Withdrawal
    Masculine Protest
    Origins of the Masculine Protest
    Adler, Freud, and the Masculine Protest
    ⬥ Applications of Individual Psychology
    Family Constellation
    Early Recollections
    Dreams
    Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Birth Order Effects
    Early Recollections and
    Career Choice
    Distinguishing Narcissism as Striving for Superiority
    versus Self-Esteem as Striving for Success
    ⬥ Critique of Adler
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Adler © Imagno/Votava/The Image Works

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 71
    In 1937, a young Abraham Maslow was having dinner in a New York restaurant with a somewhat older colleague. The older man was widely known for his
    earlier association with Sigmund Freud, and many people, including Maslow,
    regarded him as a disciple of Freud. When Maslow casually asked the older man
    about being Freud’s follower, the older man became quite angry, and according to
    Maslow, he nearly shouted that
    this was a lie and a swindle for which he blamed Freud entirely, whom he then
    called names like swindler, sly, schemer. . . . He said that he had never been a
    student of Freud or a disciple or a follower. He made it clear from the
    beginning that he didn’t agree with Freud and that he had his own opinions.
    (Maslow, 1962, p. 125)
    Maslow, who had known the older man as an even-tempered, congenial person,
    was stunned by his outburst.
    The older man, of course, was Alfred Adler, who battled throughout his
    professional life to dispel the notion that he had ever been a follower of Freud.
    Whenever reporters and other people would inquire about his early relationship
    with Freud, Adler would produce the old faded postcard with Freud’s invitation to
    Adler to join Freud and three other physicians to meet at Freud’s home the fol-
    lowing Thursday evening. Freud closed the invitation saying, “With hearty greet-
    ings as your colleague” (quoted in Hoffman, 1994, p. 42). This friendly remark
    gave Adler some tangible evidence that Freud considered him to be his equal.
    However, the warm association between Adler and Freud came to a bitter
    end, with both men hurling caustic remarks toward the other. For example, after
    World War I, when Freud elevated aggression to a basic human drive, Adler, who
    had long since abandoned the concept, commented sarcastically: “I enriched psy-
    choanalysis by the aggressive drive. I gladly make them a present of it” (quoted
    in Bottome, 1939, p. 64).
    During the acrimonious breakup between the two men, Freud accused Adler
    of having paranoid delusions and of using terrorist tactics. He told one of his
    friends that the revolt by Adler was that of “an abnormal individual driven mad
    by ambition” (quoted in Gay, 1988, p. 223).
    Overview of Individual Psychology
    Alfred Adler was neither a terrorist nor a person driven mad by ambition. Indeed,
    his individual psychology presents an optimistic view of people while resting
    heavily on the notion of social interest, that is, a feeling of oneness with all
    humankind. In addition to Adler’s more optimistic look at people, several other
    differences made the relationship between Freud and Adler quite tenuous.
    First, Freud reduced all motivation to sex and aggression, whereas Adler saw
    people as being motivated mostly by social influences and by their striving for
    superiority or success; second, Freud assumed that people have little or no choice
    in shaping their personality, whereas Adler believed that people are largely respon-
    sible for who they are; third, Freud’s assumption that present behavior is caused
    by past experiences was directly opposed to Adler’s notion that present behavior
    is shaped by people’s view of the future; and fourth, in contrast to Freud, who

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories72
    placed very heavy emphasis on unconscious components of behavior, Adler
    believed that psychologically healthy people are usually aware of what they are
    doing and why they are doing it.
    As we have seen, Adler was an original member of the small clique of phy-
    sicians who met in Freud’s home on Wednesday evenings to discuss psychological
    topics. However, when theoretical and personal differences between Adler and
    Freud emerged, Adler left the Freud circle and established an opposing theory,
    which became known as individual psychology.
    Biography of Alfred Adler
    Alfred Adler was born on February 7, 1870, in Rudolfsheim, a village near Vienna.
    His mother, Pauline, was a hard-working homemaker who kept busy with her seven
    children. His father, Leopold, was a middle-class Jewish grain merchant from
    Hungary. As a young boy, Adler was weak and sickly and at age 5, he nearly died
    of pneumonia. He had gone ice-skating with an older boy who abandoned young
    Alfred. Cold and shivering, Adler managed to find his way home where he imme-
    diately fell asleep on the living room couch. As Adler gradually gained conscious-
    ness, he heard a doctor say to his parents, “Give yourself no more trouble. The
    boy is lost” (Hoffman, 1994, p. 8). This experience, along with the death of a
    younger brother, motivated Adler to become a physician.
    Adler’s poor health was in sharp contrast to the health of his older brother
    Sigmund. Several of Adler’s earliest memories were concerned with the unhappy
    competition between his brother’s good health and his own illness. Sigmund Adler,
    the childhood rival whom Adler attempted to surpass, remained a worthy opponent,
    and in later years he became very successful in business and even helped Alfred
    financially. By almost any standard, however, Alfred Adler was much more famous
    than Sigmund Adler. Like many secondborn children, however, Alfred continued
    the rivalry with his older brother into middle age. He once told one of his biogra-
    phers, Phyllis Bottome (1939, p. 18), “My eldest brother is a good industrious
    fellow—he was always ahead of me . . . and he is still ahead of me!”
    The lives of Freud and Adler have several interesting parallels. Although
    both men came from middle- or lower-middle-class Viennese Jewish parents, nei-
    ther was devoutly religious. However, Freud was much more conscious of his
    Jewishness than was Adler and often believed himself to be persecuted because of
    his Jewish background. On the other hand, Adler never claimed to have been
    mistreated, and in 1904, while still a member of Freud’s inner circle, he converted
    to Protestantism. Despite this conversion, he held no deep religious convictions,
    and in fact, one of his biographers (Rattner, 1983) regarded him as an agnostic.
    Like Freud, Adler had a younger brother who died in infancy. This early
    experience profoundly affected both men but in vastly different ways. Freud, by
    his own account, had wished unconsciously for the death of his rival and when the
    infant Julius did in fact die, Freud was filled with guilt and self-reproach, condi-
    tions that continued into his adulthood.
    In contrast, Adler would seem to have had a more powerful reason to be
    traumatized by the death of his younger brother Rudolf. At age 4, Adler awoke one

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 73
    morning to find Rudolf dead in the bed next to his. Rather than being terrified or
    feeling guilty, Adler saw this experience, along with his own near death from pneu-
    monia, as a challenge to overcome death. Thus, at age 5, he decided that his goal
    in life would be to conquer death. Because medicine offered some chance to fore-
    stall death, Adler decided at that early age to become a physician (Hoffman, 1994).
    Although Freud was surrounded by a large family, including seven younger
    brothers and sisters, two grown half-brothers, and a nephew and niece about his
    age, he felt more emotionally attached to his parents, especially his mother, than
    to these other family members. In contrast, Adler was more interested in social
    relationships, and his siblings and peers played a pivotal role in his childhood
    development. Personality differences between Freud and Adler continued through-
    out adulthood, with Freud preferring intense one-to-one relationships and Adler
    feeling more comfortable in group situations. These personality differences were
    also reflected in their professional organizations. Freud’s Vienna Psychoanalytic
    Society and International Psychoanalytic Association were highly structured in
    pyramid fashion, with an inner circle of six of Freud’s trusted friends forming a
    kind of oligarchy at the top. Adler, by comparison, was more democratic, often
    meeting with colleagues and friends in Vienna coffeehouses where they played a
    piano and sang songs. Adler’s Society for Individual Psychology, in fact, suffered
    from a loose organization, and Adler had a relaxed attitude toward business details
    that did not enhance his movement (Ellenberger, 1970).
    Adler attended elementary school with neither difficulty nor distinction.
    However, when he entered the Gymnasium in preparation for medical school, he
    did so poorly that his father threatened to remove him from school and apprentice
    him to a shoemaker (Grey, 1998). As a medical student he once again completed
    work with no special honors, probably because his interest in patient care conflicted
    with his professors’ interest in precise diagnoses (Hoffman, 1994). When he
    received his medical degree near the end of 1895, he had realized his childhood
    goal of becoming a physician.
    Because his father had been born in Hungary, Adler was a Hungarian citizen
    and was thus obliged to serve a tour of military duty in the Hungarian army. He
    fulfilled that obligation immediately after receiving his medical degree and then
    returned to Vienna for postgraduate study. (Adler became an Austrian citizen in 1911.)
    He began private practice as an eye specialist, but gave up that specialization and
    turned to psychiatry and general medicine.
    Scholars disagree on the first meeting of Adler and Freud (Bottome, 1939;
    Ellenberger, 1970; Fiebert, 1997; Handlbauer, 1998), but all agree that in the late
    fall of 1902, Freud invited Adler and three other Viennese physicians to attend
    a meeting in Freud’s home to discuss psychology and neuropathology. This group
    was known as the Wednesday Psychological Society until 1908, when it became
    the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Although Freud led these discussion groups,
    Adler never considered Freud to be his mentor and believed somewhat naively
    that he and others could make contributions to psychoanalysis—contributions
    that would be acceptable to Freud. Although Adler was one of the original
    members of Freud’s inner circle, the two men never shared a warm personal
    relationship. Neither man was quick to recognize theoretical differences even
    after Adler’s 1907 publication of Study of Organ Inferiority and Its Psychical

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories74
    Compensation (1907/1917), which assumed that physical deficiencies—not sex—
    formed the foundation for human motivation.
    During the next few years, Adler became even more convinced that psycho-
    analysis should be much broader than Freud’s view of infantile sexuality. In 1911,
    Adler, who was then president of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, presented his
    views before the group, expressing opposition to the strong sexual proclivities of psy-
    choanalysis and insisting that the drive for superiority was a more basic motive than
    sexuality. Both he and Freud finally recognized that their differences were irreconcil-
    able, and in October of 1911 Adler resigned his presidency and membership in the
    Psychoanalytic Society. Along with nine other former members of the Freudian circle,
    he formed the Society for Free Psychoanalytic Study, a name that irritated Freud with
    its implication that Freudian psychoanalysis was opposed to a free expression of ideas.
    Adler, however, soon changed the name of his organization to the Society for Indi-
    vidual Psychology—a name that clearly indicated he had abandoned psychoanalysis.
    Like Freud, Adler was affected by events surrounding World War I. Both men
    had financial difficulties, and both reluctantly borrowed money from relatives—Freud
    from his brother-in-law Edward Bernays and Adler from his brother Sigmund. Each
    man also made important changes in his theory. Freud elevated aggression to the level
    of sex after viewing the horrors of war, and Adler suggested that social interest and
    compassion could be the cornerstones of human motivation. The war years also
    brought a major disappointment to Adler when his application for an unpaid lecture
    position at the University of Vienna was turned down. Adler wanted this position to
    gain another forum for spreading his views, but he also desperately desired to attain
    the same prestigious position that Freud had held for more than a dozen years. Adler
    never attained this position, but after the war he was able to advance his theories
    through lecturing, establishing child guidance clinics, and training teachers.
    During the last several years of his life, Adler frequently visited the United
    States, where he taught individual psychology at Columbia University and the New
    School for Social Research. By 1932, he was a permanent resident of the United
    States and held the position of Visiting Professor for Medical Psychology at Long
    Island College of Medicine, now Downstate Medical School, State University of
    New York. Unlike Freud, who disliked Americans and their superficial understand-
    ing of psychoanalysis, Adler was impressed by Americans and admired their opti-
    mism and open-mindedness. His popularity as a speaker in the United States
    during the mid-1930s had few rivals, and he aimed his last several books toward
    a receptive American market (Hoffman, 1994).
    Adler married a fiercely independent Russian woman, Raissa Epstein, in
    December of 1897. Raissa was an early feminist and much more political than her
    husband. In later years, while Adler lived in New York, she remained mostly in
    Vienna and worked to promote Marxist-Leninist views that were quite different
    from Adler’s notion of individual freedom and responsibility. After several years
    of requests by her husband to move to New York, Raissa finally came to stay in
    New York only a few months before Adler’s death. Ironically, Raissa, who did not
    share her husband’s love for America, continued to live in New York until her
    own death, nearly a quarter of a century after Adler had died (Hoffman, 1994).
    Raissa and Alfred had four children: Alexandra and Kurt, who became
    psychiatrists and continued their father’s work; Valentine (Vali), who died as a

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 75
    political prisoner of the Soviet Union in about 1942; and Cornelia (Nelly), who
    aspired to be an actress.
    Adler’s favorite relaxation was music, but he also maintained an active interest
    in art and literature. In his work he often borrowed examples from fairy tales, the
    Bible, Shakespeare, Goethe, and numerous other literary works. He identified himself
    closely with the common person, and his manner and appearance were consistent with
    that identification. His patients included a high percentage of people from the lower
    and middle classes, a rarity among psychiatrists of his time. His personal qualities
    included an optimistic attitude toward the human condition, an intense competitiveness
    coupled with friendly congeniality, and a strong belief in the basic gender equality,
    which combined with a willingness to forcefully advocate women’s rights.
    From middle childhood until after his 67th birthday, Adler enjoyed robust
    health. Then, in the early months of 1937, while concerned with the fate of his
    daughter Vali, who had disappeared somewhere in Moscow, Adler felt chest pains
    while on a speaking tour in the Netherlands. Ignoring the doctor’s advice to rest,
    he continued on to Aberdeen, Scotland, where on May 28, 1937, he died of a heart
    attack. Freud, who was 14 years older than Adler, had outlived his longtime adver-
    sary. On hearing of Adler’s death, Freud (as quoted in E. Jones, 1957) sarcastically
    remarked, “For a Jew boy out of a Viennese suburb a death in Aberdeen is an
    unheard-of career in itself and a proof of how far he had got on. The world really
    rewarded him richly for his service in having contradicted psychoanalysis” (p. 208).
    Introduction to Adlerian Theory
    Although Alfred Adler has had a profound effect on such later theorists as Harry
    Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney, Julian Rotter, Abraham H. Maslow, Carl Rogers,
    Albert Ellis, Rollo May, and others (Mosak & Maniacci, 1999), his name is less
    well known than that of either Freud or Carl Jung. At least three reasons account
    for this. First, Adler did not establish a tightly run organization to perpetuate his
    theories. Second, he was not a particularly gifted writer, and most of his books
    were compiled by a series of editors using Adler’s scattered lectures. Third, many
    of his views were incorporated into the works of such later theorists as Maslow,
    Rogers, and Ellis and thus are no longer associated with Adler’s name.
    Although his writings revealed great insight into the depth and complex-
    ities of human personality, Adler evolved a basically simple and parsimonious
    theory. To Adler, people are born with weak, inferior bodies—a condition
    that leads to feelings of inferiority and a consequent dependence on other peo-
    ple. Therefore, a feeling of unity with others (social interest) is inherent in
    people and the ultimate standard for psychological health. More specifically,
    the main tenets of Adlerian theory can be stated in outline form. The following
    is adapted from a list that represents the final statement of individual psychology
    (Adler, 1964).
    1. The one dynamic force behind people’s behavior is the striving for success
    or superiority.
    2. People’s subjective perceptions shape their behavior and personality.
    3. Personality is unified and self-consistent.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories76
    4. The value of all human activity must be seen from the viewpoint of social
    interest.
    5. The self-consistent personality structure develops into a person’s style of life.
    6. Style of life is molded by people’s creative power.
    Striving for Success or Superiority
    The first tenet of Adlerian theory is: The one dynamic force behind people’s behav-
    ior is the striving for success or superiority.
    Adler reduced all motivation to a single drive—the striving for success or
    superiority. Adler’s own childhood was marked by physical deficiencies and
    strong feelings of competitiveness with his older brother. Individual psychology
    holds that everyone begins life with physical deficiencies that activate feelings of
    inferiority—feelings that motivate a person to strive for either superiority or
    success. Psychologically unhealthy individuals strive for personal superiority,
    whereas psychologically healthy people seek success for all humanity.
    Early in his career, Adler believed that aggression was the dynamic power
    behind all motivation, but he soon became dissatisfied with this term. After reject-
    ing aggression as a single motivational force, Adler used the term masculine pro-
    test, which implied will to power or a domination of others. However, he soon
    abandoned masculine protest as a universal drive while continuing to give it a
    limited role in his theory of abnormal development.
    Next, Adler called the single dynamic force striving for superiority. In his
    final theory, however, he limited striving for superiority to those people who strive
    for personal superiority over others and introduced the term striving for success to
    describe actions of people who are motivated by highly developed social interest
    (Adler, 1956). Regardless of the motivation for striving, each individual is guided
    by a final goal.
    The Final Goal
    According to Adler (1956), people strive toward a final goal of either personal
    superiority or the goal of success for all humankind. In either case, the final goal
    is fictional and has no objective existence. Nevertheless, the final goal has great
    significance because it unifies personality and renders all behavior comprehensible.
    Each person has the power to create a personalized fictional goal, one con-
    structed out of the raw materials provided by heredity and environment. However,
    the goal is neither genetically nor environmentally determined. Rather, it is the
    product of the creative power, that is, people’s ability to freely shape their behav-
    ior and create their own personality. By the time children reach 4 or 5 years of
    age, their creative power has developed to the point that they can set their final
    goal. Even infants have an innate drive toward growth, completion, or success.
    Because infants are small, incomplete, and weak, they feel inferior and powerless.
    To compensate for this deficiency, they set a fictional goal to be big, complete,
    and strong. Thus, a person’s final goal reduces the pain of inferiority feelings and
    points that person in the direction of either superiority or success.

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 77
    If children feel neglected or pampered, their goal remains largely uncon-
    scious. Adler (1964) hypothesized that children will compensate for feelings of
    inferiority in devious ways that have no apparent relationship to their fictional goal.
    The goal of superiority for a pampered girl, for example, may be to make perma-
    nent her parasitic relationship with her mother. As an adult, she may appear depen-
    dent and self-deprecating, and such behavior may seem inconsistent with a goal of
    superiority. However, it is quite consistent with her unconscious and misunderstood
    goal of being a parasite that she set at age 4 or 5, a time when her mother appeared
    large and powerful, and attachment to her became a natural means of attaining
    superiority.
    Conversely, if children experience love and security, they set a goal that is
    largely conscious and clearly understood. Psychologically secure children strive
    toward superiority defined in terms of success and social interest. Although their
    goal never becomes completely conscious, these healthy individuals understand
    and pursue it with a high level of awareness.
    In striving for their final goal, people create and pursue many preliminary
    goals. These subgoals are often conscious, but the connection between them and
    the final goal usually remains unknown. Furthermore, the relationship among pre-
    liminary goals is seldom realized. From the point of view of the final goal, how-
    ever, they fit together in a self-consistent pattern. Adler (1956) used the analogy
    of the playwright who builds the characteristics and the subplots of the play accord-
    ing to the final goal of the drama. When the final scene is known, all dialogue and
    every subplot acquire new meaning. When an individual’s final goal is known, all
    actions make sense and each subgoal takes on new significance.
    The Striving Force as Compensation
    People strive for superiority or success as a means of compensation for feelings
    of inferiority or weakness. Adler (1930) believed that all humans are “blessed” at
    birth with small, weak, and inferior bodies. These physical deficiencies ignite feel-
    ings of inferiority only because people, by their nature, possess an innate tendency
    toward completion or wholeness. People are continually pushed by the need to
    overcome inferiority feelings and pulled by the desire for completion. The minus
    and plus situations exist simultaneously and cannot be separated because they are
    two dimensions of a single force.
    The striving force itself is innate, but its nature and direction are due both
    to feelings of inferiority and to the goal of superiority. Without the innate move-
    ment toward perfection, children would never feel inferior; but without feelings of
    inferiority, they would never set a goal of superiority or success. The goal, then,
    is set as compensation for the deficit feeling, but the deficit feeling would not exist
    unless a child first possessed a basic tendency toward completion (Adler, 1956).
    Although the striving for success is innate, it must be developed. At birth it
    exists as potentiality, not actuality; each person must actualize this potential in his
    or her own manner. At about age 4 or 5, children begin this process by setting a
    direction to the striving force and by establishing a goal either of personal superi-
    ority or of social success. The goal provides guidelines for motivation, shaping
    psychological development and giving it an aim.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories78
    As a creation of the individual, the goal may take any form. It is not
    necessarily a mirror image of the deficiency, even though it is a compensation
    for it. For example, a person with a weak body will not necessarily become a
    robust athlete but instead may become an artist, an actor, or a writer. Success
    is an individualized concept and all people formulate their own definition of it.
    Although creative power is swayed by the forces of heredity and environment,
    it is ultimately responsible for people’s personality. Heredity establishes the
    potentiality, whereas environment contributes to the development of social inter-
    est and courage. The forces of nature and nurture can never deprive a person
    of the power to set a unique goal or to choose a unique style of reaching for
    the goal (Adler, 1956).
    In his final theory, Adler identified two general avenues of striving. The first
    is the socially nonproductive attempt to gain personal superiority; the second
    involves social interest and is aimed at success or perfection for everyone.
    Striving for Personal Superiority
    Some people strive for superiority with little or no concern for others. Their
    goals are personal ones, and their strivings are motivated largely by exaggerated
    feelings of personal inferiority, or the presence of an inferiority complex.
    Murderers, thieves, and con artists are obvious examples of people who strive
    for personal gain. Some people create clever disguises for their personal striving
    and may consciously or unconsciously hide their self-centeredness behind the
    cloak of social concern. A college teacher, for example, may appear to have a
    great interest in his students because he establishes a personal relationship with
    many of them. By conspicuously displaying much sympathy and concern, he
    encourages vulnerable students to talk to him about their personal problems.
    This teacher possesses a private intelligence that allows him to believe that he
    is the most accessible and dedicated teacher in his college. To a casual observer,
    he may appear to be motivated by social interest, but his actions are largely
    self-serving and motivated by overcompensation for his exaggerated feelings of
    personal superiority.
    Striving for Success
    In contrast to people who strive for personal gain are those psychologically healthy
    people who are motivated by social interest and the success of all humankind.
    These healthy individuals are concerned with goals beyond themselves, are capable
    of helping others without demanding or expecting a personal payoff, and are able
    to see others not as opponents but as people with whom they can cooperate for
    social benefit. Their own success is not gained at the expense of others but is a
    natural tendency to move toward completion or perfection.
    People who strive for success rather than personal superiority maintain a
    sense of self, of course, but they see daily problems from the view of society’s
    development rather than from a strictly personal vantage point. Their sense of
    personal worth is tied closely to their contributions to human society. Social prog-
    ress is more important to them than personal credit (Adler, 1956).

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 79
    Subjective Perceptions
    Adler’s second tenet is: People’s subjective perceptions shape their behavior and
    personality.
    People strive for superiority or success to compensate for feelings of inferior-
    ity, but the manner in which they strive is not shaped by reality but by their subjec-
    tive perceptions of reality, that is, by their fictions, or expectations of the future.
    Fictionalism
    Our most important fiction is the goal of superiority or success, a goal we created
    early in life and may not clearly understand. This subjective, fictional final goal
    guides our style of life, gives unity to our personality. Adler’s ideas on fictionalism
    originated with Hans Vaihinger’s book The Philosophy of “As If” (1911/1925).
    Vaihinger believed that fictions are ideas that have no real existence, yet they
    influence people as if they really existed. One example of a fiction might be: “Men
    are superior to women.” Although this notion is a fiction, many people, both men
    and women, act as if it were a reality. A second example might be: “Humans have
    a free will that enables them to make choices.” Again, many people act as if they
    and others have a free will and are thus responsible for their choices. No one can
    prove that free will exists, yet this fiction guides the lives of most of us. People
    are motivated not by what is true but by their subjective perceptions of what is
    true. A third example of a fiction might be a belief in an omnipotent God who
    rewards good and punishes evil. Such a belief guides the daily lives of millions of
    people and helps shape many of their actions. Whether true or false, fictions have
    a powerful influence on people’s lives.
    Adler’s emphasis on fictions is consistent with his strongly held teleological
    view of motivation. Teleology is an explanation of behavior in terms of its final
    purpose or aim. It is opposed to causality, which considers behavior as springing
    from a specific cause. Teleology is usually concerned with future goals or ends,
    whereas causality ordinarily deals with past experiences that produce some present
    effect. Freud’s view of motivation was basically causal; he believed that people
    are driven by past events that activate present behavior. In contrast, Adler adopted
    a teleological view, one in which people are motivated by present perceptions of
    the future. As fictions, these perceptions need not be conscious or understood.
    Nevertheless, they bestow a purpose on all of people’s actions and are responsible
    for a consistent pattern that runs throughout their life.
    Physical Inferiorities
    Because people begin life small, weak, and inferior, they develop a fiction or belief
    system about how to overcome these physical deficiencies and become big, strong,
    and superior. But even after they attain size, strength, and superiority, they may
    act as if they are still small, weak, and inferior.
    Adler (1929/1969) insisted that the whole human race is “blessed” with organ
    inferiorities. These physical handicaps have little or no importance by themselves
    but become meaningful when they stimulate subjective feelings of inferiority,

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories80
    which serve as an impetus toward perfection or completion. Some people compen-
    sate for these feelings of inferiority by moving toward psychological health and a
    useful style of life, whereas others overcompensate and are motivated to subdue
    or retreat from other people.
    History provides many examples of people like Demosthenes or Beethoven
    overcoming a handicap and making significant contributions to society. Adler him-
    self was weak and sickly as a child, and his illness moved him to overcome death
    by becoming a physician and by competing with his older brother and with Sigmund
    Freud.
    Adler (1929/1969) emphasized that physical deficiencies alone do not cause
    a particular style of life; they simply provide present motivation for reaching future
    goals. Such motivation, like all aspects of personality, is unified and self-consistent.
    Unity and Self-Consistency
    of Personality
    The third tenet of Adlerian theory is: Personality is unified and self-consistent.
    In choosing the term individual psychology, Adler wished to stress his belief
    that each person is unique and indivisible. Thus, individual psychology insists on
    the fundamental unity of personality and the notion that inconsistent behavior does
    not exist. Thoughts, feelings, and actions are all directed toward a single goal and
    serve a single purpose. When people behave erratically or unpredictably, their
    behavior forces other people to be on the defensive, to be watchful so as not to be
    confused by capricious actions. Although behaviors may appear inconsistent, when
    they are viewed from the perspective of a final goal, they appear as clever but
    probably unconscious attempts to confuse and subordinate other people. This con-
    fusing and seemingly inconsistent behavior gives the erratic person the upper hand
    in an interpersonal relationship. Although erratic people are often successful in
    their attempt to gain superiority over others, they usually remain unaware of their
    underlying motive and may stubbornly reject any suggestion that they desire supe-
    riority over other people.
    Adler (1956) recognized several ways in which the entire person operates with
    unity and self-consistency. The first of these he called organ jargon, or organ dialect.
    Organ Dialect
    According to Adler (1956), the whole person strives in a self-consistent fashion
    toward a single goal, and all separate actions and functions can be understood only
    as parts of this goal. The disturbance of one part of the body cannot be viewed in
    iso lation; it affects the entire person. In fact, the deficient organ expresses the
    direction of the individual’s goal, a condition known as organ dialect. Through
    organ dialect, the body’s organs “speak a language which is usually more expres-
    sive and discloses the individual’s opinion more clearly than words are able to do”
    (Adler, 1956, p. 223).
    One example of organ dialect might be a man suffering from rheumatoid
    arthritis in his hands. His stiff and deformed joints voice his whole style of life.
    It is as if they cry out, “See my deformity. See my handicap. You can’t expect me

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 81
    to do manual work.” Without an audible sound, his hands speak of his desire for
    sympathy from others.
    Adler (1956) presented another example of organ dialect—the case of a very
    obedient boy who wet the bed at night to send a message that he does not wish
    to obey parental wishes. His behavior is “really a creative expression, for the child
    is speaking with his bladder instead of his mouth” (p. 223).
    Conscious and Unconscious
    A second example of a unified personality is the harmony between conscious and
    unconscious actions. Adler (1956) defined the unconscious as that part of the goal
    that is neither clearly formulated nor completely understood by the individual. With
    this definition, Adler avoided a dichotomy between the unconscious and the con-
    scious, which he saw as two cooperating parts of the same unified system. Con-
    scious thoughts are those that are understood and regarded by the individual as
    helpful in striving for success, whereas unconscious thoughts are those that are not
    helpful.
    We cannot oppose “consciousness” to “unconsciousness” as if they were
    antagonistic halves of an individual’s existence. The conscious life becomes
    unconscious as soon as we fail to understand it—and as soon as we understand
    an unconscious tendency it has already become conscious. (Adler, 1929/1964,
    p. 163)
    Whether people’s behaviors lead to a healthy or an unhealthy style of life
    depends on the degree of social interest that they developed during their childhood
    years.
    Social Interest
    The fourth of Adler’s tenets is: The value of all human activity must be seen from
    the viewpoint of social interest.
    Social interest is Adler’s somewhat misleading translation of his original
    German term, Gemeinschaftsgefühl. A better translation might be “social feeling”
    or “community feeling,” but Gemeinschaftsgefühl actually has a meaning that is not
    fully expressed by any English word or phrase. Roughly, it means a feeling of one-
    ness with all humanity; it implies membership in the social community of all peo-
    ple. A person with well-developed Gemeinschaftsgefühl strives not for personal
    superiority but for perfection for all people in an ideal community. Social interest
    can be defined as an attitude of relatedness with humanity in general as well as an
    empathy for each member of the human community. It manifests itself as coopera-
    tion with others for social advancement rather than for personal gain (Adler, 1964).
    Social interest is the natural condition of the human species and the adhesive
    that binds society together (Adler, 1927). The natural inferiority of individuals neces-
    sitates their joining together to form a society. Without protection and nourishment
    from a father or mother, a baby would perish. Without protection from the family
    or clan, our ancestors would have been destroyed by animals that were stronger,
    more ferocious, or endowed with keener senses. Social interest, therefore, is a neces-
    sity for perpetuating the human species.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories82
    Origins of Social Interest
    Social interest is rooted as potentiality in everyone, but it must be developed before
    it can contribute to a useful style of life. It originates from the mother-child relation-
    ship during the early months of infancy. Every person who has survived infancy was
    kept alive by a mothering person who possessed some amount of social interest. Thus,
    every person has had the seeds of social interest sown during those early months.
    Adler believed that marriage and parenthood is a task for two. However, the
    two parents may influence a child’s social interest in somewhat different ways.
    The mother’s job is to develop a bond that encourages the child’s mature social
    interest and fosters a sense of cooperation. Ideally, she should have a genuine and
    deep-rooted love for her child—a love that is centered on the child’s well-being,
    not on her own needs or wants. This healthy love relationship develops from a true
    caring for her child, her husband, and other people. If the mother has learned to
    give and receive love from others, she will have little difficulty broadening her
    child’s social interest. But if she favors the child over the father, her child may
    become pampered and spoiled. Conversely, if she favors her husband or society,
    the child will feel neglected and unloved.
    The father is a second important person in a child’s social environment. He
    must demonstrate a caring attitude toward his wife as well as to other people. The
    ideal father cooperates on an equal footing with the child’s mother in caring for
    the child and treating the child as a human being. According to Adler’s (1956)
    standards, a successful father avoids the dual errors of emotional detachment and
    paternal authoritarianism. These errors may represent two attitudes, but they are
    often found in the same father. Both prevent the growth and spread of social
    Both mother and father can contribute powerfully to the developing social interest of their children.
    © Purestock/SuperStock

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 83
    interest in a child. A father’s emotional detachment may influence the child to
    develop a warped sense of social interest, a feeling of neglect, and possibly a
    parasitic attachment to the mother. A child who experiences paternal detachment
    creates a goal of personal superiority rather than one based on social interest. The
    second error—paternal authoritarianism—may also lead to an unhealthy style of
    life. A child who sees the father as a tyrant learns to strive for power and personal
    superiority.
    Adler (1956) believed that the effects of the early social environment are
    extremely important. The relationship a child has with the mother and father is so
    powerful that it smothers the effects of heredity. Adler believed that after age 5,
    the effects of heredity become blurred by the powerful influence of the child’s
    social environment. By that time, environmental forces have modified or shaped
    nearly every aspect of a child’s personality.
    Importance of Social Interest
    Social interest was Adler’s yardstick for measuring psychological health and is thus
    “the sole criterion of human values” (Adler, 1927, p. 167). To Adler, social interest
    is the only gauge to be used in judging the worth of a person. As the barometer of
    normality, it is the standard to be used in determining the usefulness of a life. To
    the degree that people possess social interest, they are psychologically mature. Imma-
    ture people lack Gemeinschaftsgefühl, are self-centered, and strive for personal power
    and superiority over others. Healthy individuals are genuinely concerned about peo-
    ple and have a goal of success that encompasses the well-being of all people.
    Social interest is not synonymous with charity and unselfishness. Acts of
    philanthropy and kindness may or may not be motivated by Gemeinschaftsgefühl.
    A wealthy woman may regularly give large sums of money to the poor and
    needy, not because she feels a oneness with them, but, quite to the contrary,
    because she wishes to maintain a separateness from them. The gift implies, “You
    are inferior, I am superior, and this charity is proof of my superiority.” Adler
    believed that the worth of all such acts can only be judged against the criterion
    of social interest.
    In summary, people begin life with a basic striving force that is activated by
    ever-present physical deficiencies. These organic weaknesses lead inevitably to
    feelings of inferiority. Thus, all people possess feelings of inferiority, and all set
    a final goal at around age 4 or 5. However, psychologically unhealthy individuals
    develop exaggerated feelings of inferiority and attempt to compensate by setting a
    goal of personal superiority. They are motivated by personal gain rather than by
    social interest, whereas healthy people are motivated by normal feelings of incom-
    pleteness and high levels of social interest. They strive toward the goal of success,
    defined in terms of perfection and completion for everyone. Figure 3.1 illustrates
    how the innate striving force combines with inevitable physical deficiencies to
    produce universal feelings of inferiority, which can be either exaggerated or nor-
    mal. Exaggerated feelings of inferiority lead to a neurotic style of life, whereas
    normal feelings of incompletion result in a healthy style of life. Whether a person
    forms a useless style of life or a socially useful one depends on how that person
    views these inevitable feelings of inferiority.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories84
    Style of Life
    Adler’s fifth tenet is: The self-consistent personality structure develops into a per-
    son’s style of life.
    Style of life is the term Adler used to refer to the flavor of a person’s life.
    It includes a person’s goal, self-concept, feelings for others, and attitude toward the
    world. It is the product of the interaction of heredity, environment, and a person’s
    creative power. Adler (1956) used a musical analogy to elucidate style of life. The
    separate notes of a composition are meaningless without the entire melody, but the
    melody takes on added significance when we recognize the composer’s style or
    unique manner of expression.
    A person’s style of life is fairly well established by age 4 or 5. After that
    time, all our actions revolve around our unified style of life. Although the final
    goal is singular, style of life need not be narrow or rigid. Psychologically unhealthy
    individuals often lead rather inflexible lives that are marked by an inability to
    choose new ways of reacting to their environment. In contrast, psychologically
    healthy people behave in diverse and flexible ways with styles of life that are
    complex, enriched, and changing. Healthy people see many ways of striving for
    success and continually seek to create new options for themselves. Even though
    their final goal remains constant, the way in which they perceive it continually
    changes. Thus, they can choose new options at any point in life.
    People with a healthy, socially useful style of life express their social inter-
    est through action. They actively struggle to solve what Adler regarded as the three
    major problems of life—neighborly love, sexual love, and occupation—and they
    do so through cooperation, personal courage, and a willingness to make a contribu-
    tion to the welfare of another. Adler (1956) believed that people with a socially
    Personal superiority
    Personal gain
    Exaggerated feelings
    Success
    Social interest
    Normal feelings of incompletion
    Feelings of inferiority
    Physical deficiencies
    Innate striving force
    Final goal
    dimly perceived
    Final goal
    clearly perceived
    FIGURE 3.1 Two Basic Methods of Striving toward the Final Goal.

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 85
    useful style of life represent the highest form of humanity in the evolutionary
    process and are likely to populate the world of the future.
    Creative Power
    The final tenet of Adlerian theory is: Style of life is molded by people’s creative
    power.
    Each person, Adler believed, is empowered with the freedom to create her or
    his own style of life. Ultimately, all people are responsible for who they are and
    how they behave. Their creative power places them in control of their own lives,
    is responsible for their final goal, determines their method of striving for that goal,
    and contributes to the development of social interest. In short, creative power makes
    each person a free individual. Creative power is a dynamic concept implying move-
    ment, and this movement is the most salient characteristic of life. All psychic life
    involves movement toward a goal, movement with a direction (Adler, 1964).
    Adler (1956) acknowledged the importance of heredity and environment in
    forming personality. Except for identical twins, every child is born with a unique
    genetic makeup and soon comes to have social experiences different from those
    of any other human. People, however, are much more than a product of heredity
    and environment. They are creative beings who not only react to their environment
    but also act on it and cause it to react to them.
    Each person uses heredity and environment as the bricks and mortar to build
    personality, but the architectural design reflects that person’s own style. Of primary
    importance is not what people have been given, but how they put those materials
    to use. The building materials of personality are secondary. We are our own archi-
    tect and can build either a useful or a useless style of life. We can choose to
    construct a gaudy façade or to expose the essence of the structure. We are not
    compelled to grow in the direction of social interest, inasmuch as we have no inner
    nature that forces us to be good. Conversely, we have no inherently evil nature
    from which we must escape. We are who we are because of the use we have made
    of our bricks and mortar.
    Adler (1929/1964) used an interesting analogy, which he called “the law of
    the low doorway.” If you are trying to walk through a doorway four feet high, you
    have two basic choices. First, you can use your creative power to bend down as
    you approach the doorway, thereby successfully solving the problem. This is the
    manner in which the psychologically healthy individual solves most of life’s prob-
    lems. Conversely, if you bump your head and fall back, you must still solve the
    problem correctly or continue bumping your head. Neurotics often choose to bump
    their head on the realities of life. When approaching the low doorway, you are
    neither compelled to stoop nor forced to bump your head. You have a creative
    power that permits you to follow either course.
    Abnormal Development
    Adler believed that people are what they make of themselves. The creative power
    endows humans, within certain limits, with the freedom to be either psychologi-
    cally healthy or unhealthy and to follow either a useful or useless style of life.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories86
    General Description
    According to Adler (1956), the one factor underlying all types of maladjustments
    is underdeveloped social interest. Besides lacking social interest, neurotics tend
    to (1) set their goals too high, (2) live in their own private world, and (3) have
    a rigid and dogmatic style of life. These three characteristics follow inevitably from
    a lack of social interest. In short, people become failures in life because they are
    overconcerned with themselves and care little about others. Maladjusted people set
    extravagant goals as an overcompensation for exaggerated feelings of inferiority.
    These lofty goals lead to dogmatic behavior, and the higher the goal, the more
    rigid the striving. To compensate for deeply rooted feelings of inadequacy and
    basic insecurity, these individuals narrow their perspective and strive compulsively
    and rigidly for unrealistic goals.
    The exaggerated and unrealistic nature of neurotics’ goals sets them apart
    from the community of other people. They approach the problems of friendship,
    sex, and occupation from a personal angle that precludes successful solutions. Their
    view of the world is not in focus with that of other individuals and they possess
    what Adler (1956) called “private meaning” (p. 156). These people find everyday
    living to be hard work, requiring great effort. Adler (1929/1964) used an analogy
    to describe how these people go through life.
    In a certain popular music hall, the “strong” man comes on and lifts an
    enormous weight with care and intense difficulty. Then, during the hearty
    applause of the audience, a child comes in and gives away the fraud by carrying
    the dummy weight off with one hand. There are plenty of neurotics who
    swindle us with such weights, and who are adepts at appearing overburdened.
    They could really dance with the load under which they stagger. (p. 91)
    External Factors in Maladjustment
    Why do some people create maladjustments? Adler (1964) recognized three
    contributing factors, any one of which is sufficient to contribute to abnormality:
    (1) exaggerated physical deficiencies, (2) a pampered style of life, and (3) a neglected
    style of life.
    Exaggerated Physical Deficiencies
    Exaggerated physical deficiencies, whether congenital or the result of injury or
    disease, are not sufficient to lead to maladjustment. They must be accompanied by
    accentuated feelings of inferiority. These subjective feelings may be greatly encour-
    aged by a defective body, but they are the progeny of the creative power.
    Each person comes into the world “blessed” with physical deficiencies,
    and these deficiencies lead to feelings of inferiority. People with exaggerated
    physical deficiencies sometimes develop exaggerated feelings of inferiority
    because they overcompensate for their inadequacy. They tend to be overly
    concerned with themselves and lack consideration for others. They feel as if
    they are living in enemy country, fear defeat more than they desire success,
    and are convinced that life’s major problems can be solved only in a selfish
    manner (Adler, 1927).

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 87
    Pampered Style of Life
    A pampered style of life lies at the heart of most neuroses. Pampered people have
    weak social interest but a strong desire to perpetuate the pampered, parasitic rela-
    tionship they originally had with one or both of their parents. They expect others
    to look after them, overprotect them, and satisfy their needs. They are characterized
    by extreme discouragement, indecisiveness, oversensitivity, impatience, and exag-
    gerated emotion, especially anxiety. They see the world with private vision and
    believe that they are entitled to be first in everything (Adler, 1927, 1964).
    Pampered children have not received too much love; rather, they feel unloved.
    Their parents have demonstrated a lack of love by doing too much for them and
    by treating them as if they were incapable of solving their own problems. Because
    these children feel pampered and spoiled, they develop a pampered style of life.
    Pampered children may also feel neglected. Having been protected by a doting
    parent, they are fearful when separated from that parent. Whenever they must fend
    for themselves, they feel left out, mistreated, and neglected. These experiences add
    to the pampered child’s stockpile of inferiority feelings.
    Neglected Style of Life
    The third external factor contributing to maladjustment is neglect. Children who
    feel unloved and unwanted are likely to borrow heavily from these feelings in
    creating a neglected style of life. Neglect is a relative concept. No one feels totally
    neglected or completely unwanted. The fact that a child survived infancy is proof
    that someone cared for that child and that the seed of social interest has been
    planted (Adler, 1927).
    Abused and mistreated children develop little social interest and tend to cre-
    ate a neglected style of life. They have little confidence in themselves and tend to
    overestimate difficulties connected with life’s major problems. They are distrustful
    of other people and are unable to cooperate for the common welfare. They see
    society as enemy country, feel alienated from all other people, and experience a
    strong sense of envy toward the success of others. Neglected children have many
    of the characteristics of pampered ones, but generally they are more suspicious and
    more likely to be dangerous to others (Adler, 1927).
    Safeguarding Tendencies
    Adler believed that people create patterns of behavior to protect their exaggerated
    sense of self-esteem against public disgrace. These protective devices, called
    safeguarding tendencies, enable people to hide their inflated self-image and to
    maintain their current style of life.
    Adler’s concept of safeguarding tendencies can be compared to Freud’s
    concept of defense mechanisms. Basic to both is the idea that symptoms are
    formed as a protection against anxiety. However, there are important differences
    between the two concepts. Freudian defense mechanisms operate unconsciously
    to protect the ego against anxiety, whereas Adlerian safeguarding tendencies are
    largely conscious and shield a person’s fragile self-esteem from public disgrace.
    Also, Freud’s defense mechanisms are common to everyone, but Adler (1956)

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories88
    discussed safeguarding tendencies only with reference to the construction of neu-
    rotic symptoms. Excuses, aggression, and withdrawal are three common safe-
    guarding tendencies, each designed to protect a person’s present style of life and
    to maintain a fictional, elevated feeling of self-importance (Adler, 1964).
    Excuses
    The most common of the safeguarding tendencies are excuses, which are typically
    expressed in the “Yes, but” or “If only” format. In the “Yes, but” excuse, people
    first state what they claim they would like to do—something that sounds good to
    others—then they follow with an excuse. A woman might say, “Yes, I would like
    to go to college, but my children demand too much of my attention.” An executive
    explains, “Yes, I agree with your proposal, but company policy will not allow it.”
    The “If only” statement is the same excuse phrased in a different way. “If
    only my husband were more supportive, I would have advanced faster in my pro-
    fession.” “If only I did not have this physical deficiency, I could compete success-
    fully for a job.” These excuses protect a weak—but artificially inflated—sense of
    self-worth and deceive people into believing that they are more superior than they
    really are (Adler, 1956).
    Aggression
    Another common safeguarding tendency is aggression. Adler (1956) held that
    some people use aggression to safeguard their exaggerated superiority complex,
    that is, to protect their fragile self-esteem. Safeguarding through aggression may
    take the form of depreciation, accusation, or self-accusation.
    Depreciation is the tendency to undervalue other people’s achievements and to
    overvalue one’s own. This safeguarding tendency is evident in such aggressive behav-
    iors as criticism and gossip. “The only reason Kenneth got the job I applied for is
    because he is an African American.” “If you look closely, you’ll notice that Jill works
    hardest at avoiding work.” The intention behind each act of depreciation is to belittle
    another so that the person, by comparison, will be placed in a favorable light.
    Accusation, the second form of an aggressive safeguarding device, is the
    tendency to blame others for one’s failures and to seek revenge, thereby safeguard-
    ing one’s own tenuous self-esteem. “I wanted to be an artist, but my parents forced
    me to go to medical school. Now I have a job that makes me miserable.” Adler
    (1956) believed that there is an element of aggressive accusation in all unhealthy
    lifestyles. Unhealthy people invariably act to cause the people around them to suf-
    fer more than they do.
    The third form of neurotic aggression, self-accusation, is marked by self-
    torture and guilt. Some people use self-torture, including masochism, depression,
    and suicide, as means of hurting people who are close to them. Guilt is often
    aggressive, self-accusatory behavior. “I feel distressed because I wasn’t nicer to
    my grandmother while she was still living. Now, it’s too late.”
    Self-accusation is the converse of depreciation, although both are aimed
    toward gaining personal superiority. With depreciation, people who feel inferior
    devalue others to make themselves look good. With self-accusation, people devalue
    themselves in order to inflict suffering on others while protecting their own mag-
    nified feelings of self-esteem (Adler, 1956).

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 89
    Withdrawal
    Personality development can be halted when people run away from difficulties.
    Adler referred to this tendency as withdrawal, or safeguarding through distance.
    Some people unconsciously escape life’s problems by setting up a distance between
    themselves and those problems.
    Adler (1956) recognized four modes of safeguarding through withdrawal:
    (1) moving backward, (2) standing still, (3) hesitating, and (4) constructing
    obstacles.
    Moving backward is the tendency to safeguard one’s fictional goal of supe-
    riority by psychologically reverting to a more secure period of life. Moving back-
    ward is similar to Freud’s concept of regression in that both involve attempts to
    return to earlier, more comfortable phases of life. Whereas regression takes place
    unconsciously and protects people against anxiety-filled experiences, moving back-
    ward may sometimes be conscious and is directed at maintaining an inflated goal
    of superiority. Moving backward is designed to elicit sympathy, the deleterious
    attitude offered so generously to pampered children.
    Psychological distance can also be created by standing still. This withdrawal
    tendency is similar to moving backward but, in general, it is not as severe. People
    who stand still simply do not move in any direction; thus, they avoid all respon-
    sibility by ensuring themselves against any threat of failure. They safeguard their
    fictional aspirations because they never do anything to prove that they cannot
    accomplish their goals. A person who never applies to graduate school can never
    be denied entrance; a child who shies away from other children will not be rejected
    by them. By doing nothing, people safeguard their self-esteem and protect them-
    selves against failure.
    Closely related to standing still is hesitating. Some people hesitate or vacil-
    late when faced with difficult problems. Their procrastinations eventually give
    them the excuse “It’s too late now.” Adler believed that most compulsive behaviors
    are attempts to waste time. Compulsive hand washing, retracing one’s steps, behav-
    ing in an obsessive orderly manner, destroying work already begun, and leaving
    work unfinished are examples of hesitation. Although hesitating may appear to
    other people to be self-defeating, it allows neurotic individuals to preserve their
    inflated sense of self-esteem.
    The least severe of the withdrawal safeguarding tendencies is constructing
    obstacles. Some people build a straw house to show that they can knock it down.
    By overcoming the obstacle, they protect their self-esteem and their prestige. If
    they fail to hurdle the barrier, they can always resort to an excuse.
    In summary, safeguarding tendencies are found in nearly everyone, but when
    they become overly rigid, they lead to self-defeating behaviors. Overly sensitive
    people create safeguarding tendencies to buffer their fear of disgrace, to eliminate
    their exaggerated inferiority feelings, and to attain self-esteem. However, safe-
    guarding tendencies are self-defeating because their built-in goals of self-interest
    and personal superiority actually block them from securing authentic feelings of
    self-esteem. Many people fail to realize that their self-esteem would be better
    safeguarded if they gave up their self-interest and developed a genuine caring for
    other people. Adler’s idea of safeguarding tendencies and Freud’s notion of defense
    mechanisms are compared in Table 3.1.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories90
    Masculine Protest
    In contrast to Freud, Adler (1930, 1956) believed that the psychic life of women is
    essentially the same as that of men and that a male-dominated society is not natural
    but rather an artificial product of historical development. According to Adler, cultural
    and social practices—not anatomy—influence many men and women to overempha-
    size the importance of being manly, a condition he called the masculine protest.
    Origins of the Masculine Protest
    In many societies, both men and women place an inferior value on being a woman.
    Boys are frequently taught early that being masculine means being courageous, strong,
    and dominant. The epitome of success for boys is to win, to be powerful, to be on top.
    In contrast, girls often learn to be passive and to accept an inferior position in society.
    Some women fight against their feminine roles, developing a masculine ori-
    entation and becoming assertive and competitive; others revolt by adopting a pas-
    sive role, becoming exceedingly helpless and obedient; still others become resigned
    to the belief that they are inferior human beings, acknowledging men’s privileged
    position by shifting responsibilities to them. Each of these modes of adjustment
    results from cultural and social influences, not from inherent psychic difference
    between the two genders.
    Adler, Freud, and the Masculine Protest
    In the previous chapter we saw that Freud (1924/1961) believed that “anatomy is
    destiny” (p. 178), and that he regarded women as the “ ‘dark continent’ for psychology”
    T A B L E 3 . 1
    Comparison of Safeguarding Tendencies with Defense Mechanisms
    Adler’s Safeguarding Tendencies
    1. Limited mostly to the construction
    of a neurotic style of life
    2. Protect the person’s fragile self-
    esteem from public disgrace
    3. Can be partly conscious
    4. Common types include:
    A. excuses
    B . aggression
    (1) depreciation
    (2) accusation
    (3) self-accusation
    C . withdrawal
    (1) moving backward
    (2) standing still
    (3) hesitating
    (4) constructing obstacles
    Freud’s Defense Mechanisms
    1. Found in everyone
    2. Protect the ego from the pain of
    anxiety
    3. Operate only on an unconscious
    level
    4. Common types include:
    A. repression
    B . reaction formation
    C . displacement
    D . fixation
    E . regression
    F . projection
    G. introjection
    H. sublimation

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 91
    (Freud 1926/1959b, p. 212). Moreover, near the end of his life, he was still asking,
    “What does a woman want?” (E. Jones, 1955, p. 421). According to Adler, these
    attitudes toward women would be evidence of a person with a strong masculine protest.
    In contrast to Freud’s views on women, Adler assumed that women—because they
    have the same physiological and psychological needs as men—want more or less the
    same things that men want.
    These opposing views on femininity were magnified in the women Freud and
    Adler chose to marry. Martha Bernays Freud was a subservient housewife dedicated
    to her children and husband, but she had no interest in her husband’s professional
    work. In contrast, Raissa Epstein Adler was an intensely independent woman who
    abhorred the traditional domestic role, preferring a politically active career.
    During the early years of their marriage, Raissa and Alfred Adler had some-
    what compatible political views, but in time, these views diverged. Alfred became
    more of a capitalist, advocating personal responsibility, while Raissa became
    involved in the dangerous Communist politics of her native Russia. Such indepen-
    dence pleased Adler, who was as much a feminist as his strong-willed wife.
    Applications of Individual Psychology
    We have divided the practical applications of individual psychology into four areas:
    (1) family constellation, (2) early recollections, (3) dreams, and (4) psychotherapy.
    Family Constellation
    In therapy, Adler almost always asked patients about their family constellation,
    that is, their birth order, the gender of their siblings, and the age spread between
    them. Although people’s perception of the situation into which they were born is
    more important than numerical rank, Adler did form some general hypotheses
    about birth order.
    Firstborn children, according to Adler (1931), are likely to have intensified
    feelings of power and superiority, high anxiety, and overprotective tendencies.
    (Recall that Freud was his mother’s firstborn child.) Firstborn children occupy a
    unique position, being an only child for a time and then experiencing a traumatic
    dethronement when a younger sibling is born. This event dramatically changes the
    situation and the child’s view of the world.
    If firstborn children are age 3 or older when a baby brother or sister is born,
    they incorporate this dethronement into a previously established style of life. If they
    have already developed a self-centered style of life, they likely will feel hostility
    and resentment toward the new baby, but if they have formed a cooperating style,
    they will eventually adopt this same attitude toward the new sibling. If firstborn
    children are less than 3 years old, their hostility and resentment will be largely
    unconscious, which makes these attitudes more resistant to change in later life.
    According to Adler, secondborn children (such as himself ) begin life in a bet-
    ter situation for developing cooperation and social interest. To some extent, the
    personalities of secondborn children are shaped by their perception of the older
    child’s attitude toward them. If this attitude is one of extreme hostility and vengeance,
    the second child may become highly competitive or overly discouraged. The typical

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories92
    second child, however, does not develop in either of these two directions. Instead,
    the secondborn child matures toward moderate competitiveness, having a healthy
    desire to overtake the older rival. If some success is achieved, the child is likely to
    develop a revolutionary attitude and feel that any authority can be challenged. Again,
    children’s interpretations are more important than their chronological position.
    Youngest children, Adler believed, are often the most pampered and, conse-
    quently, run a high risk of being problem children. They are likely to have strong
    feelings of inferiority and to lack a sense of independence. Nevertheless, they
    possess many advantages. They are often highly motivated to exceed older siblings
    and to become the fastest runner, the best musician, the most skilled athlete, or the
    most ambitious student.
    Only children are in a unique position of competing, not against brothers and
    sisters, but against father and mother. Living in an adult world, they often develop
    an exaggerated sense of superiority and an inflated self-concept. Adler (1931)
    stated that only children may lack well-developed feelings of cooperation and
    social interest, possess a parasitic attitude, and expect other people to pamper
    and  protect them. Typical positive and negative traits of oldest, second, youngest,
    and only children are shown in Table 3.2.
    Early Recollections
    To gain an understanding of patients’ personality, Adler would ask them to reveal
    their early recollections (ERs). Although he believed that the recalled memories
    yield clues for understanding patients’ style of life, he did not consider these memories
    Siblings may feel superior or inferior and may adopt different attitudes toward the world depending
    in part on their order of birth. © Design Pics/Don Hammond

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 93
    to have a causal effect. Whether the recalled experiences correspond with objective
    reality or are complete fantasies is of no importance. People reconstruct the events
    to make them consistent with a theme or pattern that runs throughout their lives.
    Adler (1929/1969, 1931) insisted that early recollections are always consistent
    with people’s present style of life and that their subjective account of these experiences
    yields clues to understanding both their final goal and their present style of life. One
    of Adler’s earliest recollections was of the great contrast between his brother Sigmund’s
    good health and his own sickly condition. As an adult, Adler reported that
    One of my earliest recollections is of sitting on a beach . . . bandaged up on
    account of rickets, with my healthier elder brother sitting opposite me. He could
    run, jump, and move about quite effortlessly, while for me movement of any sort
    was a strain. . . . Everyone went to great pains to help me. (Bottome, 1957, p. 30)
    If Adler’s assumption that early recollections are a valid indicator of a per-
    son’s style of life, then this memory should yield clues about Adler’s adult style
    T A B L E 3 . 2
    Adler’s View of Some Possible Traits by Birth Order
    Positive Traits Negative Traits
    Oldest Child
    Second Child
    Highly anxious
    Exaggerated feelings of power
    Unconscious hostility
    Fights for acceptance
    Must always be “right,” whereas
    others are always “wrong”
    Highly critical of others
    Uncooperative
    Nurturing and protective of others
    Good organizer
    Highly motivated
    Cooperative
    Moderately competitive
    Highly competitive
    Easily discouraged
    Realistically ambitious Pampered style of life
    Dependent on others
    Wants to excel in everything
    Unrealistically ambitious
    Socially mature Exaggerated feelings of superiority
    Low feelings of cooperation
    Inflated sense of self
    Pampered style of life
    Youngest Child
    Only Child

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories94
    of life. First, it tells us that he must have seen himself as an underdog, competing
    valiantly against a powerful foe. However, this early recollection also indicates that
    he believed he had the help of others. Receiving aid from other people would have
    given Adler the confidence to compete against such a powerful rival. This confi-
    dence coupled with a competitive attitude likely carried over to his relationship
    with Sigmund Freud, making that association tenuous from the beginning.
    Adler (1929/1964) presented another example of the relationship between early
    recollections and style of life. During therapy an outwardly successful man who
    greatly distrusted women reported the following early memory: “I was going with my
    mother and little brother to market. Suddenly it began to rain and my mother took
    me in her arms, and then, remembering that I was the older, she put me down and
    took up my younger brother” (p. 123). Adler saw that this recollection related directly
    to the man’s current distrust of women. Having initially gained a favorite position
    with his mother, he eventually lost it to his younger brother. Although others may
    claim to love him, they will soon withdraw their love. Note that Adler did not believe
    that the early childhood experiences caused the man’s current distrust of women, but
    rather that his current distrustful style of life shapes and colors his early recollections.
    Adler believed that highly anxious patients will often project their current
    style of life onto their memory of childhood experiences by recalling fearful and
    anxiety-producing events, such as being in a motor vehicle crash, losing parents
    either temporarily or permanently, or being bullied by other children. In contrast,
    self-confident people tend to recall memories that include pleasant relations with
    other people. In either case the early experience does not determine the style of
    life. Adler believed that the opposite was true; that is, recollections of early expe-
    riences are simply shaped by present style of life.
    Dreams
    Although dreams cannot foretell the future, they can provide clues for solving
    future problems. Nevertheless, the dreamer frequently does not wish to solve the
    problem in a productive manner. Adler (1956) reported the dream of a 35-year-old
    man who was considering marriage. In the dream, the man “crossed the border
    between Austria and Hungary, and they wanted to imprison me” (p. 361). Adler
    interpreted this dream to mean that the dreamer wants to come to a standstill
    because he would be defeated if he went on. In other words, the man wanted to
    limit his scope of activity and had no deep desire to change his marital status. He
    did not wish to be “imprisoned” by marriage. Any interpretation of this or any
    dream must be tentative and open to reinterpretation. Adler (1956) applied the
    golden rule of individual psychology to dream work, namely, “Everything can be
    different” (p. 363). If one interpretation doesn’t feel right, try another.
    Immediately before Adler’s first trip to the United States in 1926, he had a
    vivid and anxious dream that related directly to his desire to spread his individual
    psychology to a new world and to free himself from the constraints of Freud and
    Vienna. The night before he was to depart for America, Adler dreamed that he
    was on board the ship when
    suddenly it capsized and sunk. All of Adler’s worldly possessions were on it
    and were destroyed by the raging waves. Hurled into the ocean, Adler was

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 95
    forced to swim for his life. Alone he thrashed and struggled through the choppy
    water. But through the force of will and determination, he finally reached land
    in safety. (Hoffman, 1994, p. 151)
    Adler interpreted this dream to mean that he had to muster the courage to venture
    into a new world and to break from old worldly possessions.
    Although Adler believed that he could easily interpret this dream, he con-
    tended that most dreams are self-deceptions and not easily understood by the
    dreamer. Dreams are disguised to deceive the dreamer, making self-interpretation
    difficult. The more an individual’s goal is inconsistent with reality, the more likely
    that person’s dreams will be used for self-deception. For example, a man may have
    the goal of reaching the top, being above, or becoming an important military fig-
    ure. If he also possesses a dependent style of life, his ambitious goal may be
    expressed in dreams of being lifted onto another person’s shoulders or being shot
    from a cannon. The dream unveils the style of life, but it fools the dreamer by
    presenting him with an unrealistic, exaggerated sense of power and accomplish-
    ment. In contrast, a more courageous and independent person with similar lofty
    ambitions may dream of unaided flying or reaching a goal without help, much as
    Adler had done when he dreamed of escaping from a sinking ship.
    Psychotherapy
    Adlerian theory postulates that psychopathology results from lack of courage, exag-
    gerated feelings of inferiority, and underdeveloped social interest. Thus, the chief
    purpose of Adlerian psychotherapy is to enhance courage, lessen feelings of inferi-
    ority, and encourage social interest. This task, however, is not easy because patients
    struggle to hold on to their existing, comfortable view of themselves. To overcome
    this resistance to change, Adler would sometimes ask patients, “What would you
    do if I cured you immediately?” Such a question usually forced patients to examine
    their goals and to see that responsibility for their current misery rests with them.
    Adler often used the motto “Everybody can accomplish everything.” Except
    for certain limitations set by heredity, he strongly believed this maxim and repeat-
    edly emphasized that what people do with what they have is more important than
    what they have (Adler, 1925/1968, 1956). Through the use of humor and warmth,
    Adler tried to increase the patient’s courage, self-esteem, and social interest. He
    believed that a warm, nurturing attitude by the therapist encourages patients to
    expand their social interest to each of the three problems of life: sexual love,
    friendship, and occupation.
    Adler innovated a unique method of therapy with problem children by treat-
    ing them in front of an audience of parents, teachers, and health professionals.
    When children receive therapy in public, they more readily understand that their
    problems are community problems. Adler (1964) believed that this procedure
    would enhance children’s social interest by allowing them to feel that they belong
    to a community of concerned adults. Adler was careful not to blame the parents
    for a child’s misbehavior. Instead, he worked to win the parents’ confidence and
    to persuade them to change their attitudes toward the child.
    Although Adler was quite active in setting the goal and direction of psycho-
    therapy, he maintained a friendly and permissive attitude toward the patient. He

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories96
    established himself as a congenial coworker, refrained from moralistic preaching,
    and placed great value on the human relationship. By cooperating with their ther-
    apists, patients establish contact with another person. The therapeutic relationship
    awakens their social interest in the same manner that children gain social interest
    from their parents. Once awakened, the patients’ social interest must spread to
    family, friends, and people outside the therapeutic relationship (Adler, 1956).
    Related Research
    Adlerian theory continues to generate a moderate amount of research. For example,
    some researchers have recently argued that using social media such as Facebook,
    Instagram, and Twitter serves the purpose of increasing Gemeinschaftsgefühl
    (Bluvshtein, Kruzic, & Massaglia, 2015). The most widely researched topics in
    Adler’s theory, however, have been birth-order, early recollections, and striving
    for superiority. Each of these topics can provide a potentially rich source for under-
    standing various Adlerian concepts.
    Birth Order Effects
    Adler’s fascinating theorizing on birth order has led to an almost overwhelming
    amount of research. Yet, controlled studies of birth order effects are not only difficult
    to conduct, but often result in no effects at all. Imagine the many variables that ought
    to be accounted for: the overall number, gender, and spacing of the siblings, and the
    events and timing of those events that occur in families (moves, divorce, death, dis-
    ability, to name just a few). Few studies can include high enough numbers of par-
    ticipants and control for these many variables in a way that leads to meaningful
    results. Critics have argued that for all these reasons, research can neither confirm
    nor deny Adler’s predictions about the impact of birth order position on individuals.
    In 1996, Frank Sulloway published Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family
    Dynamics and Creative Lives, in which he presented an evolutionary argument for
    birth order effects on personality. Siblings, he wrote, compete for an important and
    often scarce resource: parental affection and attention. Children’s success in this
    competition reflects strategies that impact their personalities, and our birth order
    position predicts these strategic personality traits. Lending support to Adler’s the-
    ory, Sulloway proposed that first-borns are likely to be achievement-oriented, anx-
    ious, and conformist whereas later-borns tend to be more adventurous, open to
    experience, innovative, and rejecting of the status quo. After all, they must find a
    way to earn their parent’s love that’s different from their older sibling. So, “watch
    this, mom!” is likely to be the later-born’s battle cry. Indeed, Sulloway’s historical
    analysis found that later-born scientists were much more likely to accept radical
    new theories when first proposed than first-born scientists. First-borns were more
    likely to stick to conventional and already established theories.
    A fascinating study by Zweigenhaft and von Ammon (2000) tested Sulloway’s
    predictions about later-borns being more rebellious quite cleverly. The researchers
    interviewed a group of college students who had been arrested for engaging in civil
    disobedience. As predicted, there was a significantly higher percentage of later-borns
    among those who had been arrested than among a comparison group of their friends

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 97
    who had not participated in any civil disobedience or among a control group of
    college students simply drawn from classes at the same college. These findings lend
    empirical support for the prediction of greater conventionality and cooperativeness
    among eldest children, compared to their more radical, risk-taking younger siblings.
    Although Sulloway has been criticized for his methodology (he collected bio-
    graphical data on historical individuals), Born to Rebel breathed new life into birth
    order research, and since its publication, many and better studies have been con-
    ducted to test Adler’s predictions. Generally, “between-family” research designs
    (individuals from different families are compared) tend not to confirm Adler’s
    theory, perhaps because of the difficulty in these sorts of designs of controlling for
    the many variables that distinguish families. In contrast, “within-family” designs
    ask respondents to compare themselves to their own siblings, and these studies are
    more likely to provide some confirmation for Adler’s theory. For example, Paulhus,
    Trapnell, and Chen (1999) conducted a within-family study of over 1,000 families
    and found that first-borns were nominated as most high-achieving and conscien-
    tious, while later-borns were seen as most rebellious, liberal, and agreeable. In a
    very recent review of over 200 birth-order studies that did show significant differ-
    ences between siblings, Eckstein and colleagues (2010) found support for Adler
    and Sulloway: first-borns and only children are seen as the most high-achieving,
    and later-borns as the most rebellious and socially interested.
    Important to note in Adler’s theory of birth order effects is that he hypothesized
    that it is the family constellation, not something biological or prenatal, that results
    in different personalities among siblings. That is, for Adler, the personalities of later-
    borns are shaped by older siblings’ and parents’ attitudes toward and treatment of
    them. But is this social hypothesis supported by the research? Research using within-
    family designs has been conducted to examine both hypotheses. One important bio-
    logical theory concerns immunoreactivity. The theory is that histocompatibility-Y
    antigens, which are exclusive to males and located on the Y-chromosome, can induce
    an immune system response from mothers carrying male fetuses. Several studies have
    examined the immunoreactivity hypothesis for explaining sexual orientation in males,
    with evidence that the prevalence of homosexuality among males is higher among
    later-born males with a greater number of older brothers (e.g., Bogaert & Skorska,
    2011). The reason the finding is explained biologically is that studies show that
    fraternal birth order does not predict homosexuality in males in adoptive or blended
    families, only in biologically related brothers (Bogaert, 2006).
    On the other hand, greater support has been found for other birth order effects,
    such as higher achievement among first- than later-borns, being explained by the more
    Adlerian social, family constellation perspective. For example, one very recent study
    used data on fully adopted sibling and fully biologically related sibling groups in a
    within-family design of Swedish sibling sets. Barclay (2015) found that older chil-
    dren indeed had higher educational attainment than their later-born siblings, regard-
    less of whether they were from adoptive or biologically related families. This finding
    provides strong evidence for intrafamily dynamics such as resource competition,
    much as Sulloway predicted, being the driving force behind birth order effects.
    In general, the specific predictions that Adler made about the traits of oldest,
    middle, youngest and only children have not found strong support in the research lit-
    erature. However, within-family studies have indeed found support for some consistent

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories98
    (though small) differences between first- and later-born children in the realms of aca-
    demic achievement, conventionality and risk-taking. As well, within-family designs are
    best suited to examine whether birth order effects are due to dynamics that occur in
    families, where later-born siblings may engage in “de-identification” (finding one’s
    niche by observing what older siblings do and then finding a way to do the opposite),
    versus due to some prenatal or biological cause. Here again there is some support for
    Adler’s theory that such effects are indeed social, and due to the constellation dynam-
    ics in families.
    Early Recollections and Career Choice
    Do early recollections predict career choice among young students? Adler believed
    that career choices reflect a person’s personality. “If ever I am called on for voca-
    tional guidance, I always ask the individual what he was interested in during his
    first years. His memories of this period show conclusively what he has trained
    himself for most continuously” (Adler, 1958, as quoted in Kasler & Nevo, 2005,
    p. 221). Researchers inspired by Adler therefore predicted that the kind of career
    one chooses as an adult is often reflected in one’s earliest recollections.
    In order to test this hypothesis, Jon Kasler and Ofra Nevo (2005) gathered
    earliest memories from 130 participants. These recollections were then coded by two
    judges on the kind of career the memory reflected. The recollections were classified
    using Holland’s (1973) vocational interest types, namely Realistic, Investigative,
    Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional (see Table 3.3 for description of these
    interest types). For example, an early recollection that reflects a social career interest
    later in life was: “I went to nursery school for the first time in my life at the age of
    four or five. I don’t remember my feelings that day but I went with my mother and
    the moment I arrived I met my first friend, a boy by the name of P. I remember a clear
    picture of P playing on the railings and somehow I joined him. I had fun all day”
    (Kasler & Nevo, 2005, p. 226). This early recollection centers around social interac-
    tion and relationships. An example of an early recollection that reflects a realistic
    career interest was: “When I was a little boy, I used to like to take things apart,
    especially electrical appliances. One day I wanted to find out what was inside the
    television, so I decided to take a knife and break it open. Because I was so small I
    didn’t have the strength and anyway my father caught me and yelled at me” (Kasler
    & Nevo, 2005, p. 225).
    Career interest of participants was assessed by a self-report measure, the Self-
    Directed Search (SDS) questionnaire (Holland, 1973). The SDS measures vocational
    interests, which were independently categorized into the same six Holland types
    that early recollections were placed into. The researchers therefore had early recol-
    lections and adult career interests both classified into the six career types, and they
    wanted to examine whether early recollections matched career interest.
    Kasler and Nevo (2005) found that early recollections in childhood did match
    career type as an adult, at least for the three career types that were well represented
    in their sample (Realistic, Artistic, and Social). The general direction of a partici-
    pant’s career path could be identified from themes seen in early recollections. These
    vignettes are consistent with Alder’s view of early recollections and demonstrate
    how style of life may relate to occupational choice.

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 99
    T A B L E 3 . 3
    Qualities of Holland’s Six Career Types: Realistic, Investigative,
    Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional
    Realistic
    ∙ Likes to work with animals, tools, or machines; generally avoids social activities like
    teaching, healing, and informing others;
    ∙ Has good skills in working with tools, mechanical or electrical drawings, machines, or
    plants and animals;
    ∙ Values practical things you can see, touch, and use like plants and animals, tools,
    equipment, or machines; and
    ∙ Sees self as practical, mechanical, and realistic.
    Investigative
    ∙ Likes to study and solve math or science problems; generally avoids leading, selling, or
    persuading people;
    ∙ Is good at understanding and solving science and math problems;
    ∙ Values science; and
    ∙ Sees self as precise, scientific, and intellectual.
    Artistic
    ∙ Likes to do creative activities like art, drama, crafts, dance, music, or creative writing;
    generally avoids highly ordered or repetitive activities;
    ∙ Has good artistic abilities—in creative writing, drama, crafts, music, or art;
    ∙ Values the creative arts—like drama, music, art, or the works of creative writers; and
    ∙ Sees self as expressive, original, and independent.
    Social
    ∙ Likes to do things to help people—like teaching, nursing, or giving first aid, providing
    information; generally avoids using machines, tools, or animals to achieve a goal;
    ∙ Is good at teaching, counseling, nursing, or giving information;
    ∙ Values helping people and solving social problems; and
    ∙ Sees self as helpful, friendly, and trustworthy.
    Enterprising
    ∙ Likes to lead and persuade people, and to sell things and ideas; generally avoids
    activities that require careful observation and scientific, analytical thinking;
    ∙ Is good at leading people and selling things or ideas;
    ∙ Values success in politics, leadership, or business; and
    ∙ Sees self as energetic, ambitious, and sociable.
    Conventional
    ∙ Likes to work with numbers, records, or machines in a set, orderly way; generally
    avoids ambiguous, unstructured activities;
    ∙ Is good at working with written records and numbers in a systematic, orderly way;
    ∙ Values success in business; and
    ∙ Sees self as orderly, and good at following a set plan.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories100
    Distinguishing Narcissism as Striving for Superiority
    versus Self-Esteem as Striving for Success
    Perhaps Donald Trump sprang to mind when you read about Adler’s notion of
    “Striving for Superiority.” The media have flooded the public with analyses of
    Trump’s personality, and respected psychologists argue that he is a textbook case
    of a narcissist (e.g., Howard Gardner, Harvard psychologist, in Vanity Fair).
    Named after the Greek myth of Narcissus, a hunter who fell in love with his
    own reflection in a pool of water, narcissism was discussed by Freud and many
    other theorists, and today this construct is operationalized in psychology via
    narcissism scales. High scores on such scales tend to reveal a personality that
    feels superior to others and feels entitled to prestige and admiration from others.
    Adler has been credited with making an important contribution to our understand-
    ing of narcissism (Ansbacher, 1985). The historical record shows that Adler’s
    idea of the “masculine protest” significantly influenced Freud’s theorizing regard-
    ing narcissism. Furthermore, Adler’s personality theory provided a foundation
    for our modern understanding that a narcissist is someone who lacks social inter-
    est. If that doesn’t sound like Donald Trump to you, then perhaps you, yourself,
    ought to look in the mirror.
    For a narcissist, and for someone whom Adler believed is driven by a
    striving for personal superiority, others’ welfare is of little to no concern. Such
    a person’s striving is centered around being acknowledged as better than every-
    one else, to be “the best.” But is this just healthy esteem seeking? There is a
    common belief that narcissism is simply an exaggerated form of high self-esteem.
    Don’t all people wish to win? Indeed modern American society places an espe-
    cially high value on children’s self-esteem, and some psychologists have
    expressed concern that American parents’ habit of praising their children for
    being extraordinary is not enhancing healthy self-esteem (which, in Adler’s view,
    would involve striving for success, but not at the expense of others) but rather
    creating a generation of narcissists who feel entitled to privileges and lack humility
    (e.g., Twenge & Campbell, 2009).
    Brummelman, Thomaes, and Sedikides (2016) recently provided a theoretical
    analysis of the distinction between narcissism and self-esteem that maps quite
    nicely onto Adler’s perspective. For these psychologists, narcissism, a maladaptive
    and unhealthy personality orientation, differs dramatically from self-esteem, an
    adaptive and healthy approach to the self. They argue that both narcissism and
    self-esteem have their origins in children’s internalization of regard from their
    caregivers. However, this regard is characterized differently when it underlies nar-
    cissism rather than self-esteem. That is, parental overvaluation leads to a core belief
    that “I am superior to others.” In contrast, parental warmth leads to a core belief
    that “I am worthy.” These two different core beliefs about the self are not equally
    resilient. As the authors write, “Although everyone can be worthy, not everyone
    can be superior” (Brummelman et al., 2016, p. 10). The precariousness of feelings
    of personal superiority may account for the need many narcissists appear to have
    for others to validate their superiority. And, indeed, Trump rallies during the elec-
    tion campaign were nothing if not enormous platforms for a narcissist to receive
    endless validation for his feelings of personal superiority.

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 101
    Critique of Adler
    Adler’s theory, like that of Freud, produced many concepts that do not easily lend
    themselves to either verification or falsification. For example, although research has
    consistently shown a relationship between early childhood recollections and a person’s
    present style of life (Clark, 2002), these results do not verify Adler’s notion that pres-
    ent style of life shapes one’s early recollections. An alternate, causal explanation is
    also possible; that is, early experiences may cause present style of life. Thus, one of
    Adler’s most important concepts—the assumption that present style of life determines
    early memories rather than vice versa—is difficult to either verify or falsify.
    Another function of a useful theory is to generate research, and on this
    criterion we rate Adler’s theory above average. Much of the research suggested by
    individual psychology has investigated early recollections, social interest, and style
    of life. Arthur J. Clark (2002), for example, cites evidence showing that early
    recollections relate to myriad personality factors, including dimensions of person-
    ality clinical disorders, vocational choice, explanatory style, and psychotherapy
    processes and outcomes. In addition, Adler’s theory has encouraged researchers to
    construct several social interest scales, for example, the Social Interest Scale
    (Crandall, 1975, 1981), the Social Interest Index (Greever, Tseng, & Friedland,
    1973), and the Sulliman Scale of Social Interest (Sulliman, 1973). Research activ-
    ity on these scales and on birth order, early recollections, and style of life gives
    Adlerian theory a moderate to high rating on its ability to generate research.
    How well does Adlerian theory organize knowledge into a meaningful frame-
    work? In general, individual psychology is sufficiently broad to encompass possible
    explanations for much of what is known about human behavior and development.
    Even seemingly self-defeating and inconsistent behaviors can be fit into the frame-
    work of striving for superiority. Adler’s practical view of life’s problems allows us
    to rate his theory high on its ability to make sense out of what we know about human
    behavior.
    We also rate Adlerian theory high on its ability to guide action. The theory
    serves the psychotherapist, the teacher, and the parent with guidelines for the solu-
    tion to practical problems in a variety of settings. Adlerian practitioners gather
    information through reports on birth order, dreams, early recollections, childhood
    difficulties, and physical deficiencies. They then use this information to understand
    a person’s style of life and to apply those specific techniques that will both increase
    that person’s individual responsibility and broaden his or her freedom of choice.
    Is individual psychology internally consistent? Does it include a set of opera-
    tionally defined terms? Although Adlerian theory is a model for self-consistency, it
    suffers from a lack of precise operational definitions. Terms such as goal of superior-
    ity and creative power have no scientific definition. Nowhere in Adler’s works are
    they operationally defined, and the potential researcher will look in vain for precise
    definitions that lend themselves to rigorous study. The term creative power is an
    especially illusory one. Just what is this magical force that takes the raw materials of
    heredity and environment and molds a unique personality? How does the creative
    power transform itself into specific actions or operations needed by the scientist to
    carry out an investigation? Unfortunately, individual psychology is somewhat philo-
    sophical—even moralistic—and does not provide answers to these questions.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories102
    The concept of creative power is a very appealing one. Probably most people
    prefer to believe that they are composed of something more than the interactions of
    heredity and environment. Many people intuitively feel that they have some agent
    (soul, ego, self, creative power) within them that allows them to make choices and to
    create their style of life. As inviting as it is, however, the concept of creative power
    is simply a fiction and cannot be scientifically studied. Due to lack of operational
    definitions, therefore, we rate individual psychology low on internal consistency.
    The final criterion of a useful theory is simplicity, or parsimony. On this standard
    we rate individual psychology about average. Although Adler’s awkward and unorga-
    nized writings distract from the theory’s rating on parsimony, the work of Ansbacher
    and Ansbacher (Adler, 1956, 1964) has made individual psychology more parsimonious.
    Concept of Humanity
    Adler believed that people are basically self-determined and that they shape
    their personalities from the meaning they give to their experiences. The build-
    ing material of personality is provided by heredity and environment, but the
    creative power shapes this material and puts it to use. Adler frequently empha-
    sized that the use that people make of their abilities is more important than
    the quantity of those abilities. Heredity endows people with certain abilities
    and environment gives them some opportunity to enhance those abilities, but
    we are ultimately responsible for the use they make of these abilities.
    Adler also believed that people’s interpretations of experiences are
    more important than the experiences themselves. Neither the past nor the
    future determines present behavior. Instead, people are motivated by their
    present perceptions of the past and their present expectations of the future.
    These perceptions do not necessarily correspond with reality, and as Adler
    (1956) stated, “meanings are not determined by situations, but we deter-
    mine ourselves by the meanings we give to situations” (p. 208).
    People are forward moving, motivated by future goals rather than by innate
    instincts or causal forces. These future goals are often rigid and unrealistic, but
    people’s personal freedom allows them to reshape their goals and thereby
    change their lives. People create their personalities and are capable of altering
    them by learning new attitudes. These attitudes encompass an understanding
    that change can occur, that no other person or circumstance is responsible for
    what a person is, and that personal goals must be subordinated to social interest.
    Although our final goal is relatively fixed during early childhood, we
    remain free to change our style of life at any time. Because the goal is fictional
    and unconscious, we can set and pursue temporary goals. These momentary
    goals are not rigidly circumscribed by the final goal but are created by us
    merely as partial solutions. Adler (1927) expressed this idea as follows: “We
    must understand that the reactions of the human soul are not final and abso-
    lute: Every response is but a partial response, valid temporarily, but in no way
    to be considered a final solution of a problem” (p. 24). In other words, even
    though our final goal is set during childhood, we are capable of change at any
    point in life. However, Adler maintained that not all our choices are conscious

    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology 103
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ People begin life with both an innate striving force and physical
    deficiencies, which combine to produce feelings of inferiority.
    ∙ These feelings stimulate people to set a goal of overcoming their inferiority.
    ∙ People who see themselves as having more than their share of physical
    deficiencies or who experience a pampered or neglected style of life
    overcompensate for these deficiencies and are likely to have exaggerated
    feelings of inferiority, strive for personal gain, and set unrealistically
    high goals.
    ∙ People with normal feelings of inferiority compensate for these feelings
    by cooperating with others and developing a high level of social interest.
    ∙ Social interest, or a deep concern for the welfare of other people, is the
    sole criterion by which human actions should be judged.
    ∙ The three major problems of life—neighborly love, work, and sexual
    love—can only be solved through social interest.
    ∙ All behaviors, even those that appear to be incompatible, are consistent
    with a person’s final goal.
    ∙ Human behavior is shaped neither by past events nor by objective
    reality, but rather by people’s subjective perception of a situation.
    ∙ Heredity and environment provide the building material of personality,
    but people’s creative power is responsible for their style of life.
    ∙ All people, but especially neurotics, make use of various safeguarding
    tendencies—such as excuses, aggression, and withdrawal—as conscious
    or unconscious attempts to protect inflated feelings of superiority against
    public disgrace.
    ∙ The masculine protest—the belief that men are superior to women—is a
    fiction that lies at the root of many neuroses, both for men and for women.
    ∙ Adlerian therapy uses birth order, early recollections, and dreams to
    foster courage, self-esteem, and social interest.
    and that style of life is created through both conscious and unconscious
    choices.
    Adler believed that ultimately people are responsible for their own per-
    sonalities. People’s creative power is capable of transforming feelings of inad-
    equacy into either social interest or into the self-centered goal of personal
    superiority. This capacity means that people remain free to choose between
    psychological health and neuroticism. Adler regarded self-centeredness as path-
    ological and established social interest as the standard of psychological maturity.
    Healthy people have a high level of social interest, but throughout their lives,
    they remain free to accept or reject normality and to become what they will.
    On the six dimensions of a concept of humanity listed in Chapter 1,
    we rate Adler very high on free choice and optimism; very low on causality;
    moderate on unconscious influences; and high on social factors and on the
    uniqueness of individuals. In summary, Adler held that people are self-deter-
    mining social creatures, forward moving and motivated by present fictions
    to strive toward perfection for themselves and society.

    104
    C H A P T E R 4
    Jung © Hulton Archive/Archive Photos/Getty
    Images
    Jung: Analytical
    Psychology
    ⬥ Overview of Analytical Psychology
    ⬥ Biography of Carl Jung
    ⬥ Levels of the Psyche
    Conscious
    Personal Unconscious
    Collective Unconscious
    Archetypes
    Persona
    Shadow
    Anima
    Animus
    Great Mother
    Wise Old Man
    Hero
    Self
    ⬥ Dynamics of Personality
    Causality and Teleology
    Progression and Regression
    ⬥ Psychological Types
    Attitudes
    Introversion
    Extraversion
    Functions
    Thinking
    Feeling
    Sensing
    Intuiting
    ⬥ Development of Personality
    Stages of Development
    Childhood
    Youth
    Middle Life
    Old Age
    Self-Realization
    ⬥ Jung’s Methods of Investigation
    Word Association Test
    Dream Analysis
    Active Imagination
    Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Personality Type and Leadership
    Personality Type Among Clergy and Churchgoers
    A Critical Look at the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
    (MBTI)
    ⬥ Critique of Jung
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 105
    The middle-aged doctor sat at his desk in deep contemplation and concern. A 6-year relationship with an older friend and mentor had recently ended on bit-
    ter terms, and the doctor felt frustrated and uncertain of his future. He no longer
    had confidence in his manner of treating patients and had begun to simply allow
    them to talk, not offering any specific advice or treatment.
    For some months the doctor had been having bizarre, inexplicable dreams
    and seeing strange, mysterious visions. None of this seemed to make sense to him.
    He felt lost and disoriented—unsure whether or not the work he had been trained
    to do was indeed science.
    A moderately gifted artist, he had begun to illustrate his dreams and visions
    with little or no comprehension of what the finished product might mean. He had
    also been writing down his fantasies without really trying to understand them.
    On this particular day, he began to ponder: “What am I really doing?” He
    doubted if his work was science but was uncertain about what it was. Suddenly,
    to his astonishment, he heard a clear, distinct feminine voice from within him say,
    “It is art.” He recognized the voice as that of a gifted female patient who had
    strong, positive feelings for him. He protested to the voice that his work was not
    art, but no answer was immediately forthcoming. Then, returning to his writing,
    he again heard the voice say, “That is art.” When he tried to argue with the voice,
    no answer came. He reasoned that the “woman from within” had no speech center
    so he suggested that she use his. This she did, and a lengthy conversation followed.
    The middle-aged doctor who talked to the “woman from within” was Carl Gustav
    Jung, and the time was the winter of 1913–1914. Jung had been an early admirer and
    friend of Sigmund Freud, but when theoretical differences arose, their personal relation-
    ship broke up, leaving Jung with bitter feelings and a deep sense of loss.
    The above story is but one of many strange and bizarre occurrences experi-
    enced by Jung during his midlife “confrontation with the unconscious.” An interest-
    ing account of his unusual journey into the recesses of his psyche is found in Jung’s
    autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Jung, 1961).
    Overview of Analytical Psychology
    An early colleague of Freud, Carl Gustav Jung broke from orthodox psychoanaly-
    sis to establish a separate theory of personality called analytical psychology,
    which rests on the assumption that occult phenomena can and do influence the
    lives of everyone. Jung believed that each of us is motivated not only by repressed
    experiences but also by certain emotionally toned experiences inherited from our
    ancestors. These inherited images make up what Jung called the collective uncon-
    scious. The collective unconscious includes those elements that we have never
    experienced individually but which have come down to us from our ancestors.
    Some elements of the collective unconscious become highly developed and
    are called archetypes. The most inclusive archetype is the notion of self-realization,
    which can be achieved only by attaining a balance between various opposing forces
    of personality. Thus, Jung’s theory is a compendium of opposites. People are both
    introverted and extraverted; rational and irrational; male and female; conscious and
    unconscious; and pushed by past events while being pulled by future expectations.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories106
    This chapter looks with some detail into the long and colorful life of Carl
    Jung and uses fragments from his life history to illustrate his concepts and theories.
    Jung’s notion of a collective unconscious makes his theory one of the most intrigu-
    ing of all conceptions of personality.
    Biography of Carl Jung
    Carl Gustav Jung was born on July 26, 1875, in Kesswil, a town on Lake Constance
    in Switzerland. His paternal grandfather, the elder Carl Gustav Jung, was a prom-
    inent physician in Basel and one of the best-known men of that city. A local rumor
    suggested that the elder Carl Jung was the illegitimate son of the great German
    poet Goethe. Although the elder Jung never acknowledged the rumor, the younger
    Jung, at least sometimes, believed himself to be the great-grandson of Goethe
    (Ellenberger, 1970).
    Both of Jung’s parents were the youngest of 13 children, a situation that may
    have contributed to some of the difficulties they had in their marriage. Jung’s
    father, Johann Paul Jung, was a minister in the Swiss Reformed Church, and his
    mother, Emilie Preiswerk Jung, was the daughter of a theologian. In fact, eight of
    Jung’s maternal uncles and two of his paternal uncles were pastors, so both religion
    and medicine were prevalent in his family. Jung’s mother’s family had a tradition
    of spiritualism and mysticism, and his maternal grandfather, Samuel Preiswerk,
    was a believer in the occult and often talked to the dead. He kept an empty chair
    for the ghost of his first wife and had regular and intimate conversations with her.
    Quite understandably, these practices greatly annoyed his second wife.
    Jung’s parents had three children, a son born before Carl but who lived only
    3 days and a daughter 9 years younger than Carl. Thus, Jung’s early life was that
    of an only child.
    Jung (1961) described his father as a sentimental idealist with strong doubts
    about his religious faith. He saw his mother as having two separate dispositions.
    On one hand, she was realistic, practical, and warmhearted, but on the other, she
    was unstable, mystical, clairvoyant, archaic, and ruthless. An emotional and sensi-
    tive child, Jung identified more with this second side of his mother, which he called
    her No. 2 or night personality (Alexander, 1990). At age 3 years, Jung was separated
    from his mother, who had to be hospitalized for several months, and this separation
    deeply troubled young Carl. For a long time after, he felt distrustful whenever the
    word “love” was mentioned. Years later he still associated “woman” with unreli-
    ability, whereas the word “father” meant reliable—but powerless (Jung, 1961).
    Before Jung’s fourth birthday, his family moved to a suburb of Basel. It is
    from this period that his earliest dream stems. This dream, which was to have a
    profound effect on his later life and on his concept of a collective unconscious,
    will be described later.
    During his school years, Jung gradually became aware of two separate aspects
    of his self, and he called these his No. 1 and No. 2 personalities. At first he saw
    both personalities as parts of his own personal world, but during adolescence he
    became aware of the No. 2 personality as a reflection of something other than
    himself—an old man long since dead. At that time Jung did not fully comprehend
    these separate powers, but in later years he recognized that No. 2 personality had

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 107
    been in touch with feelings and intuitions that No. 1 personality did not perceive.
    Between his 16th and 19th years, Jung’s No. 1 personality emerged as more dom-
    inant. As his conscious, everyday personality prevailed, he could concentrate on
    school and career. In Jung’s own theory of attitudes, his No. 1 personality was
    extraverted and in tune to the objective world, whereas his No. 2 personality was
    introverted and directed inward toward his subjective world. Thus, during his early
    school years, Jung was mostly introverted, but when the time came to prepare for
    a profession and meet other objective responsibilities, he became more extraverted,
    an attitude that prevailed until he experienced a midlife crisis and entered a period
    of extreme introversion.
    Jung’s first choice of a profession was archeology, but he was also interested
    in philology, history, philosophy, and the natural sciences. Despite a somewhat
    aristocratic background, Jung had limited financial resources (Noll, 1994). Forced
    by lack of money to attend a school near home, he enrolled in Basel University,
    a school without an archeology teacher. Having to select another field of study,
    Jung chose natural science because he twice dreamed of making important discov-
    eries in the natural world (Jung, 1961). His choice of a career eventually narrowed
    to medicine. That choice was narrowed further when he learned that psychiatry
    deals with subjective phenomena (Singer, 1994).
    While Jung was in his first year of medical school, his father died, leaving
    him in care of his mother and sister. Also while still in medical school, Jung began
    to attend a series of seances with relatives from the Preiswerk family, including
    his first cousin Helene Preiswerk, who claimed she could communicate with dead
    people. Jung attended these seances mostly as a family member, but later, when
    he wrote his medical dissertation on the occult phenomenon, he reported that these
    seances had been controlled experiments (McLynn, 1996).
    After completing his medical degree from Basel University in 1900, Jung
    became a psychiatric assistant to Eugene Bleuler at Burghöltzli Mental Hospital in
    Zürich, possibly the most prestigious psychiatric teaching hospital in the world at
    that time. During 1902–1903, Jung studied for 6 months in Paris with Pierre Janet,
    successor to Charcot. When he returned to Switzerland in 1903, he married Emma
    Rauschenbach, a young sophisticated woman from a wealthy Swiss family. Two
    years later, while continuing his duties at the hospital, he began teaching at the
    University of Zürich and seeing patients in his private practice.
    Jung had read Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900/1953) soon after
    it appeared, but he was not much impressed with it (Singer, 1994). When he reread
    the book a few years later, he had a better understanding of Freud’s ideas and was
    moved to begin interpreting his own dreams. In 1906, Jung and Freud began a steady
    correspondence (see McGuire & McGlashan, 1994, for the Freud/Jung letters). The
    following year, Freud invited Carl and Emma Jung to Vienna. Immediately, both
    Freud and Jung developed a strong mutual respect and affection for one another,
    talking during their first meeting for 13 straight hours and well into the early morn-
    ing hours. During this marathon conversation, Martha Freud and Emma Jung bus-
    ied themselves with polite conversation (Ferris, 1997).
    Freud believed that Jung was the ideal person to be his successor. Unlike
    other men in Freud’s circle of friends and followers, Jung was neither Jewish nor
    Viennese. In addition, Freud had warm personal feelings for Jung and regarded

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories108
    him as a man of great intellect. These qualifications prompted Freud to select Jung
    as the first president of the International Psychoanalytic Association.
    In 1909, G. Stanley Hall, the president of Clark University and one of the
    first psychologists in the United States, invited Jung and Freud to deliver a series
    of lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. Together with Sándor
    Ferenczi, another psychoanalyst, the two men journeyed to America, the first of
    Jung’s nine visits to the United States (Bair, 2003). During their 7-week trip and
    while they were in daily contact, an underlying tension between Jung and Freud
    slowly began to simmer. This personal tension was not diminished when the two
    now-famous psychoanalysts began to interpret each other’s dreams, a pastime
    likely to strain any relationship.
    In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung (1961) claimed that Freud was
    unwilling to reveal details of his personal life—details Jung needed in order to
    interpret one of Freud’s dreams. According to Jung’s account, when asked for
    intimate details, Freud protested, “But I cannot risk my authority!” (Jung, 1961, p.
    158). At that moment, Jung concluded, Freud indeed had lost his authority. “That
    sentence burned itself into my memory, and in it the end of our relationship was
    already foreshadowed” (p. 158).
    Jung also asserted that, during the trip to America, Freud was unable to inter-
    pret Jung’s dreams, especially one that seemed to contain rich material from Jung’s
    collective unconscious. Later, we discuss this dream in more detail, but here we
    merely present those aspects of the dream that may relate to some of the lifelong
    problems Jung had with women. In this dream, Jung and his family were living on
    the second floor of his house when he decided to explore its hitherto unknown
    levels. At the bottom level of his dwelling, he came upon a cave where he found
    two old and mostly disintegrated human skulls.
    After Jung described the dream, Freud became interested in the two
    skulls, but not as collective unconscious material. Instead, he insisted that Jung
    associate the skulls to some wish. Whom did Jung wish dead? Not yet com-
    pletely trusting his own judgment and knowing what Freud expected, Jung told
    Freud that he wished his wife and sister-in-law dead because those were most
    believable.
    Although Jung’s interpretation of this dream may be more accurate than
    Freud’s, it is quite possible that Jung did indeed wish for the death of his wife. At
    that time, Jung was not recently married but had been married for nearly 7 years,
    and for the previous 5 of those years he was deeply involved in an intimate rela-
    tionship with a former patient named Sabina Spielrein. Frank McLynn (1996)
    claimed that Jung’s “mother complex” caused him to harbor animosity toward his
    wife, but a more likely explanation is that Jung needed more than one woman to
    satisfy the two aspects of his personality.
    However, the two women who shared Jung’s life for nearly 40 years were
    his wife Emma and another former patient named Antonia (Toni) Wolff (Bair,
    2003). Emma Jung seemed to have related better to Jung’s No. 1 personality while
    Toni Wolff was more in touch with his No. 2 personality. The three-way relation-
    ship was not always amiable, but Emma Jung realized that Toni Wolff could do
    more for Carl than she (or anyone else) could, and she remained grateful to Wolff
    (Dunne, 2000).

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 109
    Although Jung and Wolff made no attempt to hide their relationship, the
    name Toni Wolff does not appear in Jung’s posthumously published autobiogra-
    phy, Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Alan Elms (1994) discovered that Jung had
    written a whole chapter on Toni Wolff, a chapter that was never published. The
    absence of Wolff’s name in Jung’s autobiography is probably due to the lifelong
    resentments Jung’s children had toward her. They remembered when she had car-
    ried on openly with their father, and as adults with some veto power over what
    appeared in their father’s autobiography, they were not in a generous mood to
    perpetuate knowledge of the affair.
    In any event, little doubt exists that Jung needed women other than his wife.
    In a letter to Freud dated January 30, 1910, Jung wrote: “The prerequisite for a
    good marriage, it seems to me, is the license to be unfaithful” (McGuire, 1974,
    p. 289).
    Almost immediately after Jung and Freud returned from their trip to the
    United States, personal as well as theoretical differences became more intense as
    their friendship cooled. In 1913, they terminated their personal correspondence,
    and the following year, Jung resigned the presidency and shortly afterward with-
    drew his membership in the International Psychoanalytic Association.
    Jung’s break with Freud may have been related to events not discussed in
    Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Jung, 1961). In 1907, Jung wrote to Freud of his
    “boundless admiration” for him and confessed that his veneration “has something
    of the character of a ‘religious’ crush” and that it had an “undeniable erotic under-
    tone” (McGuire, 1974, p. 95). Jung continued his confession, saying: “This abom-
    inable feeling comes from the fact that as a boy I was the victim of a sexual assault
    by a man I once worshipped” (p. 95). Jung was actually 18 years old at the time
    of the sexual assault and saw the older man as a fatherly friend in whom he could
    confide nearly everything. Alan Elms (1994) contended that Jung’s erotic feelings
    toward Freud—coupled with his early experience of the sexual assault by an older
    man he once worshipped—may have been one of the major reasons why Jung
    eventually broke from Freud. Elms further suggested that Jung’s rejection of
    Freud’s sexual theories may have stemmed from his ambivalent sexual feelings
    toward Freud.
    The years immediately following the break with Freud were filled with lone-
    liness and self-analysis for Jung. From December of 1913 until 1917, he underwent
    the most profound and dangerous experience of his life—a trip through the under-
    ground of his own unconscious psyche. Marvin Goldwert (1992) referred to this
    time in Jung’s life as a period of “creative illness,” a term Henri Ellenberger (1970)
    had used to describe Freud in the years immediately following his father’s death.
    Jung’s period of “creative illness” was similar to Freud’s self-analysis. Both men
    began their search for self while in their late 30s or early 40s: Freud, as a reaction
    to the death of his father; Jung, as a result of his split with his spiritual father,
    Freud. Both underwent a period of loneliness and isolation and both were deeply
    changed by the experience.
    Although Jung’s journey into the unconscious was dangerous and painful, it
    was also necessary and fruitful. By using dream interpretation and active imagina-
    tion to force himself through his underground journey, Jung eventually was able
    to create his unique theory of personality.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories110
    During this period he wrote down his dreams, drew pictures of them, told
    himself stories, and then followed these stories wherever they moved. Through
    these procedures he became acquainted with his personal unconscious. (See Jung,
    1979, and Dunne, 2000, for a collection of many of his paintings during this
    period.) Prolonging the method and going more deeply, he came upon the contents
    of the collective unconscious—the archetypes. He heard his anima speak to him
    in a clear feminine voice; he discovered his shadow, the evil side of his personal-
    ity; he spoke with the wise old man and the great mother archetypes; and finally,
    near the end of his journey, he achieved a kind of psychological rebirth called
    individuation (Jung, 1961).
    Although Jung traveled widely in his study of personality, he remained a
    citizen of Switzerland, residing in Küsnacht, near Zürich. He and his wife, who
    was also an analyst, had five children, four girls and a boy. Jung was a Christian,
    but did not attend church. His hobbies included wood carving, stone cutting, and
    sailing his boat on Lake Constance. He also maintained an active interest in
    alchemy, archeology, gnosticism, Eastern philosophies, history, religion, mythol-
    ogy, and ethnology.
    In 1944, he became professor of medical psychology at the University of
    Basel, but poor health forced him to resign his position the following year. After
    his wife died in 1955, he was mostly alone, the “wise old man of Küsnacht.” He
    died June 6, 1961, in Zürich, a few weeks short of his 86th birthday. At the time
    of his death, Jung’s reputation was worldwide, extending beyond psychology to
    include philosophy, religion, and popular culture (Brome, 1978).
    Levels of the Psyche
    Jung, like Freud, based his personality theory on the assumption that the mind, or
    psyche, has both a conscious and an unconscious level. Unlike Freud, however,
    Jung strongly asserted that the most important portion of the unconscious springs
    not from personal experiences of the individual but from the distant past of human
    existence, a concept Jung called the collective unconscious. Of lesser importance
    to Jungian theory are the conscious and the personal unconscious.
    Conscious
    According to Jung, conscious images are those that are sensed by the ego, whereas
    unconscious elements have no relationship with the ego. Jung’s notion of the ego
    is more restrictive than Freud’s. Jung saw the ego as the center of consciousness,
    but not the core of personality. Ego is not the whole personality, but must be
    completed by the more comprehensive self, the center of personality that is largely
    unconscious. In a psychologically healthy person, the ego takes a secondary posi-
    tion to the unconscious self (Jung, 1951/1959a). Thus, consciousness plays a rela-
    tively minor role in analytical psychology, and an overemphasis on expanding
    one’s conscious psyche can lead to psychological imbalance. Healthy individuals
    are in contact with their conscious world, but they also allow themselves to expe-
    rience their unconscious self and thus to achieve individuation, a concept we dis-
    cuss in the section titled Self-Realization.

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 111
    Personal Unconscious
    The personal unconscious embraces all repressed, forgotten, or subliminally per-
    ceived experiences of one particular individual. It contains repressed infantile
    memories and impulses, forgotten events, and experiences originally perceived
    below the threshold of our consciousness. Our personal unconscious is formed by
    our individual experiences and is therefore unique to each of us. Some images in
    the personal unconscious can be recalled easily, some remembered with difficulty,
    and still others are beyond the reach of consciousness. Jung’s concept of the per-
    sonal unconscious differs little from Freud’s view of the unconscious and precon-
    scious combined (Jung, 1931/1960b).
    Contents of the personal unconscious are called complexes. A complex is an
    emotionally toned conglomeration of associated ideas. For example, a person’s
    experiences with Mother may become grouped around an emotional core so that
    the person’s mother, or even the word “mother,” sparks an emotional response that
    blocks the smooth flow of thought. Complexes are largely personal, but they may
    also be partly derived from humanity’s collective experience. In our example, the
    mother complex comes not only from one’s personal relationship with mother but
    also from the entire species’ experiences with mother. In addition, the mother
    complex is partly formed by a person’s conscious image of mother. Thus, com-
    plexes may be partly conscious and may stem from both the personal and the
    collective unconscious (Jung, 1928/1960).
    Collective Unconscious
    In contrast to the personal unconscious, which results from individual experiences,
    the collective unconscious has roots in the ancestral past of the entire species. It
    represents Jung’s most controversial, and perhaps his most distinctive, concept.
    The physical contents of the collective unconscious are inherited and pass from
    one generation to the next as psychic potential. Distant ancestors’ experiences with
    universal concepts such as God, mother, water, earth, and so forth have been
    transmitted through the generations so that people in every clime and time have
    been influenced by their primitive ancestors’ primordial experiences (Jung,
    1937/1959). Therefore, the contents of the collective unconscious are more or less
    the same for people in all cultures (Jung, 1934/1959).
    The contents of the collective unconscious do not lie dormant but are active
    and influence a person’s thoughts, emotions, and actions. The collective uncon-
    scious is responsible for people’s many myths, legends, and religious beliefs. It also
    produces “big dreams,” that is, dreams with meaning beyond the individual dreamer
    and that are filled with significance for people of every time and place (Jung,
    1948/1960b).
    The collective unconscious does not refer to inherited ideas but rather to
    humans’ innate tendency to react in a particular way whenever their experiences
    stimulate a biologically inherited response tendency. For example, a young mother
    may unexpectedly react with love and tenderness to her newborn infant, even
    though she previously had negative or neutral feelings toward the fetus. The ten-
    dency to respond was part of the woman’s innate potential or inherited blueprint,

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories112
    but such innate potential requires an individual experience before it will become
    activated. Humans, like other animals, come into the world with inherited predis-
    positions to act or react in certain ways if their present experiences touch on these
    biologically based predispositions. For example, a man who falls in love at first
    sight may be greatly surprised and perplexed by his own reactions. His beloved
    may not resemble his conscious ideal of a woman, yet something within him moves
    him to be attracted to her. Jung would suggest that the man’s collective uncon-
    scious contained biologically based impressions of woman and that these impres-
    sions were activated when the man first saw his beloved.
    How many biologically based predispositions do humans have? Jung said
    that people have as many of these inherited tendencies as they have typical situa-
    tions in life. Countless repetitions of these typical situations have made them part
    of the human biological constitution. At first, they are “forms without content,
    representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action”
    (Jung, 1937/1959, p. 48). With more repetition these forms begin to develop some
    content and to emerge as relatively autonomous archetypes.
    Archetypes
    Archetypes are ancient or archaic images that derive from the collective uncon-
    scious. They are similar to complexes in that they are emotionally toned collections
    of associated images. But whereas complexes are individualized components of the
    personal unconscious, archetypes are generalized and derive from the contents of
    the collective unconscious.
    Archetypes should also be distinguished from instincts. Jung (1948/1960a)
    defined an instinct as an unconscious physical impulse toward action and saw the
    archetype as the psychic counterpart to an instinct. In comparing archetypes to
    instincts, Jung (1975) wrote:
    As animals of the same kind show the same instinctual phenomena all over the
    world, man also shows the same archetypal forms no matter where he lives. As
    animals have no need to be taught their instinctive activities, so man also
    possesses his primordial psychic patterns and repeats them spontaneously,
    independently of any kind of teaching. Inasmuch as man is conscious and
    capable of introspection, it is quite possible that he can perceive his instinctual
    patterns in the form of archetypal representations. (p. 152)
    In summary, both archetypes and instincts are unconsciously determined, and both
    can help shape personality.
    Archetypes have a biological basis but originate through the repeated experi-
    ences of humans’ early ancestors. The potential for countless numbers of arche-
    types exists within each person, and when a personal experience corresponds to
    the latent primordial image, the archetype becomes activated.
    The archetype itself cannot be directly represented, but when activated, it
    expresses itself through several modes, primarily dreams, fantasies, and delusions.
    During his midlife encounter with his unconscious, Jung had many archetypal
    dreams and fantasies. He frequently initiated fantasies by imagining that he was
    descending into a deep cosmic abyss. He could make little sense of his visions and
    dreams at that time, but later, when he began to understand that dream images and

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 113
    fantasy figures were actually archetypes, these experiences took on a completely
    new meaning (Jung, 1961).
    Dreams are the main source of archetypal material, and certain dreams offer
    what Jung considered proof for the existence of the archetype. These dreams pro-
    duce motifs that could not have been known to the dreamer through personal
    experience. The motifs often coincide with those known to ancient people or to
    natives of contemporary aboriginal tribes.
    Jung believed that hallucinations of psychotic patients also offered evidence
    for universal archetypes (Bair, 2003). While working as a psychiatric assistant at
    Burghöltzli, Jung observed a paranoid schizophrenic patient looking through a
    window at the sun. The patient begged the young psychiatrist to also observe.
    He said I must look at the sun with eyes half shut, and then I could see the
    sun’s phallus. If I moved my head from side to side the sun-phallus would
    move too, and that was the origin of the wind. (Jung, 1931/1960b, p. 150)
    Four years later Jung came across a book by the German philologist Albrecht
    Dieterich that had been published in 1903, several years after the patient was com-
    mitted. The book, written in Greek, dealt with a liturgy derived from the so-called
    Paris magic papyrus, which described an ancient rite of the worshippers of Mithras,
    the Persian god of light. In this liturgy, the initiate was asked to look at the sun
    until he could see a tube hanging from it. The tube, swinging toward the east and
    west, was the origin of the wind. Dieterich’s account of the sun-phallus of the
    Mithraic cult was nearly identical to the hallucination of the mental patient who,
    almost certainly, had no personal knowledge of the ancient initiation rite. Jung
    (1931/1960b) offered many similar examples as proof of the existence of arche-
    types and the collective unconscious.
    As noted in Chapter 2, Freud also believed that people collectively inherit
    predispositions to action. His concept of phylogenetic endowment, however, dif-
    fers somewhat from Jung’s formulation. One difference was that Freud looked
    first to the personal unconscious and resorted to the phylogenetic endowment
    only when individual explanations failed—as he sometimes did when explaining
    the Oedipus complex (Freud, 1933/1964). In contrast, Jung placed primary
    emphasis on the collective unconscious and used personal experiences to round
    out the total personality.
    The major distinction between the two, however, was Jung’s differentiation
    of the collective unconscious into autonomous forces called archetypes, each with
    a life and a personality of its own. Although a great number of archetypes exist
    as vague images, only a few have evolved to the point where they can be concep-
    tualized. The most notable of these include the persona, shadow, anima, animus,
    great mother, wise old man, hero, and self.
    Persona
    The side of personality that people show to the world is designated as the persona.
    The term is well chosen because it refers to the mask worn by actors in the early
    theater. Jung’s concept of the persona may have originated from experiences with
    his No. 1 personality, which had to make accommodations to the outside world.
    Each of us, Jung believed, should project a particular role, one that society dictates

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories114
    to each of us. A physician is expected to adopt a characteristic “bedside manner,”
    a politician must show a face to society that can win the confidence and votes of
    the people; an actor exhibits the style of life demanded by the public (Jung,
    1950/1959).
    Although the persona is a necessary side of our personality, we should not
    confuse our public face with our complete self. If we identify too closely with our
    persona, we remain unconscious of our individuality and are blocked from attaining
    self-realization. True, we must acknowledge society, but if we over identify with
    our persona, we lose touch with our inner self and remain dependent on society’s
    expectations of us. To become psychologically healthy, Jung believed, we must
    strike a balance between the demands of society and what we truly are. To be
    oblivious of one’s persona is to underestimate the importance of society, but to be
    unaware of one’s deep individuality is to become society’s puppet (Jung, 1950/1959).
    During Jung’s near break with reality from 1913 to 1917, he struggled hard to
    remain in touch with his persona. He knew that he must maintain a normal life, and
    his work and family provided that contact. He was frequently forced to tell himself
    basic facts about who he was, such as that he had a medical degree, that he had a
    wife and five children, and that he lived in Küsnacht, Switzerland, etc. Such self-talk
    kept Jung’s feet rooted to the ground and reassured him that he really existed.
    Shadow
    The shadow, the archetype of darkness and repression, represents those qualities we
    do not wish to acknowledge but attempt to hide from ourselves and others. The
    shadow consists of morally objectionable tendencies as well as
    a number of constructive and creative qualities that we, never-
    theless, are reluctant to face (Jung, 1951/1959a).
    Jung contended that, to be whole, we must continually
    strive to know our shadow and that this quest is our first test
    of courage. It is easier to project the dark side of our person-
    ality onto others, to see in them the ugliness and evil that we
    refuse to see in ourselves. To come to grips with the darkness
    within ourselves is to achieve the “realization of the shadow.”
    Unfortunately, most of us never realize our shadow but iden-
    tify only with the bright side of our personality. People who
    never realize their shadow may, nevertheless, come under its
    Fictional figures such as Darth Vader and Voldemort are classic examples of Shadow archetypes.
    © Stefano Buttafoco/Shutterstock, © E. Charbonneau/WireImage/Getty Images

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 115
    power and lead tragic lives, constantly running into “bad luck” and reaping harvests
    of defeat and discouragement for themselves (Jung, 1954/1959a).
    In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung (1961) reported a dream that took
    place at the time of his break from Freud. In this dream his shadow, a brown-skinned
    savage, killed the hero, a man named Siegfried, who represented the German people.
    Jung interpreted the dream to mean that he no longer needed Sig Freud (Siegfried);
    thus, his shadow performed the constructive task of eradicating his former hero.
    Anima
    Like Freud, Jung believed that all humans are psychologically bisexual and possess
    both a masculine and a feminine side. The feminine side of men originates in the
    collective unconscious as an archetype and remains extremely resistant to con-
    sciousness. Few men become well acquainted with their anima because this task
    requires great courage and is even more difficult than becoming acquainted with
    their shadow. To master the projections of the anima, men must overcome intel-
    lectual barriers, delve into the far recesses of their unconscious, and realize the
    feminine side of their personality.
    As we reported in the opening vignette in this chapter, Jung first encountered
    his own anima during his journey through his unconscious psyche soon after his
    break with Freud. The process of gaining acquaintance with his anima was Jung’s
    second test of courage. Like all men, Jung could recognize his anima only after
    learning to feel comfortable with his shadow (Jung, 1954/1959a, 1954/1959b).
    In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung vividly described this experience.
    Intrigued by this “woman from within,” Jung (1961) concluded that
    she must be the “soul,” in the primitive sense, and I began to speculate on the
    reasons why the name “anima” was given to the soul. Why was it thought of as
    feminine? Later I came to see that this inner feminine figure plays a typical, or
    archetypal, role in the unconscious of a man, and I called her the “anima.” The
    corresponding figure in the unconscious of woman I called the “animus.” (p. 186)
    Jung believed that the anima originated from early men’s experiences with
    women—mothers, sisters, and lovers—that combined to form a generalized picture
    of woman. In time, this global concept became embedded in the collective uncon-
    scious of all men as the anima archetype. Since prehistoric days, every man has
    come into the world with a predetermined concept of woman that shapes and molds
    all his relationships with individual women. A man is especially inclined to project
    his anima onto his wife or lover and to see her not as she really is but as his per-
    sonal and collective unconscious have determined her. This anima can be the source
    of much misunderstanding in male-female relationships, but it may also be respon-
    sible for the alluring mystique woman has in the psyche of men (Hayman, 2001;
    Hillman, 1985).
    A man may dream about a woman with no definite image and no particular
    identity. The woman represents no one from his personal experience, but enters his
    dream from the depths of his collective unconscious. The anima need not appear in
    dreams as a woman, but can be represented by a feeling or mood (Jung, 1945/1953).
    Thus, the anima influences the feeling side in man and is the explanation for certain
    irrational moods and feelings. During these moods a man almost never admits that

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories116
    his feminine side is casting her spell; instead, he either ignores the irrationality of
    the feelings or tries to explain them in a very rational masculine manner. In either
    event he denies that an autonomous archetype, the anima, is responsible for his mood.
    Animus
    The masculine archetype in women is called the animus. Whereas the anima rep-
    resents irrational moods and feelings, the animus is symbolic of thinking and rea-
    soning. It is capable of influencing the thinking of a woman, yet it does not
    actually belong to her. It belongs to the collective unconscious and originates from
    the encounters of prehistoric women with men. In every female-male relationship,
    the woman runs a risk of projecting her distant ancestors’ experiences with fathers,
    brothers, lovers, and sons onto the unsuspecting man. In addition, of course, her
    personal experiences with men, buried in her personal unconscious, enter into her
    relationships with men. Couple these experiences with projections from the man’s
    anima and with images from his personal unconscious, and you have the basic
    ingredients of any female-male relationship.
    Jung believed that the animus is responsible for thinking and opinion in
    women just as the anima produces feelings and moods in men. The animus is also
    the explanation for the irrational thinking and illogical opinions often attributed to
    women. Many opinions held by women are objectively valid, but according to
    Jung, close analysis reveals that these opinions were not thought out, but existed
    ready-made. If a woman is dominated by her animus, no logical or emotional
    appeal can shake her from her prefabricated beliefs (Jung, 1951/1959a). Like the
    anima, the animus appears in dreams, visions, and fantasies in a personified form.
    Great Mother
    Two other archetypes, the great mother and the wise old man, are derivatives of
    the anima and animus. Everyone, man or woman, possesses a great mother arche-
    type. This preexisting concept of mother is always associated with both positive
    and negative feelings. Jung (1954/1959c), for example, spoke of the “loving and
    terrible mother” (p. 82). The great mother, therefore, represents two opposing
    forces— fertility and nourishment on the one hand and power and destruction on
    the other. She is capable of producing and sustaining life (fertility and nourish-
    ment), but she may also devour or neglect her offspring (destruction). Recall that
    Jung saw his own mother as having two personalities—one loving and nurturing;
    the other uncanny, archaic, and ruthless.
    Jung (1954/1959c) believed that our view of a personal loving and terrible
    mother is largely overrated. “All those influences which the literature describes as being
    exerted on the children do not come from the mother herself, but rather from the
    archetype projected upon her, which gives her a mythological background” (p. 83). In
    other words, the strong fascination that mother has for both men and women, often in
    the absence of a close personal relationship, was taken by Jung as evidence for the
    great mother archetype.
    The fertility and nourishment dimension of the great mother archetype is
    symbolized by a tree, garden, plowed field, sea, heaven, home, country, church,
    and hollow objects such as ovens and cooking utensils. Because the great mother

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 117
    also represents power and destruction, she is sometimes symbolized as a god-
    mother, the Mother of God, Mother Nature, Mother Earth, a stepmother, or a witch.
    One example of the opposing forces of fertility and destruction is the story of
    Cinderella, whose fairy godmother is able to create for her a world of horses, car-
    riages, fancy balls, and a charming prince. However, the powerful godmother could
    also destroy that world at the stroke of midnight. Legends, myths, religious beliefs,
    art, and literary stories are filled with other symbols of the great mother, a person
    who is both nurturing and destructive.
    Fertility and power combine to form the concept of rebirth, which may be
    a separate archetype, but its relation to the great mother is obvious. Rebirth is
    represented by such processes as reincarnation, baptism, resurrection, and indi-
    viduation or self-realization. People throughout the world are moved by a desire
    to be reborn: that is, to reach self-realization, nirvana, heaven, or perfection (Jung,
    1952/1956, 1954/1959c).
    Wise Old Man
    The wise old man, archetype of wisdom and meaning, symbolizes humans’ pre-
    existing knowledge of the mysteries of life. This archetypal meaning, however, is
    unconscious and cannot be directly experienced by a single individual. Politicians
    and others who speak authoritatively—but not authentically—often sound sensible
    and wise to others who are all too willing to be misled by their own wise old man
    archetypes. Similarly, the wizard in L. Frank Baum’s Wizard of Oz was an impres-
    sive and captivating speaker whose words, however, rang hollow. A man or woman
    dominated by the wise old man archetype may gather a large following of disciples
    by using verbiage that sounds profound but that really makes little sense because
    the collective unconscious cannot directly impart its wisdom to an individual.
    Political, religious, and social prophets who appeal to reason as well as emotion
    (archetypes are always emotionally tinged) are guided by this unconscious arche-
    type. The danger to society comes when people become swayed by the pseu-
    doknowledge of a powerful prophet and mistake nonsense for real wisdom. Recall
    that Jung saw the preachings of his own father (a pastor) as hollow pontifications,
    not backed by any strong religious conviction.
    The wise old man archetype is personified in dreams as father, grandfather,
    teacher, philosopher, guru, doctor, or priest. He appears in fairy tales as the king, the
    sage, or the magician who comes to the aid of the troubled protagonist and, through
    superior wisdom, he helps the protagonist escape from myriad misadventures. The
    wise old man is also symbolized by life itself. Literature is replete with stories of
    young people leaving home, venturing out into the world, experiencing the trials and
    sorrows of life, and in the end acquiring a measure of wisdom (Jung, 1954/1959a).
    Hero
    The hero archetype is represented in mythology and legends as a powerful person,
    sometimes part god, who fights against great odds to conquer or vanquish evil in
    the form of dragons, monsters, serpents, or demons. In the end, however, the hero
    often is undone by some seemingly insignificant person or event (Jung, 1951/1959b).
    For example, Achilles, the courageous hero of the Trojan War, was killed by an

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories118
    arrow in his only vulnerable spot—his heel. Similarly, Macbeth was a heroic fig-
    ure with a single tragic flaw—ambition. This ambition was also the source of his
    greatness, but it contributed to his fate and his downfall. Heroic deeds can be
    performed only by someone who is vulnerable, such as Achilles or the comic book
    character Superman, whose only weakness was the chemical element kryptonite.
    An immortal person with no weakness cannot be a hero.
    The image of the hero touches an archetype within us, as demonstrated by
    our fascination with the heroes of movies, novels, plays, and television programs.
    When the hero conquers the villain, he or she frees us from feelings of impotence
    and misery, at the same time serving as our model for the ideal personality (Jung,
    1934/1954a).
    The origin of the hero motif goes back to earliest human history—to the dawn
    of consciousness. In conquering the villain, the hero is symbolically overcoming the
    darkness of prehuman unconsciousness. The achievement of consciousness was one
    of our ancestors’ greatest accomplishments, and the image of the archetypal con-
    quering hero represents victory over the forces of darkness (Jung, 1951/1959b).
    Self
    Jung believed that each person possesses an inherited tendency to move toward
    growth, perfection, and completion, and he called this innate disposition the self.
    The most comprehensive of all archetypes, the self is the archetype of archetypes
    because it pulls together the other archetypes and unites them in the process of
    self-realization. Like the other archetypes, it possesses conscious and personal
    unconscious components, but it is mostly formed by collective unconscious images.
    As an archetype, the self is symbolized by a person’s ideas of perfection,
    completion, and wholeness, but its ultimate symbol is the mandala, which is
    depicted as a circle within a square, a square within a circle, or any other con-
    centric figure. It represents the strivings of the collective unconscious for unity,
    balance, and wholeness.
    The self includes both personal and collective unconscious images and thus
    should not be confused with the ego, which represents consciousness only. In
    Figure 4.1, consciousness (the ego) is represented by the outer circle and is only
    a small part of total personality; the personal unconscious is depicted by the
    middle circle; the collective unconscious is represented by the inner circle; and
    totality of all three circles symbolizes the self. Only four archetypes—persona,
    shadow, animus, and anima—have been drawn in this mandala, and each has been
    idealistically depicted as being the same size. For most people the persona is more
    conscious than the shadow, and the shadow may be more accessible to conscious-
    ness than either the anima or the animus. As shown in Figure 4.1, each archetype
    is partly conscious, partly personal unconscious, and partly collective unconscious.
    The balance shown in Figure 4.1 between consciousness and the total self is
    also somewhat idealistic. Many people have an overabundance of consciousness
    and thus lack the “soul spark” of personality; that is, they fail to realize the rich-
    ness and vitality of their personal unconscious and especially of their collective
    unconscious. On the other hand, people who are overpowered by their unconscious
    are often pathological, with one-sided personalities (Jung, 1951/1959a).

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 119
    Although the self is almost never perfectly balanced, each person has in the
    collective unconscious a concept of the perfect, unified self. The mandala repre-
    sents the perfect self, the archetype of order, unity, and totality. Because self-
    realization involves completeness and wholeness, it is represented by the same
    symbol of perfection (the mandala) that sometimes signifies divinity. In the col-
    lective unconscious, the self appears as an ideal personality, sometimes taking the
    form of Jesus Christ, Buddha, Krishna, or other deified figures.
    Jung found evidence for the self archetype in the mandala symbols that appear
    in dreams and fantasies of contemporary people who have never been conscious of
    their meaning. Historically, people produced countless mandalas without appearing to
    have understood their full significance. Jung (1951/1959a) believed that psychotic
    patients experience an increasing number of mandala motifs in their dreams at the
    exact time that they are undergoing a period of serious psychic disorder and that this
    experience is further evidence that people strive for order and balance. It is as if the
    unconscious symbol of order counterbalances the conscious manifestation of disorder.
    In summary, the self includes both the conscious and unconscious mind, and
    it unites the opposing elements of psyche—male and female, good and evil, light
    and dark forces. These opposing elements are often represented by the yang and
    yin (see Figure 4.2), whereas the self is usually symbolized by the mandala. This
    latter motif stands for unity, totality, and order—that is, self-realization. Complete
    Personal
    unconscious
    Anima (femininity) Animus (masculinity)
    Personal
    unconscious
    Collective
    unconscious
    Conscious (ego)
    Conscious (ego)
    C
    o
    n
    sc
    io
    u
    s
    (e
    g
    o
    )
    C
    o
    n
    sc
    io
    u
    s
    (e
    g
    o
    )
    Shadow
    Persona
    FIGURE 4.1 Jung’s Conception of Personality.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories120
    self-realization is seldom if ever achieved, but as an ideal it exists within the col-
    lective unconscious of everyone. To actualize or fully experience the self, people
    must overcome their fear of the unconscious; prevent their persona from dominat-
    ing their personality; recognize the dark side of themselves (their shadow); and
    then muster even greater courage to face their anima or animus.
    On one occasion during his midlife crisis, Jung had a vision in which he
    confronted a bearded old man who was living with a beautiful blind young girl
    and a large black snake. The old man explained that he was Elijah and that the
    young girl was Salome, both biblical figures. Elijah had a certain, sharp intelli-
    gence, although Jung did not clearly understand him. Salome gave Jung a feeling
    of distinct suspiciousness, while the serpent showed a remarkable fondness for
    Jung. At the time he experienced this vision, Jung was unable to comprehend its
    meaning, but many years later he came to see the three figures as archetypes.
    Elijah represented the wise old man, seemingly intelligent, but not making a good
    deal of sense; the blind Salome was an anima figure, beautiful and seductive, but
    unable to see the meaning of things; and the snake was the counterpart of the
    hero, showing an affinity for Jung, the hero of the vision. Jung (1961) believed
    that he had to identify these unconscious images in order to maintain his own
    identity and not lose himself to the powerful forces of the collective unconscious.
    He later wrote:
    The essential thing is to differentiate oneself from these unconscious contents by
    personifying them, and at the same time to bring them into relationship with
    consciousness. That is the technique for stripping them of their power. (p. 187)
    Introversion
    Extraversion
    FIGURE 4.2 The Yang and the Yin.

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 121
    Dynamics of Personality
    In this section on the dynamics of personality, we look at Jung’s ideas on causal-
    ity and teleology and on progression and regression.
    Causality and Teleology
    Does motivation spring from past causes or from teleological goals? Jung insisted that
    it comes from both. Causality holds that present events have their origin in previous
    experiences. Freud relied heavily on a causal viewpoint in his explanations of adult
    behavior in terms of early childhood experiences (see Chapter 2). Jung criticized Freud
    for being one-sided in his emphasis on causality and insisted that a causal view could
    not explain all motivation. Conversely, teleology holds that present events are moti-
    vated by goals and aspirations for the future that direct a person’s destiny. Adler held
    this position, insisting that people are motivated by conscious and unconscious percep-
    tions of fictional final goals (see Chapter 3). Jung was less critical of Adler than of
    Freud, but he insisted that human behavior is shaped by both causal and teleological
    forces and that causal explanations must be balanced with teleological ones.
    Jung’s insistence on balance is seen in his conception of dreams. He agreed
    with Freud that many dreams spring from past events; that is, they are caused by
    earlier experiences. On the other hand, Jung claimed that some dreams can help a
    person make decisions about the future, just as dreams of making important dis-
    coveries in the natural sciences eventually led to his own career choice.
    Progression and Regression
    To achieve self-realization, people must adapt not only to their outside environment
    but to their inner world as well. Adaptation to the outside world involves the for-
    ward flow of psychic energy and is called progression, whereas adaptation to the
    inner world relies on a backward flow of psychic energy and is called regression.
    Both progression and regression are essential if people are to achieve individual
    growth or self-realization.
    Progression inclines a person to react consistently to a given set of environ-
    mental conditions, whereas regression is a necessary backward step in the success-
    ful attainment of a goal. Regression activates the unconscious psyche, an essential
    aid in the solution of most problems. Alone, neither progression nor regression
    leads to development. Either can bring about too much one-sidedness and failure
    in adaptation; but the two, working together, can activate the process of healthy
    personality development (Jung, 1928/1960).
    Regression is exemplified in Jung’s midlife crisis, during which time his
    psychic life was turned inward toward the unconscious and away from any sig-
    nificant outward accomplishments. He spent most of his energy becoming
    acquainted with his unconscious psyche and did little in the way of writing or
    lecturing. Regression dominated his life while progression nearly ceased. Subse-
    quently, he emerged from this period with a greater balance of the psyche and once
    again became interested in the extraverted world. However, his regressive experi-
    ences with the introverted world had left him permanently and profoundly changed.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories122
    Jung (1961) believed that the regressive step is necessary to create a balanced
    personality and to grow toward self-realization.
    Psychological Types
    Besides the levels of the psyche and the dynamics of personality, Jung recognized
    various psychological types that grow out of a union of two basic attitudes—
    introversion and extraversion—and four separate functions—thinking, feeling,
    sensing, and intuiting.
    Attitudes
    Jung (1921/1971) defined an attitude as a predisposition to act or react in a char-
    acteristic direction. He insisted that each person has both an introverted and an
    extraverted attitude, although one may be conscious while the other is unconscious.
    Like other opposing forces in analytical psychology, introversion and extraversion
    serve in a compensatory relationship to one another and can be illustrated by the
    yang and yin motif (see Figure 4.2).
    Introversion
    According to Jung, introversion is the turning inward of psychic energy with an
    orientation toward the subjective. Introverts are tuned in to their inner world with
    all its biases, fantasies, dreams, and individualized perceptions. These people per-
    ceive the external world, of course, but they do so selectively and with their own
    subjective view (Jung, 1921/1971).
    The story of Jung’s life shows two episodes when introversion was clearly
    the dominant attitude. The first was during early adolescence when he became
    cognizant of a No. 2 personality, one beyond awareness to his extraverted person-
    ality. The second episode was during his midlife confrontation with his uncon-
    scious when he carried on conversations with his anima, experienced bizarre
    dreams, and induced strange visions that were the “stuff of psychosis” (Jung, 1961,
    p. 188). During his nearly completely introverted midlife crisis, his fantasies were
    individualized and subjective. Other people, including even Jung’s wife, could not
    accurately comprehend what he was experiencing. Only Toni Wolff seemed capa-
    ble of helping him emerge from his confrontation with the unconscious. During
    that introverted confrontation, Jung suspended or discontinued much of his extra-
    verted or objective attitude. He stopped actively treating his patients, resigned his
    position as lecturer at the University of Zürich, ceased his theoretical writing, and
    for 3 years, found that he could not even read any kind of scientific book. He was
    in the process of discovering the introverted pole of his existence.
    Jung’s voyage of discovery, however, was not totally introverted. He knew
    that unless he retained some hold on his extraverted world, he would risk becoming
    absolutely possessed by his inner world. Afraid that he might become completely
    psychotic, he forced himself to continue as much of a normal life as possible with
    his family and his profession. By this technique, Jung eventually emerged from his
    inner journey and established a balance between introversion and extraversion.

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 123
    Extraversion
    In contrast to introversion, extraversion is the attitude distinguished by the turning
    outward of psychic energy so that a person is oriented toward the objective and
    away from the subjective. Extraverts are more influenced by their surroundings than
    by their inner world. They tend to focus on the objective attitude while suppressing
    the subjective. Like Jung’s childhood No. 1 personality, they are pragmatic and
    well rooted in the realities of everyday life. At the same time, they are overly
    suspicious of the subjective attitude, whether their own or that of someone else.
    In summary, people are neither completely introverted nor completely extra-
    verted. Introverted people are like an unbalanced teeter-totter with a heavy weight
    on one end and a very light weight on the other (see Figure 4.3 A). Conversely,
    extraverted people are unbalanced in the other direction, with a heavy extraverted
    attitude and a very light introverted one (see Figure 4.3 B). However, psycho-
    logically healthy people attain a balance of the two attitudes, feeling equally com-
    fortable with their internal and their external worlds (see Figure 4.3 C).
    In Chapter 3, we said that Adler developed a theory of personality that was
    quite opposite to that of Freud. Where did Jung place these two theories on the
    extraversion/introversion pole? Jung (1921/1971) said that “Freud’s view is essen-
    tially extraverted, Adler’s introverted” (p. 62). Our biographical sketches of Freud
    Introverted Extraverted
    A
    B
    C
    FIGURE 4.3 The Balance of Introversion and Extraversion.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories124
    and Adler reveal that the opposite appears to be true: Freud was personally some-
    what introverted, in tune to his dreams and fantasy life, whereas Adler was person-
    ally extraverted, feeling most comfortable in group settings, singing songs and
    playing the piano in the coffeehouses of Vienna. Yet Jung held that Freud’s theory
    was extraverted because it reduced experiences to the external world of sex and
    aggression. Conversely, Jung believed that Adler’s theory was introverted because
    it emphasized fictions and subjective perceptions. Jung, of course, saw his own
    theory as balanced, able to accept both the objective and the subjective.
    Functions
    Both introversion and extraversion can combine with any one or more of four func-
    tions, forming eight possible orientations, or types. The four functions—sensing,
    thinking, feeling, and intuiting—can be briefly defined as follows: Sensing tells
    people that something exists; thinking enables them to recognize its meaning; feel-
    ing tells them its value or worth; and intuition allows them to know about it with-
    out knowing how they know.
    Thinking
    Logical intellectual activity that produces a chain of ideas is called thinking. The
    thinking type can be either extraverted or introverted, depending on a person’s
    basic attitude.
    Extraverted thinking people rely heavily on concrete thoughts, but they may
    also use abstract ideas if these ideas have been transmitted to them from without,
    for example, from parents or teachers. Mathematicians and engineers make fre-
    quent use of extraverted thinking in their work. Accountants, too, are extraverted
    thinking types because they must be objective and not subjective in their approach
    to numbers. Not all objective thinking, however, is productive. Without at least
    some individual interpretation, ideas are merely previously known facts with no
    originality or creativity (Jung, 1921/1971).
    Introverted thinking people react to external stimuli, but their interpretation
    of an event is colored more by the internal meaning they bring with them than by
    the objective facts themselves. Inventors and philosophers are often introverted
    thinking types because they react to the external world in a highly subjective and
    creative manner, interpreting old data in new ways. When carried to an extreme,
    introverted thinking results in unproductive mystical thoughts that are so individu-
    alized that they are useless to any other person (Jung, 1921/1971).
    Feeling
    Jung used the term feeling to describe the process of evaluating an idea or event.
    Perhaps a more accurate word would be valuing, a term less likely to be confused
    with either sensing or intuiting. For example, when people say, “This surface feels
    smooth,” they are using their sensing function, and when they say, “I have a feel-
    ing that this will be my lucky day,” they are intuiting, not feeling.
    The feeling function should be distinguished from emotion. Feeling is the
    evaluation of every conscious activity, even those valued as indifferent. Most of

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 125
    these evaluations have no emotional content, but they are capable of becoming
    emotions if their intensity increases to the point of stimulating physiological
    changes within the person. Emotions, however, are not limited to feelings; any of
    the four functions can lead to emotion when their strength is increased.
    Extraverted feeling people use objective data to make evaluations. They are
    not guided so much by their subjective opinion, but by external values and widely
    accepted standards of judgment. They are likely to be at ease in social situations,
    knowing on the spur of the moment what to say and how to say it. They are usu-
    ally well liked because of their sociability, but in their quest to conform to social
    standards, they may appear artificial, shallow, and unreliable. Their value judg-
    ments will have an easily detectable false ring. Extraverted feeling people often
    become businesspeople or politicians because these professions demand and
    reward the making of value judgments based on objective information (Jung,
    1921/1971).
    Introverted feeling people base their value judgments primarily on subjective
    perceptions rather than objective facts. Critics of the various art forms make much
    use of introverted feeling, making value judgments on the basis of subjective indi-
    vidualized data. These people have an individualized conscience, a taciturn
    demeanor, and an unfathomable psyche. They ignore traditional opinions and
    beliefs, and their nearly complete indifference to the objective world (including
    people) often causes persons around them to feel uncomfortable and to cool their
    attitude toward them (Jung, 1921/1971).
    Sensing
    The function that receives physical stimuli and transmits them to perceptual con-
    sciousness is called sensation. Sensing is not identical to the physical stimulus but
    is simply the individual’s perception of sensory impulses. These perceptions are not
    dependent on logical thinking or feeling but exist as absolute, elementary facts within
    each person.
    Extraverted sensing people perceive external stimuli objectively, in much the
    same way that these stimuli exist in reality. Their sensations are not greatly influ-
    enced by their subjective attitudes. This facility is essential in such occupations as
    proofreader, house painter, wine taster, or any other job demanding sensory dis-
    criminations congruent with those of most people (Jung, 1921/1971).
    Introverted sensing people are largely influenced by their subjective sensa-
    tions of sight, sound, taste, touch, and so forth. They are guided by their interpre-
    tation of sense stimuli rather than the stimuli themselves. Portrait artists, especially
    those whose paintings are extremely personalized, rely on an introverted-sensing
    attitude. They give a subjective interpretation to objective phenomena yet are able
    to communicate meaning to others. When the subjective sensing attitude is carried
    to its extreme, however, it may result in hallucinations or esoteric and incompre-
    hensible speech (Jung, 1921/1971).
    Intuiting
    Intuition involves perception beyond the workings of consciousness. Like sensing,
    it is based on the perception of absolute elementary facts, ones that provide the

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories126
    raw material for thinking and feeling. Intuiting differs from sensing in that it is
    more creative, often adding or subtracting elements from conscious sensation.
    Extraverted intuitive people are oriented toward facts in the external world.
    Rather than fully sensing them, however, they merely perceive them subliminally.
    Because strong sensory stimuli interfere with intuition, intuitive people suppress
    many of their sensations and are guided by hunches and guesses contrary to sensory
    data. An example of an extraverted intuitive type might be inventors who must
    inhibit distracting sensory data and concentrate on unconscious solutions to objec-
    tive problems. They may create things that fill a need few other people realized
    existed.
    Introverted intuitive people are guided by unconscious perception of facts
    that are basically subjective and have little or no resemblance to external real-
    ity. Their subjective intuitive perceptions are often remarkably strong and
    capable of motivating decisions of monumental magnitude. Introverted intuitive
    people, such as mystics, prophets, surrealistic artists, or religious fanatics, often
    appear peculiar to people of other types who have little comprehension of their
    motives. Actually, Jung (1921/1971) believed that introverted intuitive people
    may not clearly understand their own motivations, yet they are deeply moved
    by them. (See Table 4.1 for the eight Jungian types with some possible exam-
    ples of each.)
    The four functions usually appear in a hierarchy, with one occupying a supe-
    rior position, another a secondary position, and the other two inferior positions.
    Most people cultivate only one function, so they characteristically approach a
    situation relying on the one dominant or superior function. Some people develop
    two functions, and a few very mature individuals have cultivated three. A person
    who has theoretically achieved self-realization or individuation would have all four
    functions highly developed.
    T A B L E 4 . 1
    Examples of the Eight Jungian Types
    Thinking
    Feeling
    Sensation
    Intuition
    Philosophers, theoretical
    scientists, some inventors
    Subjective movie critics, art
    appraisers
    Artists, classical musicians
    Prophets, mystics, religious
    fanatics
    Research scientists, accountants,
    mathematicians
    Real estate appraisers, objective
    movie critics
    Wine tasters, proofreaders,
    popular musicians, house
    painters
    Some inventors, religious
    reformers
    Functions Attitudes
    Introversion Extraversion

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 127
    Development of Personality
    Jung believed that personality develops through a series of stages that culminate in
    individuation, or self-realization. In contrast to Freud, he emphasized the second half
    of life, the period after age 35 or 40, when a person has the opportunity to bring
    together the various aspects of personality and to attain self-realization. However,
    the opportunity for degeneration or rigid reactions is also present at that time. The
    psychological health of middle-aged people is related to their ability in achieving
    balance between the poles of the various opposing processes. This ability is propor-
    tional to the success achieved in journeying through the previous stages of life.
    Stages of Development
    Jung grouped the stages of life into four general periods—childhood, youth, middle
    life, and old age. He compared the trip through life to the journey of the sun through
    the sky, with the brightness of the sun representing consciousness. The early morn-
    ing sun is childhood, full of potential, but still lacking in brilliance (consciousness);
    the morning sun is youth, climbing toward the zenith, but unaware of the impend-
    ing decline; the early afternoon sun is middle life, brilliant like the late morning
    sun, but obviously headed for the sunset; the evening sun is old age, its once bright
    consciousness now markedly dimmed (see Figure 4.4). Jung (1931/1960a) argued
    that values, ideals, and modes of behavior suitable for the morning of life are inap-
    propriate for the second half, and that people must learn to find new meaning in
    their declining years of life.
    Childhood
    Jung divided childhood into three substages: (1) the anarchic, (2) the monarchic,
    and (3) the dualistic. The anarchic phase is characterized by chaotic and sporadic
    consciousness. “Islands of consciousness” may exist, but there is little or no con-
    nection among these islands. Experiences of the anarchic phase sometimes enter
    consciousness as primitive images, incapable of being accurately verbalized.
    The monarchic phase of childhood is characterized by the development of the
    ego and by the beginning of logical and verbal thinking. During this time children see
    Childhood
    Youth Middle life
    Old age
    FIGURE 4.4 Jung Compares the Stages of Life to the Sun’s Journey through the
    Sky, with the Brilliance of the Sun Representing Consciousness.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories128
    themselves objectively and often refer to themselves in the third person. The islands
    of consciousness become larger, more numerous, and inhabited by a primitive ego.
    Although the ego is perceived as an object, it is not yet aware of itself as perceiver.
    The ego as perceiver arises during the dualistic phase of childhood when the
    ego is divided into the objective and subjective. Children now refer to themselves
    in the first person and are aware of their existence as separate individuals. During
    the dualistic period, the islands of consciousness become continuous land, inhabited by
    an ego-complex that recognizes itself as both object and subject (Jung, 1931/1960a).
    Youth
    The period from puberty until middle life is called youth. Young people strive to gain
    psychic and physical independence from their parents, find a mate, raise a family, and
    make a place in the world. According to Jung (1931/1960a), youth is, or should be, a
    period of increased activity, maturing sexuality, growing consciousness, and recognition
    that the problem-free era of childhood is gone forever. The major difficulty facing youth
    is to overcome the natural tendency (found also in middle and later years) to cling to
    the narrow consciousness of childhood, thus avoiding problems pertinent to the present
    time of life. This desire to live in the past is called the conservative principle.
    A middle-aged or elderly person who attempts to hold on to youthful values
    faces a crippled second half of life, handicapped in the capacity to achieve self-
    realization and impaired in the ability to establish new goals and seek new mean-
    ing to life (Jung, 1931/1960a).
    Middle Life
    Jung believed that middle life begins at approximately age 35 or 40, by which time
    the sun has passed its zenith and begins its downward descent. Although this
    decline can present middle-aged people with increasing anxieties, middle life is
    also a period of tremendous potential.
    If middle-aged people retain the social and moral values of their early life,
    they become rigid and fanatical in trying to hold on to their physical attractiveness
    and agility. Finding their ideals shifting, they may fight desperately to maintain
    their youthful appearance and lifestyle. Most of us, wrote Jung (1931/1960a), are
    unprepared to “take the step into the afternoon of life; worse still, we take this step
    with the false assumption that our truths and ideals will serve us as hitherto. . . .
    We cannot live in the afternoon of life according to the programme of life’s morn-
    ing; for what was great in the morning will be little at evening, and what in the
    morning was true will at evening have become a lie” (p. 399).
    How can middle life be lived to its fullest? People who have lived youth by
    neither childish nor middle-aged values are well prepared to advance to middle life
    and to live fully during that stage. They are capable of giving up the extraverted
    goals of youth and moving in the introverted direction of expanded consciousness.
    Their psychological health is not enhanced by success in business, prestige in
    society, or satisfaction with family life. They must look forward to the future with
    hope and anticipation, surrender the lifestyle of youth, and discover new meaning
    in middle life. This step often, but not always, involves a mature religious orienta-
    tion, especially a belief in some sort of life after death (Jung, 1931/1960a).

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 129
    Old Age
    As the evening of life approaches, people experience a diminution of consciousness
    just as the light and warmth of the sun diminish at dusk. If people fear life during
    the early years, then they will almost certainly fear death during the later ones.
    Fear of death is often taken as normal, but Jung believed that death is the goal of
    life and that life can be fulfilling only when death is seen in this light. In 1934,
    during his 60th year, Jung wrote:
    Ordinarily we cling to our past and remain stuck in the illusion of youthfulness.
    Being old is highly unpopular. Nobody seems to consider that not being able to
    grow old is just as absurd as not being able to outgrow child’s-size shoes. A still
    infantile man of thirty is surely to be deplored, but a youthful septuagenarian—
    isn’t that delightful? And yet both are perverse, lacking in style, psychological
    monstrosities. A young man who does not fight and conquer has missed the best
    part of his youth, and an old man who does not know how to listen to the
    secrets of the brooks, as they tumble down from the peaks to the valleys, makes
    no sense; he is a spiritual mummy who is nothing but a rigid relic of the past.
    (Jung, 1934/1960, p. 407)
    Most of Jung’s patients were middle aged or older, and many of them suf-
    fered from a backward orientation, clinging desperately to goals and lifestyles of
    the past and going through the motions of life aimlessly. Jung treated these people
    by helping them establish new goals and find meaning in living by first finding
    meaning in death. He accomplished this treatment through dream interpretation,
    because the dreams of elderly people are often filled with symbols of rebirth, such
    as long journeys or changes in location. Jung used these and other symbols to
    determine patients’ unconscious attitudes toward death and to help them discover
    a meaningful philosophy of life (Jung, 1934/1960).
    Self-Realization
    Psychological rebirth, also called self-realization or individuation, is the process of
    becoming an individual or whole person (Jung, 1939/1959, 1945/1953). Analytical
    psychology is essentially a psychology of opposites, and self-realization is the process
    of integrating the opposite poles into a single homogeneous individual. This process
    of “coming to selfhood” means that a person has all psychological components func-
    tioning in unity, with no psychic process atrophying. People who have gone through
    this process have achieved realization of the self, minimized their persona, recognized
    their anima or animus, and acquired a workable balance between introversion and
    extraversion. In addition, these self-realized individuals have elevated all four of the
    functions to a superior position, an extremely difficult accomplishment.
    Self-realization is extremely rare and is achieved only by people who are able
    to assimilate their unconscious into their total personality. To come to terms with
    the unconscious is a difficult process that demands courage to face the evil nature
    of one’s shadow and even greater fortitude to accept one’s feminine or masculine
    side. This process is almost never achieved before middle life and then only by men
    and women who are able to remove the ego as the dominant concern of personality
    and replace it with the self. The self-realized person must allow the unconscious
    self to become the core of personality. To merely expand consciousness is to inflate

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories130
    the ego and to produce a one-sided person who lacks the soul spark of personality.
    The self-realized person is dominated neither by unconscious processes nor by the
    conscious ego but achieves a balance between all aspects of personality.
    Self-realized people are able to contend with both their external and their inter-
    nal worlds. Unlike psychologically disturbed individuals, they live in the real world
    and make necessary concessions to it. However, unlike average people, they are aware
    of the regressive process that leads to self-discovery. Seeing unconscious images as
    potential material for new psychic life, self-realized people welcome these images as
    they appear in dreams and introspective reflections (Jung, 1939/1959, 1945/1953).
    Jung’s Methods of Investigation
    Jung looked beyond psychology in his search for data to build his conception of
    humanity. He made no apologies for his ventures into the fields of sociology, his-
    tory, anthropology, biology, physics, philology, religion, mythology, and philoso-
    phy. He strongly believed that the study of personality was not the prerogative of
    any single discipline and that the whole person could be understood only by pursu-
    ing knowledge wherever it existed. Like Freud, Jung persistently defended himself
    as a scientific investigator, eschewing the labels of mystic and philosopher. In a
    letter to Calvin Hall, dated October 6, 1954, Jung argued: “If you call me an occult-
    ist because I am seriously investigating religious, mythological, folkloristic and
    philosophical fantasies in modern individuals and ancient texts, then you are bound
    to diagnose Freud as a sexual pervert since he is doing likewise with sexual fan-
    tasies” (Jung, 1975, p. 186). Nevertheless, Jung asserted that the psyche could not
    be understood by the intellect alone but must be grasped by the total person. Along
    the same line, he once said, “Not everything I bring forth is written out of my head,
    but much of it comes from the heart also” (Jung, 1943/1953, p. 116).
    Jung gathered data for his theories from extensive reading in many disci-
    plines, but he also gathered data from his use of the word association test, dream
    analysis, active imagination, and psychotherapy. This information was then com-
    bined with readings on medieval alchemy, occult phenomena, or any other subject
    in an effort to confirm the hypotheses of analytical psychology.
    Word Association Test
    Jung was not the first to use the word association test, but he can be credited with
    helping develop and refine it. He originally used the technique as early as 1903
    when he was a young psychiatric assistant at Burghöltzli, and he lectured on the
    word association test during his trip with Freud to the United States in 1909.
    However, he seldom employed it in his later career. In spite of this inattention, the
    test continues to be closely linked with Jung’s name.
    His original purpose in using the word association test was to demonstrate
    the validity of Freud’s hypothesis that the unconscious operates as an autonomous
    process. However, the basic purpose of the test in Jungian psychology today is to
    uncover feeling-toned complexes. As noted in the section of levels of the psyche,
    a complex is an individualized, emotionally toned conglomeration of images
    grouped around a central core. The word association test is based on the principle
    that complexes create measurable emotional responses.

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 131
    In administering the test, Jung typically used a list of about 100 stimulus words
    chosen and arranged to elicit an emotional reaction. He instructed the person to respond
    to each stimulus word with the first word that came to mind. Jung recorded each
    verbal response, time taken to make a response, rate of breathing, and galvanic skin
    response. Usually, he would repeat the experiment to determine test-retest consistency.
    Certain types of reactions indicate that the stimulus word has touched a com-
    plex. Critical responses include restricted breathing, changes in the electrical conduc-
    tivity of the skin, delayed reactions, multiple responses, disregard of instructions,
    inability to pronounce a common word, failure to respond, and inconsistency on
    test-retest. Other significant responses include blushing, stammering, laughing,
    coughing, sighing, clearing the throat, crying, excessive body movement, and repeti-
    tion of the stimulus word. Any one or combination of these responses might indicate
    that a complex has been reached (Jung, 1935/1968; Jung & Riklin, 1904/1973).
    Dream Analysis
    Jung agreed with Freud that dreams have meaning and that they should be taken
    seriously. He also agreed with Freud that dreams spring from the depths of the
    unconscious and that their latent meaning is expressed in symbolic form. However,
    he objected to Freud’s notion that nearly all dreams are wish fulfillments and that
    most dream symbols represent sexual urges. Jung (1964) believed that people used
    symbols to represent a variety of concepts—not merely sexual ones—to try to
    comprehend the “innumerable things beyond the range of human understanding”
    (p. 21). Dreams are our unconscious and spontaneous attempt to know the unknow-
    able, to comprehend a reality that can only be expressed symbolically.
    The purpose of Jungian dream interpretation is to uncover elements from the
    personal and collective unconscious and to integrate them into consciousness in order
    to facilitate the process of self-realization. The Jungian therapist must realize that
    dreams are often compensatory; that is, feelings and attitudes not expressed during
    waking life will find an outlet through the dream process. Jung believed that the
    natural condition of humans is to move toward completion or self-realization. Thus,
    if a person’s conscious life is incomplete in a certain area, then that person’s uncon-
    scious self will strive to complete that condition through the dream process. For
    example, if the anima in a man receives no conscious development, she will express
    herself through dreams filled with self-realization motifs, thus balancing the man’s
    masculine side with his feminine disposition (Jung, 1916/1960).
    Jung felt that certain dreams offered proof for the existence of the collective
    unconscious. These dreams included big dreams, which have special meaning for
    all people; typical dreams, which are common to most people; and earliest dreams
    remembered.
    In Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung (1961) wrote about a big dream he
    had while traveling to the United States with Freud in 1909. In this dream—briefly
    mentioned in our biographical sketch of Jung—Jung was living in the upper floor of
    a two-story house. This floor had an inhabited atmosphere, although its furnishings
    were somewhat old. In the dream, Jung realized that he did not know what the ground
    floor was like, so he decided to explore it. After descending the stairs, he noticed
    that all the furnishings were medieval and dated to the 15th or 16th century. While
    exploring this floor, he discovered a stone stairway that led down into a cellar. From

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories132
    there he descended into another ancient room with beautiful vaulted ceilings, which
    he knew intuitively were from the ancient Roman period. While exploring the floor
    of this cellar, Jung noticed a ring on one of the stone slabs. When he lifted it, he
    saw another narrow stairway leading to an ancient cave. There, he saw broken pot-
    tery, scattered animal bones, and two very old human skulls. In his own words, he
    had “discovered the world of the primitive man within myself—a world which can
    scarcely be reached or illuminated by consciousness” (Jung, 1961, p. 160).
    Jung later accepted this dream as evidence for different levels of the psyche.
    The upper floor had an inhabited atmosphere and represented consciousness, the top
    layer of the psyche. The ground floor was the first layer of the unconscious—old but
    not as alien or ancient as the Roman artifacts in the cellar, which symbolized a deeper
    layer of the personal unconscious. In the cave, Jung discovered two human skulls—the
    ones for which Freud insisted Jung harbored death wishes. Jung, however, saw these
    ancient human skulls as representing the depths of his collective unconscious.
    The second kind of collective dreams is the typical dreams, those that are com-
    mon to most people. These dreams include archetypal figures, such as mother, father,
    God, devil, or wise old man. They may also touch on archetypal events, such as birth,
    death, separation from parents, baptism, marriage, flying, or exploring a cave. They may
    also include archetypal objects, such as sun, water, fish, snakes, or predatory animals.
    The third category includes earliest dreams remembered. These dreams can be
    traced back to about age 3 or 4 and contain mythological and symbolic images and
    motifs that could not have reasonably been experienced by the individual child. These
    early childhood dreams often contain archetypal motifs and symbols such as the hero,
    the wise old man, the tree, the fish, and the mandala. Jung (1948/1960b) wrote of
    these images and motifs: “Their frequent appearance in individual case material, as
    well as their universal distribution, prove that the human psyche is unique and sub-
    jective or personal only in part, and for the rest is collective and objective” (p. 291).
    Jung (1961) presented a vivid illustration in one of his earliest dreams, which
    took place before his 4th birthday. He dreamed he was in a meadow when suddenly
    he saw a dark rectangular hole in the ground. Fearfully, he descended a flight of
    stairs and at the bottom encountered a doorway with a round arch covered by a
    heavy green curtain. Behind the curtain was a dimly lit room with a red carpet
    running from the entrance to a low platform. On the platform was a throne and on
    the throne was an elongated object that appeared to Jung to be a large tree trunk,
    but in fact it was made of skin and flesh, with a round head and eye on top. Filled
    with terror, the young boy heard his mother say, “Yes, just look at him. That is
    the man-eater!” This comment frightened him even more and jolted him awake.
    Jung thought often about the dream, but 30 years would pass before the obvious
    phallus became apparent to him. An additional number of years were required before
    he could accept the dream as an expression of his collective unconscious rather than
    the product of a personal memory trace. In his own interpretation of the dream, the
    rectangular hole represented death; the green curtain symbolized the mystery of Earth
    with her green vegetation; the red carpet signified blood; and the tree, resting majes-
    tically on a throne, was the erect penis, anatomically accurate in every detail. After
    interpreting the dream, Jung was forced to conclude that no 31/2-year-old boy could
    produce such universally symbolic material solely from his own experiences. A col-
    lective unconscious, common to the species, was his explanation (Jung, 1961).

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 133
    Active Imagination
    A technique Jung used during his own self-analysis as well as with many of his patients
    was active imagination. This method requires a person to begin with any impression—
    a dream image, vision, picture, or fantasy—and to concentrate until the impression
    begins to “move.” The person must follow these images to wherever they lead and
    then courageously face these autonomous images and freely communicate with them.
    The purpose of active imagination is to reveal archetypal images emerging from
    the unconscious. It can be a useful technique for people who want to become better
    acquainted with their collective and personal unconscious and who are willing to
    overcome the resistance that ordinarily blocks open communication with the uncon-
    scious. Jung believed that active imagination has an advantage over dream analysis in
    that its images are produced during a conscious state of mind, thus making them more
    clear and reproducible. The feeling tone is also quite specific, and ordinarily a person
    has little difficulty reproducing the vision or remembering the mood (Jung, 1937/1959).
    As a variation to active imagination, Jung sometimes asked patients who
    were so inclined to draw, paint, or express in some other nonverbal manner the
    progression of their fantasies. Jung relied on this technique during his own self-
    analysis, and many of these reproductions, rich in universal symbolism and often
    exhibiting the mandala, are scattered throughout his books. Man and His Symbols
    Carl Jung, the wise old man of Küsnacht. © Dmitri Kessel/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories134
    (1964), Word and Image (1979), Psychology and Alchemy (1952/1968), and Claire
    Dunne’s (2000) illustrated biography, Carl Jung: Wounded Healer of the Soul, are
    especially prolific sources for these drawings and photographs.
    In 1961, Jung wrote about his experiences with active imagination during his
    midlife confrontation with the unconscious:
    When I look back upon it all today and consider what happened to me during
    the period of my work on the fantasies, it seems as though a message had come
    to me with overwhelming force. There were things in the images which
    concerned not only myself but many others also. It was then that I ceased to
    belong to myself alone, ceased to have the right to do so. From then on, my life
    belonged to the generality. . . . It was then that I dedicated myself to service of
    the psyche: I loved it and hated it, but it was my greatest wealth. My delivering
    myself over to it, as it were, was the only way by which I could endure my
    existence and live it as fully as possible. (p. 192)
    Psychotherapy
    Jung (1931/1954b) identified four basic approaches to therapy, representing four devel-
    opmental stages in the history of psychotherapy. The first is confession of a pathogenic
    secret. This is the cathartic method practiced by Josef Breuer and his patient Anna O.
    For patients who merely have a need to share their secrets, catharsis is effective. The
    second stage involves interpretation, explanation, and elucidation. This approach, used
    by Freud, gives the patients insight into the causes of their neuroses, but may still leave
    them incapable of solving social problems. The third stage, therefore, is the approach
    adopted by Adler and includes the education of patients as social beings. Unfortunately,
    says Jung, this approach often leaves patients merely socially well adjusted.
    To go beyond these three approaches, Jung suggested a fourth stage, trans-
    formation. By transformation, he meant that the therapist must first be transformed
    into a healthy human being, preferably by undergoing psychotherapy. Only after
    transformation and an established philosophy of life is the therapist able to help
    patients move toward individuation, wholeness, or self-realization. This fourth
    stage is especially employed with patients who are in the second half of life and
    who are concerned with realization of the inner self, with moral and religious
    problems, and with finding a unifying philosophy of life (Jung, 1931/1954b).
    Jung was quite eclectic in his theory and practice of psychotherapy. His treat-
    ment varied according to the age, stage of development, and particular problem of the
    patient. About two thirds of Jung’s patients were in the second half of life, and a great
    many of them suffered from a loss of meaning, general aimlessness, and a fear of
    death. Jung attempted to help these patients find their own philosophical orientation.
    The ultimate purpose of Jungian therapy is to help neurotic patients be-
    come healthy and to encourage healthy people to work independently toward self-
    realization. Jung sought to achieve this purpose by using such techniques as dream
    analysis and active imagination to help patients discover personal and collective
    unconscious material and to balance these unconscious images with their conscious
    attitude (Jung, 1931/1954a).
    Although Jung encouraged patients to be independent, he admitted the impor-
    tance of transference, particularly during the first three stages of therapy. He

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 135
    regarded both positive and negative transference as a natural concomitant to patients’
    revelation of highly personal information. He thought it quite all right that a num-
    ber of male patients referred to him as “Mother Jung” and quite understandable that
    others saw him as God or savior. Jung also recognized the process of countertrans-
    ference, a term used to describe a therapist’s feelings toward the patient. Like
    transference, countertransference can be either a help or a hindrance to treatment,
    depending on whether it leads to a better relationship between doctor and patient,
    something that Jung felt was indispensable to successful psychotherapy.
    Because Jungian psychotherapy has many minor goals and a variety of tech-
    niques, no universal description of a person who has successfully completed ana-
    lytical treatment is possible. For the mature person, the goal may be to find
    meaning in life and strive toward achieving balance and wholeness. The self-
    realized person is able to assimilate much of the unconscious self into conscious-
    ness but, at the same time, remains fully aware of the potential dangers hidden in
    the far recess of the unconscious psyche. Jung once warned against digging too
    deeply in land not properly surveyed, comparing this practice to a person digging
    for an artesian well and running the risk of activating a volcano.
    Related Research
    Jung’s approach to personality was very influential in the early development of person-
    ality psychology. In recent times, however, its influence has waned, even though
    there are still a few institutions around the world dedicated to analytical psychology.
    Today, most research related to Jung focuses on his descriptions of personality types.
    The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Myers, 1962) is the most frequently used
    measure of Jung’s personality types. The MBTI adds a fifth and sixth function, Judg-
    ing and Perceiving, to Jung’s original typology, creating a total of 16 possible per-
    sonality types. Judging involves the preference to come to firm conclusions rather
    than staying open minded to new evidence (perceiving). This instrument is often used
    by school counselors to direct students toward rewarding avenues of study. For exam-
    ple, research has found that people high on the intuition and feeling dimensions are
    likely to find teaching rewarding (Willing, Guest, & Morford, 2001). More recently,
    researchers have extended work on the usefulness of Jungian personality types by
    exploring the role of the personality types in leadership style as well as in clergy and
    their congregation. Lastly, we take a critical look at the MBTI.
    Personality Type and Leadership
    The MBTI has been used extensively in organizational behavior research, specifi-
    cally related to leadership and managerial behaviors. Interestingly, some of this
    work suggests that the preference for thinking over feeling and for judging over
    perceiving (e.g., Gardner & Martinko, 1990) is characteristic of effective managers,
    who are commonly called upon to focus on achieving results through quick analy-
    sis of problems and confident implementation of decisions. Indeed, people who
    display the sorts of behaviors associated with the thinking and judging functions
    are commonly considered “leadership material” (Kirby, 1997), because these have
    almost become defining characteristics of what it means to lead.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories136
    A recent study of Finnish business students and managers (Jarlstrom &
    Valkealahti, 2010) used the MBTI to examine what is known as “person–job fit,”
    which is defined as the match between a person’s knowledge, skills, and abilities and
    job demands. As in previous studies, business students and managers shared prefer-
    ences for thinking and judging over feeling and perceiving. However, when the
    samples were compared with each other, an interesting trend appeared that runs
    contrary to the earlier research. Feeling types were overrepresented among business
    students compared to managers. The authors argue that their results suggest a new
    type profile is emerging in today’s business world, one characterized by qualities
    associated with Jung’s feeling function: encouragement of participation and consen-
    sus building, and compassionate placement of oneself in other people’s shoes during
    decision-making processes. Perhaps, argue Jarlstrom and Valkealahti (2010), manage-
    rial jobs are becoming more characterized by coordination of human resources than
    by decisiveness, efficiency, and implementation. If this is so, then new workplaces
    may increasingly demand and reward leaders who are expected to motivate teams of
    employees much as a coach does, a style of leading well suited to the feeling func-
    tion. Future research, following up on business students’ actual careers, will tell.
    Personality Type Among Clergy and Churchgoers
    A well-established empirical literature in the psychology of religion exploring Jungian
    personality types illuminates areas of church life in a variety of Christian denomina-
    tions. Studies have compared the personality profiles of clergymen and clergywomen,
    churchgoers and the general population. In addition to using the MBTI, researchers
    in this area also employ an instrument developed by Francis (2005) called the Francis
    Psychological Type Scale, specifically designed for completion within the context of
    a church service (with fewer forced-choice items than the MBTI). One study in this
    tradition examined the personality types of 3,715 Christian clergy in Australia,
    England, and New Zealand (Francis, Robbins, Kaldor, & Castle, 2009). Interestingly,
    results showed preferences for the sensing (versus intuiting) and judging (versus per-
    ceiving) functions among clergy in these countries. Recall that sensing is a preference
    to be concrete, down-to-earth, and rely on direct experience (versus interpreting what
    things mean, or intuiting). Judging involves a desire for planning, organizing, and
    getting closure versus being spontaneous and flexible and keeping an open mind to
    new information (perceiving). Further studies show a high proportion of sensing types
    among churchgoers (80%) (Francis, Robbins, Williams, & Williams, 2007).
    Powell, Robbins, and Francis (2012) explored the psychological type profiles
    of male and female lay church leaders and churchgoers in Australia. A total of 2,336
    individuals completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales, 845 of whom identi-
    fied themselves as laypersons serving in leadership roles in their churches. Lay
    church leaders are not professional clergy, but instead leaders who contribute on a
    voluntary basis to maintaining church communities. Whereas professional clergy
    may come and go, depending on denomination, lay leaders are often part of and
    shape the culture of their churches for far longer periods. The study showed fascinat-
    ing differences between and among female and male lay church leaders and church-
    goers. Among the 444 Australian female lay church leaders, there was a strong
    preference for sensing (75%) over intuition (25%), for feeling (66%) over thinking

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 137
    (34%), and for judging (83%) over perceiving (17%) functions, with no significant
    differences between introverted and extraverted attitudes. Indeed, Sensing-Judging
    (SJ) preference accounted for two out of every three female lay church leaders.
    Interestingly, the profiles of the 936 Australian female churchgoers were remarkably
    similar to these lay leaders, with again marked preferences for the SJ functions.
    The 401 male lay church leaders also displayed strong preferences for sens-
    ing (75%) over intuition (25%), and for judging (86%) over perceiving (14%).
    However, in contrast with their female lay leader counterparts, male lay leaders
    showed clear preferences for introversion (61%) over extraversion (39%) and for
    thinking (55%) over feeling (45%). Again, the SJ functions were highly repre-
    sented. And, again, the profiles of the 591 male churchgoers surveyed matched
    these male lay leaders’, with highly similar preferences for introversion, sensing,
    thinking, and judging.
    The authors drew a number of interesting conclusions from this study. First,
    the fact that the psychological type profiles of lay leaders and the congregations
    from which they are drawn are so similar presents both potential benefits and
    drawbacks. A benefit might be that lay leaders know and understand their congre-
    gations very well. A drawback may be that both congregations and lay leaders are
    out of step with the psychological types of the general community, as an earlier
    study found that both male and female church attenders show significantly higher
    preferences for sensing, feeling, and judging than the wider population (Robbins
    & Francis, 2011). As the authors write, “In principle, churches proclaim their
    invitation to worship to all psychological types. In practice, some psychological
    types appear more willing to respond” (p. 909).
    A second important conclusion from this work is the striking predominance
    of the Sensing-Judging profile among lay church leaders, which again may have
    its strengths and weaknesses. According to previous theorists of psychological type
    and pastoral characteristics, SJ leaders value formal, dignified, and predictable
    worship services (Oswald & Kroeger, 1988). This means that congregations led by
    such individuals will not undergo unnecessary and significant change, that a sense
    of loyalty and belonging will likely be fostered among their church attendees, and
    that procedures and policies of the church will be clear. On the other hand, areas
    of potential difficulty for SJ church leaders may be vulnerability to burnout, given
    their strict commitments to rules, procedures, and obligations, and this profile may
    cause disaffection among those in the congregation who question traditional church
    teachings or who find order and discipline stifling.
    Finally, this profile, which appears so strongly among lay church leaders,
    lies in contrast to the profiles of ordained professional clergy, where SJ preferences
    are seen in smaller percentages (31% of male clergy and 29% of female clergy)
    (Francis et al., 2007). The authors warn that professional clergymen and clergy-
    women, given their educations and likely participation in professional develop-
    ment, may wish to try new and exploratory teachings or practices in their churches,
    which may disgruntle long-standing SJ lay church leaders who prefer a more con-
    ventional and predictable church culture.
    This line of research applying psychological type theory to understand relation-
    ships among clergy, churchgoers, and the general public provides insight into the
    psychology of religion and helps illuminate differences in attitudes and values between

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories138
    people in different areas of church life and in different Christian denominations. In
    this way, the work may also have a direct impact on how clergy, lay clergy, and their
    congregations relate to one another and to their wider non-churchgoing communities.
    A Critical Look at the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
    Although the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator has been used for decades in career and
    couples counseling, among other areas, there have been some critical analyses of
    it both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical criticism mostly revolves
    around the debate of type versus trait. Most modern personality psychologists are
    convinced (and there is much empirical evidence to support them, see Chapters 13
    and 14 of this book) that personality traits are not either-or typologies or categories
    (e.g., Introversion or Extraversion), but rather they exist on a continuum with most
    people being in the middle rather than on one extreme end (Grant, 2013; Pittenger,
    2005). Personality is not so black and white as types would suggest. Note that this
    is currently a debate in clinical psychology as well, with a growing number of
    psychologists arguing against categorical diagnosis (e.g., someone is either schizo-
    phrenic or they are not). They argue that disorders are also on a continuum rather
    than being typologies or categories. Indeed, part of this debate is simply a disagree-
    ment between two groups who see personality differently (Lloyd, 2012). On the
    one side are clinicians and people in business who are more prone to seeing per-
    sonality as categories and on the other are experimentalists who are more prone to
    seeing personality traits on a continuum from a little to a lot.
    The empirical criticism stems primarily from whether typologies are consistent
    over time, that is, whether they have test-retest reliability. Here the argument is that
    one might receive an INTJ typology one month but an ESFP a few months later
    (Grant, 2013). If that is true, then how valid can it be since personality is consistent
    over long periods of time? To be fair, the evidence for reliability or consistency of
    types is mixed, with some studies supporting it (Capraro & Capraro, 2002) and oth-
    ers suggesting the test-retest reliability is questionable (Boyle, 1995; Grant, 2013).
    But even the Myers-Briggs Foundation reports that on retesting most people receive
    three of four same-type categories 75–90% of the time (Reliability and Validity, n.d.).
    Critics would see this as not very reliable since up to 25% of the people are receiv-
    ing a different score. The Foundation argues that these changes occur most often on
    just one dimension (not all four) and when someone is not strongly placed in one or
    the other typology to begin with. Of course, critics would argue this is the point to
    view traits on a continuum—most people are in the middle rather than on the ends.
    In the end, the MBTI does a good job of measuring Jung’s types and predict-
    ing career interests (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2004), but there are questions about the
    validity of placing people in categories and the extent to which one’s category or
    type scores change over short periods of time.
    Critique of Jung
    Carl Jung’s writings continue to fascinate students of humanity. Despite its subjec-
    tive and philosophical quality, Jungian psychology has attracted a wide audience of
    both professional and lay people. His study of religion and mythology may resonate
    with some readers but repel others. Jung, however, regarded himself as a scientist

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 139
    and insisted that his scientific study of religion, mythology, folklore, and philo-
    sophical fantasies did not make him a mystic any more than Freud’s study of sex
    made Freud a sexual pervert (Jung, 1975).
    Nevertheless, analytical psychology, like any theory, must be evaluated against
    the six criteria of a useful theory established in Chapter 1. First, a useful theory must
    generate testable hypotheses and descriptive research, and second, it must have the
    capacity for either verification or falsification. Unfortunately, Jung’s theory, like
    Freud’s, is nearly impossible to either verify or falsify. The collective unconscious,
    the core of Jung’s theory, remains a difficult concept to test empirically.
    Much of the evidence for the concepts of archetype and the collective uncon-
    scious has come from Jung’s own inner experiences, which he admittedly found
    difficult to communicate to others, so that acceptance of these concepts rests more
    on faith than on empirical evidence. Jung (1961) claimed that “archetypal state-
    ments are based upon instinctive preconditions and have nothing to do with reason;
    they are neither rationally grounded nor can they be banished by rational argument”
    (p. 353). Such a statement may be acceptable to the artist or the theologian, but it
    is not likely to win adherents among scientific researchers faced with the problems
    of designing studies and formulating hypotheses.
    On the other hand, that part of Jung’s theory concerned with classification
    and typology, that is, the functions and attitudes, can be studied and tested and has
    generated a moderate amount of research. Because the Myers-Briggs Type Indica-
    tor has yielded a great number of investigations, we give Jung’s theory a moderate
    rating on its ability to generate research.
    Third, a useful theory should organize observations into a meaningful frame-
    work. Analytical psychology is unique because it adds a new dimension to person-
    ality theory, namely, the collective unconscious. Those aspects of human
    personality dealing with the occult, the mysterious, and the parapsychological are
    not touched on by most other personality theories. Even though the collective
    unconscious is not the only possible explanation for these phenomena, and other
    concepts could be postulated to account for them, Jung is the only modern person-
    ality theorist to make a serious attempt to include such a broad scope of human
    activity within a single theoretical framework. For these reasons, we have given
    Jung’s theory a moderate rating on its ability to organize knowledge.
    A fourth criterion of a useful theory is its practicality. Does the theory aid
    therapists, teachers, parents, or others in solving everyday problems? The theory
    of psychological types or attitudes and the MBTI are used by many clinicians, but
    the usefulness of most analytical psychology is limited to those therapists who
    subscribe to basic Jungian tenets. The concept of a collective unconscious does not
    easily lend itself to empirical research, but it may have some usefulness in helping
    people understand cultural myths and adjust to life’s traumas. Overall, however,
    we can give Jung’s theory only a low rating in practicality.
    Is Jung’s theory of personality internally consistent? Does it possess a set of
    operationally defined terms? The first question receives a qualified affirmative
    answer; the second, a definite negative one. Jung generally used the same terms
    consistently, but he often employed several terms to describe the same concept.
    The words regression and introverted are so closely related that they can be said
    to describe the same process. This is also true of progression and extraverted, and
    the list could be expanded to include several other terms such as individuation and

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories140
    self-realization, which also are not clearly differentiated. Jung’s language is often
    arcane, and many of his terms are not adequately defined. As for operational
    definitions, Jung, like other early personality theorists, did not define terms opera-
    tionally. Therefore, we rate his theory as low on internal consistency.
    The final criterion of a useful theory is parsimony. Jung’s psychology is not
    simple, but neither is human personality. However, because it is more cumbersome
    than necessary, we can give it only a low rating on parsimony. Jung’s proclivity
    for searching for data from a variety of disciplines and his willingness to explore
    his own unconscious, even beneath the personal level, contribute to the great com-
    plexities and the broad scope of his theory. The law of parsimony states, “When
    two theories are equally useful, the simpler one is preferred.” In fact, of course, no
    two are ever equal, but Jung’s theory, while adding a dimension to human person-
    ality not greatly dealt with by others, is probably more complex than necessary.
    Concept of Humanity
    Jung saw humans as complex beings with many opposing poles. His view
    of humanity was neither pessimistic nor optimistic, neither deterministic nor
    purposive. To him, people are motivated partly by conscious thoughts, partly
    by images from their personal unconscious, and partly by latent memory
    traces inherited from their ancestral past. Their motivation comes from both
    causal and teleological factors.
    The complex makeup of humans invalidates any simple or one-sided
    description. According to Jung, each person is a composition of opposing
    forces. No one is completely introverted or totally extraverted; all male or
    all female; solely a thinking, feeling, sensing, or intuitive person; and no one
    proceeds invariably in the direction of either progression or regression.
    The persona is but a fraction of an individual. What one wishes to show
    others is usually only the socially acceptable side of personality. Every per-
    son has a dark side, a shadow, and most try to conceal it from both society
    and themselves. In addition, each man possesses an anima and every
    woman an animus.
    The various complexes and archetypes cast their spell over people and
    are responsible for many of their words and actions and most of their dreams
    and fantasies. Although people are not masters in their own houses, neither
    are they completely dominated by forces beyond their control. People have
    some limited capacity to determine their lives. Through strong will and with
    great courage, they can explore the hidden recesses of their psyche. They
    can recognize their shadow as their own, become partially conscious of their
    feminine or masculine side, and cultivate more than a single function. This
    process, which Jung called individuation or self-realization, is not easy and
    demands more fortitude than most people can muster. Ordinarily, a person
    who has achieved self-realization has reached middle life and has lived
    successfully through the stages of childhood and youth. During middle age,

    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology 141
    they must be willing to set aside the goals and behaviors of youth and adopt
    a new style appropriate to their stage of psychic development.
    Even after people have achieved individuation, made an acquaintance
    with their inner world, and brought the various opposing forces into balance,
    they remain under the influence of an impersonal collective unconscious that
    controls many of their prejudices, interests, fears, dreams, and creative activities.
    On the dimension of biological versus social aspects of personality,
    Jung’s theory leans strongly in the direction of biology. The collective uncon-
    scious, which is responsible for so many actions, is part of our biological
    inheritance. Except for the therapeutic potential of the doctor-patient relation-
    ship, Jung had little to say about differential effects of specific social prac-
    tices. In fact, in his studies of various cultures, he found the differences to
    be superficial, the similarities profound. Thus, analytical psychology can also
    be rated high on similarities among people and low on individual differences.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ The personal unconscious is formed by the repressed experiences of one
    particular individual and is the reservoir of the complexes.
    ∙ Humans inherit a collective unconscious that helps shape many of their
    attitudes, behaviors, and dreams.
    ∙ Archetypes are contents of the collective unconscious. Typical archetypes
    include persona, shadow, anima, animus, great mother, wise old man,
    hero, and self.
    ∙ The persona represents the side of personality that people show to the
    rest of the world. Psychologically healthy people recognize their persona
    but do not mistake it for the whole of personality.
    ∙ The anima is the feminine side of men and is responsible for many of
    their irrational moods and feelings.
    ∙ The animus, the masculine side of women, is responsible for irrational
    thinking and illogical opinions in women.
    ∙ The great mother is the archetype of fertility and destruction.
    ∙ The wise old man archetype is the intelligent but deceptive voice of
    accumulated experience.
    ∙ The hero is the unconscious image of a person who conquers an evil foe
    but who also has a tragic flaw.
    ∙ The self is the archetype of completeness, wholeness, and perfection.
    ∙ The two attitudes of introversion and extraversion can combine with any
    one or more of the four functions—thinking, feeling, sensation, and
    intuition—to produce eight basic types.
    ∙ A healthy middle life and old age depend on proper solutions to the
    problems of childhood and youth.
    ∙ Jungian therapists use dream analysis and active imagination to discover
    the contents of patients’ collective unconscious.

    142
    C H A P T E R 5
    Klein © Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone/
    Getty Images
    Klein: Object
    Relations Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Object Relations Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Melanie Klein
    ⬥ Introduction to Object Relations Theory
    ⬥ Psychic Life of the Infant
    Phantasies
    Objects
    ⬥ Positions
    Paranoid-Schizoid Position
    Depressive Position
    ⬥ Psychic Defense Mechanisms
    Introjection
    Projection
    Splitting
    Projective Identification
    ⬥ Internalizations
    Ego
    Superego
    Oedipus Complex
    Female Oedipal Development
    Male Oedipal Development
    ⬥ Later Views on Object Relations
    Margaret Mahler’s View
    Heinz Kohut’s View
    John Bowlby’s Attachment Theory
    Mary Ainsworth and the Strange Situation
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Childhood Trauma and Adult Object Relations
    Attachment Theory and Adult Relationships
    ⬥ Critique of Object Relations Theory
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 143
    Melanie Klein, the woman who developed a theory that emphasized the nurtur-ing and loving relationship between parent and child, had neither a nurturant
    nor a loving relationship to her own daughter Melitta. The rift between mother and
    daughter began early. Melitta was the oldest of three children born to parents who
    did not particularly like one another. When Melitta was 15, her parents separated,
    and Melitta blamed her mother for this separation and for the divorce that followed.
    As Melitta matured, her relationship with her mother became more acrimonious.
    After Melitta received a medical degree, underwent a personal analysis, and
    presented scholarly papers to the British Psycho-Analytical Society, she was offi-
    cially a member of that society, professionally equal to her mother.
    Her analyst, Edward Glover, was a bitter rival of Melanie Klein. Glover, who
    encouraged Melitta’s independence, was at least indirectly responsible for Melitta’s
    virulent attacks on her mother. The animosity between mother and daughter became
    even more intense when Melitta married Walter Schmideberg, another analyst who
    strongly opposed Klein and who openly supported Anna Freud, Klein’s most bitter
    rival.
    Despite being a full member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, Melitta
    Schmideberg felt that her mother saw her as an appendage, not a colleague. In a
    strongly worded letter to her mother in the summer of 1934, Melitta wrote:
    I hope you will . . . also allow me to give you some advice. . . . I am very
    different from you. I already told you years ago that nothing causes a worse
    reaction in me than trying to force feelings into me—it is the surest way to kill
    all feelings. . . . I am now grown up and must be independent. I have my own
    life, my husband. (Quoted in Grosskurth, 1986, p. 199.)
    Melitta went on to say that she would no longer relate to her mother in the neurotic
    manner of her younger years. She now had a shared profession with her mother
    and insisted that she be treated as an equal.
    The story of Melanie Klein and her daughter takes on a new perspective in
    light of the emphasis that object relations theory places on the importance of the
    mother-child relationship.
    Overview of Object Relations Theory
    The object relations theory of Melanie Klein was built on careful observations
    of young children. In contrast to Freud, who emphasized the first 4 to 6 years of
    life, Klein stressed the importance of the first 4 to 6 months after birth. She insisted
    that the infant’s drives (hunger, sex, and so forth) are directed to an object—a
    breast, a penis, a vagina, and so on. According to Klein, the child’s relation to the
    breast is fundamental and serves as a prototype for later relations to whole objects,
    such as mother and father. The very early tendency of infants to relate to partial
    objects gives their experiences an unrealistic or fantasy-like quality that affects all
    later interpersonal relations. Thus, Klein’s ideas tend to shift the focus of psycho-
    analytic theory from organically based stages of development to the role of early
    fantasy in the formation of interpersonal relationships.
    In addition to Klein, other theorists have speculated on the importance of a
    child’s early experiences with the mother. Margaret Mahler believed that children’s

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories144
    sense of identity rests on a three-step relationship with their mother. First, infants
    have basic needs cared for by their mother; next, they develop a safe symbiotic
    relationship with an all-powerful mother; and finally, they emerge from their moth-
    er’s protective circle and establish their separate individuality. Heinz Kohut theo-
    rized that children develop a sense of self during early infancy when parents and
    others treat them as if they had an individualized sense of identity. John Bowlby
    investigated infants’ attachment to their mother as well as the negative conse-
    quences of being separated from their mother. Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues
    developed a technique for measuring the type of attachment style an infant devel-
    ops toward its caregiver.
    Biography of Melanie Klein
    Melanie Reizes Klein was born March 30, 1882, in Vienna, Austria. The youngest
    of four children born to Dr. Moriz Reizes and his second wife, Libussa Deutsch
    Reizes, Klein believed that her birth was unplanned—a belief that led to feelings
    of being rejected by her parents. She felt especially distant to her father, who
    favored his oldest daughter, Emilie (Sayers, 1991). By the time Melanie was born,
    her father had long since rebelled against his early Orthodox Jewish training and
    had ceased to practice any religion. As a consequence, Klein grew up in a family
    that was neither proreligious nor antireligious.
    During her childhood Klein observed both parents working at jobs they did
    not enjoy. Her father was a physician who struggled to make a living in medicine
    and eventually was relegated to working as a dental assistant. Her mother ran a
    shop selling plants and reptiles, a difficult, humiliating, and fearful job for someone
    who abhorred snakes (H. Segal, 1979). Despite her father’s meager income as a
    doctor, Klein aspired to become a physician.
    Klein’s early relationships were either unhealthy or ended in tragedy. She
    felt neglected by her elderly father, whom she saw as cold and distant, and although
    she loved and idolized her mother, she felt suffocated by her. Klein had a special
    fondness for her older sister Sidonie, who was 4 years older and who taught
    Melanie arithmetic and reading. Unfortunately, when Melanie was 4 years old,
    Sidonie died. In later years, Klein confessed that she never got over grieving for
    Sidonie (H. Segal, 1992). After her sister’s death, Klein became deeply attached
    to her only brother, Emmanuel, who was nearly 5 years older and who became her
    close confidant. She idolized her brother, and this infatuation may have contributed
    to her later difficulties in relating to men. Like Sidonie earlier, Emmanuel tutored
    Melanie, and his excellent instructions helped her pass the entrance examinations
    of a reputable preparatory school (Petot, 1990).
    When Klein was 18, her father died, but a greater tragedy occurred 2 years
    later when her beloved brother, Emmanuel, died. Emmanuel’s death left Klein dev-
    astated. While still in mourning over her brother’s death, she married Arthur Klein,
    an engineer who had been Emmanuel’s close friend. Melanie believed that her
    marriage at age 21 prevented her from becoming a physician, and for the rest of
    her life, she regretted that she had not reached that goal (Grosskurth, 1986).
    Unfortunately, Klein did not have a happy marriage; she dreaded sex and
    abhorred pregnancy (Grosskurth, 1986). Nevertheless, her marriage to Arthur

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 145
    produced three children: Melitta, born in 1904; Hans, born in 1907; and Erich,
    born in 1914. In 1909, the Kleins moved to Budapest, where Arthur had been
    transferred. There, Klein met Sandor Ferenczi, a member of Freud’s inner circle
    and the person who introduced her into the world of psychoanalysis. When her
    mother died in 1914, Klein became depressed and entered analysis with Ferenczi,
    an experience that served as a turning point in her life. That same year she read
    Freud’s On Dreams (1901/1953) “and realized immediately that was what I was
    aiming at, at least during those years when I was so very keen to find out what
    would satisfy me intellectually and emotionally” (quoted in Grosskurth, 1986, p.
    69). At about the same time that she discovered Freud, her youngest child, Erich,
    was born. Klein was deeply taken by psychoanalysis and trained her son according
    to Freudian principles. As part of this training, she began to psychoanalyze Erich
    from the time he was very young. In addition, she also attempted to analyze Melitta
    and Hans, both of whom eventually went to other analysts. Melitta, who became
    a psychoanalyst, was analyzed by Karen Horney (see Chapter 6) as well as by
    others (Grosskurth, 1986). An interesting parallel between Horney and Klein is that
    Klein later analyzed Horney’s two youngest daughters when they were 12 and 9 years
    old. (Horney’s oldest daughter was 14 and refused to be analyzed.) Unlike Melitta’s
    voluntary analysis by Horney, the two Horney children were compelled to attend
    analytic sessions, not for treatment of any neurotic disorder but as a preventive
    measure (Quinn, 1987).
    Klein separated from her husband in 1919 but did not obtain a divorce for
    several years. After the separation, she established a psychoanalytic practice in
    Berlin and made her first contributions to the psychoanalytic literature with a
    paper dealing with her analysis of Erich, who was not identified as her son until
    long after Klein’s death (Grosskurth, 1998). Not completely satisfied with her
    own analysis by Ferenczi, she ended the relationship and began an analysis with
    Karl Abraham, another member of Freud’s inner circle. After only 14 months,
    however, Klein experienced another tragedy when Abraham died. At this point
    of her life, Klein decided to begin a self-analysis, one that continued for the
    remainder of her life. Before 1919, psychoanalysts, including Freud, based their
    theories of child development on their therapeutic work with adults. Freud’s
    only case study of a child was Little Hans, a boy whom he saw as a patient
    only once. Melanie Klein changed that situation by psychoanalyzing children
    directly. Her work with very young children, including her own, convinced her
    that children internalize both positive and negative feelings toward their mother
    and that they develop a superego much earlier than Freud had believed. Her
    slight divergence from standard psychoanalytic theory brought much criticism
    from her colleagues in Berlin, causing her to feel increasingly uncomfortable in
    that city. Then, in 1926, Ernest Jones invited her to London to analyze his
    children and to deliver a series of lectures on child analysis. These lectures later
    resulted in her first book, The Psycho-Analysis of Children (Klein, 1932). In
    1927, she took up permanent residency in England, remaining there until her
    death on September 22, 1960. On the day of her memorial service, her daughter
    Melitta delivered a final posthumous insult by giving a professional lecture
    wearing flamboyant red boots, which scandalized many in her audience
    (Grosskurth, 1986).

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories146
    Klein’s years in London were marked by division and controversy. Although
    she continued to regard herself as a Freudian, neither Freud nor his daughter Anna
    accepted her emphasis on the importance of very early childhood or her analytic
    technique with children. Her differences with Anna Freud began while the Freuds
    were still living in Vienna, but they climaxed after Anna moved with her father
    and mother to London in 1938. Before the arrival of Anna Freud, the English
    school of psychoanalysis was steadily becoming the “Kleinian School,” and Klein’s
    battles were limited mostly to those with her daughter, Melitta, and these battles
    were both fierce and personal.
    In 1934, Klein’s older son, Hans, was killed in a fall. Melitta, who had
    recently moved to London with her psychoanalyst husband, Walter Schmideberg,
    maintained that her brother had committed suicide, and she blamed her mother for
    his death. During that same year, Melitta began an analysis with Edward Glover,
    one of Klein’s rivals in the British Society. Klein and her daughter then became
    even more personally estranged and professionally antagonistic, and Melitta main-
    tained her animosity even after her mother’s death.
    Although Melitta Schmideberg was not a supporter of Anna Freud, her per-
    sistent antagonism toward Klein increased the difficulties of Klein’s struggle with
    Anna Freud, who never recognized the possibility of analyzing young children
    (King & Steiner, 1991; Mitchell & Black, 1995). The friction between Klein and
    Anna Freud never abated, with each side claiming to be more “Freudian” than the
    other (Hughes, 1989). Finally, in 1946 the British Society accepted three training
    procedures—the traditional one of Melanie Klein, the one advocated by Anna
    Freud, and a Middle Group that accepted neither training school but was more
    eclectic in its approach. By such a division, the British Society remained intact,
    albeit with an uneasy alliance.
    Introduction to Object Relations Theory
    Object relations theory is an offspring of Freud’s instinct theory, but it differs from
    its ancestor in at least three general ways. First, object relations theory places less
    emphasis on biologically based drives and more importance on consistent patterns
    of interpersonal relationships. Second, as opposed to Freud’s rather paternalistic
    theory that emphasizes the power and control of the father, object relations theory
    tends to be more maternal, stressing the intimacy and nurturing of the mother.
    Third, object relations theorists generally see human contact and relatedness—not
    sexual pleasure—as the prime motive of human behavior.
    More specifically, however, the concept of object relations has many mean-
    ings, just as there are many object relations theorists. This chapter concentrates
    primarily on Melanie Klein’s work, but it also briefly discusses the theories of
    Margaret S. Mahler, Heinz Kohut, John Bowlby, and Mary Ainsworth. In general,
    Mahler’s work was concerned with the infant’s struggle to gain autonomy and a
    sense of self; Kohut’s, with the formation of the self; Bowlby’s, with the stages
    of separation anxiety; and Ainsworth’s, with styles of attachment.
    If Klein is the mother of object relations theory, then Freud himself is the
    father. Recall from Chapter 2 that Freud (1915/1957a) believed instincts or drives
    have an impetus, a source, an aim, and an object, with the latter two having the

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 147
    greater psychological significance. Although different drives may seem to have
    separate aims, their underlying aim is always the same—to reduce tension: that is,
    to achieve pleasure. In Freudian terms, the object of the drive is any person, part
    of a person, or thing through which the aim is satisfied. Klein and other object
    relations theorists begin with this basic assumption of Freud and then speculate on
    how the infant’s real or fantasized early relations with the mother or the breast
    become a model for all later interpersonal relationships. Adult relationships, there-
    fore, are not always what they seem. An important portion of any relationship is
    the internal psychic representations of early significant objects, such as the moth-
    er’s breast or the father’s penis, that have been introjected, or taken into the infant’s
    psychic structure, and then projected onto one’s partner. These internal pictures
    are not accurate representations of the other person but are remnants of each per-
    son’s earlier experiences.
    Although Klein continued to regard herself as a Freudian, she extended psy-
    choanalytic theory beyond the boundaries set by Freud. For his part, Freud chose
    mostly to ignore Klein. When pressed for an opinion on her work, Freud had little
    to say. For example, in 1925 when Ernest Jones wrote to him praising Klein’s
    “valuable work” with childhood analysis and play therapy, Freud simply replied
    that “Melanie Klein’s work has aroused considerable doubt and controversy here
    in Vienna” (Steiner, 1985, p. 30).
    Psychic Life of the Infant
    Whereas Freud emphasized the first few years of life, Klein stressed the importance
    of the first 4 or 6 months. To her, infants do not begin life with a blank slate but
    with an inherited predisposition to reduce the anxiety they experience as a result
    of the conflict produced by the forces of the life instinct and the power of the death
    instinct. The infant’s innate readiness to act or react presupposes the existence of
    phylogenetic endowment, a concept that Freud also accepted.
    Phantasies
    One of Klein’s basic assumptions is that the infant, even at birth, possesses an
    active phantasy life. These phantasies are psychic representations of unconscious
    id instincts; they should not be confused with the conscious fantasies of older
    children and adults. In fact, Klein intentionally spelled phantasy this way to make
    it distinguishable. When Klein (1932) wrote of the dynamic phantasy life of infants,
    she did not suggest that neonates could put thoughts into words. She simply meant
    that they possess unconscious images of “good” and “bad.” For example, a full
    stomach is good; an empty one is bad. Thus, Klein would say that infants who fall
    asleep while sucking on their fingers are phantasizing about having their mother’s
    good breast inside themselves. Similarly, hungry infants who cry and kick their
    legs are phantasizing that they are kicking or destroying the bad breast.
    As the infant matures, unconscious phantasies connected with the breast con-
    tinue to exert an impact on psychic life, but newer ones emerge as well. These later
    unconscious phantasies are shaped by both reality and by inherited predispositions.
    One of these phantasies involves the Oedipus complex, or the child’s wish to destroy

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories148
    one parent and sexually possess the other. (Klein’s notion of the Oedipus complex
    is discussed more fully in the section titled Internalizations.) Because these phantasies
    are unconscious, they can be contradictory. For example, a little boy can phantasize
    both beating his mother and having babies with her. Such phantasies spring partly
    from the boy’s experiences with his mother and partly from universal predisposi-
    tions to destroy the bad breast and to incorporate the good one.
    Objects
    Klein agreed with Freud that humans have innate drives or instincts, including a
    death instinct. Drives, of course, must have some object. Thus, the hunger drive
    has the good breast as its object, the sex drive has a sexual organ as its object,
    and so on. Klein (1948) believed that from early infancy children relate to these
    external objects, both in fantasy and in reality. The earliest object relations are with
    the mother’s breast, but “very soon interest develops in the face and in the hands
    which attend to his needs and gratify them” (Klein, 1991, p. 757). In their active
    fantasy, infants introject, or take into their psychic structure, these external objects,
    including their father’s penis, their mother’s hands and face, and other body parts.
    Introjected objects are more than internal thoughts about external objects; they are
    fantasies of internalizing the object in concrete and physical terms. For example,
    children who have introjected their mother believe that she is constantly inside
    their own body. Klein’s notion of internal objects suggests that these objects have
    a power of their own, comparable to Freud’s concept of a superego, which assumes
    that the father’s or mother’s conscience is carried within the child.
    Positions
    Klein (1946) saw human infants as constantly engaging in a basic conflict
    between the life instinct and the death instinct, that is, between good and bad,
    love and hate, creativity and destruction. As the ego moves toward integration
    and away from disintegration, infants naturally prefer gratifying sensations over
    frustrating ones.
    In their attempt to deal with this dichotomy of good and bad feelings, infants
    organize their experiences into positions, or ways of dealing with both internal
    and external objects. Klein chose the term “position” rather than “stage of develop-
    ment” to indicate that positions alternate back and forth; they are not periods of
    time or phases of development through which a person passes. Although she used
    psychiatric or pathological labels, Klein intended these positions to represent nor-
    mal social growth and development. The two basic positions are the paranoid-
    schizoid position and the depressive position.
    Paranoid-Schizoid Position
    During the earliest months of life, an infant comes into contact with both the good
    breast and the bad breast. These alternating experiences of gratification and frustra-
    tion threaten the very existence of the infant’s vulnerable ego. The infant desires

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 149
    to control the breast by devouring and harboring it. At the same time, the infant’s
    innate destructive urges create fantasies of damaging the breast by biting, tearing,
    or annihilating it. In order to tolerate both these feelings toward the same object
    at the same time, the ego splits itself, retaining parts of its life and death instincts
    while deflecting parts of both instincts onto the breast. Now, rather than fearing
    its own death instinct, the infant fears the persecutory breast. But the infant also
    has a relationship with the ideal breast, which provides love, comfort, and grati-
    fication. The infant desires to keep the ideal breast inside itself as a protection
    against annihilation by persecutors. To control the good breast and to fight off its
    persecutors, the infant adopts what Klein (1946) called the paranoid-schizoid
    position, a way of organizing experiences that includes both paranoid feelings of
    being persecuted and a splitting of internal and external objects into the good and
    the bad.
    According to Klein, infants develop the paranoid-schizoid position during the
    first 3 or 4 months of life, during which time the ego’s perception of the external
    world is subjective and fantastic rather than objective and real. Thus, the persecu-
    tory feelings are considered to be paranoid; that is, they are not based on any real
    or immediate danger from the outside world. The child must keep the good breast
    and bad breast separate, because to confuse them would be to risk annihilating the
    good breast and losing it as a safe harbor. In the young child’s schizoid world,
    rage and destructive feelings are directed toward the bad breast, while feelings of
    love and comfort are associated with the good breast.
    Infants, of course, do not use language to identify the good and bad
    breast. Rather, they have a biological predisposition to attach a positive value
    to nourishment and the life instinct and to assign a negative value to hunger
    and the death instinct. This preverbal splitting of the world into good and bad
    serves as a prototype for the subsequent development of ambivalent feelings
    toward a single person. For example, Klein (1946) compared the infantile
    paranoid-schizoid position to transference feelings that therapy patients often
    develop toward their therapist.
    Under pressure of ambivalence, conflict and guilt, the patient often splits the
    figure of the analyst, then the analyst may at certain moments be loved, at other
    moments hated. Or the analyst may be split in such a way that he remains the
    good (or bad) figure while someone else becomes the opposite figure. (p. 19)
    Ambivalent feelings, of course, are not limited to therapy situations. Most
    people have both positive and negative feelings toward their loved ones. Con-
    scious ambivalence, however, does not capture the essence of the paranoid-
    schizoid position. When adults adopt the paranoid-schizoid position, they do so
    in a primitive, unconscious fashion. As Ogden (1990) pointed out, they may
    experience themselves as a passive object rather than an active subject. They
    are likely to say “He’s dangerous” instead of saying “I am aware that he is
    dangerous to me.” Other people may project their unconscious paranoid feelings
    onto others as a means of avoiding their own destruction by the malevolent
    breast. Still others may project their unconscious positive feelings onto another
    person and see that person as being perfect while viewing themselves as empty
    or worthless.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories150
    Depressive Position
    Beginning at about the 5th or 6th month, an infant begins to view external objects
    as whole and to see that good and bad can exist in the same person. At that time,
    the infant develops a more realistic picture of the mother and recognizes that she
    is an independent person who can be both good and bad. Also, the ego is begin-
    ning to mature to the point at which it can tolerate some of its own destructive
    feelings rather than projecting them outward. However, the infant also realizes that
    the mother might go away and be lost forever. Fearing the possible loss of the
    mother, the infant desires to protect her and keep her from the dangers of its own
    destructive forces, those cannibalistic impulses that had previously been projected
    onto her. But the infant’s ego is mature enough to realize that it lacks the capacity
    to protect the mother, and thus the infant experiences guilt for its previous destruc-
    tive urges toward the mother. The feelings of anxiety over losing a loved object
    coupled with a sense of guilt for wanting to destroy that object constitute what
    Klein called the depressive position.
    Children in the depressive position recognize that the loved object and the
    hated object are now one and the same. They reproach themselves for their previ-
    ous destructive urges toward their mother and desire to make reparation for these
    attacks. Because children see their mother as whole and also as being endangered,
    they are able to feel empathy for her, a quality that will be beneficial in their future
    interpersonal relations.
    The depressive position is resolved when children fantasize that they have
    made reparation for their previous transgressions and when they recognize that
    their mother will not go away permanently but will return after each departure.
    When the depressive position is resolved, children close the split between the good
    and the bad mother. They are able not only to experience love from their mother,
    but also to display their own love for her. However, an incomplete resolution of
    the depressive position can result in lack of trust, morbid mourning at the loss of
    a loved one, and a variety of other psychic disorders.
    Psychic Defense Mechanisms
    Klein (1955) suggested that, from very early infancy, children adopt several psy-
    chic defense mechanisms to protect their ego against the anxiety aroused by their
    own destructive fantasies. These intense destructive feelings originate with oral-
    sadistic anxieties concerning the breast—the dreaded, destructive breast on the one
    hand and the satisfying, helpful breast on the other. To control these anxieties,
    infants use several psychic defense mechanisms, such as introjection, projection,
    splitting, and projective identification.
    Introjection
    By introjection, Klein simply meant that infants fantasize taking into their body
    those perceptions and experiences that they have had with the external object, orig-
    inally the mother’s breast. Introjection begins with an infant’s first feeding, when
    there is an attempt to incorporate the mother’s breast into the infant’s body.

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 151
    Ordinarily, the infant tries to introject good objects, to take them inside itself as a
    protection against anxiety. However, sometimes the infant introjects bad objects,
    such as the bad breast or the bad penis, in order to gain control over them. When
    dangerous objects are introjected, they become internal persecutors, capable of ter-
    rifying the infant and leaving frightening residues that may be expressed in dreams
    or in an interest in fairy tales such as “The Big Bad Wolf” or “Snow White and
    the Seven Dwarfs.”
    Introjected objects are not accurate representations of the real objects but are
    colored by children’s fantasies. For example, infants will fantasize that their mother
    is constantly present; that is, they feel that their mother is always inside their body.
    The real mother, of course, is not perpetually present, but infants nevertheless
    devour her in fantasy so that she becomes a constant internal object.
    Projection
    Just as infants use introjection to take in both good and bad objects, they use
    projection to get rid of them. Projection is the fantasy that one’s own feelings and
    impulses actually reside in another person and not within one’s body. By project-
    ing unmanageable destructive impulses onto external objects, infants alleviate the
    unbearable anxiety of being destroyed by dangerous internal forces (Klein, 1935).
    Children project both bad and good images onto external objects, especially
    their parents. For example, a young boy who desires to castrate his father may
    instead project these castration fantasies onto his father, thus turning his castration
    wishes around and blaming his father for wanting to castrate him. Similarly, a
    young girl might fantasize devouring her mother but projects that fantasy onto her
    mother, who she fears will retaliate by persecuting her.
    People can also project good impulses. For example, infants who feel good
    about their mother’s nurturing breast will attribute their own feelings of goodness
    onto the breast and imagine that the breast is good. Adults sometimes project their
    own feelings of love onto another person and become convinced that the other
    person loves them. Projection thus allows people to believe that their own subjec-
    tive opinions are true.
    Splitting
    Infants can only manage the good and bad aspects of themselves and of external
    objects by splitting them, that is, by keeping apart incompatible impulses. In order
    to separate bad and good objects, the ego must itself be split. Thus, infants develop
    a picture of both the “good me” and the “bad me” that enables them to deal with
    both pleasurable and destructive impulses toward external objects.
    Splitting can have either a positive or a negative effect on the child. If it is
    not extreme and rigid, it can be a positive and useful mechanism not only for
    infants but also for adults. It enables people to see both positive and negative
    aspects of themselves, to evaluate their behavior as good or bad, and to differenti-
    ate between likable and unlikable acquaintances. On the other hand, excessive and
    inflexible splitting can lead to pathological repression. For instance, if children’s
    egos are too rigid to be split into good me and bad me, then they cannot introject
    bad experiences into the good ego. When children cannot accept their own bad

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories152
    behavior, they must then deal with destructive and terrifying impulses in the only
    way they can—by repressing them.
    Projective Identification
    A fourth means of reducing anxiety is projective identification, a psychic defense
    mechanism in which infants split off unacceptable parts of themselves, project them
    into another object, and finally introject them back into themselves in a changed or
    distorted form. By taking the object back into themselves, infants feel that they have
    become like that object; that is, they identify with that object. For example, infants
    typically split off parts of their destructive impulse and project them into the bad,
    frustrating breast. Next, they identify with the breast by introjecting it, a process
    that permits them to gain control over the dreaded and wonderful breast.
    Projective identification exerts a powerful influence on adult interpersonal
    relations. Unlike simple projection, which can exist wholly in phantasy, projective
    identification exists only in the world of real interpersonal relationships. For exam-
    ple, a husband with strong but unwanted tendencies to dominate others will project
    those feelings into his wife, whom he then sees as domineering. The man subtly
    tries to get his wife to become domineering. He behaves with excessive submis-
    siveness in an attempt to force his wife to display the very tendencies that he has
    deposited in her.
    Internalizations
    When object relations theorists speak of internalizations, they mean that the person
    takes in (introjects) aspects of the external world and then organizes those introjec-
    tions into a psychologically meaningful framework. In Kleinian theory, three impor-
    tant internalizations are the ego, the superego, and the Oedipus complex.
    Ego
    Klein (1930, 1946) believed that the ego, or one’s sense of self, reaches maturity
    at a much earlier stage than Freud had assumed. Although Freud hypothesized that
    the ego exists at birth, he did not attribute complex psychic functions to it until
    about the 3rd or 4th year. To Freud, the young child is dominated by the id. Klein,
    however, largely ignored the id and based her theory on the ego’s early ability to
    sense both destructive and loving forces and to manage them through splitting,
    projection, and introjection.
    Klein (1959) believed that although the ego is mostly unorganized at birth,
    it nevertheless is strong enough to feel anxiety, to use defense mechanisms, and
    to form early object relations in both phantasy and reality. The ego begins to evolve
    with the infant’s first experience with feeding, when the good breast fills the infant
    not only with milk but with love and security. But the infant also experiences the
    bad breast—the one that is not present or does not give milk, love, or security.
    The infant introjects both the good breast and the bad breast, and these images
    provide a focal point for further expansion of the ego. All experiences, even those
    not connected with feeding, are evaluated by the ego in terms of how they relate

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 153
    to the good breast and the bad breast. For example, when the ego experiences the
    good breast, it expects similar good experiences with other objects, such as its own
    fingers, a pacifier, or the father. Thus, the infant’s first object relation (the breast)
    becomes the prototype not only for the ego’s future development but for the indi-
    vidual’s later interpersonal relations.
    However, before a unified ego can emerge, it must first become split. Klein
    assumed that infants innately strive for integration, but at the same time, they are
    forced to deal with the opposing forces of life and death, as reflected in their
    experience with the good breast and the bad breast. To avoid disintegration, the
    newly emerging ego must split itself into the good me and the bad me. The good
    me exists when infants are being enriched with milk and love; the bad me is expe-
    rienced when they do not receive milk and love. This dual image of self allows
    them to manage the good and bad aspects of external objects. As infants mature,
    their perceptions become more realistic, they no longer see the world in terms of
    partial objects, and their egos become more integrated.
    Superego
    Klein’s picture of the superego differs from Freud’s in at least three important
    respects. First, it emerges much earlier in life; second, it is not an outgrowth of
    the Oedipus complex; and third, it is much more harsh and cruel. Klein (1933)
    arrived at these differences through her analysis of young children, an experience
    Freud did not have.
    There could be no doubt that a super-ego had been in full operation for some
    time in my small patients of between two-and-three-quarters and four years of
    age, whereas according to the accepted [Freudian] view the super-ego would not
    begin to be activated until the Oedipus complex had died down—i.e. until about
    the fifth year of life. Furthermore, my data showed that this early super-ego was
    immeasurably harsher and more cruel than that of the older child or adult, and
    that it literally crushed down the feeble ego of the small child. (p. 267)
    Recall that Freud conceptualized the superego as consisting of two subsys-
    tems: an ego-ideal that produces inferiority feelings and a conscience that results
    in guilt feelings. Klein would concur that the more mature superego produces
    feelings of inferiority and guilt, but her analysis of young children led her to
    believe that the early superego produces not guilt but terror.
    To Klein, young children fear being devoured, cut up, and torn into
    pieces—fears that are greatly out of proportion to any realistic dangers. Why
    are the children’s superegos so drastically removed from any actual threats by
    their parents? Klein (1933) suggested that the answer resides with the infant’s
    own destructive instinct, which is experienced as anxiety. To manage this anx-
    iety, the child’s ego mobilizes libido (life instinct) against the death instinct.
    However, the life and death instincts cannot be completely separated, so the ego
    is forced to defend itself against its own actions. This early ego defense lays
    the foundation for the development of the superego, whose extreme violence is
    a reaction to the ego’s aggressive self-defense against its own destructive ten-
    dencies. Klein believed that this harsh, cruel superego is responsible for many
    antisocial and criminal tendencies in adults.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories154
    Klein would describe a 5-year-old child’s superego in much the same way Freud
    did. By the 5th or 6th year, the superego arouses little anxiety but a great measure of
    guilt. It has lost most of its severity while gradually being transformed into a realistic
    conscience. However, Klein rejected Freud’s notion that the superego is a consequence
    of the Oedipus complex. Instead, she insisted that it grows along with the Oedipus
    complex and finally emerges as realistic guilt after the Oedipus complex is resolved.
    Oedipus Complex
    Although Klein believed that her view of the Oedipus complex was merely an
    extension and not a refutation of Freud’s ideas, her conception departed from the
    Freudian one in several ways. First, Klein (1946, 1948, 1952) held that the Oedipus
    complex begins at a much earlier age than Freud had suggested. Freud believed
    that the Oedipus complex took place during the phallic stage, when children are
    about 4 or 5 years old and after they have experienced an oral and anal stage. In
    contrast, Klein held that the Oedipus complex begins during the earliest months of
    life, overlaps with the oral and anal stages, and reaches its climax during the
    genital stage at around age 3 or 4. (Klein preferred the term “genital” stage rather
    than “phallic,” because the latter suggests a masculine psychology.) Second, Klein
    believed that a significant part of the Oedipus complex is children’s fear of retal-
    iation from their parent for their fantasy of emptying the parent’s body. Third, she
    stressed the importance of children retaining positive feelings toward both parents
    during the Oedipal years. Fourth, she hypothesized that during its early stages, the
    Oedipus complex serves the same need for both genders, that is, to establish a
    positive attitude with the good or gratifying object (breast or penis) and to avoid
    the bad or terrifying object (breast or penis). In this position, children of either
    gender can direct their love either alternately or simultaneously toward each parent.
    Thus, children are capable of both homosexual and heterosexual relations with both
    parents. Like Freud, Klein assumed that girls and boys eventually come to experi-
    ence the Oedipus complex differently.
    Female Oedipal Development
    At the beginning of the female Oedipal development—during the first months of
    life—a little girl sees her mother’s breast as both “good and bad.” Then around
    6 months of age, she begins to view the breast as more positive than negative.
    Later, she sees her whole mother as full of good things, and this attitude leads her
    to imagine how babies are made. She fantasizes that her father’s penis feeds her
    mother with riches, including babies. Because the little girl sees the father’s penis
    as the giver of children, she develops a positive relationship to it and fantasizes
    that her father will fill her body with babies. If the female Oedipal stage proceeds
    smoothly, the little girl adopts a “feminine” position and has a positive relationship
    with both parents.
    However, under less ideal circumstances, the little girl will see her mother
    as a rival and will fantasize robbing her mother of her father’s penis and stealing
    her mother’s babies. The little girl’s wish to rob her mother produces a paranoid
    fear that her mother will retaliate against her by injuring her or taking away her
    babies. The little girl’s principal anxiety comes from a fear that the inside of her

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 155
    body has been injured by her mother, an anxiety that can be alleviated only when
    she later gives birth to a healthy baby. According to Klein (1945), penis envy stems
    from the little girl’s wish to internalize her father’s penis and to receive a baby
    from him. This fantasy precedes any desire for an external penis. Contrary to
    Freud’s view, Klein could find no evidence that the little girl blames her mother
    for bringing her into the world without a penis. Instead, Klein contended that the
    girl retains a strong attachment to her mother throughout the Oedipal period.
    Male Oedipal Development
    Like the young girl, the little boy sees his mother’s breast as both good and bad
    (Klein, 1945). Then, during the early months of Oedipal development, a boy shifts
    some of his oral desires from his mother’s breast to his father’s penis. At this time
    the little boy is in his feminine position; that is, he adopts a passive homosexual
    attitude toward his father. Next, he moves to a heterosexual relationship with his
    mother, but because of his previous homosexual feeling for his father, he has no
    fear that his father will castrate him. Klein believed that this passive homosexual
    position is a prerequisite for the boy’s development of a healthy heterosexual
    relationship with his mother. More simply, the boy must have a good feeling about
    his father’s penis before he can value his own.
    As the boy matures, however, he develops oral-sadistic impulses toward his
    father and wants to bite off his penis and to murder him. These feelings arouse
    castration anxiety and the fear that his father will retaliate against him by biting
    off his penis. This fear convinces the little boy that sexual intercourse with his
    mother would be extremely dangerous to him.
    The boy’s Oedipus complex is resolved only partially by his castration anxiety.
    A more important factor is his ability to establish positive relationships with both
    parents at the same time. At that point, the boy sees his parents as whole objects,
    a condition that enables him to work through his depressive position.
    For both girls and boys, a healthy resolution of the Oedipus complex depends
    on their ability to allow their mother and father to come together and to have
    sexual intercourse with each other. No remnant of rivalry remains. Children’s pos-
    itive feelings toward both parents later serve to enhance their adult sexual relations.
    In summary, Klein believed that people are born with two strong drives—the
    life instinct and the death instinct. Infants develop a passionate caring for the good
    breast and an intense hatred for the bad breast, leaving a person to struggle a lifetime
    to reconcile these unconscious psychic images of good and bad, pleasure and pain.
    The most crucial stage of life is the first few months, a time when relationships with
    mother and other significant objects form a model for later interpersonal relations.
    A person’s adult ability to love or to hate originates with these early object relations.
    Later Views on Object Relations
    Since Melanie Klein’s bold and insightful descriptions, a number of other theorists
    have expanded and modified object relations theory. Among the more prominent
    of these later theorists are Margaret Mahler, Heinz Kohut, John Bowlby, and Mary
    Ainsworth.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories156
    Margaret Mahler’s View
    Margaret Schoenberger Mahler (1897–1985) was born in Sopron, Hungary, and
    received a medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1923. In 1938, she
    moved to New York, where she was a consultant to the Children’s Service of the
    New York State Psychiatric Institute. She later established her own observational
    studies at the Masters Children’s Center in New York. From 1955 to 1974, she was
    clinical professor of psychiatry at Albert Einstein College of Medicine.
    Mahler was primarily concerned with the psychological birth of the indi-
    vidual that takes place during the first 3 years of life, a time when a child gradu-
    ally surrenders security for autonomy. Originally, Mahler’s ideas came from her
    observation of the behaviors of disturbed children interacting with their mothers.
    Later, she observed normal babies as they bonded with their mothers during the
    first 36 months of life (Mahler, 1952).
    To Mahler, an individual’s psychological birth begins during the first weeks
    of postnatal life and continues for the next 3 years or so. By psychological birth,
    Mahler meant that the child becomes an individual separate from his or her primary
    caregiver, an accomplishment that leads ultimately to a sense of identity.
    To achieve psychological birth and individuation, a child proceeds through a
    series of three major developmental stages and four substages (Mahler, 1967, 1972;
    Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). The first major developmental stage is normal
    autism, which spans the period from birth until about age 3 or 4 weeks. To describe
    the normal autism stage, Mahler (1967) borrowed Freud’s (1911/1958) analogy that
    compared psychological birth with an unhatched bird egg. The bird is able to satisfy
    its nutritional needs autistically (without regard to external reality) because its food
    supply is enclosed in its shell. Similarly, a newborn infant satisfies various needs
    within the all-powerful protective orbit of a mother’s care. Neonates have a sense
    of omnipotence, because, like unhatched birds, their needs are cared for automatically
    and without their having to expend any effort. Unlike Klein, who conceptualized a
    newborn infant as being terrified, Mahler pointed to the relatively long periods of
    sleep and general lack of tension in a neonate. She believed that this stage is a
    period of absolute primary narcissism in which an infant is unaware of any other
    person. Thus, she referred to normal autism as an “objectless” stage, a time when
    an infant naturally searches for the mother’s breast. She disagreed with Klein’s
    notion that infants incorporate the good breast and other objects into their ego.
    As infants gradually realize that they cannot satisfy their own needs, they
    begin to recognize their primary caregiver and to seek a symbiotic relationship
    with her, a condition that leads to normal symbiosis, the second developmental
    stage in Mahler’s theory. Normal symbiosis begins around the 4th or 5th week of
    age but reaches its zenith during the 4th or 5th month. During this time, “the infant
    behaves and functions as though he and his mother were an omnipotent system—a
    dual unity within one common boundary” (Mahler, 1967, p. 741). In the analogy
    of the bird egg, the shell is now beginning to crack, but a psychological membrane
    in the form of a symbiotic relationship still protects the newborn. Mahler recog-
    nized that this relationship is not a true symbiosis because, although the infant’s
    life is dependent on the mother, the mother does not absolutely need the infant.
    The symbiosis is characterized by a mutual cuing of infant and mother. The infant

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 157
    sends cues to the mother of hunger, pain, pleasure, and so forth, and the mother
    responds with her own cues, such as feeding, holding, or smiling. By this age the
    infant can recognize the mother’s face and can perceive her pleasure or distress.
    However, object relations have not yet begun—mother and others are still “preob-
    jects.” Older children and even adults sometimes regress to this stage, seeking the
    strength and safety of their mother’s care.
    The third major developmental stage, separation-individuation, spans the
    period from about the 4th or 5th month of age until about the 30th to 36th month.
    During this time, children become psychologically separated from their mothers,
    achieve a sense of individuation, and begin to develop feelings of personal identity.
    Because children no longer experience a dual unity with their mother, they must
    surrender their delusion of omnipotence and face their vulnerability to external
    threats. Thus, young children in the separation-individuation stage experience the
    external world as being more dangerous than it was during the first two stages.
    Mahler divided the separation-individuation stage into four overlapping sub-
    stages. The first is differentiation, which lasts from about the 5th month until the
    7th to 10th month of age and is marked by a bodily breaking away from the
    mother-infant symbiotic orbit. For this reason, the differentiation substage is anal-
    ogous to the hatching of an egg. At this age, Mahler observed, infants smile in
    response to their own mother, indicating a bond with a specific other person.
    Psychologically healthy infants who expand their world beyond the mother will be
    curious about strangers and will inspect them; unhealthy infants will fear strang-
    ers and recoil from them.
    As infants physically begin to move away from their mothers by crawling
    and walking, they enter the practicing substage of separation-individuation, a
    period from about the 7th to 10th month of age to about the 15th or 16th month.
    During this subphase, children easily distinguish their body from their mother’s,
    establish a specific bond with their mother, and begin to develop an autonomous
    ego. Yet, during the early stages of this period, they do not like to lose sight of
    their mother; they follow her with their eyes and show distress when she is away.
    Later, they begin to walk and to take in the outside world, which they experience
    as fascinating and exciting.
    From about 16 to 25 months of age, children experience a rapprochement
    with their mother; that is, they desire to bring their mother and themselves back
    together, both physically and psychologically. Mahler noticed that children of this
    age want to share with their mother every new acquisition of skill and every new
    experience. Now that they can walk with ease, children are more physically sepa-
    rate from the mother, but paradoxically, they are more likely to show separation
    anxiety during the rapprochement stage than during the previous period. Their
    increased cognitive skills make them more aware of their separateness, causing
    them to try various ploys to regain the dual unity they once had with their mother.
    Because these attempts are never completely successful, children of this age often
    fight dramatically with their mother, a condition called the rapprochement crisis.
    The final subphase of the separation-individuation process is libidinal object
    constancy, which approximates the 3rd year of life. During this time, children must
    develop a constant inner representation of their mother so that they can tolerate
    being physically separate from her. If this libidinal object constancy is not developed,

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories158
    children will continue to depend on their mother’s physical presence for their own
    security. Besides gaining some degree of object constancy, children must consoli-
    date their individuality; that is, they must learn to function without their mother
    and to develop other object relationships (Mahler et al., 1975).
    The strength of Mahler’s theory is its elegant description of psychological
    birth based on empirical observations that she and her colleagues made on child-
    mother interactions. Although many of her tenets rely on inferences gleaned from
    reactions of preverbal infants, her ideas can easily be extended to adults. Any errors
    made during the first 3 years—the time of psychological birth—may result in later
    regressions to a stage when a person had not yet achieved separation from the
    mother and thus a sense of personal identity.
    Heinz Kohut’s View
    Heinz Kohut (1913–1981) was born in Vienna to educated and talented Jewish
    parents (Strozier, 2001). On the eve of World War II, he emigrated to England
    and, a year later, he moved to the United States, where he spent most of his pro-
    fessional life. He was a professional lecturer in the Department of Psychiatry at
    the University of Chicago, a member of the faculty at the Chicago Institute for
    Psychoanalysis, and visiting professor of psychoanalysis at the University of
    Cincinnati. A neurologist and a psychoanalyst, Kohut upset many psychoanalysts
    in 1971 with his publication of The Analysis of the Self, which replaced the ego
    with the concept of self. In addition to this book, aspects of his self psychology are
    found in The Restoration of the Self (1977) and The Kohut Seminars (1987), edited
    by Miriam Elson and published after Kohut’s death.
    More than the other object relations theorists, Kohut emphasized the process
    by which the self evolves from a vague and undifferentiated image to a clear and
    precise sense of individual identity. As did other object relations theorists, he
    focused on the early mother-child relationship as the key to understanding later
    development. Kohut believed that human relatedness, not innate instinctual drives,
    are at the core of human personality.
    According to Kohut, infants require adult caregivers not only to gratify physical
    needs but also to satisfy basic psychological needs. In caring for both physical and
    psychological needs, adults, or selfobjects, treat infants as if they had a sense of self.
    For example, parents will act with warmth, coldness, or indifference depending in part
    on their infant’s behavior. Through the process of empathic interaction, the infant
    takes in the selfobject’s responses as pride, guilt, shame, or envy—all attitudes that
    eventually form the building blocks of the self. Kohut (1977) defined the self as “the
    center of the individual’s psychological universe” (p. 311). The self gives unity and
    consistency to one’s experiences, remains relatively stable over time, and is “the
    center of initiative and a recipient of impressions” (p. 99). The self is also the child’s
    focus of interpersonal relations, shaping how he or she will relate to parents and other
    selfobjects.
    Kohut (1971, 1977) believed that infants are naturally narcissistic. They are
    self-centered, looking out exclusively for their own welfare and wishing to be
    admired for who they are and what they do. The early self becomes crystallized
    around two basic narcissistic needs: (1) the need to exhibit the grandiose self and

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 159
    (2) the need to acquire an idealized image of one or both parents. The grandiose-
    exhibitionistic self is established when the infant relates to a “mirroring” selfobject
    who reflects approval of its behavior. The infant thus forms a rudimentary self-
    image from messages such as “If others see me as perfect, then I am perfect.” The
    idealized parent image is opposed to the grandiose self because it implies that
    someone else is perfect. Nevertheless, it too satisfies a narcissistic need because
    the infant adopts the attitude “You are perfect, but I am part of you.”
    Both narcissistic self-images are necessary for healthy personality develop-
    ment. Both, however, must change as the child grows older. If they remain unal-
    tered, they result in a pathologically narcissistic adult personality. Grandiosity must
    change into a realistic view of self, and the idealized parent image must grow into
    a realistic picture of the parents. The two self-images should not entirely disappear;
    the healthy adult continues to have positive attitudes toward self and continues to
    see good qualities in parents or parent substitutes. However, a narcissistic adult
    does not transcend these infantile needs and continues to be self-centered and to
    see the rest of the world as an admiring audience. Freud believed that such a nar-
    cissistic person was a poor candidate for psychoanalysis, but Kohut held that psy-
    chotherapy could be effective with these patients.
    John Bowlby’s Attachment Theory
    John Bowlby (1907–1990) was born in London, where his father was a well-known
    surgeon. From an early age, Bowlby was interested in natural science, medicine,
    and psychology—subjects he studied at Cambridge University. After receiving a
    medical degree, he started his practice in psychiatry and psychoanalysis in 1933.
    At about the same time, he began training in child psychiatry under Melanie Klein.
    During World War II, Bowlby served as an army psychiatrist, and in 1946 he was
    appointed director of the Department for Children and Parents of the Tavistock
    Clinic. During the late 1950s, Bowlby spent some time at Stanford’s Center for
    the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences but returned to London, where he
    remained until his death in 1990 (van Dijken, 1998).
    In the 1950s, Bowlby became dissatisfied with the object relations perspec-
    tive, primarily for its inadequate theory of motivation and its lack of empiricism.
    With his knowledge of ethology and evolutionary theory (especially Konrad
    Lorenz’s idea of early bonding to a mother-figure), he realized that object relations
    theory could be integrated with an evolutionary perspective. By forming such an
    integration he felt he could correct the empirical shortcomings of the theory and
    extend it in a new direction. Bowlby’s attachment theory also departed from psy-
    choanalytic thinking by taking childhood as its starting point and then extrapolat-
    ing forward to adulthood (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1988). Bowlby firmly believed that
    the attachments formed during childhood have an important impact on adulthood.
    Because childhood attachments are crucial to later development, Bowlby argued
    that investigators should study childhood directly and not rely on distorted retro-
    spective accounts from adults.
    The origins of attachment theory came from Bowlby’s observations that both
    human and primate infants go through a clear sequence of reactions when separated
    from their primary caregivers. Bowlby observed three stages of this separation anxiety.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories160
    When their caregiver is first out of sight, infants will cry, resist soothing by other
    people, and search for their caregiver. This stage is the protest stage. As separation
    continues, infants become quiet, sad, passive, listless, and apathetic. This second stage
    is called despair. The last stage—the only one unique to humans—is detachment.
    During this stage, infants become emotionally detached from other people, including
    their caregiver. If their caregiver (mother) returns, infants will disregard and avoid her.
    Children who become detached are no longer upset when their mother leaves them.
    As they become older, they play and interact with others with little emotion but appear
    to be sociable. However, their interpersonal relations are superficial and lack warmth.
    From such observations, Bowlby developed his attachment theory, which he
    published in a trilogy titled Attachment and Loss (1969/1982, 1973, 1980). Bowlby’s
    theory rests on two fundamental assumptions: First, a responsive and accessible care-
    giver (usually the mother) must create a secure base for the child. The infant needs
    to know that the caregiver is accessible and dependable. If this dependability is pres-
    ent, the child is better able to develop confidence and security in exploring the world.
    This bonding relationship serves the critical function of attaching the caregiver to the
    infant, thereby making survival of the infant, and ultimately the species, more likely.
    A second assumption of attachment theory is that a bonding relationship (or
    lack thereof ) becomes internalized and serves as a mental working model on which
    future friendships and love relationships are built. The first bonding attachment is
    therefore the most critical of all relationships. However, for bonding to take place,
    an infant must be more than a mere passive receptor to the caregiver’s behavior,
    even if that behavior radiates accessibility and dependability. Attachment style is
    a relationship between two people and not a trait given to the infant by the care-
    giver. It is a two-way street—the infant and the caregiver must be responsive to
    each other and each must influence the other’s behavior.
    Mary Ainsworth and the
    Strange Situation
    Mary Dinsmore Salter Ainsworth (1919–1999)
    was born in Glendale, Ohio, the daughter of the
    president of an aluminum goods business. She
    received her BA, MA, and PhD, all from the
    University of Toronto, where she also served as
    instructor and lecturer. During her long career,
    she taught and conducted research at several
    universities and institutes in Canada, the United
    States, the United Kingdom, and Uganda.
    Influenced by Bowlby’s theory, Ainsworth
    and her associates (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, &
    Wall, 1978) developed a technique for measuring
    the type of attachment style that exists between
    caregiver and infant, known as the Strange Situ-
    ation. This procedure consists of a 20-minute
    laboratory session in which a mother and infant
    are initially alone in a playroom. Then a stranger
    Mary Ainsworth © JHU Sheridan
    Libraries/Gado/Getty Images

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 161
    comes into the room, and after a few minutes the stranger begins a brief interaction
    with the infant. The mother then goes away for two separate 2-minute periods. Dur-
    ing the first period, the infant is left alone with the stranger; during the second period,
    the infant is left completely alone. The critical behavior is how the infant reacts when
    the mother returns; this behavior is the basis of the attachment style rating. Ainsworth
    and her associates found three attachment style ratings: secure, anxious-resistant, and
    anxious-avoidant.
    In a secure attachment, when their mother returns, infants are happy and
    enthusiastic and initiate contact; for example, they will go over to their mother and
    want to be held. All securely attached infants are confident in the accessibility and
    responsiveness of their caregiver, and this security and dependability provides the
    foundation for play and exploration.
    In an anxious-resistant attachment style, infants are ambivalent. When their
    mother leaves the room, they become unusually upset, and when their mother
    returns they seek contact with her but reject attempts at being soothed. With the
    anxious-resistant attachment style, infants give very conflicted messages. On the
    one hand, they seek contact with their mother, while on the other hand, they squirm
    to be put down and may throw away toys that their mother has offered them.
    The third attachment style is anxious-avoidant. With this style, infants stay
    calm when their mother leaves; they accept the stranger, and when their mother
    returns, they ignore and avoid her. In both kinds of insecure attachment (anxious-
    resistant and anxious-avoidant), infants lack the ability to engage in effective play
    and exploration.
    Secure attachment to caregivers is an important part of the process of developing relationships with
    other people. © Ingram Publishing/SuperStock

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories162
    Psychotherapy
    Klein, Mahler, Kohut, and Bowlby were all psychoanalysts trained in orthodox
    Freudian practices. However, each modified psychoanalytic treatment to fit her or
    his own theoretical orientation. Because these theorists varied among themselves
    on therapeutic procedures, we will limit our discussion of therapy to the approach
    used by Melanie Klein.
    Klein’s pioneering use of psychoanalysis with children was not well accepted
    by other analysts during the 1920s and 1930s. Anna Freud was especially resistive
    to the notion of childhood psychoanalysis, contending that young children who
    were still attached to their parents could not develop a transference to the therapist
    because they have no unconscious fantasies or images. Therefore, she claimed,
    young children could not profit from psychoanalytic therapy. In contrast, Klein
    believed that both disturbed and healthy children should be psychoanalyzed; dis-
    turbed children would receive the benefit of therapeutic treatment, whereas healthy
    children would profit from a prophylactic analysis. Consistent with this belief, she
    insisted that her own children be analyzed. She also insisted that negative transfer-
    ence was an essential step toward successful treatment, a view not shared by Anna
    Freud and many other psychoanalysts.
    To foster negative transference and aggressive fantasies, Klein provided each
    child with a variety of small toys, pencil and paper, paint, crayons, and so forth. She
    substituted play therapy for Freudian dream analysis and free association, believing
    that young children express their conscious and unconscious wishes through play
    therapy. In addition to expressing negative transference feelings as means of play,
    Klein’s young patients often attacked her verbally, which gave her an opportunity to
    interpret the unconscious motives behind these attacks (Klein, 1943).
    The aim of Kleinian therapy is to reduce depressive anxieties and persecutory
    fears and to mitigate the harshness of internalized objects. To accomplish this aim,
    Klein encouraged her patients to reexperience early emotions and fantasies but this
    time with the therapist pointing out the differences between reality and fantasy,
    between conscious and unconscious. She also allowed patients to express both
    positive and negative transference, a situation that is essential for patients’ under-
    standing of how unconscious fantasies connect with present everyday situations.
    Once this connection is made, patients feel less persecuted by internalized objects,
    experience reduced depressive anxiety, and are able to project previously frighten-
    ing internal objects onto the outer world.
    Related Research
    Both object relations theory and attachment theory continue to spark empirical
    research on the ways early trauma may disrupt adult relationships and on extend-
    ing attachment theory to adult relationships.
    Childhood Trauma and Adult Object Relations
    Object relations theory presumes that the quality of young children’s relationships
    with their caregivers is internalized as a model for later interpersonal relations. A
    great deal of research has explored the impact of childhood trauma and abuse on

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 163
    adult object relational functioning, and whether these experiences predict patho-
    logical outcomes later in life. One very recent example of this type of work is a
    study by a team at York University (Bedi, Muller, & Thornback, 2012).
    Sixty adults identified as having had histories of childhood physical and/or
    sexual abuse were given the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943).
    This is what is known in the field as a projective test, and operates much like the
    more well-known Rorschach ink blot test, wherein individuals simply describe
    what they see in ambiguous images. The assumption of projective tests is that test
    takers will “project” unconscious wishes, fantasies, and ideas into their stories and
    interpretations of ink blots. Projective tests are alternative ways to uncover uncon-
    scious aspects of the personality. The TAT presents participants with a series of
    scenes depicting people either alone or in social interactions that are ambiguous in
    nature. Participants are instructed to look at the images and make up a story about
    what might be happening in the picture, what the characters might be thinking and
    feeling, and what the outcome might be. Because the TAT depicts people in rela-
    tionships, it is particularly well-suited to examining individuals’ object relations.
    The abuse survivors in this study completed the TAT, and their stories were
    scored for four object relations themes: a) the degree to which interpersonal rela-
    tionships are seen as threatening versus safe; b) the level of commitment and
    emotional sharing in relationships; c) the ability to see the self as distinct from
    others; and d) the accuracy of attributions about the causes of people’s behaviors,
    thoughts, and feelings. The participants also completed a variety of measures of
    mental health, including self-esteem and post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSD).
    The results showed, much as object relations theory would predict, that hav-
    ing a tendency to view people and relationships as more malevolent, as well as
    investing less emotionally in relationships, was correlated with greater symptoms
    of PTSD and lower self-esteem in these abuse survivors. This suggests that such
    people with traumatic childhoods see other people as dangerous and rejecting and
    this may result in the development within themselves of a feeling of shame and
    unworthiness. Treating such individuals effectively likely requires awareness that
    even the therapeutic relationship might be impacted by disturbed object relations.
    As the researchers write, “Trauma survivors have had personal relationships as a
    cause of their pain. Thus, it is crucial for clinicians working with survivors of abuse
    to target presenting symptoms of psychopathology through a relational perspective”
    (Bedi, Muller, & Thornback, 2012, p. 6). Enabling trauma survivors to learn new
    ways that others can respond to them positively, say these researchers, can change
    their object representations in healthy ways.
    Attachment Theory and Adult Relationships
    Attachment theory as originally conceptualized by John Bowlby emphasized the
    relationship between parent and child. Since the 1980s, however, researchers have
    begun to systematically examine attachment relationships in adults, especially in
    romantic relationships.
    A classic study of adult attachment was conducted by Cindy Hazan and Phil
    Shaver (1987), who predicted that different types of early attachment styles would
    distinguish the kind, duration, and stability of adult love relationships. More

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories164
    specifically, these investigators expected that people who had secure early attach-
    ments with their caregivers would experience more trust, closeness, and positive
    emotions in their adult love relationships than would people in either of the two
    insecure groups. Likewise, they predicted that avoidant adults would fear closeness
    and lack trust, whereas anxious-ambivalent adults would be preoccupied with and
    obsessed by their relationships.
    Using college students and other adults, Hazan and Shaver found support for
    each of these predictions. Securely attached adults did experience more trust and close-
    ness in their love relationships than did avoidant or anxious-ambivalent adults. More-
    over, the researchers found that securely attached adults were more likely than insecure
    adults to believe that romantic love can be long lasting. In addition, securely attached
    adults were less cynical about love in general, had longer lasting relationships, and
    were less likely to divorce than either avoidant or anxious-ambivalent adults.
    Other researchers have continued to extend the research on attachment and
    adult romantic relationships. Steven Rholes and colleagues, for example, tested the
    idea that attachment style is related to the type of information people seek or avoid
    regarding their relationship and romantic partner (Rholes, Simpson, Tran, Martin,
    & Friedman, 2007). The researchers predicted that avoidant individuals would not
    seek out additional information about their partner’s intimate feelings and dreams,
    whereas anxious individuals would express a strong desire to gain more informa-
    tion about their romantic partner. Avoidant individuals typically strive to maintain
    emotional independence and therefore do not want any information that could
    increase closeness. Closeness subverts their goal of independence. Conversely,
    anxious individuals tend to be chronically worried about the state of their relation-
    ship and want to strengthen emotional bonds by seeking out as much information
    about their partner’s most intimate feelings as possible.
    To test their predictions, Rholes and colleagues recruited couples who had
    been dating for a while and had them come in to a psychology lab to complete
    mea sures of attachment and information seeking. Attachment style was measured
    using a standard questionnaire containing self-report items about how anxious or
    avoidant the person feels within their romantic relationship. Information seeking
    was mea sured using a clever (and bogus) computerized task whereby each par-
    ticipant independently completed several items about their relationship including
    each partner’s intimate feelings and goals for the future. Participants were told that
    the computer would then generate a profile of their relationship that both dating
    partners could view at the end of the study. The researchers then were able to
    measure how much of the information provided by the relationship profile each
    partner read about the other. In accord with their predictions, and attachment the-
    ory more generally, the avoidant individuals showed less interest in reading infor-
    mation about their partner contained in the relationship profile, whereas anxious
    individuals sought more information about their partner’s intimacy-related issues
    and goals for the future.
    Jealousy occurs when we feel threatened by the perceived loss of a close
    partner, usually romantic. Jealousy can often be based in reality—that is, there may
    be a legitimate threat of loss. However, some people are hypersensitive to threat-
    ened loss of a partner and feel jealous even when there is little or no real basis for
    it. Psychologists call this “pathological jealousy.” A recent study investigated the

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 165
    attachment styles of people who are pathologically jealous in comparison to those
    who are not (Costa, Sophia, Sanches, Tavares, & Zilberman, 2015). Thirty-two
    people classified as “pathologically jealous” sought therapy for pathological jeal-
    ousy and then were positively diagnosed by the psychiatric staff at the Impulse
    Control Disorder Outpatient Clinic in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The comparison group
    consisted of 31 people who were matched in age and gender but had no history of
    psychiatric disorders.
    In addition to completing the Questionnaire of Affective Relationships (QAR)
    that assesses whether participants are pathologically jealous or not, participants also
    completed a battery of questionnaires, including the Adult Attachment Questionnaire
    by Hazan and Shaver, as well as measures of relationship quality, novelty-seeking,
    persistence, impulsivity, anxiety, depression, and aggressiveness. Costa and col-
    leagues found that those with pathological jealousy had attachment styles that were
    less secure, more avoidant, and more anxious-ambivalent than those who were not
    pathologically jealous. The jealous participants also were less satisfied in their rela-
    tionships, more impulsive, and more likely to seek new and novel experiences.
    Another topic of research has been conflict, attachment style, and romantic
    relationships. Conflict is an inevitable part of every romantic relationship, and a
    great deal of research has been conducted on the ways adult attachment styles
    influence how partners react to and behave during conflict. Research shows that,
    generally speaking, insecurely attached partners (both anxious-ambivalent and
    avoidant) do not cope with conflict as well as their secure counterparts. For exam-
    ple, anxious and avoidant partners experience greater autonomic nervous system
    reactivity during conflict discussions with their spouses than do securely attached
    individuals (Powers, Pietromonaco, Gunlicks, & Sayer, 2006). And partners with
    anxious attachment styles tend to escalate the emotional severity of conflicts
    (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996).
    The transition to parenthood is a particularly stressful time for many couples,
    and conflict levels tend to rise. Rholes and colleagues (2014) conducted a longitudinal
    study of the ways the attachment styles of new mothers and fathers played a role in
    their experience of conflict during this specific moment in time. Couples who were
    expecting their first child were recruited during childbirth classes, and they completed
    self-report and perception-of-partner measures of conflict approaches, attachment
    style, and relationship satisfaction five different times, from approximately 6 weeks
    before their expected due date, through 24 months after their child was born.
    The results revealed that more anxious and avoidant partners used less effec-
    tive conflict resolution styles, such as verbal aggression or “stalemating” as opposed
    to collaboration. Furthermore, the insecurely attached individuals perceived more
    destructive conflict tactics being directed at them by their partners during this
    stressful time. Not surprisingly, most of the partners in the study—both women
    and men—reported enacting and receiving fewer helpful and more destructive con-
    flict tactics as the transition to parenthood unfolded. The good news is that the
    more securely attached individuals in the study showed improvement over time,
    adjusting to their status as parents as well as partners, and using fewer ineffective
    and more effective conflict resolution tactics.
    Attachment style is not only important in parental and romantic relationships,
    but also in the relationships between leaders and their followers (military officers and

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories166
    their soldiers, for example; Davidovitz, Mikulincer, Shaver, Izsak, & Popper, 2007;
    Hinojosa, Davis, Randolph-Seng, & Gardner, 2014; Popper & Mayseless, 2003). The
    theory is that attachment style is relevant in leader-follower relationships because
    leaders or authority figures can occupy the role of caregiver and be a source of secu-
    rity in a manner similar to the support offered by parents and romantic partners.
    Researchers predicted that leaders with a secure attachment style (neither anxious nor
    avoidant) are more effective than insecurely attached (anxious or avoidant) leaders.
    To explore the role of attachment in leadership, Rivka Davidovitz and col-
    leagues (2007) studied a group of military officers and the soldiers in their charge.
    Officers completed the same measure of attachment used in the previously dis-
    cussed study on attachment and information seeking (Rholes et al., 2007), but
    rather than reporting on their attachment within a romantic relationship they
    reported on their close relationships more generally. Soldiers then completed mea-
    sures of the effectiveness of their officer’s leadership, cohesiveness of their military
    unit, and measures of psychological well-being.
    The results provided further support of the generality and importance of
    attachment style in multiple types of relationships. The units of officers who had
    an avoidant attachment style were less cohesive and the soldiers expressed lower
    psychological well-being compared to members of other units. Most likely, these
    effects of leaders’ avoidant attachment style are due to the avoidant officers’ desire
    to avoid information about the social and emotional well-being of their unit. Anx-
    iously attached officers led units that were rated low on instrumental functioning
    (degree to which soldiers take their work seriously). Yet, those same units were
    rated high on socioemotional functioning (degree to which soldiers feel free to
    express their thoughts and feelings). This last finding regarding socioemotional
    functioning was surprising to the researchers but makes sense when considering
    the findings of Rholes and colleagues discussed above (Rholes et al., 2007): The
    anxiously attached officers were likely more interested in seeking out information
    about how their soldiers were feeling and how they were getting along with others.
    Attachment is a construct in personality psychology that continues to gener-
    ate a substantial amount of research. While the work on attachment theory began as
    a way to understand differences in parent-child relationships, recent research has
    shown that those same dynamics (secure, avoidant, and anxious attachment styles)
    are important to understanding a wide range of adult relationships—from romantic
    partners to military leaders and soldiers.
    Critique of Object Relations Theory
    Currently, object relations theory continues to be more popular in the United Kingdom
    than it is in the United States. The “British School,” which included not only Melanie
    Klein but also W. R. D. Fairbairn and D. W. Winnicott, has exerted a strong influence
    on psychoanalysts and psychiatrists in the United Kingdom. In the United States, how-
    ever, the influence of object relations theorists, while growing, has been less direct.
    How does object relations theory rate in generating research? In 1986, Morris
    Bell and colleagues published the Bell Object Relations Inventory (BORI), a self-
    report questionnaire that identifies four main aspects of object relations: Alienation,

    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 167
    Attachment, Egocentricity, and Social Incompetence. To date, only a few studies
    have used the BORI to empirically investigate object relations. However, attach-
    ment theory is currently generating much research. Thus, we rate object relations
    theory low on its ability to generate research, but we judge attachment theory
    moderate to high on this criterion for a useful theory.
    Because object relations theory grew out of orthodox psychoanalytic theory,
    it suffers from some of the same problems with falsification that confront Freud’s
    theory. Most of its tenets are based on what is happening inside the infant’s psyche,
    and thus these assumptions cannot be falsified. The theory does not lend itself to
    falsifications because it generates very few testable hypotheses. Attachment theory,
    on the other hand, rates somewhat higher on falsification.
    Perhaps the most useful feature of object relations theory is its ability to
    organize information about the behavior of infants. More than most other person-
    ality theorists, object relations theorists have speculated on how humans gradually
    come to acquire a sense of identity. Klein, and especially Mahler, Bowlby, and
    Ainsworth, built their theories on careful observations of the mother-child rela-
    tionship. They watched the interactions between infant and mother and drew infer-
    ences based on what they saw. However, beyond the early childhood years, object
    relations theory lacks usefulness as an organizer of knowledge.
    As a guide to the practitioner, the theory fares somewhat better than it does in
    organizing data or suggesting testable hypotheses. Parents of young infants can learn
    of the importance of a warm, accepting, and nurturing caregiver. Psychotherapists
    may find object relations theory useful not only in understanding the early develop-
    ment of their clients but also in understanding and working with the transference
    relationship that clients form with the therapist, whom they view as a substitute parent.
    On the criterion of consistency, each of the theories discussed in this chapter
    has a high level of internal consistency, but the different theorists disagree among
    themselves on a number of points. Even though they all place primary importance
    on human relationships, the differences among them far exceed the similarities.
    In addition, we rate object relations theory low on the criterion of parsimony.
    Klein, especially, used needlessly complex phrases and concepts to express her theory.
    Concept of Humanity
    Object relations theorists generally see human personality as a product of
    the early mother-child relationship. The interaction between mother and
    infant lays the foundation for future personality development because that
    early interpersonal experience serves as a prototype for subsequent inter-
    personal relations. Klein saw the human psyche as “unstable, fluid, con-
    stantly fending off psychotic anxieties” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 87). More-
    over, “each of us struggles with the deep terrors of annihilation . . . and utter
    abandonment” (p. 88).

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories168
    Because they emphasize the mother-child relationship and view these
    experiences as crucial to later development, object relations theorists rate
    high on determinism and low on free choice.
    For the same reason, these theorists can be either pessimistic or opti-
    mistic, depending on the quality of the early mother-infant relationship. If
    that relationship is healthy, then a child will grow into a psychologically
    healthy adult; if it is not, the child will acquire a pathological, self-absorbed
    personality.
    On the dimension of causality versus teleology, object relations theory
    tends to be more causal. Early experiences are the primary shapers of per-
    sonality. Expectations of the future play a very minor role in object relations
    theory.
    We rate object relations theory high on unconscious determinants of
    behavior because most of the theorists trace the prime determinants of
    behavior to very early infancy, a time before verbal language. Thus, people
    acquire many personal traits and attitudes on a preverbal level and remain
    unaware of the complete nature of these traits and attitudes. In addition,
    Klein’s acceptance of an innately acquired phylogenetic endowment places
    her theory even further in the direction of unconscious determinants.
    The emphasis that Klein placed on the death instinct and phylogenetic
    endowment would seem to suggest that she saw biology as more important
    than environment in shaping personality. However, Klein shifted the empha-
    sis from Freud’s biologically based infantile stages to an interpersonal one.
    Because the intimacy and nurturing that infants receive from their mother
    are environmental experiences, Klein and other object relations theorists
    lean more toward social determinants of personality.
    On the dimension of uniqueness versus similarities, object relations
    theorists tend more toward similarities. As clinicians dealing mostly with dis-
    turbed patients, Klein, Mahler, Kohut, and Bowlby limited their discussions to
    the distinction between healthy personalities and pathological ones and were
    little concerned with differences among psychologically healthy personalities.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Object relations theories assume that the mother-child relationship
    during the first 4 or 5 months is the most critical time for personality
    development.
    ∙ Klein believed that an important part of any relationship is the internal
    psychic representations of early significant objects, such as the mother’s
    breast or the father’s penis.
    ∙ Infants introject these psychic representations into their own psychic
    structure and then project them onto an external object, that is, another
    person. These internal pictures are not accurate representations of the
    other person but are remnants of earlier interpersonal experiences.

    ∙ The ego, which exists at birth, can sense both destructive and loving
    forces, that is, both a nurturing and a frustrating breast.
    ∙ To deal with the nurturing breast and the frustrating breast, infants split
    these objects into good and bad while also splitting their own ego,
    giving them a dual image of self.
    ∙ Klein believed that the superego comes into existence much earlier than
    Freud had speculated and that it grows along with the Oedipal process
    rather than being a product of it.
    ∙ During the early female Oedipus complex, the little girl adopts a
    feminine position toward both parents. She has a positive feeling both
    for her mother’s breasts and for her father’s penis, which she believes
    will feed her with babies.
    ∙ Sometimes the little girl develops hostility toward her mother, who she
    fears will retaliate against her and rob her of her babies.
    ∙ With most girls, however, the female Oedipus complex is resolved
    without any antagonism or jealousy toward their mother.
    ∙ The little boy also adopts a feminine position during the early Oedipal
    years. At that time, he has no fear of being castrated as punishment for
    his sexual feelings for his mother.
    ∙ Later, the boy projects his destructive drive onto his father, who he fears
    will bite or castrate him.
    ∙ The male Oedipus complex is resolved when the boy establishes good
    relations with both parents and feels comfortable about his parents
    having sexual intercourse with one another.
    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory 169

    170
    C H A P T E R 6
    Horney:
    Psychoanalytic
    Social Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Psychoanalytic
    Social Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Karen Horney
    ⬥ Introduction to Psychoanalytic
    Social Theory
    Horney and Freud Compared
    The Impact of Culture
    The Importance of Childhood Experiences
    ⬥ Basic Hostility and Basic Anxiety
    ⬥ Compulsive Drives
    Neurotic Needs
    Neurotic Trends
    Moving Toward People
    Moving Against People
    Moving Away From People
    ⬥ Intrapsychic Conflicts
    The Idealized Self-Image
    The Neurotic Search for Glory
    Neurotic Claims
    Neurotic Pride
    Self-Hatred
    ⬥ Feminine Psychology
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Developing and Validating a New Measure of
    Horney’s Neurotic Trends
    Can Neuroticism Ever Be a Good Thing?
    ⬥ Critique of Horney
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Horney © Bettmann/Getty Images

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 171
    Please Mark These “True” or “False” as They Apply to You.
    1. T F It’s very important to me to please other people.
    2. T F When I feel distressed, I seek out an emotionally strong
    person to tell my troubles to.
    3. T F I prefer routine more than change.
    4. T F I enjoy being in a powerful leadership position.
    5. T F I believe in and follow the advice: “Do unto others before
    they can do unto me.”
    6. T F I enjoy being the life of the party.
    7. T F It’s very important to me to be recognized for my
    accomplishments.
    8. T F I enjoy seeing the achievements of my friends.
    9. T F I usually end relationships when they begin to get too close.
    10. T F It’s very difficult for me to overlook my own mistakes and
    personal flaws.
    These questions represent 10 important needs proposed by Karen
    Horney. We discuss these items in the section on neurotic needs. Please
    know that marking an item in the direction of neurotic needs does not indi-
    cate that you are emotionally unstable or driven by neurotic needs.
    Overview of Psychoanalytic
    Social Theory
    The psychoanalytic social theory of Karen Horney (pronounced Horn-eye) was
    built on the assumption that social and cultural conditions, especially childhood
    experiences, are largely responsible for shaping personality. People who do not have
    their needs for love and affection satisfied during childhood develop basic hostility
    toward their parents and, as a consequence, suffer from basic anxiety. Horney the-
    orized that people combat basic anxiety by adopting one of three fundamental styles
    of relating to others: (1) moving toward people, (2) moving against people, or
    (3) moving away from people. Normal individuals may use any of these modes of
    relating to other people, but neurotics are compelled to rigidly rely on only one.
    Their compulsive behavior generates a basic intrapsychic conflict that may take the
    form of either an idealized self-image or self-hatred. The idealized self-image is
    expressed as (1) neurotic search for glory, (2) neurotic claims, or (3) neurotic pride.
    Self-hatred is expressed as either self-contempt or alienation from self.
    Although Horney’s writings are concerned mostly with the neurotic personal-
    ity, many of her ideas can also be applied to normal individuals. This chapter looks
    at Horney’s basic theory of neurosis, compares her ideas to those of Freud, examines
    her views on feminine psychology, and briefly discusses her ideas on psychotherapy.
    As with other personality theorists, Horney’s views on personality are a
    reflection of her life experiences. Bernard Paris (1994) wrote that “Horney’s
    insights were derived from her efforts to relieve her own pain, as well as that
    of her patients. If her suffering had been less intense, her insights would have

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories172
    been less profound” (p. xxv). We look now at the life of this often-troubled
    woman.
    Biography of Karen Horney
    The biography of Karen Horney has several parallels with the life of Melanie Klein
    (see Chapter 5). Each was born during the 1880s, the youngest child of a 50-year-
    old father and his second wife. Each had older siblings who were favored by the
    parents, and each felt unwanted and unloved. Also, each had wanted to become a
    physician, but only Horney fulfilled that ambition. Finally, both Horney and Klein
    engaged in an extended self-analysis—Horney’s, beginning with her diaries from
    age 13 to 26, continuing with her analysis by Karl Abraham, and culminating with
    her book Self-Analysis (Quinn, 1987).
    Karen Danielsen Horney was born in Eilbek, a small town near Hamburg,
    Germany, on September 15, 1885. She was the only daughter of Berndt (Wackels)
    Danielsen, a sea captain, and Clothilda van Ronzelen Danielsen, a woman nearly
    18 years younger than her husband. The only other child of this marriage was a
    son, about 4 years older than Karen. However, the old sea captain had been mar-
    ried earlier and had four other children, most of whom were adults by the time
    Horney was born. The Danielsen family was an unhappy one, in part because
    Karen’s older half-siblings turned their father against his second wife. Karen felt
    great hostility toward her stern, devoutly religious father and regarded him as a
    religious hypocrite. However, she idolized her mother, who both supported and
    protected her against the stern old sea captain. Nevertheless, Karen was not a happy
    child. She resented the favored treatment given to her older brother, and in addi-
    tion, she worried about the bitterness and discord between her parents.
    When she was 13, Horney decided to become a physician, but at that time
    no university in Germany admitted women. By the time she was 16, this situation
    had changed. So Horney—over the objections of her father, who wanted her to
    stay home and take care of the household—entered the gymnasium, a school that
    would lead to a university and then to medical school. On her own for the first
    time, Karen was to remain independent for the rest of her life. According to Paris
    (1994), however, Horney’s independence was mostly superficial. On a deeper
    level, she retained a compulsive need to merge with a great man. This morbid
    dependency, which typically included idealization and fear of inciting angry rejec-
    tion, haunted Horney during her relationships with a series of men.
    In 1906, she entered the University of Freiburg, becoming one of the first women
    in Germany to study medicine. There she met Oskar Horney, a political science student.
    Their relationship began as a friendship, but it eventually became a romantic one. After
    their marriage in 1909, the couple settled in Berlin, where Oskar, now with a PhD,
    worked for a coal company and Karen, not yet with an MD, specialized in psychiatry.
    By this time, Freudian psychoanalysis was becoming well established, and
    Karen Horney became familiar with Freud’s writings. Early in 1910, she began an
    analysis with Karl Abraham, one of Freud’s close associates and a man who later
    analyzed Melanie Klein. After Horney’s analysis was terminated, she attended Abra-
    ham’s evening seminars, where she became acquainted with other psychoanalysts.
    By 1917, she had written her first paper on psychoanalysis, “The Technique of

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 173
    Psychoanalytic Therapy” (Horney, 1917/1968), which reflected the orthodox Freud-
    ian view and gave little indication of Horney’s subsequent independent thinking.
    The early years of her marriage were filled with many notable personal
    experiences for Horney. Her father and mother, who were now separated, died
    within less than a year of each other; she gave birth to three daughters in 5 years;
    she received her MD degree in 1915 after 5 years of psychoanalysis; and, in her
    quest for the right man, she had several love affairs (Paris, 1994; Quinn, 1987).
    After World War I, the Horneys lived a prosperous, suburban lifestyle with
    several servants and a chauffeur. Oskar did well financially while Karen enjoyed
    a thriving psychiatric practice. This idyllic scene, however, soon ended. The infla-
    tion and economic disorder of 1923 cost Oskar his job, and the family was forced
    to move back to an apartment in Berlin. In 1926, Karen and Oskar separated but
    did not officially divorce until 1938 (Paris, 1994).
    The early years following her separation from Oskar were the most produc-
    tive of Horney’s life. In addition to seeing patients and caring for her three daugh-
    ters, she became more involved with writing, teaching, traveling, and lecturing.
    Her papers now showed important differences with Freudian theory. She believed
    that culture, not anatomy, was responsible for psychic differences between men
    and women. When Freud reacted negatively to Horney’s position, she became even
    more outspoken in her opposition.
    In 1932, Horney left Germany for a position as associate director of the newly
    established Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. Several factors contributed to her deci-
    sion to immigrate—the anti-Jewish political climate in Germany (although Horney
    was not Jewish), increasing opposition to her unorthodox views, and an opportunity
    to extend her influence beyond Berlin. During the 2 years she spent in Chicago, she
    met Margaret Mead and John Dollard. In addition, she renewed acquaintances with
    Erich Fromm and his wife, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, whom she had known in
    Berlin. During the next 10 years, Horney and Fromm were close friends, greatly
    influencing one another and eventually becoming lovers (Hornstein, 2000).
    After 2 years in Chicago, Horney moved to New York, where she taught at the
    New School for Social Research. While in New York, she became a member of the
    Zodiac group that included Fromm, Fromm-Reichmann, and others. Although Horney
    was a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, she seldom agreed with the
    established members. Moreover, her book New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939) made
    her the leader of an opposition group. In this book, Horney called for abandoning
    the instinct theory and placing more emphasis on ego and social influences. In
    1941, she resigned from the institute over issues of dogma and orthodoxy and helped
    form a rival organization—the Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis
    (AAP). This new group, however, also quickly suffered from internal strife. In 1943,
    Fromm (whose intimate relationship with Horney had recently ended) and several oth-
    ers resigned from the AAP, leaving that organization without its strongest members.
    Despite this rift, the association continued, but under a new name—the Karen Horney
    Psychoanalytic Institute. In 1952, Horney established the Karen Horney Clinic.
    In 1950, Horney published her most important work, Neurosis and Human
    Growth. This book sets forth theories that were no longer merely a reaction to Freud
    but rather were an expression of her own creative and independent thinking. After a
    short illness, Horney died of cancer on December 4, 1952. She was 65 years old.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories174
    Introduction to Psychoanalytic
    Social Theory
    The early writings of Karen Horney, like those of Adler, Jung, and Klein, have a
    distinctive Freudian flavor. Like Adler and Jung, she eventually became disen-
    chanted with orthodox psychoanalysis and constructed a revisionist theory that
    reflected her own personal experiences—clinical and otherwise.
    Although Horney wrote nearly exclusively about neuroses and neurotic per-
    sonalities, her works suggest much that is appropriate to normal, healthy develop-
    ment. Culture, especially early childhood experiences, plays a leading role in shaping
    human personality, either neurotic or healthy. Horney, then, agreed with Freud that
    early childhood traumas are important, but she differed from him in her insistence
    that social rather than biological forces are paramount in personality development.
    Horney and Freud Compared
    Horney criticized Freud’s theories on several accounts. First, she cautioned that
    strict adherence to orthodox psychoanalysis would lead to stagnation in both theo-
    retical thought and therapeutic practice (Horney, 1937). Second, Horney (1937,
    1939) objected to Freud’s ideas on feminine psychology, a subject we return to
    later. Third, she stressed the view that psychoanalysis should move beyond instinct
    theory and emphasize the importance of cultural influences in shaping personality.
    “Man is ruled not by the pleasure principle alone but by two guiding principles:
    safety and satisfaction” (Horney, 1939, p. 73). Similarly, she claimed that neuroses
    are not the result of instincts but rather of the person’s “attempt to find paths
    through a wilderness full of unknown dangers” (p. 10). This wilderness is created
    by society and not by instincts or anatomy.
    Despite becoming increasingly critical of Freud, Horney continued to recog-
    nize his perceptive insights. Her main quarrel with Freud was not so much the
    accuracy of his observations but the validity of his interpretations. In general terms,
    she held that Freud’s explanations result in a pessimistic concept of humanity based
    on innate instincts and the stagnation of personality. In contrast, her view of
    humanity is an optimistic one and is centered on cultural forces that are amenable
    to change (Horney, 1950).
    The Impact of Culture
    Although Horney did not overlook the importance of genetic factors, she repeatedly
    emphasized cultural influences as the primary bases for both neurotic and normal
    personality development. Modern culture, she contended, is based on competition
    among individuals. “Everyone is a real or potential competitor of everyone else”
    (Horney, 1937, p. 284). Competitiveness and the basic hostility it spawns result in
    feelings of isolation. These feelings of being alone in a potentially hostile world
    lead to intensified needs for affection, which, in turn, cause people to overvalue
    love. As a result, many people see love and affection as the solution for all their
    problems. Genuine love, of course, can be a healthy, growth-producing experience;
    but the desperate need for love (such as that shown by Horney herself ) provides

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 175
    a fertile ground for the development of neuroses. Rather than benefiting from the
    need for love, neurotics strive in pathological ways to find it. Their self-defeating
    attempts result in low self-esteem, increased hostility, basic anxiety, more com-
    petitiveness, and a continuous excessive need for love and affection.
    According to Horney, Western society contributes to this vicious circle in several
    respects. First, people of this society are imbued with the cultural teachings of kinship
    and humility. These teachings, however, run contrary to another prevailing attitude,
    namely, aggressiveness and the drive to win or be superior. Second, society’s demands
    for success and achievement are nearly endless, so that even when people achieve their
    material ambitions, additional goals are continually being placed before them. Third,
    Western society tells people that they are free, that they can accomplish anything
    through hard work and perseverance. In reality, however, the freedom of most people
    is greatly restricted by genetics, social position, and the competitiveness of others.
    These contradictions—all stemming from cultural influences rather than bio-
    logical ones—provide intrapsychic conflicts that threaten the psychological health
    of normal people and provide nearly insurmountable obstacles for neurotics.
    The Importance of Childhood Experiences
    Horney believed that neurotic conflict can stem from almost any developmental
    stage, but childhood is the age from which the vast majority of problems arise. A
    variety of traumatic events, such as sexual abuse, beatings, open rejection, or per-
    vasive neglect, may leave their impressions on a child’s future development; but
    Horney (1937) insisted that these debilitating experiences can almost invariably be
    traced to lack of genuine warmth and affection. Horney’s own lack of love from
    her father and her close relationship with her mother must have had a powerful
    effect on her personal development as well as on her theoretical ideas.
    Horney (1939) hypothesized that a difficult childhood is primarily respon-
    sible for neurotic needs. These needs become powerful because they are the child’s
    only means of gaining feelings of safety. Nevertheless, no single early experience
    is responsible for later personality. Horney cautioned that “the sum total of child-
    hood experiences brings about a certain character structure, or rather, starts its
    development” (p. 152). In other words, the totality of early relationships molds
    personality development. “Later attitudes to others, then, are not repetitions of
    infantile ones but emanate from the character structure, the basis of which is laid
    in childhood” (p. 87).
    Although later experiences can have an important effect, especially in normal
    individuals, childhood experiences are primarily responsible for personality devel-
    opment. People who rigidly repeat patterns of behavior do so because they interpret
    new experiences in a manner consistent with those established patterns.
    Basic Hostility and Basic Anxiety
    Horney (1950) believed that each person begins life with the potential for healthy
    development, but like other living organisms, people need favorable conditions for
    growth. These conditions must include a warm and loving environment yet one
    that is not overly permissive. Children need to experience both genuine love and

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories176
    healthy discipline. Such conditions provide them with feelings of safety and satis-
    faction and permit them to grow in accordance with their real self.
    Unfortunately, a multitude of adverse influences may interfere with these
    favorable conditions. Primary among these is the parents’ inability or unwilling-
    ness to love their child. Because of their own neurotic needs, parents often dom-
    inate, neglect, overprotect, reject, or overindulge. If parents do not satisfy the
    child’s needs for safety and satisfaction, the child develops feelings of basic
    hostility toward the parents. However, children seldom overtly express this hostil-
    ity as rage; instead, they repress their hostility toward their parents and have no
    awareness of it. Repressed hostility then leads to profound feelings of insecurity
    and a vague sense of apprehension. This condition is called basic anxiety, which
    Horney (1950) defined as “a feeling of being isolated and helpless in a world
    conceived as potentially hostile” (p. 18). Earlier, she gave a more graphic descrip-
    tion, calling basic anxiety “a feeling of being small, insignificant, helpless,
    deserted, endangered, in a world that is out to abuse, cheat, attack, humiliate,
    betray, envy” (Horney, 1937, p. 92).
    Horney (1937, p. 75) believed that basic hostility and basic anxiety are “inex-
    tricably interwoven.” Hostile impulses are the principal source of basic anxiety, but
    basic anxiety can also contribute to feelings of hostility. As an example of how
    basic hostility can lead to anxiety, Horney (1937) wrote about a young man with
    repressed hostility who went on a hiking trip in the mountains with a young woman
    with whom he was deeply in love. His repressed hostility, however, also led him
    to become jealous of the woman. While walking on a dangerous mountain pass, the
    young man suddenly suffered a severe “anxiety attack” in the form of rapid heart
    rate and heavy breathing. The anxiety resulted from a seemingly inappropriate but
    conscious impulse to push the young woman over the edge of the mountain pass.
    In this case, basic hostility led to severe anxiety, but anxiety and fear can
    also lead to strong feelings of hostility. Children who feel threatened by their
    parents develop a reactive hostility in defense of that threat. This reactive hostility,
    in turn, may create additional anxiety, thus completing the interactive circle
    between hostility and anxiety. Horney (1937) contended that “it does not matter
    whether anxiety or hostility has been the primary factor” (p. 74). The important
    point is that their reciprocal influence may intensify a neurosis without a person’s
    experiencing any additional outside conflict.
    Basic anxiety itself is not a neurosis, but “it is the nutritive soil out of which a
    definite neurosis may develop at any time” (Horney, 1937, p. 89). Basic anxiety is
    constant and unrelenting, needing no particular stimulus such as taking a test in school
    or giving a speech. It permeates all relationships with others and leads to unhealthy
    ways of trying to cope with people.
    Although she later amended her list of defenses against basic anxiety, Horney
    (1937) originally identified four general ways that people protect themselves against this
    feeling of being alone in a potentially hostile world. The first is affection, a strategy that
    does not always lead to authentic love. In their search for affection, some people may
    try to purchase love with self-effacing compliance, material goods, or sexual favors.
    The second protective device is submissiveness. Neurotics may submit them-
    selves either to people or to institutions such as an organization or a religion. Neu-
    rotics who submit to another person often do so in order to gain affection.

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 177
    Neurotics may also try to protect themselves by striving for power, prestige,
    or possession. Power is a defense against the real or imagined hostility of others
    and takes the form of a tendency to dominate others; prestige is a protection against
    humiliation and is expressed as a tendency to humiliate others; possession acts as
    a buffer against destitution and poverty and manifests itself as a tendency to deprive
    others.
    The fourth protective mechanism is withdrawal. Neurotics frequently protect
    themselves against basic anxiety either by developing an independence from others
    or by becoming emotionally detached from them. By psychologically withdrawing,
    neurotics feel that they cannot be hurt by other people.
    These protective devices did not necessarily indicate a neurosis, and Horney
    believed that all people use them to some extent. They become unhealthy when
    peo ple feel compelled to rely on them and are thus unable to employ a variety of
    inter personal strategies. Compulsion, then, is the salient characteristic of all neu-
    rotic drives.
    Compulsive Drives
    Neurotic individuals have the same problems that affect normal people, except
    neurotics experience them to a greater degree. Everyone uses the various protective
    devices to guard against the rejection, hostility, and competitiveness of others. But
    whereas normal individuals are able to use a variety of defensive maneuvers in a
    somewhat useful way, neurotics compulsively repeat the same strategy in an essen-
    tially unproductive manner.
    Horney (1942) insisted that neurotics do not enjoy misery and suffering.
    They cannot change their behavior by free will but must continually and compul-
    sively protect themselves against basic anxiety. This defensive strategy traps them
    in a vicious circle in which their compulsive needs to reduce basic anxiety lead to
    behaviors that perpetuate low self-esteem, generalized hostility, inappropriate striv-
    ing for power, inflated feelings of superiority, and persistent apprehension, all of
    which result in more basic anxiety.
    Neurotic Needs
    At the beginning of this chapter, we asked you to select either “True” or “False”
    for each of 10 items that might suggest a neurotic need. For each item except
    number 8, a “True” response parallels one of Horney’s neurotic needs. For number
    8, a “False” answer is consistent with the neurotic need for self-centeredness.
    Remember that endorsing most or even all of these statements in the “neurotic”
    direction is no indication of emotional instability, but these items may give you a
    better understanding of what Horney meant by neurotic needs.
    Horney tentatively identified 10 categories of neurotic needs that character-
    ize neurotics in their attempts to combat basic anxiety. These needs were more
    specific than the four protective devices discussed earlier, but they describe the
    same basic defensive strategies. The 10 categories of neurotic needs overlapped
    one another, and a single person might employ more than one. Each of the following
    neurotic needs relates in some way or another to other people.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories178
    1. The neurotic need for affection and approval. In their quest for affection
    and approval, neurotics attempt indiscriminately to please others. They try
    to live up to the expectations of others, tend to dread self-assertion, and
    are quite uncomfortable with the hostility of others as well as the hostile
    feelings within themselves.
    2. The neurotic need for a powerful partner. Lacking self-confidence,
    neurotics try to attach themselves to a powerful partner. This need includes
    an overvaluation of love and a dread of being alone or deserted. Horney’s
    own life story reveals a strong need to relate to a great man, and she had a
    series of such relationships during her adult life.
    3. The neurotic need to restrict one’s life within narrow borders. Neurotics
    frequently strive to remain inconspicuous, to take second place, and to be
    content with very little. They downgrade their own abilities and dread
    making demands on others.
    4. The neurotic need for power. Power and affection are perhaps the two
    greatest neurotic needs. The need for power is usually combined with the
    needs for prestige and possession and manifests itself as the need to
    control others and to avoid feelings of weakness or stupidity.
    5. The neurotic need to exploit others. Neurotics frequently evaluate others
    on the basis of how they can be used or exploited, but at the same time,
    they fear being exploited by others.
    6. The neurotic need for social recognition or prestige. Some people combat
    basic anxiety by trying to be first, to be important, or to attract attention to
    themselves.
    7. The neurotic need for personal admiration. Neurotics have a need to be
    admired for what they are rather than for what they possess. Their inflated
    self-esteem must be continually fed by the admiration and approval of others.
    8. The neurotic need for ambition and personal achievement. Neurotics often
    have a strong drive to be the best—the best salesperson, the best bowler,
    the best lover. They must defeat other people in order to confirm their
    superiority.
    9. The neurotic need for self-sufficiency and independence. Many neurotics
    have a strong need to move away from people, thereby proving that they
    can get along without others. The playboy who cannot be tied down by
    any woman exemplifies this neurotic need.
    10. The neurotic need for perfection and unassailability. By striving
    relentlessly for perfection, neurotics receive “proof” of their self-esteem
    and personal superiority. They dread making mistakes and having personal
    flaws, and they desperately attempt to hide their weaknesses from others.
    Neurotic Trends
    As her theory evolved, Horney began to see that the list of 10 neurotic needs could
    be grouped into three general categories, each relating to a person’s basic attitude
    toward self and others. In 1945, she identified the three basic attitudes, or neurotic
    trends, as (1) moving toward people, (2) moving against people, and (3) moving
    away from people.

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 179
    Although these neurotic trends constitute Horney’s theory of neurosis, they
    also apply to normal individuals. There are, of course, important differences
    between normal and neurotic attitudes. Whereas normal people are mostly or com-
    pletely conscious of their strategies toward other people, neurotics are unaware of
    their basic attitude; although normals are free to choose their actions, neurotics are
    forced to act; whereas normals experience mild conflict, neurotics experience
    severe and insoluble conflict; and whereas normals can choose from a variety of
    strategies, neurotics are limited to a single trend. Figure 6.1 shows Horney’s con-
    ception of the mutual influence of basic hostility and basic anxiety as well as both
    normal and neurotic defenses against anxiety.
    People can use each of the neurotic trends to solve basic conflict, but unfor-
    tunately, these solutions are essentially nonproductive or neurotic. Horney (1950)
    used the term basic conflict because very young children are driven in all three
    directions—toward, against, and away from people.
    In healthy children, these three drives are not necessarily incompatible. But
    the feelings of isolation and helplessness that Horney described as basic anxiety
    Defenses against anxiety
    Basic anxiety
    Results from parental threats or
    from a defense against hostility
    Basic anxiety
    Results from parental threats or
    from a defense against hostility
    Basic hostility
    Results from childhood feelings of rejection or neglect
    by parents or from a defense against basic anxiety
    Basic anxiety
    Results from parental threats or
    from a defense against hostility
    Normal defenses
    Spontaneous movement
    Toward people
    (friendly, loving personality)
    Against people
    (a survivor in a competitive society)
    Away from people
    (autonomous, serene personality)
    Neurotic defenses
    Compulsive movement
    Toward people
    (compliant personality)
    Against people
    (aggressive personality)
    Away from people
    (detached personality)
    FIGURE 6.1 The Interaction of Basic Hostility and Basic Anxiety with the Defenses
    against Anxiety.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories180
    drive some children to act compulsively, thereby limiting their repertoire to a sin-
    gle neurotic trend. Experiencing basically contradictory attitudes toward others,
    these children attempt to solve this basic conflict by making one of the three
    neurotic trends consistently dominant. Some children move toward people by
    behaving in a compliant manner as a protection against feelings of helplessness;
    other children move against people with acts of aggression in order to circumvent
    the hostility of others; and still other children move away from people by adopting
    a detached manner, thus alleviating feelings of isolation (Horney, 1945).
    Moving Toward People
    Horney’s concept of moving toward people does not mean moving toward them
    in the spirit of genuine love. Rather, it refers to a neurotic need to protect oneself
    against feelings of helplessness.
    In their attempts to protect themselves against feelings of helplessness, com-
    pliant people employ either or both of the first two neurotic needs; that is, they
    desperately strive for affection and approval of others, or they seek a powerful
    partner who will take responsibility for their lives. Horney (1937) referred to these
    needs as “morbid dependency,” a concept that anticipated the term “codependency.”
    The neurotic trend of moving toward people involves a complex of strategies.
    It is “a whole way of thinking, feeling, acting—a whole way of life” (Horney, 1945,
    p. 55). Horney also called it a philosophy of life. Neurotics who adopt this phi-
    losophy are likely to see themselves as loving, generous, unselfish, humble, and
    sensitive to other people’s feelings. They are willing to subordinate themselves to
    others, to see others as more intelligent or attractive, and to rate themselves accord-
    ing to what others think of them.
    Moving Against People
    Just as compliant people assume that everyone is nice, aggressive people take for
    granted that everyone is hostile. As a result, they adopt the strategy of moving
    against people. Neurotically aggressive people are just as compulsive as compliant
    people are, and their behavior is just as much prompted by basic anxiety. Rather than
    moving toward people in a posture of submissiveness and dependence, these people
    move against others by appearing tough or ruthless. They are motivated by a strong
    need to exploit others and to use them for their own benefit. They seldom admit their
    mistakes and are compulsively driven to appear perfect, powerful, and superior.
    Five of the 10 neurotic needs are incorporated in the neurotic trend of mov-
    ing against people. They include the need to be powerful, to exploit others, to
    receive recognition and prestige, to be admired, and to achieve. Aggressive people
    play to win rather than for the enjoyment of the contest. They may appear to be
    hard working and resourceful on the job, but they take little pleasure in the work
    itself. Their basic motivation is for power, prestige, and personal ambition.
    In the United States, the striving for these goals is usually viewed with
    admiration. Compulsively aggressive people, in fact, frequently come out on top
    in many endeavors valued by American society. They may acquire desirable sex
    partners, high-paying jobs, and the personal admiration of many people. Horney
    (1945) said that it is not to the credit of American society that such characteristics
    are rewarded while love, affection, and the capacity for true friendship—the very
    qualities that aggressive people lack—are valued less highly.

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 181
    Moving toward others and moving against others are, in many ways, polar
    opposites. The compliant person is compelled to receive affection from everyone,
    whereas the aggressive person sees everyone as a potential enemy. For both types,
    however, “the center of gravity lies outside the person” (Horney, 1945, p. 65). Both
    need other people. Compliant people need others to satisfy their feelings of helpless-
    ness; aggressive people use others as a protection against real or imagined hostility.
    With the third neurotic trend, in contrast, other people are of lesser importance.
    Moving Away From People
    In order to solve the basic conflict of isolation, some people behave in a detached
    manner and adopt a neurotic trend of moving away from people. This strategy is an
    expression of needs for privacy, independence, and self-sufficiency. Again, each of
    these needs can lead to positive behaviors, with some people satisfying these needs in
    a healthy fashion. However, these needs become neurotic when people try to satisfy
    them by compulsively putting emotional distance between themselves and other people.
    Many neurotics find associating with others an intolerable strain. As a conse-
    quence, they are compulsively driven to move away from people, to attain autonomy
    and separateness. They frequently build a world of their own and refuse to allow any-
    one to get close to them. They value freedom and self-sufficiency and often appear to
    be aloof and unapproachable. If married, they maintain their detachment even from their
    spouse. They shun social commitments, but their greatest fear is to need other people.
    All neurotics possess a need to feel superior, but detached persons have an
    intensified need to be strong and powerful. Their basic feelings of isolation can
    be tolerated only by the self-deceptive belief that they are perfect and therefore
    beyond criticism. They dread competition, fearing a blow to their illusory feelings
    Moving away from people is a neurotic trend that many people use in an attempt to solve the basic
    conflict of isolation. © Image Source, all rights reserved.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories182
    of superiority. Instead, they prefer that their hidden greatness be recognized with-
    out any effort on their part (Horney, 1945).
    In summary, each of the three neurotic trends has an analogous set of char-
    acteristics that describe normal individuals. In addition, each of 10 neurotic needs
    can be easily placed within the three neurotic trends. Table 6.1 summarizes the
    three neurotic trends, the basic conflicts that give rise to them, the outstanding
    characteristics of each, the 10 neurotic needs that compose them, and the three
    analogous traits that characterize normal people.
    Intrapsychic Conflicts
    The neurotic trends flow from basic anxiety, which in turn, stems from a child’s
    relationships with other people. To this point, our emphasis has been on culture and
    interpersonal conflict. However, Horney did not neglect the impact of intrapsychic
    factors in the development of personality. As her theory evolved, she began to place
    T A B L E 6 . 1
    Summary of Horney’s Neurotic Trends
    Basic conflict
    or source of
    neurotic trend
    Neurotic needs
    Normal analog
    The Compliant
    Personality
    Feelings of
    helplessness
    1. Affection and
    approval
    2. Powerful
    partner
    3. Narrow limits
    to life
    Friendly, loving
    The Detached
    Personality
    Feelings of
    isolation
    9. Self-sufficiency
    and
    independence
    10. Perfection and
    prestige
    Autonomous and
    serene
    The Aggressive
    Personality
    Protection against
    hostility of
    others
    4. Power
    5. Exploitation
    6. Recognition
    and
    unassailability
    7. Personal
    admiration
    8. Personal
    achievement
    Ability to survive
    in a
    competitive
    society
    Neurotic Trends
    Toward People Against People Away from People

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 183
    greater emphasis on the inner conflicts that both normal and neurotic individuals
    experience. Intrapsychic processes originate from interpersonal experiences; but as
    they become part of a person’s belief system, they develop a life of their own—an
    existence separate from the interpersonal conflicts that gave them life.
    This section looks at two important intrapsychic conflicts: the idealized self-
    image and self-hatred. Briefly, the idealized self-image is an attempt to solve
    conflicts by painting a godlike picture of oneself. Self-hatred is an interrelated yet
    equally irrational and powerful tendency to despise one’s real self. As people build
    an idealized image of their self, their real self lags farther and farther behind. This
    gap creates a growing alienation between the real self and the idealized self and
    leads neurotics to hate and despise their actual self because it falls so short in
    matching the glorified self-image (Horney, 1950).
    The Idealized Self-Image
    Horney believed that human beings, if given an environment of discipline and
    warmth, will develop feelings of security and self-confidence and a tendency to
    move toward self-realization. Unfortunately, early negative influences often impede
    people’s natural tendency toward self-realization, a situation that leaves them with
    feelings of isolation and inferiority. Added to this failure is a growing sense of
    alienation from themselves.
    Feeling alienated from themselves, people need desperately to acquire a
    stable sense of identity. This dilemma can be solved only by creating an idealized
    self-image, an extravagantly positive view of themselves that exists only in their
    personal belief system. These people endow themselves with infinite powers and
    unlimited capabilities; they see themselves as “a hero, a genius, a supreme lover,
    a saint, a god” (Horney, 1950, p. 22). The idealized self-image is not a global
    construction. Neurotics glorify and worship themselves in different ways. Compli-
    ant people see themselves as good and saintly; aggressive people build an idealized
    image of themselves as strong, heroic, and omnipotent; and detached neurotics
    paint their self-portraits as wise, self-sufficient, and independent.
    As the idealized self-image becomes solidified, neurotics begin to believe in
    the reality of that image. They lose touch with their real self and use the idealized
    self as the standard for self-evaluation. Rather than growing toward self-realization,
    they move toward actualizing their idealized self.
    Horney (1950) recognized three aspects of the idealized image: (1) the neu-
    rotic search for glory, (2) neurotic claims, and (3) neurotic pride.
    The Neurotic Search for Glory
    As neurotics come to believe in the reality of their idealized self, they begin to
    incorporate it into all aspects of their lives—their goals, their self-concept, and
    their relations with others. Horney (1950) referred to this comprehensive drive
    toward actualizing the ideal self as the neurotic search for glory.
    In addition to self-idealization, the neurotic search for glory includes three
    other elements: the need for perfection, neurotic ambition, and the drive toward a
    vindictive triumph.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories184
    The need for perfection refers to the drive to mold the whole personality into
    the idealized self. Neurotics are not content to merely make a few alterations;
    nothing short of complete perfection is acceptable. They try to achieve perfection
    by erecting a complex set of “shoulds” and “should nots.” Horney (1950) referred
    to this drive as the tyranny of the should. Striving toward an imaginary picture
    of perfection, neurotics unconsciously tell themselves: “Forget about the disgrace-
    ful creature you actually are; this is how you should be” (p. 64).
    A second key element in the neurotic search for glory is neurotic ambition,
    that is, the compulsive drive toward superiority. Although neurotics have an
    exaggerated need to excel in everything, they ordinarily channel their energies
    into those activities that are most likely to bring success. This drive, therefore,
    may take several different forms during a person’s lifetime (Horney, 1950). For
    example, while still in school, a girl may direct her neurotic ambition toward
    being the best student in school. Later, she may be driven to excel in business
    or to raise the very best show dogs. Neurotic ambition may also take a less
    materialistic form, such as being the most saintly or most charitable person in
    the community.
    The third aspect of the neurotic search for glory is the drive toward a vindic-
    tive triumph, the most destructive element of all. The need for a vindictive triumph
    may be disguised as a drive for achievement or success, but “its chief aim is to
    put others to shame or defeat them through one’s very success; or to attain the
    power . . . to inflict suffering on them—mostly of a humiliating kind” (Horney,
    1950, p. 27). Interestingly, in Horney’s personal relationship with men, she seemed
    to take pleasure in causing them to feel ashamed and humiliated (Hornstein, 2000).
    The drive for a vindictive triumph grows out of the childhood desire to take
    revenge for real or imagined humiliations. No matter how successful neurotics are
    in vindictively triumphing over others, they never lose their drive for a vindictive
    triumph—instead, they increase it with each victory. Every success raises their fear
    of defeat and increases their feelings of grandeur, thus solidifying their need for
    further vindictive triumphs.
    Neurotic Claims
    A second aspect of the idealized image is neurotic claims. In their search for glory,
    neurotics build a fantasy world—a world that is out of sync with the real world.
    Believing that something is wrong with the outside world, they proclaim that they
    are special and therefore entitled to be treated in accordance with their idealized view
    of themselves. Because these demands are very much in accord with their idealized
    self-image, they fail to see that their claims of special privilege are unreasonable.
    Neurotic claims grow out of normal needs and wishes, but they are quite
    different. When normal wishes are not fulfilled, people become understandably frus-
    trated; but when neurotic claims are not met, neurotics become indignant, bewildered,
    and unable to comprehend why others have not granted their claims. The difference
    between normal desires and neurotic claims is illustrated by a situation in which many
    people are waiting in line for tickets for a popular movie. Most people near the end
    of the line might wish to be up front, and some of them may even try some ploy to
    get a better position. Nevertheless, these people know that they don’t really deserve
    to cut ahead of others. Neurotic people, on the other hand, truly believe that they are

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 185
    entitled to be near the
    front of the line, and they
    feel no guilt or remorse in
    moving ahead of others.
    Neurotic Pride
    The third aspect of an
    idealized image is
    neurotic pride, a false
    pride based not on a real-
    istic view of the true self
    but on a spurious image
    of the idealized self.
    Neurotic pride is qualita-
    tively different from
    healthy pride or realistic
    self-esteem. Genuine
    self-esteem is based on
    realistic attributes and
    accomplishments and is
    generally expressed with
    quiet dignity. Neurotic pride, on the other hand, is based on an idealized image of
    self and is usually loudly proclaimed in order to protect and support a glorified view
    of one’s self (Horney, 1950).
    Neurotics imagine themselves to be glorious, wonderful, and perfect, so when
    others fail to treat them with special consideration, their neurotic pride is hurt. To
    prevent the hurt, they avoid people who refuse to yield to their neurotic claims,
    and instead, they try to become associated with socially prominent and prestigious
    institutions and acquisitions.
    Self-Hatred
    People with a neurotic search for glory can never be happy with themselves because
    when they realize that their real self does not match the insatiable demands of their
    idealized self, they will begin to hate and despise themselves:
    The glorified self becomes not only a phantom to be pursued; it also becomes a
    measuring rod with which to measure his actual being. And this actual being is
    such an embarrassing sight when viewed from the perspective of a godlike
    perfection that he cannot but despise it. (Horney, 1950, p. 110)
    Horney (1950) recognized six major ways in which people express self-hatred.
    First, self-hatred may result in relentless demands on the self, which are exemplified
    by the tyranny of the should. For example, some people make demands on themselves
    that don’t stop even when they achieve a measure of success. These people continue
    to push themselves toward perfection because they believe they should be perfect.
    The second mode of expressing self-hatred is merciless self-accusation. Neu-
    rotics constantly berate themselves. “If people only knew me, they would realize
    Many people carry the burden of the “tyranny of the should.”
    © Martin Barraud/OJO Images/Getty Images

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories186
    that I’m pretending to be knowledgeable, competent, and sincere. I’m really a
    fraud, but no one knows it but me.” Self-accusation may take a variety of forms—
    from obviously grandiose expressions, such as taking responsibility for natural
    disasters, to scrupulously questioning the virtue of their own motivations.
    Third, self-hatred may take the form of self-contempt, which might be
    expressed as belittling, disparaging, doubting, discrediting, and ridiculing oneself.
    Self-contempt prevents people from striving for improvement or achievement. A
    young man may say to himself, “You conceited idiot! What makes you think you
    can get a date with the best-looking woman in town?” A woman may attribute her
    successful career to “luck.” Although these people may be aware of their behavior,
    they have no perception of the self-hatred that motivates it.
    A fourth expression of self-hatred is self-frustration. Horney (1950) distin-
    guished between healthy self-discipline and neurotic self-frustration. The former
    involves postponing or forgoing pleasurable activities in order to achieve reason-
    able goals. Self-frustration stems from self-hatred and is designed to actualize an
    inflated self-image. Neurotics are frequently shackled by taboos against enjoyment.
    “I don’t deserve a new car.” “I must not wear nice clothes because many people
    around the world are in rags.” “I must not strive for a better job because I’m not
    good enough for it.”
    Fifth, self-hatred may be manifested as self-torment, or self-torture. Although
    self-torment can exist in each of the other forms of self-hatred, it becomes a sep-
    arate category when people’s main intention is to inflict harm or suffering on
    themselves. Some people attain masochistic satisfaction by anguishing over a deci-
    sion, exaggerating the pain of a headache, cutting themselves with a knife, starting
    a fight that they are sure to lose, or inviting physical abuse.
    The sixth and final form of self-hatred is self-destructive actions and impulses,
    which may be either physical or psychological, conscious or unconscious, acute or
    chronic, carried out in action or enacted only in the imagination. Overeating, abus-
    ing alcohol and other drugs, working too hard, driving recklessly, and suicide are
    common expressions of physical self-destruction. Neurotics may also attack them-
    selves psychologically, for example, quitting a job just when it begins to be fulfill-
    ing, breaking off a healthy relationship in favor of a neurotic one, or engaging in
    promiscuous sexual activities.
    Horney (1950) summarized the neurotic search for glory and its attendant
    self-hatred with these descriptive words:
    Surveying self-hate and its ravaging force, we cannot help but see in it a great
    tragedy, perhaps the greatest tragedy of the human mind. Man in reaching out
    for the Infinite and Absolute also starts destroying himself. When he makes a
    pact with the devil, who promises him glory, he has to go to hell—to the hell
    within himself. (p. 154)
    Feminine Psychology
    As a woman trained in the promasculine psychology of Freud, Horney gradually
    realized that the traditional psychoanalytic view of women was skewed. She then
    set forth her own theory, one that rejected several of Freud’s basic ideas.

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 187
    For Horney, psychic differences between men and women are not the result
    of anatomy but rather of cultural and social expectations. Men who subdue and
    rule women and women who degrade or envy men do so because of the neurotic
    competitiveness that is rampant in many societies. Horney (1937) insisted that
    basic anxiety is at the core of men’s need to subjugate women and women’s wish
    to humiliate men.
    Although Horney (1939) recognized the existence of the Oedipus complex,
    she insisted that it was due to certain environmental conditions and not to biology.
    If it were the result of anatomy, as Freud contended, then it would be universal
    (as Freud indeed believed). However, Horney (1967) saw no evidence for a uni-
    versal Oedipus complex. Instead, she held that it is found only in some people and
    is an expression of the neurotic need for love. The neurotic need for affection and
    the neurotic need for aggression usually begin in childhood and are two of the
    three basic neurotic trends. A child may passionately cling to one parent and
    express jealousy toward the other, but these behaviors are means of alleviating
    basic anxiety and not manifestations of an anatomically based Oedipus complex.
    Even when there is a sexual aspect to these behaviors, the child’s main goal is
    security, not sexual intercourse.
    Horney (1939) found the concept of penis envy even less tenable. She contended
    that there is no more anatomical reason why girls should be envious of the penis than
    boys should desire a breast or a womb. In fact, boys sometimes do express a desire
    to have a baby, but this desire is not the result of a universal male “womb envy.”
    Horney agreed with Adler that many women possess a masculine protest;
    that is, they have a pathological belief that men are superior to women. This per-
    ception easily leads to the neurotic desire to be a man. The desire, however, is not
    an expression of penis envy but rather “a wish for all those qualities or privileges
    which in our culture are regarded as masculine” (Horney, 1939, p. 108). (This view
    is nearly identical to that expressed by Erikson.)
    In 1994, Bernard J. Paris published a talk that Horney had delivered in 1935 to
    a professional and business women’s club in which she summarized her ideas on
    feminine psychology. By that time Horney was less interested in differences between
    men and women than in a general psychology of both genders. Because culture and
    society are responsible for psychological differences between women and men, Horney
    felt that “it was not so important to try to find the answer to the question about differ-
    ences as to understand and analyze the real significance of this keen interest in feminine
    ‘nature’ ” (Horney, 1994, p. 233). Horney concluded her speech by saying that
    once and for all we should stop bothering about what is feminine and what is
    not. Such concerns only undermine our energies. Standards of masculinity and
    femininity are artificial standards. All that we definitely know at present about
    sex differences is that we do not know what they are. Scientific differences
    between the two sexes certainly exist, but we shall never be able to discover
    what they are until we have first developed our potentialities as human beings.
    Paradoxical as it may sound, we shall find out about these differences only if
    we forget about them. (p. 238)
    One prominent contemporary feminist psychological scientist who has taken
    up the cause of “forgetting” about gender differences that Karen Horney so force-
    fully articulated is Janet Shibley Hyde. In 2005, she published a landmark piece

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories188
    in The American Psychologist. In it, instead of testing the commonly held gender
    differences model, she analyzed meta-analyses of gender differences to test the
    opposite prediction: that males and females are more alike than they are different.
    One nagging problem in the study of gender differences and similarities is
    embedded in the very nature of empirical science, and Hyde’s method provided a
    way of getting around it. That is, comparing groups relies on statistical tests of
    significant difference. When differences do not reach statistical significance, then
    such a study is typically not published. This is referred to as the “file drawer
    problem.” Consider the fact that there are likely countless studies of gender dif-
    ferences in all kinds of cognitive, behavioral, and emotional domains that did not
    result in statistically significant differences between males and females, and these
    were put in some researchers’ file drawers because the results did not reach the
    standard for publication. This means we have more evidence for differences
    between the genders not necessarily because they are meaningfully and lastingly
    there, but because only the studies that resulted in difference got published.
    Meta-analysis is a statistical method of systematically combining data from
    many studies (published and unpublished). This increases power over individual
    studies, and can improve our capacity to estimate the size of effects. Hyde’s (2005)
    analysis did just this, examining 46 meta-analyses, each of which included between
    20 and 200 individual gender difference studies, and her examination of effect sizes
    supported the gender similarities hypothesis. That is, there were far more arenas
    where gender differences were either meaninglessly small in effect size, or nonex-
    istent, than the areas where the genders did differ significantly. In some of the
    arenas in which we hold the strongest stereotypes about males and females being
    different, such as math and verbal ability as well as aggression, self-esteem, and
    assertiveness, Hyde found that gender differences were negligible.
    It seems that our culture’s obsession with gender difference has remained
    strong since Horney’s day, despite her insistence that we ought to stop “bothering
    about what is feminine and what is not.” Women are apparently from Venus and
    men are supposedly from Mars. Google “gender differences” and you get over 9 million
    results! Why do we persist in believing so strongly in gender differences in person-
    ality, despite powerful evidence that they are barely there at all? One answer is
    that thinking males and females come from different planets appeals to our intu-
    itions. The danger here, of course, is that our expectations likely guide our cogni-
    tions and our behaviors, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. We likely make gender
    differences come true when we believe that women are “bad at math” or men are
    “not emotional.” When we treat each gender based on these expectations, then we
    should not be surprised that they behave accordingly. If a girl is not expected to
    perform well in math, her parents might not encourage her to study, and she may
    begin to lack confidence and eventually not, in fact, get the education that would
    make her good at math. If a boy is expected to “suck it up” and not cry when he
    feels hurt, he may suppress tears in an effort to be more masculine, and these
    efforts may, over time, create an actual inability to cry in adulthood.
    Hyde (2005) issued a warning in her article about the costs of overinflated
    claims of gender differences: “Arguably they cause harm in numerous realms,
    including women’s opportunities in the workplace, couple conflict and communica-
    tion, and analyses of self-esteem problems among adolescents. Most important,

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 189
    these claims are not consistent with the scientific data” (p. 590). Here we see
    Horney’s prescience when she broke with Freud to insist that cultural and social
    expectations account for any observed personality distinctions between the genders.
    Contemporary psychological science has clearly supported her claims.
    Psychotherapy
    Horney believed that neuroses grow out of basic conflict that usually begins in
    childhood. As people attempt to solve this conflict, they are likely to adopt one of
    the three neurotic trends: namely, moving toward, against, or away from others.
    Each of these tactics can produce temporary relief, but eventually they drive the
    person farther away from actualizing the real self and deeper into a neurotic spiral
    (Horney, 1950).
    The general goal of Horneyian therapy is to help patients gradually grow in
    the direction of self-realization. More specifically, the aim is to have patients give
    up their idealized self-image, relinquish their neurotic search for glory, and change
    self-hatred to an acceptance of the real self. Unfortunately, patients are usually
    convinced that their neurotic solutions are correct, so they are reluctant to surren-
    der their neurotic trends. Even though patients have a strong investment in main-
    taining the status quo, they do not wish to remain ill. They find little pleasure in
    their sufferings and would like to be free of them. Unfortunately, they tend to resist
    change and cling to those behaviors that perpetuate their illness. The three neurotic
    trends can be cast in favorable terms such as “love,” “mastery,” or “freedom.”
    Because patients usually see their behaviors in these positive terms, their actions
    appear to them to be healthy, right, and desirable (Horney, 1942, 1950).
    The therapist’s task is to convince patients that their present solutions are
    perpetuating rather than alleviating the core neurosis, a task that takes much time
    and hard work. Patients may look for quick cures or solutions, but only the long,
    laborious process of self-understanding can effect positive change. Self-understanding
    must go beyond information; it must be accompanied by an emotional experience.
    Patients must understand their pride system, their idealized image, their neurotic
    search for glory, their self-hatred, their shoulds, their alienation from self, and their
    conflicts. Moreover, they must see how all these factors are interrelated and oper-
    ate to preserve their basic neurosis.
    Although a therapist can help encourage patients toward self-understanding,
    ultimately successful therapy is built on self-analysis (Horney, 1942, 1950). Patients
    must understand the difference between their idealized self-image and their real
    self. Fortunately, people possess an inherent curative force that allows them to
    move inevitably in the direction of self-realization once self-understanding and
    self-analysis are achieved.
    As to techniques, Horneyian therapists use many of the same ones employed
    by Freudian therapists, especially dream interpretation and free association. Horney
    saw dreams as attempts to solve conflicts, but the solutions can be either neurotic
    or healthy. When therapists provide a correct interpretation, patients are helped
    toward a better understanding of their real self. “From dreams . . . the patient can
    catch a glimpse, even in the initial phase of analysis, of a world operating within

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories190
    him which is peculiarly his own and which is more true of his feelings than the
    world of his illusions” (Horney, 1950, p. 349).
    With the second major technique, free association, patients are asked to say every-
    thing that comes to mind regardless of how trivial or embarrassing it may seem (Horney,
    1987). They are also encouraged to express whatever feelings may arise from the asso-
    ciations. As with dream interpretation, free association eventually reveals patients’ ide-
    alized self-image and persistent but unsuccessful attempts at accomplishing it.
    When therapy is successful, patients gradually develop confidence in their
    ability to assume responsibility for their psychological development. They move
    toward self-realization and all those processes that accompany it; they have a
    deeper and clearer understanding of their feelings, beliefs, and wishes; they relate
    to others with genuine feelings instead of using people to solve basic conflicts; at
    work, they take a greater interest in the job itself rather than seeing it as a means
    to perpetuate a neurotic search for glory.
    Related Research
    Horney’s psychoanalytic social theory has not directly inspired a great deal of
    research in modern personality psychology. Her musings on neurotic trends however
    are quite relevant to much of the research being conducted today on neuroticism.
    Frederick Coolidge and his colleagues have spent some years developing and validat-
    ing an instrument designed to classify individuals on the neurotic trends.
    Developing and Validating a New Measure of Horney’s
    Neurotic Trends
    Frederick Coolidge and his colleagues in recent years have worked to operational-
    ize Karen Horney’s three neurotic trends, developing and testing the psychometric
    properties of an instrument called The Horney-Coolidge Tridimensional Inventory,
    or HCTI (Coolidge, Moor, Yamazaki, Stewart, & Segal, 2001; Coolidge, Segal,
    Benight, & Danielian, 2004; Coolidge, Segal, Estey, & Neuzil, 2011). The HCTI
    measures Horney’s personality dimensions in strict accordance with her theory,
    identifying Compliance (Toward), Aggression (Against), and Detachment (Away)
    as the primary dimensions, and three facets for each of those dimensions (Coolidge
    et al., 2001). For the Compliance scale, the three facets are Altruism (desire to help
    others), Need for Relationships (strong need/desire to be in a relationship), and
    Self-Abasement (subjugation of own needs to others’). For the Aggression scale,
    the three facets are Malevolence (malevolent view of others’ motivations), Power
    (desire to be in command), and Strength (bravery, toughness). And finally, for the
    Detachment scale, the three facets are Need for Aloneness (preference for being
    alone), Avoidance (resistance to personal interactions), and Self-Sufficiency (enjoy-
    ment of living independently of family and friends). Each of these subscales has
    acceptable internal reliability—that is, the questions are adequately correlated with
    one another.
    In one study of the construct validity of the HCTI, Coolidge et al. (2004)
    found evidence for the usefulness of Horney’s theory in understanding personality

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 191
    disorders. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) contains “clusters” of
    personality disorders. Cluster A personality disorders are known as the odd or
    eccentric disorders and include paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal. Cluster B are
    the dramatic, emotional, or erratic group, and include antisocial, borderline, his-
    trionic, and narcissistic. Cluster C, the anxious and fearful group of disorders,
    includes avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive. Their study showed that
    the Cluster A disorders were negatively correlated with the features of Horney’s
    Compliant Type, confirming that people with these disorders do not exhibit sym-
    pathetic or altruistic behaviors, and have a low need for relationships. In contrast,
    the Cluster C group correlated positively with Compliance. For the Cluster B
    group, Aggression was the strongest predictor, suggesting that people with these
    disorders behave erratically, and often show hurtful intent toward others and
    themselves.
    In research on the predictive validity of the HCTI, Rosowsky and colleagues
    (2012) explored the question of whether Horney’s trends predicted marital satisfac-
    tion in long-term married couples, that is, those who were married for 40 years or
    more. The study administered the Comprehensive Marital Satisfaction Scale
    (CMSS, Blum & Mehrabian, 1999) and the Horney-Coolidge Tridimensional
    Inventory (HCTI) to 32 couples who were married 40 years or more (mean age
    for men was 74 and for women it was 73). The main finding was that husbands
    and wives who had low scores on the Detachment scale (moving away) were hap-
    pier in their marriages than those who score high on detachment. In short, detach-
    ment is associated with an unhappy marriage. Interestingly, moving toward
    (compliance) and moving against (aggression) were unrelated to marital satisfac-
    tion in both wives and husbands.
    In another study, Coolidge et al. (2011) established the psychometric proper-
    ties of a child and adolescent version of the HCTI. These authors wanted to test the
    validity of Horney’s contention that cultural, familial, and childhood experience
    shape the three trends. They reasoned that if this were the case, the trends should
    manifest themselves relatively early in life. Parents of over 300 children, ages 5–17,
    completed the revised instrument, and indeed sufficient internal and test-retest reli-
    ability as well as construct validity emerged.
    In sum, Coolidge and colleagues’ work with their HCTI strongly suggests
    that Horney’s theory provides a parsimonious way of understanding three
    important facets of normal and disordered personality, and for adults as well as
    children. Further research on the predictive value of these new scales in clinical
    and nonclinical settings is surely warranted, but for now it seems clear that
    Horney’s perspective holds up in psychometric research operationalizing her
    three neurotic trends.
    Can Neuroticism Ever Be a Good Thing?
    Horney’s theory, as well as most of the work in personality psychology, paints
    neuroticism rather negatively. Based on the research reviewed in the previous sec-
    tion on neuroticism and avoidance goals and the associated negative outcomes, the
    negative bias toward neuroticism is understandable. Some recent research has

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories192
    begun investigating conditions under which neuroticism might not be all negative
    and, ironically, may actually have some benefits.
    Michael Robinson and colleagues (Robinson, Ode, Wilkowski, & Amodio,
    2007) asked the question “How could one be a successful neurotic?” Surely it’s
    tough to be a successful neurotic. People high in neuroticism are constantly
    drawn toward avoidance goals and dealing with basic anxiety by using all the
    detrimental neurotic defenses described by Horney. But there may be some cases
    where neuroticism is good, specifically in detecting threats. Neurotics are pre-
    disposed to avoid threats (and any negative outcome). Therefore, Robinson and
    colleagues designed a study to investigate the relationship between neuroticism,
    recognition of threats, and mood. They predicted that for those high in neu-
    roticism, the ability to accurately recognize threats in the environment would
    be related to decreased negative mood. In other words, the neurotic sensitivity
    to threat would serve a purpose in that such people could recognize problems,
    and presumably avoid them, and that successful avoidance would make them
    feel better.
    To test this hypothesis, Robinson and colleagues (2007) had 181 students
    come into the lab and complete a self-report measure of neuroticism and then
    engage in a computer task that measured their ability to accurately detect threats.
    The team then assessed what students did upon making an error in detecting a
    threat. If a person makes an error, the adaptive thing to do would be to slow
    down and assess the situation more carefully. But not everyone does this, and
    the computer task used by Robinson and colleagues measured whether people
    exhibited the appropriate response to making an error. The computer task con-
    sisted of a word appearing on a computer screen and then the participant, as
    quickly as possible, had to determine whether or not the word represented a
    threat. For example, the word “stench” does not represent a threat, but the word
    “knife” does. The computer kept track of how long participants took at deciding
    whether or not the word was a threat and whether or not the participant correctly
    identified the threat. Additionally, when the participant made an error, the com-
    puter also kept track of how long a participant took to determine whether or not
    the next word to appear on the screen represented a threat. Once the researchers
    had each participant’s neuroticism score and a good measure of how they detected
    threats and reacted to errors, participants were asked to keep track of their mood
    over the next 7 days.
    Interestingly, Robinson and colleagues found that there actually is a way to
    be a “successful neurotic.” Specifically, they discovered that for those who are
    predisposed toward being neurotic, the ability to react adaptively to errors (i.e., to
    slow down and think carefully) while assessing threat was related to experiencing
    less negative mood in daily life (Robinson et al., 2007).
    Generally speaking, it may not be a positive thing to be neurotic and con-
    stantly obsessed with avoiding negative outcomes, but there is only so much about
    our personality that is in our control. Neurotic people cannot simply wake up one
    day and stop being neurotic. Neurotic trends and related defenses outlined by
    Horney are stable and durable aspects of individuals’ personalities that are not
    likely to change suddenly. Therefore, it is important to realize that, though much

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 193
    research shows the dark side of neuroticism, it is not all bad news. Many neurotic
    people are quite skilled at avoiding negative outcomes, and the avoidance of these
    outcomes does indeed make them feel better on a daily basis.
    Critique of Horney
    Horney’s social psychoanalytic theory provides interesting perspectives on the
    nature of humanity, but it suffers from lack of current research that might support
    her suppositions. The strength of Horney’s theory is her lucid portrayal of the
    neurotic personality. No other personality theorist has written so well (or so much)
    about neuroses. Her comprehensive descriptions of neurotic personalities provide an
    excellent framework for understanding unhealthy people. However, her nearly
    exclusive concern with neurotics is a serious limitation to her theory. Her refer-
    ences to the normal or healthy personality are general and not well explicated. She
    believed that people by their very nature will strive toward self-realization, but she
    suggested no clear picture of what self-realization would be.
    Horney’s theory falls short on its power both to generate research and to
    submit to the criterion of falsifiability. Speculations from the theory do not easily
    yield testable hypotheses and therefore lack both verifiability and falsifiability.
    Horney’s theory was based largely on clinical experiences that put her in contact
    mostly with neurotic individuals. To her credit, she was reluctant to make specific
    assumptions about psychologically healthy individuals. Because her theory deals
    mostly with neurotics, it is rated high on its ability to organize knowledge of neu-
    rotics but very low on its capacity to explain what is known about people in
    general.
    As a guide to action, Horney’s theory fares somewhat better. Teachers, ther-
    apists, and especially parents can use her assumptions concerning the development
    of neurotic trends to provide a warm, safe, and accepting environment for their
    students, patients, or children. Beyond these provisions, however, the theory is not
    specific enough to give the practitioner a clear and detailed course of action. On
    this criterion, the theory receives a low rating.
    Is Horney’s theory internally consistent, with clearly defined terms used uni-
    formly? In Horney’s book Neurosis and Human Growth (1950), her concepts and
    formulations are precise, consistent, and unambiguous. However, when all her
    works are examined, a different picture emerges. Through the years, she used terms
    such as “neurotic needs” and “neurotic trends” sometimes separately and some-
    times interchangeably. Also, the terms “basic anxiety” and “basic conflict” were
    not always clearly differentiated. These inconsistencies render her entire work
    somewhat inconsistent, but again, her final theory (1950) is a model of lucidity
    and consistency.
    Another criterion of a useful theory is parsimony, and Horney’s final theory,
    as expressed in the last chapter of Neurosis and Human Growth (Horney, 1950,
    Chap. 15), would receive a high mark on this standard. This chapter, which pro-
    vides a useful and concise introduction to Horney’s theory of neurotic develop-
    ment, is relatively simple, straightforward, and clearly written.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories194
    Concept of Humanity
    Horney’s concept of humanity was based almost entirely on her clinical
    experiences with neurotic patients; therefore, her view of human personality
    is strongly colored by her concept of neurosis. According to Horney, the
    prime difference between a healthy person and a neurotic individual is the
    degree of compulsivity with which each moves toward, against, or away from
    people.
    The compulsive nature of neurotic trends suggests that Horney’s con-
    cept of humanity is deterministic. However, a healthy person would have a
    large element of free choice. Even a neurotic individual, through psycho-
    therapy and hard work, can wrest some control over those intrapsychic con-
    flicts. For this reason, Horney’s psychoanalytic social theory is rated slightly
    higher on free choice than on determinism.
    On the same basis, Horney’s theory is somewhat more optimistic than
    pessimistic. Horney believed that people possess inherent curative powers
    that lead them toward self-realization. If basic anxiety (the feeling of being
    alone and helpless in a potentially hostile world) can be avoided, people will
    feel safe and secure in their interpersonal relations and consequently will
    develop healthy personalities.
    My own belief is that man has the capacity as well as the desire to develop his
    potentialities and become a decent human being, and that these deteriorate if his
    relationship to others and hence to himself is, and continues to be, disturbed.
    I believe that man can change and go on changing as long as he lives.
    (Horney, 1945, p. 19)
    On the dimension of causality versus teleology, Horney adopted a
    middle position. She stated that the natural goal for people is self-realization,
    but she also believed that childhood experiences can block that movement.
    “The past in some way or other is always contained in the present” (Horney,
    1939, p. 153). Included in people’s past experiences, however, is the forma-
    tion of a philosophy of life and a set of values that give both their present
    and their future some direction.
    Although Horney adopted a middle stance regarding conscious versus
    unconscious motivation, she believed that most people have only limited
    awareness of their motives. Neurotics, especially, have little understanding
    of themselves and do not see that their behaviors guarantee the continua-
    tion of their neuroses. They mislabel their personal characteristics, couching
    them in socially acceptable terms, while remaining largely unaware of their
    basic conflict, their self-hate, their neurotic pride and neurotic claims, and
    their need for a vindictive triumph.
    Horney’s concept of personality strongly emphasized social influences
    more than biological ones. Psychological differences between men and
    women, for example, are due more to cultural and societal expectations
    than to anatomy. To Horney, the Oedipus complex and penis envy are not

    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory 195
    inevitable consequences of biology but rather are shaped by social forces.
    Horney did not neglect biological factors completely, but her main empha-
    sis was on social influences.
    Because Horney’s theory looks almost exclusively at neuroses, it tends
    to highlight similarities among people more than uniqueness. Not all neurot-
    ics are alike, of course, and Horney described three basic types—the help-
    less, the hostile, and the detached. However, she placed little emphasis on
    individual differences within each of these categories.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Horney insisted that social and cultural influences were more important
    than biological ones.
    ∙ Children who lack warmth and affection fail to meet their needs for
    safety and satisfaction.
    ∙ These feelings of isolation and helplessness trigger basic anxiety, or
    feelings of isolation and helplessness in a potentially hostile world.
    ∙ The inability of people to use different tactics in their relationships with
    others generates basic conflict: that is, the incompatible tendencies to
    move toward, against, and away from people.
    ∙ Horney called the tendencies to move toward, against, or away from
    people the three neurotic trends.
    ∙ Healthy people solve their basic conflict by using all three neurotic
    trends, whereas neurotics compulsively adopt only one of these trends.
    ∙ The three neurotic trends (moving toward, against, or away from people)
    are a combination of 10 neurotic needs that Horney had earlier identified.
    ∙ Both healthy and neurotic people experience intrapsychic conflicts that
    have become part of their belief system. The two major intrapsychic
    conflicts are the idealized self-image and self-hatred.
    ∙ The idealized self-image results in neurotics’ attempts to build a godlike
    picture of themselves.
    ∙ Self-hatred is the tendency for neurotics to hate and despise their real self.
    ∙ Any psychological differences between men and women are due to
    cultural and social expectations and not to biology.
    ∙ The goal of Horneyian psychotherapy is to bring about growth toward
    actualization of the real self.

    196
    C H A P T E R 7
    Erikson:
    Post-Freudian Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Post-Freudian Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Erik Erikson
    ⬥ The Ego in Post-Freudian Theory
    Society’s Influence
    Epigenetic Principle
    ⬥ Stages of Psychosocial Development
    Infancy
    Early Childhood
    Play Age
    School Age
    Adolescence
    Young Adulthood
    Adulthood
    Old Age
    Summary of the Life Cycle
    ⬥ Erikson’s Methods of Investigation
    Anthropological Studies
    Psychohistory
    ⬥ Related Research
    Ego Identity Status in Adolescents Across Cultures
    Does Identity Precede Intimacy?
    ⬥ Critique of Erikson
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Erikson © Jon Erikson/The Image Works

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 197
    As a child, Erik Salomonsen had many questions but few answers about his biological father. He knew who his mother was—a beautiful Jewish Dane whose
    family tried hard to appear Danish rather than Jewish. But who was his father?
    Born into a single-parent family, the young boy held three separate beliefs
    regarding his origins. At first, he believed that his mother’s husband, a physician
    named Theodor Homburger, was his biological father. However, as Erik matured,
    he began to realize that this was incorrect because his blond hair and blue eyes did
    not match the dark features of either parent. He pressed his mother for an explana-
    tion, but she lied to him and said that a man named Valdemar Salomonsen—her
    first husband—was his biological father and that he abandoned her after she
    became pregnant with Erik. However, Erik didn’t quite believe this  second story
    either because he learned that Salomonsen had left his mother 4 years before Erik
    was born. Finally, Erik chose to believe that he was the outcome of a sexual liai-
    son between his mother and an artistically gifted aristocratic Dane. For nearly the
    remainder of his life, Erik believed this third story. Nevertheless, he continued to
    search for his own identity while seeking the name of his biological father.
    During his school days, Erik’s Scandinavian features contributed to his iden-
    tity confusion. When he attended temple, his blue eyes and blond hair made him
    appear to be an outsider. At public school, his Aryan classmates referred to him
    as a Jew, so Erik felt out of place in both arenas. Throughout his life, he had dif-
    ficulty accepting himself as either a Jew or a Gentile.
    When his mother died, Erik, then 58 years old, feared he would never know
    the identity of his biological father. But he persevered in his search. Finally, more
    than 30 years later and as his mind and body began to deteriorate, Erik lost interest
    in learning his father’s name. However, he continued to show some identity confu-
    sion. For example, he spoke mostly in German—the language of his youth—and
    rarely spoke in English, his primary language for more than 60 years. In addition,
    he retained a long-held affinity for Denmark and the Danish people and took per-
    verted pride in displaying the flag of Denmark, a country in which he never lived.
    Overview of Post-Freudian Theory
    The person we introduced in the opening vignette, of course, was Erik Erikson,
    the person who coined the term identity crisis. Erikson had no college degree of
    any kind, but this lack of formal training did not prevent him from gaining world
    fame in an impressive variety of fields including psychoanalysis, anthropology,
    psychohistory, and education.
    Unlike earlier psychodynamic theorists who severed nearly all ties to Freudian
    psychoanalysis, Erikson intended his theory of personality to extend rather than
    repudiate Freud’s assumptions and to offer a new “way of looking at things”
    (Erikson, 1963, p. 403). His post-Freudian theory extended Freud’s infantile devel-
    opmental stages into adolescence, adulthood, and old age. Erikson suggested that
    at each stage a specific psychosocial struggle contributes to the formation of per-
    sonality. From adolescence on, that struggle takes the form of an identity crisis—
    a turning point in one’s life that may either strengthen or weaken personality.
    Erikson regarded his post-Freudian theory as an extension of psychoanalysis,
    something Freud might have done in time. Although he used Freudian theory as

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories198
    the foundation for his life-cycle approach to personality, Erikson differed from
    Freud in several respects. In addition to elaborating on psychosexual stages beyond
    childhood, Erikson placed more emphasis on both social and historical influences.
    Erikson’s post-Freudian theory, like those of other personality theorists, is a
    reflection of his background, a background that included art, extensive travels,
    experiences with a variety of cultures, and a lifelong search for his own identity,
    which we mentioned briefly in our opening story.
    Biography of Erik Erikson
    Who was Erik Erikson? Was he a Dane, a German, or an American? Jew or Gentile?
    Artist or psychoanalyst? Erikson himself had difficulty answering these questions,
    and he spent nearly a lifetime trying to determine who he was.
    Born June 15, 1902, in southern Germany, Erikson was brought up by his
    mother and stepfather, but he remained uncertain of the true identity of his bio-
    logical father. To discover his niche in life, Erikson ventured away from home
    during late adolescence, adopting the life of a wandering artist and poet. After
    nearly 7 years of drifting and searching, he returned home confused, exhausted,
    depressed, and unable to sketch or paint. At this time, a fortuitous event changed
    his life: He received a letter from his friend Peter Blos inviting him to teach chil-
    dren in a new school in Vienna. One of the founders of the school was Anna Freud,
    who became not only Erikson’s employer, but his psychoanalyst as well.
    While undergoing analytic treatment, he stressed to Anna Freud that his most
    difficult problem was searching for the identity of his biological father. However,
    Ms. Freud was less than empathic and told Erikson that he should stop fantasizing
    about his absent father. Although Erikson usually obeyed his psychoanalyst, he
    could not take Freud’s advice to stop trying to learn his father’s name.
    While in Vienna, Erikson met and, with Anna Freud’s permission, married Joan
    Serson, a Canadian-born dancer, artist, and teacher who had also undergone psycho-
    analysis. With her psychoanalytic background and her facility with the English lan-
    guage, she became a valuable editor and occasional coauthor of Erikson’s books.
    The Eriksons had four children: sons Kai, Jon, and Neil, and daughter Sue.
    Kai and Sue pursued important professional careers, but Jon, who shared his
    father’s experience as a wandering artist, worked as a laborer and never felt emo-
    tionally close to his parents.
    Erikson’s search for identity took him through some difficult experiences
    during his adult developmental stage (Friedman, 1999). According to Erikson, this
    stage requires a person to take care of children, products, and ideas that he or she
    has generated. On this issue, Erikson was deficient in meeting his own standards.
    He failed to take good care of his son Neil, who was born with Down syndrome.
    At the hospital while Joan was still under sedation, Erik agreed to place Neil in an
    institution. Then he went home and told his three older children that their brother
    had died at birth. He lied to them much as his mother had lied to him about the
    identity of his biological father. Later, he told his oldest son, Kai, the truth, but he
    continued to deceive the two younger children, Jon and Sue. Although his mother’s
    lie had distressed him greatly, he failed to understand that his lie about Neil might
    later distress his other children. In deceiving his children the way he did, Erikson
    violated two of his own principles: “Don’t lie to people you should care for,” and

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 199
    “Don’t pit one family member against another.” To compound the situation, when
    Neil died at about age 20, the Eriksons, who were in Europe at the time, called Sue
    and Jon and instructed them to handle all the funeral arrangements for a brother
    they had never met and who they only recently knew existed (Friedman, 1999).
    Erikson also sought his identity through the myriad changes of jobs and
    places of residence. Lacking any academic credentials, he had no specific profes-
    sional identity and was variously known as an artist, a psychologist, a psychoana-
    lyst, a clinician, a professor, a cultural anthropologist, an existentialist, a
    psychobiographer, and a public intellectual.
    In 1933, with fascism on the rise in Europe, Erikson and his family left
    Vienna for Denmark, hoping to gain Danish citizenship. When Danish officials
    refused his request, he left Copenhagen and immigrated to the United States.
    In America, he changed his name from Homburger to Erikson. This change was
    a crucial turning point in his life because it represented a retreat from his earlier Jewish
    identification. Originally, Erikson resented any implication that he was abandoning
    his Jewish identity by changing his name. He countered these charges by pointing out
    that he used his full name—Erik Homburger Erikson—in his books and essays. How-
    ever, as time passed, he dropped his middle name and replaced it with the initial
    H. Thus, this person who at the end of life was known as Erik H. Erikson had previ-
    ously been called Erik Salomonsen, Erik Homburger, and Erik Homburger Erikson.
    In America, Erikson continued his pattern of moving from place to place.
    He first settled in the Boston area where he set up a modified psychoanalytic
    practice. With neither medical credentials nor any kind of college degree, he
    accepted research positions at Massachusetts General Hospital, Harvard Medical
    School, and the Harvard Psychological Clinic.
    Wanting to write but needing more time than his busy schedule in Boston
    and Cambridge allowed, Erikson took a position at Yale in 1936, but after 21/2
    years, he moved to the University of California at Berkeley, but not before living
    among and studying people of the Sioux nation on the Pine Ridge reservation in
    South Dakota. He later lived with people of the Yurok nation in northern California,
    and these experiences in cultural anthropology added to the richness and completeness
    of his concept of humanity.
    During his California period, Erikson gradually evolved a theory of person-
    ality, separate from but not incompatible with Freud’s. In 1950, Erikson published
    Childhood and Society, a book that at first glance appears to be a hodgepodge of
    unrelated chapters. Erikson himself originally had some difficulty finding a com-
    mon theme underlying such topics as childhood in two Native American tribes,
    the growth of the ego, the eight stages of human development, and Hitler’s child-
    hood. Eventually, however, he recognized that the influence of psychological, cul-
    tural, and historical factors on identity was the underlying element that held the
    various chapters together. Childhood and Society, which became a classic and gave
    Erikson an international reputation as an imaginative thinker, remains the finest
    introduction to his post-Freudian personality theory.
    In 1949, the University of California officials demanded that faculty mem-
    bers sign an oath pledging loyalty to the United States. Such a demand was not
    uncommon during those days when Senator Joseph McCarthy convinced many
    Americans that Communists and Communist sympathizers were poised to over-
    throw the U.S. government. Erikson was not a Communist, but as a matter of

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories200
    principle he refused to sign the oath. Although the Committee on Privilege and
    Tenure recommended that he retain his position, Erikson left California and
    returned to Massachusetts, where he worked as a therapist at Austen Riggs, a treat-
    ment center for psychoanalytic training and research located in Stockbridge. In
    1960, he returned to Harvard and, for the next 10 years, held the position of pro-
    fessor of human development. After retirement, Erikson continued an active
    career—writing, lecturing, and seeing a few patients. During the early years of his
    retirement, he lived in Marin County, California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; and
    Cape Cod. Through all these changes, Erikson continued to seek his father’s name.
    He died May 12, 1994, at the age of 91.
    Who was Erik Erikson? Although he himself may not have been able to
    answer this question, other people can learn about the person known as Erik
    Erikson through his brilliantly constructed books, lectures, and essays.
    Erikson’s best-known works include Childhood and Society (1950, 1963,
    1985); Young Man Luther (1958); Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968); Gandhi’s Truth
    (1969), a book that won both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award;
    Dimensions of a New Identity (1974); Life History and the Historical Moment (1975);
    Identity and the Life Cycle (1980); and The Life Cycle Completed (1982). Stephen
    Schlein compiled many of his papers in A Way of Looking at Things (Erikson, 1987).
    The Ego in Post-Freudian Theory
    In Chapter 2, we pointed out that Freud used the analogy of a rider on horseback to
    describe the relationship between the ego and the id. The rider (ego) is ultimately at
    the mercy of the stronger horse (id). The ego has no strength of its own but must
    borrow its energy from the id. Moreover, the ego is constantly attempting to balance
    blind demands of the superego against the relentless forces of the id and the realistic
    opportunities of the external world. Freud believed that, for psychologically healthy
    people, the ego is sufficiently developed to rein in the id, even though its control is
    still tenuous and id impulses might erupt and overwhelm the ego at any time.
    In contrast, Erikson held that our ego is a positive force that creates a self-
    identity, a sense of “I.” As the center of our personality, our ego helps us adapt to the
    various conflicts and crises of life and keeps us from losing our individuality to the
    leveling forces of society. During childhood, the ego is weak, pliable, and fragile; but
    by adolescence it should begin to take form and gain strength. Throughout our life, it
    unifies personality and guards against indivisibility. Erikson saw the ego as a partially
    unconscious organizing agency that synthesizes our present experiences with past self-
    identities and also with anticipated images of self. He defined the ego as a person’s
    ability to unify experiences and actions in an adaptive manner (Erikson, 1963).
    Erikson (1968) identified three interrelated aspects of ego: the body ego, the
    ego ideal, and ego identity. The body ego refers to experiences with our body; a
    way of seeing our physical self as different from other people. We may be satisfied
    or dissatisfied with the way our body looks and functions, but we recognize that
    it is the only body we will ever have. The ego ideal represents the image we have
    of ourselves in comparison with an established ideal; it is responsible for our being
    satisfied or dissatisfied not only with our physical self but with our entire personal
    identity. Ego identity is the image we have of ourselves in the variety of social

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 201
    roles we play. Although adolescence is ordinarily the time when these three com-
    ponents are changing most rapidly, alterations in body ego, ego ideal, and ego
    identity can and do take place at any stage of life.
    Society’s Influence
    Although inborn capacities are important in personality development, the ego
    emerges from and is largely shaped by society. Erikson’s emphasis on social and
    historical factors was in contrast with Freud’s mostly biological viewpoint. To
    Erikson, the ego exists as potential at birth, but it must emerge from within a
    cultural environment. Different societies, with their variations in child-rearing prac-
    tices, tend to shape personalities that fit the needs and values of their culture. For
    example, Erikson (1963) found that prolonged and permissive nursing of infants
    of the Sioux nation (sometimes for as long as 4 or 5 years) resulted in what Freud
    would call “oral” personalities: that is, people who gain great pleasure through
    functions of the mouth. The Sioux place great value on generosity, and Erikson
    believed that the reassurance resulting from unlimited breast-feeding lays the foun-
    dation for the virtue of generosity. However, Sioux parents quickly suppress biting,
    a practice that may contribute to the child’s fortitude and ferocity. On the other
    hand, people of the Yurok nation set strict regulations concerning elimination of
    urine and feces, practices that tend to develop “anality,” or compulsive neatness,
    stubbornness, and miserliness. In European American societies, orality and anality
    are often considered undesirable traits or neurotic symptoms. Erikson (1963), how-
    ever, argued that orality among the Sioux hunters and anality among the Yurok
    fishermen are adaptive characteristics that help both the individual and the culture.
    The fact that European American culture views orality and anality as deviant traits
    merely displays its own ethnocentric view of other societies. Erikson (1968, 1974)
    argued that historically all tribes or nations, including the United States, have devel-
    oped what he called a pseudospecies: that is, an illusion perpetrated and perpetu-
    ated by a particular society that it is somehow chosen to be the human species. In
    past centuries, this belief has aided the survival of the tribe, but with modern means
    of world annihilation, such a prejudiced perception (as demonstrated by Nazi
    Gemany) threatens the survival of every nation.
    One of Erikson’s principal contributions to personality theory was his extension
    of the Freudian early stages of development to include school age, youth, adulthood,
    and old age. Before looking more closely at Erikson’s theory of ego development, we
    discuss his view of how personality develops from one stage to the next.
    Epigenetic Principle
    Erikson believed that the ego develops throughout the various stages of life accord-
    ing to an epigenetic principle, a term borrowed from embryology. Epigenetic
    development implies a step-by-step growth of fetal organs. The embryo does not
    begin as a completely formed little person, waiting to merely expand its structure
    and form. Rather, it develops, or should develop, according to a predetermined rate
    and in a fixed sequence. If the eyes, liver, or other organs do not develop during
    that critical period for their development, then they will never attain proper maturity.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories202
    In similar fashion, the ego follows the path of epigenetic development, with
    each stage developing at its proper time. One stage emerges from and is built
    upon a previous stage, but it does not replace that earlier stage. This epigenetic
    development is analogous to the physical development of children, who crawl
    before they walk, walk before they run, and run before they jump. When children
    are still crawling, they are developing the potential to walk, run, and jump; and
    after they are mature enough to jump, they still retain their ability to run, walk,
    and crawl. Erikson (1968) described the epigenetic principle by saying that “any-
    thing that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts
    arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen
    to form a functioning whole” (p. 92). More succinctly, “Epigenesis means that
    one characteristic develops on top of another in space and time” (Evans, 1967,
    pp. 21–22).
    The epigenetic principle is illustrated in Figure 7.1, which depicts the first
    three Eriksonian stages. The sequence of stages (1, 2, 3) and the development of
    their component parts (A, B, C) are shown in the heavily lined boxes along the
    diagonal. Figure 7.1 shows that each part exists before its critical time (at least as
    biological potential), emerges at its proper time, and finally, continues to develop
    during subsequent stages. For example, component part B of Stage 2 (early child-
    hood) exists during Stage 1 (infancy) as shown in Box 1B. Part B reaches its full
    ascendance during Stage 2 (Box 2B), but continues into Stage 3 (Box 3B). Similarly,
    all components of Stage 3 exist during Stages 1 and 2, reach full development
    during Stage 3, and continue throughout all later stages (Erikson, 1982).
    Children crawl before they walk, walk before they run, and run before they jump.
    © Andersen Ross/Getty Images

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 203
    Stages of Psychosocial Development
    Comprehension of Erikson’s eight stages of psychosocial development requires an
    understanding of several basic points. First, growth takes place according to the
    epigenetic principle. That is, one component part arises out of another and has its
    own time of ascendancy, but it does not entirely replace earlier components.
    Second, in every stage of life there is an interaction of opposites—that is, a con-
    flict between a syntonic (harmonious) element and a dystonic (disruptive) element. For
    example, during infancy basic trust (a syntonic tendency) is opposed to basic mistrust
    (a dystonic tendency). Both trust and mistrust, however, are necessary for proper adap-
    tation. An infant who learns only to trust becomes gullible and is ill prepared for the
    realities encountered in later development, whereas an infant who learns only to mistrust
    becomes overly suspicious and cynical. Similarly, during each of the other seven stages,
    people must have both harmonious (syntonic) and disruptive (dystonic) experiences.
    Third, at each stage, the conflict between the dystonic and syntonic elements
    produces an ego quality or ego strength, which Erikson referred to as a basic
    strength. For instance, from the antithesis between trust and mistrust emerges
    hope, an ego quality that allows an infant to move into the next stage. Likewise,
    each of the other stages is marked by a basic ego strength that emerges from the
    clash between the harmonious and the disruptive elements of that stage.
    Fourth, too little basic strength at any one stage results in a core pathology
    for that stage. For example, a child who does not acquire sufficient hope during
    infancy will develop the antithesis or opposite of hope, namely, withdrawal. Again,
    each stage has a potential core pathology.
    Fifth, although Erikson referred to his eight stages as psychosocial stages,
    he never lost sight of the biological aspect of human development.
    1
    Infancy
    Parts
    3
    Play age
    2
    Early childhood
    A B C
    3A 3B 3C
    2A 2B 2C
    1A 1B 1C
    Stage
    FIGURE 7.1 Three Eriksonian Stages, Depicting the Epigenetic Principle.
    Source: Erikson, Erik H. The Life Cycle Completed. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1982.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories204
    Sixth, events in earlier stages do not cause later personality development. Ego
    identity is shaped by a multiplicity of conflicts and events—past, present, and anticipated.
    Seventh, during each stage, but especially from adolescence forward, personality
    development is characterized by an identity crisis, which Erikson (1968) called “a turning
    point, a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential” (p. 96). Thus,
    during each crisis, a person is especially susceptible to major modifications in identity,
    either positive or negative. Contrary to popular usage, an identity crisis is not a cata-
    strophic event but rather an opportunity for either adaptive or maladaptive adjustment.
    Erikson’s eight stages of psychosocial development are shown in Figure 7.2.
    The boldfaced capitalized words are the ego qualities or basic strengths that emerge
    from the conflicts or psychosocial crises that typify each period. The “vs.” separating
    syntonic and dystonic elements signifies not only an antithetical relationship but
    also  a complementary one. Only the boxes along the diagonal are filled in; that is,
    Figure 7.2 highlights only the basic strengths and psychosocial crises that are most
    HA
    Old Age
    VIII
    MATURITY
    Adulthood
    VII
    Young
    Adulthood
    VI
    Adolescence
    V
    PUBERTY AND
    ADOLESCENCE
    School Age
    IV
    LATENCY
    Play Age
    III
    LOCOMOTOR
    GENITAL
    Early
    Childhood
    II
    MUSCULAR
    ANAL
    Infancy
    I
    ORAL
    SENSORY
    B C D E F G
    Basic trust
    vs.
    basic mistrust
    HOPE
    Ego Integrity
    vs.
    despair,
    WISDOM
    Generativity
    vs.
    stagnation
    Self-Absorption
    CARE
    Intimacy
    vs.
    isolation
    LOVE
    Identity
    vs.
    confusion
    FIDELITY
    Industry
    vs.
    inferiority
    COMPETENCE
    Initiative
    vs.
    guilt
    PURPOSE
    Autonomy
    vs.
    shame, doubt
    WILL
    FIGURE 7.2 Erikson’s Eight Stages of Development with Their Appropriate Basic
    Strengths and Psychosocial Crises.
    Source: Erikson, 1982.

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 205
    characteristic of each stage of development. However, the epigenetic principle sug-
    gests that all the other boxes would be filled (as in Figure 7.1), though with other
    items less characteristic of their stage of psychosocial development. Each item in the
    ensemble is vital to personality development, and each is related to all the others.
    Infancy
    The first psychosocial stage is infancy, a period encompassing approximately the
    first year of life and paralleling Freud’s oral phase of development. However, Erikson’s
    model adopts a broader focus than Freud’s oral stage, which was concerned almost
    exclusively with the mouth. To Erikson (1963, 1989), infancy is a time of incor-
    poration, with infants “taking in” not only through their mouth but through their
    various sense organs as well. Through their eyes, for example, infants take in visual
    stimuli. As they take in food and sensory information, infants learn to either trust
    or mistrust the outside world, a situation that gives them realistic hope. Infancy,
    then, is marked by the oral-sensory psychosexual mode, the psychosocial crisis of
    basic trust versus basic mistrust, and the basic strength of hope.
    Oral-Sensory Mode
    Erikson’s expanded view of infancy is expressed in the term oral-sensory, a phrase
    that includes infants’ principal psychosexual mode of adapting. The oral-sensory
    stage is characterized by two modes of incorporation—receiving and accepting what
    is given. Infants can receive even in the absence of other people; that is, they can
    take in air through the lungs and can receive sensory data without having to manip-
    ulate others. The second mode of incorporation, however, implies a social context.
    Infants not only must get, but they also must get someone else to give. This early
    training in interpersonal relations helps them learn to eventually become givers. In
    getting other people to give, they learn to trust or mistrust other people, thus setting
    up the basic psychosocial crisis of infancy, namely, basic trust versus basic mistrust.
    Basic Trust Versus Basic Mistrust
    Infants’ most significant interpersonal relations are with their primary caregiver,
    ordinarily their mother. If they realize that their mother will provide food regularly,
    then they begin to learn basic trust; if they consistently hear the pleasant, rhythmic
    voice of their mother, then they develop more basic trust; if they can rely on an
    exciting visual environment, then they solidify basic trust even more. In other
    words, if their pattern of accepting things corresponds with culture’s way of giving
    things, then infants learn basic trust. In contrast, they learn basic mistrust if they
    find no correspondence between their oral-sensory needs and their environment.
    Basic trust is ordinarily syntonic, and basic mistrust, dystonic. Nevertheless,
    infants must develop both attitudes. Too much trust makes them gullible and
    vulnerable to the vagaries of the world, whereas too little trust leads to frustration,
    anger, hostility, cynicism, or depression.
    Both trust and mistrust are inevitable experiences of infants. All babies who
    have survived have been fed and otherwise cared for and therefore have some
    reason to trust. In addition, all have been frustrated by pain, hunger, or discomfort,
    and thus have a reason to mistrust. Erikson believed that some ratio of trust and

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories206
    mistrust is critical to people’s ability to adapt. He told Richard Evans (1967) that
    “when we enter a situation, we must be able to differentiate how much we can
    trust and how much we must mistrust, and I use mistrust in the sense of a readi-
    ness for danger and an anticipation of discomfort” (p. 15).
    The inevitable clash between basic trust and basic mistrust results in people’s
    first psychosocial crisis. If people successfully solve this crisis, they acquire their
    first basic strength—hope.
    Hope: The Basic Strength of Infancy
    Hope emerges from the conflict between basic trust and basic mistrust. Without the
    antithetical relationship between trust and mistrust, people cannot develop hope.
    Infants must experience hunger, pain, and discomfort as well as the alleviation of
    these unpleasant conditions. By having both painful and pleasurable experiences,
    infants learn to expect that future distresses will meet with satisfactory outcomes.
    If infants do not develop sufficient hope during infancy, they will demon-
    strate the antithesis or the opposite of hope—withdrawal, the core pathology of
    infancy. With little to hope for, they will retreat from the outside world and begin
    the journey toward serious psychological disturbance.
    Early Childhood
    The second psychosocial stage is early childhood, a period paralleling Freud’s
    anal stage and encompassing approximately the 2nd and 3rd years of life. Again,
    some differences exist between the views of Freud and Erikson. In Chapter 2, we
    explained that Freud regarded the anus as the primary erogenous zone during this
    period and that during the early sadistic-anal phase, children receive pleasure in
    destroying or losing objects, while later they take satisfaction in defecating.
    Once again, Erikson took a broader view. To him, young children receive
    pleasure not only from mastering the sphincter muscle but also from mastering
    other body functions such as urinating, walking, throwing, holding, and so on. In
    addition, children develop a sense of control over their interpersonal environment,
    as well as a measure of self-control. However, early childhood is also a time of
    experiencing doubt and shame as children learn that many of their attempts at
    autonomy are unsuccessful.
    Anal-Urethral-Muscular Mode
    During the 2nd year of life, children’s primary psychosexual adjustment is the
    anal-urethral-muscular mode. At this time, children learn to control their body,
    especially in relation to cleanliness and mobility. Early childhood is more than a
    time of toilet training; it is also a time of learning to walk, run, hug parents, and
    hold on to toys and other objects. With each of these activities, young children are
    likely to display some stubborn tendencies. They may retain their feces or eliminate
    them at will, snuggle up to their mother or suddenly push her away, delight in
    hoarding objects or ruthlessly discard them.
    Early childhood is a time of contradiction, a time of stubborn rebellion and
    meek compliance, a time of impulsive self-expression and compulsive deviance, a

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 207
    time of loving cooperation and hateful resistance. This obstinate insistence on
    conflicting impulses triggers the major psychosocial crisis of childhood—autonomy
    versus shame and doubt (Erikson, 1968).
    Autonomy Versus Shame and Doubt
    If early childhood is a time for self-expression and autonomy, then it is also a time
    for shame and doubt. As children stubbornly express their anal-urethral-muscular
    mode, they are likely to find a culture that attempts to inhibit some of their self-
    expression. Parents may shame their children for soiling their pants or for making
    a mess with their food. They may also instill doubt by questioning their children’s
    ability to meet their standards. The conflict between autonomy and shame and
    doubt becomes the major psychosocial crisis of early childhood.
    Ideally, children should develop a proper ratio between autonomy and shame
    and doubt, and the ratio should be in favor of autonomy, the syntonic quality of
    early childhood. Children who develop too little autonomy will have difficulties in
    subsequent stages, lacking the basic strengths of later stages.
    According to Erikson’s epigenetic diagrams (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2), auton-
    omy grows out of basic trust; and if basic trust has been established in infancy,
    then children learn to have faith in themselves, and their world remains intact while
    they experience a mild psychosocial crisis. Conversely, if children do not develop
    basic trust during infancy, then their attempts to gain control of their anal, urethral,
    and muscular organs during early childhood will be met with a strong sense of
    shame and doubt, setting up a serious psychosocial crisis. Shame is a feeling of self-
    consciousness, of being looked at and exposed. Doubt, on the other hand, is the
    feeling of not being certain, the feeling that something remains hidden and cannot
    be seen. Both shame and doubt are dystonic qualities, and both grow out of the
    basic mistrust that was established in infancy.
    Will: The Basic Strength of Early Childhood
    The basic strength of will or willfulness evolves from the resolution of the crisis of
    autonomy versus shame and doubt. This step is the beginning of free will and
    willpower—but only a beginning. Mature willpower and a significant measure of
    free will are reserved for later stages of development, but they originate in the
    rudimentary will that emerges during early childhood. Anyone who has spent much
    time around 2-year-olds knows how willful they can be. Toilet training often
    epitomizes the conflict of wills between adult and child, but willful expression is not
    limited to this area. The basic conflict during early childhood is between the child’s
    striving for autonomy and the parent’s attempts to control the child through the use
    of shame and doubt.
    Children develop will only when their environment allows them some self-
    expression in their control of sphincters and other muscles. When their experiences
    result in too much shame and doubt, children do not adequately develop this sec-
    ond important basic strength. Inadequate will is expressed as compulsion, the core
    pathology of early childhood. Too little will and too much compulsivity carry
    forward into the play age as lack of purpose and into the school age as lack of
    confidence.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories208
    Play Age
    Erikson’s third stage of development is the play age, a period covering the same
    time as Freud’s phallic phase—roughly ages 3 to 5 years. Again, differences emerge
    between the views of Freud and Erikson. Whereas Freud placed the Oedipus complex
    at the core of the phallic stage, Erikson believed that the Oedipus complex is but
    one of several important developments during the play age. Erikson (1968) contended
    that, in addition to identifying with their parents, preschool-age children are develop-
    ing locomotion, language skills, curiosity, imagination, and the ability to set goals.
    Genital-Locomotor Mode
    The primary psychosexual mode during the play age is genital-locomotor. Erikson
    (1982) saw the Oedipal situation as a prototype “of the lifelong power of human
    playfulness” (p. 77). In other words, the Oedipus complex is a drama played out in
    the child’s imagination and includes the budding understanding of such basic concepts
    as reproduction, growth, future, and death. The Oedipus and castration complexes,
    therefore, are not always to be taken literally. A child may play at being a mother, a
    father, a wife, or a husband; but such play is an expression not only of the genital
    mode but also of the child’s rapidly developing locomotor abilities. A little girl may
    envy boys, not because boys possess a penis, but rather because society grants more
    prerogatives to children with a penis. A little boy may have anxiety about losing
    something, but this anxiety refers not only to the penis but also to other body parts.
    The Oedipus complex, then, is both more than and less than what Freud believed,
    and infantile sexuality is “a mere promise of things to come” (Erikson, 1963, p. 86).
    Unless sexual interest is provoked by cultural sex play or by adult sexual abuse, the
    Oedipus complex produces no harmful effects on later personality development.
    The interest that play-age children have in genital activity is accompanied
    by their increasing facility at locomotion. They can now move with ease, running,
    jumping, and climbing with no conscious effort; and their play shows both initia-
    tive and imagination. Their rudimentary will, developed during the preceding stage,
    is now evolving into activity with a purpose. Children’s cognitive abilities enable
    them to manufacture elaborate fantasies that include Oedipal fantasies but also
    include imagining what it is like to be grown up, to be omnipotent, or to be a
    ferocious animal. These fantasies, however, also produce guilt and thus contribute
    to the psychosocial crisis of the play age, namely, initiative versus guilt.
    Initiative Versus Guilt
    As children begin to move around more easily and vigorously and as their genital
    interest awakens, they adopt an intrusive head-on mode of approaching the world.
    Although they begin to adopt initiative in their selection and pursuit of goals, many
    goals, such as marrying their mother or father or leaving home, must be either
    repressed or delayed. The consequence of these taboo and inhibited goals is guilt.
    The conflict between initiative and guilt becomes the dominant psychosocial crisis
    of the play age.
    Again, the ratio between these two should favor the syntonic quality—initiative.
    Unbridled initiative, however, may lead to chaos and a lack of moral principles. On
    the other hand, if guilt is the dominant element, children may become compulsively

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 209
    moralistic or overly inhibited. Inhibition, which is the antipathy of purpose, consti-
    tutes the core pathology of the play age.
    Purpose: The Basic Strength of the Play Age
    The conflict of initiative versus guilt produces the basic strength of purpose. Chil-
    dren now play with a purpose, competing at games in order to win or to be on
    top. Their genital interests have a direction, with mother or father being the object
    of their sexual desires. They set goals and pursue them with purpose. Play age is
    also the stage in which children are developing a conscience and beginning to
    attach labels such as right and wrong to their behavior. This youthful conscience
    becomes the “cornerstone of morality” (Erikson, 1968, p. 119).
    School Age
    Erikson’s concept of school age covers development from about age 6 to approx-
    imately age 12 or 13 and matches the latency years of Freud’s theory. At this age,
    the social world of children is expanding beyond family to include peers, teachers,
    and other adult models. For school-age children, their wish to know becomes
    strong and is tied to their basic striving for competence. In normal development,
    children strive industriously to read and write, to hunt and fish, or to learn the
    skills required by their culture. School age does not necessarily mean formalized
    schools. In contemporary literate cultures, schools and professional teachers play
    a major part in children’s education, whereas in preliterate societies, adults use less
    formalized but equally effective methods to instruct children in the ways of society.
    Latency
    Erikson agreed with Freud that school age is a period of psychosexual latency.
    Sexual latency is important because it allows children to divert their energies to
    learning the technology of their culture and the strategies of their social interactions.
    As children work and play to acquire these essentials, they begin to form a picture
    of themselves as competent or incompetent. These self images are the origin of ego
    identity—that feeling of “I” or “me-ness” that evolves more fully during adolescence.
    Industry Versus Inferiority
    Although school age is a period of little sexual development, it is a time of tre-
    mendous social growth. The psychosocial crisis of this stage is industry versus
    inferiority. Industry, a syntonic quality, means industriousness, a willingness to
    remain busy with something and to finish a job. School-age children learn to work
    and play at activities directed toward acquiring job skills and toward learning the
    rules of cooperation.
    As children learn to do things well, they develop a sense of industry, but if their
    work is insufficient to accomplish their goals, they acquire a sense of inferiority—the
    dystonic quality of the school age. Earlier inadequacies can also contribute to children’s
    feelings of inferiority. For example, if children acquire too much guilt and too little
    purpose during the play age, they will likely feel inferior and incompetent during the

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories210
    school age. However, failure is not inevitable. Erikson was optimistic in suggesting
    that people can successfully handle the crisis of any given stage even though they
    were not completely successful in previous stages.
    The ratio between industry and inferiority should, of course, favor industry;
    but inferiority, like the other dystonic qualities, should not be avoided. As Alfred
    Adler (Chapter 3) pointed out, inferiority can serve as an impetus to do one’s best.
    Conversely, an oversupply of inferiority can block productive activity and stunt
    one’s feelings of competence.
    Competence: The Basic Strength of the School Age
    From the conflict of industry versus inferiority, school-age children develop the basic
    strength of competence: that is, the confidence to use one’s physical and cog nitive
    abilities to solve the problems that accompany school age. Competence lays the foun-
    dation for “co-operative participation in productive adult life” (Erikson, 1968, p. 126).
    If the struggle between industry and inferiority favors either inferiority or an
    overabundance of industry, children are likely to give up and regress to an earlier stage
    of development. They may become preoccupied with infantile genital and Oedipal
    fantasies and spend most of their time in nonproductive play. This regression is called
    inertia, the antithesis of competence and the core pathology of the school age.
    Adolescence
    Adolescence, the period from puberty to young adulthood, is one of the most
    crucial developmental stages because, by the end of this period, a person must gain
    a firm sense of ego identity. Although ego identity neither begins nor ends during
    adolescence, the crisis between identity and identity confusion reaches its ascen-
    dance during this stage. From this crisis of identity versus identity confusion
    emerges fidelity, the basic strength of adolescence.
    Erikson (1982) saw adolescence as a period of social latency, just as he saw
    school age as a time of sexual latency. Although adolescents are developing sexually
    and cognitively, in most Western societies they are allowed to postpone lasting
    commitment to an occupation, a sex partner, or an adaptive philosophy of life. They
    are permitted to experiment in a variety of ways and to try out new roles and beliefs
    while seeking to establish a sense of ego identity. Adolescence, then, is an adaptive
    phase of personality development, a period of trial and error.
    Puberty
    Puberty, defined as genital maturation, plays a relatively minor role in Erikson’s
    concept of adolescence. For most young people, genital maturation presents no
    major sexual crisis. Nevertheless, puberty is important psychologically because it
    triggers expectations of adult roles yet ahead—roles that are essentially social and
    can be filled only through a struggle to attain ego identity.
    Identity Versus Identity Confusion
    The search for ego identity reaches a climax during adolescence as young people strive
    to find out who they are and who they are not. With the advent of puberty, adolescents

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 211
    look for new roles to help
    them discover their sexual,
    ideological, and occupa-
    tional identities. In this
    search, young people draw
    from a variety of earlier
    self-images that have been
    accepted or rejected. Thus,
    the seeds of identity begin
    to sprout during infancy
    and continue to grow
    through childhood, the play
    age, and the school age.
    Then during adolescence,
    identity strengthens into a
    crisis as young people learn
    to cope with the psychoso-
    cial conflict of identity ver-
    sus identity confusion.
    A crisis should not
    suggest a threat or catas-
    trophe but rather “a turn-
    ing point, a crucial period
    of increased vulnerability
    and heightened potential”
    (Erikson, 1968, p. 96). An
    identity crisis may last for
    many years and can result
    in either greater or lesser
    ego strength.
    According to Erikson (1982), identity emerges from two sources: (1) adoles-
    cents’ affirmation or repudiation of childhood identifications, and (2) their historical
    and social contexts, which encourage conformity to certain standards. Young people
    frequently reject the standards of their elders, preferring instead the values of a peer
    group or gang. In any event, the society in which they live plays a substantial role
    in shaping their identity.
    Identity is defined both positively and negatively, as adolescents are deciding
    what they want to become and what they believe while also discovering what they
    do not wish to be and what they do not believe. Often they must either repudiate
    the values of parents or reject those of the peer group, a dilemma that may inten-
    sify their identity confusion.
    Identity confusion is a syndrome of problems that includes a divided self-
    image, an inability to establish intimacy, a sense of time urgency, a lack of con-
    centration on required tasks, and a rejection of family or community standards. As
    with the other dystonic tendencies, some amount of identity confusion is both
    normal and necessary. Young people must experience some doubt and confusion
    about who they are before they can evolve a stable identity. They may leave home
    Identity involves finding out which groups you belong to and
    which you don’t. © fotostorm/Getty Images

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories212
    (as Erikson did) to wander alone in search of self; experiment with drugs and sex;
    identify with a street gang; join a religious order; or rail against the existing soci-
    ety, with no alternative answers. Or they may simply and quietly consider where
    they fit into the world and what values they hold dear.
    Once again, Erikson’s theory is consistent with his own life. At age 18 and
    feeling alienated from the standards of his bourgeois family, Erikson set about
    searching for a different style of life. Gifted at sketching and with more identity
    confusion than identity, he spent the next 7 years wandering through southern
    Europe in search of an identity as an artist. Erikson (1975) referred to this stage
    of his life as a time of discontent, rebellion, and identity confusion.
    Although identity confusion is a necessary part of our search for identity, too
    much confusion can lead to pathological adjustment in the form of regression to
    earlier stages of development. We may postpone the responsibilities of adulthood
    and drift aimlessly from one job to another, from one sex partner to another, or
    from one ideology to another. Conversely, if we develop the proper ratio of iden-
    tity to identity confusion, we will have (1) faith in some sort of ideological prin-
    ciple, (2) the ability to freely decide how we should behave, (3) trust in our peers
    and adults who give us advice regarding goals and aspirations, and (4) confidence
    in our choice of an eventual occupation.
    Fidelity: The Basic Strength of Adolescence
    The basic strength emerging from adolescent identity crises is fidelity, or faith in
    one’s ideology. After establishing their internal standards of conduct, adolescents
    are no longer in need of parental guidance but have confidence in their own reli-
    gious, political, and social ideologies.
    The trust learned in infancy is basic for fidelity in adolescence. Young peo-
    ple must learn to trust others before they can have faith in their own view of the
    future. They must have developed hope during infancy, and they must follow hope
    with the other basic strengths—will, purpose, and competence. Each is a prereq-
    uisite for fidelity, just as fidelity is essential for acquiring subsequent ego strengths.
    The pathological counterpart of fidelity is role repudiation, the core pathology
    of adolescence that blocks one’s ability to synthesize various self-images and values
    into a workable identity. Role repudiation can take the form of either diffidence or
    defiance (Erikson, 1982). Diffidence is an extreme lack of self-trust or self-confidence
    and is expressed as shyness or hesitancy to express oneself. In contrast, defiance is
    the act of rebelling against authority. Defiant adolescents stubbornly hold to socially
    unacceptable beliefs and practices simply because these beliefs and practices are
    unacceptable. Some amount of role repudiation, Erikson believed, is necessary, not
    only because it allows adolescents to evolve their personal identity, but also because
    it injects some new ideas and new vitality into the social structure.
    Young Adulthood
    After achieving a sense of identity during adolescence, people must acquire the
    ability to fuse that identity with the identity of another person while maintaining
    their sense of individuality. Young adulthood—a time from about age 19 to 30—
    is circumscribed not so much by time as by the acquisition of intimacy at the
    beginning of the stage and the development of generativity at the end. For some

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 213
    people, this stage is a relatively short time, lasting perhaps only a few years. For
    others, young adulthood may continue for several decades. Young adults should
    develop mature genitality, experience the conflict between intimacy and isolation,
    and acquire the basic strength of love.
    Genitality
    Much of the sexual activity during adolescence is an expression of one’s search for
    identity and is basically self-serving. True genitality can develop only during young
    adulthood when it is distinguished by mutual trust and a stable sharing of sexual
    satisfactions with a loved person. It is the chief psychosexual accomplishment of
    young adulthood and exists only in an intimate relationship (Erikson, 1963).
    Intimacy Versus Isolation
    Young adulthood is marked by the psychosocial crisis of intimacy versus isolation.
    Intimacy is the ability to fuse one’s identity with that of another person without
    fear of losing it. Because intimacy can be achieved only after people have formed
    a stable ego, the infatuations often found in young adolescents are not true inti-
    macy. People who are unsure of their identity may either shy away from psycho-
    social intimacy or desperately seek intimacy through meaningless sexual encounters.
    In contrast, mature intimacy means an ability and willingness to share a mutual
    trust. It involves sacrifice, compromise, and commitment within a relationship of two
    equals. It should be a requirement for marriage, but many marriages lack intimacy
    because some young people marry as part of their search for the identity that they
    failed to establish during adolescence.
    The psychosocial counterpart to intimacy is isolation, defined as “the inca-
    pacity to take chances with one’s identity by sharing true intimacy” (Erikson, 1968,
    p. 137). Some people become financially or socially successful, yet retain a sense
    of isolation because they are unable to accept the adult responsibilities of produc-
    tive work, procreation, and mature love.
    Again, some degree of isolation is essential before one can acquire mature
    love. Too much togetherness can diminish a person’s sense of ego identity, which
    leads that person to a psychosocial regression and an inability to face the next
    developmental stage. The greater danger, of course, is too much isolation, too
    little intimacy, and a deficiency in the basic strength of love.
    Love: The Basic Strength of Young Adulthood
    Love, the basic strength of young adulthood, emerges from the crisis of intimacy
    versus isolation. Erikson (1968, 1982) defined love as mature devotion that over-
    comes basic differences between men and women. Although love includes inti-
    macy, it also contains some degree of isolation, because each partner is permitted
    to retain a separate identity. Mature love means commitment, sexual passion, coop-
    eration, competition, and friendship. It is the basic strength of young adulthood,
    enabling a person to cope productively with the final two stages of development.
    The antipathy of love is exclusivity, the core pathology of young adulthood.
    Some exclusivity, however, is necessary for intimacy; that is, a person must be able
    to exclude certain people, activities, and ideas in order to develop a strong sense of

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories214
    identity. Exclusivity becomes pathological when it blocks one’s ability to cooperate,
    compete, or compromise—all prerequisite ingredients for intimacy and love.
    Adulthood
    The seventh stage of development is adulthood, that time when people begin to
    take their place in society and assume responsibility for whatever society produces.
    For most people, this is the longest stage of development, spanning the years from
    about age 31 to 60. Adulthood is characterized by the psychosexual mode of pro-
    creativity, the psychosocial crisis of generativity versus stagnation, and the basic
    strength of care.
    Procreativity
    Erikson’s psychosexual theory assumes an instinctual drive to perpetuate the species.
    This drive is the counterpart of an adult animal’s instinct toward procreation and is
    an extension of the genitality that marks young adulthood (Erikson, 1982). However,
    procreativity refers to more than genital contact with an intimate partner. It includes
    assuming responsibility for the care of offspring that result from that sexual contact.
    Ideally, procreation should follow from the mature intimacy and love established dur-
    ing the preceding stage. Obviously, people are physically capable of producing off-
    spring before they are psychologically ready to care for the welfare of these children.
    Mature adulthood demands more than procreating offspring; it includes car-
    ing for one’s children as well as other people’s children. In addition, it encom-
    passes working productively to transmit culture from one generation to the next.
    Generativity Versus Stagnation
    The syntonic quality of adulthood is generativity, defined as “the generation of
    new beings as well as new products and new ideas” (Erikson, 1982, p. 67). Gen-
    erativity, which is concerned with establishing and guiding the next generation,
    includes the procreation of children, the production of work, and the creation of
    new things and ideas that contribute to the building of a better world.
    People have a need not only to learn but also to instruct. This need extends
    beyond one’s own children to an altruistic concern for other young people. Generativ-
    ity grows out of earlier syntonic qualities such as intimacy and identity. As noted
    earlier, intimacy calls for the ability to fuse one’s ego to that of another person with-
    out fear of losing it. This unity of ego identities leads to a gradual expansion of
    interests. During adulthood, one-to-one intimacy is no longer enough. Other people,
    especially children, become part of one’s concern. Instructing others in the ways of
    culture is a practice found in all societies. For the mature adult, this motivation is not
    merely an obligation or a selfish need but an evolutionary drive to make a contribution
    to succeeding generations and to ensure the continuity of human society as well.
    The antithesis of generativity is self-absorption and stagnation. The gen-
    erational cycle of productivity and creativity is crippled when people become
    too absorbed in themselves, too self-indulgent. Such an attitude fosters a pervad-
    ing sense of stagnation. Some elements of stagnation and self-absorption, how-
    ever, are necessary. Creative people must, at times, remain in a dormant stage

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 215
    and be absorbed with themselves in order to eventually generate new growth.
    The interaction of generativity and stagnation produces care, the basic strength
    of adulthood.
    Care: The Basic Strength of Adulthood
    Erikson (1982) defined care as “a widening commitment to take care of the per-
    sons, the products, and the ideas one has learned to care for” (p. 67). As the basic
    strength of adulthood, care arises from each earlier basic ego strength. One must
    have hope, will, purpose, competence, fidelity, and love in order to take care of
    that which one cares for. Care is not a duty or obligation but a natural desire
    emerging from the conflict between generativity and stagnation or self-absorption.
    The antipathy of care is rejectivity, the core pathology of adulthood. Rejectiv-
    ity is the unwillingness to take care of certain persons or groups (Erikson, 1982).
    Rejectivity is manifested as self-centeredness, provincialism, or pseudospeciation:
    that is, the belief that other groups of people are inferior to one’s own. It is respon-
    sible for much of human hatred, destruction, atrocities, and wars. As Erikson said,
    rejectivity “has far-reaching implications for the survival of the species as well as
    for every individual’s psychosocial development” (p. 70).
    Old Age
    The eighth and final stage of
    development is old age. Erikson
    was in his early 40s when he
    first conceptualized this stage
    and arbitrarily defined it as
    the period from about age 60 to
    the end of life. Old age need not
    mean that people are no longer
    generative. Procreation, in the
    narrow sense of producing chil-
    dren, may be absent, yet old
    people can remain productive
    and creative in other ways. They
    can be caring grandparents to
    their own grandchildren as well
    as to other younger members of
    society. Old age can be a time of
    joy, playfulness, and wonder;
    but it is also a time of senility,
    depression, and despair. The
    psychosexual mode of old age is
    generalized sensuality; the psy-
    chosocial crisis is integrity ver-
    sus despair, and the basic
    strength is wisdom.
    Erikson’s stages of development extend into old age.
    © DesignPics/Darren Greenwood

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories216
    Generalized Sensuality
    The final psychosexual stage is generalized sensuality. Erikson had little to say
    about this mode of psychosexual life, but one may infer that it means to take
    pleasure in a variety of different physical sensations—sights, sounds, tastes, odors,
    embraces, and perhaps genital stimulation. Generalized sensuality may also include
    a greater appreciation for the traditional lifestyle of the opposite sex. Men become
    more nurturant and more acceptant of the pleasures of nonsexual relationships,
    including those with their grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Women become
    more interested and involved in politics, finance, and world affairs (Erikson,
    Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986). A generalized sensual attitude, however, is dependent
    on one’s ability to hold things together, that is, to maintain integrity in the face of
    despair.
    Integrity Versus Despair
    A person’s final identity crisis is integrity versus despair. At the end of life, the dystonic
    quality of despair may prevail, but for people with a strong ego identity who have
    learned intimacy and who have taken care of both people and things, the syntonic
    quality of integrity will predominate. Integrity means a feeling of wholeness and coher-
    ence, an ability to hold together one’s sense of “I-ness” despite diminishing physical
    and intellectual powers.
    Ego integrity is sometimes difficult to maintain when people see that they are
    losing familiar aspects of their existence: for example, spouse, friends, physical
    health, body strength, mental alertness, independence, and social usefulness. Under
    such pressure, people often feel a pervading sense of despair, which they may
    express as disgust, depression, contempt for others, or any other attitude that reveals
    a nonacceptance of the finite boundaries of life.
    Despair literally means to be without hope. A reexamination of Figure 7.2
    reveals that despair, the last dystonic quality of the life cycle, is in the opposite
    corner from hope, a person’s first basic strength. From infancy to old age,
    hope can exist. Once hope is lost, despair follows and life ceases to have meaning.
    Wisdom: The Basic Strength of Old Age
    Some amount of despair is natural and necessary for psychological maturity.
    The inevitable struggle between integrity and despair produces wisdom, the
    basic strength of old age. Erikson (1982) defined wisdom as “informed and
    detached concern with life itself in the face of death itself” (p. 61). People with
    detached concern do not lack concern; rather, they exhibit an active but dis-
    passionate interest. With mature wisdom, they maintain their integrity in spite
    of declining physical and mental abilities. Wisdom draws from and contributes
    to the traditional knowledge passed from generation to generation. In old age,
    people are concerned with ultimate issues, including nonexistence (Erikson,
    Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986).
    The antithesis of wisdom and the core pathology of old age is disdain, which
    Erikson (1982, p. 61) defined as “a reaction to feeling (and seeing others) in an
    increasing state of being finished, confused, helpless.” Disdain is a continuation of
    rejectivity, the core pathology of adulthood.

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 217
    As Erikson himself aged, he became less optimistic about old age, and he
    and his wife began to describe a ninth stage—a period of very old age when
    physical and mental infirmities rob people of their generative abilities and
    reduce them to waiting for death. Joan, especially, was interested in this ninth
    stage as she watched her husband’s health rapidly deteriorate during the last
    few years of his life. Unfortunately, Joan herself died before she could complete
    this ninth stage.
    Summary of the Life Cycle
    Erikson’s cycle of life is summarized in Table 7.1. Each of the eight stages is
    characterized by a psychosocial crisis. The psychosocial crisis is stimulated by a
    conflict between the predominating syntonic element and its antithetical dystonic
    element. From this conflict emerges a basic strength, or ego quality. Each basic
    strength has an underlying antipathy that becomes the core pathology of that stage.
    Humans have an ever-increasing radius of significant relations, beginning with the
    maternal person in infancy and ending with an identification with all humanity
    during old age.
    Wisdom
    Care
    Love
    Fidelity
    Competence
    Purpose
    Will
    Hope
    Disdain
    Rejectivity
    Exclusivity
    Role repudiation
    Inertia
    Inhibition
    Compulsion
    Withdrawal
    T A B L E 7 . 1
    Summary of Erikson’s Eight Stages of the Life Cycle
    Psychosocial Basic Core
    Stage Crisis Strength Pathology
    8
    Old age
    7
    Adulthood
    6
    Young
    adulthood
    5
    Adolescence
    4
    School age
    3
    Play age
    2
    Early childhood
    1
    Infancy
    Integrity vs.
    despair
    Generativity vs.
    stagnation
    Intimacy vs.
    isolation
    Identity vs.
    identity
    confusion
    Industry vs.
    inferiority
    Initiative vs.
    guilt
    Autonomy vs.
    shame, doubt
    Basic trust vs.
    basic mistrust

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories218
    Personality always develops during a particular historical period and within
    a given society. Nevertheless, Erikson believed that the eight developmental stages
    transcend chronology and geography and are appropriate to nearly all cultures, past
    and present.
    Erikson’s Methods of Investigation
    Erikson insisted that personality is a product of history, culture, and biology; and
    his diverse methods of investigation reflect this belief. He employed anthropo-
    logical, historical, sociological, and clinical methods to learn about children, ado-
    lescents, mature adults, and elderly people. He studied middle-class Americans,
    European children, people of the Sioux and Yurok nations of North America, and
    even sailors on a submarine. He wrote biographical portraits of Adolf Hitler,
    Maxim Gorky, Martin Luther, and Mohandas K. Gandhi, among others. In this
    section, we present two approaches Erikson used to explain and describe human
    personality—anthropological studies and psychohistory.
    Anthropological Studies
    In 1937, Erikson made a field trip to the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South
    Dakota to investigate the causes of apathy among Sioux children. Erikson (1963)
    reported on early Sioux training in terms of his newly evolving theories of psy-
    chosexual and psychosocial development. He found that apathy was an expres-
    sion of an extreme dependency the Sioux had developed as a result of their
    reliance on various federal government programs. At one time, they had been
    courageous buffalo hunters, but by 1937, the Sioux had lost their group identity
    as hunters and were trying halfheartedly to scrape out a living as farmers. Child-
    rearing practices, which in the past had trained young boys to be hunters and
    young girls to be helpers and mothers of future hunters, were no longer appropri-
    ate for an agrarian society. As a consequence, the Sioux children of 1937 had
    great difficulty achieving a sense of ego identity, especially after they reached
    adolescence.
    Two years later, Erikson made a similar field trip to northern California to study
    people of the Yurok nation, who lived mostly on salmon fishing. Although the Sioux
    and Yurok had vastly divergent cultures, each tribe had a tradition of training its youth
    in the virtues of its society. Yurok people were trained to catch fish, and therefore
    they possessed no strong national feeling and had little taste for war. Obtaining and
    retaining provisions and possessions were highly valued among people of the Yurok
    nation. Erikson (1963) was able to show that early childhood training was consistent
    with this strong cultural value and that history and society helped shape personality.
    Psychohistory
    The discipline called psychohistory is a controversial field that combines psycho-
    analytic concepts with historical methods. Freud (1910/1957) originated psychohis-
    tory with an investigation of Leonardo da Vinci and later collaborated with

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 219
    American ambassador
    William Bullitt to write a
    book-length psychologi-
    cal study of American
    president Woodrow Wil-
    son (Freud & Bullitt,
    1967). Although Erikson
    (1975) deplored this lat-
    ter work, he took up the
    methods of psychohistory
    and refined them, espe-
    cially in his study of
    Martin Luther (Erikson,
    1958, 1975) and Mahatma
    Gandhi (Erikson, 1969,
    1975). Both Luther and
    Gandhi had an important
    impact on history because
    each was an exceptional
    person with the right per-
    sonal conflict living dur-
    ing a historical period
    that needed to resolve
    collectively what could
    not be resolved individu-
    ally (E. Hall, 1983).
    Erikson (1974)
    defined psychohistory as
    “the study of individual
    and collective life with
    the combined methods of psychoanalysis and history” (p. 13). He used psychohis-
    tory to demonstrate his fundamental beliefs that each person is a product of his or
    her historical time and that those historical times are influenced by exceptional
    leaders experiencing a personal identity conflict.
    As an author of psychohistory, Erikson believed that he should be emotion-
    ally involved in his subject. For example, he developed a strong emotional attach-
    ment to Gandhi, which he attributed to his own lifelong search for the father he
    had never seen (Erikson, 1975). In Gandhi’s Truth, Erikson (1969) revealed strong
    positive feelings for Gandhi as he attempted to answer the question of how healthy
    individuals such as Gandhi work through conflict and crisis when other people
    are debilitated by lesser strife. In searching for an answer, Erikson examined
    Gandhi’s entire life cycle but concentrated on one particular crisis, which cli-
    maxed when a middle-aged Gandhi first used self-imposed fasting as a political
    weapon.
    As a child, Gandhi was close to his mother but experienced conflict with his
    father. Rather than viewing this situation as an Oedipal conflict, Erikson saw it as
    According to Erikson, Mahatma Gandhi developed basic strengths
    from his several identity crises. © Ingram Publishing

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories220
    Gandhi’s opportunity to work out conflict with authority figures—an opportunity
    Gandhi was to have many times during his life.
    Gandhi was born October 2, 1869, in Porbandar, India. As a young man, he
    studied law in London and was inconspicuous in manner and appearance. Then,
    dressed like a proper British subject, he returned to India to practice law. After
    2 years of unsuccessful practice, he went to South Africa, which, like India, was
    a British colony. He intended to remain for a year, but his first serious identity
    crisis kept him there for more than 20 years.
    A week after a judge excluded him from a courtroom, Gandhi was thrown
    off a train when he refused to give up his seat to a “white” man. These two expe-
    riences with racial prejudice changed Gandhi’s life. By the time he resolved this
    identity crisis, his appearance had changed dramatically. No longer attired in silk
    hat and black coat, he dressed in the cotton loincloth and shawl that were to
    become familiar to millions of people throughout the world. During those years in
    South Africa, he evolved the technique of passive resistance known as Satyagraha
    and used it to solve his conflicts with authorities. Satyagraha is a Sanskirt term
    meaning a tenacious, stubborn method of gathering the truth.
    After returning to India, Gandhi experienced another identity crisis when, in
    1918, at age 49, he became the central figure in a workers’ strike against the mill
    owners at Ahmedabad. Erikson referred to the events surrounding the strike as
    “The Event” and devoted the core of Gandhi’s Truth to this crisis. Although this
    strike was only a minor event in the history of India and received only scant atten-
    tion in Gandhi’s autobiography, Erikson (1969) saw it as having a great impact on
    Gandhi’s identity as a practitioner of militant nonviolence.
    The mill workers had pledged to strike if their demands for a 35% pay
    increase were not met. But the owners, who had agreed among themselves to
    offer no more than a 20% increase, locked out the workers and tried to break
    their solidarity by offering the 20% increase to those who would come back to
    work. Gandhi, the workers’ spokesperson, agonized over this impasse. Then,
    somewhat impetuously, he pledged to eat no more food until the workers’
    demands were met. This, the first of his 17 “fasts to the death,” was not under-
    taken as a threat to the mill owners but to demonstrate to the workers that a
    pledge must be kept. In fact, Gandhi feared that the mill owners might surrender
    out of sympathy for him rather than from recognition of the workers’ desperate
    plight. Indeed, on the third day, the workers and owners reached a compromise
    that allowed both to save face—the workers would work one day for a 35%
    increase, one day for a 20% increase, and then for whatever amount an arbitrator
    decided. The next day Gandhi ended his hunger strike, but his passive resistance
    had helped shape his identity and had given him a new tool for peaceful politi-
    cal and social change.
    Unlike neurotic individuals whose identity crises result in core pathologies,
    Gandhi had developed strength from this and other crises. Erikson (1969) described
    the difference between conflicts in great people, such as Gandhi, and psychologi-
    cally disturbed people: “This, then, is the difference between a case history and a
    life-history: patients, great or small, are increasingly debilitated by their inner con-
    flicts, but in historical actuality inner conflict only adds an indispensable momen-
    tum to all superhuman effort” (p. 363).

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 221
    Related Research
    One of Erikson’s major contributions was to extend personality development into
    adulthood. By expanding Freud’s notion of development all the way into old age,
    Erikson challenged the idea that psychological development stops with childhood.
    Erikson’s most influential legacy has been his theory of development and, in par-
    ticular, the stages from adolescence into old age. He was one of the first theorists
    to emphasize the critical period of adolescence and the conflicts revolving around
    one’s search for an identity. Adolescents and young adults often ask: Who am I?
    Where am I going? And what do I want to do with the rest of my life? How they
    answer these questions plays an important role in what kinds of relationships they
    develop, who they choose for a life-partner, and what career paths they follow.
    Recall that Erikson argued that each stage of development emerges from and
    is built upon a previous stage. So, for example, identity achievement in adolescence
    involves having explored various elements of one’s self, both ideological (religion,
    politics) and interpersonal (friendship, dating), and coming to what Erikson called
    a commitment. Studies of Western cultures conclude that identity achievement is
    the healthiest ego identity status, and that it ought to predict successful resolutions
    of the next developmental tasks of intimacy and generativity. However, Erikson
    (1959) also argued that, despite this step-wise quality of personality unfolding, all
    developmental tasks are present in some way at every stage of life, even if they
    vary in how pressing they are at different points. Thus, for teens involved in solid-
    ifying their identity, concerns about intimacy, and even generativity, are meaningful
    and present. Scholars have thus studied “later” psychosocial crises in earlier stages
    of life as a way of seeing how successful resolution of developmental tasks can be
    fostered at younger ages (Lawford, Pratt, Hunsberger, & Pancer, 2005).
    In contrast to most other psychodynamic theorists, Erikson stimulated quite
    a bit of empirical research, much of it on adolescence, young adulthood, and adult-
    hood. Here we discuss recent research on development in adolescence and early
    and middle adulthood, specifically the tasks of identity and intimacy.
    Ego Identity Status in Adolescents Across Cultures
    Erikson himself was what we might call today a cross-cultural psychologist, study-
    ing people from several cultures, but he employed qualitative and case study meth-
    odologies. Until recently little in the way of empirical investigation has been
    conducted to test his personality development theory across cultures. In 2011,
    Holger Busch and Jan Hofer sought to be among the first to do so.
    Their study was an effort to test whether adolescents develop ego identity in
    the same way across two very dissimilar cultures: the European nation of Germany
    and the African nation of Cameroon. Participants in Busch and Hofer’s study were
    15- to 18-year-old German and Cameroonian Nso teens. The Nso live in the high-
    land grassfields in the northwest of the country, and so German teens were also
    selected from the northwestern region of Germany for comparison. Adolescence
    differs in both countries in some respects (e.g., Cameroonian parents emphasize
    obedience to elders more strongly than do German parents, Cameroonian families
    tend to be larger than German families, and so children in Cameroon have greater

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories222
    caretaking responsibilities for younger siblings than do German children), but both
    cultural groups consider adolescence a transitional phase between childhood and
    full adulthood, with its greater work and family duties. Thus, the researchers pre-
    dicted both some cultural differences in self-concepts between these two groups of
    teenagers, as well as similarities between them in terms of identity achievement as
    a predictor, as Erikson theorized, of later developmental concerns.
    The German and Cameroonian adolescents were given the Extended Objective
    Measure of Ego Identity Status (EOMEIS; Bennion & Adams, 1986), which measures
    Erikson’s four identity statuses: achievement (successful exploration of identity ele-
    ments and commitment), foreclosure (commitment without adequate exploration of
    varying identity elements), moratorium (being in a state of exploration without having
    committed yet), and diffusion (neither exploration nor commitment are present). They
    were also given a test of their generative concern, with questions such as “I try to pass
    along the knowledge that I have gained through my experiences,” a global measure of
    their tendencies to be pro-social (altruistic, charitable), and finally the Self-Construal
    Scale (SCS; Singelis, 1994), which measures the degree to which individuals feel
    relatively more independent versus interdependent in their sense of self.
    Results supported predictions. In terms of cultural differences, Busch and Hofer
    (2011) found that German students scored significantly higher on the achieved and
    diffused identity status features, whereas Cameroonian Nso teens scored higher on
    foreclosure and moratorium. On both the pro-social tendencies and generativity con-
    cerns scales, the Cameroonian students scored higher than the Germans. Finally, based
    on results from the Self-Construal Scale, German students viewed themselves as more
    independent, whereas Cameroonian students viewed themselves as more interdepen-
    dent. However, for both groups, positive identity predicted generative concerns, indi-
    cating that, regardless of culture, achieved identity is developmentally beneficial. That
    is, identity “sets up” adolescents to begin to consider their future capacity to positively
    guide the next generation. Finally, in both groups, teens with the clearest identity were
    the most pro-social, but this effect was stronger for the German teens.
    These interesting findings reflect how each culture provides unique pathways
    through Erikson’s stages, but that the stages themselves appear to be epigenetic
    across cultures, as Erikson predicted. For example, in cultures that emphasize a
    more interdependent self-construal like Cameroon, adopting identity elements from
    one’s elders may be more valued than it is in a more independent culture like
    Germany or even the United States, where young people are urged to distinguish
    themselves from their parents and grandparents and find their “own” unique iden-
    tity. Furthermore, the authors discuss how cultures differ in their definitions of
    pro-social behavior, with some cultures emphasizing moral obligation and others
    personal choice. Yet, despite these distinctions between cultures, resolving our
    identity crisis in adolescence, regardless of where we reside, enables us to better
    take others’ needs to heart, to behave accordingly, and even to begin to consider
    turning around and “giving back” to the next generation (Busch & Hofer, 2011).
    Does Identity Precede Intimacy?
    Researchers Wim Beyers and Inge Seiffge-Krenke (2010) asked exactly this question, as
    a way of testing Erikson’s epigenetic principal. Does the achievement in adolescence of
    a confident sense of identity provide a base for the development of healthy intimate

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 223
    relationships in emerging adulthood? Their longitudinal study tested Erikson’s assumption
    of this fixed developmental ordering to fill two gaps in the research literature:
    a) only cross-sectional and short-term studies had been done to date on these two
    Eriksonian stages, so a truly developmental conclusion could not yet be drawn; and
    b) several more recent frameworks on adolescent development have questioned whether
    identity does indeed precede intimacy as Erikson’s theory postulates.
    There are indications of a dramatically altered developmental context in recent
    decades, which call into question the appropriateness of Erikson’s stage ordering in
    adolescence and emerging adulthood. For example, adolescents today can postpone
    adult commitments and explore a broad array of options well into college and beyond
    (Luyckx, Goossens, Soenens, & Beyers, 2006), suggesting that identity solidification
    is protracted. Furthermore, some have suggested that intimate sexual relationships
    increasingly develop during adolescence, perhaps preceding and even interrupting
    identity development (consider the teen pregnancy rate) (e.g., Brown, 1999).
    Beyers and Seiffge-Krenke (2010) examined data from 52 females and
    41  males in a 10-year longitudinal study in Germany to assess whether Erikson’s
    developmental ordering of identity first, then intimacy, still holds true. Their par-
    ticipants were interviewed when they were 15 years old and then again when they
    were 25 years old. They found evidence for a strong developmental progression
    from identity to intimacy, with increasing ego development from ages 15 to 25,
    from more conforming at age 15 to more self-aware and individualistic at age 25.
    Secondly, they found no indication of postponement of identity as suggested by
    others, in the young adults. And finally, most in the sample had intimate partner-
    ships at age 25, and their levels of intimacy were strongly predicted by ego iden-
    tity development at age 15. So they concluded that, even in the new millennium,
    ego development in adolescence strongly predicts intimacy in young adulthood.
    Erik Erikson himself once wrote, “the condition of twoness is that one must
    first become oneself” (1982, p. 101). Beyers and Sieffge-Krenke (2010) appear to
    have demonstrated the truth of that rather pithy statement about healthy personality
    in emerging adulthood. To the extent we become comfortable with ourselves, we
    are likely to enjoy higher quality intimacy with a partner.
    Critique of Erikson
    Erikson built his theory largely on ethical principles and not necessarily on scien-
    tific data. He came to psychology from art and acknowledged that he saw the world
    more through the eyes of an artist than through those of a scientist. He once wrote
    that he had nothing to offer except “a way of looking at things” (Erikson, 1963,
    p. 403). His books are admittedly subjective and personal, which undoubtedly adds
    to their appeal. Nevertheless, Erikson’s theory must be judged by the standards of
    science, not ethics or art.
    The first criterion of a useful theory is its ability to generate research, and
    by this standard, we rate Erikson’s theory somewhat higher than average. For
    example, the topic of ego identity alone has generated several hundred studies, and
    other aspects of Erikson’s developmental stages, such as intimacy versus isolation
    (Gold & Rogers, 1995) and generativity (Arnett, 2000; Pratt, Norris, Arnold, &
    Filyer, 1999), as well as the entire life cycle (Whitbourne, Zuschlag, Elliot, &
    Waterman, 1992), have stimulated active empirical investigations.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories224
    Despite this active research, we rate Erikson’s theory only average on the
    criterion of falsifiability. Many findings from this body of research can be explained
    by theories other than Erikson’s developmental stages theory.
    In its ability to organize knowledge, Erikson’s theory is limited mostly to
    developmental stages. It does not adequately address such issues as personal traits
    or motivation, a limitation that subtracts from the theory’s ability to shed meaning
    on much of what is currently known about human personality. The eight stages of
    development remain an eloquent statement of what the life cycle should be, and
    research findings in these areas usually can be fit into an Eriksonian framework.
    However, the theory lacks sufficient scope to be rated high on this criterion.
    As a guide to action, Erikson’s theory provides many general guidelines, but
    offers little specific advice. Compared to other theories discussed in this book,
    it ranks near the top in suggesting approaches to dealing with middle-aged and
    older adults. Erikson’s views on aging have been helpful to people in the field
    of gerontology, and his ideas on ego identity are nearly always cited in adolescent
    psychology textbooks. In addition, his concepts of intimacy versus isolation and
    generativity versus stagnation have much to offer to marriage counselors and oth-
    ers concerned with intimate relationships among young adults.
    We rate Erikson’s theory high on internal consistency, mostly because the
    terms used to label the different psychosocial crises, basic strengths, and core
    pathologies are very carefully chosen. English was not Erikson’s first language,
    and his extensive use of a dictionary while writing increased the precision of his
    terminology. Yet concepts like hope, will, purpose, love, care, and so on are not
    operationally defined. They have little scientific usefulness, although they rank
    high in both literary and emotional value. On the other hand, Erikson’s epigenetic
    principle and the eloquence of his description of the eight stages of development
    mark his theory with conspicuous internal consistency.
    On the criterion of simplicity, or parsimony, we give the theory a moderate
    rating. The precision of its terms is a strength, but the descriptions of psycho-
    sexual stages and psychosocial crises, especially in the later stages, are not always
    clearly differentiated. In addition, Erikson used different terms and even different
    concepts to fill out the 64 boxes that are mostly vacant in Figure 7.2. Such
    inconsistency subtracts from the theory’s simplicity.
    Concept of Humanity
    In contrast to Freud, who believed that anatomy was destiny, Erikson sug-
    gested that other factors might be responsible for differences between women
    and men. Citing some of his own research, Erikson (1977) suggested that,
    although girls and boys have different methods of play, these differences are
    at least partly a result of different socialization practices. Does this conclusion
    mean that Erikson agreed with Freud that anatomy is destiny? Erikson’s answer
    was yes, anatomy is destiny, but he quickly qualified that dictum to read:
    “Anatomy, history, and personality are our combined destiny” (Erikson, 1968,

    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory 225
    p. 285). In other words, anatomy alone does not determine destiny, but it
    combines with past events, including social and various personality dimensions
    such as temperament and intelligence, to determine who a person will become.
    How does Erikson’s theory conceptualize humanity in terms of the six
    dimensions we introduced in Chapter 1? First, is the life cycle determined by
    external forces or do people have some choice in molding their personalities
    and shaping their lives? Erikson was not as deterministic as Freud, but neither
    did he believe strongly in free choice. His position was somewhere in the mid-
    dle. Although personality is molded in part by culture and history, people retain
    some limited control over their destiny. People can search for their own identi-
    ties and are not completely constrained by culture and history. Individuals, in
    fact, can change history and alter their environment. The two subjects of Erik-
    son’s most extensive psychohistories, Martin Luther and Mahatma Gandhi, each
    had a profound effect on world history and on his own immediate surroundings.
    Similarly, each of us has the power to determine his or her own life cycles, even
    though our global impact may be on a lesser scale.
    On the dimension of pessimism versus optimism, Erikson tended to be
    somewhat optimistic. Even though core pathologies may predominate early
    stages of development, humans are not inevitably doomed to continue a
    pathological existence in later stages. Although weaknesses in early life
    make it more difficult to acquire basic strengths later on, people remain
    capable of changing at any stage of life. Each psychosocial conflict consists
    of a syntonic and a dystonic quality. Each crisis can be resolved in favor of
    the syntonic, or harmonious element, regardless of past resolutions.
    Erikson did not specifically address the issue of causality versus teleol-
    ogy, but his view of humanity suggests that people are influenced more by
    biological and social forces than by their view of the future. People are a
    product of a particular historical moment and a specific social setting.
    Although we can set goals and actively strive to achieve these goals, we
    cannot completely escape the powerful causal forces of anatomy, history,
    and culture. For this reason, we rate Erikson high on causality.
    On the fourth dimension, conscious versus unconscious determinants, Erik-
    son’s position is mixed. Prior to adolescence, personality is largely shaped by
    unconscious motivation. Psychosexual and psychosocial conflicts during the first
    four developmental stages occur before children have firmly established their
    identity. We seldom are clearly aware of these crises and the ways in which they
    mold our personalities. From adolescence forward, however, people ordinarily
    are aware of their actions and most of the reasons underlying those actions.
    Erikson’s theory, of course, is more social than biological, although it
    does not overlook anatomy and other physiological factors in personality
    development. Each psychosexual mode has a clear biological component.
    However, as people advance through the eight stages, social influences
    become increasingly more powerful. Also, the radius of social relations expands
    from the single maternal person to a global identification with all humanity.
    The sixth dimension for a concept of humanity is uniqueness versus
    similarities. Erikson tended to place more emphasis on individual differences
    than on universal characteristics. Although people in different cultures

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories226
    advance through the eight developmental stages in the same order, myriad
    differences are found in the pace of that journey. Each person resolves
    psychosocial crises in a unique manner, and each uses the basic strengths
    in a way that is peculiarly theirs.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Erikson’s stages of development rest on an epigenetic principle, meaning
    that each component proceeds in a step-by-step fashion with later growth
    building on earlier development.
    ∙ During every stage, people experience an interaction of opposing syntonic
    and dystonic attitudes, which leads to a conflict, or psychosocial crisis.
    ∙ Resolution of this crisis produces a basic strength and enables a person
    to move to the next stage.
    ∙ Biological components lay a ground plan for each individual, but a
    multiplicity of historical and cultural events also shapes ego identity.
    ∙ Each basic strength has an underlying antipathy that becomes the core
    pathology of that stage.
    ∙ The first stage of development is infancy, characterized by the oral-
    sensory mode, the psychosocial crisis of basic trust versus mistrust, the
    basic strength of hope, and the core pathology of withdrawal.
    ∙ During early childhood, children experience the anal, urethral, and
    muscular psychosexual mode; the psychosocial conflict of autonomy
    versus shame and doubt; the basic strength of will; and the core
    pathology of compulsion.
    ∙ During the play age, children experience genital-locomotor psychosexual
    development and undergo a psychosocial crisis of initiative versus guilt,
    with either the basic strength of purpose or the core pathology of inhibition.
    ∙ School-age children are in a period of sexual latency but face the
    psychosocial crisis of industry versus inferiority, which produces either
    the basic strength of competence or the core pathology of inertia.
    ∙ Adolescence, or puberty, is a crucial stage because a person’s sense of
    identity should emerge from this period. However, identity confusion may
    dominate the psychosocial crisis, thereby postponing identity. Fidelity is
    the basic strength of adolescence; role repudiation is its core pathology.
    ∙ Young adulthood, the time from about age 18 to 30, is characterized by the
    psychosexual mode of genitality, the psychosocial crisis of intimacy versus
    isolation, the basic strength of love, and the core pathology of exclusivity.
    ∙ Adulthood is a time when people experience the psychosexual mode of
    procreativity, the psychosocial crisis of generativity versus stagnation,
    the basic strength of care, and the core pathology of rejectivity.
    ∙ Old age is marked by the psychosexual mode of generalized sensuality,
    the crisis of integrity versus despair, and the basic strength of wisdom
    or the core pathology of disdain.
    ∙ Erikson used psychohistory (a combination of psychoanalysis and history)
    to study the identity crises of Martin Luther, Mahatma Gandhi, and others.
    Part II Psychodynamic Theories226

    227
    C H A P T E R 8
    Fromm © Bill Ray/The LIFE Picture Collection/
    Getty Images
    Fromm: Humanistic
    Psychoanalysis
    ⬥ Overview of Humanistic Psychoanalysis
    ⬥ Biography of Erich Fromm
    ⬥ Fromm’s Basic Assumptions
    ⬥ Human Needs
    Relatedness
    Transcendence
    Rootedness
    Sense of Identity
    Frame of Orientation
    Summary of Human Needs
    ⬥ The Burden of Freedom
    Mechanisms of Escape
    Authoritarianism
    Destructiveness
    Conformity
    Positive Freedom
    ⬥ Character Orientations
    Nonproductive Orientations
    Receptive
    Exploitative
    Hoarding
    Marketing
    The Productive Orientation
    ⬥ Personality Disorders
    Necrophilia
    Malignant Narcissism
    Incestuous Symbiosis
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Fromm’s Methods of Investigation
    Social Character in a Mexican Village
    A Psychohistorical Study of Hitler
    ⬥ Related Research
    Testing the Assumptions of Fromm’s
    Marketing Character
    Estrangement From Culture and Well-Being
    Authoritarianism and Fear
    ⬥ Critique of Fromm
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories228
    Why war? Why can’t nations get along? Why can’t people from different countries relate to one another, if not in a respectful manner at least in an
    acceptable one? How can people avoid the violence that leads to and perpetuates
    slaughter on the battlefield?
    As the young boy pondered these questions, a war raged throughout his
    homeland. This war that he saw firsthand was World War I, the Great War, the
    War to End All Wars. He saw that the people of his country—Germany—hated
    people of the opposing countries—mostly France and England, and he was sure
    that the people of France and England hated the people of Germany. The war made
    no sense. Why would normally friendly and rational people revert to such senseless
    killing?
    These questions weren’t the first to have bothered the young boy. He was
    also at a loss in trying to understand the suicide of a beautiful young artist who
    killed herself immediately after the death of her father—an event that left the
    12-year-old boy confused and perplexed. The young woman—a friend of the boy’s
    family—was both beautiful and talented, whereas her father was old and unat-
    tractive. Yet she left a suicide note stating that she wished to be buried with her
    father. The young boy could make no sense of either her wish or her actions. The
    beautiful artist seemed to have had much to live for, but she chose death rather
    than a life without her father. How could the young woman make such a decision?
    A third experience that helped shape the young man’s early life was his train-
    ing by Talmudic teachers. He was especially moved by the compassionate and
    redemptive tone of the Old Testament prophets Isaiah, Hosea, and Amos. Although
    he later abandoned organized religion, these early experiences with the Talmudic
    scholars, combined with his distaste for war and his puzzlement over the suicide of
    the young artist, contributed substantially to the humanistic views of Erich Fromm.
    Overview of Humanistic Psychoanalysis
    Erich Fromm’s basic thesis is that modern-day people have been torn away from
    their prehistoric union with nature and also with one another, yet they have the
    power of reasoning, foresight, and imagination. This combination of lack of animal
    instincts and presence of rational thought makes humans the freaks of the universe.
    Self-awareness contributes to feelings of loneliness, isolation, and homelessness.
    To escape from these feelings, people strive to become reunited with nature and
    with their fellow human beings.
    Trained in Freudian psychoanalysis and influenced by Karl Marx, Karen
    Horney, and other socially oriented theorists, Fromm developed a theory of per-
    sonality that emphasizes the influence of sociobiological factors, history, econom-
    ics, and class structure. His humanistic psychoanalysis assumes that humanity’s
    separation from the natural world has produced feelings of loneliness and isolation,
    a condition called basic anxiety.
    Fromm was more than a personality theorist. He was a social critic, psycho-
    therapist, philosopher, biblical scholar, cultural anthropologist, and psychobiogra-
    pher. His humanistic psychoanalysis looks at people from a historical and cultural
    perspective rather than a strictly psychological one. It is less concerned with the
    individual and more concerned with those characteristics common to a culture.

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 229
    Fromm takes an evolutionary view of humanity. When humans emerged as
    a separate species in animal evolution, they lost most of their animal instincts but
    gained “an increase in brain development that permitted self-awareness, imagina-
    tion, planning, and doubt” (Fromm, 1992, p. 5). This combination of weak instincts
    and a highly developed brain makes humans distinct from all other animals.
    A more recent event in human history has been the rise of capitalism, which
    on one hand has contributed to the growth of leisure time and personal freedom, but
    on the other hand, it has resulted in feelings of anxiety, isolation, and powerlessness.
    The cost of freedom, Fromm maintained, has exceeded its benefits. The isolation
    wrought by capitalism has been unbearable, leaving people with two alternatives:
    (1) to escape from freedom into interpersonal dependencies, or (2)  to move to
    self-realization through productive love and work.
    Biography of Erich Fromm
    Like the views of all personality theorists, Erich Fromm’s view of human nature
    was shaped by childhood experiences. For Fromm, a Jewish family life, the suicide
    of a young woman, and the extreme nationalism of the German people contributed
    to his conception of humanity.
    Fromm was born on March 23, 1900, in Frankfurt, Germany, the only child of
    middle-class Orthodox Jewish parents. His father, Naphtali Fromm, was the son of a
    rabbi and the grandson of two rabbis. His mother, Rosa Krause Fromm, was the niece
    of Ludwig Krause, a well-known Talmudic scholar. As a boy, Erich studied the Old
    Testament with several prominent scholars, men who were regarded as “humanists of
    extraordinary tolerance” (Landis & Tauber, 1971, p. xi). Fromm’s humanistic psychol-
    ogy can be traced to the reading of these prophets, “with their vision of universal
    peace and harmony, and their teachings that there are ethical aspects to history—that
    nations can do right and wrong, and that history has its moral laws” (p. x).
    Fromm’s early childhood was less than ideal. He recalled that he had “very
    neurotic parents” and that he was “probably a rather unbearably neurotic child” (Evans,
    1966, p. 56). He saw his father as being moody and his mother as prone to depression.
    Moreover, he grew up in two very distinct worlds, one the traditional Orthodox Jewish
    world, the other the modern capitalist world. This split existence created tensions that
    were nearly unendurable, but it generated in Fromm a lifelong tendency to see events
    from more than one perspective (Fromm, 1986; Hausdorff, 1972).
    The chapter opening vignette chronicled the shocking and puzzling suicide
    of an attractive artistic young woman who killed herself so she could be buried
    with her father, who had just died. How was it possible that this young woman
    could prefer death to being “alive to the pleasures of life and painting”? (Fromm,
    1962, p. 4). This question haunted Fromm for the next 10 years and eventually led
    to an interest in Sigmund Freud and psychoanalysis. As Fromm read Freud, he
    began to learn about the Oedipus complex and to understand how such an event
    might be possible. Later, Fromm would interpret the young woman’s irrational
    dependence on her father as a nonproductive symbiotic relationship, but in those
    early years he was content with the Freudian explanation.
    Fromm was 14 when World War I began, too young to fight but not too
    young to be impressed by the irrationality of the German nationalism that he had

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories230
    observed firsthand. He was sure that the British and French were equally irrational,
    and once again he was struck by a troubling question: How could normally ratio-
    nal and peaceful people become so driven by national ideologies, so intent on
    killing, so ready to die? “When the war ended in 1918, I was a deeply troubled
    young man who was obsessed by the question of how war was possible, by the
    wish to understand the irrationality of human mass behavior, by a passionate desire
    for peace and international understanding” (Fromm, 1962, p. 9).
    During adolescence, Fromm was deeply moved by the writings of Freud and
    Karl Marx, but he was also stimulated by differences between the two. As he
    studied more, he began to question the validity of both systems. “My main interest
    was clearly mapped out. I wanted to understand the laws that govern the life of
    the individual man, and the laws of society” (Fromm, 1962, p. 9).
    After the war, Fromm became a socialist, although at that time, he refused
    to join the Socialist Party. Instead, he concentrated on his studies in psychology,
    philosophy, and sociology at the University of Heidelberg, where he received his
    PhD in sociology at either age 22 or 25. [Fromm was such a private person that
    his biographers do not agree on many facts of his life (Hornstein, 2000).]
    Still not confident that his training could answer such troubling questions as
    the suicide of the young woman or the insanity of war, Fromm turned to psycho-
    analysis, believing that it promised answers to questions of human motivation not
    offered in other fields. From 1925 until 1930 he studied psychoanalysis, first in
    Munich, then in Frankfurt, and finally at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, where
    he was analyzed by Hanns Sachs, a student of Freud. Although Fromm never met
    Freud, most of his teachers during those years were strict adherents of Freudian
    theory (Knapp, 1989).
    In 1926, the same year that he repudiated Orthodox Judaism, Fromm married
    Frieda Reichmann, his analyst, who was more than 10 years his senior. Reichmann
    would later obtain an international reputation for her work with schizophrenic
    patients. G. P. Knapp (1989) claimed that Reichmann was clearly a mother figure
    to Fromm and that she even resembled his mother. Gail Hornstein (2000) added that
    Fromm seemed to have gone directly from being his mother’s darling to relationships
    with a number of older women who doted on him. In any event, the marriage of
    Fromm and Fromm-Reichmann was not a happy one. They separated in 1930 but
    were not divorced until much later, after both had emigrated to the United States.
    In 1930, Fromm and several others founded the South German Institute for
    Psychoanalysis in Frankfurt, but with the Nazi threat becoming more intense, he
    soon moved to Switzerland where he joined the newly founded International Insti-
    tute of Social Research in Geneva. In 1933, he accepted an invitation to deliver a
    series of lectures at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute. The following year he
    emigrated to the United States and opened a private practice in New York City.
    In both Chicago and New York, Fromm renewed his acquaintance with
    Karen Horney, whom he had known casually at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute.
    Horney, who was 15 years older than Fromm, eventually became a strong mother
    figure and mentor to him (Knapp, 1989). Fromm joined Horney’s newly formed
    Association for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis (AAP) in 1941. Although he
    and Horney had been lovers, by 1943 dissension within the association had made
    them rivals. When students requested that Fromm, who did not hold an MD degree,

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 231
    teach a clinical course, the organization split over his qualifications. With Horney
    siding against him, Fromm, along with Harry Stack Sullivan, Clara Thompson, and
    several other members, quit the association and immediately made plans to begin an
    alternative organization (Quinn, 1987). In 1946, this group established the William
    Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology, with Fromm
    chairing both the faculty and the training committee.
    In 1944, Fromm married Henny Gurland, a woman two years younger than
    Fromm and whose interest in religion and mystical thought furthered Fromm’s own
    inclinations toward Zen Buddhism. In 1951, the couple moved to Mexico for a
    more favorable climate for Gurland, who suffered from rheumatoid arthritis.
    Fromm joined the faculty at the National Autonomous University in Mexico City,
    where he established a psychoanalytic department at the medical school. After his
    wife died in 1952, he continued to live in Mexico and commuted between his home
    in Cuernavaca and the United States, where he held various academic positions,
    including professor of psychology at Michigan State University from 1957 to 1961 and
    adjunct professor at New York University from 1962 to 1970. While in Mexico,
    he met Annis Freeman, whom he married in 1953. In 1968, Fromm suffered a
    serious heart attack and was forced to slow down his busy schedule. In 1974 and
    still ill, he and his wife moved to Muralto, Switzerland, where he died March 18,
    1980, a few days short of his 80th birthday.
    What kind of person was Erich Fromm? Apparently, different people saw him
    in quite different ways. Hornstein (2000) listed a number of opposing traits that have
    been used to describe his personality. According to this account, Fromm was authori-
    tarian, gentle, pretentious, arrogant, pious, autocratic, shy, sincere, phony, and brilliant.
    Fromm began his professional career as a psychotherapist using orthodox
    psychoanalytic technique, but after 10 years he became “bored” with the Freudian
    approach and developed his own more active and confrontational methods (Fromm,
    1986, 1992; Sobel, 1980). Over the years, his cultural, social, economic, and psy-
    chological ideas have attained a wide audience. Among his best-known books are
    Escape from Freedom (1941), Man for Himself (1947), Psychoanalysis and Reli-
    gion (1950), The Sane Society (1955), The Art of Loving (1956), Marx’s Concept
    of Man (1961), The Heart of Man (1964), The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness
    (1973), To Have or Be (1976), and For the Love of Life (1986).
    Fromm’s theory of personality borrows from myriad sources and is, perhaps,
    the most broadly based theory in this book. Landis and Tauber (1971) listed five
    important influences on Fromm’s thinking: (1) the teachings of the humanistic rabbis;
    (2) the revolutionary spirit of Karl Marx; (3) the equally revolutionary ideas of
    Sigmund Freud; (4) the rationality of Zen Buddhism as espoused by D. T. Suzuki;
    and (5) the writings of Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815–1887) on matriarchal societies.
    Fromm’s Basic Assumptions
    Fromm’s most basic assumption is that individual personality can be understood
    only in the light of human history. “The discussion of the human situation must
    precede that of personality, [and] psychology must be based on an anthropologic-
    philosophical concept of human existence” (Fromm, 1947, p. 45).

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories232
    Fromm (1947) believed that humans, unlike other animals, have been “torn
    away” from their prehistoric union with nature. They have no powerful instincts to
    adapt to a changing world; instead, they have acquired the facility to reason—a
    condition Fromm called the human dilemma. People experience this basic dilemma
    because they have become separate from nature and yet have the capacity to be
    aware of themselves as isolated beings. The human ability to reason, therefore, is
    both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, it permits people to survive, but on the
    other, it forces them to attempt to solve basic insoluble dichotomies. Fromm referred
    to these as “existential dichotomies” because they are rooted in people’s very exis-
    tence. Humans cannot do away with these existential dichotomies; they can only
    react to these dichotomies relative to their culture and their individual personalities.
    The first and most fundamental dichotomy is that between life and death. Self-
    awareness and reason tell us that we will die, but we try to negate this dichotomy
    by postulating life after death, an attempt that does not alter the fact that our lives
    end with death.
    A second existential dichotomy is that humans are capable of conceptualizing
    the goal of complete self-realization, but we also are aware that life is too short to
    reach that goal. “Only if the life span of the individual were identical with that of
    mankind could he participate in the human development which occurs in the his-
    torical process” (Fromm, 1947, p. 42). Some people try to solve this dichotomy
    by assuming that their own historical period is the crowning achievement of
    humanity, while others postulate a continuation of development after death.
    The third existential dichotomy is that people are ultimately alone, yet we
    cannot tolerate isolation. They are aware of themselves as separate individuals, and
    at the same time, they believe that their happiness depends on uniting with their
    fellow human beings. Although people cannot completely solve the problem of
    aloneness versus union, they must make an attempt or run the risk of insanity.
    Human Needs
    As animals, humans are motivated by such physiological needs as hunger, sex, and
    safety; but they can never resolve their human dilemma by satisfying these animal
    needs. Only the distinctive human needs can move people toward a reunion with
    the natural world. These existential needs have emerged during the evolution of
    human culture, growing out of their attempts to find an answer to their existence
    and to avoid becoming insane. Indeed, Fromm (1955) contended that one important
    difference between mentally healthy individuals and neurotic or insane ones is that
    healthy people find answers to their existence—answers that more completely cor-
    respond to their total human needs. In other words, healthy individuals are better
    able to find ways of reuniting to the world by productively solving the human
    needs of relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, a sense of identity, and a frame
    of orientation.
    Relatedness
    The first human, or existential, need is relatedness, the drive for union with another
    person or other persons. Fromm postulated three basic ways in which a person may

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 233
    relate to the world: (1) submission, (2) power, and (3) love. A person can submit
    to another, to a group, or to an institution in order to become one with the world.
    “In this way he transcends the separateness of his individual existence by becoming
    part of somebody or something bigger than himself and experiences his identity in
    connection with the power to which he has submitted” (Fromm, 1981, p. 2).
    Whereas submissive people search for a relationship with domineering peo-
    ple, power seekers welcome submissive partners. When a submissive person and
    a domineering person find each other, they frequently establish a symbiotic rela-
    tionship, one that is satisfying to both partners. Although such symbiosis may be
    gratifying, it blocks growth toward integrity and psychological health. The two
    partners “live on each other and from each other, satisfying their craving for close-
    ness, yet suffering from the lack of inner strength and self-reliance which would
    require freedom and independence” (Fromm, 1981, p. 2).
    People in symbiotic relationships are drawn to one another not by love but
    by a desperate need for relatedness, a need that can never be completely satisfied
    by such a partnership. Underlying the union are unconscious feelings of hostility.
    People in symbiotic relationships blame their partners for not being able to com-
    pletely satisfy their needs. They find themselves seeking additional submission or
    power, and as a result, they become more and more dependent on their partners
    and less and less of an individual.
    Fromm believed that love is the only route by which a person can become
    united with the world and, at the same time, achieve individuality and integrity.
    He defined love as a “union with somebody, or something outside oneself under
    the condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one’s own self ”
    (Fromm,  1981, p. 3). Love involves sharing and communion with another, yet it
    allows a person the freedom to be unique and separate. It enables a person to
    satisfy the need for relatedness without surrendering integrity and independence.
    In love, two people become one yet remain two.
    In The Art of Loving, Fromm (1956) identified care, responsibility, respect,
    and knowledge as four basic elements common to all forms of genuine love. Some-
    one who loves another person must care for that person and be willing to take care
    of him or her. Love also means responsibility, that is, a willingness and ability to
    respond. A person who loves others responds to their physical and psychological
    needs, respects them for who they are, and avoids the temptation of trying to
    change them. But people can respect others only if they have knowledge of them.
    To know others means to see them from their own point of view. Thus, care,
    responsibility, respect, and knowledge are all entwined in a love relationship.
    Transcendence
    Like other animals, humans are thrown into the world without their consent or will
    and then removed from it—again without their consent or will. But unlike other
    animals, human beings are driven by the need for transcendence, defined as the urge
    to rise above a passive and accidental existence and into “the realm of purposeful-
    ness and freedom” (Fromm, 1981, p. 4). Just as relatedness can be pursued through
    either productive or nonproductive methods, transcendence can be sought through
    either positive or negative approaches. People can transcend their passive nature by

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories234
    either creating life or by destroying it. Although other animals can create life
    through reproduction, only humans are aware of themselves as creators. Also,
    humans can be creative in other ways. They can create art, religions, ideas, laws,
    material production, and love.
    To create means to be active and to care about that which we create. But we
    can also transcend life by destroying it and thus rising above our slain victims. In
    The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Fromm (1973) argued that humans are
    the only species to use malignant aggression: that is, to kill for reasons other than
    survival. Although malignant aggression is a dominant and powerful passion in
    some individuals and cultures, it is not common to all humans. It apparently was
    unknown to many prehistoric societies as well as some contemporary “primitive”
    societies.
    Rootedness
    A third existential need is for rootedness, or the need to establish roots or to feel
    at home again in the world. When humans evolved as a separate species, they lost
    their home in the natural world. At the same time, their capacity for thought
    enabled them to realize that they were without a home, without roots. The conse-
    quent feelings of isolation and helplessness became unbearable.
    Rootedness, too, can be sought in either productive or nonproductive strate-
    gies. With the productive strategy, people are weaned from the orbit of their mother
    and become fully born; that is, they actively and creatively relate to the world and
    become whole or integrated. This new tie to the natural world confers security and
    reestablishes a sense of belongingness and rootedness. However, people may also
    seek rootedness through the nonproductive strategy of fixation—a tenacious
    reluctance to move beyond the protective security provided by one’s mother. Peo-
    ple who strive for rootedness through fixation are “afraid to take the next step of
    birth, to be weaned from the mother’s breast. [They] . . . have a deep craving to
    be mothered, nursed, protected by a motherly figure; they are the externally depen-
    dent ones, who are frightened and insecure when motherly protection is with-
    drawn” (Fromm, 1955, p. 40).
    Rootedness can also be seen phylogenetically in the evolution of the human
    species. Fromm agreed with Freud that incestuous desires are universal, but he
    disagreed with Freud’s belief that they are essentially sexual. According to Fromm
    (1955, pp. 40–41), incestuous feelings are based in “the deep-seated craving to
    remain in, or to return to, the all-enveloping womb, or to the all-nourishing breasts.”
    Fromm was influenced by Johann Jakob Bachofen’s (1861/1967) ideas on early
    matriarchal societies. Unlike Freud, who believed that early societies were patri-
    archal, Bachofen held that the mother was the central figure in these ancient social
    groups. It was she who provided roots for her children and motivated them either
    to develop their individuality and reason or to become fixated and incapable of
    psychological growth.
    Fromm’s (1997) strong preference for Bachofen’s mother-centered theory of
    the Oedipal situation over Freud’s father-centered conception is consistent with his
    preference for older women. Fromm’s first wife, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, was
    more than 10 years older than Fromm, and his long-time lover, Karen Horney, was

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 235
    15 years his senior. Fromm’s conception of the Oedipus complex as a desire to
    return to the mother’s womb or breast or to a person with a mothering function
    should be viewed in light of his attraction to older women.
    Sense of Identity
    The fourth human need is for a sense of identity, or the capacity to be aware of
    ourselves as a separate entity. Because we have been torn away from nature, we
    need to form a concept of our self, to be able to say, “I am I,” or “I am the subject
    of my actions.” Fromm (1981) believed that primitive people identified more
    closely with their clan and did not see themselves as individuals existing apart
    from their group. Even during medieval times, people were identified largely by
    their social role in the feudal hierarchy. In agreement with Marx, Fromm believed
    that the rise of capitalism has given people more economic and political freedom.
    However, this freedom has given only a minority of people a true sense of “I.”
    The identity of most people still resides in their attachment to others or to institu-
    tions such as nation, religion, occupation, or social group.
    Instead of the pre-individualistic clan identity, a new herd identity develops in
    which the sense of identity rests on the sense of an unquestionable belonging to
    the crowd. That this uniformity and conformity are often not recognized as such,
    and are covered by the illusion of individuality, does not alter the facts. (p. 9)
    Without a sense of identity, people could not retain their sanity, and this
    threat provides a powerful motivation to do almost anything to acquire a sense of
    identity. Neurotics try to attach themselves to powerful people or to social or
    political institutions. Healthy people, however, have less need to conform to the
    herd, less need to give up their sense of self. They do not have to surrender their
    freedom and individuality in order to fit into society because they possess an
    authentic sense of identity.
    Frame of Orientation
    A final human need is for a frame of orientation. Being split off from nature, humans
    need a road map, a frame of orientation, to make their way through the world. With-
    out such a map, humans would be “confused and unable to act purposefully and
    consistently” (Fromm, 1973, p. 230). A frame of orientation enables people to organize
    the various stimuli that impinge on them. People who possess a solid frame of orien-
    tation can make sense of these events and phenomena, but those who lack a reliable
    frame of orientation will, nevertheless, strive to put these events into some sort of
    framework in order to make sense of them. For example, an American with a shaky
    frame of orientation and a poor understanding of history may attempt to understand
    the events of September 11, 2001, by blaming them on “evil” or “bad” people.
    Every person has a philosophy, a consistent way of looking at things. Many
    people take for granted this philosophy or frame of reference so that anything at odds
    with their view is judged as “crazy” or “unreasonable.” Anything consistent with it
    is seen simply as “common sense.” People will do nearly anything to acquire and
    retain a frame of orientation, even to the extreme of following irrational or bizarre
    philosophies such as those espoused by fanatical political and religious leaders.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories236
    A road map without a goal or destination is worthless. Humans have the
    mental capacity to imagine many alternative paths to follow. To keep from going
    insane, however, they need a final goal or “object of devotion” (Fromm, 1976,
    p.  137). According to Fromm, this goal or object of devotion focuses people’s
    energies in a single direction, enables us to transcend our isolated existence, and
    confers meaning to our lives.
    Summary of Human Needs
    In addition to physiological or animal needs, people are motivated by five distinc-
    tively human needs—relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, a sense of identity,
    and a frame of orientation. These needs have evolved from human existence as a
    separate species and are aimed at moving people toward a reunion with the natural
    world. Fromm believed that lack of satisfaction of any of these needs is unbearable
    and results in insanity. Thus, people are strongly driven to fulfill them in some
    way or another, either positively or negatively.
    Table 8.1 shows that relatedness can be satisfied through submission, domi-
    nation, or love, but only love produces authentic fulfillment; transcendence can be
    satisfied by either destructiveness or creativeness, but only the latter permits joy;
    rootedness can be satisfied either by fixation to the mother or by moving forward
    into full birth and wholeness; the sense of identity can be based on adjustment to
    the group, or it can be satisfied through creative movement toward individuality;
    and a frame of orientation may be either irrational or rational, but only a rational
    philosophy can serve as a basis for the growth of total personality (Fromm, 1981).
    The Burden of Freedom
    The central thesis of Fromm’s writings is that humans have been torn from
    nature, yet they remain part of the natural world, subject to the same physical
    limitations as other animals. As the only animal possessing self-awareness, imag-
    ination, and reason, humans are “the freak[s] of the universe” (Fromm, 1955, p.
    23). Reason is both a curse and a blessing. It is responsible for feelings of isola-
    tion and loneliness, but it is also the process that enables humans to become
    reunited with the world.
    T A B L E 8 . 1
    Summary of Fromm’s Human Needs
    Relatedness Submission or domination Love
    Transcendence Destructiveness Creativeness
    Rootedness Fixation Wholeness
    Sense of identity Adjustment to a group Individuality
    Frame of orientation Irrational goals Rational goals
    Negative Components Positive Components

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 237
    Historically, as people gained more and more economic and political freedom,
    they came to feel increasingly more isolated. For example, during the Middle Ages
    people had relatively little personal freedom. They were anchored to prescribed roles
    in society, roles that provided security, dependability, and certainty. Then, as they
    acquired more freedom to move both socially and geographically, they found that
    they were free from the security of a fixed position in the world. They were no
    longer tied to one geographic region, one social order, or one occupation. They
    became separated from their roots and isolated from one another.
    A parallel experience exists on a personal level. As children become more
    independent of their mothers, they gain more freedom to express their individuality,
    to move around unsupervised, to choose their friends, clothes, and so on. At the
    same time, they experience the burden of freedom; that is, they are free from the
    security of being one with the mother. On both a social and an individual level, this
    burden of freedom results in basic anxiety, the feeling of being alone in the world.
    Mechanisms of Escape
    Because basic anxiety produces a frightening sense of isolation and aloneness,
    people attempt to flee from freedom through a variety of escape mechanisms. In
    Escape from Freedom, Fromm (1941) identified three primary mechanisms of
    escape— authoritarianism, destructiveness, and conformity. Unlike Horney’s neu-
    rotic trends (see Chapter 6), Fromm’s mechanisms of escape are the driving forces
    in normal people, both individually and collectively.
    Authoritarianism
    Fromm (1941) defined authoritarianism as the “tendency to give up the indepen-
    dence of one’s own individual self and to fuse one’s self with somebody or some-
    thing outside oneself, in order to acquire the strength which the individual is
    lacking” (p. 141). This need to unite with a powerful partner can take one of two
    forms—masochism or sadism. Masochism results from basic feelings of powerless-
    ness, weakness, and inferiority and is aimed at joining the self to a more powerful
    person or institution. Masochistic strivings often are disguised as love or loyalty,
    but unlike love and loyalty, they can never contribute positively to independence
    and authenticity.
    Compared with masochism, sadism is more neurotic and more socially harmful.
    Like masochism, sadism is aimed at reducing basic anxiety through achieving unity
    with another person or persons. Fromm (1941) identified three kinds of sadistic ten-
    de ncies, all more or less clustered together. The first is the need to make others
    dependent on oneself and to gain power over those who are weak. The second is the
    compulsion to exploit others, to take advantage of them, and to use them for one’s
    benefit or pleasure. A third sadistic tendency is the desire to see others suffer, either
    physically or psychologically.
    Destructiveness
    Like authoritarianism, destructiveness is rooted in the feelings of aloneness, isola-
    tion, and powerlessness. Unlike sadism and masochism, however, destructiveness

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories238
    does not depend on a continuous relationship with another person; rather, it seeks
    to do away with other people.
    Both individuals and nations can employ destructiveness as a mechanism of
    escape. By destroying people and objects, a person or a nation attempts to restore lost
    feelings of power. However, by destroying other persons or nations, destructive peo-
    ple eliminate much of the outside world and thus acquire a type of perverted isolation.
    Conformity
    A third means of escape is conformity. People who conform try to escape from a
    sense of aloneness and isolation by giving up their individuality and becoming what-
    ever other people desire them to be. Thus, they become like robots, reacting predict-
    ably and mechanically to the whims of others. They seldom express their own
    opinion, cling to expected standards of behavior, and often appear stiff and automated.
    People in the modern world are free from many external bonds and are free
    to act according to their own will, but at the same time, they do not know what
    they want, think, or feel. They conform like automatons to an anonymous authority
    and adopt a self that is not authentic. The more they conform, the more powerless
    they feel; the more powerless they feel, the more they must conform. People can
    break this cycle of conformity and powerlessness only by achieving self-realization
    or positive freedom (Fromm, 1941).
    Positive Freedom
    The emergence of political and economic freedom does not lead inevitably to the
    bondage of isolation and powerlessness. A person “can be free and not alone, criti-
    cal and yet not filled with doubts, independent and yet an integral part of mankind”
    (Fromm, 1941, p. 257). People can attain this kind of freedom, called positive
    freedom, by a spontaneous and full expression of both their rational and their emo-
    tional potentialities. Spontaneous activity is frequently seen in small children and in
    artists who have little or no tendency to conform to whatever others want them to
    be. They act according to their basic natures and not according to conventional rules.
    Positive freedom represents a successful solution to the human dilemma of being
    part of the natural world and yet separate from it. Through positive freedom and
    spontaneous activity, people overcome the terror of aloneness, achieve union with the
    world, and maintain individuality. Fromm (1941) held that love and work are the twin
    components of positive freedom. Through active love and work, humans unite with
    one another and with the world without sacrificing their integrity. They affirm their
    uniqueness as individuals and achieve full realization of their potentialities.
    Character Orientations
    In Fromm’s theory, personality is reflected in one’s character orientation, that is,
    a person’s relatively permanent way of relating to people and things. Fromm (1947)
    defined personality as “the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities
    which are characteristic of one individual and which make the individual unique”
    (p. 50). The most important of the acquired qualities of personality is character,

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 239
    defined as “the relatively permanent system of all noninstinctual strivings through
    which man relates himself to the human and natural world” (Fromm, 1973, p. 226).
    Fromm (1992) believed that character is a substitute for instincts. Instead of acting
    according to their instincts, people act according to their character. If they had to
    stop and think about the consequences of their behavior, their actions would be very
    inefficient and inconsistent. By acting according to their character traits, humans
    can behave both efficiently and consistently.
    People relate to the world in two ways—by acquiring and using things
    (assimilation) and by relating to self and others (socialization). In general terms,
    people can relate to things and to people either nonproductively or productively.
    Nonproductive Orientations
    People can acquire things through any one of four nonproductive orientations:
    (1) receiving things passively, (2) exploiting, or taking things through force, (3) hoard-
    ing objects, and (4) marketing or exchanging things. Fromm used the term “nonpro-
    ductive” to suggest strategies that fail to move people closer to positive freedom and
    self-realization. Nonproductive orientations are, however, not entirely negative; each
    has both a negative and a positive aspect. Personality is always a blend or combina-
    tion of several orientations, even though one orientation is dominant.
    Receptive
    Receptive characters feel that the source of all good lies outside themselves and
    that the only way they can relate to the world is to receive things, including love,
    knowledge, and material possessions. They are more concerned with receiving than
    with giving, and they want others to shower them with love, ideas, and gifts.
    The negative qualities of receptive people include passivity, submissiveness,
    and lack of self-confidence. Their positive traits are loyalty, acceptance, and trust.
    Exploitative
    Like receptive people, exploitative characters believe that the source of all good
    is outside themselves. Unlike receptive people, however, they aggressively take
    what they desire rather than passively receive it. In their social relationships, they
    are likely to use cunning or force to take someone else’s spouse, ideas, or property.
    An exploitative man may “fall in love” with a married woman, not so much
    because he is truly fond of her, but because he wishes to exploit her husband. In
    the realm of ideas, exploitative people prefer to steal or plagiarize rather than cre-
    ate. Unlike receptive characters, they are willing to express an opinion, but it is
    usually an opinion that has been pilfered.
    On the negative side, exploitative characters are egocentric, conceited, arro-
    gant, and seducing. On the positive side, they are impulsive, proud, charming, and
    self-confident.
    Hoarding
    Rather than valuing things outside themselves, hoarding characters seek to save
    that which they have already obtained. They hold everything inside and do not let

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories240
    go of anything. They keep money, feelings, and thoughts to themselves. In a love
    relationship, they try to possess the loved one and to preserve the relationship
    rather than allowing it to change and grow. They tend to live in the past and are
    repelled by anything new. They are similar to Freud’s anal characters in that they
    are excessively orderly, stubborn, and miserly. Fromm (1964), however, believed
    that hoarding characters’ anal traits are not the result of sexual drives but rather
    are part of their general interest in all that is not alive, including the feces.
    Negative traits of the hoarding personality include rigidity, sterility, obsti-
    nacy, compulsivity, and lack of creativity; positive characteristics are orderliness,
    cleanliness, and punctuality.
    Marketing
    The marketing character is an outgrowth of modern commerce in which trade is
    no longer personal but carried out by large, faceless corporations. Consistent with
    the demands of modern commerce, marketing characters see themselves as com-
    modities, with their personal value dependent on their exchange value, that is, their
    ability to sell themselves.
    Marketing, or exchanging, personalities must see themselves as being in con-
    stant demand; they must make others believe that they are skillful and salable.
    Their personal security rests on shaky ground because they must adjust their per-
    sonality to that which is currently in fashion. They play many roles and are guided
    by the motto “ ‘I am as you desire me’ ” (Fromm, 1947, p. 73).
    Marketing people are without a past or a future and have no permanent prin-
    ciples or values. They have fewer positive traits than the other orientations because
    Hoarding is saving what one has already obtained and is an inability to discard things because
    everything has equal value. © Roger Bamber/Alamy Stock Photo

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 241
    they are basically empty vessels waiting to be filled with whatever characteristic is
    most marketable.
    Negative traits of marketing characters are aimlessness, opportunism, inconsis-
    tency, and wastefulness. Some of their positive qualities include changeability, open-
    mindedness, adaptability, and generosity.
    The Productive Orientation
    The single productive orientation has three dimensions—working, loving, and rea-
    soning. Because productive people work toward positive freedom and a continuing
    realization of their potential, they are the most healthy of all character types. Only
    through productive activity can people solve the basic human dilemma: that is, to
    unite with the world and with others while retaining uniqueness and individuality.
    This solution can be accomplished only through productive work, love, and thought.
    Healthy people value work not as an end in itself, but as a means of creative
    self-expression. They do not work to exploit others, to market themselves, to
    withdraw from others, or to accumulate needless material possessions. They are
    neither lazy nor compulsively active, but use work as a means of producing
    life’s necessities.
    Productive love is characterized by the four qualities of love discussed
    earlier—care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. In addition to these four char-
    acteristics, healthy people possess biophilia: that is, a passionate love of life and
    all that is alive. Biophilic people desire to further all life—the life of people,
    animals, plants, ideas, and cultures. They are concerned with the growth and devel-
    opment of themselves as well as others. Biophilic individuals want to influence
    people through love, reason, and example—not by force.
    Fromm believed that love of others and self-love are inseparable but that
    self-love must come first. All people have the capacity for productive love, but
    most do not achieve it because they cannot first love themselves.
    Productive thinking, which cannot be separated from productive work and
    love, is motivated by a concerned interest in another person or object. Healthy
    people see others as they are and not as they would wish them to be. Similarly,
    they know themselves for who they are and have no need for self-delusion.
    Fromm (1947) believed that healthy people rely on some combination of all
    five character orientations. Their survival as healthy individuals depends on their
    ability to receive things from other people, to take things when appropriate, to
    preserve things, to exchange things, and to work, love, and think productively.
    Personality Disorders
    If healthy people are able to work, love, and think productively, then unhealthy
    personalities are marked by problems in these three areas, especially failure to love
    productively. Fromm (1981) held that psychologically disturbed people are inca-
    pable of love and have failed to establish union with others. He discussed three
    severe personality disorders—necrophilia, malignant narcissism, and incestuous
    symbiosis.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories242
    Necrophilia
    The term “necrophilia” means love of death and usually refers to a sexual perversion
    in which a person desires sexual contact with a corpse. However, Fromm (1964, 1973)
    used necrophilia in a more generalized sense to denote any attraction to death. Necro-
    philia is an alternative character orientation to biophilia. People naturally love life,
    but when social conditions stunt biophilia, they may adopt a necrophilic orientation.
    Necrophilic personalities hate humanity; they are racists, warmongers, and
    bullies; they love bloodshed, destruction, terror, and torture; and they delight in
    destroying life. They are strong advocates of law and order; love to talk about
    sickness, death, and burials; and they are fascinated by dirt, decay, corpses, and
    feces. They prefer night to day and love to operate in darkness and shadow.
    Necrophilous people do not simply behave in a destructive manner; rather,
    their destructive behavior is a reflection of their basic character. All people behave
    aggressively and destructively at times, but the entire lifestyle of the necrophilous
    person revolves around death, destruction, disease, and decay.
    Malignant Narcissism
    Just as all people display some necrophilic behavior, so too do all have some
    narcissistic tendencies. Healthy people manifest a benign form of narcissism, that
    is, an interest in their own body. However, in its malignant form, narcissism
    impedes the perception of reality so that everything belonging to a narcissistic
    person is highly valued and everything belonging to another is devalued.
    Narcissistic individuals are preoccupied with themselves, but this concern is
    not limited to admiring themselves in a mirror. Preoccupation with one’s body
    often leads to hypochondriasis, or an obsessive attention to one’s health. Fromm
    (1964) also discussed moral hypochondriasis, or a preoccupation with guilt about
    previous transgressions. People who are fixated on themselves are likely to inter-
    nalize experiences and to dwell on both physical health and moral virtues.
    Narcissistic people possess what Horney (see Chapter 6) called “neurotic
    claims.” They achieve security by holding on to the distorted belief that their
    extraordinary personal qualities give them superiority over everyone else. Because
    what they have—looks, physique, wealth—is so wonderful, they believe that they
    need not do anything to prove their value. Their sense of worth depends on their
    narcissistic self-image and not on their achievements. When their efforts are criti-
    cized by others, they react with anger and rage, frequently striking out against their
    critics, trying to destroy them. If the criticism is overwhelming, they may be unable
    to destroy it, and so they turn their rage inward. The result is depression, a feeling
    of worthlessness. Although depression, intense guilt, and hypochondriasis may
    appear to be anything but self-glorification, Fromm believed that each of these
    could be symptomatic of deep underlying narcissism.
    Incestuous Symbiosis
    A third pathological orientation is incestuous symbiosis, or an extreme dependence
    on the mother or mother surrogate. Incestuous symbiosis is an exaggerated form
    of the more common and more benign mother fixation. Men with a mother fixation

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 243
    need a woman to care for them, dote on them, and admire them; they feel some-
    what anxious and depressed when their needs are not fulfilled. This condition is
    relatively normal and does not greatly interfere with their daily life.
    With incestuous symbiosis, however, people are inseparable from the host
    person; their personalities are blended with the other person and their individual
    identities are lost. Incestuous symbiosis originates in infancy as a natural attachment
    to the mothering one. The attachment is more crucial and fundamental than any
    sexual interest that may develop during the Oedipal period. Fromm disagreed with
    Freud in suggesting that attachment to the mother rests on the need for security and
    not for sex. “Sexual strivings are not the cause of the fixation to mother, but the
    result” (Fromm, 1964, p. 99).
    People living in incestuous symbiotic relationships feel extremely anxious
    and frightened if that relationship is threatened. They believe that they cannot live
    without their mother substitute. (The host need not be another human—it can be
    a family, a business, a church, or a nation.) The incestuous orientation distorts
    reasoning powers, destroys the capacity for authentic love, and prevents people
    from achieving independence and integrity.
    Some pathologic individuals possess all three personality disorders; that is,
    they are attracted to death (necrophilia), take pleasure in destroying those whom
    they regard as inferiors (malignant narcissism), and possess a neurotic symbiotic
    relationship with their mother or mother substitute (incestuous symbiosis). Such
    people formed what Fromm called the syndrome of decay. He contrasted these
    pathological people with those who are marked by the syndrome of growth, which
    is made up of the opposite qualities: namely, biophilia, love, and positive freedom.
    As shown in Figure 8.1, both the syndrome of decay and the syndrome of growth
    are extreme forms of development; most people have average psychological health.
    Ne
    cro
    ph
    ilia
    Biophilia
    Incestuous symbiosis P
    os
    itiv
    e f
    ree
    dom

    Syndrome
    of
    decay
    Syndrome
    of
    growth
    Average
    development
    Average
    development
    Love of othersNarcissism
    FIGURE 8.1 Three pathological orientations—necrophilia, narcissism, and
    incestuous symbiosis—converge to form the syndrome of decay, whereas three healthy
    orientations—biophilia, love of others, and positive freedom—converge in the syndrome
    of growth. Most people have average development and are motivated by neither the
    syndrome of decay nor the syndrome of growth.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories244
    Psychotherapy
    Fromm was trained as an orthodox Freudian analyst but became bored with stan-
    dard analytic techniques. “With time I came to see that my boredom stemmed
    from the fact that I was not in touch with the life of my patients” (Fromm, 1986,
    p. 106). He then evolved his own system of therapy, which he called humanistic
    psychoanalysis. Compared with Freud, Fromm was much more concerned with
    the interpersonal aspects of a therapeutic encounter. He believed that the aim of
    therapy is for patients to come to know themselves. Without knowledge of our-
    selves, we cannot know any other person or thing.
    Fromm believed that patients come to therapy seeking satisfaction of their
    basic human needs—relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, a sense of identity,
    and a frame of orientation. Therefore, therapy should be built on a personal rela-
    tionship between therapist and patient. Because accurate communication is essen-
    tial to therapeutic growth, the therapist must relate “as one human being to another
    with utter concentration and utter sincerity” (Fromm, 1963, p. 184). In this spirit
    of relatedness, the patient will once again feel at one with another person. Although
    transference and even countertransference may exist within this relationship, the
    important point is that two real human beings are involved with one another.
    As part of his attempt to achieve shared communication, Fromm asked
    patients to reveal their dreams. He believed that dreams, as well as fairy tales and
    myths, are expressed in symbolic language—the only universal language humans
    have developed (Fromm, 1951). Because dreams have meaning beyond the indi-
    vidual dreamer, Fromm would ask for the patient’s associations to the dream mate-
    rial. Not all dream symbols, however, are universal; some are accidental and
    depend on the dreamer’s mood before going to sleep; others are regional or national
    and depend on climate, geography, and dialect. Many symbols have several mean-
    ings because of the variety of experiences that are connected with them. For exam-
    ple, fire may symbolize warmth and home to some people but death and
    destruction to others. Similarly, the sun may represent a threat to desert people,
    but growth and life to people in cold climates.
    Fromm (1963) believed that therapists should not try to be too scientific in
    understanding a patient. Only with the attitude of relatedness can another person
    be truly understood. The therapist should not view the patient as an illness or a
    thing but as a person with the same human needs that all people possess.
    Fromm’s Methods of Investigation
    Fromm gathered data on human personality from many sources, including psycho-
    therapy, cultural anthropology, and psychohistory. In this section, we look briefly
    at his anthropological study of life in a Mexican village and his psychobiographi-
    cal analysis of Adolf Hitler.
    Social Character in a Mexican Village
    Beginning in the late 1950s and extending into the mid-1960s, Fromm and a group
    of psychologists, psychoanalysts, anthropologists, physicians, and statisticians studied

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 245
    social character in Chiconcuac, a Mexican village about 50 miles south of Mexico
    City. The team interviewed every adult and half the children in this isolated farming
    village of 162 households and about 800 inhabitants. The people of the village were
    mostly farmers, earning a living from small plots of fertile land. As Fromm and
    Michael Maccoby (1970) described them:
    They are selfish, suspicious of each others’ motives, pessimistic about the future,
    and fatalistic. Many appear submissive and self-deprecatory, although they have the
    potential for rebelliousness and revolution. They feel inferior to city people, more
    stupid, and less cultured. There is an overwhelming feeling of  powerlessness to
    influence either nature or the industrial machine that bears down on them. (p. 37)
    Could one expect to find Fromm’s character orientations in such a society?
    After living among the villagers and gaining their acceptance, the research team
    employed an assortment of techniques designed to answer this and other questions.
    Included among the research tools were extensive interviews, dream reports,
    detailed questionnaires, and two projective techniques—the Rorschach inkblot test
    and the Thematic Apperception Test.
    Fromm believed that the marketing character was a product of modern com-
    merce and that it is most likely to exist in societies where trade is no longer personal
    and where people regard themselves as commodities. Not surprisingly, the research
    team found that the marketing orientation did not exist among these peasant villagers.
    However, the researchers did find evidence for several other character types, the
    most common of which was the nonproductive-receptive type. People of this orienta-
    tion tended to look up to others and devoted much energy in trying to please those
    whom they regarded as superiors. On paydays, working men who belonged to this type
    would accept their pay in servile fashion, as if somehow they had not earned it.
    The second most frequently found personality type was the productive-
    hoarding character. People of this type were hardworking, productive, and inde-
    pendent. They usually farmed their own plot of land and relied on saving part of
    each crop for seed and for food in the event of a future crop failure. Hoarding,
    rather than consuming, was essential to their lives.
    The nonproductive-exploitative personality was identified as a third character
    orientation. Men of this type were most likely to get into knife or pistol fights,
    whereas the women tended to be malicious gossipmongers (Fromm & Maccoby,
    1970). Only about 10% of the population was predominantly exploitative, a sur-
    prisingly small percentage considering the extreme poverty of the village.
    An even smaller number of inhabitants were described as productive-
    exploitative—no more than 15 individuals in the whole village. Among them were
    the richest and most powerful men in the village—men who had accumulated
    capital by taking advantage of new agricultural technology as well as a recent
    increase in tourism. They had also taken advantage of the nonproductive-receptive
    villagers by keeping them economically dependent.
    In general, Fromm and Maccoby (1970) reported a remarkable similarity
    between character orientations in this Mexican village and the theoretical orien-
    tations Fromm had suggested some years earlier. This anthropological study, of
    course, cannot be considered a confirmation of Fromm’s theory. As one of the
    study’s principal investigators, Fromm may simply have found what he had
    expected to find.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories246
    A Psychohistorical Study of Hitler
    Following Freud (see Chapter 2), Fromm examined historical documents in order
    to sketch a psychological portrait of a prominent person, a technique called psy-
    chohistory or psychobiography. The subject of Fromm’s most complete psychobio-
    graphical study was Freud (Fromm, 1959), but Fromm (1941, 1973, 1986) also
    wrote at length on the life of Adolf Hitler.
    Fromm regarded Hitler as the world’s most conspicuous example of a person
    with the syndrome of decay, possessing a combination of necrophilia, malignant nar-
    cissism, and incestuous symbiosis. Hitler displayed all three pathological disorders.
    He was attracted to death and destruction; narrowly focused on self-interests; and
    driven by an incestuous devotion to the Germanic “race,” being fanatically dedicated
    to preventing its blood from being polluted by Jews and other “non-Aryans.”
    Unlike some psychoanalysts who look only to early childhood for clues to
    adult personality, Fromm believed that each stage of development is important and
    that nothing in Hitler’s early life bent him inevitably toward the syndrome of decay.
    As a child, Hitler was somewhat spoiled by his mother, but her indulgence
    did not cause his later pathology. It did, however, foster narcissistic feelings of
    self-importance. “Hitler’s mother never became to him a person to whom he was
    lovingly or tenderly attached. She was a symbol of the protecting and admiring god-
    desses, but also of the goddess of death and chaos” (Fromm, 1973, p. 378).
    Hitler was an above-average student in elementary school, but a failure in high
    school. During adolescence, he experienced some conflict with his father, who wanted
    him to be more responsible and to take a reliable civil service job. Hitler, on the other
    hand, somewhat unrealistically desired to be an artist. Also during this time, he began
    increasingly to lose himself in fantasy. His narcissism ignited a burning passion for
    greatness as an artist or architect, but reality brought him failure after failure in this
    area. “Each failure caused a graver wound to his narcissism and a deeper humiliation
    than the previous one” (Fromm, 1973, p. 395). As
    his failures grew in number, he became more
    involved in his fantasy world, more resentful of
    others, more motivated for revenge, and more
    necrophilic.
    Hitler’s terrible realization of his failure as
    an artist was blunted by the outbreak of World
    War I. His fierce ambition could now be chan-
    neled into being a great war hero fighting for his
    homeland. Although he was no great hero, he
    was a responsible, disciplined, and dutiful sol-
    dier. After the war, however, he experienced
    more failure. Not only had his beloved nation
    lost, but revolutionaries within Germany had
    “attacked everything that was sacred to Hitler’s
    reactionary nationalism, and they won. . . . The
    victory of the revolutionaries gave Hitler’s
    destructiveness its final and ineradicable form”
    (Fromm, 1973, p. 394).
    Adolf Hitler personified for Fromm
    the syndrome of decay. © Ingram
    Publishing

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 247
    Necrophilia does not simply refer to behavior; it pervades a person’s entire
    character. And so it was with Hitler. After he came to power, he demanded that
    his enemies not merely surrender, but that they be annihilated as well. His necro-
    philia was expressed in his mania for destroying buildings and cities, his orders to
    kill “defective” people, his boredom, and his slaughter of millions of Jews.
    Another trait Hitler manifested was malignant narcissism. He was interested
    only in himself, his plans, and his ideology. His conviction that he could build a
    “Thousand-Year Reich” shows an inflated sense of self-importance. He had no
    interest in anyone unless that person was of service to him. His relations to women
    lacked love and tenderness; he seemed to have used them solely for perverted
    personal pleasure, especially for voyeuristic satisfaction.
    According to Fromm’s analysis, Hitler also possessed an incestuous symbiosis,
    manifested by his passionate devotion not to his real mother but to the Germanic “race.”
    Consistent with this trait, he also was sadomasochistic, withdrawn, and lacking in feel-
    ings of genuine love or compassion. All these characteristics, Fromm contended, did
    not make Hitler psychotic. They did, however, make him a sick and dangerous man.
    Insisting that people not see Hitler as inhuman, Fromm (1973) concluded his
    psychohistory with these words: “Any analysis that would distort Hitler’s picture
    by depriving him of his humanity would only intensify the tendency to be blind
    to the potential Hitlers unless they wear horns” (p. 433).
    Related Research
    Although Erich Fromm’s writings are stimulating and insightful, his ideas have pro-
    duced very little empirical research in the field of personality psychology. One rea-
    son for this may be due to the broad approach Fromm takes. In many ways his ideas
    are more sociological than psychological in that his theory deals with alienation from
    culture and nature in general, two topics that are more typically covered in a sociol-
    ogy class than a psychology class. This does not mean, however, that such broad
    topics are not important to personality psychology. Quite the contrary, how and when
    we present and market ourselves socially (think Facebook and Instagram) are clearly
    tied to Fromm’s theory of “marketing character.” In addition, although broad and
    sociological, estrangement from one’s culture is a topic that can be studied at the
    individual level in psychological studies and can have implications for well-being.
    Finally, Fromm’s ideas about authoritarianism have led to recent empirical investiga-
    tions, in particular into the association between fear and authoritarian beliefs.
    Testing the Assumptions of Fromm’s Marketing Character
    In The Sane Society (1955), Fromm wrote critically about western cultures such
    as the United States encouraging the development of the marketing character ori-
    entation, which buys and sells and sees everything as a potential object of con-
    sumption. If you think about it, millions of Americans’ engagement with social
    media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and Pinterest is a testament to our
    desire to sell our very selves, to showcase our best photographs and experiences
    in a marketplace of “likes” and “followers.” Fromm believed that an illusion of
    individuality is promoted in such a society. We differentiate ourselves from each

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories248
    other by what we possess (the biggest house, the most exotic vacation, the tightest
    abs, even the best boyfriend or girlfriend) rather than by who we are.
    In Australia, two researchers, Shaun Saunders and Don Munro, sought to test
    whether Fromm’s marketing character was indeed a more nonproductive orientation to
    the world, and whether it was more prevalent in cultures that emphasize individualism,
    as Fromm theorized. First, they developed and validated a measure of the marketing
    character called the Saunders Consumer Orientation Index (SCOI; Saunders & Munro,
    2000). This 35-item scale includes such statements as “It doesn’t matter what some-
    thing costs as long as it looks good,” “If money was not a problem, I would prefer an
    expensive car,” and “I try to keep up with the latest fashions.” Scores on the SCOI
    were positively correlated with conformity, authoritarianism, and anger, supporting
    Fromm’s (1955) theorizing about this character orientation. Furthermore, scores on the
    SCOI and materialism were positively correlated with depression and negatively cor-
    related, as Fromm would have predicted, with biophilia and environmentalism.
    In a second study, Saunders and Munro (2001) tested whether the marketing
    character was more associated with cultural individualism. People in cultures that are
    individualistic are motivated to serve their own interests, and seek personal success.
    Other cultures are more collectivistic, and in these cultures, people are more concerned
    with service to others (Hofstede, 1984). Within individualist and collectivist cultures,
    there is also variation in whether the culture is more “horizontal” or “vertical” in
    nature (Triandis, 1995). The vertical dimension describes cultures in which rank and
    inequality prevail. The horizontal dimension is characterized by valuing the essential
    similarity of people, and a dislike for “standing out.” So there can be Horizontal Col-
    lectivism (e.g., an Israeli kibbutz or a monastic order), Horizontal Individualism (e.g.,
    Scandinavian countries), Vertical Collectivism (e.g., India), and Vertical Individualism
    (e.g., United States). Saunders and Munro (2001) administered the SCOI as well as
    a measure of vertical and horizontal collectivism and individualism (Singelis, Triandis,
    Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995) to 167 psychology students. Interestingly, they found that
    scores on the SCOI were more strongly correlated with the vertical than the horizon-
    tal dimension of individualism, but found only partial support for their prediction that
    SCOI scores would be positively correlated with individualism per se. That is, higher
    marketing character orientation appears to be associated with an emphasis on hierar-
    chy, but not necessarily on individualism. The authors discuss China as a highly
    collectivist culture, also characterized by hierarchy and respect for rank, as an exam-
    ple of a remarkable and rapid embracing of marketing values as they experience
    economic growth. This study suggests that Fromm’s marketing character may not be
    associated so much with individualist values per se, but rather with whether hierarchy
    and income inequality prevail in a consumerist society.
    Estrangement From Culture and Well-Being
    Recall that the central theme to Erich Fromm’s theory of personality involves
    estrangement and alienation: Humans have become removed from the natural envi-
    ronment they were designed to inhabit and distanced from one another. Further-
    more, according to Fromm, the material wealth created by capitalism has created
    so much freedom that quite frankly we do not know what to do with ourselves.
    Anxiety and isolation, ironically, result from too much freedom. Mark Bernard and

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 249
    colleagues (2006) sought to test these central components of Fromm’s theory
    through the use of self-report measures in a sample of undergraduate students in
    Great Britain. Specifically, the researchers wanted to test whether or not discrepan-
    cies between a person’s own beliefs and the way the person perceived the beliefs
    of his or her society led to feelings of estrangement.
    Seventy-two participants completed a questionnaire consisting of several values
    that had been identified by previous research as being present in many different cul-
    tures (such as the importance of freedom, wealth, spirituality, etc.). First, participants
    rated each value for how much it was a guiding principle in their lives, and then they
    rated the same values on how much each was a guiding principle for their society.
    Administering the questionnaire in this manner allowed the researchers to compute
    the extent to which each participant held values that were different from their society
    in general. Second, estrangement was assessed by having participants complete a
    questionnaire with items that asked them how much they felt different from their
    society and the extent to which they felt they were not “normal” in their culture.
    The findings of the study were as predicted. The more a person reported that
    his or her values were discrepant from society in general, the more likely he or she
    was to have a strong feeling of estrangement (Bernard, Gebauer, & Maio, 2006).
    This is not surprising. Basically, if your values are different from those of your
    society or culture, you feel as though you are different and not normal. This is also
    precisely what Fromm’s theory predicts. The more distant people feel from those
    around them in their community, the more people are likely to feel isolated.
    To further test Fromm’s ideas, Bernard and colleagues (2006) next examined
    whether having a feeling of estrangement from one’s culture was related to
    increased feelings of anxiety and depression. The same participants who com-
    pleted the self-report measures of values discrepancies and estrangement also com-
    pleted a measure of anxiety and depression. Just as the researchers predicted, and as
    Fromm’s theory contends, the more estranged from society people felt in general, the
    more anxious and depressed they were. Although estrangement from society in general
    was detrimental to well-being, there was a specific type of estrangement that was bad
    for people. Those who felt a sense of estrangement from their friends reported
    increased feelings of anxiety and depression. This finding suggests that feeling
    estranged from society in general may make people more susceptible to feelings of
    depression, but these feelings can be lessened if a person can find a group of people
    who share their beliefs, even if those are not the beliefs of the society in general.
    It  is particularly harmful, however, if people feel estranged not only from society in
    general, but also from those closest to them.
    Taken together, these findings clearly support the ideas of Erich Fromm. The
    modern society in which we live provides us with innumerable conveniences and
    benefits. But those conveniences do come at a cost. Personal freedom and a sense
    of individuality are important, but when those forces lead people to be estranged
    from their community, it can be harmful to their well-being.
    Authoritarianism and Fear
    Foundational to Fromm’s (1941) theory is that freedom is, ironically, frightening.
    Individuals seek to escape freedom through mechanisms like authoritarianism,
    destruction, or conformity to ease the fear of isolation. Shortly after Fromm’s

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories250
    publication of Escape from Freedom, scholars became interested particularly in the
    authoritarian escape mechanism. The central idea behind Escape from Freedom is
    that people are attracted to absolute answers and certainty, even if it means author-
    itarian dictators, when they are afraid and uncertain. Following Fromm, Adorno
    and colleagues published a book entitled The Authoritarian Personality in 1950,
    and this work spurred a great deal of research, ongoing today, into the question of
    authoritarianism as a personality orientation. However, much of this work has
    veered away from Fromm’s original conceptualization and focused on the out-
    comes of authoritarianism, including prejudice and hostility.
    Recently, however, J. Corey Butler (2009) has sought to reopen the question
    of the relationship between fear and authoritarianism. Adorno (1950) postulated
    that authoritarianism is the consequence of overly harsh parenting during child-
    hood, leading to a generalized sense of a fear about the interpersonal world.
    Butler’s work, in contrast, is an effort to confirm Fromm’s idea that feelings of
    powerlessness engendered by the isolation of modern, “free” society lead to author-
    itarian submission. Sociological studies do indeed show that groups shift toward
    authoritarianism during times of economic or social strain (e.g., Rickert, 1998),
    preferring order and stability. Consistent with Fromm’s original thesis, Butler pre-
    dicted that, since authoritarians give up personal autonomy and freedom for the
    sake of established cultural norms, those with authoritarian personality tendencies
    ought to be fearful not of all interpersonal situations, but particularly of social
    deviance and social disorder. That is, those in society who challenge norms of
    order ought to be particularly troublesome to authoritarians.
    Butler conducted several studies to test this prediction. In each, he gave
    college undergraduates the “Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale” (RWA, Altemeyer,
    1981), a 22-item scale with statements such as “Our country desperately needs a
    mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways
    and sinfulness that are ruining us” on which participants rate their strength of
    agreement. In the first set of studies (2009) students also rated how afraid they
    were of a variety of items, situations, or circumstances. In the second study
    (2013), the students were presented with a slideshow of various items, including
    animals, dangerous situations, diverse people, or scenes of social disorder. Butler
    found support for his prediction in all cases. Social differences and social disorder
    were disproportionately feared over other fears by those who scored high on
    authoritarianism.
    It seems, then, as Erich Fromm theorized, that political and social threats,
    not personal threats, are most strongly related to authoritarianism. This implies that
    the ideology associated with authoritarianism is a kind of motivated social cogni-
    tion. Butler (2009) hypothesizes that certain cultural stimuli lead to fear, which
    then creates the motivation for an authoritarian belief system. Deviance and social
    disorder, then, become particularly threatening to such people, who have now
    developed a more conventional and restricted lifestyle. Since so-called deviant
    behavior suggests that there are other ways of living, authoritarians will be espe-
    cially threatened by it.
    Today, in the United States and the European Union, refugees, immigrants and
    asylum seekers, religious extremist movements, and even marriage equality for
    LGBTQ persons might all be considered the “perfect storm” of social and economic
    unrest that Erich Fromm would argue opens the door to authoritarianism as an escape.

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 251
    In such times, political figures like Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, who characterized him-
    self as the only savior of a nation struggling against sinister liberal influences, become
    attractive to voters (Jebreal, 2015). Here in the United States, a similar candidate,
    Donald Trump, announced his presidential bid in 2015 by saying that he would “build
    a wall” on the United States’ southern border and ban all Muslims from entering the
    U.S. until they could be vetted. Accepting the nomination for president, he told the
    delegates at the convention “I alone can fix it.” Such candidates appeal to voters’
    fears and provide reassurance in the form of absolute answers and certainty. We might
    all do well to read Escape from Freedom in these uncertain times, so as to educate
    ourselves about the dangers of submitting to charismatic leaders offering simple solu-
    tions to complex (and, yes, often frightening) global problems.
    Critique of Fromm
    Erich Fromm was perhaps the most brilliant essayist of all personality theorists.
    He wrote beautiful essays on international politics (Fromm, 1961); on the relevance
    of biblical prophets for people today (Fromm, 1986); on the psychological prob-
    lems of the aging (Fromm, 1981); on Marx, Hitler, Freud, and Christ; and on
    myriad other topics. Regardless of the topic, at the core of all Fromm’s writings
    can be found an unfolding of the essence of human nature.
    Like other psychodynamic theorists, Fromm tended to take a global
    approach to theory construction, erecting a grand, highly abstract model that was
    more philosophical than scientific. His insights into human nature strike a
    responsive chord, as evidenced by the popularity of his books. Unfortunately, his
    essays and arguments are not as popularly known today as they were 50 years
    ago. Paul Roazen (1996) stated that, during the mid-1950s, a person could not
    be considered educated without having read Fromm’s eloquently written Escape
    from Freedom. Today, however, Fromm’s books are seldom required reading on
    college campuses.
    From a scientific perspective, we must ask how Fromm’s ideas rate on the six
    criteria of a useful theory. First, Fromm’s relatively imprecise and vague terms have
    rendered his ideas difficult to operationalize, and therefore somewhat immune to
    being generators of research. Research using the Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale,
    as well as some work on the marketing orientation, serve as exceptions to the rule,
    but generally speaking our search of the last 45 years of psychology literature yielded
    few empirical studies that directly tested Fromm’s theoretical assumptions. This pau-
    city of scientific investigations places him among the lowest of the empirically
    validated theorists covered in this book.
    Second, Fromm’s theory is too philosophical to be either falsifiable or veri-
    fiable. Nearly any empirical findings generated by Fromm’s theory (if they existed)
    could be explained by alternative theories.
    Third, the breadth of Fromm’s theory enables it to organize and explain
    much of what is known about human personality. Fromm’s social, political, and
    historical perspective provides both breadth and depth for understanding the human
    condition; but his theory’s lack of precision makes prediction difficult and falsifi-
    cation impossible.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories252
    Concept of Humanity
    More than any other personality theorist, Erich Fromm emphasized the dif-
    ferences between humans and the other animals. The essential nature of
    humans rests on their unique experience of “being in nature and subject to
    all its laws, and simultaneously transcending nature” (Fromm, 1992, p. 24).
    He believed that only humans are aware of themselves and their existence.
    More specifically, Fromm’s view of humanity is summed up in his defini-
    tion of the species: “The human species can be defined as the primate who
    emerged at that point of evolution where instinctive determinism had reached
    a minimum and the development of the brain a maximum” (Fromm, 1976, p.
    137). Human beings, then, are the freaks of nature, the only species ever to
    have evolved this combination of minimal instinctive powers and maximal
    brain development. “Lacking the capacity to act by the command of instincts
    while possessing the capacity for self-awareness, reason, and imagination . . .
    the human species needed a frame of orientation and an object of devotion
    in order to survive” (p. 137).
    Human survival, however, has been paid for by the price of basic anx-
    iety, loneliness, and powerlessness. In every age and culture, people have
    been faced with the same fundamental problem: how to escape from feel-
    ings of isolation and find unity with nature and with other people.
    In general, Fromm was both pessimistic and optimistic. On one hand,
    he believed that most people do not accomplish a reunion with nature or
    other people and that few people achieve positive freedom. He also had a
    rather negative attitude toward modern capitalism, which he insisted was
    responsible for most people’s feeling isolated and alone while clinging des-
    perately to the illusion of independence and freedom. On the other hand,
    Fromm was hopeful enough to believe that some people will achieve reunion
    and will therefore realize their human potential. He also believed that humans
    can achieve a sense of identity, positive freedom, and growing individuality
    within the confines of a capitalistic society. In Man for Himself (1947), he
    wrote: “I have become increasingly impressed by . . . the strength of the
    Fourth, as a guide to action, the chief value of Fromm’s writings is to stim-
    ulate readers to think productively. Unfortunately, however, neither the researcher
    nor the therapist receives much practical information from Fromm’s essays.
    Fifth, Fromm’s views are internally consistent in the sense that a single
    theme runs throughout his writings. However, the theory lacks a structured tax-
    onomy, a set of operationally defined terms, and a clear limitation of scope. There-
    fore, it rates low on internal consistency.
    Finally, because Fromm was reluctant to abandon earlier concepts or to relate
    them precisely to his later ideas, his theory lacks simplicity and unity. For these
    reasons, we rate Fromm’s theory low on the criterion of parsimony.

    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis 253
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ People have been torn away from their prehistoric union with nature and
    also with one another, yet they have the power of reasoning, foresight,
    and imagination.
    ∙ Self-awareness contributes to feelings of loneliness, isolation, and
    homelessness.
    ∙ To escape these feelings, people strive to become united with others and
    with nature.
    ∙ Only the uniquely human needs of relatedness, transcendence,
    rootedness, sense of identity, and a frame of orientation can move
    people toward a reunion with the natural world.
    ∙ A sense of relatedness drives people to unite with another person
    through submission, power, or love.
    strivings for happiness and health, which are part of the natural equipment
    of [people]” (p. x).
    On the dimension of free choice versus determinism, Fromm took a mid-
    dle position, insisting that this issue cannot be applied to the entire species.
    Instead, he believed that individuals have degrees of inclinations toward freely
    chosen action, even though they are seldom aware of all the possible alterna-
    tives. Nevertheless, their ability to reason enables people to take an active part
    in their own fate.
    On the dimension of causality versus teleology, Fromm tended to
    slightly favor teleology. He believed that people constantly strive for a frame
    of orientation, a road map, by which to plan their lives into the future.
    Fromm took a middle stance regarding conscious versus unconscious
    motivation, placing slightly more emphasis on conscious motivation and con-
    tending that one of the uniquely human traits is self-awareness. Humans are
    the only animal that can reason, visualize the future, and consciously strive
    toward self-erected goals. Fromm insisted, however, that self-awareness is
    a mixed blessing and that many people repress their basic character to avoid
    mounting anxiety.
    On the issue of social influences versus biological ones, Fromm placed
    somewhat more importance on the impact of history, culture, and society
    than on biology. Although he insisted that human personalities are histori-
    cally and culturally determined, he did not overlook biological factors, defin-
    ing humans as the freaks of the universe.
    Finally, whereas Fromm placed moderate emphasis on similarities among
    people, he also allowed room for some individuality. He believed that although
    history and culture impinge heavily on personality, people can retain some
    degree of uniqueness. Humans are one species sharing many of the same
    human needs, but interpersonal experiences throughout people’s lives give them
    some measure of uniqueness.

    Part II Psychodynamic Theories254
    ∙ Transcendence is the need for people to rise above their passive
    existence and create or destroy life.
    ∙ Rootedness is the need for a consistent structure in people’s lives.
    ∙ A sense of identity gives a person a feeling of “I” or “me.”
    ∙ A frame of orientation is a consistent way of looking at the world.
    ∙ Basic anxiety is a sense of being alone in the world.
    ∙ To relieve basic anxiety, people use various mechanisms of escape,
    especially authoritarianism, destructiveness, and conformity.
    ∙ Psychologically healthy people acquire the syndrome of growth, which
    includes (1) positive freedom, or the spontaneous activity of a whole,
    integrated personality; (2) biophilia, or a passionate love of life; and
    (3) love for fellow humans.
    ∙ Other people, however, live nonproductively and acquire things through
    passively receiving things, exploiting others, hoarding things, and
    marketing or exchanging things, including themselves.
    ∙ Some extremely sick people are motivated by the syndrome of decay,
    which includes (1) necrophilia, or the love of death; (2) malignant
    narcissism, or infatuation with self; and (3) incestuous symbiosis, or the
    tendency to remain bound to a mothering person or her equivalents.
    ∙ The goal of Fromm’s psychotherapy is to establish a union with patients
    so that they can become reunited with the world.

    255
    Humanistic/
    Existential
    Theories
    C h a p t e r 9 Maslow
    Holistic-Dynamic Theory 256
    C h a p t e r 1 0 Rogers
    Person-Centered Theory 290
    C h a p t e r 1 1 May
    Existential Psychology 323
    P A R T T H R E E

    256
    C H A P T E R 9
    Maslow: Holistic-
    Dynamic Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Holistic-Dynamic Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Abraham H. Maslow
    ⬥ Maslow’s View of Motivation
    Hierarchy of Needs
    Aesthetic Needs
    Cognitive Needs
    Neurotic Needs
    General Discussion of Needs
    ⬥ Self-Actualization
    Maslow’s Quest for the Self-Actualizing Person
    Criteria for Self-Actualization
    Values of Self-Actualizers
    Characteristics of Self-Actualizing People
    Love, Sex, and Self-Actualization
    ⬥ Maslow’s Psychology and Philosophy
    of Science
    ⬥ Measuring Self-Actualization
    ⬥ The Jonah Complex
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Mindfulness and Self-Actualization
    Positive Psychology
    ⬥ Critique of Maslow
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Maslow © Bettmann/Getty Images

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 257
    College professors and students have long recognized that some intellectually “average” students are able to make good grades, whereas some intellectually
    superior students make only average grades, and some bright students actually flunk
    out of school. What factors account for this situation? Motivation is one likely
    suspect. Personal health, death in the immediate family, and too many jobs are
    other possibilities.
    Some years ago, a brilliant young college student was struggling through his
    third school. Although he performed reasonably well in courses that aroused his
    interest, his work was so poor in other classes that he was placed on academic
    probation. Later, this young man took an IQ test on which he scored 195, a score
    so high that it can be achieved by only about one person in several million. There-
    fore, lack of intellectual ability was not the reason for this young man’s lackluster
    college performance.
    Like some other young men, this student was deeply in love, a condition that
    made it difficult to concentrate on school work. Being hopelessly shy, the young
    man could not muster the courage to approach his beloved in any romantic fashion.
    Interestingly, the young woman who was the object of his affections was also his
    first cousin. This situation allowed him to visit his cousin on the pretext of calling
    on his aunt. He loved his cousin in a distant, bashful sort of way, having never
    touched her nor expressed his feelings. Then, suddenly a fortuitous event changed
    his life. While visiting his aunt, his cousin’s older sister shoved the young man
    toward his cousin, virtually ordering him to kiss her. He did, and to his surprise
    his cousin did not fight back. She kissed him, and from that time on his life became
    meaningful.
    The bashful young man in this story was Abraham Maslow, and his cousin
    was Bertha Goodman. After the fortuitous first kiss, Abe and Bertha were quickly
    married, and this marriage changed him from a mediocre college student to a bril-
    liant scholar who eventually shaped the course of humanistic psychology in the
    United States. This story should not be seen as a recommendation for marrying
    one’s first cousin, but it does illustrate how brilliant people sometimes need only
    a small shove to reach their potential.
    Overview of Holistic-Dynamic Theory
    The personality theory of Abraham Maslow has variously been called humanistic
    theory, transpersonal theory, the third force in psychology, the fourth force in
    personality, needs theory, and self-actualization theory. However, Maslow (1970)
    referred to it as a holistic-dynamic theory because it assumes that the whole
    person is constantly being motivated by one need or another and that people have
    the potential to grow toward psychological health, that is, self-actualization. To
    attain self-actualization, people must satisfy lower level needs such as hunger,
    safety, love, and esteem. Only after they are relatively satisfied in each of these
    needs can they reach self-actualization.
    The theories of Maslow, Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, Rollo May, and
    others are sometimes thought of as the third force in psychology. (The first force
    was psychoanalysis and its modifications; the second was behaviorism and its
    various forms.) Like these other theorists, Maslow accepted some of the tenets

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories258
    of psychoanalysis and behaviorism. As a graduate student, he had studied Freud’s
    Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900/1953) and became keenly interested in
    psychoanalysis. In addition, his graduate-level research with primates was greatly
    influenced by the work of John B. Watson (Watson, 1925). In his mature theory,
    however, Maslow criticized both psychoanalysis and behaviorism for their lim-
    ited views of humanity and their inadequate understanding of the psychologically
    healthy person. Maslow believed that humans have a higher nature than either
    psychoanalysis or behaviorism would suggest; and he spent the latter years of
    his life trying to discover the nature of psychologically healthy individuals.
    Biography of Abraham H. Maslow
    Abraham Harold (Abe) Maslow had, perhaps, the most lonely and miserable child-
    hood of any person discussed in this book. Born in Manhattan, New York, on April 1,
    1908, Maslow spent his unhappy childhood in Brooklyn. Maslow was the oldest of
    seven children born to Samuel Maslow and Rose Schilosky Maslow. Maslow’s child-
    hood life was filled with intense feelings of shyness, inferiority, and depression.
    Maslow was not especially close to either parent, but he tolerated his often-
    absent father, a Russian-Jewish immigrant who made a living preparing barrels.
    Toward his mother, however, Maslow felt hatred and deep-seated animosity, not
    only during his childhood, but until the day she died just a couple of years before
    Maslow’s own death. Despite several years of psychoanalysis, he never overcame
    the intense hatred of his mother and refused to attend her funeral, despite pleas
    from his siblings, who did not share his hateful feelings for their mother. A year
    before his own death, Maslow (1969) entered this reflection in his diary:
    What I had reacted against and totally hated and rejected was not only her
    physical appearance, but also her values and world view, her stinginess, her
    total selfishness, her lack of love for anyone else in the world, even her own
    husband and children . . . her assumption that anyone was wrong who disagreed
    with her, her lack of concern for her grandchildren, her lack of friends, her
    sloppiness and dirtiness, her lack of family feeling for her own parents and
    siblings. . . . I’ve always wondered where my Utopianism, ethical stress,
    humanism, stress on kindness, love, friendship, and all the rest came from. I
    knew certainly of the direct consequences of having no mother-love. But the
    whole thrust of my life-philosophy and all my research and theorizing also has
    its roots in a hatred for and revulsion against everything she stood for. (p. 958)
    Edward Hoffman (1988) reported a story that vividly describes Rose Maslow’s
    cruelty. One day young Maslow found two abandoned kittens in the neighborhood.
    Moved with pity, he brought the kittens home, put them in the basement, and fed
    them milk from a dish. When his mother saw the kittens, she became furious and,
    as the young boy watched, she smashed the kittens’ heads against the basement
    walls until they were dead.
    Maslow’s mother was also a very religious woman who often threatened
    young Maslow with punishment from God. As a young boy, Maslow decided to
    test his mother’s threats by intentionally misbehaving. When no divine retribution
    befell him, he reasoned that his mother’s warnings were not scientifically sound.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 259
    From such experiences, Maslow learned to hate and mistrust religion and to become
    a committed atheist.
    Despite his atheistic views, he felt the sting of anti-Semitism not only in
    childhood but also during his adult years. Possibly as a defense against the anti-
    Semitic attitudes of his classmates, he turned to books and scholarly pursuits. He
    loved to read, but to reach the safety of the public library, he had to avoid the
    anti-Semitic gangs that roamed his Brooklyn neighborhood and that needed no
    excuse to terrorize young Maslow and other Jewish boys.
    Being intellectually gifted, Abe found some solace during his years at Boys
    High School in Brooklyn, where his grades were only slightly better than average.
    At the same time, he developed a close friendship with his cousin Will Maslow, an
    outgoing, socially active person. Through this relationship, Abe himself developed
    some social skills and was involved in several school activities (Hoffman, 1988).
    After Maslow graduated from Boys High School, his cousin Will encouraged
    him to apply to Cornell University, but lacking self-confidence, Maslow selected the
    less prestigious City College of New York. At about this time, his parents divorced
    and he and his father became less emotionally distant. Maslow’s father had wanted
    his oldest son to be a lawyer, and while attending City College, Maslow enrolled in
    law school. However, he walked out of law classes one night, leaving his books
    behind. Significantly, he felt that law dealt too much with evil people and was not
    sufficiently concerned with the good. His father, although initially disappointed,
    eventually accepted Maslow’s decision to quit law school (M. H. Hall, 1968).
    As a student at City College, Maslow did well in philosophy and other courses
    that sparked his interest. However, in courses he did not like, he performed so poorly
    that he was placed on academic probation. After three semesters, he transferred to
    Cornell University in upstate New York partly to be closer to his cousin Will, who
    attended that school, but also to distance himself from his first cousin Bertha Goodman,
    with whom he was falling in love (Hoffman, 1988). At Cornell, too, Maslow’s
    scholastic work was only mediocre. His introductory psychology professor was
    Edward B. Titchener, a renowned pioneer in psychology who taught all his classes
    in full academic robes. Maslow was not impressed. He regarded Titchener’s approach
    to psychology as cold, “bloodless,” and having nothing to do with people.
    After one semester at Cornell, Maslow returned to the City College of New
    York, now to be nearer to Bertha. After the fortuitious event described in the open-
    ing vignette, Abe and Bertha were soon married but not before overcoming his
    parents’ resistance. Maslow’s parents objected to the marriage partly because he
    was only 20 and she 19. However, their strongest fear was that a marriage between
    first cousins might result in hereditary defects in any possible offspring. This fear
    was ironic in light of the fact that Maslow’s parents themselves were first cousins
    and had six healthy children. (One daughter died during infancy but not because
    of any genetic defect.)
    One semester before his marriage, Maslow had enrolled at the University of
    Wisconsin, from which he received a BA degree in philosophy. In addition, he
    was quite interested in John B. Watson’s behaviorism, and this interest prompted
    him to take enough psychology courses to meet prerequisites for a PhD in psychol-
    ogy. As a graduate student, he worked closely with Harry Harlow, who was just
    beginning his research with monkeys. Maslow’s dissertation research on dominance

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories260
    and sexual behavior of monkeys suggested that social dominance was a more
    powerful motive than sex, at least among primates (Blum, 2002).
    In 1934, Maslow received his doctorate, but he could not find an academic
    position, partly because of the Great Depression and partly because of an anti-
    Semitic prejudice still strong on many American campuses in those years. Conse-
    quently, he continued to teach at Wisconsin for a short time and even enrolled in
    medical school there. However, he was repulsed by the cold and dispassionate
    attitude of surgeons who could cut off diseased body parts with no discernible
    emotion. To Maslow, medical school—like law school—reflected an unemotional
    and negative view of people, and he was both disturbed and bored by his experi-
    ences in medical school. When Maslow became bored with something, he usually
    quit it, and medical school was no exception (Hoffman, 1988).
    The following year he returned to New York to become E. L. Thorndike’s
    research assistant at Teachers College, Columbia University. Maslow, a mediocre
    student during his days at City College and Cornell, scored 195 on Thorndike’s
    intelligence test, prompting Thorndike to give his assistant free rein to do as he
    wished. Maslow’s fertile mind thrived in this situation; but after a year and a half
    of doing research on human dominance and sexuality, he left Columbia to join the
    faculty of Brooklyn College, a newly established school whose students were
    mostly bright, young adolescents from working-class homes, much like Maslow
    himself 10 years earlier (Hoffman, 1988).
    Living in New York during the 1930s and 1940s afforded Maslow an opportu-
    nity to come into contact with many of the European psychologists who had escaped
    Nazi rule. In fact, Maslow surmised that, of all the people who had ever lived, he had
    the best teachers (Goble, 1970). Among others, he met and learned from Erich Fromm,
    Karen Horney, Max Wertheimer, and Kurt Goldstein. He was influenced by each of
    these people, most of whom conducted lectures at the New School for Social Research.
    Maslow also became associated with Alfred Adler, who was living in New York at
    that time. Adler held seminars in his home on Friday nights, and Maslow was a
    frequent visitor to these sessions, as was Julian Rotter (see Chapter 18).
    Another of Maslow’s mentors was Ruth Benedict, an anthropologist at
    Columbia University. In 1938, Benedict encouraged Maslow to conduct anthropo-
    logical studies among the Northern Blackfoot Indians of Alberta, Canada. His work
    among these Native Americans taught him that differences among cultures were
    superficial and that the Northern Blackfoot were first people and only second were
    they Blackfoot Indians. This insight helped Maslow in later years to see that his
    famous hierarchy of needs applied equally to everyone.
    During the mid-1940s, Maslow’s health began to deteriorate. In 1946, at age
    38, he suffered a strange illness that left him weak, faint, and exhausted. The next
    year he took a medical leave and, with Bertha and their two daughters, moved to
    Pleasanton, California, where, in name only, he was plant manager of a branch of
    the Maslow Cooperage Corporation. His light work schedule enabled him to read
    biographies and histories in a search for information on self-actualizing people. After
    a year, his health had improved and he went back to teaching at Brooklyn College.
    In 1951, Maslow took a position as chairman of the psychology department
    at the recently established Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts. During
    his Brandeis years, he began writing extensively in his journals, jotting down at

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 261
    irregular intervals his thoughts, opinions, feelings, social activities, important con-
    versations, and concerns for his health (Maslow, 1979).
    Despite achieving fame during the 1960s, Maslow became increasingly dis-
    enchanted with his life at Brandeis. Some students rebelled against his teaching
    methods, demanding more experiential involvement and less of an intellectual and
    scientific approach.
    In addition to work-related problems, Maslow suffered a severe but nonfatal
    heart attack in December of 1967. He then learned that his strange malady more
    than 20 years earlier had been an undiagnosed heart attack. Now in poor health
    and disappointed with the academic atmosphere at Brandeis, Maslow accepted an
    offer to join the Saga Administrative Corporation in Menlo Park, California. He
    had no particular job there and was free to think and write as he wished. He
    enjoyed that freedom, but on June 8, 1970, he suddenly collapsed and died of a
    massive heart attack. He was 62.
    Maslow received many honors during his lifetime, including his election to the
    presidency of the American Psychological Association for the year 1967–1968. At
    the time of his death, he was well known, not only within the profession of psychol-
    ogy, but among educated people generally, particularly in business management,
    marketing, theology, counseling, education, nursing, and other health-related fields.
    Maslow’s personal life was filled with pain, both physical and psychological.
    As an adolescent, he was terribly shy, unhappy, isolated, and self-rejecting. In later
    years, he was often in poor physical health, suffering from a series of ailments,
    including chronic heart problems. His journals (Maslow, 1979) are sprinkled with
    references to poor health. In his last journal entry (May 7, 1970), a month before
    his death, he complained about people expecting him to be a courageous leader and
    spokesperson. He wrote: “I am not temperamentally ‘courageous.’ My cou rage is
    really an overcoming of all sorts of inhibitions, politeness, gentleness, timidities—
    and it always cost me a lot in fatigue, tension, apprehension, bad sleep” (p. 1307).
    Maslow’s View of Motivation
    Maslow’s theory of personality rests on several basic assumptions regarding moti-
    vation. First, Maslow (1970) adopted a holistic approach to motivation: That is,
    the whole person, not any single part or function, is motivated.
    Second, motivation is usually complex, meaning that a person’s behavior may
    spring from several separate motives. For example, the desire for sexual union may
    be motivated not only by a genital need but also by needs for dominance, com-
    panionship, love, and self-esteem. Moreover, the motivation for a behavior may be
    unconscious or unknown to the person. For example, the motivation for a college
    student to make a high grade may mask the need for dominance or power. Maslow’s
    acceptance of the importance of unconscious motivation represents one important
    way in which he differed from Gordon Allport (Chapter 12). Whereas Allport
    might say that a person plays golf just for the fun of it, Maslow would look beneath
    the surface for underlying and often complex reasons for playing golf.
    A third assumption is that people are continually motivated by one need or
    another. When one need is satisfied, it ordinarily loses its motivational power and
    is then replaced by another need. For example, as long as people’s hunger needs

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories262
    are frustrated, they will strive for food; but when they do have enough to eat, they
    move on to other needs such as safety, friendship, and self-worth.
    Another assumption is that all people everywhere are motivated by the same
    basic needs. The manner in which people in different cultures obtain food, build
    shelters, express friendship, and so forth may vary widely, but the fundamental
    needs for food, safety, and friendship are common to the entire species.
    A final assumption concerning motivation is that needs can be arranged on
    a hierarchy (Maslow, 1943, 1970).
    Hierarchy of Needs
    Maslow’s hierarchy of needs concept assumes that lower level needs must be
    satisfied or at least relatively satisfied before higher level needs become motivators.
    The five needs composing this hierarchy are conative needs, meaning that they
    have a striving or motivational character. These needs, which Maslow often
    referred to as basic needs, can be arranged on a hierarchy or staircase, with each
    ascending step representing a higher need but one less basic to survival (see Figure
    9.1). Lower level needs have prepotency over higher level needs; that is, they must
    be satisfied or mostly satisfied before higher level needs become activated. For
    example, anyone motivated by esteem or self-actualization must have previously
    satisfied needs for food and safety. Hunger and safety, therefore, have prepotency
    over both esteem and self-actualization.
    Maslow (1970) listed the following needs in order of their prepotency: phys-
    iological, safety, love and belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization.
    Esteem
    Self-actualization
    Physiological
    Safety
    Love and
    belongingness
    FIGURE 9.1 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. One Must Reach Self-actualization One
    Step at a Time.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 263
    Physiological Needs
    The most basic needs of any person are physiological needs, including food,
    water, oxygen, maintenance of body temperature, and so on. Physiological needs
    are the most prepotent of all. Perpetually hungry people are motivated to eat—not
    to make friends or gain self-esteem. They do not see beyond food, and as long
    as this need remains unsatisfied, their primary motivation is to obtain something
    to eat.
    In affluent societies, most people satisfy their hunger needs as a matter of
    course. They usually have enough to eat, so when they say they are hungry, they
    are really speaking of appetites, not hunger. A truly hungry person will not be
    overly particular about taste, smell, temperature, or texture of the food.
    Maslow (1970) said: “It is quite true that man lives by bread alone—when
    there is no bread” (p. 38). When people do not have their physiological needs
    satisfied, they live primarily for those needs and strive constantly to satisfy them.
    Starving people become preoccupied with food and are willing to do nearly any-
    thing to obtain it (Keys, Brozek, Henschel, Mickelsen, & Taylor, 1950).
    Physiological needs differ from other needs in at least two important respects.
    First, they are the only needs that can be completely satisfied or even overly satis-
    fied. People can get enough to eat so that food completely loses its motivational
    power. For someone who has just finished a large meal, the thought of more food
    can even have a nauseating effect. A second characteristic peculiar to physiological
    needs is their recurring nature. After people have eaten, they will eventually become
    hungry again; they constantly need to replenish their food and water supply; and
    one breath of air must be followed by another. Other level needs, however, do not
    constantly recur. For example, people who have at least partially satisfied their love
    and esteem needs will remain confident that they can continue to satisfy their love
    and esteem needs.
    Safety Needs
    When people have partially satisfied their physiological needs, they become moti-
    vated by safety needs, including physical security, stability, dependency, protec-
    tion, and freedom from threatening forces such as war, terrorism, illness, fear,
    anxiety, danger, chaos, and natural disasters. The needs for law, order, and struc-
    ture are also safety needs (Maslow, 1970).
    Safety needs differ from physiological needs in that they cannot be overly
    satiated; people can never be completely protected from meteorites, fires, floods,
    or the dangerous acts of others.
    In societies not at war, most healthy adults satisfy their safety needs most
    of the time, thus making these needs relatively unimportant. Children, however,
    are more often motivated by safety needs because they live with such threats as
    darkness, animals, strangers, and punishments from parents. Also, some adults
    feel relatively unsafe because they retain irrational fears from childhood that cause
    them to act as if they were afraid of parental punishment. They spend far more
    energy than do healthy people trying to satisfy safety needs, and when they are
    not successful in their attempts, they suffer from what Maslow (1970) called basic
    anxiety.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories264
    Love and Belongingness Needs
    After people partially satisfy their physiological and safety needs, they become
    motivated by love and belongingness needs, such as the desire for friendship; the
    wish for a mate and children; the need to belong to a family, a club, a neighborhood,
    or a nation. Love and belongingness also include some aspects of sex and human
    contact as well as the need to both give and receive love (Maslow, 1970).
    People who have had their love and belongingness needs adequately satisfied
    from early years do not panic when denied love. These people have confidence
    that they are accepted by those who are important to them, so when other people
    reject them, they do not feel devastated.
    A second group of people consists of those who have never experienced love
    and belongingness, and, therefore, are incapable of giving love. They have seldom
    or never been hugged or cuddled nor experienced any form of verbal love. Maslow
    believed that these people will eventually learn to devalue love and to take its
    absence for granted.
    A third category includes those people who have received love and belong-
    ingness only in small doses. Because they receive only a taste of love and belong-
    ingness, they will be strongly motivated to seek it. In other words, people who
    have received only a little amount of love have stronger needs for affection and
    acceptance than do people who have received either a healthy amount of love or
    no love at all (Maslow, 1970).
    Children need love in order to grow psychologically, and their attempts to satisfy
    this need are usually straightforward and direct. Adults, too, need love, but their
    A solid sense of being loved is important in fostering confidence and psychological growth.
    © Image Source, all rights reserved.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 265
    attempts to attain it are sometimes cleverly disguised. These adults often engage in
    self-defeating behaviors, such as pretending to be aloof from other people or adopting
    a cynical, cold, and calloused manner in their interpersonal relationships. They may
    give the appearance of self-sufficiency and independence, but in reality they have a
    strong need to be accepted and loved by other people. Other adults whose love needs
    remain largely unsatisfied adopt more obvious ways of trying to satisfy them, but they
    undermine their own success by striving too hard. Their constant supplications for
    acceptance and affection leave others suspicious, unfriendly, and impenetrable.
    Esteem Needs
    To the extent that people satisfy their love and belongingness needs, they are free
    to pursue esteem needs, which include self-respect, confidence, competence, and
    the knowledge that others hold them in high esteem. Maslow (1970) identified
    two levels of esteem needs—reputation and self-esteem. Reputation is the percep-
    tion of the prestige, recognition, or fame a person has achieved in the eyes of
    others, whereas self-esteem is a person’s own feelings of worth and confidence.
    Self-esteem is based on more than reputation or prestige; it reflects a “desire for
    strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confi-
    dence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom” (p. 45). In
    other words, self-esteem is based on real competence and not merely on others’
    opinions. Once people meet their esteem needs, they stand on the threshold of
    self-actualization, the highest need recognized by Maslow.
    Self-Actualization Needs
    When lower level needs are satisfied,
    people proceed more or less automat-
    ically to the next level. However,
    once esteem needs are met, they do
    not always move to the level of self-
    actualization. Originally, Maslow
    (1950) assumed that self-actualization
    needs become potent whenever
    esteem needs have been met. How-
    ever, during the 1960s, he realized
    that many of the young students at
    Brandeis and other campuses around
    the country had all their lower needs
    gratified, including reputation and
    self-esteem, and yet they did not
    become self-actualizing (Frick, 1982;
    Hoffman, 1988; Maslow, 1971). Why
    some people step over the threshold
    from esteem to self-actualization and
    others do not is a matter of whether
    or not they embrace the B-values
    (B-values will be discussed in the
    Although not necessarily artistic, self-actualizers
    are creative in their own ways.
    © BananaStock/Alamy

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories266
    section titled Self-Actualization). People who highly respect such values as truth,
    beauty, justice, and the other B-values become self-actualizing after their esteem needs
    are met, whereas people who do not embrace these values are frustrated in their self-
    actualization needs even though they have satisfied each of their other basic needs.
    Self-actualization needs include self-fulfillment, the realization of all one’s
    potential, and a desire to become creative in the full sense of the word (Maslow,
    1970). People who have reached the level of self-actualization become fully human,
    satisfying needs that others merely glimpse or never view at all. They are natural
    in the same sense that animals and infants are natural; that is, they express their
    basic human needs and do not allow them to be suppressed by culture.
    Self-actualizing people maintain their feelings of self-esteem even when
    scorned, rejected, and dismissed by other people. In other words, self-actualizers
    are not dependent on the satisfaction of either love or esteem needs; they become
    independent from the lower level needs that gave them birth. (We present a more
    complete sketch of self-actualizing people in the section titled Self-Actualization.)
    In addition to these five conative needs, Maslow identified three other cat-
    egories of needs—aesthetic, cognitive, and neurotic. The satisfaction of aesthetic
    and cognitive needs is consistent with psychological health, whereas the depriva-
    tion of these two needs results in pathology. Neurotic needs, however, lead to
    pathology whether or not they are satisfied.
    Aesthetic Needs
    Unlike conative needs, aesthetic needs are not universal, but at least some people
    in every culture seem to be motivated by the need for beauty and aesthetically
    pleasing experiences (Maslow, 1967). From the days of the cave dwellers down to
    the present time, some people have produced art for art’s sake.
    People with strong aesthetic needs desire beautiful and orderly surroundings,
    and when these needs are not met, they become sick in the same way that they become
    sick when their conative needs are frustrated. People prefer beauty to ugliness, and
    they may even become physically and spiritually ill when forced to live in squalid,
    disorderly environments (Maslow, 1970).
    Cognitive Needs
    Most people have a desire to know, to solve mysteries, to understand, and to be
    curious. Maslow (1970) called these desires cognitive needs. When cognitive
    needs are blocked, all needs on Maslow’s hierarchy are threatened; that is, knowl-
    edge is necessary to satisfy each of the five conative needs. People can gratify
    their physiological needs by knowing how to secure food, safety needs by knowing
    how to build a shelter, love needs by knowing how to relate to people, esteem
    needs by knowing how to acquire some level of self-confidence, and self-actualization
    by fully using their cognitive potential.
    Maslow (1968b, 1970) believed that healthy people desire to know more, to
    theorize, to test hypotheses, to uncover mysteries, or to find out how something
    works just for the satisfaction of knowing. However, people who have not satisfied
    their cognitive needs, who have been consistently lied to, have had their curiosity

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 267
    stifled, or have been denied information, become pathological, a pathology that
    takes the form of skepticism, disillusionment, and cynicism.
    Neurotic Needs
    The satisfaction of conative, aesthetic, and cognitive needs is basic to one’s phys-
    ical and psychological health, and their frustration leads to some level of illness.
    However, neurotic needs lead only to stagnation and pathology (Maslow, 1970).
    By definition, neurotic needs are nonproductive. They perpetuate an unhealthy
    style of life and have no value in the striving for self-actualization. Neurotic needs
    are usually reactive; that is, they serve as compensation for unsatisfied basic needs.
    For example, a person who does not satisfy safety needs may develop a strong desire
    to hoard money or property. The hoarding drive is a neurotic need that leads to
    pathology whether or not it is satisfied. Similarly, a neurotic person may be able to
    establish a close relationship with another person, but that relationship may be a
    neurotic, symbiotic one that leads to a pathological relationship rather than genuine
    love. Maslow (1970) presented yet another example of a neurotic need. A person
    strongly motivated by power can acquire nearly unlimited power, but that does not
    make the person less neurotic or less demanding of additional power. “It makes little
    difference for ultimate health whether a neurotic need be gratified or frustrated”
    (Maslow, 1970, p. 274).
    General Discussion of Needs
    Maslow (1970) estimated that the hypothetical average person has his or her needs
    satisfied to approximately these levels: physiological, 85%; safety, 70%; love and
    belongingness, 50%; esteem, 40%; and self-actualization, 10%. The more a lower
    level need is satisfied, the greater the emergence of the next level need. For exam-
    ple, if love needs are only 10% satisfied, then esteem needs may not be active at
    all. But  if love needs are 25% satisfied, then esteem may emerge 5% as a need. If
    love is 75% satisfied, then esteem may emerge 50%, and so on. Needs, therefore,
    emerge gradually, and a person may be simultaneously motivated by needs from
    two or more levels. For example, a self-actualizing person may be the honorary
    guest at a dinner given by close friends in a peaceful restaurant. The act of eating
    gratifies a physiological need; but at the same time, the guest of honor may be
    satisfying safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization needs.
    Reversed Order of Needs
    Even though needs are generally satisfied in the hierarchical order shown in
    Figure 9.1, occasionally they are reversed. For some people, the drive for creativ-
    ity (a self-actualization need) may take precedence over safety and physiological
    needs. An enthusiastic artist may risk safety and health to complete an important
    work. For years, the late sculptor Korczak Ziolkowski endangered his health and
    abandoned companionship to work on carving a mountain in the Black Hills into
    a monument to Chief Crazy Horse.
    Reversals, however, are usually more apparent than real, and some seemingly
    obvious deviations in the order of needs are not variations at all. If we understood

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories268
    the unconscious motivation underlying the behavior, we would recognize that the
    needs are not reversed.
    Unmotivated Behavior
    Maslow believed that even though all behaviors have a cause, some behaviors are
    not motivated. In other words, not all determinants are motives. Some behavior is
    not caused by needs but by other factors such as conditioned reflexes, maturation,
    or drugs. Motivation is limited to the striving for the satisfaction of some need.
    Much of what Maslow (1970) called “expressive behavior” is unmotivated.
    Expressive and Coping Behavior
    Maslow (1970) distinguished between expressive behavior (which is often unmoti-
    vated) and coping behavior (which is always motivated and aimed at satisfying a need).
    Expressive behavior is often an end in itself and serves no other purpose than
    to be. It is frequently unconscious and usually takes place naturally and with little
    effort. It has no goals or aim but is merely the person’s mode of expression.
    Expressive behavior includes such actions as slouching, looking stupid, being
    relaxed, showing anger, and expressing joy. Expressive behavior can continue even
    in the absence of reinforcement or reward. For example, a frown, a blush, or a
    twinkle of the eye is not ordinarily specifically reinforced.
    Expressive behaviors also include one’s gait, gestures, voice, and smile
    (even when alone). A person, for example, may express a methodical, compulsive
    personality simply because she is what she is and not because of any need to do
    so. Other examples of expression include art, play, enjoyment, appreciation, won-
    der, awe, and excitement. Expressive behavior is usually unlearned, spontaneous,
    and determined by forces within the person rather than by the environment.
    On the other hand, coping behavior is ordinarily conscious, effortful, learned,
    and determined by the external environment. It involves the individual’s attempts
    to cope with the environment; to secure food and shelter; to make friends; and to
    receive acceptance, appreciation, and prestige from others. Coping behavior serves
    some aim or goal (although not always conscious or known to the person), and it
    is always motivated by some deficit need (Maslow, 1970).
    Deprivation of Needs
    Lack of satisfaction of any of the basic needs leads to some kind of pathology. Depri-
    vation of physiological needs results in malnutrition, fatigue, loss of energy, obsession
    with sex, and so on. Threats to one’s safety lead to fear, insecurity, and dread. When
    love needs go unfulfilled, a person becomes defensive, overly aggressive, or socially
    timid. Lack of esteem results in the illnesses of self-doubt, self-depreciation, and lack
    of confidence. Deprivation of self-actualization needs also leads to pathology, or more
    accurately, metapathology. Maslow (1967) defined metapathology as the absence of
    values, the lack of fulfillment, and the loss of meaning in life.
    Instinctoid Nature of Needs
    Maslow (1970) hypothesizes that some human needs are innately determined even
    though they can be modified by learning. He called these needs instinctoid needs.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 269
    Sex, for example, is a basic physiological need, but the manner in which it is
    expressed depends on learning. For most people, then, sex is an instinctoid need.
    One criterion for separating instinctoid needs from noninstinctoid needs is the
    level of pathology upon frustration. The thwarting of instinctoid needs produces pathol-
    ogy, whereas the frustration of noninstinctoid needs does not. For example, when
    people are denied sufficient love, they become sick and are blocked from achieving
    psychological health. Likewise, when people are frustrated in satisfying their physio-
    logical, safety, esteem, and self-actualization needs, they become sick. Therefore, these
    needs are instinctoid. On the other hand, the need to comb one’s hair or to speak one’s
    native tongue is learned, and the frustration of these needs does not ordinarily produce
    illness. If one would become psychologically ill as the result of not being able to comb
    one’s hair or to speak one’s native language, then the frustrated need is actually a basic
    instinctoid need, perhaps love and belongingness or possibly esteem.
    A second criterion for distinguishing between instinctoid and noninstinctoid
    needs is that instinctoid needs are persistent and their satisfaction leads to psycho-
    logical health. Noninstinctoid needs, in contrast, are usually temporary and their
    satisfaction is not a prerequisite for health.
    A third distinction is that instinctoid needs are species-specific. Therefore,
    animal instincts cannot be used as a model for studying human motivation. Only
    humans can be motivated by esteem and self-actualization.
    Fourth, though difficult to change, instinctoid needs can be molded, inhibited,
    or altered by environmental influences. Because many instinctoid needs (e.g., love)
    are weaker than cultural forces (e.g., aggression in the form of crime or war),
    Maslow (1970) insisted that society should “protect the weak, subtle, and tender
    instinctoid needs if they are not to be overwhelmed by the tougher more powerful
    culture” (p. 82). Stated another way, even though instinctoid needs are basic and
    unlearned, they can be changed and even destroyed by the more powerful forces
    of civilization. Hence, a healthy society should seek ways in which its members
    can receive satisfaction not only for physiological and safety needs but for love,
    esteem, and self-actualization needs as well.
    Comparison of Higher and Lower Needs
    Important similarities and differences exist between higher level needs (love, esteem,
    and self-actualization) and lower level needs (physiological and safety). Higher needs
    are similar to lower ones in that they are instinctoid. Maslow (1970) insisted that
    love, esteem, and self-actualization are just as biological as thirst, sex, and hunger.
    Differences between higher needs and lower ones are those of degree and
    not of kind. First, higher level needs are later on the phylogenetic or evolutionary
    scale. For instance, only humans (a relatively recent species) have the need for
    self-actualization. Also, higher needs appear later during the course of individual
    development; lower level needs must be cared for in infants and children before
    higher level needs become operative.
    Second, higher level needs produce more happiness and more peak experi-
    ences, although satisfaction of lower level needs may produce a degree of pleasure.
    Hedonistic pleasure, however, is usually temporary and not comparable to the
    quality of happiness produced by the satisfaction of higher needs. Also, the

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories270
    satisfaction of higher level needs is more subjectively desirable to those people
    who have experienced both higher and lower level needs. In other words, a person
    who has reached the level of self-actualization would have no motivation to return
    to a lower stage of development (Maslow, 1970).
    Self-Actualization
    Maslow’s ideas on self-actualization began soon after he received his PhD, when
    he became puzzled about why two of his teachers in New York City—anthropologist
    Ruth Benedict and psychologist Max Wertheimer—were so different from average
    people. To Maslow, these two people represented the highest level of human devel-
    opment, and he called this level “self-actualization.”
    Maslow’s Quest for the Self-Actualizing Person
    What traits made Wertheimer and Benedict so special? To answer this question,
    Maslow began to take notes on these two people; and he hoped to find others whom
    he could call a “Good Human Being.” However, he had trouble finding them. The
    young students in his classes were willing volunteers, but none of them seemed to
    match Wertheimer and Benedict as Good Human Beings, causing Maslow to won-
    der if 20-year-old college students could be Good Human Beings (Hoffman, 1988).
    Maslow found a number of older
    people who seemed to have some of
    the characteristics for which he was
    searching, but when he interviewed
    these people to learn what made them
    special, he was almost always disap-
    pointed. Typically, he found them to
    be “well-adjusted . . . but they have no
    flame, spark, excitement, good dedica-
    tion, feeling of responsibility” (Lowry,
    1973, p. 87). Maslow was forced to
    conclude that emotional security and
    good adjustment were not dependable
    predictors of a Good Human Being.
    Maslow faced additional handi-
    caps in his quest for whom he now
    called the “self-actualizing person.”
    First, he was trying to find a personal-
    ity syndrome that had never been
    clearly identified. Second, many of the
    people he believed to be self-actualiz-
    ing refused to participate in his search.
    They weren’t much interested in what
    Professor Maslow was trying to do.
    Maslow (1968a) later commented that
    not one single person he identified as
    Jane Addams was an activist and social worker
    who founded the profession of social work. She
    won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931, becoming
    the first American woman to win a Nobel Prize.
    © Atlas Archive/The Image Works

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 271
    definitely self-actualizing would agree to be tested. They seemed to value their
    privacy too much to share themselves with the world.
    Rather than being discouraged by his inability to find self-actualizing people,
    Maslow decided to take a different approach—he began reading biographies of
    famous people to see if he could find self-actualizing people among the saints, sages,
    national heroes, and artists. While learning about the lives of Thomas Jefferson,
    Abraham Lincoln (in his later years), Albert Einstein, William James, Albert Schweit-
    zer, Benedict de Spinoza, Jane Addams, and other great people, Maslow suddenly
    had an “Aha” experience. Rather than asking “What makes Max Wertheimer and
    Ruth Benedict self-actualizing?” he turned the question around and asked, “Why are
    we not all self-actualizing?” This new slant on the problem gradually changed
    Maslow’s conception of humanity and expanded his list of self-actualizing people.
    Once he had learned to ask the right questions, Maslow continued his quest for
    the self-actualizing person. To facilitate his search, he identified a syndrome for psy-
    chological health. After selecting a sample of potentially healthy individuals, he care-
    fully studied those people to build a personality syndrome. Next, he refined his
    original definition and then reselected potential self-actualizers, retaining some, elim-
    inating others, and adding new ones. Then he repeated the entire procedure with the
    second group, making some changes in the definition and the criteria of self-actual-
    ization. Maslow (1970) continued this cyclical process to a third or fourth selection
    group or until he was satisfied that he had refined a vague, unscientific concept into
    a precise and scientific definition of the self-actualizing person.
    Criteria for Self-Actualization
    What criteria did these and other self-actualizing people possess? First, they were
    free from psychopathology. They were neither neurotic nor psychotic nor did they
    have a tendency toward psychological disturbances. This point is an important neg-
    ative criterion because some neurotic and psychotic individuals have some things in
    common with self-actualizing people: namely, such characteristics as a heightened
    sense of reality, mystical experiences, creativity, and detachment from other people.
    Maslow eliminated from the list of possible self-actualizing people anyone who
    showed clear signs of psychopathology—excepting some psychosomatic illnesses.
    Second, these self-actualizing people had progressed through the hierarchy
    of needs and therefore lived above the subsistence level of existence and had no
    ever-present threat to their safety. Also, they experienced love and had a well-
    rooted sense of self-worth. Because they had their lower level needs satisfied,
    self-actualizing people were better able to tolerate the frustration of these needs,
    even in the face of criticism and scorn. They are capable of loving a wide variety
    of people but have no obligation to love everyone.
    Maslow’s third criterion for self-actualization was the embracing of the B-values.
    His self-actualizing people felt comfortable with and even demanded truth, beauty,
    justice, simplicity, humor, and each of the other B-values that we discuss later.
    The final criterion for reaching self-actualization was “full use and exploita-
    tion of talents, capacities, potentialities, etc.” (Maslow, 1970, p. 150). In other
    words, his self-actualizing individuals fulfilled their needs to grow, to develop, and
    to increasingly become what they were capable of becoming.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories272
    Values of Self-Actualizers
    Maslow (1971) held that self-actualizing people are motivated by the “eternal
    verities,” what he called B-values. These “Being” values are indicators of psycho-
    logical health and are opposed to deficiency needs, which motivate non-self-actualizers.
    B-values are not needs in the same sense that food, shelter, or companionship are.
    Maslow termed B-values “metaneeds” to indicate that they are the ultimate level of
    needs. He distinguished between ordinary need motivation and the motives of self-
    actualizing people, which he called metamotivation.
    Metamotivation is characterized by expressive rather than coping behavior
    and is associated with the B-values. It differentiates self-actualizing people from
    those who are not. In other words, metamotivation was Maslow’s tentative answer
    to the problem of why some people have their lower needs satisfied, are capable
    of giving and receiving love, possess a great amount of confidence and self-esteem,
    and yet fail to pass over the threshold to self-actualization. The lives of these
    people are meaningless and lacking in B-values. Only people who live among the
    B-values are self-actualizing, and they alone are capable of metamotivation.
    Maslow (1964, 1970) identified 14 B-values, but the exact number is not
    important because ultimately all become one, or at least all are highly correlated.
    The values of self-actualizing people include truth, goodness, beauty, wholeness
    or the transcendence of dichotomies, aliveness or spontaneity, uniqueness, perfec-
    tion, completion, justice and order, simplicity, richness or totality, effortlessness,
    playfulness or humor, and self-sufficiency or autonomy (see Figure 9.2).
    These values distinguish self-actualizing people from those whose psycho-
    logical growth is stunted after they reach esteem needs. Maslow (1970) hypothe-
    sized that when people’s metaneeds are not met, they experience illness, an
    existential illness. All people have a holistic tendency to move toward completeness
    Wholeness
    AlivenessU
    niqueness
    P
    e
    rfe
    ctio
    n
    C
    o
    m
    p
    le
    tio
    n
    Ju
    st
    ic
    e
    Sim
    plic
    ity
    Totality
    E�ortlessness
    H
    um
    or
    Bea
    uty
    G
    oo
    dn
    es
    s
    Tr
    u
    th
    A
    u
    to
    n
    o
    m
    y
    B-values
    FIGURE 9.2 Maslow’s B-values: A Single Jewel with Many Facets.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 273
    or totality, and when this movement is thwarted, they suffer feelings of inadequacy,
    disintegration, and unfulfillment. Absence of the B-values leads to pathology just
    as surely as lack of food results in malnutrition. When denied the truth, people suf-
    fer from paranoia; when they live in ugly surroundings, they become physically ill;
    without justice and order, they experience fear and anxiety; without playfulness and
    humor, they become stale, rigid, and somber. Deprivation of any of the B- values
    results in metapathology, or the lack of a meaningful philosophy of life.
    Characteristics of Self-Actualizing People
    Maslow believed that all humans have the potential for self-actualization. Then why
    are we not all self-actualizing? To be self-actualizing, Maslow believed, people must
    be regularly satisfied in their other needs and must also embrace the B-values. Using
    these two criteria, he guessed that the psychologically healthiest 1% of the adult
    population of the United States would be self-actualizing.
    Maslow (1970) listed 15 tentative qualities that characterize self-actualizing
    people to at least some degree.
    More Efficient Perception of Reality
    Self-actualizing people can more easily detect phoniness in others. They can dis-
    criminate between the genuine and the fake not only in people but also in literature,
    art, and music. They are not fooled by facades and can see both positive and
    negative underlying traits in others that are not readily apparent to most people.
    They perceive ultimate values more clearly than other people do and are less
    prejudiced and less likely to see the world as they wish it to be.
    Also, self-actualizing people are less afraid and more comfortable with the
    unknown. They not only have a greater tolerance of ambiguity, but they actively
    seek it and feel comfortable with problems and puzzles that have no definite right
    or wrong solution. They welcome doubt, uncertainty, indefiniteness, and uncharted
    paths, a quality that makes self-actualizing people particularly well suited to be
    philosophers, explorers, or scientists.
    Acceptance of Self, Others, and Nature
    Self-actualizing people can accept themselves the way they are. They lack defen-
    siveness, phoniness, and self-defeating guilt; have good hearty animal appetites for
    food, sleep, and sex; are not overly critical of their own shortcomings; and are not
    burdened by undue anxiety or shame. In similar fashion, they accept others and
    have no compulsive need to instruct, inform, or convert. They can tolerate weak-
    nesses in others and are not threatened by others’ strengths. They accept nature,
    including human nature, as it is and do not expect perfection either in themselves
    or in others. They realize that people suffer, grow old, and die.
    Spontaneity, Simplicity, and Naturalness
    Self-actualizing people are spontaneous, simple, and natural. They are unconven-
    tional but not compulsively so; they are highly ethical but may appear unethical or
    nonconforming. They usually behave conventionally, either because the issue is not
    of great importance or out of deference to others. But when the situation warrants

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories274
    it, they can be unconventional and uncompromising even at the price of ostracism
    and censure. The similarity between self-actualizing people and children and ani-
    mals is in their spontaneous and natural behavior. They ordinarily live simple lives
    in the sense that they have no need to erect a complex veneer designed to deceive
    the world. They are unpretentious and not afraid or ashamed to express joy, awe,
    elation, sorrow, anger, or other deeply felt emotions.
    Problem-Centering
    A fourth characteristic of self-actualizing people is their interest in problems out-
    side themselves. Non-self-actualizing people are self-centered and tend to see all
    the world’s problems in relation to themselves, whereas self-actualizing people are
    task-oriented and concerned with problems outside themselves. This interest allows
    self-actualizers to develop a mission in life, a purpose for living that spreads
    beyond self-aggrandizement. Their occupation is not merely a means to earning a
    living but a vocation, a calling, an end in itself.
    Self-actualizing people extend their frame of reference far beyond self. They
    are concerned with eternal problems and adopt a solid philosophical and ethical
    basis for handling these problems. They are unconcerned with the trivial and the
    petty. Their realistic perception enables them to clearly distinguish between the
    important and the unimportant issues in life.
    The Need for Privacy
    Self-actualizing people have a quality of detachment that allows them to be alone
    without being lonely. They feel relaxed and comfortable when they are either with
    people or alone. Because they have already satisfied their love and belongingness
    needs, they have no desperate need to be surrounded by other people. They can
    find enjoyment in solitude and privacy.
    Self-actualizing people may be seen as aloof or uninterested, but in fact, their
    disinterest is limited to minor matters. They have a global concern for the welfare
    of others without becoming entangled in minute and insignificant problems.
    Because they spend little energy attempting to impress others or trying to gain love
    and acceptance, they have more ability to make responsible choices. They are self-
    movers, resisting society’s attempts to make them adhere to convention.
    Autonomy
    Self-actualizing people are autonomous and depend on themselves for growth even
    though at some time in their past they had to have received love and security from
    others. No one is born autonomous, and therefore no one is completely independent
    of people. Autonomy can be achieved only through satisfactory relations with others.
    However, the confidence that one is loved and accepted without conditions
    or qualifications can be a powerful force in contributing to feelings of self-worth.
    Once that confidence is attained, a person no longer depends on others for self-
    esteem. Self-actualizing people have that confidence and therefore a large measure
    of autonomy that allows them to be unperturbed by criticism as well as unmoved
    by flattery. This independence also gives them an inner peace and serenity not
    enjoyed by those who live for the approval of others.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 275
    Continued Freshness of Appreciation
    Maslow (1970) wrote that “self-actualizing people have the wonderful capacity to
    appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life, with awe,
    pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy” (p. 163). They are keenly aware of their good
    physical health, friends and loved ones, economic security, and political freedom.
    Unlike other people who take their blessings for granted, self-actualizing individu-
    als see with a fresh vision such everyday phenomena as flowers, food, and friends.
    They have an appreciation of their possessions and do not waste time complaining
    about a boring, uninteresting existence. In short, they “retain their constant sense
    of good fortune and gratitude for it” (Maslow, 1970, p. 164).
    The Peak Experience
    As Maslow’s study of self-actualizers continued, he made the unexpected discov-
    ery that many of his people had had experiences that were mystical in nature and
    that somehow gave them a feeling of transcendence. Originally, he thought that
    these so-called peak experiences were far more common among self-actualizers
    than among non-self-actualizers. Later, however, Maslow (1971) stated that “most
    people, or almost all people, have peak experiences, or ecstasies” (p. 175).
    Not all peak experiences are of equal intensity; some are only mildly sensed,
    others moderately felt, and some are quite intensely experienced. In their mild
    form, these peak experiences probably occur in everyone, although they are seldom
    noticed. For example, long-distance runners often report a sort of transcendence,
    a loss of self, or a feeling of being separated from their body. Sometimes, during
    periods of intense pleasure or satisfaction, people will experience mystical or peak
    experiences. Viewing a sunset or some other grandeur of nature may precipitate a
    Peak experiences can be transcendent and life-altering. © Getty Images

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories276
    peak experience, but these experiences cannot be brought on by an act of the will;
    often they occur at unexpected, quite ordinary moments.
    What is it like to have a peak experience? Maslow (1964) described several
    guidelines that may help answer this question. First, peak experiences are quite
    natural and are part of human makeup. Second, people having a peak experience
    see the whole universe as unified or all in one piece, and they see clearly their
    place in that universe. Also, during this mystical time, peakers feel both more
    humble and more powerful at the same time. They feel passive, receptive, more
    desirous of listening, and more capable of hearing. Simultaneously, they feel more
    responsible for their activities and perceptions, more active, and more self-determined.
    Peakers experience a loss of fear, anxiety, and conflict and become more loving,
    accepting, and spontaneous. Although peakers often report such emotions as awe,
    wonder, rapture, ecstasy, reverence, humility, and surrender, they are not likely to
    want to get something practical from the experience. They often experience a
    disorientation in time and space, a loss of self-consciousness, an unselfish attitude,
    and an ability to transcend everyday polarities.
    The peak experience is unmotivated, nonstriving, and nonwishing, and during
    such an experience, a person experiences no needs, wants, or deficiencies. In addition,
    Maslow (1964) says, “The peak experience is seen only as beautiful, good, desirable,
    worthwhile, etc., and is never experienced as evil or undesirable” (p. 63). Maslow
    also believed that the peak experience often has a lasting effect on a person’s life.
    Gemeinschaftsgefühl
    Self-actualizing people possess Gemeinschaftsgefühl, Adler’s term for social interest,
    community feeling, or a sense of oneness with all humanity. Maslow found that his
    self-actualizers had a kind of caring attitude toward other people. Although they often
    feel like aliens in a foreign land, self-actualizers nevertheless identify with all other
    people and have a genuine interest in helping others—strangers as well as friends.
    Self-actualizers may become angry, impatient, or disgusted with others; but
    they retain a feeling of affection for human beings in general. More specifically,
    Maslow (1970) stated that self-actualizing people are “often saddened, exasperated,
    and even enraged by the shortcomings of the average person” (p. 166), but never-
    theless, they continue to feel a basic kinship with that person.
    Profound Interpersonal Relations
    Related to Gemeinschaftsgefühl is a special quality of interpersonal relations that
    involves deep and profound feelings for individuals. Self-actualizers have a nur-
    turant feeling toward people in general, but their close friendships are limited to
    only a few. They have no frantic need to be friends with everyone, but the few
    important interpersonal relationships they do have are quite deep and intense. They
    tend to choose healthy people as friends and avoid intimate interpersonal relation-
    ships with dependent or infantile people, although their social interest allows them
    to have a special feeling of empathy for these less healthy persons.
    Self-actualizers are often misunderstood and sometimes despised by others.
    On the other hand, many are greatly loved and attract a large group of admirers
    and even worshipers, especially if they have made a notable contribution to their

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 277
    business or professional field. Those healthy people studied by Maslow felt uneasy
    and embarrassed by this veneration, preferring instead relationships that were
    mutual rather than one-sided.
    The Democratic Character Structure
    Maslow found that all his self-actualizers possessed democratic values. They could
    be friendly and considerate with other people regardless of class, color, age, or gender,
    and in fact, they seemed to be quite unaware of superficial differences among people.
    Beyond this democratic attitude, self-actualizers have a desire and an ability
    to learn from anyone. In a learning situation, they recognize how little they know
    in relation to what they could know. They realize that less healthy individuals have
    much to offer them, and they are respectful and even humble before these people.
    However, they do not passively accept evil behavior in others; rather, they fight
    against evil people and evil behavior.
    Discrimination Between Means and Ends
    Self-actualizing people have a clear sense of right and wrong conduct and have
    little conflict about basic values. They set their sights on ends rather than means
    and have an unusual ability to distinguish between the two. What other people
    consider to be a means (e.g., eating or exercising), self-actualizing people often see
    as an end in itself. They enjoy doing something for its own sake and not just because
    it is a means to some other end. Maslow (1970) described his self-actualizing peo-
    ple by saying that “they can often enjoy for its own sake the getting to some place
    as well as the arriving. It is occasionally possible for them to make out of the most
    trivial and routine activity an intrinsically enjoyable game” (p. 169).
    Philosophical Sense of Humor
    Another distinguishing characteristic of self-actualizing people is their philosophi-
    cal, nonhostile sense of humor. Most of what passes for humor or comedy is basi-
    cally hostile, sexual, or scatological. The laugh is usually at someone else’s
    expense. Healthy people see little humor in put-down jokes. They may poke fun
    at themselves, but not masochistically so. They make fewer tries at humor than
    others, but their attempts serve a purpose beyond making people laugh. They
    amuse, inform, point out ambiguities, provoke a smile rather than a guffaw.
    The humor of a self-actualizing person is intrinsic to the situation rather than
    contrived; it is spontaneous rather than planned. Because it is situation-dependent, it
    usually cannot be repeated. For those who look for examples of a philosophical sense
    of humor, disappointment is inevitable. A retelling of the incident almost invariably
    loses its original quality of amusement. One must “be there” to appreciate it.
    Creativeness
    All self-actualizing people studied by Maslow were creative in some sense of the
    word. In fact, Maslow suggested that creativity and self-actualization may be
    one  and the same. Not all self-actualizers are talented or creative in the arts, but
    all are creative in their own way. They have a keen perception of truth, beauty,
    and reality—ingredients that form the foundation of true creativity.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories278
    Self-actualizing people need not be poets or artists to be creative. In speak-
    ing of his mother-in-law (who was also his aunt), Maslow (1968a) vividly pointed
    out that creativity can come from almost anywhere. He said that whereas his self-
    actualizing mother-in-law had no special talents as a writer or artist, she was truly
    creative in preparing homemade soup. Maslow remarked that first-rate soup was
    more creative than second-rate poetry!
    Resistance to Enculturation
    A final characteristic identified by Maslow was resistance to enculturation. Self-
    actualizing people have a sense of detachment from their surroundings and are able
    to transcend a particular culture. They are neither antisocial nor consciously non-
    conforming. Rather, they are autonomous, following their own standards of con-
    duct and not blindly obeying the rules of others.
    Self-actualizing people do not waste energy fighting against insignificant
    customs and regulations of society. Such folkways as dress, hair style, and traffic
    laws are relatively arbitrary, and self-actualizing people do not make a conspicuous
    show of defying these conventions. Because they accept conventional style and
    dress, they are not too different in appearance from anyone else. However, on
    important matters, they can become strongly aroused to seek social change and to
    resist society’s attempts to enculturate them. Self-actualizing people do not merely
    have different social mores, but, Maslow (1970) hypothesized, they are “less encul-
    turated, less flattened out, less molded” (p. 174).
    For this reason, these healthy people are more individualized and less homog-
    enized than others. They are not all alike. In fact, the term “self-actualization”
    means to become everything that one can become, to actualize or fulfill all of one’s
    potentials. When people can accomplish this goal, they become more unique, more
    heterogeneous, and less shaped by a given culture (Maslow, 1970).
    Love, Sex, and Self-Actualization
    Before people can become self-actualizing, they must satisfy their love and belonging-
    ness needs. It follows then that self-actualizing people are capable of both giving and
    receiving love and are no longer motivated by the kind of deficiency love (D-love)
    common to other people. Self-actualizing people are capable of B-love, that is, love
    for the essence or “Being” of the other. B-love is mutually felt and shared and not
    motivated by a deficiency or incompleteness within the lover. In fact, it is unmotivated,
    expressive behavior. Self-actualizing people do not love because they expect some-
    thing in return. They simply love and are loved. Their love is never harmful. It is the
    kind of love that allows lovers to be relaxed, open, and nonsecretive (Maslow, 1970).
    Because self-actualizers are capable of a deeper level of love, Maslow (1970)
    believed that sex between two B-lovers often becomes a kind of mystical experi-
    ence. Although they are lusty people, fully enjoying sex, food, and other sensuous
    pleasures, self-actualizers are not dominated by sex. They can more easily tolerate
    the absence of sex (as well as other basic needs), because they have no deficiency
    need for it. Sexual activity between B-lovers is not always a heightened emotional
    experience; sometimes it is taken quite lightly in the spirit of playfulness and humor.
    But this approach is to be expected, because playfulness and humor are B-values,
    and like the other B-values, they are an important part of a self-actualizer’s life.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 279
    Maslow’s Psychology and Philosophy of Science
    Maslow’s philosophy of science and his research methods are integral to an
    understanding of how he arrived at his concept of self-actualization. Maslow
    (1966) believed that value-free science does not lead to the proper study of human
    personality. Maslow argued for a different philosophy of science, a humanistic,
    holistic approach that is not value free and that has scientists who care about the
    people and topics they investigate. For example, Maslow was motivated to search
    for self-actualizing people because he idolized and greatly admired Max Wertheimer
    and Ruth Benedict, his two original models for self-actualization. But he also
    expressed affection and admiration for Abraham Lincoln, Eleanor Roosevelt, and
    other self-actualizing people (Maslow, 1968a).
    Maslow agreed with Allport (see Chapter 12) that psychological science
    should place more emphasis on the study of the individual and less on the study
    of large groups. Subjective reports should be favored over rigidly objective ones,
    and people should be allowed to tell about themselves in a holistic fashion instead
    of the more orthodox approach that studies people in bits and pieces. Traditional
    psychology has dealt with sensations, intelligence, attitudes, stimuli, reflexes, test
    scores, and hypothetical constructs from an external point of view. It has not been
    much concerned with the whole person as seen from that person’s subjective view.
    When Maslow attended medical school, he was shocked by the impersonal
    attitude of surgeons who nonchalantly tossed recently removed body parts onto a
    table. His observation of such a cold and calloused procedure led Maslow to orig-
    inate the concept of desacralization: that is, the type of science that lacks emotion,
    joy, wonder, awe, and rapture (Hoffman, 1988). Maslow believed that orthodox
    science has no ritual or ceremony, and he called for scientists to put values, cre-
    ativity, emotion, and ritual back into their work. Scientists must be willing to
    resacralize science or to instill it with human values, emotion, and ritual. Astron-
    omers must not only study the stars; they must be awestruck by them. Psycholo-
    gists must not only study human personality; they must do so with enjoyment,
    excitement, wonder, and affection.
    Maslow (1966) argued for a Taoistic attitude for psychology, one that would
    be noninterfering, passive, and receptive. This new psychology would abolish predic-
    tion and control as the major goals of science and replace them with sheer fascination
    and the desire to release people from controls so that they can grow and become less
    predictable. The proper response to mystery, Maslow said, is not analysis but awe.
    Maslow insisted that psychologists must themselves be healthy people, able to
    tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty. They must be intuitive, nonrational, insightful, and
    courageous enough to ask the right questions. They must also be willing to flounder,
    to be imprecise, to question their own procedures, and to take on the important prob-
    lems of psychology. Maslow (1966) contended that there is no need to do well that
    which is not worth doing. Rather, it is better to do poorly that which is important.
    In his study of self-actualizing people and peak experiences, Maslow
    employed research methods consistent with his philosophy of science. He began
    intuitively, often “skating on thin ice,” then attempted to verify his hunches using
    idiographic and subjective methods. He often left to others the technical work of
    gathering evidence. His personal preference was to “scout out ahead,” leaving one
    area when he grew tired of it and going on to explore new ones (M. H. Hall, 1968).

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories280
    Measuring Self-Actualization
    Everett L. Shostrom (1974) developed the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI)
    in an attempt to measure the values and behaviors of self-actualizing people. This
    inventory consists of 150 forced-choice items, such as (a) “I can feel comfortable
    with less than a perfect performance” versus (b) “I feel uncomfortable with any-
    thing less than a perfect performance”; (a) “Two people will get along best if each
    concentrates on pleasing the other” versus (b) “Two people can get along best if
    each person feels free to express himself ”; and (a) “My moral values are dictated
    by society” versus (b) “My moral values are self-determined” (Shostrom, 1963).
    Respondents are asked to choose either statement (a) or statement (b), but they
    may leave the answer blank if neither statement applies to them or if they do not
    know anything about the statement.
    The POI has 2 major scales and 10 subscales. The first major scale—the Time
    Competence/Time Incompetence scale—measures the degree to which people are
    present oriented. The second major scale—the Support scale—is “designed to mea-
    sure whether an individual’s mode of reaction is characteristically ‘self’ oriented or
    ‘other’ oriented” (Shostrom, 1974, p. 4). The 10 subscales assess levels of (1) self-
    actualization values, (2) flexibility in applying values, (3) sensitivity to one’s own
    needs and feelings, (4) spontaneity in expressing feelings behaviorally, (5) self-
    regard, (6) self-acceptance, (7) positive view of humanity, (8) ability to  see oppo-
    sites of life as meaningfully related, (9) acceptance of aggression, and (10) capacity
    for intimate contact. High scores on the 2 major scales and the 10 subscales indicate
    some level of self-actualization; low scores do not nece ssarily suggest pathology but
    give clues concerning a person’s self-actualizing values and behaviors.
    The POI seems to be quite resistant to faking—unless one is familiar with
    Maslow’s description of a self-actualizing person. In the POI manual, Shostrom
    (1974) cited several studies in which the examinees were asked to “fake good” or
    “make a favorable impression” in filling out the inventory. When participants fol-
    lowed these instructions, they generally scored lower (in the direction away from
    self-actualization) than they did when responding honestly to the statements.
    This finding, indeed, is an interesting one. Why should people lower their
    scores when trying to look good? The answer lies in Maslow’s concept of self-
    actualization. Statements that might be true for self-actualizers are not necessarily
    socially desirable and do not always conform to cultural standards. For example,
    items such as “I can overcome any obstacles as long as I believe in myself” or
    “My basic responsibility is to be aware of others’ needs” may seem like desirable
    goals to someone trying to simulate self-actualization, but a self-actualizing person
    probably would not endorse either of these items. On the other hand, a truly self-
    actualizing person may choose such items as “I do not always need to live by the
    rules and standards of society” or “I do not feel obligated when a stranger does
    me a favor” (Shostrom, 1974, p. 22). Because one of the characteristics of self-
    actualizing people is resistance to enculturation, it should not be surprising that
    attempts to make a good impression will usually result in failure.
    Interestingly, Maslow himself seemed to have answered the questions hon-
    estly when he filled out the inventory. Despite the fact that he helped in the con-
    struction of the POI, Maslow’s own scores were only in the direction of

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 281
    self-actualization and not nearly as high as the scores of people who were definitely
    self-actualizing (Shostrom, 1974).
    Even though the POI has demonstrated reasonable reliability and validity, some
    researchers (Weiss, 1991; Whitson & Olczak, 1991) have criticized the inventory for
    failing to distinguish between known self-actualizers and non-self-actualizers. Further-
    more, the POI has two practical problems; first, it is long, taking most participants
    30 to 45 minutes to complete; and second, the two-item forced-choice format can
    engender hostility in the participants, who feel frustrated by the limitations of a forced-
    choice option. To overcome these two practical limitations, Alvin Jones and Rick
    Crandall (1986) created the Short Index of Self-Actualization (SISA), which borrows
    15 items from the POI that are most strongly correlated with the total self-actualization
    score. Items on the Short Index are on a 6-point Likert scale (from strongly disagree
    to strongly agree). Research (Compton, Smith, Cornish, & Qualls, 1996; Rowan,
    Compton, & Rust, 1995; Runco, Ebersole, & Mraz, 1991) on the Short Index of the
    POI has indicated that it is a useful scale for assessing self-actualization.
    A third measure of self-actualization is the Brief Index of Self-Actualization
    (BISA), developed by John Sumerlin and Charles Bundrick (1996, 1998). The orig-
    inal Brief Index (Sumerlin & Bundrick, 1996) comprised 40 items placed on a
    6-point Likert scale and thus yields scores from 40 to 240. Factor analysis yielded
    four factors of self-actualization, but because some items were placed in more than
    one factor, the authors (Sumerlin & Bundrick, 1998) revised the Brief Index of
    Self-Actualization by eliminating eight items so that no single item was found on
    more than one factor. This inventory yields four factors: (I) Core Self-Actualization,
    or the full use of one’s potentials; (II) Autonomy; (III) Openness to Experience;
    and (IV) Comfort with Solitude. Typical items include “I enjoy my achievements”
    (Core Self-Actualization), “I fear that I will not live up to my potential” (a reversed
    scored item measuring Autonomy), “I am sensitive to the needs of others” (Open-
    ness to Experience), and “I enjoy my solitude” (Comfort with Solitude). The BISA-R
    shows strong psychometric properties, that is, it has high internal consistency and
    a high test-retest reliability. Furthermore, it correlates highly with the SISA. Sum-
    erlin (1997) showed that it correlated positively with measures of psychological
    adjustment such as hopefulness and subjective health. It appears to be a useful
    measure of self-actualization.
    The Jonah Complex
    According to Maslow (1970), everyone is born with a will toward health, a ten-
    dency to grow toward self-actualization, but few people reach it. What prevents
    people from achieving this high level of health? Growth toward normal, healthy
    personality can be blocked at each of the steps in the hierarchy of needs. If people
    cannot provide for food and shelter, they remain at the level of physiological and
    safety needs. Others remain blocked at the level of love and belongingness needs,
    striving to give and receive love and to develop feelings of belongingness. Still
    others satisfy their love needs and gain self-esteem, but do not advance to the level
    of self-actualization because they fail to embrace the B-values (Maslow, 1970).
    Another obstacle that often blocks people’s growth toward self-actualization
    is the Jonah complex, or the fear of being one’s best (Maslow, 1979). The Jonah

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories282
    complex is characterized by attempts to run away from one’s destiny just as the
    biblical Jonah tried to escape from his fate. The Jonah complex, which is found in
    nearly everyone, represents a fear of success, a fear of being one’s best, and a
    feeling of awesomeness in the presence of beauty and perfection. Maslow’s own
    life story demonstrated his Jonah complex. Despite an IQ of 195, he was only an
    average student, and, as a world-famous psychologist, he frequently experienced
    panic when called on to deliver a talk.
    Why do people run away from greatness and self-fulfillment? Maslow (1971,
    1996) offered the following rationale. First, the human body is simply not strong
    enough to endure the ecstasy of fulfillment for any length of time, just as peak
    experiences and sexual orgasms would be overly taxing if they lasted too long.
    Therefore, the intense emotion that accompanies perfection and fulfillment carries
    with it a shattering sensation such as “This is too much” or “I can’t stand it anymore.”
    Maslow (1971) listed a second explanation for why people evade greatness.
    Most people, he reasoned, have private ambition to be great, to write a great novel,
    to be a movie star, to become a world-famous scientist, and so on. However, when
    they compare themselves with those who have accomplished greatness, they are
    appalled by their own arrogance: “Who am I to think I could do as well as this
    great person?” As a defense against this grandiosity or “sinful pride,” they lower
    their aspirations, feel stupid and humble, and adopt the self-defeating approach of
    running away from the realization of their full potentials.
    Although the Jonah complex stands out most sharply in neurotic people,
    nearly everyone has some timidity toward seeking perfection and greatness. People
    allow false humility to stifle creativity, and thus they prevent themselves from
    becoming self-actualizing.
    Psychotherapy
    To Maslow (1970), the aim of therapy would be for clients to embrace the Being-
    values, that is, to value truth, justice, goodness, simplicity, and so forth. To accom-
    plish this aim, clients must be free from their dependency on others so that their
    natural impulse toward growth and self-actualization could become active. Psycho-
    therapy cannot be value free but must take into consideration the fact that everyone
    has an inherent tendency to move toward a better, more enriching condition,
    namely self-actualization.
    The goals of psychology follow from the client’s position on the hierarchy
    of needs. Because physiological and safety needs are prepotent, people operating
    on these levels will not ordinarily be motivated to seek psychotherapy. Instead,
    they will strive to obtain nourishment and protection.
    Most people who seek therapy have these two lower level needs relatively
    well satisfied but have some difficulty achieving love and belongingness needs.
    Therefore, psychotherapy is largely an interpersonal process. Through a warm,
    loving, interpersonal relationship with the therapist, the client gains satisfaction of
    love and belongingness needs and thereby acquires feelings of confidence and
    self-worth. A healthy interpersonal relationship between client and therapist is
    therefore the best psychological medicine. This accepting relationship gives clients
    a feeling of being worthy of love and facilitates their ability to establish other

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 283
    healthy relationships outside of therapy. This view of psychotherapy is nearly iden-
    tical to that of Carl Rogers, as we discuss in Chapter 10.
    Related Research
    As you just read, one of the most notable aspects of Maslow’s theory of personal-
    ity is  the concept of a hierarchy of needs. Some needs such as physiological
    and  safety needs are lower order needs, whereas needs like esteem and self-
    actualization are higher order. Generally speaking, according to Maslow’s the-
    ory the lower order needs must be met early in life, whereas the higher order
    needs such as self-actualization tend to be fulfilled later in life.
    Recently, researchers have tested this aspect of Maslow’s theory by measur-
    ing need fulfillment in a sample of 1,749 people of all age groups (Reiss & Haver-
    camp, 2006). In this study, participants completed a questionnaire that asked about
    their fulfillment of needs. These needs were divided into two types of motivation:
    lower motivation (e.g., eating and physical exercise) and higher motivation (e.g.,
    honor, family, and idealism). The results supported Maslow’s theory. The research-
    ers found that the lower motives were stronger in younger people, whereas the
    higher motives were stronger in older people. Recall that in order to focus on
    fulfilling the highest order needs such as esteem and self-actualization, people must
    first have fulfilled the lower order needs. Therefore, as Maslow theorized and as
    Reiss and Havercamp (2006) found, if people can secure the most basic needs early
    in life, they have more time and energy to focus on achieving the highest reaches
    of human existence later in life.
    Mindfulness and Self-Actualization
    Mindfulness is a Buddhist concept that has begun to be examined in Western ther-
    apeutic and scientific domains. It is a difficult concept to define, but one premier
    researcher in the arena of mindfulness, Ellen Langer, defines the state as “the process
    of drawing novel distinctions . . . . Actively drawing these distinctions keeps us situated
    in the present” (Langer & Moldoveanu, 2000, p. 2). Mindful observers are open to
    directly experiencing events, without judgment or elaboration. Put simply, to be
    mindful is to be present and aware. Empirical studies have shown that mindfulness
    is good for us; it is negatively correlated with depression and anxiety, and positively
    correlated with positive affect and empathy (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003). Given that
    Maslow viewed self-actualization as a pathway toward psychological health, Mark
    Beitel and colleagues (2014) hypothesized that self-actualization and mindfulness
    must be related, and they conducted an exploratory study to examine this relationship.
    Maslow (1971) observed that self-actualizing people attend to the world in
    ways that come very close to descriptions of mindfulness: intensely, with a contin-
    ued freshness of appreciation, and an acceptance of things as they are. Furthermore,
    the practice of mindfulness meditation likely brings with it moments much like
    Maslow’s peak experiences—mystical and transcendent. Beitel and colleagues
    (2014) gave 204 American undergraduate students both of the contemporary mea-
    sures of self-actualization discussed earlier in this chapter. They completed the
    BISA-R (Sumerlin & Bundrick, 1998), which, as you may recall, involves four fea-
    tures of Maslow’s theorizing about the B-values: Autonomy, Core Self-Actualization,

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories284
    Comfort with Solitude, and Openness to Experience. They also completed the SISA,
    derived from the Personal Orientation Inventory. In addition, the students completed
    two measures of mindfulness. The first, the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness
    Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004), assesses four features of mindfulness: observing,
    describing, acting with awareness, and accepting without judgment. The Mindful
    Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) asks participants indirect
    questions about being attentive and aware. This is because preliminary research
    revealed that asking people to directly endorse mindfulness statements led to inflated
    estimates. This scale, instead, asks questions about mindlessness, and hence gets at
    people’s levels of mindfulness indirectly (e.g., “I find it difficult to stay focused on
    what’s happening in the present”; “I rush through activities without being really
    attentive to them”).
    Results revealed a significant positive correlation between both the MAAS
    mindfulness measure and the most general SISA self-actualization measure. So the
    more mindful participants reported themselves to be, the higher they scored on the
    general measure of self-actualization. Second, the relationships between the factors of
    the BISA-R and the mindfulness measures revealed that the acceptance feature of
    mindfulness and the autonomy feature of self-actualization were the driving factors
    among all the variables of interest. The authors state: “The strong relationship
    between acceptance and autonomy suggests that the highly non-judgmental, non
    self-critical individual is also quite independent and self-confident in ways that support
    self-actualization” (Beitel et al., 2014, p. 198). Several null findings in this study were
    also interesting. One of them was that the mindfulness feature of non-judgmental
    acceptance was not related to self-actualization generally nor to openness to experience.
    Maslow’s theorizing around the self-actualization process seems to fit with this: mind-
    ful practice may, in fact, be antithetical to the goal oriented features of the process of
    engaging the B-values in self-actualization, because some judging of “good and bad”
    or “right and wrong” is likely part and parcel of that self-development process.
    Because this study was correlational in nature, we cannot say which comes
    first. Do self-actualizers become more mindful? Or does the practice of mindful-
    ness launch us into and support the process of self-actualizing? In any case, the
    positive relationship between these two important constructs provides a fascinating
    link between Buddhism and humanistic psychology. Future research will need to
    explore the direction of causality between mindfulness and self-actualization.
    Positive Psychology
    Positive psychology is a relatively new field of psychology that combines an empha-
    sis on hope, optimism, and well-being with scientific research and assessment. Many
    of the questions examined by positive psychologists stem directly from humanistic
    theorists such as Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers (see Chapter 10). Like Maslow
    and Rogers, positive psychologists are critical of traditional psychology, which has
    resulted in a model of the human being as lacking the positive features that make life
    worth living. Hope, wisdom, creativity, future mindedness, courage, spirituality, respon-
    sibility, and positive experiences are ignored (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).
    One area of positive psychology where Maslow’s ideas have been par-
    ticularly influential is in the role of positive experiences in people’s lives.

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 285
    Maslow referred to extremely positive experiences that involve a sense of awe,
    wonder, and reverence as peak experiences. While such experiences are more
    common among self-actualizers, they can be experienced to various degrees by
    other people as well. Recently, researchers have investigated the potential ben-
    efits that come from reexperiencing, through writing or thinking, such positive
    experiences. In one such study, participants were instructed to write about a
    positive experience or experiences for 20 minutes each day for 3 consecutive
    days (Burton & King, 2004). Instructions given to participants before starting
    were derived directly from Maslow’s writings on peak experiences, and they
    asked participants to write about their “happiest moments, ecstatic moments,
    moments of rapture, perhaps from being in love, from listening to music or
    suddenly ‘being hit’ by a book or painting or from some great creative moment”
    (p. 155). Experiencing such positive awe-inspiring events will undoubtedly
    enhance positive emotion, and, as this study tested, perhaps simply recalling such
    events from the past by writing about them can also enhance positive emotion.
    The experience of positive emotion is generally a good thing and has been
    associated with enhanced coping resources, better health, creativity, and prosocial
    behaviors (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). Therefore, Burton and King
    predicted that writing about these peak or intensely positive experiences would
    be associated with better physical health in the months following the writing
    exercise. Indeed, Burton and King (2004) found that those who wrote about pos-
    itive experiences, compared to those in a control condition who wrote about non-
    emotional topics such as a description of their bedroom, visited the doctor fewer
    times for illness during the 3 months after writing.
    Positive psychology focuses on how positive experiences affect one’s per-
    sonality and one’s life. Moreover, an important quality of self-actualizing people
    is their capacity to have “peak experiences”—feeling unified with the universe and
    more humble and powerful at the same time. Maslow also mentioned awe as part
    of the peak experience. In the last 10 to 15 years, research on the nature and
    experience of the positive emotion of awe has begun to garner serious scientific
    attention (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). Awe is
    defined as experiencing the feelings of vastness and expansiveness while at the
    same time needing to alter or accommodate one’s perceptions of the world (that
    is, it changes how we view ourselves in the world) (Keltner & Haidt, 2003).
    In a series of three experimental studies, Rudd and colleagues (2012) examined
    how the experience of awe affects people’s sense of how much time they have and
    whether they would donate their time as well as their preference of experience over
    material things and how satisfied they feel about their lives. They predicted that awe
    would increase people’s sense that they have time for things, make them more gen-
    erous with their time, increase their preference for experience over material things,
    and would boost their sense of satisfaction with life. In three separate experiments,
    they randomly assigned half the participants to experience awe. In the first study awe
    was induced by showing participants a 60-second video of people experiencing vast
    and mentally overwhelming realistic scenes such as waterfalls, whales, and astronauts
    in space. In the second study awe was induced by having people reflect upon and
    then write when they had “a response to things perceived as vast and overwhelming
    and alters the way you understand the world” (Rudd et al., 2012, p. 4). In the third

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories286
    study awe was induced by having participants read a story of going up the Eiffel
    Tower and then seeing Paris from hundreds of feet above ground. Each of these
    procedures resulted in significant increases in participants’ experience of awe.
    As predicted, people who experienced awe expanded their sense of having
    time, increased their willingness to donate their time (but had no effect on their
    willingness to donate money) for pro-social causes. Finally, the experience of awe
    increases (at least temporarily) one’s overall satisfaction with one’s life.
    These studies demonstrate the importance of reflecting and reliving the most
    positive or “peak” experiences in our lives. Recall from earlier in the chapter that
    Abraham Maslow predicted that peak experiences often have a lasting impact on
    people’s lives. The recent research in the area of positive psychology reviewed in
    this section certainly supports this aspect of Maslow’s theory.
    Critique of Maslow
    Maslow’s search for the self-actualizing person did not end with his empirical stud-
    ies. In his later years, he would frequently speculate about self-actualization with
    little evidence to support his suppositions. Although this practice opens the door for
    criticizing Maslow, he was unconcerned about desacralized, or orthodox, science.
    Nevertheless, we use the same criteria to evaluate holistic-dynamic personal-
    ity theory as we do with the other theories. First, how does Maslow’s theory rate
    on its ability to generate research? On this criterion, we rate Maslow’s theory a
    little above average. Self-actualization remains a popular topic with researchers,
    and the tests of self-actualization have facilitated efforts to investigate this illusive
    concept. However, Maslow’s notions about metamotivation, the hierarchy of needs,
    the Jonah complex, and instinctoid needs have received less research interest.
    On the criterion of falsifiability, we must rate Maslow’s theory low. Research-
    ers remained handicapped in their ability to falsify or confirm Maslow’s means of
    identifying self-actualizing people. Maslow said that his self-actualizing people
    refused to take any tests that might assess self-actualization. If this is true, then
    the various inventories that purport to measure self-actualization may be incapable
    of identifying the truly self-actualizing person. However, if researchers wish to
    follow Maslow’s lead and use personal interviews, they will have few guidelines
    to direct them. Because Maslow failed to provide an operational definition of self-
    actualization and a full description of his sampling procedures, researchers cannot
    be certain that they are replicating Maslow’s original study or that they are iden-
    tifying the same syndrome of self-actualization. Maslow left future researchers with
    few clear guidelines to follow when attempting to replicate his studies on self-
    actualization. Lacking operational definitions of most of Maslow’s concepts,
    researchers are able to neither verify nor falsify much of his basic theory.
    Nevertheless, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs framework gives his theory excel-
    lent flexibility to organize what is known about human behavior. Maslow’s theory
    is also quite consistent with common sense. For example, common sense suggests
    that a person must have enough to eat before being motivated by other matters.
    Starving people care little about political philosophy. Their primary motivation is
    to obtain food, not to sympathize with one political philosophy or another. Simi-
    larly, people living under threat to their physical well-being will be motivated

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 287
    Concept of Humanity
    Maslow believed that all of us can be self-actualizing; our human nature
    carries with it a tremendous potential for being a Good Human Being. If we
    have not yet reached this high level of functioning, it is because we are in
    some manner crippled or pathological. We fail to satisfy our self-actualization
    needs when our lower level needs become blocked: that is, when we cannot
    satisfy our needs for food, safety, love and belongingness, and esteem. This
    insight led Maslow to postulate a hierarchy of basic needs that must be
    regularly satisfied before we become fully human.
    Maslow concluded that true human nature is seen only in self-actuaized
    people, and that “there seems no intrinsic reason why everyone should not
    be this way. Apparently, every baby has possibilities for self-actualization,
    but most get it knocked out of them” (Lowry, 1973, p. 91). In other words,
    mostly to secure safety, and people who have physiological and safety needs rela-
    tively satisfied will strive to be accepted and to establish a love relationship.
    Does Maslow’s theory serve as a guide to the practitioner? On this criterion,
    we rate the theory as highly useful. For example, psychotherapists who have clients
    with threatened safety needs must provide a safe and secure environment for those
    clients. Once clients have satisfied their safety needs, the therapist can work to
    provide them with feelings of love and belongingness. Likewise, personnel manag-
    ers in business and industry can use Maslow’s theory to motivate workers. The
    theory suggests that increases in pay cannot satisfy any needs beyond the physio-
    logical and safety levels. Because physiological and safety needs are already largely
    gratified for the average worker in the United States, wage increases per se will not
    permanently increase worker morale and productivity. Pay raises can satisfy higher
    level needs only when workers see them as recognition for a job well done. Maslow’s
    theory suggests that business executives should allow workers more responsibility
    and freedom, tap into their ingenuity and creativity in solving problems, and encour-
    age them to use their intelligence and imagination on the job.
    Is the theory internally consistent? Unfortunately, Maslow’s arcane and often
    unclear language makes important parts of his theory ambiguous and inconsistent.
    Apart from the problem of idiosyncratic language, however, Maslow’s theory ranks
    high on the criterion of internal consistency. The hierarchy of needs concept fol-
    lows a logical progression, and Maslow hypothesized that the order of needs is the
    same for everyone, although he does not overlook the possibility of certain rever-
    sals. Aside from some deficiencies in his scientific methods, Maslow’s theory has
    a consistency and precision that give it popular appeal.
    Is Maslow’s theory parsimonious, or does it contain superfluous fabricated
    concepts and models? At first glance, the theory seems quite simplistic. A hierar-
    chy of needs model with only five steps gives the theory a deceptive appearance
    of simplicity. A full understanding of Maslow’s total theory, however, suggests a
    far more complex model. Overall, the theory is moderately parsimonious.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories288
    self-actualizing people are not ordinary people with something added, but
    rather ordinary people with nothing taken away. That is, if food, safety, love,
    and esteem are not taken away from people, then those people will move
    naturally toward self-actualization.
    Maslow was generally optimistic and hopeful about humans, but he
    recognized that people are capable of great evil and destruction. Evil, how-
    ever, stems from the frustration or thwarting of basic needs, not from the
    essential nature of people. When basic needs are not met, people may steal,
    cheat, lie, or kill.
    Maslow believed that society, as well as individuals, can be improved,
    but growth for both is slow and painful. Nevertheless, these small forward steps
    seem to be part of humanity’s evolutionary history. Unfortunately, most people
    “are doomed to wish for what they do not have” (Maslow, 1970, p. 70). In other
    words, although all people have the potential for self-actualization, most will
    live out their lives struggling for food, safety, or love. Most societies, Maslow
    believed, emphasize these lower level needs and base their educational and
    political systems on an invalid concept of humanity.
    Truth, love, beauty, and the like are instinctoid and are just as basic to
    human nature as are hunger, sex, and aggression. All people have the
    potential to strive toward self-actualization, just as they have the motivation
    to seek food and protection. Because Maslow held that basic needs are
    structured the same for all people and that people satisfy these needs at
    their own rate, his holistic-dynamic theory of personality places moderate
    emphasis on both uniqueness and similarities.
    From both a historical and an individual point of view, humans are an
    evolutionary animal, in the process of becoming more and more fully human.
    That is, as evolution progresses, humans gradually become more motivated
    by metamotivations and by the B-values. High level needs exist, at least as
    potentiality, in everyone. Because people aim toward self-actualization,
    Maslow’s view can be considered teleological and purposive.
    Maslow’s view of humanity is difficult to classify on such dimensions
    as determinism versus free choice, conscious versus unconscious, or bio-
    logical versus social determinants of personality. In general, the behavior of
    people motivated by physiological and safety needs is determined by out-
    side forces, whereas the behavior of self-actualizing people is at least par-
    tially shaped by free choice.
    On the dimension of consciousness versus unconsciousness, Maslow
    held that self-actualizing people are ordinarily more aware than others of
    what they are doing and why. However, motivation is so complex that people
    may be driven by several needs at the same time, and even healthy people
    are not always fully aware of all the reasons underlying their behavior.
    As for biological versus social influences, Maslow would have insisted
    that this dichotomy is a false one. Individuals are shaped by both biology and
    society, and the two cannot be separated. Inadequate genetic endowment
    does not condemn a person to an unfulfilled life, just as a poor social envi-
    ronment does not preclude growth. When people achieve self-actualization,
    they experience a wonderful synergy among the biological, social, and

    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory 289
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Maslow assumed that motivation affects the whole person; it is
    complete, often unconscious, continual, and applicable to all people.
    ∙ People are motivated by four dimensions of needs: conative (willful
    striving), aesthetic (the need for order and beauty), cognitive (the need
    for curiosity and knowledge), and neurotic (an unproductive pattern of
    relating to other people).
    ∙ The conative needs can be arranged on a hierarchy, meaning that one
    need must be relatively satisfied before the next need can become active.
    ∙ The five conative needs are physiological, safety, love and
    belongingness, esteem, and self-actualization.
    ∙ Occasionally, needs on the hierarchy can be reversed, and they are
    frequently unconscious.
    ∙ Coping behavior is motivated and is directed toward the satisfaction of
    basic needs.
    ∙ Expressive behavior has a cause but is not motivated; it is simply one’s
    way of expressing oneself.
    ∙ Conative needs, including self-actualization, are instinctoid; that is, their
    deprivation leads to pathology.
    ∙ The frustration of self-actualization needs results in metapathology and a
    rejection of the B-values.
    ∙ Acceptance of the B-values (truth, beauty, humor, etc.) is the criterion
    that separates self-actualizing people from those who are merely healthy
    but mired at the level of esteem.
    ∙ The characteristics of self-actualizers include (1) a more efficient
    perception of reality; (2) acceptance of self, others, and nature; (3)
    spontaneity, simplicity, and naturalness; (4) a problem-centered approach to
    life; (5) the need for privacy; (6) autonomy; (7) freshness of appreciation;
    (8) peak experiences; (9) social interest; (10) profound interpersonal
    relations; (11) a democratic attitude; (12) the ability to discriminate means
    from ends; (13) a philosophical sense of humor; (14) creativeness; and
    (15) resistance to enculturation.
    ∙ In his philosophy of science, Maslow argued for a Taoistic attitude, one
    that is noninterfering, passive, receptive, and subjective.
    ∙ The Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) is a standardized test designed
    to measure self-actualizing values and behavior.
    ∙ The Jonah complex is the fear of being or doing one’s best.
    ∙ Psychotherapy should be directed at the need level currently being
    thwarted, in most cases love and belongingness needs.
    spiritual aspects of their lives. Self-actualizers receive more physical enjoy-
    ment from the sensuous pleasures; they experience deeper and richer inter-
    personal relationships; and they receive pleasure from spiritual qualities such
    as beauty, truth, goodness, justice, and perfection.

    290
    Rogers: Person-
    Centered Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Client-Centered Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Carl Rogers
    ⬥ Person-Centered Theory
    Basic Assumptions
    The Self and Self-Actualization
    Awareness
    Becoming a Person
    Barriers to Psychological Health
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    Conditions
    Process
    Outcomes
    ⬥ The Person of Tomorrow
    ⬥ Philosophy of Science
    ⬥ The Chicago Studies
    Hypotheses
    Method
    Findings
    Summary of Results
    C H A P T E R 1 0
    ⬥ Related Research
    Self-Discrepancy Theory
    Motivation and Pursuing One’s Goals
    ⬥ Critique of Rogers
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Rogers © Carl Rogers Memorial Library,
    Center for Studies of the Person

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 291
    He shared his elementary school days in Oak Park, Illinois, with Ernest Heming-way and the children of Frank Lloyd Wright, but he had no aspirations for
    either literature or for architecture. Instead, he wanted to be a farmer, a scientific
    farmer who cared about plants and animals and how they grew and developed.
    Although he was from a large family, he was quite shy and lacking in social
    skills. A sensitive boy, he was easily hurt by the teasing he received from class-
    mates and siblings.
    At the beginning of his high school years, his parents—hoping for a more
    wholesome and religious atmosphere—moved their family to a farm about 45 miles
    west of Chicago. The move met his parents’ purpose. In this isolated atmosphere,
    the family developed close ties with one another but not with young people from
    other families. Reading the Bible, working hard, and taking care of farm animals
    and plants occupied much of his time. Although he believed that his parents cared
    very much for their children, he also believed that they were quite controlling in
    their child-rearing practices. As a result, the children grew up in a home that
    included almost no social life and an abundance of hard work. Dancing, playing
    cards, drinking carbonated beverages, and attending the theater were all forbidden.
    In this environment, the young man developed a scientific attitude toward
    farming, taking detailed notes on his observations. These notes taught him about
    the “necessary and sufficient” conditions for the optimal growth of plants and
    animals. Throughout his high school years and into his college days, he retained
    a passionate interest in scientific agriculture. However, he never did become a
    farmer. After two years of college, he changed his life goal from agriculture to the
    ministry and later to psychology.
    But devotion to the scientific method was to remain with Carl Rogers for a
    lifetime, and his research on the “necessary and sufficient” conditions for human
    psychological growth was at least partially responsible for his winning the first
    Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award granted by the American Psycho-
    logical Association.
    Overview of Client-Centered Theory
    Although he is best known as the founder of client-centered therapy, Carl Rogers
    developed a humanistic theory of personality that grew out of his experiences as
    a practicing psychotherapist. Unlike Freud, who was primarily a theorist and sec-
    ondarily a therapist, Rogers was a consummate therapist but only a reluctant theo-
    rist (Rogers, 1959). He was more concerned with helping people than with
    discovering why they behaved as they did. He was more likely to ask “How can
    I help this person grow and develop?” than to ponder the question “What caused
    this person to develop in this manner?”
    Like many personality theorists, Rogers built his theory on the scaffold pro-
    vided by experiences as a therapist. Unlike most of these other theorists, however,
    he continually called for empirical research to support both his personality theory
    and his therapeutic approach. Perhaps more than any other therapist-theorist,
    Rogers (1986) advocated a balance between tender-minded and hardheaded studies
    that would expand knowledge of how humans feel and think.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories292
    Even though he formulated a rigorous, internally consistent theory of per-
    sonality, Rogers did not feel comfortable with the notion of theory. His personal
    preference was to be a helper of people and not a constructor of theories. To him,
    theories seemed to make things too cold and external, and he worried that his
    theory might imply a measure of finality.
    During the 1950s, at a midpoint in his career, Rogers was invited to write
    what was then called the “client-centered” theory of personality, and his original
    statement is found in Volume 3 of Sigmund Koch’s Psychology: A Study of a
    Science (see Rogers, 1959). Even at that time, Rogers realized that 10 or 20 years
    hence, his theories would be different; but unfortunately, throughout the interven-
    ing years, he never systematically reformulated his theory of personality. Although
    many of his subsequent experiences altered some of those earlier ideas, his final
    theory of personality rests on that original foundation spelled out in the Koch
    series.
    Biography of Carl Rogers
    Carl Ransom Rogers was born on January 8, 1902, in Oak Park, Illinois, the fourth
    of six children born to Walter and Julia Cushing Rogers. Carl was closer to his
    mother than to his father who, during the early years, was often away from home
    working as a civil engineer. Walter and Julia Rogers were both devoutly religious,
    and Carl became interested in the Bible, reading from it and other books even as
    a preschool child. From his parents, he also learned the value of hard work—a
    value that, unlike religion, stayed with him throughout his life.
    Rogers had intended to become a farmer, and after he graduated from high
    school, he entered the University of Wisconsin as an agriculture major. However,
    he soon became less interested in farming and more devoted to religion. By his
    third year at Wisconsin, Rogers was deeply involved with religious activities on
    campus and spent 6 months traveling to China to attend a student religious confer-
    ence. This trip made a lasting impression on Rogers. The interaction with other
    young religious leaders changed him into a more liberal thinker and moved him
    toward independence from the religious views of his parents. These experiences
    with his fellow leaders also gave him more self-confidence in social relationships.
    Unfortunately, he returned from the journey with an ulcer.
    Although his illness prevented him from immediately going back to the uni-
    versity, it did not keep him from working: He spent a year recuperating by laboring
    on the farm and at a local lumberyard before eventually returning to Wisconsin.
    There, he joined a fraternity, displayed more self-confidence, and in general, was
    a changed student from his pre-China days.
    In 1924, Rogers entered the Union Theological Seminary in New York with
    the intention of becoming a minister. While at the seminary, he enrolled in several
    psychology and education courses at neighboring Columbia University. He was
    influenced by the progressive education movement of John Dewey, which was then
    strong at Teachers College, Columbia. Gradually, Rogers became disenchanted
    with the doctrinaire attitude of religious work. Even though Union Theological
    Seminary was quite liberal, Rogers decided that he did not wish to express a fixed
    set of beliefs but desired more freedom to explore new ideas. Finally, in the fall

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 293
    of 1926, he left the seminary to attend Teachers College on a full-time basis with
    a major in clinical and educational psychology. From that point on, he never
    returned to formal religion. His life would now take a new direction—toward
    psychology and education.
    In 1927, Rogers served as a fellow at the new Institute for Child Guidance
    in New York City and continued to work there while completing his doctoral
    degree. At the institute, he gained an elementary knowledge of Freudian psycho-
    analysis, but he was not much influenced by it, even though he tried it out in his
    practice. He also attended a lecture by Alfred Adler, who shocked Rogers and the
    other staff members with his contention that an elaborate case history was unnec-
    essary for psychotherapy.
    Rogers received a PhD from Columbia in 1931 after having already moved
    to New York to work with the Rochester Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
    Children. During the early phase of his professional career, Rogers was strongly
    influenced by the ideas of Otto Rank, who had been one of Freud’s closest associ-
    ates before his dismissal from Freud’s inner circle. In 1936, Rogers invited Rank
    to Rochester for a 3-day seminar to present his new post-Freudian practice of
    psychotherapy. Rank’s lectures provided Rogers with the notion that therapy is an
    emotional growth-producing relationship, nurtured by the therapist’s empathic lis-
    tening and unconditional acceptance of the client.
    Rogers spent 12 years at Rochester, working at a job that might easily have
    isolated him from a successful academic career. He had harbored a desire to teach
    in a university after a rewarding teaching experience during the summer of 1935
    at Teachers College and after having taught courses in sociology at the University
    of Rochester. During this period, he wrote his first book, The Clinical Treatment
    of the Problem Child (1939), the publication of which led to a teaching offer from
    Ohio State University. Despite his fondness for teaching, he might have turned
    down the offer if his wife had not urged him to accept and if Ohio State had not
    agreed to start him at the top, with the academic rank of full professor. In 1940,
    at the age of 38, Rogers moved to Columbus to begin a new career.
    Pressed by his graduate students at Ohio State, Rogers gradually conceptual-
    ized his own ideas on psychotherapy, not intending them to be unique and certainly
    not controversial. These ideas were put forth in Counseling and Psychotherapy,
    published in 1942. In this book, which was a reaction to the older approaches to
    therapy, Rogers minimized the causes of disturbances and the identification and
    labeling of disorders. Instead, he emphasized the importance of growth within the
    patient (called by Rogers the “client”).
    In 1944, as part of the war effort, Rogers moved back to New York as direc-
    tor of counseling services for the United Services Organization. After 1 year, he
    took a position at the University of Chicago, where he established a counseling
    center and was allowed more freedom to do research on the process and outcome
    of psychotherapy. The years 1945 to 1957 at Chicago were the most productive
    and creative of his career. His therapy evolved from one that emphasized method-
    ology, or what in the early 1940s was called the “nondirective” technique, to one
    in which the sole emphasis was on the client-therapist relationship. Always the
    scientist, Rogers, along with his students and colleagues, produced groundbreaking
    research on the process and effectiveness of psychotherapy.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories294
    Wanting to expand his research and his ideas to psychiatry, Rogers accepted
    a position at the University of Wisconsin in 1957. However, he was frustrated with
    his stay at Wisconsin because he was unable to unite the professions of psychiatry
    and psychology and because he felt that some members of his own research staff
    had engaged in dishonest and unethical behavior (Milton, 2002).
    Disappointed with his job at Wisconsin, Rogers moved to California where
    he joined the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (WBSI) and became increas-
    ingly interested in encounter groups.
    Rogers resigned from WBSI when he felt it was becoming less democratic
    and, along with about 75 others from the institute, formed the Center for Studies of
    the Person. He continued to work with encounter groups but extended his person-
    centered methods to education (including the training of physicians) and to interna-
    tional politics. During the last years of his life, he led workshops in such countries
    as Hungary, Brazil, South Africa, and the former Soviet Union (Gendlin, 1988). He
    died February 4, 1987, following surgery for a broken hip.
    The personal life of Carl Rogers was marked by change and openness to
    experience. As an adolescent, he was extremely shy, had no close friends, and was
    “socially incompetent in any but superficial contacts” (Rogers, 1973, p. 4). He did,
    however, have an active fantasy life, which he later believed would have been
    diagnosed as “schizoid” (Rogers, 1980, p. 30). His shyness and social ineptitude
    greatly restricted his experiences with women. When he originally entered the
    University of Wisconsin, he had only enough courage to ask out a young lady
    whom he had known in elementary school in Oak Park—Helen Elliott. Helen and
    Carl were married in 1924 and had two children—David and Natalie. Despite his
    early problems with interpersonal relationships, Rogers grew to become a leading
    proponent of the notion that the interpersonal relationship between two individuals
    is a powerful ingredient that cultivates psychological growth within both persons.
    However, the transition was not easy. He abandoned the formalized religion of his
    parents, gradually shaping a humanistic/existential philosophy that he hoped would
    bridge the gap between Eastern and Western thought.
    One of the tenets of Rogers’ theory of counseling is the need to be true to
    oneself, authentic and honest. In this regard, Rogers practiced what he preached in
    that he was open and honest about his own personal problems in an oral history
    with David Russell toward the end of his life (Rogers & Russell, 2002). He was
    candid about the problems he and his wife Helen had in their marriage over its
    last 15 years or so, his need to have other romantic relationships, and his problem
    with drinking in his 70s.
    Rogers received many honors during his long professional life. He was
    the first president of the American Association for Applied Psychology and
    helped bring that organization and the American Psychological Association
    (APA) back together. He served as president of APA for the year 1946–1947
    and served as first president of the American Academy of Psychotherapists. In
    1956, he was cowinner of the first Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award
    presented by APA. This award was especially satisfying to Rogers because it
    highlighted his skill as a researcher, a skill he learned well as a farm boy in
    Illinois (O’Hara, 1995).

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 295
    Rogers originally saw little need for a theory of personality. But under pres-
    sure from others and also to satisfy an inner need to be able to explain the phe-
    nomena he was observing, he evolved his own theory, which was first tentatively
    expressed in his APA presidential address (Rogers, 1947). His theory was more
    fully espoused in Client-Centered Therapy (1951) and was expressed in even
    greater detail in the Koch series (Rogers, 1959). However, Rogers always insisted
    that the theory should remain tentative, and it is with this thought that one should
    approach a discussion of Rogerian personality theory.
    Person-Centered Theory
    Although Rogers’ concept of humanity remained basically unchanged from the
    early 1940s until his death in 1987, his therapy and theory underwent several
    changes in name. During the early years, his approach was known as “nondirec-
    tive,” an unfortunate term that remained associated with his name for far too long.
    Later, his approach was variously termed “client-centered,” “person-centered,”
    “student-centered,” “group-centered,” and “person to person.” We use the label
    client-centered in reference to Rogers’ therapy and the more inclusive term person-
    centered to refer to Rogerian personality theory.
    In Chapter 1, we said that clearly formulated theories often are stated in
    an if-then framework. Of all the theories in this book, Rogers’ person-centered
    theory comes closest to meeting this standard. An example of an if-then
    construction is: If certain conditions exist, then a process will occur; if this
    process occurs, then certain outcomes can be expected. A more specific exam-
    ple is found in therapy: If the therapist is congruent and communicates uncon-
    ditional positive regard and accurate empathy to the client, then therapeutic
    change will occur; if therapeutic change occurs, then the client will experience
    more self-acceptance, greater trust of self, and so on. (We discuss congruence,
    unconditional positive regard, and empathy more fully in the section titled
    Psychotherapy.)
    Basic Assumptions
    What are the basic assumptions of person-centered theory? Rogers postulated two
    broad assumptions—the formative tendency and the actualizing tendency.
    Formative Tendency
    Rogers (1978, 1980) believed that there is a tendency for all matter, both organic
    and inorganic, to evolve from simpler to more complex forms. For the entire uni-
    verse, a creative process, rather than a disintegrative one, is in operation. Rogers
    called this process the formative tendency and pointed to many examples from
    nature. For instance, complex galaxies of stars form from a less well-organized
    mass; crystals such as snowflakes emerge from formless vapor; complex organisms
    develop from single cells; and human consciousness evolves from a primitive
    unconsciousness to a highly organized awareness.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories296
    Actualizing Tendency
    An interrelated and more pertinent assumption is the actualizing tendency, or the
    tendency within all humans (and other animals and plants) to move toward comple-
    tion or fulfillment of potentials (Rogers, 1959, 1980). This tendency is the only
    motive people possess. The need to satisfy one’s hunger drive, to express deep
    emotions when they are felt, and to accept one’s self are all examples of the single
    motive of actualization. Because each person operates as one complete organism,
    actualization involves the whole person—physiological and intellectual, rational
    and emotional, conscious and unconscious.
    Tendencies to maintain and to enhance the organism are subsumed within
    the actualizing tendency. The need for maintenance is similar to the lower steps
    on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (see Chapter 9). It includes such basic needs as
    food, air, and safety; but it also includes the tendency to resist change and to seek
    the status quo. The conservative nature of maintenance needs is expressed in peo-
    ple’s desire to protect their current, comfortable self-concept. People fight against
    new ideas; they distort experiences that do not quite fit; they find change painful
    and growth frightening.
    Even though people have a strong desire to maintain the status quo, they are
    willing to learn and to change. This need to become more, to develop, and to
    achieve growth is called enhancement. The need for enhancing the self is seen in
    people’s willingness to learn things that are not immediately rewarding. Other than
    enhancement, what motivates a child to walk? Crawling can satisfy the need for
    mobility, whereas walking is associated with falling and with pain. Rogers’ posi-
    tion is that people are willing to face threat and pain because of a biologically
    based tendency for the organism to fulfill its basic nature.
    Enhancement needs are expressed in a variety of forms, including curiosity,
    playfulness, self-exploration, friendship, and confidence that one can achieve psy-
    chological growth. People have within themselves the creative power to solve
    problems, to alter their self-concepts, and to become increasingly self-directed.
    Individuals perceive their experiences as reality, and they know their reality better
    than anyone else. They do not need to be directed, controlled, exhorted, or manip-
    ulated in order to spur them toward actualization.
    The actualization tendency is not limited to humans. Other animals and even
    plants have an inherent tendency to grow toward reaching their genetic potential—
    provided certain conditions are present. For example, in order for a bell pepper
    plant to reach its full productive potential, it must have water, sunlight, and a
    nutrient soil. Similarly, a human’s actualization tendency is realized only under
    certain conditions. Specifically, people must be involved in a relationship with a
    partner who is congruent, or authentic, and who demonstrates empathy and uncon-
    ditional positive regard. Rogers (1961) emphasized that having a partner who
    possesses these three qualities does not cause people to move toward constructive
    personal change. It does, however, permit them to actualize their innate tendency
    toward self-fulfillment.
    Rogers contended that whenever congruence, unconditional positive regard,
    and empathy are present in a relationship, psychological growth will invariably
    occur. For this reason, he regarded these three conditions as both necessary and
    sufficient conditions for becoming a fully functioning or self-actualizing person.

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 297
    Although people share the actualizing tendency with plants and other animals, only
    humans have a concept of self and thus a potential for self-actualization.
    The Self and Self-Actualization
    According to Rogers (1959), infants begin to develop a vague concept of self
    when a portion of their experience becomes personalized and differentiated in
    awareness as “I” or “me” experiences. Infants gradually become aware of their
    own identity as they learn what tastes good and what tastes bad, what feels pleas-
    ant and what does not. They then begin to evaluate experiences as positive or
    negative, using as a criterion the actualizing tendency. Because nourishment is a
    requirement for actualization, infants value food and devalue hunger. They also
    value sleep, fresh air, physical contact, and health because each of these is needed
    for actualization.
    Once infants establish a rudimentary self structure, their tendency to actu-
    alize the self begins to evolve. Self-actualization is a subset of the actualization
    tendency and is therefore not synonymous with it. The actualization tendency
    refers to organismic experiences of the individual; that is, it refers to the whole
    person—conscious and unconscious, physiological and cognitive. On the other
    hand, self-actualization is the tendency to actualize the self as perceived in
    awareness. When the organism and the perceived self are in harmony, the two
    actualization tendencies are nearly identical; but when people’s organismic expe-
    riences are not in harmony with their view of self, a discrepancy exists between
    the actualization tendency and the self-actualization tendency. For example, if a
    man’s organismic experience is one of anger toward his wife, and if anger toward
    spouse is contrary to his perception of self, then his actualization tendency and
    his self-actualization are incongruent and he will experience conflict and inner
    tension. Rogers (1959) postulated two self subsystems, the self-concept and the
    ideal self.
    The Self-Concept
    The self-concept includes all those aspects of one’s being and one’s experi-
    ences that are perceived in awareness (though not always accurately) by the
    individual. The self-concept is not identical with the organismic self. Portions
    of the organismic self may be beyond a person’s awareness or simply not
    owned by that person. For example, the stomach is part of the organismic self,
    but unless it malfunctions and causes concern, it is not likely to be part of
    one’s self-concept. Similarly, people can disown certain aspects of their selves,
    such as experiences of dishonesty, when such experiences are not consistent
    with their self-concept.
    Thus, once people form their self-concept, they find change and significant
    learnings quite difficult. Experiences that are inconsistent with their self-concept
    usually are either denied or accepted only in distorted forms.
    An established self-concept does not make change impossible, merely dif-
    ficult. Change most readily occurs in an atmosphere of acceptance by others, which
    allows a person to reduce anxiety and threat and to take ownership of previously
    rejected experiences.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories298
    The Ideal Self
    The second subsystem of the self is the ideal self, defined as one’s view of self as
    one wishes to be. The ideal self contains all those attributes, usually positive, that
    people aspire to possess. A wide gap between the ideal self and the self-concept indi-
    cates incongruence and an unhealthy personality. Psychologically healthy individuals
    perceive little discrepancy
    between their self-concept
    and what they ideally
    would like to be.
    Awareness
    Without awareness the
    self-concept and the
    ideal self would not
    exist. Rogers (1959)
    defined awareness as
    “the symbolic represen-
    tation (not necessarily in
    verbal symbols) of some
    portion of our experi-
    ence” (p. 198). He used
    the term synonymously
    with both consciousness
    and symbolization.
    Incongruence between the ideal self and the perceived self can result in conflict and unhappiness.
    © Ingram Publishing/SuperStock
    Original Artist, Reproduction rights obtained from www.
    cartoonstock.com

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 299
    Levels of Awareness
    Rogers (1959) recognized three levels of awareness. First, some events are expe-
    rienced below the threshold of awareness and are either ignored or denied. An
    ignored experience can be illustrated by a woman walking down a busy street, an
    activity that presents many potential stimuli, particularly of sight and sound.
    Because she cannot attend to all of them, many remain ignored. An example of
    denied experience might be a mother who never wanted children, but out of guilt
    she becomes overly solicitous to them. Her anger and resentment toward her chil-
    dren may be hidden to her for years, never reaching consciousness but yet remain-
    ing a part of her experience and coloring her conscious behavior toward them.
    Second, Rogers (1959) hypothesized that some experiences are accurately
    symbolized and freely admitted to the self-structure. Such experiences are both
    nonthreatening and consistent with the existing self-concept. For example, if a
    pianist who has full confidence in his piano-playing ability is told by a friend that
    his playing is excellent, he may hear these words, accurately symbolize them, and
    freely admit them to his self-concept.
    A third level of awareness involves experiences that are perceived in a dis-
    torted form. When our experience is not consistent with our view of self, we
    reshape or distort the experience so that it can be assimilated into our existing
    self-concept. If the gifted pianist were to be told by a distrusted competitor that
    his playing was excellent, he might react very differently than he did when he
    heard the same words from a trusted friend. He may hear the remarks but distort
    their meaning because he feels threatened. “Why is this person trying to flatter
    me? This doesn’t make sense.” His experiences are inaccurately symbolized in
    awareness and therefore can be distorted so that they conform to an existing self-
    concept that, in part, says, “I am a person who does not trust my piano-playing
    competitors, especially those who are trying to trick me.”
    Denial of Positive Experiences
    Our example of the gifted pianist illustrates that it is not only the negative or
    derogatory experiences that are distorted or denied to awareness; many people have
    difficulty accepting genuine compliments and positive feedback, even when
    deserved. A student who feels inadequate but yet makes a superior grade might
    say to herself, “I know this grade should be evidence of my scholastic ability, but
    somehow I just don’t feel that way. This class was the easiest one on campus. The
    other students just didn’t try. My teacher did not know what she was doing.”
    Compliments, even those genuinely dispensed, seldom have a positive influence
    on the self-concept of the recipient. They may be distorted because the person
    distrusts the giver, or they may be denied because the recipient does not feel
    deserving of them; in all cases, a compliment from another also implies the right
    of that person to criticize or condemn, and thus the compliment carries an implied
    threat (Rogers, 1961).
    Becoming a Person
    Rogers (1959) discussed the processes necessary to becoming a person. First,
    an individual must make contact—positive or negative—with another person.
    This contact is the minimum experience necessary for becoming a person. In

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories300
    order to survive, an infant must experience some contact from a parent or other
    caregiver.
    As children (or adults) become aware that another person has some measure
    of regard for them, they begin to value positive regard and devalue negative regard.
    That is, the person develops a need to be loved, liked, or accepted by another
    person, a need that Rogers (1959) referred to as positive regard. If we perceive
    that others, especially significant others, care for, prize, or value us, then our need
    to receive positive regard is at least partially satisfied.
    Positive regard is a prerequisite for positive self-regard, defined as the expe-
    rience of prizing or valuing one’s self. Rogers (1959) believed that receiving pos-
    itive regard from others is necessary for positive self-regard, but once positive
    self-regard is established, it becomes independent of the continual need to be loved.
    This conception is quite similar to Maslow’s (see Chapter 9) notion that we must
    satisfy our love and belongingness needs before self-esteem needs can become
    active, but once we begin to feel confident and worthy, we no longer require a
    replenishing supply of love and approval from others.
    The source of positive self-regard, then, lies in the positive regard we receive
    from others, but once established, it is autonomous and self-perpetuating. As Rogers
    (1959) stated it, the person then “becomes in a sense his [or her] own significant
    social other” (p. 224).
    Barriers to Psychological Health
    Not everyone becomes a psychologically healthy person. Rather, most people expe-
    rience conditions of worth, incongruence, defensiveness, and disorganization.
    Conditions of Worth
    Instead of receiving unconditional positive regard, most people receive conditions
    of worth; that is, they perceive that their parents, peers, or partners love and accept
    them only if they meet those people’s expectations and approval. “A condition of
    worth arises when the positive regard of a significant other is conditional, when
    the individual feels that in some respects he [or she] is prized and in others not”
    (Rogers, 1959, p. 209).
    Conditions of worth become the criterion by which we accept or reject our
    experiences. We gradually assimilate into our self-structure the attitudes we per-
    ceive others expressing toward us, and in time we begin to evaluate experiences
    on this basis. If we see that others accept us regardless of our actions, then we
    come to believe that we are prized unconditionally. But if we perceive that some
    of our behaviors are approved and some disapproved, then we see that our worth
    is conditional. Eventually, we may come to believe those appraisals of others that
    are consistent with our negative view of self, ignore our own sensory and visceral
    perceptions, and gradually become estranged from our real or organismic self.
    From early childhood forward, most of us learn to disregard our own organismic
    valuations and to look beyond ourselves for direction and guidance. To the degree
    that we introject the values of others, that is, accept conditions of worth, we tend to
    be incongruent or out of balance. Other people’s values can be assimilated only in
    distorted fashion or at the risk of creating disequilibrium and conflict within the self.

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 301
    Our perceptions of other people’s view of us are called external evaluations.
    These evaluations, whether positive or negative, do not foster psychological health
    but, rather, prevent us from being completely open to our own experiences. For
    example, we may reject pleasurable experiences because we believe that other
    people do not approve of them. When our own experiences are distrusted, we
    distort our awareness of them, thus solidifying the discrepancy between our organ-
    ismic evaluation and the values we have introjected from others. As a result, we
    experience incongruence (Rogers, 1959).
    Incongruence
    We have seen that the organism and the self are two separate entities that may or
    may not be congruent with one another. Also recall that actualization refers to the
    organism’s tendency to move toward fulfillment, whereas self-actualization is the
    desire of the perceived self to reach fulfillment. These two tendencies are some-
    times at variance with one another.
    Psychological disequilibrium begins when we fail to recognize our organismic
    experiences as self-experiences: that is, when we do not accurately symbolize organ-
    ismic experiences into awareness because they appear to be inconsistent with our
    emerging self-concept. This incongruence between our self-concept and our organ-
    ismic experience is the source of psychological disorders. Conditions of worth that
    we received during early childhood lead to a somewhat false self-concept, one based
    on distortions and denials. The self-concept that emerges includes vague perceptions
    that are not in harmony with our organismic experiences, and this incongruence
    between self and experience leads to discrepant and seemingly inconsistent behav-
    iors. Sometimes we behave in ways that maintain or enhance our actualizing ten-
    dency, and at other times, we may behave in a manner designed to maintain or
    enhance a self-concept founded on other people’s expectations and evaluations of us.
    Vulnerability The greater the incongruence between our perceived self (self-
    concept) and our organismic experience, the more vulnerable we are. Rogers
    (1959) believed that people are vulnerable when they are unaware of the discrep-
    ancy between their organismic self and their significant experience. Lacking aware-
    ness of their incongruence, vulnerable people often behave in ways that are
    incomprehensible not only to others but also to themselves.
    Anxiety and Threat Whereas vulnerability exists when we have no awareness of
    the incongruence within our self, anxiety and threat are experienced as we gain
    awareness of such an incongruence. When we become dimly aware that the dis-
    crepancy between our organismic experience and our self-concept may become
    conscious, we feel anxious. Rogers (1959) defined anxiety as “a state of uneasiness
    or tension whose cause is unknown” (p. 204). As we become more aware of the
    incongruence between our organismic experience and our perception of self, our
    anxiety begins to evolve into threat: that is, an awareness that our self is no lon-
    ger whole or congruent. Anxiety and threat can represent steps toward psycho-
    logical health because they signal to us that our organismic experience is
    inconsistent with our self-concept. Nevertheless, they are not pleasant or comfort-
    able feelings.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories302
    Defensiveness
    In order to prevent this inconsistency between our organismic experience and our
    perceived self, we react in a defensive manner. Defensiveness is the protection of
    the self-concept against anxiety and threat by the denial or distortion of experiences
    inconsistent with it (Rogers, 1959). Because the self-concept consists of many
    self-descriptive statements, it is a many-faceted phenomenon. When one of our
    experiences is inconsistent with one part of our self-concept, we will behave in a
    defensive manner in order to protect the current structure of our self-concept.
    The two chief defenses are distortion and denial. With distortion, we mis-
    interpret an experience in order to fit it into some aspect of our self-concept. We
    perceive the experience in awareness, but we fail to understand its true meaning.
    With denial, we refuse to perceive an experience in awareness, or at least we keep
    some aspect of it from reaching symbolization. Denial is not as common as distor-
    tion because most experiences can be twisted or reshaped to fit the current self-
    concept. According to Rogers (1959), both distortion and denial serve the same
    purpose—they keep our perception of our organismic experiences consistent with
    our self-concept—which allows us to ignore or block out experiences that other-
    wise would cause unpleasant anxiety or threat.
    Disorganization
    Most people engage in defensive behavior, but sometimes defenses fail and behav-
    ior becomes disorganized or psychotic. But why would defenses fail to function?
    To answer this question, we must trace the course of disorganized behavior,
    which has the same origins as normal defensive behavior, namely a discrepancy
    between people’s organismic experience and their view of self. Denial and distor-
    tion are adequate to keep normal people from recognizing this discrepancy, but
    when the incongruence between people’s perceived self and their organismic expe-
    rience is either too obvious or occurs too suddenly to be denied or distorted, their
    behavior becomes disorganized. Disorganization can occur suddenly, or it can take
    place gradually over a long period of time. Ironically, people are particularly vul-
    nerable to disorganization during therapy, especially if a therapist accurately inter-
    prets their actions and
    also insists that they face
    the experience prema-
    turely (Rogers, 1959).
    In a state of disor-
    ganization, people some-
    times behave consistently
    with their organismic
    experience and some-
    times in accordance with
    their shattered self-con-
    cept. An example of the
    first case is a previously
    prudish and proper
    woman who suddenly
    begins to use language
    Behavior can become disorganized or even psychotic when one’s
    defenses fail to operate properly. © Zigy Kaluzny/Getty Images

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 303
    explicitly sexual and scatological. The second case can be illustrated by a man
    who, because his self-concept is no longer a gestalt or unified whole, begins to
    behave in a confused, inconsistent, and totally unpredictable manner. In both cases,
    behavior is still consistent with the self-concept, but the self-concept has been
    broken and thus the behavior appears bizarre and confusing.
    Although Rogers was even more tentative than usual when he first put forth
    his views of disorganized behavior in 1959, he made no important revisions in this
    portion of his theory. He never wavered in his disdain for using diagnostic labels
    to describe people. Traditional classifications such as those found in the Diagnos-
    tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) (American
    Psychiatric Association, 2013) have never been part of the vocabulary of person-
    centered theory. In fact, Rogers always remained uncomfortable with the terms
    “neurotic” and “psychotic,” preferring instead to speak of “defensive” and “disor-
    ganized” behaviors, terms that more accurately convey the idea that psychological
    maladjustment is on a continuum from the slightest discrepancy between self and
    experience to the most incongruent.
    Psychotherapy
    Client-centered therapy is deceptively simple in statement but decidedly difficult
    in practice. Briefly, the client-centered approach holds that in order for vulnerable
    or anxious people to grow psychologically, they must come into contact with a
    therapist who is congruent and whom they perceive as providing an atmosphere
    of unconditional acceptance and accurate empathy. But therein lies the difficulty.
    The qualities of congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathic under-
    standing are not easy for a counselor to attain.
    Like person-centered theory, the client-centered counseling approach can be
    stated in an if-then fashion. If the conditions of therapist congruence, unconditional
    positive regard, and empathic listening are present in a client-counselor relation-
    ship, then the process of therapy will transpire. If the process of therapy takes
    place, then certain outcomes can be predicted. Rogerian therapy, therefore, can be
    viewed in terms of conditions, process, and outcomes.
    Conditions
    Rogers (1959) postulated that in order for therapeutic growth to take place, the
    following conditions are necessary and sufficient. First, an anxious or vulnerable
    client must come into contact with a congruent therapist who also possesses empa-
    thy and unconditional positive regard for that client. Next, the client must perceive
    these characteristics in the therapist. Finally, the contact between client and thera-
    pist must be of some duration.
    The significance of the Rogerian hypothesis is revolutionary. With nearly any
    psychotherapy, the first and third conditions are present; that is, the client, or patient,
    is motivated by some sort of tension to seek help, and the relationship between the
    client and the therapist will last for some period of time. Client- centered therapy is
    unique in its insistence that the conditions of counselor congruence, unconditional

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories304
    positive regard, and empathic listening are both necessary and sufficient
    (Rogers, 1957).
    Even though all three conditions are necessary for psychological growth,
    Rogers (1980) believed that congruence is more basic than either unconditional
    positive regard or empathic listening. Congruence is a general quality possessed
    by the therapist, whereas the other two conditions are specific feelings or attitudes
    that the therapist has for an individual client.
    Counselor Congruence
    The first necessary and sufficient condition for therapeutic change is a congruent ther-
    apist. Congruence exists when a person’s organismic experiences are matched by an
    awareness of them and by an ability and willingness to openly express these feelings
    (Rogers, 1980). To be congruent means to be real or genuine, to be whole or integrated,
    to be what one truly is. Rogers (1995) spoke about congruence in these words:
    In my relationships with persons I have found that it does not help, in the long
    run, to act as though I were something that I am not. . . . It does not help to
    act calm and pleasant when actually I am angry and critical. It does not help to
    act as though I were permissive when I am really feeling that I would like to
    set limits. . . . It does not help to act as though I were acceptant of another
    person when underneath that exterior I feel rejection. (p. 9)
    A congruent counselor, then, is not simply a kind and friendly person but rather a
    complete human being with feelings of joy, anger, frustration, confusion, and so
    on. When these feelings are experienced, they are neither denied nor distorted but
    flow easily into awareness and are freely expressed. A congruent therapist, there-
    fore, is not passive, not aloof, and definitely not “nondirective.”
    Congruent therapists are not static. Like most other people, they are constantly
    exposed to new organismic experiences, but unlike most people, they accept these
    experiences into awareness, which contributes to their psychological growth. They
    wear no mask, do not attempt to fake a pleasant facade, and avoid any pretense of
    friendliness and affection when these emotions are not truly felt. Also, they do not
    fake anger, toughness, or
    ignorance, nor do they
    cover up feelings of joy,
    elation, or happiness. In
    addition, they are able to
    match feelings with
    awareness and both with
    honest expression.
    Because congruence
    involves (1) feelings, (2)
    awareness, and (3) expres-
    sion, incongruence can
    arise from either of the two
    points dividing these three
    experiences. First, there
    can be a breakdown
    between feelings and
    Effective client-centered therapy requires a congruent counselor
    who feels empathy and unconditional positive regard for the client.
    © Mark Bowden/Getty Images

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 305
    awareness. A person may be feeling angry, and the anger may be obvious to others; but
    the angry person is unaware of the feeling. “I’m not angry. How dare you say I’m angry!”
    The second source of incongruence is a discrepancy between awareness of an experience
    and the ability or willingness to express it to another. “I know I’m feeling bored by what
    is being said, but I don’t dare verbalize my disinterest because my client will think that
    I am not a good therapist.” Rogers (1961) stated that therapists will be more effective if
    they communicate genuine feelings, even when those feelings are negative or threatening.
    To do otherwise would be dishonest, and clients will detect—though not necessarily
    consciously—any significant indicators of incongruence.
    Although congruence is a necessary ingredient in successful therapy, Rogers
    (1980) did not believe that it is necessary for a therapist to be congruent in all
    relationships outside the therapeutic process. One can be less than perfect and yet
    become an effective psychotherapist. Also, a therapist need not be absolutely con-
    gruent in order to facilitate some growth within a client. As with unconditional
    positive regard and empathic listening, different degrees of congruence exist. The
    more the client perceives each of these qualities as characterizing the therapist, the
    more successful will be the therapeutic process.
    Unconditional Positive Regard
    Positive regard is the need to be liked, prized, or accepted by another person. When
    this need exists without any conditions or qualifications, unconditional positive
    regard occurs (Rogers, 1980). Therapists have unconditional positive regard when
    they are “experiencing a warm, positive and accepting attitude toward what is the
    client” (Rogers, 1961, p. 62). The attitude is without possessiveness, without eval-
    uations, and without reservations.
    A therapist with unconditional positive regard toward a client will show
    a nonpossessive warmth and acceptance, not an effusive, effervescent persona.
    To have nonpossessive warmth means to care about another without smothering
    or owning that person. It includes the attitude “Because I care about you, I
    can permit you to be autonomous and independent of my evaluations and restric-
    tions. You are a separate person with your own feelings and opinions regarding
    what is right or wrong. The fact that I care for you does not mean that I must
    guide you in making choices, but that I can allow you to be yourself and
    to  decide what is best for you.” This kind of permissive attitude earned for
    Rogers the undeserved reputation of being passive or nondirective in therapy,
    but a client-centered therapist must be actively involved in a relationship with
    the client.
    Unconditional positive regard means that therapists accept and prize their
    clients without any restrictions or reservations and without regard to the clients’
    behavior. Although therapists may value some client behaviors more than others,
    their positive regard remains constant and unwavering. Unconditional positive
    regard also means that therapists do not evaluate clients, nor do they accept one
    action and reject another. External evaluation, whether positive or negative, leads
    to clients’ defensiveness and prevents psychological growth.
    Although unconditional positive regard is a somewhat awkward term, all three
    words are important. “Regard” means that there is a close relationship and that the
    therapist sees the client as an important person; “positive” indicates that the direc-
    tion of the relationship is toward warm and caring feelings; and “unconditional”

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories306
    suggests that the positive regard is no longer dependent on specific client behaviors
    and does not have to be continually earned.
    Empathic Listening
    The third necessary and sufficient condition of psychological growth is empathic
    listening. Empathy exists when therapists accurately sense the feelings of their
    clients and are able to communicate these perceptions so that clients know that
    another person has entered their world of feelings without prejudice, projection, or
    evaluation. To Rogers (1980), empathy “means temporarily living in the other’s
    life, moving about in it delicately without making judgments” (p. 142). Empathy
    does not involve interpreting clients’ meanings or uncovering their unconscious
    feelings, procedures that would entail an external frame of reference and a threat
    to clients. In contrast, empathy suggests that a therapist sees things from the cli-
    ent’s point of view and that the client feels safe and unthreatened.
    Client-centered therapists do not take empathy for granted; they check the
    accuracy of their sensings by trying them out on the client. “You seem to be tell-
    ing me that you feel a great deal of resentment toward your father.” Valid empathic
    understanding is often followed by an exclamation from the client along these
    lines: “Yes, that’s it exactly! I really do feel resentful.”
    Empathic listening is a powerful tool, which along with genuineness and
    caring, facilitates personal growth within the client. What precisely is the role of
    empathy in psychological change? How does an empathic therapist help a client
    move toward wholeness and psychological health? Rogers’ (1980) own words pro-
    vide the best answer to these questions.
    When persons are perceptively understood, they find themselves coming in
    closer touch with a wider range of their experiencing. This gives them an
    expanded referent to which they can turn for guidance in understanding
    themselves and directing their behavior. If the empathy has been accurate and
    deep, they may also be able to unblock a flow of experiencing and permit it to
    run its uninhibited course. (p. 156)
    Empathy is effective because it enables clients to listen to themselves and, in effect,
    become their own therapists.
    Empathy should not be confused with sympathy. The latter term suggests
    a feeling for a client, whereas empathy connotes a feeling with a client. Sym-
    pathy is never therapeutic, because it stems from external evaluation and usually
    leads to clients’ feeling sorry for themselves. Self-pity is a deleterious attitude
    that threatens a positive self-concept and creates disequilibrium within the self-
    structure. Also, empathy does not mean that a therapist has the same feelings
    as the client. A therapist does not feel anger, frustration, confusion, resentment,
    or sexual attraction at the same time a client experiences them. Rather, a thera-
    pist is experiencing the depth of the client’s feeling while permitting the client
    to be a separate person. A therapist has an emotional as well as a cognitive
    reaction to a client’s feelings, but the feelings belong to the client, not the
    therapist. A therapist does not take ownership of a client’s experiences but is
    able to convey to the client an understanding of what it means to be the client
    at that particular moment (Rogers, 1961).

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 307
    Process
    If the conditions of therapist congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empa-
    thy are present, then the process of therapeutic change will be set in motion.
    Although each person seeking psychotherapy is unique, Rogers (1959) believed
    that a certain lawfulness characterizes the process of therapy.
    Stages of Therapeutic Change
    The process of constructive personality change can be placed on a continuum from
    most defensive to most integrated. Rogers (1961) arbitrarily divided this continuum
    into seven stages.
    Stage 1 is characterized by an unwillingness to communicate anything about
    oneself. People at this stage ordinarily do not seek help, but if for some reason
    they come to therapy, they are extremely rigid and resistant to change. They do
    not recognize any problems and refuse to own any personal feelings or emotions.
    In Stage 2, clients become slightly less rigid. They discuss external events
    and other people, but they still disown or fail to recognize their own feelings.
    However, they may talk about personal feelings as if such feelings were objective
    phenomena.
    As clients enter into Stage 3, they more freely talk about self, although still
    as an object. “I’m doing the best I can at work, but my boss still doesn’t like me.”
    Clients talk about feelings and emotions in the past or future tense and avoid pres-
    ent feelings. They refuse to accept their emotions, keep personal feelings at a
    distance from the here-and-now situation, only vaguely perceive that they can make
    personal choices, and deny individual responsibility for most of their decisions.
    Clients in Stage 4 begin to talk of deep feelings but not ones presently felt.
    “I was really burned up when my teacher accused me of cheating.” When clients
    do express present feelings, they are usually surprised by this expression. They
    deny or distort experiences, although they may have some dim recognition that
    they are capable of feeling emotions in the present. They begin to question some
    values that have been introjected from others, and they start to see the incongru-
    ence between their perceived self and their organismic experience. They accept
    more freedom and responsibility than they did in Stage 3 and begin to tentatively
    allow themselves to become involved in a relationship with the therapist.
    By the time clients reach Stage 5, they have begun to undergo significant
    change and growth. They can express feelings in the present, although they have
    not yet accurately symbolized those feelings. They are beginning to rely on an
    internal locus of evaluation for their feelings and to make fresh and new discover-
    ies about themselves. They also experience a greater differentiation of feelings and
    develop more appreciation for nuances among them. In addition, they begin to
    make their own decisions and to accept responsibility for their choices.
    People at Stage 6 experience dramatic growth and an irreversible movement
    toward becoming fully functioning or self-actualizing. They freely allow into aware-
    ness those experiences that they had previously denied or distorted. They become
    more congruent and are able to match their present experiences with awareness and
    with open expression. They no longer evaluate their own behavior from an external
    viewpoint but rely on their organismic self as the criterion for evaluating experiences.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories308
    They begin to develop unconditional self-regard, which means that they have a feel-
    ing of genuine caring and affection for the person they are becoming.
    An interesting concomitant to this stage is a physiological loosening. These
    people experience their whole organismic self, as their muscles relax, tears flow,
    circulation improves, and physical symptoms disappear.
    In many ways, Stage 6 signals an end to therapy. Indeed, if therapy were to
    be terminated at this point, clients would still progress to the next level.
    Stage 7 can occur outside the therapeutic encounter, because growth at Stage 6
    seems to be irreversible. Clients who reach Stage 7 become fully functioning
    “persons of tomorrow” (a concept more fully explained in the section titled The
    Person of Tomorrow). They are able to generalize their in-therapy experiences to
    their world beyond therapy. They possess the confidence to be themselves at all
    times, to own and to feel deeply the totality of their experiences, and to live those
    experiences in the present. Their organismic self, now unified with the self- concept,
    becomes the locus for evaluating their experiences. People at Stage 7 receive plea-
    sure in knowing that these evaluations are fluid and that change and growth will
    continue. In addition, they become congruent, possess unconditional positive self-
    regard, and are able to be loving and empathic toward others.
    Theoretical Explanation for Therapeutic Change
    What theoretical formulation can explain the dynamics of therapeutic change?
    Rogers’ (1980) explanation follows this line of reasoning. When persons come to
    experience themselves as prized and unconditionally accepted, they realize, perhaps
    for the first time, that they are lovable. The example of the therapist enables them
    to prize and accept themselves, to have unconditional positive self-regard. As cli-
    ents perceive that they are empathically understood, they are freed to listen to
    themselves more accurately, to have empathy for their own feelings. As a conse-
    quence, when these persons come to prize themselves and to accurately understand
    themselves, their perceived self becomes more congruent with their organismic
    experiences. They now possess the same three therapeutic characteristics as any
    effective helper, and in effect, they become their own therapist.
    Outcomes
    If the process of therapeutic change is set in motion, then certain observable out-
    comes can be expected. The most basic outcome of successful client-centered
    therapy is a congruent client who is less defensive and more open to experience.
    Each of the remaining outcomes is a logical extension of this basic one.
    As a result of being more congruent and less defensive, clients have a clearer
    picture of themselves and a more realistic view of the world. They are better able
    to assimilate experiences into the self on the symbolic level; they are more effec-
    tive in solving problems; and they have a higher level of positive self-regard.
    Being realistic, they have a more accurate view of their potentials, which
    permits them to narrow the gap between self-ideal and real self. Typically, this gap
    is narrowed because both the ideal self and the true self show some movement.
    Because clients are more realistic, they lower their expectations of what they
    should be or would like to be; and because they have an increase in positive self-
    regard, they raise their view of what they really are.

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 309
    Because their ideal self and their real self are more congruent, clients experi-
    ence less physiological and psychological tension, are less vulnerable to threat, and
    have less anxiety. They are less likely to look to others for direction and less likely
    to use others’ opinions and values as the criteria for evaluating their own experi-
    ences. Instead, they become more self-directed and more likely to perceive that the
    locus of evaluation resides within themselves. They no longer feel compelled to
    please other people and to meet external expectations. They feel sufficiently safe to
    take ownership of an increasing number of their experiences and comfortable
    enough with themselves to lessen their need for denial and distortion.
    Their relationships with others are also changed. They become more accept-
    ing of others, make fewer demands, and simply allow others to be themselves.
    Because they have less need to distort reality, they have less desire to force others
    to meet their expectations. They are also perceived by others as being more mature,
    more likable, and more socialized. Their genuineness, positive self-regard, and
    empathic understanding are extended beyond therapy, and they become better able
    to participate in other growth-facilitating relationships (Rogers, 1959, 1961).
    Table 10.1 illustrates Rogers’ theory of therapy.
    The Person of Tomorrow
    The interest shown by Rogers in the psychologically healthy individual is rivaled
    only by that of Maslow (see Chapter 9). Whereas Maslow was primarily a researcher,
    Rogers was first of all a psychotherapist whose concern with psychologically healthy
    T A B L E 1 0 . 1
    Rogers’ Theory of Therapeutic Change
    If the following conditions exist:
    1. A vulnerable or anxious client
    2. contacts a counselor who possesses
    3. congruence in the relationship,
    4. unconditional positive regard for
    the client, and
    5. empathic understanding for the
    client’s internal frame of
    reference, and
    6. the client perceives Conditions 3, 4,
    and 5—the three necessary and
    sufficient conditions for therapeutic
    growth;
    Then therapeutic change occurs and the
    client will
    1. become more congruent;
    2. be less defensive;
    3. become more open to experiences;
    4. have a more realistic view of the
    world;
    5. develop positive self-regard;
    6. narrow the gap between ideal self
    and real self;
    7. be less vulnerable to threat;
    8. become less anxious;
    9. take ownership of experiences;
    10. become more accepting of others;
    11. become more congruent in
    relationships with others.
    Note: Boldfaced phrases represent the key therapeutic conditions and the most basic outcomes.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories310
    people grew out of his general theory of therapy. In 1951, Rogers first briefly put
    forward his “characteristics of the altered personality”; then he enlarged on the
    concept of the fully functioning person in an unpublished paper (Rogers, 1953).
    In 1959, his theory of the healthy personality was expounded in the Koch series,
    and he returned to this topic frequently during the early 1960s (Rogers, 1961, 1962,
    1963). Somewhat later, he described both the world of tomorrow and the person
    of tomorrow (Rogers, 1980).
    If the three necessary and sufficient therapeutic conditions of congruence,
    unconditional positive regard, and empathy are optimal, then what kind of person
    would emerge? Rogers (1961, 1962, 1980) listed several possible characteristics.
    First, psychologically healthy people would be more adaptable. Thus, from an
    evolutionary viewpoint, they would be more likely to survive—hence the title “persons
    of tomorrow.” They would not merely adjust to a static environment but would realize
    that conformity and adjustment to a fixed condition have little long-term survival value.
    Second, persons of tomorrow would be open to their experiences, accurately
    symbolizing them in awareness rather than denying or distorting them. This simple
    statement is pregnant with meaning. For people who are open to experience, all
    stimuli, whether stemming from within the organism or from the external environ-
    ment, are freely received by the self. Persons of tomorrow would listen to them-
    selves and hear their joy, anger, discouragement, fear, and tenderness.
    A related characteristic of persons of tomorrow would be a trust in their
    organismic selves. These fully functioning people would not depend on others for
    guidance because they would realize that their own experiences are the best crite-
    ria for making choices; they would do what feels right for them because they would
    trust their own inner feelings more than the pontifications of parents or the rigid
    rules of society. However, they would also perceive clearly the rights and feelings
    of other people, which they would take into consideration when making decisions.
    A third characteristic of persons of tomorrow would be a tendency to live
    fully in the moment. Because these people would be open to their experiences, they
    would experience a constant state of fluidity and change. What they experience in
    each moment would be new and unique, something never before experienced by
    their evolving self. They would see each experience with a new freshness and
    appreciate it fully in the present moment. Rogers (1961) referred to this tendency
    to live in the moment as existential living. Persons of tomorrow would have no
    need to deceive themselves and no reason to impress others. They would be young
    in mind and spirit, with no preconceptions about how the world should be. They
    would discover what an experience means to them by living that experience with-
    out the prejudice of prior expectations.
    Fourth, persons of tomorrow would remain confident of their own ability
    to experience harmonious relations with others. They would feel no need to be
    liked or loved by everyone, because they would know that they are uncondition-
    ally prized and accepted by someone. They would seek intimacy with another
    person who is probably equally healthy, and such a relationship itself would
    contribute to the continual growth of each partner. Persons of tomorrow would
    be authentic in their relations with others. They would be what they appear to
    be, without deceit or fraud, without defenses and facades, without hypocrisy and
    sham. They would care about others, but in a nonjudgmental manner. They

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 311
    would seek meaning beyond themselves and would yearn for the spiritual life
    and inner peace.
    Fifth, persons of tomorrow would be more integrated, more whole, with no
    artificial boundary between conscious processes and unconscious ones. Because they
    would be able to accurately symbolize all their experiences in awareness, they would
    see clearly the difference between what is and what should be; because they would use
    their organismic feelings as criteria for evaluating their experiences, they would
    bridge  the gap between their real self and their ideal self; because they would have
    no need to defend their self-importance, they would present no facades to other
    people; and because they would have confidence in who they are, they could openly
    express whatever feelings they are experiencing.
    Sixth, persons of tomorrow would have a basic trust of human nature. They
    would not harm others merely for personal gain; they would care about others and
    be ready to help when needed; they would experience anger but could be trusted
    not to strike out unreasonably against others; they would feel aggression but would
    channel it in appropriate directions.
    Finally, because persons of tomorrow are open to all their experiences, they
    would enjoy a greater richness in life than do other people. They would neither
    distort internal stimuli nor buffer their emotions. Consequently, they would feel
    more deeply than others. They would live in the present and thus participate more
    richly in the ongoing moment.
    Philosophy of Science
    Rogers was first a scientist; second, a therapist; and third, a personality theorist.
    Because his scientific attitude permeates both his therapy and his theory of per-
    sonality, we look briefly at his philosophy of science.
    According to Rogers (1968), science begins and ends with the subjective
    experience, although everything in between must be objective and empirical. Sci-
    entists must have many of the characteristics of the person of tomorrow; that is,
    they must be inclined to look within, to be in tune with internal feelings and
    values, to be intuitive and creative, to be open to experiences, to welcome change,
    to have a fresh outlook, and to possess a solid trust in themselves.
    Rogers (1968) believed that scientists should be completely involved in the
    phenomena being studied. For example, people who conduct research on psycho-
    therapy must first have had long careers as therapists. Scientists must care about and
    care for newly born ideas and nurture them lovingly through their fragile infancy.
    Science begins when an intuitive scientist starts to perceive patterns among
    phenomena. At first, these dimly seen relationships may be too vague to be com-
    municated to others, but they are nourished by a caring scientist until eventually
    they can be formulated into testable hypotheses. These hypotheses, then, are the
    consequence of an open-minded scientist and not the result of preexisting stereo-
    typical thought.
    At this point, methodology enters the picture. Although the creativity of a
    scientist may yield innovative methods of research, these procedures themselves
    must be rigorously controlled, empirical, and objective. Precise methods prevent

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories312
    the scientist from self-deception and from intentionally or unintentionally manipu-
    lating the observations. But this precision should not be confused with science. It
    is only the method of science that is precise and objective.
    The scientist then communicates findings from that method to others, but the
    communication itself is subjective. The people receiving the communication bring
    their own degrees of open-mindedness or defensiveness into this process. They have
    varying levels of readiness to receive the findings, depending on the prevailing cli-
    mate of scientific thought and the personal subjective experiences of each individual.
    The Chicago Studies
    Consistent with his philosophy of science, Rogers did not permit methodology to
    dictate the nature of his research. In his investigations of the outcomes of client-
    centered psychotherapy, first at the Counseling Center of the University of Chicago
    (Rogers & Dymond, 1954) and then with schizophrenic patients at the University
    of Wisconsin (Rogers, Gendlin, Kiesler, & Truax, 1967), he and his colleagues
    allowed the problem to take precedence over methodology and measurement. They
    did not formulate hypotheses simply because the tools for testing them were read-
    ily available. Instead, they began by sensing vague impressions from clinical expe-
    rience and gradually forming these into testable hypotheses. It was only then that
    Rogers and his colleagues dealt with the task of finding or inventing instruments
    by which these hypotheses could be tested.
    The purpose of the Chicago Studies was to investigate both the process and
    the outcomes of client-centered therapy. The therapists were of a “journeyman”
    level. They included Rogers and other faculty members, but graduate students also
    served as therapists. Though they ranged widely in experience and ability, all were
    basically client centered in approach (Rogers, 1961; Rogers & Dymond, 1954).
    Hypotheses
    Research at the University of Chicago Counseling Center was built around the basic
    client-centered hypothesis, which states that all persons have within themselves the
    capacity, either active or latent, for self-understanding as well as the capacity and
    tendency to move in the direction of self-actualization and maturity. This tendency
    will become realized provided the therapist creates the proper psychological atmo-
    sphere. More specifically, Rogers (1954) hypothesized that during therapy, clients
    would assimilate into their self-concepts those feelings and experiences previously
    denied to awareness. He also predicted that during and after therapy the discrepancy
    between real self and ideal self would diminish and that the observed behavior of
    clients would become more socialized, more self-accepting, and more accepting of
    others. These hypotheses, in turn, became the foundation for several more specific
    hypotheses, which were operationally stated and then tested.
    Method
    Because the hypotheses of the study dictated that subtle subjective personality
    changes be measured in an objective fashion, the selection of measuring instru-
    ments was a difficult one. To assess change from an external viewpoint, the

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 313
    researchers used the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), the Self-Other Attitude
    Scale (S-O Scale), and the Willoughby Emotional Maturity Scale (E-M Scale). The
    TAT, a projective personality test developed by Henry Murray (1938), was used
    to test hypotheses that called for a standard clinical diagnosis; the S-O Scale, an
    instrument compiled at the Counseling Center from several earlier sources, mea-
    sures antidemocratic trends and ethnocentrism; the E-M Scale was used to compare
    descriptions of clients’ behavior and emotional maturity as seen by two close
    friends and by the clients themselves.
    To measure change from the client’s point of view, the researchers relied on
    the Q sort technique developed by William Stephenson of the University of Chicago
    (Stephenson, 1953). The Q sort technique begins with a universe of 100 self-referent
    statements printed on 3-by-5 cards, which participants are requested to sort into nine
    piles from “most like me” to “least like me.” Researchers asked the participants to
    sort the cards into piles of 1, 4, 11, 21, 26, 21, 11, 4, and 1. The resulting distribu-
    tion approximates a normal curve and allows for statistical analysis. At various
    points throughout the study, participants were requested to sort the cards to describe
    their self, their ideal self, and the ordinary person.
    Participants for the study were 18 men and 11 women who had sought therapy
    at the Counseling Center. More than half were university students and the others
    were from the surrounding community. These clients—called the experimental or
    therapy group—received at least six therapeutic interviews, and each session was
    electronically recorded and transcribed, a procedure Rogers had pioneered as early
    as 1938.
    The researchers used two different methods of control. First, they asked half
    the people in the therapy group to wait 60 days before they would receive therapy.
    These participants, known as the own-control or wait group, were required to wait
    before receiving therapy in order to determine if motivation to change rather than
    the therapy itself might cause people to get better. The other half of the therapy
    group, called the no-wait group, received therapy immediately.
    The second control consisted of a separate group of “normals,” who had
    volunteered to serve as participants in a “research on personality” study. This
    comparison group allowed researchers to determine the effects of such variables
    as passage of time, knowledge that one is part of an experiment (the placebo
    effect), and the impact of repeated testing. The participants in this control
    group were divided into a wait group and a no-wait group, which corresponded
    to the wait and no-wait therapy groups. Researchers tested both the therapy
    wait group and the control wait group four times: at the beginning of the 60-day
    wait period, prior to therapy, immediately after therapy, and after a 6- to
    12-month follow-up period. They administered the no-wait groups the same
    tests on the same occasions, except, of course, prior to the wait period
    (see  Figure 10.1).
    Findings
    The researchers found that the therapy group showed less discrepancy between
    self and ideal self after therapy than before, and they retained almost all those
    gains throughout the follow-up period. As expected, the “normal” controls had

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories314
    a higher level of congruence than the therapy group at the beginning of the
    study, but in contrast to the therapy group, they showed almost no change in
    congruence between self and self-ideal from the initial testing until the final
    follow-up.
    In addition, the therapy group changed their self-concept more than they
    changed their perception of the ordinary person. This finding suggests that,
    although clients showed little change in their notion of what the average person
    was like, they manifested marked change in their perceptions of self. In other
    words, intellectual insight does not result in psychological growth (Rudikoff,
    1954).
    Does therapy bring about noticeable changes in clients’ behavior as perceived
    by close friends? Participants in both the therapy and the control groups were asked
    to supply the experimenters with names of two intimate friends who would be in
    a position to judge overt behavioral changes.
    In general, the friends reported no significant behavioral changes in the cli-
    ents from the pretherapy period to posttherapy. However, this global rating of no
    change was due to a counterbalancing effect. Clients judged by their therapists as
    being most improved received higher posttherapy maturity scores from their
    friends, whereas those rated as least improved received lower scores from their
    friends. Interestingly, before therapy, clients typically rated themselves less mature
    than their friends rated them, but as therapy progressed, they began to rate them-
    selves higher and, therefore, more in agreement with their friends’ ratings. Par-
    ticipants in the control group showed no changes throughout the study in emotional
    maturity as judged by friends (Rogers & Dymond, 1954).
    TherapyTe
    st
    in
    g
    p
    o
    in
    ts
    Wait period
    60 days
    Follow-up
    6–12 months
    Therapy
    Follow-up
    6–12 months
    Own-control group No-wait group
    Therapy group
    FIGURE 10.1 Design of the Chicago Study.
    Source: C. R. Rogers and R. F. Dymond, Psychotherapy and Personality Change, 1954. Copyright © 1954 The
    University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 315
    Summary of Results
    The Chicago Studies demonstrated that people receiving client-centered therapy
    generally showed some growth or improvement. However, improvement fell short
    of the optimum. The therapy group began treatment as less healthy than the control
    group, showed growth during therapy, and retained most of that improvement
    throughout the follow-up period. However, they never attained the level of psy-
    chological health demonstrated by “normal” people in the control group.
    Looking at these outcomes another way, the typical person receiving client-
    centered therapy probably never approaches Stage 7 hypothesized by Rogers and
    discussed earlier. A more realistic expectation might be for clients to advance to
    Stage 3 or 4. Client-centered therapy is effective, but it does not result in the fully
    functioning person.
    Related Research
    Compared to Maslow’s theory, Rogers’ ideas on the power of unconditional posi-
    tive regard generated quite a bit of empirical research. Indeed, Rogers’ own
    research on the three necessary and sufficient conditions for psychological growth
    were precursors to positive psychology and have been further supported by modern
    research (Cramer, 1994, 2002, 2003a). Moreover, Rogers’ notion of incongruence
    between real and ideal self and motivation to pursue goals have sparked continued
    interest from researchers.
    Self-Discrepancy Theory
    Rogers also proposed that the cornerstone of mental health was the congruency
    between how we really view ourselves and how we ideally would like to be. If
    these two self-evaluations are congruent, then one is relatively adjusted and healthy.
    If not, then one experiences various forms of mental discomfort, such as anxiety,
    depression, and low self-esteem.
    In the 1980s, E. Tory Higgins developed a version of Rogers’ theory that
    continues to be influential in personality and social psychological research. Higgins’
    version of the theory is called self-discrepancy theory and argues not only for the
    real self–ideal self discrepancy but also for real self–ought self discrepancy (Higgins,
    1987). One difference between Rogers and Higgins is the more specific nature of
    Higgins’ theory. By proposing at least two distinct forms of discrepancy, he pre-
    dicted distinct negative outcomes from each. For instance, real-ideal discrepancy
    should lead to dejection-related emotions (e.g., depression, sadness, disappoint-
    ment), whereas real-ought discrepancy should lead to agitation-related emotions
    (e.g., anxiety, fear, threat). Although more specific, Higgins’ theory nonetheless
    has essentially the same form and assumptions of Rogers’ theory: Individuals with
    high levels of self-discrepancy are most likely to experience high levels of negative
    affect in their lives, such as anxiety and depression.
    Higgins’ theory has garnered much empirical attention since the mid-
    1980s. Some of the recent research has sought to clarify the conditions under

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories316
    which self-discrepancies predict emotional experience (Phillips & Silvia, 2005).
    For example, Ann Phillips and Paul Silvia predicted that the negative emotion
    experienced from either real-ideal or real-ought discrepancies would be most
    extreme when people are more self-focused or self-aware. Being in a state of
    self-focus not only makes one more aware of his or her self-relevant traits, but
    also makes a person more likely to detect discrepancies and therefore be more
    interested in being congruent.
    To test their prediction, Phillips and Silvia brought participants into a lab and
    induced self-awareness in half of the participants by having them complete question-
    naires about self-discrepancies and mood in front of a mirror. The other half of the
    sample completed the same questionnaires but while sitting at a normal desk with-
    out a mirror present. For obvious reasons, if you are answering questions about
    yourself while looking at yourself in a mirror, you are more likely to be self-aware.
    As predicted, the phenomenon of experiencing negative emotion as a result of self-
    discrepancies occurred only among those participants who were highly self-aware
    (i.e., those who completed the questionnaires in front of the mirror).
    In yet more research on self-discrepancy, Rachel Calogero and Neill Watson
    (2009) examined whether individuals’ perceived real-ideal and real-ought discrep-
    ancies predicted a unique form of self-consciousness they termed “chronic social
    self-consciousness.” This is characterized by self-focused attention when in public,
    and a vigilant monitoring of the self and body. They also examined the extent to
    which men and women would differ on the real-ought discrepancy in terms of body
    image and self-consciousness. These scholars predicted that real-ought discrepan-
    cies should be more strongly related to this tendency to take this vigilant view of
    the self as a social object than should real-ideal discrepancies. This is because
    real-ideal discrepancies should result in disappointment at not meeting personally
    relevant aspirations, whereas real-ought discrepancies produce agitation or fear
    because of anticipated punishment for violating social obligations.
    If this sounds like a description better suited to women than to men, that’s
    exactly what these researchers found. Indeed, in their first study, Calogero and
    Watson found that, among 108 undergraduates, real-ought discrepancies, but not
    real-ideal, predicted chronic social self-consciousness in females but not males.
    In a second study of over 200 female undergraduates, they found that, controlling
    for other variables like the importance of physical appearance, real-ought discrep-
    ancy continued to strongly predict young women’s chronic social self-consciousness.
    If we consider the media’s delivery of narrow and impossible standards of female
    physical beauty, it makes a good deal of sense that girls and women develop a
    real-ought discrepancy for their own selves, and that this results in a kind of
    vigilant attention to themselves as social objects, compared to men.
    Motivation and Pursuing One’s Goals
    One area of research where Rogers’ ideas continue to be influential is goal pursuit.
    Setting and pursuing goals is a way for people to organize their lives in a way that
    leads to desirable outcomes and adds meaning to daily activities. Setting goals is
    easy, but setting the right goals can be more difficult than it seems. According to
    Rogers, a source of psychological distress is incongruence, or when one’s ideal self

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 317
    does not sufficiently overlap with his or her self-concept and this incongruence can
    be represented in the goals the person chooses to pursue. For example, a person may
    pursue the goal to do well in biology but does not even like biology or may not even
    need it for her or his goal of being an architect. Perhaps this person’s parents are
    biologists and it was always expected he or she would do the same even though the
    person feels that architecture is more exciting and fulfilling. In this example, biology
    is a part of the person’s self-concept, but architecture is a part of his or her ideal
    self. The incongruence between the two can be a source of distress. Fortunately,
    Rogers (1951) expanded on these ideas to propose that we all have an organismic
    valuing process (OVP)—that is, a natural instinct directing us toward the most
    fulfilling pursuits. In the above example, the OVP would be represented as a visceral
    or unexplainable gut feeling that architecture, not biology, is the right path.
    Ken Sheldon and colleagues (2003) have explored the existence of an OVP in
    college students by designing studies that ask students to rate the importance of several
    goals repeatedly over the course of multiple weeks. Any time people rate the same
    thing (for example, goals) over time, there is bound to be fluctuation in their ratings.
    Sheldon and colleagues, however, predicted that the fluctuation in the importance of
    several goals would have a distinct pattern. If people truly possess an OVP as Rogers
    theorized, then over time they will rate goals that are inherently more fulfilling as
    more desirable than goals that lead only to materialistic gains. To test their prediction,
    Sheldon and colleagues had undergraduate students rate multiple pre-selected goals
    (some of which were inherently more fulfilling than others). Six weeks later, par-
    ticipants rated the same goals again, and then one final time 6 weeks after that. What
    the researchers found was that, in line with the prediction that people possess an
    OVP, the participants tended to rate the more fulfilling goals with increasing impor-
    tance over time and the materialistic goals with decreasing importance.
    Ransom, Sheldon, and Jacobsen (2010) also explored Rogers’ OVP process
    in the context of cancer survival. These researchers noted that many people with
    cancer report that they experience positive growth as a result of their disease, and
    even say that cancer had a more positive than negative impact on their lives. This
    remarkable human tendency to find lasting positive meaning in the wake of enor-
    mously stressful events has been called “Posttraumatic Growth” (PTG) (Tedeschi
    & Calhoun, 1996). The study tested the validity of PTG reports. Do cancer survivors
    actually experience personal growth as a result of Rogers’ organismic valuing
    process? Or are their reports of positive change merely illusions resulting from a
    biased comparison of their present self with their past self? Individuals might cope
    with the challenge that cancer provides by perceiving positive growth in themselves
    where no objective evidence for it exists. Eighty-three people with breast or prostate
    cancer completed measures of personal positive attributes and personal life goals
    before and after radiation therapy treatment. The findings strongly supported
    Rogers’ conceptualization of the OVP. Patients showed both actual and perceived
    change over the course of radiation therapy. But, important to humanistic
    psychology, shifts toward a more personal and genuine goal orientation among
    survivors predicted PTG. That is, patients’ reports of positive personal growth were
    not just illusory; they were reflected in a very real transition to valuing deeper and
    more fulfilling goals over more materialistic ones during the course of their cancer
    treatment.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories318
    Setting goals and finding the motivation to pursue them are both important
    aspects of the organismic valuing process (OVP), but unless we can find a way to
    maintain our goal pursuits in spite of adversity and often over long periods of time,
    we are likely to burn out or give up. Grit is conceived of as the disposition to
    pursue goals in a determined way for years or sometimes even decades, and to
    passionately maintain that perseverance despite inevitable setbacks (Duckworth,
    Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007). Grit has been shown to predict a number of
    positive outcomes in people’s lives, including higher academic achievement,
    remaining married, and sticking with challenging military training or a New Year’s
    resolution to exercise more (Duckworth et al., 2007; Eskreis-Winkler, Shulman,
    Beal, & Duckworth, 2014). But are gritty people happier people? Researchers Mia
    Vainio and Daiva Daukantaitė (2015) proposed that Rogers’ organismic valuing
    process provides a theoretical framework for predicting that they ought to be.
    For Rogers and other humanists, the good life is not about the pursuit of
    pleasure, but rather the pursuit of what the Greek philosophers such as Aristotle
    called “eudaimonia,” or flourishing. This kind of happiness does not come from
    without (e.g., obtaining goods and services), but from within—from pursuing excel-
    lence, growth, meaning, and authenticity (Huta & Waterman, 2013).
    Vainio and Daukantaitė (2015) conducted a study exploring whether grit is
    positively related to well-being and whether this relationship is mediated by two of
    Rogers’ features of the OVP: authenticity and sense of coherence in the self (Rogers,
    1961, 1964). Over 600 individuals in Sweden—200 students at Lund University,
    and over 400 non-students via online sources—were sampled.
    Participants completed a battery of questionnaires investigating their grit (items
    include “I have overcome setbacks to conquer an important challenge”), psychologi-
    cal well-being (items include “For me, life has been a continuous process of learning,
    changing, and growth”), satisfaction with life (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to
    my ideal”), authenticity (e.g., “I live in accordance with my values and beliefs”), and
    sense of coherence (e.g., “Do you have the feeling that you are being treated
    unfairly?”—this item would be reverse coded, and “Do you have the feeling that you
    don’t really care about what goes on around you?” would also be reverse coded) as
    well as socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, and educational attainment.
    Vainio and Daukantaitė found that grit was, as predicted, highly positively
    related to both well-being and life satisfaction. Grittier individuals had higher levels
    of psychological well-being as well as greater satisfaction with their lives overall.
    Further analyses showed some interesting and more complex findings. For example,
    the relationship between satisfaction with life and grit became statistically insignifi-
    cant when authenticity and sense of coherence were added to the model. This sug-
    gests that simply being gritty is not enough to give us a feeling of satisfaction with
    our lives. Instead, a sense of coherence within ourselves and an authentic connection
    between our goal pursuits and our core self are needed in order for grit to bring us
    life satisfaction. In other words, the pursuit of our goals must be meaningful to us—
    the pursuit must be connected to our true and authentic motives for us to feel satis-
    fied with it. It’s no use grittily pursuing goals that have no or low self-relevance.
    These results suggest that grit may be something particularly strongly con-
    nected to the self. Authenticity and sense of coherence provide a connection to who
    we really are, and this may provide a “compass” for gritty individuals in pursuing

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 319
    their goals (Vainio & Daukantaitė, 2015). This means that grit, rather than being a
    dogged determination, blind to any costs that might accrue in pursuit of goals, is
    only “true” if the goals are consistent with our inner values. These findings suggest
    that people should set out to determine what their real values are, and then bring
    all their grit to the pursuit of the goals that line up with those values. In doing so,
    grit will likely keep them hopeful about the future, give them a sense of meaning
    in life, and in the long run bring them real, lasting happiness.
    Carl Rogers clearly had keen insight into the human condition, and his ideas
    continue to be supported by the most modern research. If you engage in experiences
    that are part of your ideal self, you will be led to pursuits that are more engaging,
    enriching, interesting, and rewarding (Schwartz & Waterman, 2006). But what if you
    don’t know what specific pursuits you will find the most rewarding? Taken together,
    these various lines of research support the idea that we have a built-in system (the
    OVP) that will direct us toward fulfilling pursuits even, or, perhaps especially, when
    life presents us with stressful challenges. All we have to do is listen to our gut.
    Critique of Rogers
    How well does Rogerian theory satisfy the six criteria of a useful theory? First,
    does it generate research and suggest testable hypotheses? Although Rogerian
    theory has produced much research in the realm of psychotherapy and classroom
    learning (see Rogers, 1983), it has been only moderately productive outside these
    two areas and thus receives only an average rating on its ability to spark research
    activity within the general field of personality.
    Second, we rate Rogerian theory high on falsifiability. Rogers was one of
    only a few theorists who spelled out his theory in an if-then framework, and such
    a paradigm lends itself to either confirmation or disconfirmation. His precise lan-
    guage facilitated research at the University of Chicago and later at the University
    of Wisconsin that exposed his theory of therapy to falsification. Unfortunately,
    since Rogers’ death, many humanistically oriented followers have failed to put his
    more general theory to test.
    Third, does person-centered theory organize knowledge into a meaningful
    framework? Although much of the research generated by the theory has been
    limited to interpersonal relations, Rogerian theory nevertheless can be extended to
    a relatively wide range of human personality. Rogers’ interests went beyond the
    consulting room and included group dynamics, classroom learning, social prob-
    lems, and international relations. Therefore, we rate person-centered theory high
    on its ability to explain what is currently known about human behavior.
    Fourth, how well does person-centered theory serve as a guide for the solution
    of practical problems? For the psychotherapist, the answer is unequivocal. To bring
    about personality change, the therapist must possess congruence and be able to
    demonstrate empathic understanding and unconditional positive regard for the client.
    Rogers suggested that these three conditions are both necessary and sufficient to
    affect growth in any interpersonal relationship, including those outside of therapy.
    Fifth, is person-centered theory internally consistent, with a set of operational
    definitions? We rate person-centered theory very high for its consistency and its carefully

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories320
    worked-out operational definitions. Future theory builders can learn a valuable lesson
    from Rogers’ pioneering work in constructing a theory of personality.
    Finally, is Rogerian theory parsimonious and free from cumbersome con-
    cepts and difficult language? The theory itself is unusually clear and economical,
    but some of the language is awkward and vague. Concepts such as “organismic
    experiencing, ” “becoming, ” “positive self-regard, ” “need for self-regard,” “uncon-
    ditional self-regard,” and “fully functioning” are too broad and imprecise to have
    clear scientific meaning. This criticism is a small one, however, in comparison
    with the overall tightness and parsimony of person-centered theory.
    Concept of Humanity
    Rogers’ concept of humanity was clearly stated in his famous debates with
    B. F. Skinner during the mid-1950s and early 1960s. Perhaps the most
    famous debates in the history of American psychology, these discussions
    consisted of three face-to-face confrontations between Rogers and Skinner
    regarding the issue of freedom and control (Rogers & Skinner, 1956). Skinner
    (see Chapter 16) argued that people are always controlled, whether they
    realize it or not. Because we are controlled mostly by haphazard contingen-
    cies that have no grand design or plan, we often have the illusion that we
    are free (Skinner, 1971).
    Rogers, however, contended that people have some degree of free
    choice and some capacity to be self-directed. Admitting that some portion
    of human behavior is controlled, predictable, and lawful, Rogers argued that
    the important values and choices are within the scope of personal control.
    Throughout his long career, Rogers remained cognizant of the human
    capacity for great evil, yet his concept of humanity is realistically optimistic.
    He believed that people are essentially forward moving and that, under
    proper conditions, they will grow toward self-actualization. People are basi-
    cally trustworthy, socialized, and constructive. They ordinarily know what is
    best for themselves and will strive for completion provided they are prized
    and understood by another healthy individual. However, Rogers (1959) was
    also aware that people can be quite brutal, nasty, and neurotic:
    I do not have a Pollyanna view of human nature. I am quite aware that out
    of defensiveness and inner fear individuals can and do behave in ways
    which are horribly destructive, immature, regressive, anti-social, hurtful. Yet,
    one of the most refreshing and invigorating parts of my experience is to
    work with such individuals and to discover the strongly positive directional
    tendencies which exist in them, as in all of us, at the deepest levels. (p. 21)
    This tendency toward growth and self-actualization has a biological basis.
    Just as plants and animals have an innate tendency toward growth and
    fulfillment, so too do human beings. All organisms actualize themselves, but
    only humans can become self-actualizing. Humans are different from plants

    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory 321
    and animals primarily because they have self-awareness. To the extent that
    we have awareness, we are able to make free choices and to play an active
    role in forming our personalities.
    Rogers’ theory is also high on teleology, maintaining that people strive
    with purpose toward goals that they freely set for themselves. Again, under
    proper therapeutic conditions, people consciously desire to become more
    fully functioning, more open to their experiences, and more accepting of self
    and others.
    Rogers placed more emphasis on individual differences and unique-
    ness than on similarities. If plants have individual potential for growth, peo-
    ple have even greater uniqueness and individuality. Within a nurturant
    environment, people can grow in their own fashion toward the process of
    being more fully functioning.
    Although Rogers did not deny the importance of unconscious processes,
    his primary emphasis was on the ability of people to consciously choose their
    own course of action. Fully functioning people are ordinarily aware of what
    they are doing and have some understanding of their reasons for doing it.
    On the dimension of biological versus social influences, Rogers favored
    the latter. Psychological growth is not automatic. In order to move toward actu-
    alization, one must experience empathic understanding and unconditional pos-
    itive regard from another person who is genuine or congruent. Rogers firmly
    held that, although much of our behavior is determined by heredity and environ-
    ment, we have within us the capacity to choose and to become self-directed.
    Under nurturant conditions, this choice “always seems to be in the direction of
    greater socialization, improved relationships with others” (Rogers, 1982, p. 8).
    Rogers (1982) did not claim that, if left alone, people would be righ-
    teous, virtuous, or honorable. However, in an atmosphere without threat,
    people are free to become what they potentially can be. No evaluation in
    terms of morality applies to the nature of humanity. People simply have the
    potential for growth, the need for growth, and the desire for growth. By
    nature, they will strive for completion even under unfavorable conditions, but
    under poor conditions they do not realize their full potential for psychological
    health. However, under the most nurturant and favorable conditions, people
    will become more self-aware, trustworthy, congruent, and self-directed, qual-
    ities that will move them toward becoming persons of tomorrow.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ The formative tendency states that all matter, both organic and inorganic,
    tends to evolve from simple to more complex forms.
    ∙ Humans and other animals possess an actualization tendency: that is, the
    predisposition to move toward completion or fulfillment.
    ∙ Self-actualization develops after people evolve a self-system and refers
    to the tendency to move toward becoming a fully functional person.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories322
    ∙ An individual becomes a person by making contact with a caregiver
    whose positive regard for that individual fosters positive self-regard.
    ∙ Barriers to psychological growth exist when a person experiences
    conditions of worth, incongruence, defensiveness, and disorganization.
    ∙ Conditions of worth and external evaluation lead to vulnerability,
    anxiety, and threat and prevent people from experiencing unconditional
    positive regard.
    ∙ Incongruence develops when the organismic self and the perceived self
    do not match.
    ∙ When the organismic self and perceived self are incongruent, people will
    become defensive and use distortion and denial as attempts to reduce
    incongruence.
    ∙ People become disorganized whenever distortion and denial are
    insufficient to block out incongruence.
    ∙ Vulnerable people are unaware of their incongruence and are likely to
    become anxious, threatened, and defensive.
    ∙ When vulnerable people come in contact with a therapist who is
    congruent and who has unconditional positive regard and empathy, the
    process of personality change begins.
    ∙ This process of therapeutic personality change ranges from extreme
    defensiveness, or an unwillingness to talk about self, to a final stage in
    which clients become their own therapists and are able to continue
    psychological growth outside the therapeutic setting.
    ∙ The basic outcomes of client-centered counseling are congruent clients
    who are open to experiences and who have no need to be defensive.
    ∙ Theoretically, successful clients will become persons of tomorrow, or
    fully functioning persons.

    323
    C H A P T E R 1 1
    May: Existential
    Psychology
    ⬥ Overview of Existential Psychology
    ⬥ Biography of Rollo May
    ⬥ Background of Existentialism
    What Is Existentialism?
    Basic Concepts
    ⬥ The Case of Philip
    ⬥ Anxiety
    Normal Anxiety
    Neurotic Anxiety
    ⬥ Guilt
    ⬥ Intentionality
    ⬥ Care, Love, and Will
    Union of Love and Will
    Forms of Love
    ⬥ Freedom and Destiny
    Freedom Defined
    Forms of Freedom
    What Is Destiny?
    Philip’s Destiny
    ⬥ The Power of Myth
    ⬥ Psychopathology
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Threats in the Umwelt: Mortality Salience and Denial
    of Our Animal Nature
    Finding Meaning in the Mitwelt: Attachment and
    Close Relationships
    Growth in the Eigenwelt: There Is an Upside to
    Mortality Awareness
    ⬥ Critique of May
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    May © Hulton Archive/Getty Images

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories324
    Twice married, twice divorced, Philip was struggling through yet another dif-ficult relationship—this time with Nicole, a writer in her mid-40s. Philip could
    offer Nicole both love and financial security, but their relationship did not seem
    to be working.
    Six months after Philip met Nicole, the two spent an idyllic summer together
    at his retreat. Nicole’s two small sons were with their father and Philip’s three
    children were by then young adults who could care for themselves. At the begin-
    ning of the summer, Nicole talked about the possibility of marriage, but Philip
    replied that he was against it, citing his two previous unsuccessful marriages as
    his reason. Aside from this brief disagreement, the time they spent together that
    summer was completely pleasurable. Their intellectual discussions were gratifying
    to Philip and their lovemaking was the most satisfying he had ever experienced,
    often bordering on ecstasy.
    At the end of this romantic summer, Nicole returned home alone to put her
    children in school. The day after she arrived home, Philip telephoned her, but
    somehow her voice seemed strange. The next morning he called again and got the
    feeling that someone else was with Nicole. That afternoon he called several more
    times but kept getting a busy signal. When he finally got through, he asked her if
    someone had been with her that morning. Without hesitation, Nicole reported that
    Craig, an old friend from her college days, was staying with her and that she had
    fallen in love with him. Moreover, she planned to marry Craig at the end of the
    month and move to another part of the country.
    Philip was devastated. He felt betrayed and abandoned. He lost weight,
    resumed smoking, and suffered from insomnia. When he saw Nicole again, he
    expressed his anger at her “crazy” plan. This outburst of rage was rare for Philip.
    He seldom showed anger, perhaps for fear of losing the one he loved. To compli-
    cate matters, Nicole said she still loved Philip, and she continued to see him
    whenever Craig was not available. Eventually, Nicole lost her infatuation with
    Craig and told Philip that, as he well knew, she could never leave him. This com-
    ment confused Philip because he knew no such thing.
    Overview of Existential Psychology
    We return to Philip’s story at several points in this chapter. But first, we present
    a brief overview of existential psychology.
    Shortly after World War II, a new psychology—existential psychology—
    began to spread from Europe to the United States. Existential psychology is rooted
    in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger,
    Jean-Paul Sartre, and other European philosophers. The first existential psycholo-
    gists and psychiatrists were also Europeans, and these included Ludwig Binswanger,
    Medard Boss, Victor Frankl, and others.
    For nearly 50 years, the foremost spokesperson for existential psychology in
    the United States was Rollo May. During his years as a psychotherapist, May
    evolved a new way of looking at human beings. His approach was not based on
    any controlled scientific research but rather on clinical experience. He saw people
    as living in the world of present experiences and ultimately being responsible for
    who they become. May’s penetrating insights and profound analyses of the human

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 325
    condition made him a popular writer among laypeople as well as professional
    psychologists.
    Many people, May believed, lack the courage to face their destiny, and in
    the process of fleeing from it, they give up much of their freedom. Having negated
    their freedom, they likewise run away from their responsibility. Not being willing
    to make choices, they lose sight of who they are and develop a sense of insig-
    nificance and alienation. In contrast, healthy people challenge their destiny, cherish
    their freedom, and live authentically with other people and with themselves. They
    recognize the inevitability of death and have the courage to live life in the present.
    Biography of Rollo May
    Rollo Reese May was born April 21, 1909, in Ada, Ohio, the first son of the six
    children born to Earl Tittle May and Matie Boughton May. Neither parent was
    very well educated, and May’s early intellectual climate was virtually nonexistent.
    In fact, when his older sister had a psychotic breakdown some years later, May’s
    father attributed it to too much education (Bilmes, 1978)!
    At an early age, May moved with his family to Marine City, Michigan, where
    he spent most of his childhood. As a young boy, May was not particularly close
    to either of his parents, who frequently argued with each other and eventually
    separated. May’s father, a secretary for the Young Men’s Christian Association,
    moved frequently during May’s youth. May’s mother often left the children to care
    for themselves and, according to May’s description, was a “bitch-kitty on wheels”
    (Rabinowitz, Good, & Cozad, 1989, p. 437). May attributed his own two failed
    marriages to his mother’s unpredictable behavior and to his older sister’s psychotic
    episode.
    During his childhood, May found solitude and relief from family strife by
    playing on the shores of the St. Clair River. The river became his friend, a serene
    place to swim during the summer and to ice skate during the winter. He claimed
    to have learned more from the river than from the school he attended in Marine
    City (Rabinowitz et al., 1989). As a youth, he acquired an interest in art and lit-
    erature, interests that never left him. He first attended college at Michigan State
    University, where he majored in English. However, he was asked to leave school
    soon after he became editor of a radical student magazine. May then transferred
    to Oberlin College in Ohio, from which he received a bachelor’s degree in 1930.
    For the next 3 years, May followed a course very similar to the one traveled
    by Erik Erikson some 10 years earlier (see Chapter 7). He roamed throughout eastern
    and southern Europe as an artist, painting pictures and studying native art (Harris,
    1969). Actually, the nominal purpose for May’s trip was to tutor English at Anatolia
    College in Saloniki, Greece. This job provided him time to work as an itinerant artist
    in Turkey, Poland, Austria, and other countries. However, by his second year, May
    was beginning to become lonely. As a consequence, he poured himself into his work
    as a teacher, but the harder he worked, the less effective he became.
    Finally in the spring of that second year I had what is called, euphemistically, a
    nervous breakdown. Which meant simply that the rules, principles, values, by
    which I used to work and live simply did not suffice anymore. I got so
    completely fatigued that I had to go to bed for two weeks to get enough energy

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories326
    to continue my teaching. I had learned enough psychology at college to know
    that these symptoms meant that something was wrong with my whole way of
    life. I had to find some new goals and purposes for my living and to relinquish
    my moralistic, somewhat rigid way of existence. (May, 1985, p. 8)
    From that point on, May began to listen to his inner voice, the one that spoke to
    him of beauty. “It seems it had taken a collapse of my whole former way of life
    for this voice to make itself heard” (p. 13).
    A second experience in Europe also left a lasting impression on him, namely,
    his attendance at Alfred Adler’s 1932 summer seminars at a resort in the mountains
    above Vienna. May greatly admired Adler and learned much about human behav-
    ior and about himself during that time (Rabinowitz et al., 1989).
    After May returned to the United States in 1933, he enrolled at Union Theo-
    logical Seminary in New York, the same seminary Carl Rogers had attended 10
    years earlier. Unlike Rogers, however, May did not enter the seminary to become
    a minister but rather to ask the ultimate questions concerning the nature of human
    beings (Harris, 1969). While at the Union Theological Seminary, he met the
    renowned existential theologian and philosopher Paul Tillich, then a recent refugee
    from Germany and a faculty member at the seminary. May learned much of his
    philosophy from Tillich, and the two men remained friends for more than 30 years.
    Although May had not gone to the seminary to be a preacher, he was ordained
    as a Congregational minister in 1938 after receiving a Master of Divinity degree.
    He then served as a pastor for 2 years, but finding parish work meaningless, he
    quit to pursue his interest in psychology. He studied psychoanalysis at the William
    Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and Psychology while
    working as a counselor to male students at City College of New York. At about
    this time, he met Harry Stack Sullivan, president and cofounder of the William
    Alanson White Institute. May was impressed with Sullivan’s notion that the thera-
    pist is a participant observer and that therapy is a human adventure capable of
    enhancing the life of both patient and therapist. He also met and was influenced
    by Erich Fromm (see Chapter 8), who at that time was a faculty member at the
    William Alanson White Institute.
    In 1946, May opened his own private practice and, 2 years later, joined the
    faculty of the William Alanson White Institute. In 1949, at the relatively advanced
    age of 40, he earned a PhD in clinical psychology from Columbia University. He
    continued to serve as assistant professor of psychiatry at the William Alanson
    White Institute until 1974.
    Prior to receiving his doctorate, May underwent the most profound experi-
    ence of his life. While still in his early thirties, he contracted tuberculosis and spent
    3 years at the Saranac Sanitarium in upstate New York. At that time, no medication
    for tuberculosis was available, and for a year and a half, May did not know
    whether he would live or die. He felt helpless and had little to do except wait for
    the monthly X-ray that would tell whether the cavity in his lung was getting larger
    or smaller (May, 1972).
    At that point, he began to develop some insight into the nature of his illness.
    He realized that the disease was taking advantage of his helpless and passive atti-
    tude. He saw that the patients around him who accepted their illness were the very
    ones who tended to die, whereas those who fought against their condition tended

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 327
    to survive. “Not until I developed some ‘fight,’ some sense of personal responsibil-
    ity for the fact that it was I who had the tuberculosis, an assertion of my own will
    to live, did I make lasting progress” (May, 1972, p. 14).
    As May learned to listen to his body, he discovered that healing is an active,
    not a passive, process. The person who is sick, be it physiologically or psycho-
    logically, must be an active participant in the therapeutic process. May realized
    this truth for himself as he recovered from tuberculosis, but it was only later that
    he was able to see that his psychotherapy patients also had to fight against their
    disturbance in order to get better (May, 1972).
    During his illness and recovery, May was writing a book on anxiety. To
    better understand the subject, he read both Freud and Søren Kierkegaard, the great
    Danish existential philosopher and theologian. May admired Freud, but he was
    more deeply moved by Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety as a struggle against nonbe-
    ing, that is, loss of consciousness (May, 1969a).
    After May recovered from his illness, he wrote his dissertation on the subject
    of anxiety and the next year published it under the title The Meaning of Anxiety
    (May, 1950). Three years later, he wrote Man’s Search for Himself (May, 1953),
    the book that gained him some recognition not only in professional circles but
    among other educated people as well. In 1958, he collaborated with Ernest Angel
    and Henri Ellenberger to publish Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and
    Psychology. This book introduced American psychotherapists to the concepts of
    existential therapy and continued the popularity of the existential movement. May’s
    best-known work, Love and Will (1969b), became a national best-seller and won
    the 1970 Ralph Waldo Emerson Award for humane scholarship. In 1971, May won
    the American Psychological Association’s Distinguished Contribution to the Sci-
    ence and Profession of Clinical Psychology Award. In 1972, the New York Soci-
    ety of Clinical Psychologists presented him with the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
    Award for his book Power and Innocence (1972), and in 1987, May received the
    American Psychological Foundation Gold Medal Award for Lifetime Contributions
    to Professional Psychology.
    During his career, May was a visiting professor at both Harvard and Prince-
    ton and lectured at such institutions as Yale, Dartmouth, Columbia, Vassar, Oberlin,
    and the New School for Social Research. In addition, he was an adjunct professor
    at New York University, chairman for the Council for the Association of Existen-
    tial Psychology and Psychiatry, president of the New York Psychological Asso-
    ciation, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the American Foundation for
    Mental Health.
    In 1969, May and his first wife, Florence DeFrees, were divorced after
    30 years of marriage. He later married Ingrid Kepler Scholl, but that marriage too
    ended in divorce. On October 22, 1994, after 2 years of declining health, May died
    in Tiburon, California, where he had made his home since 1975. He was survived
    by his third wife, Georgia Lee Miller Johnson (a Jungian analyst whom he married
    in 1988); son, Robert; and twin daughters, Allegra and Carolyn.
    Through his books, articles, and lectures, May was the best-known American
    representative of the existential movement. Nevertheless, he spoke out against the
    tendency of some existentialists to slip into an antiscientific or even anti-intellectual
    posture (May, 1962). He was critical of any attempt to dilute existential psychology

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories328
    into a painless method of reaching self-fulfillment. People can aspire to psycho-
    logical health only through coming to grips with the unconscious core of their
    existence. Although he was philosophically aligned with Carl Rogers (see Chapter 10),
    May took issue with what he saw as Rogers’s naive view that evil is a cultural
    phenomenon. May (1982) regarded human beings as both good and evil and capa-
    ble of creating cultures that are both good and evil.
    Background of Existentialism
    Modern existential psychology has roots in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–
    1855), Danish philosopher and theologian. Kierkegaard was concerned with the
    increasing trend in postindustrial societies toward the dehumanization of people. He
    opposed any attempt to see people merely as objects, but at the same time, he opposed
    the view that subjective perceptions are one’s only reality. Instead, Kierkegaard was
    concerned with both the experiencing person and the person’s experience. He wished
    to understand people as they exist in the world as thinking, active, and willing beings.
    As May (1967) put it, “Kierkegaard sought to overcome the dichotomy of reason and
    emotion by turning [people’s] attentions to the reality of the immediate experience
    which underlies both subjectivity and objectivity” (p. 67).
    Kierkegaard, like later existentialists, emphasized a balance between freedom
    and responsibility. People acquire freedom of action through expanding their self-
    awareness and then by assuming responsibility for their actions. The acquisition
    of freedom and responsibility, however, is achieved only at the expense of anxiety.
    As people realize that, ultimately, they are in charge of their own destiny, they
    experience the burden of freedom and the pain of responsibility.
    Kierkegaard’s views had little effect on philosophical thought during his
    comparatively short lifetime (he died at age 42); but the work of two German
    philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Martin Heidegger (1899–1976),
    helped popularize existential philosophy during the 20th century. Heidegger exerted
    considerable influence on two Swiss psychiatrists, Ludwig Binswanger and Medard
    Boss. Binswanger and Boss, along with Karl Jaspers, Victor Frankl, and others,
    adapted the philosophy of existentialism to the practice of psychotherapy.
    Existentialism also permeated 20th-century literature through the work of the
    French writer Jean-Paul Sartre and the French-Algerian novelist Albert Camus;
    religion through the writings of Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, and others; and the
    world of art through the work of Cezanne, Matisse, and Picasso, whose paintings
    break through the boundaries of realism and demonstrate a freedom of being rather
    than the freedom of doing (May, 1981).
    After World War II, European existentialism in its various forms spread to
    the United States and became even more diversified as it was taken up by an
    assorted collection of writers, artists, dissidents, college professors and students,
    playwrights, clergy, and others.
    What Is Existentialism?
    Although philosophers and psychologists interpret existentialism in a variety of
    ways, some common elements are found among most existential thinkers. First,

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 329
    existence takes precedence over essence. Existence means to emerge or to become;
    essence implies a static immutable substance. Existence suggests process; essence
    refers to a product. Existence is associated with growth and change; essence signi-
    fies stagnation and finality. Western civilization, and particularly Western science,
    has traditionally valued essence over existence. It has sought to understand the
    essential composition of things, including humans. By contrast, existentialists
    affirm that people’s essence is their power to continually redefine themselves
    through the choices they make.
    Second, existentialism opposes the split between subject and object. Accord-
    ing to Kierkegaard, people are more than mere cogs in the machinery of an indus-
    trialized society, but they are also more than subjective thinking beings living
    passively through armchair speculation. Instead, people are both subjective and
    objective and must search for truth by living active and authentic lives.
    Third, people search for some meaning to their lives. They ask (though not
    always consciously) the important questions concerning their being: Who am I? Is
    life worth living? Does it have a meaning? How can I realize my humanity?
    Fourth, existentialists hold that ultimately each of us is responsible for who
    we are and what we become. We cannot blame parents, teachers, employers, God,
    or circumstances. As Sartre (1957) said, “Man is nothing else but what he makes
    of himself. Such is the first principle of existentialism” (p. 15). Although we may
    associate with others in productive and healthy relationships, in the end, we are
    each alone. We can choose to become what we can be or we can choose to avoid
    commitment and choice, but ultimately, it is our choice.
    Fifth, existentialists are basically antitheoretical. To them, theories further
    dehumanize people and render them as objects. As we mentioned in Chapter 1,
    theories are constructed in part to explain phenomena. Existentialists are generally
    opposed to this approach. Authentic experience takes precedence over artificial
    explanations. When experiences are molded into some preexisting theoretical
    model, they lose their authenticity and become divorced from the individual who
    experienced them.
    Basic Concepts
    Before proceeding to Rollo May’s view of humanity, we pause to look at two basic
    concepts of existentialism, namely, being-in-the-world and nonbeing.
    Being-in-the-World
    Existentialists adopt a phenomenological approach to understanding humanity. To
    them, we exist in a world that can be best understood from our own perspective.
    When scientists study people from an external frame of reference, they violate both
    the subjects and their existential world. The basic unity of person and environment
    is expressed in the German word Dasein, meaning to exist there. Hence, Dasein
    literally means to exist in the world and is generally written as being-in-the-world.
    The hyphens in this term imply a oneness of subject and object, of person and world.
    Many people suffer from anxiety and despair brought on by their alienation
    from themselves or from their world. They either have no clear image of them-
    selves or they feel isolated from a world that seems distant and foreign. They have

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories330
    no sense of Dasein, no unity of self and world. As people strive to gain power
    over nature, they lose touch with their relationship to the natural world. As they
    come to rely on the products of the industrial revolution, they become more alien-
    ated from the stars, the soil, and the sea. Alienation from the world includes being
    out of touch with one’s own body as well. Recall that Rollo May began his recov-
    ery from tuberculosis only after realizing that it was he who had the illness.
    This feeling of isolation and alienation of self from the world is suffered not
    only by pathologically disturbed individuals but also by most individuals in mod-
    ern societies. Alienation is the illness of our time, and it manifests itself in three
    areas: (1) separation from nature, (2) lack of meaningful interpersonal relations,
    and (3) alienation from one’s authentic self. Thus, people experience three simul-
    taneous modes in their being-in-the-world: Umwelt, or the environment around us;
    Mitwelt, or our relations with other people; and Eigenwelt, or our relationship with
    our self.
    Umwelt is the world of objects and things and would exist even if people
    had no awareness. It is the world of nature and natural law and includes biological
    drives, such as hunger and sleep, and such natural phenomena as birth and death.
    We cannot escape Umwelt; we must learn to live in the world around us and to
    adjust to changes within this world. Freud’s theory, with its emphasis on biology
    and instincts, deals mostly with Umwelt.
    But we do not live only in Umwelt. We also live in the world with
    people, that is, Mitwelt. We must relate to people as people, not as things. If
    we treat people as objects, then we are living solely in Umwelt. The difference
    between Umwelt and Mitwelt can be seen by contrasting sex with love. If a
    person uses another as an instrument for sexual gratification, then that person
    is living in Umwelt, at least in his or her relationship to that other person.
    However, love demands that one make a commitment to the other person. Love
    means respect for the other person’s being-in-the-world, an unconditional
    acceptance of that person. Not every Mitwelt relationship, however, necessi-
    tates love. The essential criterion is that the Dasein of the other person is
    respected. The theory of Rogers, with its emphasis on interpersonal relations,
    deals mostly with Mitwelt.
    Eigenwelt refers to one’s relationship with oneself. It is a world not usually
    explored by personality theorists. To live in Eigenwelt means to be aware of one-
    self as a human being and to grasp who we are as we relate to the world of things
    and to the world of people. What does this sunset mean to me? How is this other
    person a part of my life? What characteristics of mine allow me to love this person?
    How do I perceive this experience?
    Healthy people live in Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt simultaneously (see
    Figure 11.1). They adapt to the natural world, relate to others as humans, and have
    a keen awareness of what all these experiences mean to them (May, 1958a).
    Nonbeing
    Being-in-the-world necessitates an awareness of self as a living, emerging being.
    This awareness, in turn, leads to the dread of not being: that is, nonbeing or noth-
    ingness. May (1958a) wrote that

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 331
    to grasp what it means to exist, one needs to grasp the fact that he might not
    exist, that he treads at every moment on the sharp edge of possible annihilation
    and can never escape the fact that death will arrive at some unknown moment
    in the future. (pp. 47– 48)
    Death is not the only avenue of nonbeing, but it is the most obvious one.
    Life becomes more vital, more meaningful when we confront the possibility of our
    death. Nearly 40 years before his own death, May (1958a) spoke of death as “the
    one fact of my life which is not relative but absolute, and my awareness of this
    gives my existence and what I do each hour an absolute quality” (p. 49).
    When we do not courageously confront our nonbeing by contemplating
    death, we nevertheless will experience nonbeing in other forms, including addiction
    to alcohol or other drugs, promiscuous sexual activity, and other compulsive behav-
    iors. Our nonbeing can also be expressed as blind conformity to society’s expecta-
    tions or as generalized hostility that pervades our relations to others.
    Eigenwelt
    MitweltUmwelt
    FIGURE 11.1 Healthy People Live Simultaneously in Umwelt, Mitwelt, and
    Eigenwelt.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories332
    The fear of death or nonbeing often provokes us to live defensively and to receive
    less from life than if we would confront the issue of our nonexistence. As May (1991)
    said, “we are afraid of nonbeing and so we shrivel up our being” (p. 202). We flee
    from making active choices; that is, we make choices without considering who we are
    and what we want. We may try to avoid the dread of nonbeing by dimming our self-
    awareness and denying our individuality, but such choices leave us with feelings of
    despair and emptiness. Thus, we escape the dread of nonbeing at the expense of a
    constricted existence. A healthier alternative is to face the inevitability of death and to
    realize that nonbeing is an inseparable part of being.
    The Case of Philip
    Existential psychology is concerned with the individual’s struggle to work through
    life’s experiences and to grow toward becoming more fully human. May (1981)
    described this struggle in a report on one of his patients—Philip, the architect we
    met in the chapter opening. Here, we continue with Philip’s story; and later we
    use his experiences to illustrate May’s concepts of anxiety, intentionality, destiny,
    psychopathology, and psychotherapy.
    When Nicole told Philip that, as he well knew, she could never leave him,
    Philip was surprised and confused because he knew no such thing. About a year
    later, Philip learned that Nicole had had another affair; but before he could confront
    her and break off their relationship, he had to leave for a 5-day business trip. By
    the time he returned, Philip was able to reason that perhaps he could accept
    Nicole’s right to sleep with other men. Also, Nicole convinced him that the other
    man didn’t mean anything to her and that she loved only Philip.
    A little later, Nicole had a third affair, one that she made sure Philip would
    discover. Once again, Philip was filled with anger and jealousy. But once again,
    Nicole reassured him that the man meant nothing to her.
    On one level, Philip wished to accept Nicole’s behavior, but on another, he
    felt betrayed by her affairs. Yet, he did not seem to be able to leave her and to
    search for another woman to love. He was paralyzed—unable to change his rela-
    tionship with Nicole but also unable to break it off. At this point in Philip’s life,
    he sought therapy from Rollo May.
    Anxiety
    Philip was suffering from neurotic anxiety. Like others who experience neurotic
    anxiety, he behaved in a nonproductive, self-defeating manner. Although he was
    deeply hurt by Nicole’s unpredictable and “crazy” behavior, he became paralyzed
    with inaction and could not break off their relationship. Nicole’s actions seemed
    to engender in Philip a sense of duty toward her. Because she obviously needed
    him, he felt obligated to take care of her.
    Before May published The Meaning of Anxiety in 1950, most theories of
    anxiety held that high levels of anxiety were indicative of neuroses or other forms
    of psychopathology. Just prior to publishing this book, May had experienced a great
    deal of anxiety while recovering from tuberculosis. He and his first wife and their
    young son were basically penniless, and he was unsure of his own recovery. In The
    Meaning of Anxiety, May claimed that much of human behavior is motivated by an

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 333
    underlying sense of dread and anxiety. The failure to confront death serves as a
    temporary escape from the anxiety or dread of nonbeing. But the escape cannot be
    permanent. Death is the one absolute of life that sooner or later everyone must face.
    People experience anxiety when they become aware that their existence or
    some value identified with it might be destroyed. May (1958a) defined anxiety as
    “the subjective state of the individual’s becoming aware that his [or her] existence
    can be destroyed, that he can become ‘nothing’” (p. 50). At another time, May
    (1967) called anxiety a threat to some important value. Anxiety, then, can spring
    either from an awareness of one’s nonbeing or from a threat to some value essen-
    tial to one’s existence. It exists when one confronts the issue of fulfilling one’s
    potentialities. This confrontation can lead to stagnation and decay, but it can also
    result in growth and change.
    The acquisition of freedom inevitably leads to anxiety. Freedom cannot exist
    without anxiety, nor can anxiety exist without freedom. May (1981, p. 185) quoted
    Kierkegaard as saying that “anxiety is the dizziness of freedom.” Anxiety, like
    dizziness, can be either pleasurable or painful, constructive or destructive. It can
    give people energy and zest, but it can also paralyze and panic them. Moreover,
    anxiety can be either normal or neurotic.
    Normal Anxiety
    No one can escape the effects of anxiety. To grow and to change one’s values
    means to experience constructive or normal anxiety. May (1967) defined normal
    anxiety as that “which is proportionate to the threat, does not involve repression,
    and can be confronted constructively on the conscious level” (p. 80).
    As people grow from infancy to old age, their values change, and with
    each step, they experience normal anxiety. “All growth consists of the anxiety-
    creating surrender of past values” (May, 1967, p. 80). Normal anxiety is also
    experienced during those creative moments when an artist, a scientist, or a
    philosopher suddenly achieves an insight that leads to a recognition that one’s
    life, and perhaps the lives of countless others, will be permanently changed. For
    example, scientists who witnessed the first atomic bomb tests in Alamogordo,
    New Mexico, experi-
    enced normal anxiety
    with the realization that,
    from that moment for-
    ward, everything had
    changed (May, 1981).
    Neurotic Anxiety
    Normal anxiety, the
    type experienced during
    periods of growth or of
    threat to one’s values, is
    experienced by every-
    one. It can be construc-
    tive provided it remains
    Normal anxiety is proportionate to the threat and can be
    constructive. © Amble Design/Shutterstock

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories334
    proportionate to the threat. But anxiety can become neurotic or sick. May (1967)
    defined neurotic anxiety as “a reaction which is disproportionate to the threat,
    involves repression and other forms of intrapsychic conflict, and is managed by
    various kinds of blocking-off of activity and awareness” (p. 80).
    Whereas normal anxiety is felt whenever values are threatened, neurotic
    anxiety is experienced whenever values become transformed into dogma. To be
    absolutely right in one’s beliefs provides temporary security, but it is security
    “bought at the price of surrendering [one’s] opportunity for fresh learning and new
    growth” (May, 1967, p. 80).
    Philip’s neurotic anxiety was evident in his attachment to unpredictable and
    “crazy” women, an attachment that began in early childhood. During the first
    2 years of his life, his world was inhabited primarily by just two other people—his
    mother and a sister two years older than Philip. His mother was a borderline
    schizophrenic whose behavior toward Philip alternated between tenderness and
    cruelty. His sister was definitely schizophrenic and later spent some time in a
    mental hospital. So Philip learned early that he had to attach himself to women
    but also that he had to rescue them as well. “Life, then, for Philip would under-
    standably not be free, but rather would require that he be continuously on guard
    or on duty” (May, 1981, p. 30).
    Philip’s neurotic anxiety blocked any new and successful ways of behaving
    toward Nicole. His approach seemed to be a recapitulation of childhood behaviors
    toward his mother and sister.
    Guilt
    Anxiety arises when people are faced with the problem of fulfilling their poten-
    tialities. Guilt arises when people deny their potentialities, fail to accurately
    perceive the needs of fellow humans, or remain oblivious to their dependence on
    the natural world (May, 1958a). Just as May used the term “anxiety” to refer to
    large issues dealing with one’s being-in-the-world, so too did he employ the
    concept of guilt. In this sense, both anxiety and guilt are ontological; that is,
    they refer to the nature of being and not to feelings arising from specific situa-
    tions or transgressions.
    In all, May (1958a) recognized three forms of ontological guilt, each cor-
    responding to one of the three modes of being-in-the-world, that is, Umwelt,
    Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt. To understand the form of guilt that corresponds to
    Umwelt, recall that ontological guilt need not stem from one’s own actions or
    failures to act; it can arise from a lack of awareness of one’s being-in-the-world.
    As civilization advances technologically, people become more and more removed
    from nature, that is, from Umwelt. This alienation leads to a form of ontological
    guilt that is especially prevalent in “advanced” societies where people live in
    heated or cooled dwellings, use motorized means of transportation, and consume
    food gathered and prepared by others. People’s undiscerning reliance on others
    for these and other needs contributes to one’s first form of ontological guilt.
    Because this type of guilt is a result of our separation from nature, May (1958a)
    also referred to it as separation guilt, a concept similar to Fromm’s notion of the
    human dilemma (see Chapter 8).

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 335
    The second form of guilt stems from our inability to perceive accurately the
    world of others (Mitwelt). We can see other people only through our own eyes and
    can never perfectly judge the needs of these other people. Thus, we do violence to
    their true identity. Because we cannot unerringly anticipate the needs of others, we
    feel inadequate in our relations with them. This then leads to a pervasive condition
    of guilt, which is experienced by all of us to some extent. May (1958a) wrote that
    “this is not a question of moral failure . . . it is an inescapable result of the fact that
    each of us is a separate individuality and has no choice but to look at the world
    through [our] own eyes” (p. 54).
    The third form of ontological guilt is associated with our denial of our own
    potentialities or with our failure to fulfill them. In other words, this guilt is grounded
    in our relationship with self (Eigenwelt). Again, this form of guilt is universal,
    because none of us can completely fulfill all our potentials. This third type of guilt
    is reminiscent of Maslow’s concept of the Jonah complex, or the fear of being or
    doing one’s best (see Chapter 9).
    Like anxiety, ontological guilt can have either a positive or a negative effect
    on personality. We can use this guilt to develop a healthy sense of humility, to
    improve our relations with others, and to creatively use our potentialities. However,
    when we refuse to accept ontological guilt, it becomes neurotic or morbid. Neurotic
    guilt, like neurotic anxiety, leads to nonproductive or neurotic symptoms such as
    sexual impotence, depression, cruelty to others, or inability to make a choice.
    Intentionality
    The ability to make a choice implies some underlying structure upon which that
    choice is made. The structure that gives meaning to experience and allows people
    to make decisions about the future is called intentionality (May, 1969b). Without
    intentionality, people could neither choose nor act on their choice. Action implies
    intentionality, just as intentionality implies action; the two are inseparable.
    May used the term “intentionality” to bridge the gap between subject and object.
    Intentionality is “the structure of meaning which makes it possible for us, subjects that
    we are, to see and understand the outside world, objective that it is. In intentionality,
    the dichotomy between subject and object is partially overcome” (May, 1969b, p. 225).
    To illustrate how intentionality partially bridges the gap between subject and
    object, May (1969b) used a simple example of a man (the subject) seated at his
    desk observing a piece of paper (the object). The man can write on the paper, fold
    it into a paper airplane for his grandson, or sketch a picture on it. In all three
    instances, the subject (man) and object (paper) are identical, but the man’s actions
    depend on his intentions and on the meaning he gives to his experience. That
    meaning is a function of both himself (subject) and his environment (object).
    Intentionality is sometimes unconscious. For example, when Philip felt a duty
    to take care of Nicole despite her unpredictable and “crazy” behavior, he did not
    see that his actions were in some way connected to his early experiences with his
    unpredictable mother and his “crazy” sister. He was trapped in his unconscious
    belief that unpredictable and “crazy” women must be cared for, and this intention-
    ality made it impossible for him to discover new ways of relating to Nicole.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories336
    Care, Love, and Will
    Philip had a history of taking care of others, especially women. He had given
    Nicole a “job” with his company that permitted her to work at home and earn
    enough money to live on. In addition, after she ended her affair with Craig and
    gave up her “crazy” plan to move across the country, Philip gave her several
    thousand dollars. He previously had felt a duty to take care of his two wives and,
    before that, his mother and sister.
    In spite of Philip’s pattern of taking care of women, he never really learned
    to care for them. To care for someone means to recognize that person as a fellow
    human being, to identify with that person’s pain or joy, guilt or pity. Care is an
    active process, the opposite of apathy. “Care is a state in which something does
    matter” (May, 1969b, p. 289).
    Care is not the same as love, but it is the source of love. To love means to
    care, to recognize the essential humanity of the other person, to have an active
    regard for that person’s development. May (1953) defined love as a “delight in the
    presence of the other person and an affirming of [that person’s] value and develop-
    ment as much as one’s own” (p. 206). Without care there can be no love—only
    empty sentimentality or transient sexual arousal. Care is also the source of will.
    May (1969b) called will “the capacity to organize one’s self so that move-
    ment in a certain direction or toward a certain goal may take place” (p. 218). He
    distinguished between will and wish, saying that
    “will” requires self-consciousness; “wish” does not. “Will” implies some
    possibility of either/or choice; “wish” does not. “Wish” gives the warmth, the
    content, the imagination, the child’s play, the freshness, and the richness to
    “will.” “Will” gives the self-direction, the maturity to “wish.” “Will” protects
    “wish,” permits it to continue without running risks which are too great. (p. 218)
    Union of Love and Will
    Modern society, May (1969b) claimed, is suffering from an unhealthy division of
    love and will. Love has become associated with sensual love or sex, whereas will
    has come to mean a dogged determination or will power. Neither concept captures
    the true meaning of these two terms. When love is seen as sex, it becomes tem-
    porary and lacking in commitment; there is no will, but only wish. When will is
    seen as will power, it becomes self-serving and lacking in passion; there is no care,
    but only manipulation.
    There are biological reasons why love and will are separated. When children
    first come into the world, they are at one with the universe (Umwelt), their mother
    (Mitwelt), and themselves (Eigenwelt). “Our needs are met without self-conscious
    effort on our part, as, biologically, in the early condition of nursing at the mother’s
    breast. This is the first freedom, the first ‘yes’ ” (May, 1969b, p. 284).
    Later, as will begins to develop, it manifests itself as opposition, the first
    “no.” The blissful existence of early infancy is now opposed by the emerging
    willfulness of late infancy. The “no” should not be seen as a statement against
    the parents but rather as a positive assertion of self. Unfortunately, parents often
    interpret the “no” negatively and therefore stifle the child’s self-assertion. As a

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 337
    result, children learn to disassociate will from the blissful love they had previ-
    ously enjoyed.
    Our task, said May (1969b, 1990b), is to unite love and will. This task is
    not easy, but it is possible. Neither blissful love nor self-serving will have a role
    in the uniting of love and will. For the mature person, both love and will mean a
    reaching out toward another person. Both involve care, both necessitate choice,
    both imply action, and both require responsibility.
    Forms of Love
    May (1969b) identified four kinds of love in Western tradition—sex, eros, philia,
    and agape.
    Sex
    Sex is a biological function that can be satisfied through sexual intercourse or some
    other release of sexual tension. Although it has become cheapened in modern
    Western societies, “it still remains the power of procreation, the drive which per-
    petuates the race, the source at once of the human being’s most intense pleasure
    and his [or her] most pervasive anxiety” (May, 1969b, p. 38).
    May believed that in ancient times sex was taken for granted, just as eating
    and sleeping were taken for granted. In modern times, sex has become a problem.
    First, during the Victorian period, Western societies generally denied sexual feel-
    ings, and sex was not a topic of conversation in polite company. Then, during the
    1920s, people reacted against this sexual suppression; sex suddenly came into the
    open and much of Western society was preoccupied with it. May (1969b) pointed
    out that society went from a period when having sex was fraught with guilt and
    anxiety to a time when not having it brought about guilt and anxiety.
    Eros
    In the United States, sex is frequently confused with eros. Sex is a physiological need
    that seeks gratification through the release of tension. Eros is a psychological desire
    that seeks procreation or creation through an enduring union with a loved one. Eros
    is making love; sex is manipulating organs. Eros is the wish to establish a lasting
    union; sex is the desire to experience pleasure. Eros “takes wings from human imag-
    ination and is forever transcending all techniques, giving the laugh to all the ‘how to’
    books by gaily swinging into orbit above our mechanical rules” (May, 1969b, p. 74).
    Eros is built on care and tenderness. It longs to establish an enduring union with
    the other person, such that both partners experience delight and passion and both are
    broadened and deepened by the experience. Because the human species could not
    survive without desire for a lasting union, eros can be regarded as the salvation of sex.
    Philia
    Eros, the salvation of sex, is built on the foundation of philia, that is, an intimate
    nonsexual friendship between two people. Philia cannot be rushed; it takes time to
    grow, to develop, to sink its roots. Examples of philia would be the slowly evolv-
    ing love between siblings or between lifelong friends. “Philia does not require that

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories338
    we do anything for the beloved except accept him, be with him, and enjoy him. It
    is friendship in the simplest, most direct terms” (May, 1969a, p. 31).
    Harry Stack Sullivan placed great importance on preadolescence, that devel-
    opmental epoch characterized by the need for a chum, someone who is more or
    less like oneself. According to Sullivan, chumship or philia is a necessary requisite
    for healthy erotic relationships during early and late adolescence. May, who was
    influenced by Sullivan at the William Alanson White Institute, agreed that philia
    makes eros possible. The gradual, relaxed development of true friendship is a
    prerequisite for the enduring union of two people.
    Agape
    Just as eros depends on philia, so philia needs agape. May (1969b) defined agape
    as “esteem for the other, the concern for the other’s welfare beyond any gain that
    one can get out of it; disinterested love, typically, the love of God for man” (p. 319).
    Agape is altruistic love. It is a kind of spiritual love that carries with it the
    risk of playing God. It does not depend on any behaviors or characteristics of the
    other person. In this sense, it is undeserved and unconditional.
    In summary, healthy adult relationships blend all four forms of love. They are
    based on sexual satisfaction, a desire for an enduring union, genuine friendship,
    and an unselfish concern for the welfare of the other person. Such authentic love,
    unfortunately, is quite difficult. It requires self-affirmation and the assertion of
    oneself. “At the same time it requires tenderness, affirmation of the other, relaxing
    of competition as much as possible, self-abnegation at times in the interests of the
    loved one, and the age-old virtues of mercy and forgiveness” (May, 1981, p. 147).
    Freedom and Destiny
    A blend of the four forms of love requires both self-assertion and an affirmation
    of the other person. It also requires an assertion of one’s freedom and a confronta-
    tion with one’s destiny. Healthy individuals are able both to assume their freedom
    and to face their destiny.
    Freedom Defined
    In an early definition, May (1967) said that “freedom is the individual’s capac-
    ity to know that he is the determined one” (p. 175). The word “determined” in
    this definition is synonymous with what May (1981) would later call destiny.
    Freedom, then, comes from an understanding of our destiny: an understanding
    that death is a possibility at any moment, that we are male or female, that we
    have inherent weaknesses, that early childhood experiences dispose us toward
    certain patterns of behavior.
    Freedom is the possibility of changing, although we may not know what those
    changes might be. Freedom “entails being able to harbor different possibilities in
    one’s mind even though it is not clear at the moment which way one must act”
    (May, 1981, pp. 10–11). This condition often leads to increases in anxiety, but it is
    normal anxiety, the kind that healthy people welcome and are able to manage.

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 339
    Forms of Freedom
    May (1981) recognized two forms of freedom—freedom of doing and freedom of
    being. The first he called existential freedom; the latter, essential freedom.
    Existential Freedom
    Existential freedom should not be identified with existential philosophy. It is the
    freedom of action—the freedom of doing. Most middle-class adult Americans
    enjoy large measures of existential freedom. They are free to travel across state
    lines, to choose their associates, to vote for their representatives in government,
    and so on. On a more trivial scale, they are free to push their shopping carts
    through a supermarket and select from among thousands of items. Existential free-
    dom, then, is the freedom to act on the choices that one makes.
    Essential Freedom
    Freedom to act, to move around does not ensure essential freedom: that is, freedom
    of being. In fact, existential freedom often makes essential freedom more difficult. For
    example, prisoners and inmates in concentration camps often speak enthusiastically of
    their “inner freedom,” despite experiencing very limited existential freedom. Thus,
    physical confinement or the denial of liberty seems to allow people to face their destiny
    and to gain their freedom of being. In 1981, May (1981, p. 60) asked: “Do we get to
    essential freedom only when our everyday existence is interrupted?” May’s own answer
    was “no.” One need not be imprisoned to attain essential freedom, that is, freedom of
    being. Destiny itself is our prison—our concentration camp that allows us to be less
    concerned with freedom of doing and more concerned with essential freedom.
    Does not the engaging of our destiny—which is the design of our life—hedge
    us about with the confinement, the sobriety, indeed, often the cruelty, which
    forces us to look beyond the limits of day-to-day action? Is not the inescapable
    fact of death . . . the concentration camp of us all? Is not the fact that life is a
    joy and a bondage at the same time enough to drive us to consider the deeper
    aspect of being? (May, 1981, p. 61)
    What Is Destiny?
    May (1981) defined destiny as “the design of the universe speaking through the
    design of each one of us” (p. 90). Our ultimate destiny is death, but on a lesser
    scale our destiny includes other biological properties such as intelligence, gender,
    size and strength, and genetic predisposition toward certain illnesses. In addition,
    psychological and cultural factors contribute to our destiny.
    Destiny does not mean preordained or foredoomed. It is our destination, our
    terminus, our goal. Within the boundaries of our destiny, we have the power to
    choose, and this power allows us to confront and challenge our destiny. It does
    not, however, permit any change we wish. We cannot be successful at any job,
    conquer any illness, enjoy a fulfilling relationship with any person. We cannot
    erase our destiny, “but we can choose how we shall respond, how we shall live
    out our talents which confront us” (May, 1981, p. 89).

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories340
    May suggested that freedom and destiny, like love-hate or life-death, are not
    antithetical but rather a normal paradox of life. “The paradox is that freedom owes
    its vitality to destiny, and destiny owes its significance to freedom” (May, 1981,
    p. 17). Freedom and destiny are thus inexorably intertwined; one cannot exist
    without the other. Freedom without destiny is unruly license. Ironically, license
    leads to anarchy and the ultimate destruction of freedom. Without destiny, then,
    we have no freedom, but without freedom our destiny is meaningless.
    Freedom and destiny give birth to each other. As we challenge our destiny,
    we gain freedom, and as we achieve freedom, we push at the boundaries of destiny.
    Philip’s Destiny
    When Philip, the architect immobilized by his relationship with Nicole, first sought
    Rollo May as his therapist, he was paralyzed with inaction because he had refused
    to accept his destiny. He saw no connection between his adult pattern of relating
    to women and his childhood strategy of getting along in an unpredictable and
    “crazy” world. His destiny, however, was not fixed by those early experiences.
    Philip, like other people, had the freedom to change his destiny, but first he had
    to recognize his biological, social, and psychological limitations; and then he had
    to possess the courage to make choices within those limitations.
    Philip lacked both the understanding and the courage to confront his destiny.
    Up to the point of seeking therapy, he had tried to compensate for his destiny, to
    consciously deny it. “He had been searching for someone who would make up for
    his having been born into an unwelcoming world consisting of a disturbed mother
    and a schizophrenic sister, a destiny that he did not in the slightest choose” (May,
    1981, p. 88). Philip’s denial of his destiny left him resentful and confused. His
    inability or unwillingness to face his destiny robbed him of personal freedom and
    kept him tied to his mother.
    Philip treated his wives and Nicole in the same way that earlier had proven
    successful with his mother and sister. He could not dare express his anger to
    women, but instead, he adopted a charming though somewhat possessive and pro-
    tective attitude toward them. May (1981) insisted that “the freedom of each of us
    is in proportion to the degree with which we confront and live in relation to our
    destiny” (p. 89). After several weeks of psychotherapy, Philip was able to stop
    blaming his mother for not doing what he thought she should have done. When
    he began to see the positive things she did for him, he began to change his attitude
    toward her. The objective facts of his childhood had not changed, but his subjective
    perceptions had. As Philip came to terms with his destiny, he began to be able to
    express his anger, to feel less trapped in his relationship with Nicole, and to become
    more aware of his possibilities. In other words, he gained his freedom of being.
    The Power of Myth
    For many years, May was concerned with the powerful effects of myths on indi-
    viduals and cultures—a concern that culminated in his book The Cry for Myth
    (1991). May contended that the people of Western civilization have an urgent need
    for myths. Lacking myths to believe in, they have turned to religious cults, drug

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 341
    addiction, and popular culture in a
    vain effort to find meaning in their
    lives. Myths are not falsehoods;
    rather, they are conscious and
    unconscious belief systems that pro-
    vide explanations for personal and
    social problems. May (1991) com-
    pared myths to the support beams in
    a house—not visible from the out-
    side, but they hold the house
    together and make it habitable.
    From earliest times and in
    diverse civilizations, people have
    found meaning in their lives by the
    myths they share with others in their
    culture. Myths are the stories that
    unify a society; “they are essential
    to the process of keeping our souls
    alive and bringing us new meaning
    in a difficult and often meaningless
    world” (May, 1991, p. 20).
    May believed that people
    communicate with one another on
    two levels. The first is rationalistic
    language, and on this level, truth
    takes precedence over the people who are communicating. The second is through
    myths, and on this level, the total human experience is more important than the
    empirical accuracy of the communication. People use myths and symbols to transcend
    the immediate concrete situation, to expand self-awareness, and to search for identity.
    May (1990a, 1991) believed that the Oedipus story is a powerful myth in
    our culture because it contains elements of existential crises common to everyone.
    These crises include (1) birth, (2) separation or exile from parents and home,
    (3) sexual union with one parent and hostility toward the other, (4) the assertion
    of independence and the search for identity, and (5) death. The Oedipus myth has
    meaning for people because it deals with each of these five crises. Like Oedipus,
    people are removed from their mother and father and are driven by the need for
    self-knowledge. People’s struggle for self-identity, however, is not easy, and it may
    even result in tragedy, as it did for Oedipus when he insisted on knowing the truth
    about his origins. After being told that he had killed his father and married his
    mother, Oedipus put out his eyes, depriving himself of the ability to see, that is,
    to be aware, to be conscious.
    But the Oedipus narration does not end with denial of consciousness. At this
    point in Sophocles’ trilogy, Oedipus once again is exiled, an experience May saw
    as symbolic of people’s own isolation and ostracism. As an old man, Oedipus is
    seen contemplating his tragic suffering and accepting responsibility for killing his
    father and marrying his mother. His meditations during old age bring him peace
    and understanding and the ability to accept death with grace. The central themes
    The Oedipus myth holds meaning for people even
    today because it deals with existential crises common
    to everyone. © Alinari Archives/The Image Works

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories342
    of Oedipus’s life—birth, exile and separation, identity, incest and patricide, repres-
    sion of guilt, and finally, conscious meditation and death—touch everyone and
    make this myth a potentially powerful healing force in people’s lives.
    May’s concept of myths is comparable to Carl Jung’s idea of a collective
    un conscious in that myths are archetypal patterns in the human experience; they are
    avenues to universal images that lie beyond individual experience (see Chapter 4).
    And like archetypes, myths can contribute to psychological growth if people will
    embrace them and allow them to open up a new reality. Tragically, many people
    deny their universal myths and thus risk alienation, apathy, and emptiness—the
    principal ingredients of psychopathology.
    Psychopathology
    According to May, apathy and emptiness—not anxiety and guilt—are the malaise
    of modern times. When people deny their destiny or abandon their myths, they
    lose their purpose for being; they become directionless. Without some goal or
    destination, people become sick and engage in a variety of self-defeating and self-
    destructive behaviors.
    Many people in modern Western societies feel alienated from the world
    (Umwelt), from others (Mitwelt), and especially from themselves (Eigenwelt). They
    feel helpless to prevent natural disasters, to reverse industrialization, or to make
    contact with another human being. They feel insignificant in a world that increas-
    ingly dehumanizes the individual. This sense of insignificance leads to apathy and
    to a state of diminished consciousness (May, 1967).
    May saw psychopathology as lack of communication—the inability to know
    others and to share oneself with them. Psychologically disturbed individuals deny
    their destiny and thus lose their freedom. They erect a variety of neurotic symp-
    toms, not to regain their freedom, but to renounce it. Symptoms narrow the per-
    son’s phenomenological world to the size that makes coping easier. The compulsive
    person adopts a rigid routine, thereby making new choices unnecessary.
    Symptoms may be temporary, as when stress produces a headache, or they may
    be relatively permanent, as when early childhood experiences produce apathy and
    emptiness. Philip’s psychopathology was tied to his early environment with a dis-
    turbed mother and a schizophrenic sister. These experiences did not cause his pathol-
    ogy in the sense that they alone produced it. However, they did set up Philip to learn
    to adjust to his world by suppressing his anger, by developing a sense of apathy, and
    by trying to be a “good little boy.” Neurotic symptoms, therefore, do not represent a
    failure of adjustment, but rather a proper and necessary adjustment by which one’s
    Dasein can be preserved. Philip’s behavior toward his two wives and Nicole represents
    a denial of his freedom and a self-defeating attempt to escape from his destiny.
    Psychotherapy
    Unlike Freud, Adler, Rogers, and other clinically oriented personality theorists,
    May did not establish a school of psychotherapy with avid followers and identifi-
    able techniques. Nevertheless, he wrote extensively on the subject, rejecting the

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 343
    idea that psychotherapy should reduce anxiety and ease feelings of guilt. Instead,
    he suggested that psychotherapy should make people more human: that is, help
    them expand their consciousness so that they will be in a better position to make
    choices (M. H. Hall, 1967). These choices, then, lead to the simultaneous growth
    of freedom and responsibility.
    May believed that the purpose of psychotherapy is to set people free. He
    argued that therapists who concentrate on a patient’s symptoms are missing the
    more important picture. Neurotic symptoms are simply ways of running away from
    freedom and an indication that patients’ inner possibilities are not being used.
    When patients become more free, more human, their neurotic symptoms usually
    disappear, their neurotic anxiety gives way to normal anxiety, and their neurotic
    guilt is replaced by normal guilt. But these gains are secondary and not the central
    purpose of therapy. May insisted that psychotherapy must be concerned with help-
    ing people experience their existence, and that relieving symptoms is merely a
    by-product of that experience.
    How does a therapist help patients become free, responsible human beings?
    May did not offer many specific directions for therapists to follow. Existential
    therapists have no special set of techniques or methods that can be applied to all
    patients. Instead, they have only themselves, their own humanity to offer. They
    must establish a one-to-one relationship (Mitwelt) that enables patients to become
    more aware of themselves and to live more fully in their own world (Eigenwelt).
    This approach may mean challenging patients to confront their destiny, to experi-
    ence despair, anxiety, and guilt. But it also means establishing an I-thou encounter
    in which both therapist and patient are viewed as subjects rather than objects. In
    an I-thou relationship, the therapist has empathy for the patient’s experience and
    is open to the patient’s subjective world.
    May (1991) also described therapy as partly religion, partly science, and
    partly friendship. The friendship, however, is not an ordinary social relationship; rather,
    it calls for the therapist to be confronting and to challenge the patient. May believed
    that the relationship itself is therapeutic, and its transforming effects are independent
    of anything therapists might say or any theoretical orientation they might have.
    Our task is to be guide, friend, and interpreter to persons on their journeys
    through their private hells and purgatories. Specifically our task is to help
    patients get to the point where they can decide whether they wish to remain
    victims . . . or whether they choose to leave this victim-state and venture
    through purgatory with the hope of achieving some sense of paradise. Our
    patients often, toward the end, are understandably frightened by the possibility
    of freely deciding for themselves whether to take their chances by completing
    the quest they have bravely begun. (May, 1991, p. 165)
    Philosophically, May held many of the same beliefs as Carl Rogers (see
    Chapter 10). Basic to both approaches is the notion of therapy as a human encoun-
    ter: that is, an I-thou relationship with the potential to facilitate growth within both
    the therapist and the patient. In practice, however, May was much more likely to
    ask questions, to delve into a patient’s early childhood, and to suggest possible
    meanings of current behavior.
    For example, he explained to Philip that his relationship with Nicole was an
    attempt to hold on to his mother. Rogers would have rejected such a technique

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories344
    because it emanated from an external (i.e., the therapist’s) frame of reference. May,
    however, believed that these kinds of interpretations can be an effective means of
    confronting patients with information that they have been hiding from themselves.
    Another technique May used with Philip was the suggestion that he hold a
    fantasy conversation with his dead mother. In this conversation, Philip spoke for
    both himself and his mother. When talking for his mother, he was able for the first
    time to empathize with her, to see Philip from his mother’s point of view. Speak-
    ing for his mother, he said that she was very proud of him and that he had always
    been her favorite child. Then talking for himself, he told his mother that he appre-
    ciated her courage and recalled an incident when her courage saved his eyesight.
    When Philip finished the fantasy conversation, he said, ‘“I never in a thousand
    years would have imagined that would come out’” (May, 1981, p. 39).
    May also asked Philip to bring a photo of himself when he was a little boy.
    Philip then had a fantasy conversation with “Little Philip.” As the conversation
    ensued, “Little Philip” explained that he had triumphed over the problem that had
    most troubled grown Philip, namely, the fear of abandonment. “Little Philip”
    became Philip’s friendly companion and helped him overcome his loneliness and
    allay his jealousy of Nicole.
    At the end of therapy, Philip did not become a new person, but he did become
    more conscious of a part of himself that had been there all the time. An awareness
    of new possibilities allowed him to move in the direction of personal freedom. For
    Philip, the end of therapy was the beginning of “the uniting of himself with that
    early self that he had had to lock up in a dungeon in order to survive when life
    was not happy but threatening” (May, 1981, p. 41).
    Related Research
    Rollo May’s existential theory has been moderately influential as a method of
    psychotherapy, but it has sparked almost no direct empirical research. This state
    of affairs is no doubt related to the critical stance that May adopted toward objec-
    tive and quantitative measurement. Any theory that emphasizes the connection
    between subject and object and the uniqueness of each individual will not be
    conducive to large sample research with experimental or questionnaire design. In
    fact, May argued that modern science is too rationalistic, too objective, and that a
    new science is needed in order to grasp the total, living person.
    One existential topic to receive some empirical attention has been existential
    anxiety. May (1967) defined anxiety as “the apprehension cued off by a threat to
    some value which the individual holds essential to his [or her] existence as a self”
    (p. 72). When events threaten our physical or psychological existence, we experi-
    ence existential anxiety, and strongest among the threats to our existence is death.
    Indeed, May and Yalom (1989) argued that “a major developmental task is to deal
    with the terror of obliteration” (p. 367). In a sense, life is the process of coping
    with and confronting death.
    An existential approach to the study of terror and death has carried over into
    “terror management,” a modern experimental offshoot of existential psychology. A
    conceptual bridge between existential psychology and terror management theory
    (TMT) was provided by the American psychiatrist Ernest Becker, who was inspired

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 345
    by Kierkegaard and Otto Rank. A basic argument of these existentialists (as well
    as writers such as Camus and Sartre) is that humans are first and foremost motivated
    by fear of death. Moreover, many of these thinkers see human creativity, culture,
    and meaning as unconscious defenses against mortality. The work of Becker, in
    particular, has been a major source of inspiration for terror management theorists.
    Threats in the Umwelt: Mortality Salience and Denial of
    Our Animal Nature
    Terror management theory has taken this basic assumption and tested it by con-
    ducting some of the more clever and well-designed experimental studies in recent
    social and personality psychology.
    Although humans are part of the animal kingdom and hence mortal, they are
    unique in understanding of the world and unique in realizing their own uniqueness.
    Humans have long believed that they are more than just bodies—they have a soul,
    a spirit, a mind.
    Over the centuries, humans have learned to disavow their corporeal selves.
    For example, bodily functions continue to be among the most taboo and heavily
    sanctioned of social norms. To be “cultured” is to be in complete control of the
    biological nature of being human. According to terror management theorists, the
    crux of the denial of our bodily and animalistic nature stems from the existential
    fear of death and decay of our bodies. As Sheldon Solomon and colleagues put it,
    “humans could not function with equanimity if they believed they were not inherently
    more significant than apes, lizards, and lima beans” (Solomon, Greenberg, &
    Pyszczynski, 1991, p. 91).
    Jamie Goldenberg and colleagues conducted a study to investigate the extent
    to which mortality salience would lead to greater denial of our animal nature. More
    specifically, they reasoned: “Cultures promote norms to help distinguish them-
    selves from animals, because this distinction provides the very important psycho-
    logical function of providing protection against deeply rooted concerns about
    mortality” (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Kluck, & Cornwell,
    2001, p. 427). Culture, from this perspective, is the mechanism through which
    awareness of death is regulated. More specifically, cultural worldviews (religion,
    politics, and social norms) and self-esteem function to defend against thoughts of
    death so that when death becomes salient through disasters, death of a loved one,
    or images of death, people respond by clinging more closely to cultural world-
    views and bolstering their self-esteem. They do this, for instance, by becoming
    more patriotic, clinging more firmly to one’s in-group, or by wanting to punish
    more harshly those who violate cultural norms and laws. In addition, in the emo-
    tion of disgust, we see most clearly the cultural defenses against our animal
    nature. Anything that reminds us of our animal nature, and ultimately of death,
    is responded to with a strong sense of disgust.
    Goldenberg and colleagues (2001) were interested in the opposite effect: Does
    increasing death awareness increase the disgust reaction? In addition, they wondered
    whether the effect would increase after a delay or distraction because the thoughts
    of death would be less conscious. To test the prediction that death awareness would
    increase feelings of disgust and that the effect would increase as it became less

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories346
    conscious, they manipulated death salience in university students (60% female). The
    outcome variable for the study was how much disgust participants expressed on a
    questionnaire. The independent variables were whether one’s own mortality was
    made salient or not and whether there was a delay in the disgust measure or not.
    Disgust was measured by the Disgust Sensitivity scale, without its “death” subscale
    (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). Responses were made on a 9-point Likert scale,
    and example items included statements such as “You see maggots on a piece of
    meat in an outside garbage pail”; “If I see someone vomit, it makes me sick to my
    stomach”; and “It would bother me.” Thoughts of death were made salient by ask-
    ing participants to write down the feelings that thoughts of their own death aroused
    in them. They were also asked to write down what they think will happen to them
    when they physically die. The neutral (nonsalient) condition simply had participants
    write down what they would feel watching TV. Delay was manipulated by includ-
    ing a word game that took 5 minutes to complete for half of the participants. In the
    delay condition, participants wrote down thoughts (about death or TV), completed
    the word game, and then completed the disgust measure. In the immediate condition,
    the word game preceded the writing about death task.
    Results of the manipulation supported the hypothesis. Disgust reactions were
    greatest after death had been made salient and even more so when there had been
    a delay between mortality salience and disgust evaluations. Participants in the
    neutral (TV) and delay condition showed the same level of disgust as the partici-
    pants in the death salience and immediate condition. Goldenberg and colleagues
    interpreted these results as support for the basic terror management assumption that
    people distance themselves from animals because animals remind them of their
    own physical bodies and death.
    The research based on terror management theory and disgust sensitivity has
    developed into an impressive body of work that points to the general conclusion that
    human disgust, particularly disgust related to human features that remind us of our
    animal nature (such as breast-feeding), serves the function of defending against the
    existential threat posed by our inevitable death.
    Finding Meaning in the Mitwelt: Attachment
    and Close Relationships
    “When Marvin Gaye first recorded the song How Sweet It Is (to Be Loved by You)
    in 1964, he started with the lyric of needing the shelter of someone’s arms. This
    need for close relationships appears to be exacerbated by confrontations with the
    fragility of life” (Cox & Arndt, 2012, p. 616). Indeed, a great deal of empirical
    research has demonstrated that people’s attachments to others in close relationships
    serve a terror management function (e.g., Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger,
    2003). In other words, one way we manage our awareness of our mortality is by
    investing in May’s Mitwelt: in loving relationships. Indeed, reminding people of
    death leads to them initiating interactions with other people (Taubman-Ben-Ari,
    Findler, & Mikulincer, 2002), to increase their desire for intimacy and commitment
    (May’s “Eros” form of love) in their romantic partnerships (Florian, Mikulincer,
    & Hirschberger, 2002), and even to lead adult children to express closer feelings
    toward their parents (Cox et al., 2008). Studies have also reversed the relationship

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 347
    between death awareness and attachment-seeking and have found that if people
    imagine a separation from a romantic loved one, this increases the accessibility of
    death-related thoughts in their minds (Florian et al., 2002).
    Cathy Cox and Jamie Arndt (2012) sought to explore the question of why
    people are motivated to form and nurture close relationships when they are
    reminded of their mortality. Their hypothesis, supported by several studies, was
    grounded in the Rogerian construct of positive regard. They tested whether it is
    our perceptions of close others’ positive regard for us that explains why relation-
    ships and closeness buffer against death anxiety. In other words, as Carl Rogers
    (1959) argued, our sense that others care for and prize us becomes incorporated
    into our personal feeling of positive self-regard, and this, in turn, contributes to a
    sense that we are a significant person in the world. Cox and Arndt (2012) examined
    whether this perceived positive regard from close relationships is what brings relief
    from the anxiety of nonexistence or insignificance.
    Cox and Arndt’s (2012) first studies manipulated an independent variable of
    death reminder or control. In this case, students were asked to either “briefly
    describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you and jot
    down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you phys-
    ically die and once you are physically dead” versus parallel questions about an
    unexpected event. Students in the death reminder condition exaggerated how pos-
    itively their romantic partners saw them, compared to the control unexpected
    events condition. Furthermore, they found that students’ perceived positive regard
    from their romantic partner predicted their expression of more commitment to that
    partner after a death reminder.
    In yet another study, Cox and Arndt asked half of the participants to answer
    true or false to a series of statements assessing their fear of death (e.g., “I am very
    much afraid to die”) and the other half the same questions assessing a non-death
    control arena (e.g., “I am very much afraid of dental work”). Following this manip-
    ulation, a second independent variable was manipulated. Here participants were
    randomly assigned to either visualize a time when their romantic partner held a
    positive view of them (“write about a time when your romantic partner made you
    feel good about yourself”) or a negative view (“write about a time when your
    romantic partner did not make you feel good about yourself”). Finally, all partici-
    pants completed a word-stem task that measures the accessibility of death-related
    thoughts (e.g., GRA_ _ can be completed either as “grave” or “grape”). Results of
    this study indicated that when death was primed and students thought of a time
    when their partner had negative regard for them, they scored higher on death
    related thoughts, compared to those who were reminded of death but thought of
    their partner’s positive regard for them. In other words, perceived positive regard
    from one’s romantic partner buffers against the increased accessibility of death
    thoughts that can be engendered by being reminded of ones’ mortality.
    Finally, Cox and Arndt examined how attachment style interacts with mortal-
    ity salience to influence which relationships (romantic partners or parents) people
    turn to for bolstering their feelings of positive regard. In this case, participants’
    attachment styles were assessed, they were given the death versus unexpected event
    manipulation, and were asked to rate themselves on a series of positive and negative
    adjective traits from the perspective of how their romantic partner evaluates them

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories348
    and their parent evaluates them on the traits. They found that securely attached
    individuals (versus anxious or avoidantly attached) were more prone to exaggerate
    how positively their romantic partners see them after they were reminded of death
    compared to the control condition. For those with the more anxious/preoccupied
    attachment style, in contrast, death reminders led to greater perceived positive regard
    from a parent. Those with avoidant attachment style showed no effect of mortality
    salience on amount of perceived regard from either a parent or a romantic partner.
    Taken together, this fascinating series of studies provides an interesting answer
    to the question of why May’s Mitwelt provides a buffer from the anxiety and despair
    that can be brought on by feelings of nonbeing. Our relationships with others pro-
    vide us with a feeling of positive regard and hence a sense that we are significant.
    May’s colleague Irvin Yalom (1980) wrote that reminders of our mortality can
    motivate us to pursue the things that make life feel more meaningful. Cox and Arndt
    (2012) conclude that “by understanding some of the ways in which people experi-
    ence esteem-enhancing support from relationship figures, it may be possible to help
    people confront core existential concerns with greater resilience” (p. 629).
    Growth in the Eigenwelt: There Is an Upside to Mortality
    Awareness
    The research to date on terror management theory, like that cited above, has
    focused almost exclusively on what May would call the “neurotic anxiety” engen-
    dered by mortality awareness, the uglier side of our defenses against the dread of
    nonbeing. But May (1958a), like all existentialists, argued that a courageous facing
    of the inevitability of our death enables us to rise above a defensive, conformist
    existence to Dasein. Can existential concerns facilitate human growth? Newer
    research is now confirming that, indeed, humans can exist creatively within the
    threat of nonexistence.
    Kenneth Vail and colleagues (2012) conducted a review of the literature on
    the impact of both conscious and unconscious thoughts of death, and found evi-
    dence for positive growth-oriented outcomes of each. In addition to the health and
    fitness motivations engendered by proximal mortality awareness discussed above,
    other studies have shown that conscious thoughts of death may help human beings
    reprioritize their life goals. Heidegger (1926/1962) referred to this phenomenon as
    the “awakening experience,” and today we often refer to it as a “reality check.”
    For example, longitudinal studies have shown that daily conscious contemplations
    of mortality led people to place greater value on personal, intrinsic goals over
    status-oriented, extrinsic goals for their life (Heflick, Goldenberg, Keroack, &
    Cooper, 2011; Lykins, Segerstrom, Averill, Evans, & Kemeny, 2007).
    But positive outcomes have also been discovered to arise from more non-
    conscious death awareness as well. For example, Gailliot and colleagues (2008)
    conducted a clever field study in which a confederate spoke loudly on a cell phone
    within earshot of passersby about the value of helping others. Participants were
    40% more likely to actually help a second confederate who dropped something if
    they were passing through a cemetery than if they were a block further away, out
    of sight of the headstones! Another study by Schimel, Wohl, and Williams (2006)
    found that the values of empathic people prepare them to be kind as a means of

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 349
    managing morality awareness. These researchers had home team hockey fans com-
    plete an empathy scale and then the fans were reminded of death. Next they read
    about a player either on the home team, or rival team, who committed aggressive
    fouls during a game. Mortality salience always led to forgiveness of the home team
    player, of course, but, among the more empathic fans, it also led to greater forgive-
    ness of the opposing team player.
    Yet further studies have shown that our most direct encounters with death are
    especially prone to lead us toward pro-social and personal growth goals (recall the
    discussion of research on post-traumatic growth and OVP in the Rogers chapter).
    Vail and colleagues (2012) believe this is because such encounters mix both con-
    scious and nonconscious terror management processes. Individuals who suffer
    trauma or the death of a loved one often must reconstruct the “death denying system
    of meaning” they previously held, shifting away from selfish, and toward more
    growth-oriented, existential understandings of their world. In this way, existentialists
    like Rollo May were surely right to emphasize the ironic truth that death can be
    psychically good for life.
    Critique of May
    Existentialism in general and May’s psychology in particular have been criticized
    as being anti-intellectual and antitheoretical. May acknowledged the claim that his
    views did not conform to the traditional concept of theory, but he staunchly
    defended his psychology against the charge of being anti-intellectual or antiscien-
    tific. He pointed to the sterility of conventional scientific methods and their inabil-
    ity to unlock the ontological character of willing, caring, and acting human beings.
    May held that a new scientific psychology must recognize such human char-
    acteristics as uniqueness, personal freedom, destiny, phenomenological experi-
    ences, and especially our capacity to relate to ourselves as both object and subject.
    A new science of humans must also include ethics. “The actions of living, self-
    aware human beings are never automatic, but involve some weighing of conse-
    quences, some potentiality for good or ill” (May, 1967, p. 199).
    Until this new science acquires greater maturity, we must evaluate May’s
    views by the same criteria used for each of the other personality theorists. First,
    have May’s ideas generated scientific research? May did not formulate his views
    in a theoretical structure, and a paucity of hypotheses is suggested by his writings.
    Some research, such as Jeff Greenberg and associates’ investigations on terror
    management, relates generally to existential psychology, but these studies do not
    specifically flow from May’s theory. On this first criterion of a useful theory,
    therefore, May’s existential psychology receives a very low score.
    Second, can May’s ideas be verified or falsified? Again, existential psychol-
    ogy in general and May’s theory in particular must be rated very low on this
    criterion. The theory is too amorphous to suggest specific hypotheses that could
    either confirm or disconfirm its major concepts.
    Third, does May’s philosophically oriented psychology help organize what is
    currently known about human nature? On this criterion, May would receive an aver-
    age rating. Compared with most theorists discussed in this book, May has more closely

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories350
    followed Gordon Allport’s dictum, “Do not forget what you have decided to neglect”
    (Allport, 1968, p. 23). May did not forget that he excluded discourses on develop-
    mental stages, basic motivational forces, and other factors that tend to segment the
    human experience. May’s philosophical writings have reached deep into the far
    recesses of the human experience and have explored aspects of humanity not examined
    by other personality theorists. His popularity has been due in part to his ability to
    touch individual readers, to connect with their humanity. Although his ideas may affect
    people in ways that other theorists do not, his use of certain concepts was at times
    inconsistent and confusing. Moreover, he decided to neglect several important topics
    in human personality: for example, development, cognition, learning, and motivation.
    As a practical guide to action, May’s theory is quite weak. Although he pos-
    sessed a keen understanding of human personality, May gathered his views more
    from philosophical than from scientific sources. In fact, he had no objection to being
    called a philosopher and frequently referred to himself as a philosopher-therapist.
    On the criterion of internal consistency, May’s existential psychology again
    falls short. He offered a variety of definitions for such concepts as anxiety, guilt,
    intentionality, will, and destiny. Unfortunately, he never presented operational
    definitions of these terms. This imprecise terminology has contributed to the lack
    of research on May’s ideas.
    The final criterion of a useful theory is parsimony, and on this standard,
    May’s psychology receives a moderate rating. His writings at times were cumber-
    some and awkward, but to his credit, he dealt with complex issues and did not
    attempt to oversimplify human personality.
    Concept of Humanity
    Like Erik Erikson (see Chapter 7), May offered a new way of looking at
    things. His view of humanity is both broader and deeper than the views of
    most other personality theorists. He saw people as complex beings, capable
    of both tremendous good and immense evil.
    According to May, people have become estranged from the natural
    world, from other people, and most of all, from themselves. As people
    become more alienated from other people and from themselves, they sur-
    render portions of their consciousness. They become less aware of them-
    selves as a subject, that is, the person who is aware of the experiencing
    self. As the subjective self becomes obscured, people lose some of their
    capacity to make choices. This progression, however, is not inevitable. May
    believed that people, within the confines of their destiny, have the ability to
    make free choices. Each choice pushes back the boundaries of determinism
    and permits new choices. People generally have much more potential for
    freedom than they realize. However, free choice does not come without
    anxiety. Choice demands the courage to confront one’s destiny, to look
    within and to recognize the evil as well as the good.

    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology 351
    Choice also implies action. Without action, choice is merely a wish, an
    idle desire. With action comes responsibility. Freedom and responsibility are
    always commensurable. A person cannot have more freedom than respon-
    sibility, nor can one be shackled with more responsibility than freedom.
    Healthy individuals welcome both freedom and responsibility, but they real-
    ize that choice is often painful, anxiety-provoking, and difficult.
    May believed that many people have surrendered some of their ability
    to choose, but that capitulation itself, he insisted, is a choice. Ultimately,
    each of us is responsible for the choices we make, and those choices define
    each of us as a unique human being. May, therefore, must be rated high on
    the dimension of free choice.
    Is May’s theory optimistic or pessimistic? Although he sometimes
    painted a rather gloomy picture of humanity, May was not pessimistic. He
    saw the present age as merely a plateau in humanity’s quest for new symbols
    and new myths that will engender the species with renewed spirit.
    Although May recognized the potential impact of childhood experiences
    on adult personality, he clearly favored teleology over causality. Each of us
    has a particular goal or destiny that we must discover and challenge or else
    risk alienation and neurosis.
    May assumed a moderate stance on the issue of conscious versus
    unconscious forces in personality development. By their nature, people have
    enormous capacity for self-awareness, but often that capacity remains fallow.
    People sometimes lack the courage to face their destiny or to recognize the
    evil that exists within their culture as well as within themselves. Conscious-
    ness and choices are interrelated. As people make more free choices, they
    gain more insight into who they are; that is, they develop a greater sense of
    being. This sharpened sense of being, in turn, facilitates the ability to make
    further choices. An awareness of self and a capacity for free choice are hall-
    marks of psychological health.
    May also took an intermediate position on social versus biological influ-
    ences. Society contributes to personality principally through interpersonal
    relationships. Our relations with other people can have either a freeing or
    an enslaving effect. Sick relationships, such as those Philip experienced with
    his mother and sister, can stifle personal growth and leave us with an inabil-
    ity to participate in a healthy encounter with another person. Without the
    capacity to relate to people as people, life becomes meaningless and we
    develop a sense of alienation not only from others but from ourselves as
    well. Biology also contributes to personality. Biological factors such as gen-
    der, physical size, predisposition to illnesses, and ultimately death itself,
    shape a person’s destiny. Everyone must live within the confines of destiny,
    but those confines can be expanded.
    On the dimension of uniqueness versus similarities, May’s view of
    humanity definitely leans toward uniqueness. Each of us is responsible for
    shaping our own personality within the limits imposed by destiny. No two of
    us make the same sequence of choices, and no two develop identical ways
    of looking at things. May’s emphasis on phenomenology implies individual
    perceptions and therefore unique personalities.

    Part III Humanistic/Existential Theories352
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ A basic tenet of existentialism is that existence precedes essence,
    meaning that what people do is more important than what they are.
    ∙ A second assumption is that people are both subjective and objective:
    that is, they are thinking as well as acting beings.
    ∙ People are motivated to search for answers to important questions
    regarding the meaning of life.
    ∙ People have an equal degree of both freedom and responsibility.
    ∙ The unity of people and their phenomenological world is expressed by
    the term Dasein, or being-in-the-world.
    ∙ Three modes of being-in-the-world are Umwelt, one’s relationship with
    the world of things; Mitwelt, one’s relationship with the world of people;
    and Eigenwelt, one’s relationship with oneself.
    ∙ Nonbeing, or nothingness, is an awareness of the possibility of one’s not
    being, through death or loss of awareness.
    ∙ People experience anxiety when they are aware of the possibility of their
    nonbeing as well as when they are aware that they are free to choose.
    ∙ Normal anxiety is experienced by everyone and is proportionate to the
    threat.
    ∙ Neurotic anxiety is disproportionate to the threat, involves repression,
    and is handled in a self-defeating manner.
    ∙ People experience guilt as a result of their (1) separation from the
    natural world, (2) inability to judge the needs of others, and (3) denial
    of their own potentials.
    ∙ Intentionality is the underlying structure that gives meaning to
    experience and allows people to make decisions about the future.
    ∙ Love means taking delight in the presence of the other person and
    affirming that person’s value as much as one’s own.
    ∙ Sex, a basic form of love, is a biological function that seeks satisfaction
    through the release of sexual tension.
    ∙ Eros, a higher form of love, seeks an enduring union with a loved one.
    ∙ Philia is the form of love that seeks a nonsexual friendship with another
    person.
    ∙ Agape, the highest form of love, is altruistic and seeks nothing from the
    other person.
    ∙ Freedom is gained through confrontation with one’s destiny and through
    an understanding that death or nonbeing is a possibility at any moment.
    ∙ Existential freedom is freedom of action, freedom to move about, to
    pursue tangible goals.
    ∙ Essential freedom is freedom of being, freedom to think, to plan, to hope.
    ∙ Cultural myths are belief systems, both conscious and unconscious, that
    provide explanations for personal and social problems.

    353
    Dispositional
    Theories
    C h a p t e r 1 2 Allport
    Psychology of the Individual 354
    C h a p t e r 1 3 McCrae and Costa
    McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 382
    P A R T F O U R

    354
    C H A P T E R 1 2
    Allport: Psychology
    of the Individual
    ⬥ Overview of Allport’s Psychology of the Individual
    ⬥ Biography of Gordon Allport
    ⬥ Allport’s Approach to Personality Theory
    What Is Personality?
    What Is the Role of Conscious Motivation?
    What Are the Characteristics of a Healthy Person?
    ⬥ Structure of Personality
    Personal Dispositions
    Proprium
    ⬥ Motivation
    A Theory of Motivation
    Functional Autonomy
    ⬥ The Study of the Individual
    Morphogenic Science
    The Diaries of Marion Taylor
    Letters From Jenny
    ⬥ Related Research
    Understanding and Reducing Prejudice
    Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation
    ⬥ Critique of Allport
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Allport © Bettmann/Getty Images

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 355
    In the fall of 1920, a 22-year-old American philosophy and economics student was visiting with an older brother in Vienna. During his visit, the young man penned
    a note to Sigmund Freud requesting an appointment. Freud, then the world’s most
    famous psychiatrist, agreed to see the young man and suggested a specific time for
    a meeting.
    The young American arrived at No. 19 Berggasse in plenty of time for his
    appointment with Dr. Freud. At the designated time, Freud opened the door to his
    consulting room and quietly ushered the young man inside. The American visitor
    suddenly realized that he had nothing to say. Searching his mind for some incident
    that might interest Freud, he remembered seeing a small boy on the tram car that
    day while traveling to Freud’s home. The little boy, about 4 years old, displayed
    an obvious dirt phobia, constantly complaining to his well-starched mother about
    the filthy conditions on the car. Freud listened silently to the story and then—with
    a typical Freudian technique—asked his young visitor if he was in reality talking
    about himself. Feeling guilty, the young man managed to change the subject and
    to escape without too much further embarrassment.
    The American visitor to Freud’s consulting room was Gordon Allport, and this
    encounter was the spark that ignited his interest in personality theory. Back in the
    United States, Allport began to wonder if there might be room for a third approach
    to personality, one that borrowed from traditional psychoanalysis and animal-driven
    learning theories, but also one that adopted a more humanistic stance. Allport quickly
    completed work for a PhD in psychology and embarked on a long and distinguished
    career as a staunch advocate for the study of the individual.
    Overview of Allport’s Psychology
    of the Individual
    More than any other personality theorist, Gordon Allport emphasized the unique-
    ness of the individual. He believed that attempts to describe people in terms of
    general traits rob them of their unique individuality. For this reason, Allport
    objected to trait and factor theories that tend to reduce individual behaviors to
    common traits. He insisted, for example, that one person’s stubbornness is differ-
    ent from any other person’s stubbornness and the manner in which one person’s
    stubbornness interacts with his or her extraversion and creativity is duplicated by
    no other individual.
    Consistent with Allport’s emphasis on each person’s uniqueness was his
    willingness to study in depth a single individual. He called the study of the indi-
    vidual morphogenic science and contrasted it with the nomothetic methods used
    by most other psychologists. Morphogenic methods are those that gather data on
    a single individual, whereas nomothetic methods gather data on groups of people.
    Allport also advocated an eclectic approach to theory building. He accepted some
    of the contributions of Freud, Maslow, Rogers, Eysenck, Skinner, and others; but
    he believed that no one of these theorists is able to adequately explain the total
    growing and unique personality. To Allport, a broad, comprehensive theory is
    preferable to a narrow, specific theory even if it does not generate as many testable
    hypotheses.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories356
    Allport argued against particularism, or theories that emphasize a single
    aspect of personality. In an important warning to other theorists, he cautioned them
    not to “forget what you have decided to neglect” (Allport, 1968, p. 23).
    In other words, no theory is completely comprehensive, and psychologists
    should always realize that much of human nature is not included in any single
    theory. To Allport, a broad, comprehensive theory is preferable to a narrow, spe-
    cific theory even if it does not generate as many testable hypotheses.
    Biography of Gordon Allport
    Gordon Willard Allport was born on November 11, 1897, in Montezuma, Indiana,
    the fourth and youngest son of John E. Allport and Nellie Wise Allport. Allport’s
    father had engaged in a number of business ventures before becoming a physician
    at about the time of Gordon’s birth. Lacking adequate office and clinical facilities,
    Dr. Allport turned the household into a miniature hospital. Both patients and nurses
    were found in the home, and a clean, sterile atmosphere prevailed.
    Cleanliness of action was extended to cleanliness of thought. In his autobi-
    ography, Allport (1967) wrote that his early life “was marked by plain Protestant
    piety” (p. 4). Floyd Allport, his older brother by 7 years, who also became a famous
    psychologist, described their mother as a very pious woman who placed heavy
    emphasis on religion (F. Allport, 1974). As a former schoolteacher, she taught
    young Gordon the virtues of clean language and proper conduct as well as the
    importance of searching for ultimate religious answers.
    By the time Gordon was 6 years old, the family had moved three times—
    finally settling in Cleveland, Ohio. Young Allport developed an early interest in
    philosophical and religious questions and had more facility for words than for
    games. He described himself as a social “isolate” who fashioned his own circle of
    activities. Although he graduated second in his high school class of 100, he did
    not consider himself an inspired scholar (Allport, 1967).
    In the fall of 1915, Allport entered Harvard, following in the footsteps of his
    brother Floyd, who had graduated 2 years earlier and who at that time was a
    graduate assistant in psychology. In his autobiography, Gordon Allport (1967)
    wrote: “Almost overnight my world was remade. My basic moral values, to be
    sure, had been fashioned at home. What was new was the horizon of intellect and
    culture I was now invited to explore” (p. 5). His enrollment at Harvard also marked
    the beginning of a 50-year association with that university, which was only twice
    briefly interrupted. When he received his bachelor’s degree in 1919 with a major
    in philosophy and economics, he was still uncertain about a future career. He had
    taken undergraduate courses in psychology and social ethics, and both disciplines
    had made a lasting impression on him. When he received an opportunity to teach
    in Turkey, he saw it as a chance to find out whether he would enjoy teaching. He
    spent the academic year 1919–1920 in Europe teaching English and sociology at
    Robert College in Istanbul.
    While in Turkey, Allport was offered a fellowship for graduate study at
    Harvard. He also received an invitation from his brother Fayette to stay with
    him in Vienna, where Fayette was working for the U.S. trade commission. In
    Vienna, Allport had the meeting with Sigmund Freud that we briefly described in

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 357
    the introduction to this chapter. This meeting with Freud greatly influenced
    Allport’s later ideas on personality. With a certain audacity, the 22-year-old Allport
    wrote to Freud announcing that he was in Vienna and offered the father of psycho-
    analysis an opportunity to meet with him. The encounter proved to be a fortuitous
    life-altering event for Allport. Not knowing what to talk about, the young visitor
    told Freud about seeing a small boy on the tram car earlier that day. The young
    child complained to his mother about the filthy conditions of the car and announced
    that he did not want to sit near passengers whom he deemed to be dirty. Allport
    claimed that he chose this particular incident to get Freud’s reaction to a dirt pho-
    bia in a child so young, but he was quite flabbergasted when Freud “fixed his
    kindly therapeutic eyes upon me and said, ‘And was that little boy you?’ ” (Allport,
    1967, p. 8). Allport said he felt guilty and quickly changed the topic.
    Allport told this story many times, seldom changing any words, and never
    revealing the rest of his lone encounter with Freud. However, Alan Elms has
    uncovered Allport’s written description of what happened next. After realizing that
    Freud was expecting a professional consultation, Allport then talked about his dis-
    like of cooked raisins:
    I told him I thought it due to the fact that at the age of three, a nurse had told
    me they were “bugs.” Freud asked, “When you recalled this episode, did your
    dislike vanish?” I said, “No.” He replied, “Then you are not at the bottom of
    it.” (Elms, 1994, p. 77)
    When Allport returned to the United States, he immediately enrolled in the
    PhD program at Harvard. After finishing his degree, he spent the following 2 years
    in Europe studying under the great German psychologists Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang
    Kohler, William Stern, Heinz Werner, and others in Berlin and Hamburg.
    In 1924, he returned again to Harvard to teach, among other classes, a new
    course in the psychology of personality. In his autobiography, Allport (1967) sug-
    gested that this course was the first personality course offered in an American
    college. The course combined social ethics and the pursuit of goodness and moral-
    ity with the scientific discipline of psychology. It also reflected Allport’s strong
    personal dispositions of cleanliness and morality.
    Two years after beginning his teaching career at Harvard, Allport took a
    position at Dartmouth College. Four years later, he returned to Harvard and
    remained there for the rest of his professional career.
    In 1925, Allport married Ada Lufkin Gould, whom he had met when both
    were graduate students. Ada Allport, who received a master’s degree in clinical
    psychology from Harvard, had the clinical training that her husband lacked. She
    was a valuable contributor to some of Gordon’s work, especially his two exten-
    sive case studies—the case of Jenny Gove Masterson (discussed in the section
    titled The Study of the Individual) and the case of Marion Taylor, which was
    never published (Barenbaum, 1997).
    The Allports had one child, Robert, who became a pediatrician and thus sand-
    wiched Allport between two generations of physicians, a fact that seemed to have
    pleased him in no small measure (Allport, 1967). Allport’s awards and honors were
    many. In 1939, he was elected president of the American Psychological Association
    (APA). In 1963, he received the Gold Medal Award of the APA; in 1964, he was

    Part IV Dispositional Theories358
    awarded the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award of the APA; and in 1966,
    he was honored as the first Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics at
    Harvard. On October 9, 1967, Allport, a heavy smoker, died of lung cancer.
    Allport’s Approach
    to Personality Theory
    Answers to three interrelated questions reveal Allport’s approach to personality the-
    ory: (1) What is personality? (2) What is the role of conscious motivation in person-
    ality theory? (3) What are the characteristics of the psychologically healthy person?
    What Is Personality?
    Few psychologists have been as painstaking and exhaustive as Allport in defining
    terms. His pursuit of a definition of personality is classic. He traced the etymology
    of the word persona back to early Greek roots, including the Old Latin and Etrus-
    can meanings. As we saw in Chapter 1, the word “personality” probably comes
    from persona, which refers to the theatrical mask used in ancient Greek drama by
    Roman actors during the first and second centuries b.c.e. After tracing the history
    of the term, Allport spelled out 49 definitions of personality as used in theology,
    philosophy, law, sociology, and psychology. He then offered a 50th definition,
    which in 1937 was “the dynamic organization within the individual of those psy-
    chophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment”
    (Allport, 1937, p. 48). In 1961, he had changed the last phrase to read “that deter-
    mine his characteristic behavior and thought” (Allport, 1961, p. 28). The change
    was significant and reflected Allport’s penchant for accuracy. By 1961, he realized
    that the phrase “adjustments to his environment” could imply that people merely
    adapt to their environment. In his later definition, Allport conveyed the idea that
    behavior is expressive as well as adaptive. People not only adjust to their environ-
    ment, but also reflect on it and interact with it in such a way as to cause their
    environment to adjust to them.
    Allport chose each phrase of his definition carefully so that each word con-
    veys precisely what he wanted to say. The term dynamic organization implies an
    integration or interrelatedness of the various aspects of personality. Personality is
    organized and patterned. However, the organization is always subject to change:
    hence, the qualifier “dynamic.” Personality is not a static organization; it is con-
    stantly growing or changing. The term psychophysical emphasizes the importance
    of both the psychological and the physical aspects of personality.
    Another word in the definition that implies action is determine, which sug-
    gests that “personality is something and does something” (Allport, 1961, p. 29).
    In other words, personality is not merely the mask we wear, nor is it simply
    behavior. It refers to the individual behind the facade, the person behind the action.
    By characteristic, Allport wished to imply “individual” or “unique.” The word
    “character” originally meant a marking or engraving, terms that give flavor to what
    Allport meant by “characteristic.” All persons stamp their unique mark or engraving
    on their personality, and their characteristic behavior and thought set them apart

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 359
    from all other people. Characteristics are marked with a unique engraving, a stamp
    or marking, that no one else can duplicate. The words behavior and thought simply
    refer to anything the person does. They are omnibus terms meant to include internal
    behaviors (thoughts) as well as external behaviors such as words and actions.
    Allport’s comprehensive definition of personality suggests that human beings
    are both product and process; people have some organized structure while, at the
    same time, they possess the capability of change. Pattern coexists with growth,
    order with diversification.
    In summary, personality is both physical and psychological; it includes both
    overt behaviors and covert thoughts; it not only is something, but it does some-
    thing. Personality is both substance and change, both product and process, both
    structure and growth.
    What Is the Role of Conscious Motivation?
    More than any other personality theorist, Allport emphasized the importance of
    conscious motivation. Healthy adults are generally aware of what they are doing
    and their reasons for doing it. His emphasis on conscious motivation goes back to
    his meeting in Vienna with Freud and his emotional reaction to Freud’s question:
    “And was that little boy you?” Freud’s response carried the implication that his
    22-year-old visitor was unconsciously talking about his own fetish for cleanliness
    in revealing the story of the clean little boy on the tram car. Allport (1967) insisted
    that his motivation was quite conscious—he simply wanted to know Freud’s ideas
    about dirt phobia in a child so young.
    Whereas Freud would assume an underlying unconscious meaning to the
    story of the little boy on the tram, Allport was inclined to accept self-reports at
    face value. “This experience taught me that depth psychology, for all its merits,
    may plunge too deep, and that psychologists would do well to give full recognition
    to manifest motives before probing the unconscious” (Allport, 1967, p. 8).
    However, Allport (1961) did not ignore the existence or even the importance
    of unconscious processes. He recognized the fact that some motivation is driven
    by hidden impulses and sublimated drives. He believed, for example, that most
    compulsive behaviors are automatic repetitions, usually self-defeating, and moti-
    vated by unconscious tendencies. They often originate in childhood and retain a
    childish flavor into adult years.
    What Are the Characteristics of a Healthy Person?
    Long before Abraham Maslow (see Chapter 9) made the concept of self-actualization
    popular, Gordon Allport (1937) hypothesized in depth about the attributes of the
    mature personality. Allport’s interest in the psychologically healthy person goes
    back to 1922, the year he finished his PhD. Not having any particular skills in
    mathematics, biology, medicine, or laboratory manipulations, Allport (1967) was
    forced to “find [his] own way in the humanistic pastures of psychology” (p. 8).
    Such pastures led to a study of the psychologically mature personality.
    A few general assumptions are required to understand Allport’s conception
    of the mature personality. First, psychologically mature people are characterized

    Part IV Dispositional Theories360
    by proactive behavior; that is, they not only react to external stimuli, but they are
    capable of consciously acting on their environment in new and innovative ways
    and causing their environment to react to them. Proactive behavior is not merely
    directed at reducing tensions but also at establishing new ones.
    In addition, mature personalities are more likely than disturbed ones to be
    motivated by conscious processes, which allow them to be more flexible and
    autonomous than unhealthy people, who remain dominated by unconscious motives
    that spring from childhood experiences.
    Healthy people ordinarily have experienced a relatively trauma-free child-
    hood, even though their later years may be tempered by conflict and suffering.
    Psychologically healthy individuals are not without the foibles and idiosyncrasies
    that make them unique. Also, age is not a requisite for maturity, although healthy
    persons seem to become more mature as they get older.
    What, then, are the more specific requirements for psychological health?
    Allport (1961) identified six criteria for the mature personality.
    The first is an extension of the sense of self. Mature people continually seek
    to identify with and participate in events outside themselves. They are not self-
    centered but are able to become involved in problems and activities that are not
    centered on themselves. They develop an unselfish interest in work, play, and
    recreation. Social interest (Gemeinschaftsgefühl ), family, and spiritual life are
    important to them. Eventually, these outside activities become part of one’s being.
    Allport (1961) summed up this first criterion by saying: “Everyone has self-love,
    but only self-extension is the earmark of maturity” (p. 285).
    Second, mature personalities are characterized by a “warm relating of self to
    others” (Allport, 1961, p. 285). They have the capacity to love others in an intimate
    and compassionate manner. Warm relating, of course, is dependent on people’s
    ability to extend their sense of self. Only by looking beyond themselves can mature
    people love others nonpossessively and unselfishly. Psychologically healthy indi-
    viduals treat other people with respect, and they realize that the needs, desires, and
    hopes of others are not completely foreign to their own. In addition, they have a
    healthy sexual attitude and do not exploit others for personal gratification.
    A third criterion is emotional security or self-acceptance. Mature individuals
    accept themselves for what they are, and they possess what Allport (1961) called
    emotional poise. These psychologically healthy people are not overly upset when
    things do not go as planned or when they are simply “having a bad day.” They do
    not dwell on minor irritations, and they recognize that frustrations and inconve-
    niences are a part of living.
    Fourth, psychologically healthy people also possess a realistic perception of
    their environment. They do not live in a fantasy world or bend reality to fit their
    own wishes. They are problem oriented rather than self-centered, and they are in
    touch with the world as most others see it.
    A fifth criterion is insight and humor. Mature people know themselves and,
    therefore, have no need to attribute their own mistakes and weaknesses to others.
    They also have a nonhostile sense of humor, which gives them the capacity to
    laugh at themselves rather than relying on sexual or aggressive themes to elicit
    laughter from others. Allport (1961) believed that insight and humor are closely
    related and may be aspects of the same thing, namely self-objectification. Healthy

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 361
    individuals see themselves objectively. They are able to perceive the incongruities
    and absurdities in life and have no need to pretend or to put on airs.
    The final criterion of maturity is a unifying philosophy of life. Healthy peo-
    ple have a clear view of the purpose of life. Without this view, their insight would
    be empty and barren, and their humor would be trivial and cynical. The unifying
    philosophy of life may or may not be religious, but Allport (1954, 1963), on a
    personal level, seemed to have felt that a mature religious orientation is a crucial
    ingredient in the lives of most mature individuals. Although many churchgoing
    people have an immature religious philosophy and narrow racial and ethnic preju-
    dices, deeply religious people are relatively free of these prejudices. The person
    with a mature religious attitude and a unifying philosophy of life has a well-
    developed conscience and, quite likely, a strong desire to serve others.
    Structure of Personality
    The structure of personality refers to its basic units or building blocks. To Freud,
    the basic units were instincts; to Eysenck (see Chapter 14), they were biologically
    determined factors. To Allport, the most important structures are those that permit
    the description of the person in terms of individual characteristics, and he called
    these individual characteristics personal dispositions.
    Personal Dispositions
    Throughout most of his career, Allport was careful to distinguish between com-
    mon traits and individual traits. Common traits are general characteristics held
    in common by many people. They can be inferred from factor analytic studies such
    as those conducted by Eysenck and the authors of the Five-Factor Trait Theory (see
    Chapter 13), or they can be revealed by various personality inventories. Common
    traits provide the means by which people within a given culture can be compared
    to one another.
    Whereas common traits are important for studies that make comparisons
    among people, personal dispositions are of even greater importance because they
    permit researchers to study a single individual. Allport (1961) defined a personal
    disposition as “a generalized neuropsychic structure (peculiar to the individual),
    with the capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and to initiate
    and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of adaptive and stylistic behavior” (p. 373).
    The most important distinction between a personal disposition and a common trait
    is indicated by the parenthetical phrase “peculiar to the individual.” Personal dis-
    positions are individual; common traits are shared by several people.
    To identify personal dispositions, Allport and Henry Odbert (1936) counted
    nearly 18,000 (17,953, to be exact) personally descriptive words in the 1925 edition
    of Webster’s New International Dictionary, about a fourth of which described
    personality characteristics. Some of these terms, usually referred to as traits,
    describe relatively stable characteristics such as “sociable” or “introverted”; others,
    usually referred to as states, describe temporary characteristics such as “happy” or
    “angry”; others described evaluative characteristics such as “unpleasant” or “won-
    derful”; and still others referred to physical characteristics such as “tall” or “obese.”

    Part IV Dispositional Theories362
    How many personal dispositions does one individual have? This question cannot
    be answered without reference to the degree of dominance that each personal disposi-
    tion has in the individual’s life. If we count those personal dispositions that are central
    to a person, then each person probably has 10 or fewer. However, if all tendencies are
    included, then each person may have hundreds of personal dispositions.
    Levels of Personal Dispositions
    Allport placed personal dispositions on a continuum from those that are most
    central to those that are of only peripheral importance to a person.
    Cardinal Dispositions Some people possess an eminent characteristic or ruling
    passion so outstanding that it dominates their lives. Allport (1961) called these
    personal dispositions cardinal dispositions. They are so obvious that they cannot
    be hidden; nearly every action in a person’s life revolves around this one cardinal
    disposition. Most people do not have a cardinal disposition, but those few people
    who do are often known by that single characteristic.
    Allport identified several historical people and fictional characters who pos-
    sessed a disposition so outstanding that they have given our language a new word.
    Some examples of these cardinal dispositions include quixotic, chauvinistic, narcis-
    sistic, sadistic, a Don Juan, and so forth. Because cardinal dispositions are indi-
    vidual and are not shared with any other person, only Don Quixote was truly
    quixotic; only Narcissus was completely narcissistic; only the Marquis de Sade
    possessed the cardinal disposition of sadism. When these names are used to describe
    characteristics in others, they become common traits.
    Central Dispositions Few people have cardinal dispositions, but everyone has
    several central dispositions, which include the 5 to 10 most outstanding charac-
    teristics around which a person’s life focuses. Allport (1961) described central
    dispositions as those that would be listed in an accurate letter of recommendation
    written by someone who knew the person quite well. In the section titled The Study
    of the Individual, we will look at a series of letters written to Gordon and Ada
    Allport by a woman they called Jenny. The contents of these letters constitute a
    rich source of information about the writer. We will also see that three separate
    analyses of these letters revealed that Jenny could be described by about eight central
    dispositions: that is, characteristics sufficiently strong to be detected by each of these
    three separate procedures. Similarly, most people, Allport believed, have 5 to 10
    central dispositions that their friends and close acquaintances would agree are
    descriptive of that person.
    Secondary Dispositions Less conspicuous but far greater in number than central
    dispositions are the secondary dispositions. Everyone has many secondary dispo-
    sitions that are not central to the personality yet occur with some regularity and
    are responsible for much of one’s specific behaviors.
    The three levels of personal dispositions are, of course, arbitrary points on a
    continuous scale from most appropriate to least appropriate. Cardinal dispositions,
    which are exceedingly prominent in a person, shade into central dispositions, which
    are less dominating but nevertheless mark the person as unique. Central dispositions,
    which guide much of a person’s adaptive and stylistic behavior, blend into secondary

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 363
    dispositions, which are less descriptive of that individual. We cannot say, however,
    that one person’s secondary dispositions are less intense than another person’s cen-
    tral dispositions. Interperson comparisons are inappropriate to personal dispositions,
    and any attempt to make such comparison transforms the personal dispositions into
    common traits (Allport, 1961).
    Motivational and Stylistic Dispositions
    All personal dispositions are dynamic in the sense that they have motivational
    power. Nevertheless, some are much more strongly felt than others, and Allport
    called these intensely experienced dispositions motivational dispositions. These
    strongly felt dispositions receive their motivation from basic needs and drives.
    Allport (1961) referred to personal dispositions that are less intensely experienced
    as stylistic dispositions, even though these dispositions possess some motivational
    power. Stylistic dispositions guide action, whereas motivational dispositions initi-
    ate action. An example of a stylistic disposition might be neat and impeccable
    personal appearance. People are motivated to dress because of a basic need to stay
    warm, but the manner in which they attire themselves is determined by their sty-
    listic personal dispositions. Motivational dispositions are somewhat similar to
    Maslow’s concept of coping behavior, whereas stylistic dispositions are similar to
    Maslow’s idea of expressive behavior (see Chapter 9).
    Unlike Maslow, who drew a clear line between coping and expressive behav-
    iors, Allport saw no distinct division between motivational and stylistic personal
    dispositions. Although some dispositions are clearly stylistic, others are obviously
    based on a strongly felt need and are thus motivational. Politeness, for example,
    is a stylistic disposition, whereas eating is more motivational. How people eat (their
    style) depends at least partially on how hungry they are, but it also depends on the
    strength of their stylistic dispositions. A usually polite but hungry person may
    forego manners while eating alone, but if the politeness disposition is strong
    enough and if others are present, then the famished person may eat with etiquette
    and courtesy despite being famished.
    Proprium
    Whether motivational or stylistic, some personal dispositions are close to the core
    of personality, whereas others are more on the periphery. Those that are at the
    center of personality are experienced by the person as being an important part of
    self. They are characteristics that an individual refers to in such terms as “That is
    me” or “This is mine.” All characteristics that are “peculiarly mine” belong to the
    proprium (Allport, 1955).
    Allport used the term proprium to refer to those behaviors and characteris-
    tics that people regard as warm, central, and important in their lives. The proprium
    is not the whole personality, because many characteristics and behaviors of a per-
    son are not warm and central; rather, they exist on the periphery of personality.
    These nonpropriate behaviors include (1) basic drives and needs that are ordinarily
    met and satisfied without much difficulty; (2) tribal customs such as wearing
    clothes, saying “hello” to people, and driving on the right side of the road; and
    (3) habitual behaviors, such as smoking or brushing one’s teeth, that are performed
    automatically and that are not crucial to the person’s sense of self.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories364
    As the warm center of personality, the proprium includes those aspects of life
    that a person regards as important to a sense of self-identity and self-enhancement
    (Allport, 1955). The proprium includes a person’s values as well as that part of the
    conscience that is personal and consistent with one’s adult beliefs. A generalized
    conscience—one shared by most people within a given culture—may be only periph-
    eral to a person’s sense of personhood and thus outside that person’s proprium.
    Motivation
    Most people, Allport believed, are motivated by present drives rather than by past
    events and are aware of what they are doing and have some understanding of why
    they are doing it. He also contended that theories of motivation must consider the
    differences between peripheral motives and propriate strivings. Peripheral motives
    are those that reduce a need, whereas propriate strivings seek to maintain tension
    and disequilibrium. Adult behavior is both reactive and proactive, and an adequate
    theory of motivation must be able to explain both.
    A Theory of Motivation
    Allport believed that a useful theory of personality rests on the assumption that
    people not only react to their environment but also shape their environment and cause
    it to react to them. Personality is a
    growing system, allowing new
    elements to constantly enter into
    and change the person.
    Many older theories of per-
    sonality, Allport (1960) believed,
    did not allow for possibilities of
    growth. Psychoanalysis and the
    various learning theories are basi-
    cally homeostatic, or reactive,
    theories because they see people
    as being motivated primarily by
    needs to reduce tension and to
    return to a state of equilibrium.
    An adequate theory of per-
    sonality, Allport contended, must
    allow for proactive behavior.
    It must view people as con-
    sciously acting on their environ-
    ment in a manner that permits
    growth toward psychological
    health. A comprehensive theory
    must not only include an explana-
    tion of reactive theories, but must
    also include those proactive theo-
    ries that stress change and growth.
    Sometimes people are motivated to seek tension, not
    merely reduce it. © Purestock/SuperStock

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 365
    In other words, Allport argued for a psychology that, on one hand, studies behav-
    ioral patterns and general laws (the subject matter of traditional psychology) and,
    on the other, growth and individuality.
    Allport claimed that theories of unchanging motives are incomplete because
    they are limited to an explanation of reactive behavior. The mature person, how-
    ever, is not motivated merely to seek pleasure and reduce pain but to acquire new
    systems of motivation that are functionally independent from their original motives.
    Functional Autonomy
    The concept of functional autonomy represents Allport’s most distinctive and, at
    the same time, most controversial postulate. It is Allport’s (1961) explanation for the
    myriad human motives that seemingly are not accounted for by hedonistic or drive-
    reduction principles. Functional autonomy represents a theory of changing rather than
    unchanging motives and is the capstone of Allport’s ideas on motivation.
    In general, the concept of functional autonomy holds that some, but not all,
    human motives are functionally independent from the original motive responsible for
    the behavior. If a motive is functionally autonomous, it is the explanation for behav-
    ior, and one need not look beyond it for hidden or primary causes. In other words, if
    hoarding money is a functionally autonomous motive, then the miser’s behavior is
    not traceable to childhood experiences with toilet training or with rewards and punish-
    ments. Rather, the miser simply likes money, and this is the only explanation neces-
    sary. This notion that much human behavior is based on present interests and on
    conscious preferences is in harmony with the commonsense belief of many people
    who hold that they do things simply because they like to do them.
    Functional autonomy is a reaction to what Allport called theories of unchanging
    motives, namely, Freud’s pleasure principle and the drive-reduction hypothesis of
    stimulus-response psychology. Allport held that both theories are concerned with
    historical facts rather than functional facts. He believed that adult motives are built
    primarily on conscious, self-sustaining, contemporary systems. Functional autonomy rep-
    resents his attempt to explain these conscious, self-sustaining contemporary motivations.
    Admitting that some motivations are unconscious and others are the result of
    drive reduction, Allport contended that, because some behavior is functionally autono-
    mous, theories of unchanging motives are inadequate. He listed four requirements of
    an adequate theory of motivation. Functional autonomy, of course, meets each criterion.
    1. An adequate theory of motivation “will acknowledge the contemporaneity
    of motives.” In other words, “Whatever moves us must move now”
    (Allport, 1961, p. 220). The past per se is unimportant. The history of an
    individual is significant only when it has a present effect on motivation.
    2. “It will be a pluralistic theory—allowing for motives of many types”
    (Allport, 1961, p. 221). On this point, Allport was critical of Freud and his
    two-instinct theory, Adler and the single striving for success, and all theories
    that emphasize self-actualization as the ultimate motive. Allport was
    emphatically opposed to reducing all human motivation to one master drive.
    He contended that adults’ motives are basically different from those of children
    and that the motivations of neurotic individuals are not the same as those of
    normal people. In addition, some motivations are conscious, others unconscious;

    Part IV Dispositional Theories366
    some are transient, others recurring; some are peripheral, others propriate; and
    some are tension reducing, others tension maintaining. Motives that appear to
    be different really are different, not only in form but also in substance.
    3. “It will ascribe dynamic force to cognitive processes—e.g., to planning and
    intention” (Allport, 1961, p. 222). Allport argued that most people are busy
    living their lives into the future, but that many psychological theories are “busy
    tracing these lives backward into the past. And while it seems to each of us
    that we are spontaneously active, many psychologists are telling us that we are
    only reactive” (p. 206). Although intention is involved in all motivation, this
    third requirement refers more generally to long-range intention. A young
    woman declines an offer to see a movie because she prefers to study anatomy.
    This preference is consistent with her purpose of making good grades at college
    and relates to her plans of being admitted to medical school, which is necessary
    in order for her to fulfill her intention of being a doctor. The lives of healthy
    adults are future oriented, involving preferences, purposes, plans, and intentions.
    These processes, of course, are not always completely rational, as when people
    allow their anger to dominate their plans and intentions.
    4. An adequate theory of motivation is one that “will allow for the concrete
    uniqueness of motives” (Allport, 1961, p. 225). A concrete unique motive
    is different from an abstract generalized one, the latter being based on a
    preexistent theory rather than the actual motivation of a real person.
    An example of a concrete unique motive is Derrick, who is interested in
    improving his bowling game. His motive is concrete, and his manner of
    seeking improvement is unique to him. Some theories of motivation may
    ascribe Derrick’s behavior to an aggressive need, others to an inhibited
    sexual drive, and still others to a secondary drive learned on the basis of a
    primary drive. Allport would simply say that Derrick wants to improve his
    bowling game because he wants to improve his bowling game. This is
    Derrick’s unique, concrete, and functionally autonomous motive.
    In summary, a functionally autonomous motive is contemporary and self-
    sustaining; it grows out of an earlier motive but is functionally independent of it. Allport
    (1961) defined functional autonomy as “any acquired system of motivation in which the
    tensions involved are not of the same kind as the antecedent tensions from which the
    acquired system developed” (p. 229). In other words, what begins as one motive may
    grow into a new one that is historically continuous with the original but functionally
    autonomous from it. For example, a person may originally plant a garden to satisfy a
    hunger drive but eventually become interested in gardening for its own sake.
    Perseverative Functional Autonomy
    The more elementary of the two levels of functional autonomy is perseverative
    functional autonomy. Allport borrowed this term from the word “perseveration,”
    which is the tendency of an impression to leave an influence on subsequent expe-
    rience. Perseverative functional autonomy is found in animals as well as humans
    and is based on simple neurological principles. An example of perseverative func-
    tional autonomy is a rat that has learned to run a maze in order to be fed but then
    continues to run the maze even after it has become satiated. Why does it continue
    to run? Allport would say that the rat runs the maze just for the fun of it.

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 367
    Allport (1961) listed other examples of perseverative functional autonomy
    that involve human rather than animal motivation. The first is an addiction to
    alcohol, tobacco, or other drugs when there is no physiological hunger for them.
    Alcoholics continue to drink although their current motivation is functionally inde-
    pendent from their original motive.
    Another example concerns uncompleted tasks. A problem once started but
    then interrupted will perseverate, creating a new tension to finish the task. This
    new tension is different from the initial motivation. For example, a college student
    is offered 10 cents for every piece of a 500-piece jigsaw puzzle she successfully
    puts together. Assume that she does not have a preexisting interest in solving
    jigsaw puzzles and that her original motivation was solely for the money. Also
    assume that her monetary reward is limited to $45, so that after she has completed
    450 pieces, she will have maximized her pay. Will this student finish the remain-
    ing 50 pieces in the absence of monetary reward? If she does, then a new tension
    has been created, and her motive to complete the task is functionally autonomous
    from the original motive of getting paid.
    Propriate Functional Autonomy
    The master system of motivation that confers unity on personality is propriate func-
    tional autonomy, which refers to those self-sustaining motives that are related to
    the proprium. Jigsaw puzzles and alcohol are seldom regarded as “peculiarly mine.”
    They are not part of the proprium but exist only on the periphery of personality. On
    the other hand, occupations, hobbies, and interests are closer to the core of personal-
    ity, and many of our motivations concerning them become functionally autonomous.
    For example, a woman may originally take a job
    because she needs money. At first, the work is
    uninteresting, perhaps even distasteful. As the
    years pass, however, she develops a consuming
    passion for the job itself, spending some vacation
    time at work and, perhaps, even developing a
    hobby that is closely related to her occupation.
    Criterion for Functional Autonomy
    In general, a present motive is functionally autono-
    mous to the extent that it seeks new goals, meaning
    that the behavior will continue even as the motiva-
    tion for it changes. For example, a child first learn-
    ing to walk is motivated by some maturational
    drive, but later he may walk to increase mobility
    or to build self-confidence. Similarly, a scientist
    initially dedicated to finding answers to difficult
    problems may eventually gain more satisfaction
    from the search than from the solution. At that
    point, her motivation becomes functionally inde-
    pendent from her original motive of finding
    answers. She may then look for another area of
    inquiry even though the new field is somewhat
    A person might begin running to lose
    weight but continue because running is
    enjoyable. The motive for continuing
    to run is then functionally autonomous
    from the motive for beginning to run.
    © Purestock/SuperStock

    Part IV Dispositional Theories368
    different from the previous one. New problems may lead her to seek new goals and
    to set higher levels of aspiration.
    Processes That Are Not Functionally Autonomous
    Functional autonomy is not an explanation for all human motivation. Allport (1961)
    listed eight processes that are not functionally autonomous: (1) biological drives, such
    as eating, breathing, and sleeping; (2) motives directly linked to the reduction of basic
    drives; (3) reflex actions such as an eye blink; (4) constitutional equipment, namely
    physique, intelligence, and temperament; (5) habits in the process of being formed;
    (6) patterns of behavior that require primary reinforcement; (7) sublimations that can
    be tied to childhood sexual desires; and (8) some neurotic or pathological symptoms.
    The eighth process (neurotic or pathological symptoms) may or may not
    involve functionally autonomous motives. For an example of a compulsive symp-
    tom that was not functionally autonomous, Allport (1961) offered the case of a
    12-year-girl who had a disturbing habit of smacking her lips several times a min-
    ute. This habit had begun about 8 years earlier when the girl’s mother told her that
    when she inhaled it was good air and when she exhaled it was bad air. Because
    the girl believed that she had made the air bad by bringing it out, she decided to
    kiss it to make it well. As her habit continued, she repressed the reason for her
    compulsion and continued “kissing” the bad air, a behavior that took the form of
    smacking her lips. This behavior was not functionally autonomous, but the result
    of a compulsive need to keep good air from becoming bad air.
    Allport suggested a criterion for differentiating between a functionally auton-
    omous compulsion and one that is not. For example, compulsions that can be
    eliminated through therapy or behavior modification are not functionally autono-
    mous, whereas those that are extremely resistant to therapy are self-sustaining and
    thus functionally autonomous. When therapy allowed the 12-year-old girl to dis-
    cover the reason for her habit, she was able to stop smacking her lips. On the other
    hand, some pathological symptoms serve a contemporary lifestyle and are function-
    ally autonomous from earlier experiences that instigated the pathology. For exam-
    ple, a second-born child’s attempts to overtake his older brother may change into
    a compulsive lifestyle, one marked by unconscious strivings to overtake or defeat
    all rivals. Because such a deep-seated neurosis is probably not amenable to therapy,
    it meets Allport’s criterion for being functionally autonomous.
    The Study of the Individual
    Because psychology has historically dealt with general laws and characteristics that
    people have in common, Allport repeatedly advocated the development and use of
    research methods that study the individual. To balance the predominant normative
    or group approach, he suggested that psychologists employ methods that study the
    motivational and stylistic behaviors of one person.
    Morphogenic Science
    Early in his writings, Allport distinguished between two scientific approaches: the
    nomothetic, which seeks general laws, and the idiographic, which refers to that which

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 369
    is peculiar to the single case. Because the term “idiographic” was so often misused,
    misunderstood, and misspelled (being confused with “ideographic,” or the representa-
    tion of ideas by graphic symbols), Allport (1968) abandoned the term in his later
    writings and spoke of morphogenic procedures. Both “idiographic” and “morpho-
    genic” pertain to the individual, but “idiographic” does not suggest structure or pattern.
    In contrast, “morphogenic” refers to patterned properties of the whole organism and
    allows for intraperson comparisons. The pattern or structure of one’s personal dispo-
    sitions is important. For example, Tyrone may be intelligent, introverted, and strongly
    motivated by achievement needs, but the unique manner in which his intelligence is
    related to his introversion and each of his achievement needs forms a structured
    pattern. These individual patterns are the subject matter of morphogenic science.
    What are the methods of morphogenic psychology? Allport (1962) listed
    many: some, completely morphogenic; some, partly so. Examples of wholly mor-
    phogenic, first-person methods are verbatim recordings, interviews, dreams, con-
    fessions; diaries, letters; some questionnaires, expressive documents, projective
    documents, literary works, art forms, automatic writings, doodles, handshakes,
    voice patterns, body gestures, handwriting, gait, and autobiographies.
    When Allport met Hans Eysenck, the famous British factor analyst and believer
    in nomothetic science (see Chapter 14), he told Eysenck that one day he (Eysenck)
    would write his autobiography. Eventually, Eysenck (1997b) did indeed publish an
    autobiography in which he admitted that Allport was right and that morphogenic
    methods such as one’s description of one’s own life and work can have validity.
    Semimorphogenic approaches include self-rating scales, such as the adjective
    checklist; standardized tests in which people are compared to themselves rather
    than a norm group; the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values (1960); and the
    Q sort technique of Stephenson (1953), which we discussed in Chapter 10.
    Consistent with common sense, but contrary to many psychologists, Allport
    was willing to accept at face value the self-disclosure statements of most partici-
    pants in a study. A psychologist who wishes to learn the personal dynamics of
    people needs simply to ask them what they think of themselves. Answers to direct
    questions should be accepted as valid unless the person is a young child, psychotic,
    or extremely defensive. Allport (1962) said that “too often we fail to consult the
    richest of all sources of data, namely, the subject’s own self-knowledge” (p. 413).
    The Diaries of Marion Taylor
    During the late 1930s, Allport and his wife, Ada, became acquainted with an
    extremely rich source of personal data about a woman whom they called Marion
    Taylor. The core of this data was nearly a lifetime of diaries, but personal informa-
    tion on Marion Taylor also included descriptions of her by her mother, her younger
    sister, her favorite teacher, two of her friends, and a neighbor as well as notes in
    a baby book, school records, scores on several psychological tests, autobiographi-
    cal material, and two personal meetings with Ada Allport.
    Nicole Barenbaum (1997) has put together a brief account of Marion Taylor’s
    life. Taylor was born in 1902 in Illinois, moved to California with her parents and
    younger sister in 1908, and began writing to her diary in 1911. Soon after her 13th
    birthday, her diary entries became more personal, including fantasies and secret

    Part IV Dispositional Theories370
    feelings. She eventually graduated from college, earned a master’s degree, and
    became a psychology and biology teacher. She married at age 31 but had no children.
    Although a wealth of personal documents on Marion Taylor became avail-
    able to Ada and Gordon Allport, the Allports chose not to publish an account of
    her story. Barenbaum (1997) offered some possible reasons for this, but due to
    major gaps in the correspondence between Marion Taylor and Ada Allport, it is
    now impossible to know for certain why the Allports did not publish this case
    history. Their work with Marion Taylor probably helped them organize and publish
    a second case—the story of Jenny Gove Masterson, another pseudonym.
    Letters From Jenny
    Allport’s morphogenic approach to the study of lives is best illustrated in his
    famous Letters from Jenny. These letters reveal the story of an older woman and
    her intense love/hate feelings toward her son, Ross. Between March 1926 (when
    she was 58) and October 1937 (when she died), Jenny wrote a series of 301 letters
    to Ross’s former college roommate, Glenn, and his wife, Isabel, who almost cer-
    tainly were Gordon and Ada Allport (Winter, 1993). Allport originally published
    parts of these letters anonymously (Anonymous, 1946) and then later published
    them in more detail under his own name (Allport, 1965).
    Born in Ireland of Protestant parents in 1868, Jenny was the oldest in a fam-
    ily of seven children that included five sisters and a brother. When she was 5 years
    old, the family moved to Canada, and when she was 18, her father died and Jenny
    was forced to quit school and go to work to help support her family. After 9 years,
    her brothers and sisters became self-supporting and Jenny, who had always been
    considered rebellious, scandalized her family by marrying a divorced man, a deci-
    sion that further alienated her from her conservatively religious family.
    After only 2 years of marriage, Jenny’s husband died. A month or so later,
    her son, Ross, was born. This was 1897, the same year Gordon Allport, Ross’s
    future college roommate, was born. The next 17 years were somewhat contented
    ones for Jenny. Her world revolved around her son, and she worked hard to ensure
    that he had everything he wanted. She told Ross that, aside from art, the world
    was a miserable place and that it was her duty to sacrifice for him because she
    was responsible for his existence.
    When Ross moved away to attend college, Jenny continued to scrimp in order
    to pay all his bills. As Ross began to be interested in women, the idyllic mother-
    son relationship came to an end. The two quarreled often and bitterly over his female
    friends. Jenny referred to each of them as prostitutes or whores, including the woman
    Ross married. With that marriage, Jenny and Ross became temporarily estranged.
    At about that same time, Jenny began an 111/2-year correspondence with
    Glenn and Isabel (Gordon and Ada) in which she revealed much about both her
    life and her personality. The early letters showed that she was deeply concerned
    with money, death, and Ross. She felt that Ross was ungrateful and that he had
    abandoned her for another woman, and a prostitute at that! She continued her bit-
    terness toward him until he and his wife were divorced. She then moved into the
    apartment next to Ross’s and for a short time Jenny was happy. But soon Ross
    was seeing other women, and Jenny inevitably found something wrong with each.

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 371
    Her letters were filled again with animosity for Ross, a suspicious and cynical
    attitude toward others, and a morbid yet dramatic approach to life.
    Three years into the correspondence, Ross suddenly died. After his death,
    Jenny’s letters expressed a somewhat more favorable attitude toward her son. Now
    she did not have to share him with anyone. Now he was safe—no more prostitutes.
    For the next 8 years, Jenny continued writing to Glenn and Isabel, and they
    usually answered her. However, they served mostly as neutral listeners and not as
    advisors or confidantes. Jenny continued to be overly concerned with death and
    money. She increasingly blamed others for her misery and intensified her suspicions
    and hostility toward her caregivers. After Jenny died, Isabel (Ada) commented that,
    in the end, Jenny was “the same only more so” (Allport, 1965, p. 156).
    These letters represent an unusually rich source of morphogenic material. For
    years, they were subjected to close analysis and study by Allport and his students,
    who sought to build the structure of a single personality by identifying personal
    dispositions that were central to that person. Allport and his students used three
    techniques to look at Jenny’s personality. First, Alfred Baldwin (1942) developed a
    technique called personal structure analysis to analyze approximately one third of
    the letters. To analyze Jenny’s personal structure, Baldwin used two strictly morpho-
    genic procedures, frequency and contiguity, for gathering evidence. The first simply
    involves a notation of the frequency with which an item appears in the case material.
    For example, how often did Jenny mention Ross, or money, or herself ? Contiguity
    refers to the proximity of two items in the letters. How often did the category
    “Ross—unfavorable” occur in close correspondence with “herself—self-sacrificing”?
    Freud and other psychoanalysts intuitively used this technique of contiguity to dis-
    cover an association between two items in a patient’s unconscious mind. Baldwin,
    however, refined it by determining statistically those correspondences that occur
    more frequently than could be expected by chance alone.
    Using the personal structure analysis, Baldwin identified three clusters of
    categories in Jenny’s letters. The first related to Ross, women, the past, and herself—
    self-sacrificing. The second dealt with Jenny’s search for a job, and the third
    cluster revolved around her attitude toward money and death. The three clusters
    are independent of each other even though a single topic, such as money, may
    appear in all three clusters.
    Second, Jeffrey Paige (1966) used a factor analysis to extract primary personal
    dispositions revealed by Jenny’s letters. In all, Paige identified eight factors: aggres-
    sion, possessiveness, affiliation, autonomy, familial acceptance, sexuality, sentience,
    and martyrdom. Paige’s study is interesting because he identified eight factors, a
    number that corresponds very well with the number of central dispositions—5 to
    10—that Allport had earlier hypothesized would be found in most people.
    The third method of studying Jenny’s letters was a commonsense technique
    used by Allport (1965). His results are quite similar to those of Baldwin and
    Paige. Allport asked 36 judges to list what they thought were Jenny’s essential
    characteristics. They recorded 198 descriptive adjectives, many of which were
    synonymous and overlapping. Allport then grouped the terms into eight clusters:
    (1) quarrelsome-suspicious, (2) self-centered (possessive), (3) independent-
    autonomous, (4) dramatic-intense, (5) aesthetic-artistic, (6) aggressive, (7) cynical-
    morbid, and (8) sentimental.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories372
    Comparing this commonsense, clinical approach with Paige’s factorial study,
    Allport (1966) presented some interesting parallels (see Table 12.1). Through
    Jenny’s letters, then, we find that she possessed about eight central traits that char-
    acterized the last 12 years of her life—if not her entire life. She was aggressive,
    suspicious, possessive, aesthetic, sentimental, morbid, dramatic, and self-centered.
    These central dispositions were sufficiently powerful that she was described in
    similar terms both by Isabel (Ada Allport), who knew her well, and by independent
    researchers, who studied her letters (Allport, 1965).
    The close agreement between Allport’s commonsense clinical approach and
    Paige’s factor analytic method does not prove the validity of either. It does, however,
    indicate the feasibility of morphogenic studies. Psychologists can analyze one person and
    identify central dispositions with consistency even when they use different procedures.
    Related Research
    More than any other personality theorist, Gordon Allport maintained a lifelong
    active interest in the scientific study of religion and published six lectures on the
    subject under the title The Individual and His Religion (Allport, 1950). On a per-
    sonal level, Allport was a devout Episcopalian; and for nearly 30 years, he offered
    a series of meditations in Appleton Chapel, Harvard University (Allport, 1978).
    Understanding and Reducing Prejudice
    Allport was interested in prejudice, and developing ways to reduce racial prejudice
    was of the utmost importance to him. Allport (1954) proposed that one of the most
    important components to reducing prejudice was contact: If members of majority
    T A B L E 1 2 . 1
    Jenny’s Central Dispositions Revealed by Clinical and Factor
    Analytic Techniques
    Clinical Technique
    (Allport)
    Quarrelsome-suspicious
    Aggressive
    Self-centered (possessive)
    Sentimental
    Independent-autonomous
    Aesthetic-artistic
    Self-centered (self-pitying)
    (No parallel)
    Cynical-morbid
    Dramatic-intense
    Factor Analytic Technique
    (Paige)
    Aggression
    Possessiveness
    Need for affiliation
    Need for family acceptance
    Need for autonomy
    Sentience
    Martyrdom
    Sexuality
    (No parallel)
    (“Overstate”; that is, the tendency to be
    dramatic and to overstate her
    concerns)

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 373
    and minority groups interacted more under optimal conditions, there would be less
    prejudice. This became known as the contact hypothesis and the optimal conditions
    were relatively simple: (1) equal status between the two groups, (2) common goals,
    (3) cooperation between groups, and (4) support of an authority figure, law, or
    custom. For example, if African American and European American neighbors got
    together to form a neighborhood watch group with the common goal of making
    their neighborhood safer and such a program was endorsed by the mayor or city
    police department, then this interaction and group effort would be likely to lead to
    reduced prejudice among residents of the neighborhood.
    Although Allport himself conducted some research on the topic of prejudice
    reduction (Allport, 1954), one of his students, Thomas Pettigrew, has continued
    the work that Allport began (Pettigrew et al., 2011; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006;
    Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp have built a large
    research program targeted at investigating the conditions under which contact
    between groups can reduce prejudice.
    In two complex meta-analyses of over 500 studies and more than 250,000
    participants, Pettigrew, Tropp, and colleagues (2006, 2011) examined the validity
    of Allport’s contact hypothesis. They found that, indeed, intergroup contact reduces
    prejudice, and that Allport’s four conditions for optimal contact between groups
    facilitate this effect. Furthermore, although the concept of optimal contact was
    originally conceptualized as a way to reduce racial prejudice (Allport, 1954),
    research has shown that it also works to reduce prejudiced attitudes toward other
    stigmatized groups such as the elderly, disabled, mentally ill, and gay and lesbian
    individuals (Pettigrew et al., 2011). Studies generally show larger effects for mea-
    sures of liking than for such indicators as stereotyping, meaning that optimal con-
    tact helps us like the outgroup more even while stereotypes about them may persist
    (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005).
    The best way to decrease conflict and prejudice is to have more contact and interaction with those
    different from us. © Moxie Productions/Blend Images

    Part IV Dispositional Theories374
    One fascinating discovery from all these years of research on optimal contact
    is the special importance of cross-group friendship in reducing prejudice. As Pettigrew
    et al. (2011) point out, friendship involves extended contact across a variety of
    settings, and this facilitates strong, positive attitudes toward the outgroup that are
    resistant to change. One particularly moving study conducted in Northern Ireland
    illustrates this power of friendship. In it, friendships between Catholics and Protes-
    tants engendered both trust and forgiveness of the other religious group, and this
    effect was the strongest among those who had suffered directly from the religious
    violence in the area (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006).
    Some of the studies included in Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp’s reviews
    (2006, 2011) involved relatively simple methods of merely asking people how many
    friends they have who are of a minority group (a measure of contact) and then having
    them complete various self-report measures designed to capture the extent to which
    participants endorse stereotypical views of minority groups. Other studies included in
    the review however, involved a more complex methodology whereby participants
    were randomly assigned to either groups that involved optimal contact with members
    of a minority group as prescribed by Allport or groups that did not involve the opti-
    mal contact prescribed by Allport. Although both types of studies found that optimal
    contact reduces prejudice, the experiments in which people were randomly assigned
    to engage in optimal contact or not showed the strongest reduction in prejudice
    (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Of course, there is no reason such optimal contact must
    take place in a laboratory, and Pettigrew and Tropp’s (2006) findings demonstrate the
    great potential for community programs to be developed based on Allport’s prescription
    for prejudice reduction. If such programs were implemented, research shows that
    relations between majority and minority groups would likely be greatly improved.
    More recently, Pettigrew and his colleague Anthony Greenwald (Greenwald &
    Pettigrew, 2014) reviewed research on a heretofore under-examined feature of prej-
    udice that Allport (1954) also posited. We often assume a direct connection between
    prejudice and discrimination. Indeed, most definitions of prejudice explicitly connect
    it to negative evaluation and/or treatment of outgroups. However, in his book The
    Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) argued that this connection between prejudicial
    attitudes and discriminatory behavior is an empirical one, not one to be assumed.
    Much discrimination, Allport hypothesized, might actually be accomplished by
    ingroup favoritism, not outright hostility toward outgroups. Greenwald and Pettigrew
    (2014) reviewed compelling evidence from a variety of different areas of study within
    psychology and sociology supporting the rather surprising claim that indeed dis-
    crimination does not require hostility, and that unequal treatment is in fact more
    easily produced by ingroup members’ bias toward helping one another, than by their
    hurting members of a disadvantaged outgroup.
    One exemplary research finding (among many) that shows this effect is the
    “minimal group paradigm” which was first discovered forty years ago (Tajfel,
    1970). Since its discovery, many studies have demonstrated that people are more
    motivated by ingroup favoritism (even when the “group” they belong to is utterly
    arbitrary) than by the desire to punish or disfavor an outgroup. Conformity is
    another empirically validated contributor to this ingroup favoritism finding, and it
    was posited by Allport (1962) as well. Sociologists have long studied “norms” and
    studies show that unprejudiced people typically follow their ingroup’s norms. If

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 375
    these norms are characterized by preferential treatment of the ingroup, most mem-
    bers will conform, even in the absence of any bad feelings toward the outgroup
    (e.g., witness the racial segregation of a typical public high school cafeteria). In
    other words, discrimination can be accomplished, Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014)
    argue, via a decidedly unremarkable process that involves little if any outright
    hostility. For this reason, we must not only pass laws against hostile discrimination,
    but also provide societal constraints against the many forms of subtle ingroup
    favoritism that end up giving more advantages to the already-advantaged, and, over
    time, generating discrimination against the disadvantaged.
    As Pettigrew and colleagues (2011) point out, popular opinion on contact
    between groups is quite split. Some believe that “good fences make good neighbors.”
    That is, intergroup contact only causes conflict, so we’re best sticking to our own.
    But decades of work on ingroup favoritism shows that doing so will only exacerbate
    racial imbalances and discrimination, because when we’re only sticking to our own,
    we’re likely to conform to the norms of our own, at the expense of others. Allport
    believed that intergroup interaction is essential to reduce prejudice and conflict between
    groups. Decades of research by his students have resolved this disagreement and shown
    that Allport was right—the only way to decrease conflict and prejudice is to interact
    with those we consider to be “different.”
    Overall, Gordon Allport was an immensely insightful personality psychologist
    whose ideas continue to inspire psychologists today. Although his ideas undoubtedly
    continue to enrich research in personality psychology, his proposals about under-
    standing prejudice and methods for reducing prejudice have quietly enriched the
    lives of people who have, perhaps unknowingly, benefited from his deep commit-
    ment to reducing prejudice in our society.
    Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation
    Allport believed that a deep religious commitment was a mark of a mature indi-
    vidual, but he also believed that not all churchgoers have a mature religious ori-
    entation. Some, in fact, are highly prejudiced. Allport (1966) offered a possible
    explanation for this frequently reported observation. He suggested that church and
    prejudice offer the same safety, security, and status, at least for some people. These
    people can feel both comfortable and self-righteous with their prejudicial attitudes
    and their church attendance.
    To understand the relationship between church attendance and prejudice,
    Allport and J. Michael Ross (1967) developed the Religious Orientation Scale
    (ROS), which is applicable only for churchgoers. The ROS consists of 20 items—11
    Extrinsic and 9 Intrinsic. Examples of Extrinsic items are “The primary purpose of
    prayer is to gain relief and protection”; “What religion offers me most is comfort
    when sorrow and misfortune strike”; and “One reason for my being a church
    member is that such membership helps to establish a person in the community.”
    Examples of Intrinsic items include “My religious beliefs are what really lie behind
    my whole approach to life” and “I try hard to carry my religion over into all my
    other dealings in life” (p. 436). Allport and Ross assumed that people with an
    extrinsic orientation have a utilitarian view of religion; that is, they see it as a
    means to an end. Theirs is a self-serving religion of comfort and social convention.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories376
    Their beliefs are lightly held and easily reshaped when convenient. In contrast, a
    second group of people have an intrinsic orientation. These people live their religion
    and find their master motive in their religious faith. Rather than using religion for
    some end, they bring other needs into harmony with their religious values. They have
    an internalized creed and follow it fully. The publication of Allport and Ross’s (1967)
    ROS spawned a tremendous research literature on these two different motivations
    for religion and their relationship to both mental and physical health.
    Religious Motivation and Mental Health
    Forgiveness is often thought of as a religious virtue having no place in non-
    denominational psychotherapy, but empirical psychologists have begun to study
    this emotionally-laden process, clarifying what it is and what it is not, and discov-
    ering its positive association with mental health (e.g., Worthington, Witvliet, Pie-
    trini, & Miller, 2007). Empirical approaches to forgiveness define this process as
    occurring within an individual (that is, the forgiven need not know they are for-
    given), and involving a positive attitude change toward a transgressor or particular
    transgression. Furthermore, generally speaking, clinical psychology has taken a
    jaundiced view of religious faith as part of a mentally healthy personality, but
    Allport’s framework on religious motivation, as opposed to simply religiosity per
    se, provides some interesting ways for mental health professionals to work with
    their clients’ religious faith or spirituality during therapy (Bergin, 1980).
    One recent study explored whether intrinsic versus extrinsic religiosity influ-
    ences individuals’ conceptualizations of forgiveness and their attitudes toward
    forgiveness as a therapeutic intervention (Seedall & Butler, 2014). Over 300 par-
    ticipants completed a survey that assessed their intrinsic versus extrinsic motiva-
    tions for religion using a variation of the ROS. These participants were then
    randomly assigned to read one of three harm scenarios that might be addressed in
    either couples or family therapy: domestic violence, sexual affair, or sexual abuse.
    Participants then rated their understanding of forgiveness and also rated how
    acceptable they found a forgiveness therapeutic treatment in the context of the
    harm scenario. The researchers hypothesized that intrinsically religious people
    would be more likely than the extrinsically religious to accept forgiveness as a
    therapeutic treatment, and less likely to endorse misconceptions about the nature
    of forgiveness. One of these common misconceptions is assuming that forgiveness
    represents pardoning or condoning harm (it does not).
    Seedall and Butler (2014) found that, as hypothesized, intrinsically religious
    participants were significantly more accepting of forgiveness in therapy than
    extrinsically religious participants were. Furthermore, as predicted, intrinsic religi-
    osity predicted fewer misconceptions regarding forgiveness, and this may be why
    individuals who approach religion with a more intrinsic than extrinsic motivation
    are more prepared to accept forgiveness as a strategy in therapy. This suggests that
    couples and family therapists working with religious clients might do well to deter-
    mine the religious motivations of these clients in order to best facilitate mentally-
    healthy forgiveness work in therapy. Those who are more extrinsically religious
    may need to have the personal benefits of forgiveness spelled out for them in order
    that they not foreclose on this potentially healing experience due to misconceptions

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 377
    about it. It seems that both forgiveness and a more intrinsically motivated approach
    to religion are both associated with greater mental health.
    Religious Motivation and Physical Health
    Previous research has found that, generally speaking, being religious is good for
    your physical health. Attending church regularly tends to be associated with feeling
    better and living longer (Powell, Shahabi, & Thoresen, 2003). But why this is the
    case is not entirely understood. People who attend church may just tend to take
    better care of themselves than those who do not. Or maybe there is something
    unique about religion that encourages better health. One aspect of religion that may
    affect the connection between religion and health is Allport’s concept of religious
    orientation. Recently, researchers have begun investigating the health implications
    of having an intrinsic versus extrinsic religious orientation. As we discussed in
    Chapter 10, intrinsically motivated activities are usually better than those activities
    that are extrinsically motivated. Therefore, researchers have predicted that those
    who have internalized their religious values (intrinsic orientation) will be better off
    than those who use their religion to meet some end (extrinsic orientation).
    Kevin Masters and his colleagues (2005) conducted a study looking at reli-
    gious orientation and cardiovascular health. Blood pressure rises and falls depend-
    ing on a variety of factors including stressors in the environment, but sometimes
    people experience chronically high blood pressure. When blood pressure is chron-
    ically high, it places increased stress on the heart and is a major health concern
    for many people, particularly older people, because it makes individuals more
    susceptible to a variety of heart conditions including heart attacks. To examine the
    relationship between religious orientation and high blood pressure, Masters and his
    colleagues (2005) had 75 people between 60 and 80 years old come in to the lab
    and complete the ROS and some tasks while the researchers carefully monitored
    their blood pressure. The tasks were designed to be moderately stressful and likely
    to raise blood pressure in people who are particularly prone to experiencing high
    blood pressure. Specifically, the tasks involved completing some math problems
    and a hypothetical encounter with an insurance company who is refusing to cover
    a potentially life-saving medical procedure. The researchers found that, as pre-
    dicted, those who held an intrinsic religious orientation did not experience the same
    increased blood pressure that those who held an extrinsic orientation did. This
    research demonstrated that an intrinsic religious orientation serves as a buffer
    against stressors likely to be experienced in everyday life. Those who have an
    intrinsic religious orientation likely encounter the same stressors as everybody else,
    but their bodies react differently and in a healthier manner. There is something
    about having a deep, intrinsic religious faith that helps people deal with everyday
    stressors in a way that is not detrimental to physical health.
    Religion can be good for one’s health, but in order to derive health benefits
    from religion, it is important that people are being religious for the right reasons.
    It is not enough to just go to church, temple, or synagogue once a week. A person
    must be attending such services because he or she truly believes in the message
    of his or her chosen religion and has internalized it as a way of living a good life.
    It is also important to note that while Allport did consider religious commitment

    Part IV Dispositional Theories378
    to be a mark of a healthy, mature person, he considered religion to be helpful
    because it provides a unifying philosophy of life. But religion is not the only
    means by which one can have a unifying philosophy of life. Whether having a
    unifying philosophy of life that is not based on an organized religion is beneficial
    for health in the same way intrinsic religious orientation is remains an area for
    future research.
    Critique of Allport
    Allport based his theory of personality more on philosophical speculation and
    common sense than on scientific investigations. He never intended his theory to
    be completely new or comprehensive, but rather he was eclectic, carefully borrow-
    ing from older theories and recognizing that his detractors could have important
    things to say. Consistent with this tolerant attitude, Allport (1968) acknowledged
    that his adversaries may have been at least partially right.
    To Allport, most people are best thought of as conscious, forward-looking,
    tension-seeking individuals. To people who believe that deterministic theories have lost
    sight of the proactive person, Allport’s view of humanity is philosophically refreshing.
    As with any other theory, however, it must be evaluated on a scientific basis.
    Allport probably did more than any other psychologist to define personality
    and to categorize other definitions of the term. But do his writings constitute a
    theory in the sense of stating a set of related assumptions that generate testable
    hypotheses? On this criterion, Allport’s exhortations rate a qualified “Yes.” It is a
    limited theory, offering explanations for a fairly narrow scope of personality,
    namely, certain kinds of motivation. The functionally autonomous motives of psy-
    chologically healthy adults are covered quite adequately by Allport’s theory. But
    what of the motives of children and of mentally disturbed adults? What moves
    them and why? What about ordinarily healthy adults who uncharacteristically
    behave in a strange manner? What accounts for these inconsistencies? What expla-
    nation did Allport offer for the bizarre dreams, fantasies, and hallucinations of
    mature individuals? Unfortunately, his account of personality is not broad enough
    to adequately answer these questions.
    Despite its limitations as a useful theory, Allport’s approach to personality is
    both stimulating and enlightening. Anyone interested in building a theory of personal-
    ity should first become familiar with Allport’s writings. Few other psychologists have
    made as much effort to place personality theory in perspective; few have been as
    careful in defining terms, in categorizing previous definitions, or in questioning what
    units should be employed in personality theory. The work of Allport has set a standard
    for clear thinking and precision that future theorists would do well to emulate.
    Has the theory generated research? On this criterion, Allport’s theory
    receives a moderate rating. His Religious Orientation Scale, the Study of Values,
    and his interest in prejudice have led to multiple studies on the scientific study of
    religion, values, and prejudice.
    On the criterion of falsifiability, Allport’s theory must receive a low rating.
    The concept of four somewhat independent religious orientations can be verified
    or falsified, but most of Allport’s other insights lie beyond the ability of science
    to determine whether some other explanation might be equally appropriate.

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 379
    A useful theory provides an organization for observations. Does Allport’s
    theory meet this criterion? Again, only for a narrow range of adult motives does
    the theory offer a meaningful organization for observations. Much of what is
    known about human personality cannot be easily integrated into Allport’s theory.
    Specifically, behaviors motivated by unconscious forces as well as those that are
    stimulated by primary drives were not adequately explained by Allport. He rec-
    ognized the existence of these kinds of motivations, but seemed content to allow
    the psychoanalytic and behavioral explanations to stand without further elabora-
    tion. This limitation, however, does not invalidate Allport’s theory. To accept the
    validity of other theoretical concepts is a legitimate approach to theory building.
    As a guide for the practitioner, Allport’s theory has moderate usefulness. It
    certainly serves as a beacon to the teacher and the therapist, illuminating the view
    of personality that suggests that people should be treated as individuals. The details,
    unfortunately, are left unspecified.
    On the final two criteria of a useful theory, Allport’s psychology of the
    individual is highly rated. His precise language renders the theory both internally
    consistent and parsimonious.
    Concept of Humanity
    Allport had a basically optimistic and hopeful view of human nature. He
    rejected the psychoanalytic and behavioral views of humanity as being too
    deterministic and too mechanistic. He believed that our fates and our traits
    are not determined by unconscious motives originating in early childhood
    but by conscious choices we make in the present. We are not simply autom-
    atons blindly reacting to the forces of reward and punishment. Instead, we
    are able to interact with our environment and make it reactive to us. We not
    only seek to reduce tensions but to establish new ones. We desire both
    change and challenge; and we are active, purposive, and flexible.
    Because people have the potential to learn a variety of responses in
    many situations, psychological growth can take place at any age. Personality
    is not established in early childhood, even though for some people infantile
    influences remain strong. Early childhood experiences are important only to
    the extent that they exist in the present. Although early security and love
    leave lasting marks, children need more than love: They need an opportunity
    to shape their own existence creatively, to resist conformity, and to be free,
    self-directed individuals.
    Although society has some power to mold personality, Allport believed
    that it does not hold the answer to the nature of humanity. The factors shap-
    ing personality, Allport held, are not as important as personality itself. Hered-
    ity, environment, and the nature of the organism are important; but people
    are essentially proactive and free to follow the prevailing dictates of society
    or to chart their own life course.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories380
    People, however, are not completely free. Allport (1961) adopted a
    limited-freedom approach. He was often critical of those views that allow for
    absolute freedom, but he also opposed the psychoanalytic and behavioral
    views, which he regarded as denying free will. Allport’s position was some-
    where in the middle. Although free will exists, some people are more capa-
    ble of making choices than are others. A healthy person has more freedom
    than does a child or a severely disturbed adult. The high-intelligent, reflec-
    tive person has more capacity for free choice than does the low-intelligent,
    nonreflective one.
    Even though freedom is limited, Allport maintained that it can be
    expanded. The more self-insight a person develops, the greater that person’s
    freedom of choice. The more objective a person becomes—that is, the more
    the blindfolds of self-concern and egotism are removed—the greater that
    person’s degree of freedom.
    Education and knowledge also expand the amount of freedom we
    have. The greater our knowledge is of a particular arena, the broader our
    freedom in that area. To have a broad general education means that, to
    some extent, one has a wider choice of jobs, recreational activities, reading
    materials, and friends.
    Finally, our freedom can be expanded by our mode of choosing. If we
    stubbornly adhere to a familiar course of action simply because it is more
    comfortable, our freedom remains largely restricted. Conversely, if we adopt
    an open-minded mode of solving problems, then we broaden our perspec-
    tive and increase our alternatives; that is, we expand our freedom to choose
    (Allport, 1955).
    Allport’s view of humanity is more teleological than causal. Personality, to
    some extent, is influenced by past experiences, but the behaviors that make us
    human are those that are motivated by our expectations of the future. In other
    words, we are healthy individuals to the extent that we set and seek future
    purposes and aspirations. Each of us is different from others not so much
    because we have different basic drives, but because we have different self-
    erected goals and intentions.
    The growth of personality always takes place within a social setting,
    but Allport placed only moderate emphasis on social factors. He recognized
    the importance of environmental influences in helping to shape personality,
    but he insisted that personality has some life of its own. Culture can influ-
    ence our language, morals, values, fashions, and so forth; but how each of
    us reacts to cultural forces depends on our unique personality and our basic
    motivation.
    In summary, Allport held an optimistic view of humanity, maintaining
    that people have at least limited freedom. Human beings are goal oriented,
    proactive, and motivated by a variety of forces, most of which are within
    their realm of consciousness. Early childhood experiences are of relatively
    minor importance and are significant only to the extent that they exist in the
    present. Both differences and similarities among people are important, but
    individual differences and uniqueness receive far greater emphasis in All-
    port’s psychology.

    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual 381
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Allport was eclectic in his acceptance of ideas from a variety of sources.
    ∙ He defined personality as the dynamic organization within the individual
    of those psychophysical systems that determine a person’s behavior and
    thought.
    ∙ Psychologically healthy people are motivated largely by conscious
    processes; have an extended sense of self; relate warmly to others;
    accept themselves for who they are; have a realistic perception of the
    world; and possess insight, humor, and a unifying philosophy of life.
    ∙ Allport advocated a proactive position, one that emphasized the notion
    that people have a large measure of conscious control over their lives.
    ∙ Common traits are general characteristics held in common by many
    people. They may be useful for comparing one group of people with
    another.
    ∙ Individual traits (personal dispositions) are peculiar to the individual and
    have the capacity to render different stimuli functionally equivalent and
    to initiate and guide behavior.
    ∙ Three levels of personal dispositions are (1) cardinal dispositions, which
    only a few people possess and which are so conspicuous that they
    cannot be hidden; (2) central dispositions, the 5 to 10 individual traits
    that make a person unique; and (3) secondary dispositions, which are
    less distinguishable but far more numerous than central dispositions.
    ∙ Personal dispositions that initiate actions are called motivational traits.
    ∙ Personal dispositions that guide actions are called stylistic traits.
    ∙ The proprium refers to those behaviors and personal dispositions that are
    warm and central to our lives and that we regard as peculiarly our own.
    ∙ Functional autonomy refers to motives that are self-sustaining and
    independent from the motives that were originally responsible for a
    behavior.
    ∙ Perseverative functional autonomy refers to those habits and behaviors
    that are not part of one’s proprium.
    ∙ Propriate functional autonomy includes all those self-sustaining
    motivations that are related to the proprium.
    ∙ Allport used morphogenic procedures, such as diaries and letters, which
    stress patterns of behavior within a single individual.

    382
    C H A P T E R 1 3
    McCrae and Costa’s
    Five-Factor Trait
    Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Trait and Factor Theories
    ⬥ The Pioneering Work of Raymond B. Cattell
    ⬥ Basics of Factor Analysis
    ⬥ The Big Five: Taxonomy or Theory?
    ⬥ Biographies of Robert R. McCrae and
    Paul T. Costa, Jr.
    ⬥ In Search of the Big Five
    Five Factors Found
    Description of the Five Factors
    ⬥ Evolution of the Five-Factor Theory
    Units of the Five-Factor Theory
    Basic Postulates
    ⬥ Related Research
    Personality and Academic Performance
    Traits, Internet Use, and Well-Being
    Traits and Emotions
    ⬥ Critique of Trait and Factor Theories
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    McCrae
    Courtesy Robert R. McCrae Ph.D
    Costa
    Courtesy Paul T. Costa Jr. Ph.D

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 383
    Thomas was at a local bar with a few long-time friends, but one of them—Samuel—said something that really upset Thomas, who had had one too many
    to drink. Thomas stood up, pushed Samuel, and started a fight then and there.
    Clarisse, a friend of Samuel’s, pulled Thomas off before anyone got seriously hurt.
    Clarisse didn’t know Thomas well but was absolutely convinced that he was an
    aggressive, impulsive jerk and told Thomas as much as the three went storming
    out of the bar. Samuel, surprisingly, came to Thomas’s defense and said “You
    know, Thomas is really a good guy. That wasn’t like him—he must have been
    having a rough day. Give him a break.”
    Is Thomas an aggressive jerk or just having a rough day? Can we say Thomas
    is aggressive and impulsive without knowing anything else about Thomas’s per-
    sonality? Is this the way he normally is? What about when he is not drunk? Does
    he act aggressively and impulsively in other situations? Does the situation (rough
    day) explain best how Thomas acted or is it more accurate to explain his actions
    by his personality (aggressive jerk)?
    These are the kinds of questions that psychologists ask. Social psychologists
    are likely to explain Thomas’s behavior by the situation (rough day). Personality
    psychologists are more likely to attribute Thomas’s behavior to enduring traits. A
    trait, as you recall from the opening chapter, makes people unique and contributes
    to the consistency of how they behave in different situations and over time. Traits
    are the focus of study of many personality psychologists, but historically different
    psychologists had their own particular list of personality traits they focused on and
    there was little consensus as to what the major dimensions of personality were.
    This was at least the case until the 1980s when the field converged on an answer:
    there are five major dimensions of personality, namely extraversion, agreeableness,
    conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience. These are the so-called
    “Big Five” traits of personality and their widespread adoption and acceptance owes
    much to the research and theory of Robert McCrae and Paul Costa.
    Overview of Trait and Factor Theories
    How can personality best be measured? By standardized tests? Clinical observa-
    tion? Judgments of friends and acquaintances? Factor theorists have used all these
    methods and more. A second question is: How many traits or personal dispositions
    does a single person possess? Two or three? Half a dozen? A couple of hundred?
    More than a thousand? During the past 25 to 45 years, several individuals (Cattell,
    1973, 1983; Eysenck, 1981, 1997a) and several teams of researchers (Costa &
    McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 2003; Tupes & Christal, 1961) have taken a fac-
    tor analytic approach to answering these questions. Presently, most researchers who
    study personality traits agree that five, and only five, and no fewer than five
    dominant traits continue to emerge from factor analytic techniques—mathematical
    procedures capable of sifting personality traits from mountains of test data.
    Whereas many contemporary theorists believe that five is the magic number,
    earlier theorists such as Raymond B. Cattell found many more personality traits, and
    Hans J. Eysenck insisted that only three major factors can be discerned by a factor
    analytic approach. In addition, we have seen that Gordon Allport’s (see Chapter 12)

    Part IV Dispositional Theories384
    commonsense approach yielded 5 to 10 traits that are central to each person’s life.
    However, Allport’s major contribution to trait theory may have been his identification
    of nearly 18,000 trait names in an unabridged English language dictionary. These
    trait names were the basis for Cattell’s original work, and they continue to provide
    the foundation for recent factor analytic studies.
    The Five-Factor Theory (often called the Big Five) includes neuroticism and
    extraversion; but it adds openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientious-
    ness. These terms differ slightly from research team to research team, but the
    underlying traits are quite similar.
    The Pioneering Work
    of Raymond B. Cattell
    An important figure in the early years of psychometrics was Raymond B. Cattell
    (1905–1998), who was born in England but who spent most of his career in the
    United States. Cattell had only an indirect influence on McCrae and Costa. They
    did, however, share techniques and ideas, even if their approaches also had some
    real differences. Because some familiarity with Cattell’s trait theory enhances the
    understanding of McCrae and Costa’s five-factor theory, we briefly discuss Cattell’s
    work and compare and contrast it with that of McCrae and Costa.
    First, Cattell and McCrae and Costa both used an inductive method of gather-
    ing data; that is, they began with no preconceived bias concerning the number or name
    of traits or types. Other factor theorists, however, have used the deductive method,
    that is, they have preconceived hypotheses in mind before they begin to collect data.
    Second, Cattell used three different media of observation to examine people
    from as many angles as possible. The three sources of data included a person’s life
    record (L data) derived from observations made by other people; self-reports (Q
    data) obtained from questionnaires and other techniques designed to allow people
    to make subjective descriptions of themselves; and objective tests (T data), which
    measure performance such as intelligence, speed of responding, and other such
    activities designed to challenge people’s maximum performance. In contrast, each
    of McCrae and Costa’s five bipolar factors is limited to responses on questionnaires.
    These self-reports confine McCrae and Costa’s procedures to personality factors.
    Third, Cattell divided traits into common traits (shared by many) and unique
    traits (peculiar to one individual). He also distinguished source traits from trait
    indicators, or surface traits. Cattell further classified traits into temperament, moti-
    vation, and ability. Traits of temperament are concerned with how a person behaves,
    motivation deals with why one behaves, and ability refers to how far or how fast
    one can perform.
    Fourth, Cattell’s multifaceted approach yielded 35 primary, or first-order,
    traits, which measure mostly the temperament dimension of personality. Of these
    factors, 23 characterize the normal population and 12 measure the pathological
    dimension. The largest and most frequently studied of the normal traits are the
    16 personality factors found on Cattell’s (1949) Sixteen Personality Factors Ques-
    tionnaire (16 PF Scale). By comparison, the NEO-Personality Inventory of Costa
    and McCrae yields scores on only five personality factors.

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 385
    Basics of Factor Analysis
    A comprehensive knowledge of the mathematical operations involved in factor
    analysis is not essential to an understanding of trait and factor theories of person-
    ality, but a general description of this technique should be helpful.
    To use factor analysis, one begins by making specific observations of many
    individuals. These observations are then quantified in some manner; for example,
    height is measured in inches; weight in pounds; aptitude in test scores; job perfor-
    mance by rating scales; and so on. Assume that we have 1,000 such measures on
    5,000 people. Our next step is to determine which of these variables (scores) are
    related to which other variables and to what extent. To do this, we calculate the
    correlation coefficient between each variable and each of the other 999 scores. (A
    correlation coefficient is a mathematical procedure for expressing the degree of cor-
    respondence between two sets of scores.) To correlate 1,000 variables with the other
    999 scores would involve 499,500 individual correlations (1,000 multiplied by 999
    divided by 2). Results of these calculations would require a table of intercorrelations,
    or a matrix, with 1,000 rows and 1,000 columns. Some of these correlations would
    be high and positive, some near zero, and some would be negative. For example, we
    might observe a high positive correlation between leg length and height, because one
    is partially a measure of the other. We may also find a positive correlation between
    a measure of leadership ability and ratings on social poise. This relationship might
    exist because they are each part of a more basic underlying trait—self-confidence.
    With 1,000 separate variables, our table of intercorrelations would be quite
    cumbersome. At this point, we turn to factor analysis, which can account for a
    large number of variables with a smaller number of more basic dimensions. These
    more basic dimensions can be called traits, that is, factors that represent a cluster
    of closely related variables. For example, we may find high positive intercorrela-
    tions among test scores in algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and calculus. We have
    now identified a cluster of scores that we might call Factor M, which represents
    mathematical ability. In similar fashion, we can identify a number of other factors,
    or units of personality derived through factor analysis. The number of factors, of
    course, will be smaller than the original number of observations.
    Our next step is to determine the extent to which each individual score con-
    tributes to the various factors. Correlations of scores with factors are called factor
    loadings. For example, if scores for algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and calculus
    contribute highly to Factor M but not to other factors, they will have high factor
    loadings on M. Factor loadings give us an indication of the purity of the various
    factors and enable us to interpret their meanings.
    Traits generated through factor analysis may be either unipolar or bipolar.
    Unipolar traits are scaled from zero to some large amount. Height, weight, and
    intellectual ability are examples of unipolar traits. In contrast, bipolar traits extend
    from one pole to an opposite pole, with zero representing a midpoint. Introversion
    versus extraversion, liberalism versus conservatism, and social ascendancy versus
    timidity are examples of bipolar traits.
    In order for mathematically derived factors to have psychological meaning,
    the axes on which the scores are plotted are usually turned or rotated into a specific
    mathematical relationship with each other. This rotation can be either orthogonal

    Part IV Dispositional Theories386
    or oblique, but advocates of the Five-Factor Theory favor the orthogonal rotation.
    Figure 13.1 shows that orthogonally rotated axes are at right angles to each other.
    As scores on the x variable increase, scores on the y axis may have any value; that
    is, they are completely unrelated to scores on the x axis.
    The oblique method, which was advocated by Cattell, assumes some positive or
    negative correlation and refers to an angle of less than or more than 90°. Figure 13.2
    y
    x
    FIGURE 13.1 Orthogonal axes
    y
    x
    FIGURE 13.2 Oblique axes

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 387
    depicts a scattergram of scores in which x and y are positively correlated with one
    another; that is, as scores on the x variable increase, scores on the y axis have a
    tendency also to increase. Note that the correlation is not perfect; some people may
    score high on the x variable but relatively low on y and vice versa. A perfect correla-
    tion (r = 1.00) would result in x and y occupying the same line. Psychologically,
    orthogonal rotation usually results in only a few meaningful traits, whereas oblique
    methods ordinarily produce a larger number.
    The Big Five: Taxonomy or Theory?
    In Chapter 1, we defined a taxonomy as a classification of things according to their
    natural relationships. We also suggested that taxonomies are an essential starting
    point for the advance of science, but that they are not theories. Whereas theories
    generate research, taxonomies merely supply a classification system.
    In the following discussion of McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Model (FFM),
    we will see that their work began as an attempt to identify basic personality traits
    as revealed by factor analysis. This work soon evolved into a taxonomy and the
    Five-Factor Model. After much additional work, this model became a theory, one
    that can both predict and explain behavior.
    Biographies of Robert R. McCrae
    and Paul T. Costa, Jr.
    Robert Roger McCrae was born April 28, 1949 in Maryville, Missouri, a town of
    13,000 people located about 100 miles north of Kansas City. Maryville is home to
    Northwest Missouri State, the town’s largest employer. McCrae, the youngest of
    three children born to Andrew McCrae and Eloise Elaine McCrae, grew up with
    an avid interest in science and mathematics. By the time he entered Michigan State
    University, he had decided to study philosophy. A National Merit Scholar, he
    nevertheless was not completely happy with the open-ended and non-empirical
    nature of philosophy. After completing his undergraduate degree, he entered grad-
    uate school at Boston University with a major in psychology. Given his inclination
    and talent for math and science, McCrae found himself intrigued by the psycho-
    metric work of Raymond Cattell. In particular, he became curious about using
    factor analysis to search for a simple method for identifying the structural traits
    found in the dictionary. At Boston University, McCrae’s major professor was
    Henry Weinberg, a clinical psychologist with only a peripheral interest in person-
    ality traits. Hence, McCrae’s interest in traits had to be nourished more internally
    than externally.
    During the 1960s and 1970s, Walter Mischel (see Chapter 18) was questioning
    the notion that personality traits are consistent, claiming that the situation is more
    important than any personality trait. Although Mischel has since revised his stance
    on the consistency of personality, his views were accepted by many psychologists
    during those years. In a personal communication dated May 4, 1999, McCrae wrote:
    “I attended graduate school in the years after Mischel’s (1968) critique of trait psy-
    chology. Many psychologists at the time were prepared to believe that traits were

    Part IV Dispositional Theories388
    nothing but response sets, stereotypes, or cognitive fictions. That never made any
    sense to me, and my early research experience showing remarkable stability in lon-
    gitudinal studies encouraged the belief that traits were real and enduring.” Neverthe-
    less, McCrae’s work on traits while in graduate school was a relatively lonely
    enterprise, being conducted quietly and without much fanfare. As it turns out, this
    quiet approach was well-suited to his own relatively quiet and introverted personality.
    In 1975, 4 years into his PhD program, McCrae’s destiny was about to
    change. He was sent by his advisor to work as a research assistant with James
    Fozard, an adult developmental psychologist at the Normative Aging Study at the
    Veterans Administration Outpatient Clinic in Boston. It was Fozard who referred
    McCrae to another Boston-based personality psychologist, Paul T. Costa Jr., who
    was on the faculty at University of Massachusetts at Boston.
    After McCrae completed his PhD in 1976, Costa hired him as project direc-
    tor and co-principal investigator for his Smoking and Personality Grant. McCrae
    and Costa worked together on this project for 2 years, until they both were hired
    by the National Institute on Aging’s Gerontology Research Center, a division of
    the National Institutes of Health (NIH) housed in Baltimore. Costa was hired as
    the chief of the section on stress and coping, whereas McCrae took the position
    as senior staff fellow. Because the Gerontology Research Center already had large,
    well-established datasets of adults, it was an ideal place for Costa and McCrae to
    investigate the question of how personality is structured. During the 1970s, with
    the shadow of Mischel’s influence still hanging heavily over the study of person-
    ality and with the concept of traits being nearly a taboo subject, Costa and McCrae
    conducted work on traits that ensured them a prominent role in the 40-year history
    of analyzing the structure of personality.
    Paul T. Costa, Jr. was born September 16, 1942 in Franklin, New Hampshire,
    the son of Paul T. Costa, Sr. and Esther Vasil Costa. He earned his undergraduate
    degree in psychology at Clark University in 1964 and both his master’s (1968) and
    PhD (1970) in human development from the University of Chicago. His longstand-
    ing interests in individual differences and the nature of personality increased greatly
    in the stimulating intellectual environment at the University of Chicago. While at
    Chicago, he worked with Salvatore R. Maddi, with whom he published a book on
    humanistic personality theory (Maddi & Costa, 1972). After receiving his PhD,
    he taught for 2 years at Harvard and then from 1973 to 1978 at University of
    Massachusetts–Boston. In 1978, he began working at the National Institute of
    Aging’s Gerontology Research Center, becoming the chief for the Section on Stress
    and Coping and then in 1985 chief for the Laboratory of Personality & Cognition.
    That same year, 1985, he became president of Division 20 (Adult Development and
    Aging) of the American Psychological Association. Among his other list of accom-
    plishments are fellow of American Psychological Association in 1977 and president
    of International Society for the Study of Individual Differences in 1995. Costa and
    his wife, Karol Sandra Costa, have three children, Nina, Lora, and Nicholas.
    The collaboration between Costa and McCrae has been unusually fruitful,
    with well over 200 co-authored research articles and chapters, and several books,
    including Emerging Lives, Enduring Dispositions (McCrae & Costa, 1984), Per-
    sonality in Adulthood: A Five-Factor Theory Perspective, 2nd ed. (McCrae &
    Costa, 2003), and Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992).

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 389
    In Search of the Big Five
    The study of traits was first begun by Allport and Odbert in the 1930s and continued
    by Cattell in the 1940s and by Tupes, Christal, and Norman in the 1960s (see John
    & Srivastava, 1999, for a historical review of the Five-Factor Model, or the Big-Five).
    In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Costa and McCrae, like most other factor
    researchers, were building elaborate taxonomies of personality traits, but they were
    not using these classifications to generate testable hypotheses. Instead, they were
    simply using factor analytic techniques to examine the stability and structure of
    personality. During this time, Costa and McCrae focused initially on the two main
    dimensions of neuroticism and extraversion.
    Almost immediately after they discovered N and E, Costa and McCrae found
    a third factor, which they called openness to experience. Most of Costa and
    McCrae’s early work remained focused on these three dimensions (see, for exam-
    ple, Costa & McCrae, 1976; Costa, Fozard, McCrae, & Bosse, 1976). Although
    Lewis Goldberg had first used the term “Big Five” in 1981 to describe the consis-
    tent findings of factor analyses of personality traits, Costa and McCrae continued
    their work on the three factors.
    Five Factors Found
    As late as 1983, McCrae and Costa were arguing for a three-factor model of
    personality. Not until 1985 did they begin to report work on the five factors of
    personality. This work culminated in their new five-factor personality inventory:
    the NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1985). The NEO-PI was a revision of an earlier
    unpublished personality inventory that measured only the first three dimensions:
    N, E, and O. In the 1985 inventory, the last two dimensions—agreeableness and
    conscientiousness—were still the least well-developed scales, having no subscales
    associated with them. Costa and McCrae (1992) did not fully develop the A and
    C scales until the Revised NEO-PI appeared in 1992.
    Throughout the 1980s, McCrae and Costa (1985, 1989) continued their work
    of factor analyzing almost every other major personality inventory, including the
    Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962) and the Eysenck Personality Inventory
    (H. Eysenck & S. Eysenck, 1975, 1993). For instance, in a direct comparison of
    their model with Eysenck’s inventory, Costa and McCrae reported that Eysenck’s
    first two factors (N and E) are completely consistent with their first two factors.
    Eysenck’s measure of psychoticism mapped onto the low ends of agreeableness
    and conscientiousness but did not tap into openness (McCrae & Costa, 1985).
    At that time, there were two major and related questions in personality research.
    First, with the dozens of different personality inventories and hundreds of different
    scales, how was a common language to emerge? Everyone had his or her own
    somewhat idiosyncratic set of personality variables, making comparisons between
    studies and cumulative progress difficult. Indeed, as Eysenck (1991a) wrote:
    Where we have literally hundreds of inventories incorporating thousands of
    traits, largely overlapping but also containing specific variance, each empirical
    finding is strictly speaking only relevant to a specific trait. This is not the way
    to build a unified scientific discipline. (p. 786)

    Part IV Dispositional Theories390
    Second, what is the structure of personality? Cattell argued for 16 factors,
    Eysenck for three, and many others were starting to argue for five. The major
    accomplishment of the Five-Factor Model (FFM) has been to provide answers to
    both these questions.
    Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, most personality psychologists have opted
    for the Five-Factor Model (Digman, 1990; John & Srivastava, 1999). The five factors
    have been found across a variety of cultures, using a plethora of languages (McCrae
    & Allik, 2002). In addition, the five factors show some permanence with age; that is,
    adults—in the absence of catastrophic illness such as Alzheimer’s—tend to maintain
    the same personality structure as they grow older (McCrae & Costa, 2003). These
    findings prompted McCrae and Costa (1996) to write that “the facts about personality
    are beginning to fall into place” (p. 78). Or as McCrae and Oliver John (1992) insisted,
    the existence of five factors “is an empirical fact, like the fact that there are seven
    continents or eight American presidents from Virginia” (p. 194). (Incidentally, it is not
    an empirical fact that this earth has seven continents: Most geographers count only six.)
    Description of the Five Factors
    McCrae and Costa agreed with Eysenck that personality traits are bipolar and follow
    a bell-shaped distribution. That is, most people score near the middle of each trait, with
    only a few people scoring at the extremes. How can people at the extremes be described?
    Neuroticism (N) and extraversion (E) are the two strongest and most ubiq-
    uitous personality traits, and Costa and McCrae conceptualize in much the same
    way as Eysenck defined them. People who score high on neuroticism tend to be
    People high in openness to experience can be creative and prefer activities that are socially uncommon.
    © Image Source, all rights reserved.

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 391
    anxious, temperamental, self-pitying, self-conscious, emotional, and vulnerable to
    stress-related disorders. Those who score low on N are usually calm, even- tempered,
    self-satisfied, and unemotional.
    People who score high on extraversion tend to be affectionate, jovial, talkative,
    joiners, and fun-loving. In contrast, low E scorers are likely to be reserved, quiet,
    loners, passive, and lacking the ability to express strong emotion (see Table 13.1).
    Extraversion
    Neuroticism
    Openness
    Agreeableness
    Conscientiousness
    High Scores
    affectionate
    joiner
    talkative
    fun loving
    active
    passionate
    anxious
    temperamental
    self-pitying
    self-conscious
    emotional
    vulnerable
    imaginative
    creative
    original
    prefers variety
    curious
    liberal
    softhearted
    trusting
    generous
    acquiescent
    lenient
    good-natured
    conscientious
    hardworking
    well-organized
    punctual
    ambitious
    persevering
    Low Scores
    reserved
    loner
    quiet
    sober
    passive
    unfeeling
    calm
    even-tempered
    self-satisfied
    comfortable
    unemotional
    hardy
    down-to-earth
    uncreative
    conventional
    prefers routine
    uncurious
    conservative
    ruthless
    suspicious
    stingy
    antagonistic
    critical
    irritable
    negligent
    lazy
    disorganized
    late
    aimless
    quitting
    T A B L E 1 3 . 1
    Costa and McCrae’s Five-Factor Model of Personality

    Part IV Dispositional Theories392
    Openness to experience distinguishes people who prefer variety from those
    who have a need for closure and who gain comfort in their association with famil-
    iar people and things. People who consistently seek out different and varied expe-
    riences would score high on openness to experience. For example, they enjoy
    trying new menu items at a restaurant or they like searching for new and exciting
    restaurants. In contrast, people who are not open to experiences will stick with a
    familiar item, one they know they will enjoy. People high on openness also tend
    to question traditional values, whereas those low on openness tend to support
    traditional values and to preserve a fixed style of living. In summary, people high
    on openness are generally creative, imaginative, curious, and liberal and have a
    preference for variety. By contrast, those who score low on openness to experience
    are typically conventional, down-to-earth, conservative, and lacking in curiosity.
    The Agreeableness Scale distinguishes soft-hearted people from ruthless ones.
    People who score in the direction of agreeableness tend to be trusting, generous,
    yielding, acceptant, and good-natured. Those who score in the other direction are
    generally suspicious, stingy, unfriendly, irritable, and critical of other people.
    The fifth factor—conscientiousness—describes people who are ordered, con-
    trolled, organized, ambitious, achievement focused, and self-disciplined. In general,
    people who score high on C are hardworking, conscientious, punctual, and perse-
    vering. In contrast, people who score low on conscientiousness tend to be disorga-
    nized, negligent, lazy, and aimless and are likely to give up when a project becomes
    difficult. Together these dimensions make up the personality traits of the five-
    factor model, often referred to as the “Big Five” (Goldberg, 1981).
    Evolution of the Five-Factor Theory
    Originally, the five factors constituted nothing more than a taxonomy, a classifica-
    tion of basic personality traits. By the late 1980s, Costa and McCrae became
    confident that they and other researchers had found a stable structure of personal-
    ity. That is, they had answered the first central question of personality: What is
    the structure of personality? This advance was an important milestone for person-
    ality traits. The field now had a commonly agreed-on language for describing
    personality, and it was in five dimensions. Describing personality traits, however,
    is not the same as explaining them. For explanation, scientists need theory, and
    that was the next project for McCrae and Costa.
    McCrae and Costa (1996) objected to earlier theories as relying too heavily
    on clinical experiences and on armchair speculation. By the 1980s, the rift between
    classical theories and modern research-based theories had become quite pro-
    nounced. It had become clear to them that “the old theories cannot simply be
    abandoned: They must be replaced by a new generation of theories that grow out
    of the conceptual insights of the past and the empirical findings of contemporary
    research” (p. 53). Indeed, this tension between the old and new was one of the
    driving forces behind Costa and McCrae’s development of an alternative theory,
    one that went beyond the five-factor taxonomy.
    What then is the alternative? What could a modern trait theory do that was
    missing from the classic theories? According to McCrae and Costa, first and foremost,

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 393
    a new theory should be able to incorporate the change and growth of the field that
    has occurred over the last 25 years as well as be grounded in the current empirical
    principles that have emerged from research.
    For 25 years, Costa and McCrae had been at the forefront of contemporary
    personality research, developing and elaborating on the Five-Factor Model. Accord-
    ing to McCrae and Costa (1999), “neither the model itself nor the body of research
    findings with which it is associated constitutes a theory of personality. A theory
    organizes findings to tell a coherent story, to bring into focus those issues and
    phenomena that can and should be explained” (pp. 139–140). Earlier, McCrae and
    Costa (1996, p. 78) had stated that “the facts about personality are beginning to fall
    into place. Now is the time to begin to make sense of them.” In other words, it was
    time to turn the Five-Factor Model (taxonomy) into a Five-Factor Theory (FFT).
    Units of the Five-Factor Theory
    In the personality theory of McCrae and Costa (1996, 1999, 2003), behavior is
    predicted by an understanding of three central or core components and three
    peripheral ones. The three central components include (1) basic tendencies, (2)
    characteristic adaptations, and (3) self-concept.
    Core Components of Personality
    In Figure 13.3, the central or core components are represented by rectangles,
    whereas the peripheral components are represented by ellipses. The arrows repre-
    sent dynamic processes and indicate the direction of causal influence. For exam-
    ple, objective biography (life experiences) is the outcome of characteristic
    adaptations as well as external influences. Also, biological bases are the sole cause
    of basic tendencies (personality traits). The personality system can be interpreted
    either cross-sectionally (how the system operates at any given point in time) or
    longitudinally (how we develop over the lifetime). Moreover, each causal influence
    is dynamic, meaning that it changes over time.
    Basic Tendencies As defined by McCrae and Costa (1996), basic tendencies are
    one of the central components of personality, along with characteristic adaptations,
    self-concept, biological bases, objective biography, and external influences. McCrae
    and Costa defined basic tendencies as
    the universal raw material of personality capacities and dispositions that are
    generally inferred rather than observed. Basic tendencies may be inherited,
    imprinted by early experience or modified by disease or psychological
    intervention, but at any given period in an individual’s life, they define the
    individual’s potential and direction. (pp. 66, 68)
    In earlier versions of their theory, McCrae and Costa (1996) made it clear that many
    different elements make up basic tendencies. In addition to the five stable personal-
    ity traits, these basic tendencies include cognitive abilities, artistic talent, sexual
    orientation, and the psychological processes underlying acquisition of language.
    In most of their later publications, McCrae and Costa (1999, 2003) focused
    almost exclusively on the personality traits: more specifically, the five dimensions

    Part IV Dispositional Theories394
    (N, E, O, A, and C) described in detail above (see Table 13.1). The essence of
    basic tendencies is their basis in biology and their stability over time and situation.
    Characteristic Adaptations Core components of Five-Factor Theory include the
    characteristic adaptations, that is, acquired personality structures that develop as
    people adapt to their environment. The principal difference between basic tenden-
    cies and characteristic adaptations is their flexibility. Whereas basic tendencies are
    quite stable, characteristic adaptations can be influenced by external influences,
    such as acquired skills, habits, attitudes, and relationships that result from the
    interaction of individuals with their environment. McCrae and Costa (2003)
    explained the relationship between basic tendencies and characteristic adaptations,
    saying that the heart of their theory “is the distinction between basic tendencies
    and characteristic adaptations, precisely the distinction that we need to explain the
    stability of personality” (p. 187).
    All acquired and specific skills, such as the English language or statistics,
    are characteristic adaptations. How quickly we learn (talent, intelligence, aptitude)
    is a basic tendency; what we learn is a characteristic adaptation. Moreover, our
    dispositions and tendencies are the direct influence on our characteristic adapta-
    tions. Characteristic responses are shaped and molded by basic tendencies. What
    makes them characteristic is their consistency and uniqueness; hence, they reflect
    the operation of enduring personality traits. Echoing Allport, they are adaptations
    because they are shaped as a response to what the environment has to offer us at
    Dynamic
    Processes
    Dynamic
    Processes
    Dynamic
    Processes
    Dynamic
    Processes
    Dy
    na
    m
    ic
    Pr
    oc
    es
    se
    s
    Dyna
    mic
    Proc
    esse
    s
    D
    yn
    a
    m
    ic
    P
    ro
    ce
    sse
    s
    Dynamic
    Processes
    Dynamic
    Processes
    Biological
    Bases
    Characteristic
    Adaptations
    Self-Concept
    Objective
    Biography
    External
    Influences
    Basic
    Tendencies
    FIGURE 13.3 Operation of the personality system according to FFT. Arrows indicate the direction of causal
    influences, which operate through dynamic processes.
    Source: From McCrae and Costa (1996).

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 395
    any given moment. They allow us to fit into or adapt to our environment on an
    ongoing basis.
    Understanding how characteristic adaptations and basic tendencies interact is
    absolutely central to the FFT. Basic tendencies are stable and enduring whereas
    characteristic adaptations fluctuate, making them subject to change over a person’s
    lifetime. Characteristic adaptations differ from culture to culture. For instance, the
    expression of anger in the presence of a superior is much more taboo in Japan than
    it is in the United States. Distinguishing between stable tendencies and changing
    adaptations is important because this distinction can explain both the stability of
    personality and the plasticity of personality. Thus, McCrae and Costa have pro-
    vided a solution to the problem of stability versus change in personality structure.
    Basic tendencies are stable, while characteristic adaptations fluctuate.
    Self-Concept McCrae and Costa (2003) explain that self-concept is actually a
    characteristic adaptation (see Figure 13.3), but it gets its own box because it is
    such an important adaptation. McCrae and Costa (1996) wrote that it “consists of
    knowledge, views, and evaluations of the self, ranging from miscellaneous facts
    of personal history to the identity that gives a sense of purpose and coherence to
    life” (p. 70). The beliefs, attitudes, and feelings one has toward oneself are char-
    acteristic adaptations in that they influence how one behaves in a given circum-
    stance. For example, believing that one is an intelligent person makes one more
    willing to put oneself into situations that are intellectually challenging.
    Does self-concept need to be accurate? Learning theorists such as Albert Bandura
    (Chapter 17) and humanistic theorists such as Carl Rogers (Chapter 10) or Gordon
    Allport (Chapter 12) believe that the conscious views people have of themselves
    are relatively accurate, with some distortion perhaps. In contrast, psychodynamic
    theorists would argue that most of the conscious thoughts and feelings people have
    of themselves are inherently distorted and the true nature of the self (ego) is largely
    unconscious. However, McCrae and Costa (2003) include personal myths as part
    of a person’s self-concept.
    Peripheral Components
    The three peripheral components are (1) biological bases, (2) objective biography,
    and (3) external influences.
    Biological Bases The Five-Factor Theory rests on a single causal influence on per-
    sonality traits, namely biology. The principal biological mechanisms that influence
    basic tendencies are genes, hormones, and brain structures. McCrae and Costa have
    not yet provided specific details about which genes, hormones, and brain structures
    play what role in their influence on personality. Advances in behavioral genetics and
    brain imaging have begun and will continue to fill in the details. This positioning of
    biological bases eliminates any role that the environment may play in the formation
    of basic tendencies. This should not suggest that the environment has no part in per-
    sonality formation—merely that it has no direct influence on basic tendencies (see
    Figure 13.3). The environment does influence some components of personality. This
    underscores the need to distinguish the main two components of the model—basic
    tendencies and characteristic adaptations (McCrae & Costa, 1996, p. 187).

    Part IV Dispositional Theories396
    Objective Biography The second peripheral component is objective biography,
    defined as “everything the person does, thinks, or feels across the whole life span”
    (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 187). Objective biography emphasizes what has
    happened in people’s lives (objective) rather than their view or perceptions of their
    experiences (subjective). Every behavior or response becomes part of the cumula-
    tive record. Whereas theorists such as Alfred Adler (style of life) or Dan McAdams
    (personal narrative) emphasize the subjective interpretations of one’s life-story,
    McCrae and Costa focus on the objective experiences—the events and experiences
    one has had over one’s lifetime.
    External Influences People constantly find themselves in a particular physical
    or social situation that has some influence on the personality system. The question
    of how we respond to the opportunities and demands of the context is what exter-
    nal influences is all about. According to McCrae and Costa (1999, 2003), these
    responses are a function of two things: (1) characteristic adaptations and (2) their
    interaction with external influences (note the two arrows going into the objective
    biography ellipse in Figure 13.3).
    McCrae and Costa assume that behavior is a function of the interaction
    between characteristic adaptations and external influences. As an example, they
    cite the case of Joan, who is offered tickets to see the opera La Traviata (an exter-
    nal influence). But Joan has a long personal history of detesting opera (a charac-
    teristic adaptation) and therefore refuses the offer (an objective biography). To
    elaborate, Joan may well have a basic tendency toward being closed (rather than
    open) to new experiences, and she may never have been around opera as a child
    or may have simply formed a negative opinion about it based on reputation. What-
    ever the case, she is more at home with familiar events and with down-to-earth
    experiences. This background predicts that Joan is likely to respond the way she
    did to an offer to attend an opera. These decisions to stay away from such experi-
    ences reinforce themselves as her distaste for opera grows. This is reflected in the
    arrow circling back on itself in Figure 13.3.
    Basic Postulates
    Each of the components of the personality system (except biological bases) has
    core postulates. Because the components of basic tendencies and characteristic
    adaptations are most central to the personality system, we will elaborate only on
    the postulates for these two components.
    Postulates for Basic Tendencies
    Basic tendencies have four postulates: individuality, origin, development, and struc-
    ture. The individuality postulate stipulates that adults have a unique set of traits and
    that each person exhibits a unique combination of trait patterns. The precise amount
    of neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness is
    unique to all of us, and much of our uniqueness results from variability in our
    genotype. This postulate is consistent with Allport’s idea that uniqueness is the
    essence of personality.

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 397
    Second, the origin postulate takes a clear if somewhat controversial stance:
    All personality traits are the result solely of endogenous (internal) forces, such as
    genetics, hormones, and brain structures. In other words, the family environment
    plays no role in creating basic tendencies (but again, recall that personality traits
    are not synonymous with personality as a whole). Figure 13.3 shows but one
    causal arrow going from biological bases to basic tendencies. Such a claim is
    based mostly on the robust findings from behavioral genetics that the five dimen-
    sions of personality can be almost exclusively explained (about 50% each) by two
    factors, namely genetics and nonshared environment (Hamer & Copeland, 1998;
    Loehlin, 1992; Plomin & Caspi, 1999). Genetic influence is demonstrated by what
    behavioral geneticists refer to as heritability coefficients and comes out of the
    research on adoption studies and twin studies. Heritability addresses the question
    of what is the difference in the correlation on a given personality trait between
    individuals who are genetically identical (identical twins) and those who share
    only about 50% of their genes (all other siblings). If genes played no role in shap-
    ing traits, no differences would be found in correlations between people who vary
    in their degree of genetic similarity. Identical and fraternal twins would be just
    as similar or just as different. Evidence indicates that identical twins, even if
    reared in different environments, show greater similarity in personality than other
    siblings. And in the case of most personality traits, the degree of similarity sug-
    gests that about 50% of the variability in personality is due to heritability or
    genetics. Most of the remaining 50% is explained by nonshared experiences of
    siblings of varying ages; that is, siblings usually have different experiences,
    friends, and teachers. For instance, parents change their own parenting behaviors
    with time and experience. Thus, a child born three or four years after another is
    being raised in a somewhat different environment. More recent research has
    uncovered genetic regions associated with all five dimensions of personality (de
    Moor et al., 2012).
    Third, the development postulate assumes that traits develop and change
    through childhood, but in adolescence their development slows, and by early to
    mid-adulthood (roughly age 30), change in personality nearly stops altogether
    (Costa & McCrae, 1994; Costa, McCrae, & Arenberg, 1980).
    McCrae and Costa (2003) speculated that there may be some evolutionary
    and adaptive reasons for these changes: When people are young and establishing
    their relationships and careers, high E, O, and even N would be beneficial. As
    people mature and become settled, these traits are no longer as adaptive as they
    were earlier. Moreover, increases in agreeableness and conscientiousness might be
    helpful as people age. In our section on research, we discuss stability of traits dur-
    ing adulthood.
    Finally, the structure postulate states that traits are organized hierarchically
    from narrow and specific to broad and general, just as Eysenck (1990) had sug-
    gested. This postulate grows out of McCrae and Costa’s long-held position that
    the number of personality dimensions is five and only five. This number is more
    than the three hypothesized by Eysenck and considerably fewer than 35 found by
    Cattell. With the structure postulate, McCrae and Costa and other five-factor
    theorists converge on five as the answer to the long-standing debate among factor
    theorists.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories398
    Postulates for Characteristic Adaptations
    The postulate concerning characteristic adaptations states that, over time, people
    adapt to their environment “by acquiring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behav-
    iors that are consistent with their personality traits and earlier adaptations” (McCrae
    & Costa, 2003, p. 190). In other words, traits affect the way we adapt to the
    changes in our environment. Moreover, our basic tendencies result in our seeking
    and selecting particular environments that match our dispositions. For instance, an
    extraverted person may join a dance club, whereas an assertive person may become
    a lawyer or business executive.
    The second characteristic adaptation postulate—maladjustment—suggests
    that our responses are not always consistent with personal goals or cultural values.
    For example, when introversion is carried to an extreme, it may result in patho-
    logical social shyness, which prevents people from going out of the house or
    holding down a job. Also, aggression carried to an extreme may lead to belliger-
    ence and antagonism, which then result in being frequently fired from jobs. These
    habits, attitudes, and competencies that make up characteristic adaptations some-
    times become so rigid or compulsive that they become maladaptive.
    The third characteristic adaptation postulate states that basic traits may
    “change over time in response to biological maturation, changes in the environ-
    ment, or deliberate interventions” (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 190). This is McCrae
    and Costa’s plasticity postulate, one that recognizes that although basic tendencies
    may be rather stable over the lifetime, characteristic adaptations are not. For exam-
    ple, interventions such as psychotherapy and behavior modification may have a
    difficult time changing a person’s fundamental traits, but they may be potent
    enough to alter a person’s characteristic responses.
    Related Research
    The trait approach taken by Robert McCrae and Paul Costa is very popular in the
    field of personality. Costa and McCrae have developed a widely used personality
    inventory, namely the NEO-PI (Costa & McCrae, 1985, 1992).
    Traits have been linked to vital outcomes such as physical health (Martin,
    Friedman, & Schwartz, 2007), well-being (Costa & McCrae, 1980), and academic
    success (Noftle & Robins, 2007; Zyphur, Islam, & Landis, 2007); but traits have
    also been linked to more common, everyday outcomes such as mood (McNiel &
    Fleeson, 2006). As seen below, traits can predict long-term outcomes like GPA
    (Noftle & Robins, 2007) that are the product of years of work, but traits can also
    predict more discrete outcomes like whether personality predicts Internet usage
    among teenagers (van der Aa et al., 2009), and what kind of mood you might be
    in on any given day (McNiel & Fleeson, 2006).
    Personality and Academic Performance
    Personality traits are strong predictors of many aspects of life. One area that
    has received a fair amount of research is the relationship between traits and
    academic performance, as measured by standardized test scores and GPA.
    Researchers Erik Noftle and Richard Robins (2007) conducted a large study in

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 399
    which they measured the traits and academic outcomes of more than 10,000 stu-
    dents. To conduct this research, Noftle and Robins gave undergraduates self-
    report questionnaires to measure their scores on the “Big Five” traits and
    asked about their SAT scores and high school and college GPAs, which were
    then checked against university records for accuracy. The most important trait
    for predicting both high school and college GPA was conscientiousness. Those
    who are high on the trait of conscientiousness tend to have higher GPAs in both
    high school and college. Recall that conscientiousness in Costa and McCrae’s
    five-factor model of personality is defined as hardworking, well organized, and
    punctual. Students high in conscientiousness are those who, day in and day out,
    tend to make time for studying, know how to study well, and have good atten-
    dance in class, all of which contribute to doing well in school. A meta-analysis
    of 80 studies on more than 70,000 students confirmed the important role that
    conscientiousness has in GPA (Poropat, 2009). In fact, conscientiousness has
    nearly the same influence on GPA as intelligence.
    Related to the question of whether personality predicts academic achievement
    is the question of whether it predicts academic dishonesty. Which dimension(s) of
    the Big Five—Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Conscientiousness, and
    Agreeableness—would you think best predicts a willingness to cheat on tests or
    copy papers or homework?
    Giluk and Postlethwaite (2015) conducted a meta-analysis of 17 studies from
    all over the world that measured personality using a measure of the Big Five and at
    least one measure of academic dishonesty. More than 5,000 students were assessed
    in the 17 studies. Although relatively small in magnitude, correlations showed that
    scoring low on conscientiousness and low on agreeableness predicted academic dis-
    honesty. That is, students with personalities that are not very organized, disciplined,
    planful, or goal directed, and who are somewhat hostile, cold, and lacking in empathy
    are most likely to cheat on academic assignments.
    The relationship between traits and SAT scores followed a different pattern than
    for traits and GPA. The “Big Five” traits were not strong predictors of scores on the
    math section of the SAT, but openness was related to scores on the verbal section
    (Noftle & Robins, 2007). Specifically, those who scored higher on the trait of open-
    ness were more likely to do well on the SAT verbal questions. If you think about
    this, it makes sense. Those who score high on openness are imaginative, creative, and
    can think broadly, which can be useful approaches to difficult questions on a test.
    It may be surprising that in the discussion of predicting SAT scores from
    traits, conscientiousness was not a strong predictor as it was for GPA. Yet SAT
    scores and GPA, although both are general measures of academic success, are very
    different. A person’s score on the SAT is more aptitude and based on one single
    test, whereas GPA is more achievement and the product of years of work. It is
    more difficult, through studying alone, to change one’s SAT score. It is somewhat
    more akin to an intelligence test score.
    Some people take the SAT multiple times, whereas other people take it but
    once. These different approaches to test taking may reflect differences in the trait
    of neuroticism. Given that those who score high on the trait of neuroticism tend
    to be more anxious and less self-satisfied, it makes sense that these people may
    be more likely to take the SAT over and over again.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories400
    Michael Zyphur and colleagues (2007) conducted a study to see whether those
    high on neuroticism were indeed more likely to retake the SAT. To test this prediction,
    the researchers administered a self-report measure of neuroticism to 207 undergradu-
    ate students and then examined the students’ transcripts for information on how many
    times each student took the SAT prior to coming to college and what their scores
    were. The results supported the researchers’ hypothesis in that those who scored high
    on neuroticism were more likely to take the SAT multiple times. Interestingly, the
    researchers also found that scores on the SAT tended to increase over time so par-
    ticipants in the study tended to score higher the second time than the first and higher
    still the third time they took the test.
    When it comes to predicting academic performance from traits, the traits that
    are most important depend on the outcome of interest because there are multiple
    ways to do well. Conscientiousness is good for GPA but not that important for the
    SAT. Openness is great for verbal ability but doesn’t matter much for mathemati-
    cal ability. And neuroticism, although generally related to greater feelings of anx-
    iety and self-consciousness, is associated with taking tests over and over again and
    doing a little better each time.
    Traits, Internet Use, and Well-Being
    There has been much public debate about the impact of Internet use on adolescents’
    well-being, but early research on this question has provided contradictory results.
    Some studies find, as many parents and educators fear, that daily Internet use is
    associated with higher levels of depression and poorer well-being in teens (e.g.,
    Van den Eijnden et al., 2008), while others have found no correlation between
    these variables (e.g., Gross et al., 2002). In one recent study of Dutch youth, van
    der Aa and colleagues (2009) reasoned that the Internet is not used the same way
    by all teens, nor does that usage affect all teens in the same way. They sought to
    examine the contribution of the personality traits of teens to Internet usage and the
    impact that usage has on their well-being. Do more introverted teens turn to the
    Internet more for social interaction, for example? And does Internet usage differ-
    entially impact youth with different trait profiles?
    The researchers surveyed an enormous number of adolescents in the Netherlands
    via an online questionnaire. The total sample was 7,888 teens ranging in age from
    11 to 21 years. In addition to completing the “Big Five” to assess levels of extra-
    version, conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, and openness, they were
    queried about their Internet use, loneliness, self-esteem, and depressive moods. The
    results showed that daily Internet use in itself is not directly associated with low
    well-being (a finding providing relief to many readers of this textbook). Rather,
    any risks of Internet use in terms of well-being are more related to individuals’
    tendencies to use the Internet compulsively—to feel unable to stop surfing, be
    preoccupied with the Internet, or to have Internet use interfering with other duties.
    This compulsive use of the Internet was predicted in the study by personality traits.
    More introverted, less agreeable, and more neurotic adolescents and young adults
    were more likely to score high on compulsive use, and this compulsive use was,
    in turn, more strongly predictive of feelings of loneliness and having depressive
    symptoms.

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 401
    It makes intuitive sense that teens who are more introverted and neurotic and
    less agreeable might find face to face social interaction less rewarding than their
    more extraverted, agreeable, and emotionally stable peers. Because of this, such
    youth likely find the Internet a more enjoyable context for communication. Van
    der Aa and colleagues (2009) hypothesize that these young people may end up in
    a vicious cycle of ever greater Internet use that may become compulsive, setting
    themselves up for lower well-being. Perhaps, then, targeting teens with this trait
    profile to reduce Internet usage and provide rewarding offline activities could
    improve their mental health.
    Traits and Emotions
    Personality traits affect more than success at school and other long-term outcomes.
    Traits can also affect the mood a person experiences on a daily basis. If you look
    carefully at the descriptors of each trait, particularly extraversion and neuroticism,
    this is not surprising. To be high on extraversion is to be fun loving and passion-
    ate (both positive feelings), whereas to be high on neuroticism is to be anxious
    and self-conscious (both negative feelings). Therefore, researchers have long con-
    sidered positive emotion to be the core of extraversion and negative emotion to be
    the core of neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1980).
    Although the predictions seem intuitive that more “positive” feelings should
    be associated with extraversion and more “negative” feelings with neuroticism,
    what about the other traits of the Big Five? Also, what about more specific
    emotional states? Shiota, Keltner, and John (2006) explored the relationships
    among multiple positive emotions and the core personality dimensions of the Big
    Five for a more nuanced picture of the relationship between personality and
    emotion. In this case, the researchers asked students enrolled in an undergraduate
    personality psychology class (surely much like the one you are enrolled in as
    you read this textbook!) to rate their general experiences of seven distinct posi-
    tive emotions (joy, contentment, pride, love, compassion, amusement, and awe)
    on a scale the researchers had developed, called the Dispositional Positive Emo-
    tions Scale (DPES). Some example questions on this scale were “I am at peace
    with my life”—contentment; “I feel wonder almost every day”—awe; “Good
    things happen to me all the time”—joy. In addition, participants also completed
    the NEO-PI to assess their scores on the Big Five dimensions of personality. As
    well, peers completed ratings of the participants’ personalities.
    This was a correlational study. Many interesting significant relationships
    emerged between participants’ self-ratings of their positive emotions and their per-
    sonality traits. All seven positive emotions were significantly correlated with Extra-
    version, as predicted, with more extraverted people experiencing more daily joy,
    contentment, pride, love, compassion, amusement, and awe than more introverted
    people. Interestingly, domain-relevant positive emotions correlated with Conscien-
    tiousness and Agreeableness. That is, more conscientious people experience more of
    the agency-related emotions of joy, contentment, and pride than their less conscien-
    tious peers, and more agreeable individuals experience (perhaps intuitively) more
    love and compassion than their more disagreeable counterparts. Awe was, as we
    might anticipate, the most strongly related positive emotion to Openness to Experience.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories402
    It seems that to be open to the world is perhaps to set oneself up for more experi-
    ences of awe and wonder. However, Openness was also significantly positively
    correlated (though less strongly so) to joy, love, compassion, and amusement as well.
    Finally, Neuroticism was significantly negatively correlated with joy, contentment,
    pride, and love, with less emotionally stable people experiencing less of these posi-
    tive emotions on a daily basis than their more stable counterparts. Though the effect
    sizes were smaller, a similar pattern was seen among the correlations between self-
    reported DPES positive emotions and peer-rated Big Five personality.
    Because most studies of the relationship between personality and emotions
    are correlational, what has not been clear is whether the trait of extraversion or
    neuroticism causes the experience of positive and negative mood respectively or if
    it is the experience of the emotions that causes people to behave in ways concordant
    with the traits. For example, if people are in a good mood it makes sense that they
    might be more jovial and talkative (i.e., extraverted behavior), but are they in a
    good mood because they are acting extraverted or are they acting extraverted
    because they are in a good mood? Similarly, if people are in a bad mood it makes
    sense that they might act a little self-conscious and experience anxiety (i.e., neurotic
    behavior), but did the mood cause the behavior or did the behavior cause the mood?
    Murray McNiel and William Fleeson (2006) conducted a study to determine
    the direction of causality for the relationships between extraversion and positive
    mood and between neuroticism and negative mood. Specifically, they were inter-
    ested in determining whether acting in an extraverted manner causes people to
    experience positive feelings and whether acting in a neurotic manner causes peo-
    ple to experience negative feelings. To do this, McNiel and Fleeson had 45 par-
    ticipants come into a psychology laboratory in groups of three and participate in
    two different group discussions. During the first discussion, one person in the
    group was instructed to act “bold, spontaneous, assertive, and talkative” (all of
    which are extraverted behaviors), one person was instructed to act “reserved,
    inhibited, timid, and quiet” (all of which are introverted behaviors), and the third
    person received no instructions and instead was a neutral observer of the behavior
    of the other two group members. After the group discussion, the participants who
    were instructed to act extraverted or introverted rated their own mood, whereas
    the neutral observer rated the mood of his or her group members (those who were
    instructed to act extraverted or introverted). During the second group discussion,
    the roles of those who were instructed to behave either extraverted or introverted
    were switched so that whoever acted extraverted in the first discussion acted
    introverted in the second discussion and vice versa. The neutral observer stayed
    the same. This type of experimental design allowed the researchers to conclusively
    determine whether extraverted behavior does indeed cause positive mood.
    Just as predicted, participants reported higher positive mood when they were
    instructed to act extraverted than when they were instructed to act introverted. This
    finding was also supported by the ratings of the neutral observer and was consistent
    for people who were high or low on trait extraversion. This suggests that regardless
    of your natural level of extraversion, just acting in an extraverted manner can make
    you feel better than if you act introverted.
    Recall that although positive mood is thought to be the core of extraversion,
    negative mood is thought to be the core of neuroticism. McNiel and Fleeson (2006)

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 403
    wanted to extend their findings for extraversion and positive mood, so they conducted
    another study, but this time investigated the effects for neuroticism and negative mood.
    The procedure was essentially the same as their previous study, but instead of one
    person being instructed to act extraverted or introverted, one participant was instructed
    to act “emotional, subjective, moody, and demanding” (all of which are aspects of
    high neuroticism) and another participant was instructed to act “unemotional, objec-
    tive, steady, and undemanding” (all of which are aspects of low neuroticism). The
    roles of high neuroticism and low neuroticism were switched for the second group
    discussion. As predicted, participants reported being in a worse mood when they acted
    neurotic than when they did not. The general conclusion of this research then is that
    if you are in a bad mood but want to be in a good mood, act extraverted.
    So far we’ve discussed how the trait of neuroticism is generally related to
    negative emotion and how acting neurotic can cause negative emotion. But there is
    some recent research that suggests that it is not the case that everybody who scores
    high on neuroticism experiences more negative emotion (Robinson & Clore, 2007).
    There are individual differences for the speed with which people process incoming
    information, and these differences might influence the relationship between neuroti-
    cism and negative mood. These differences in speed are measured in milliseconds
    and are therefore imperceptible both to the individual and to other people, but there
    are computers that can measure these differences quite accurately. To measure these
    speed differences, participants sit in front of a computer and complete a Stroop task,
    which involves identifying whether the color of the font for a word presented on the
    screen is red or green. This task is more difficult than it sounds because sometimes
    the word “red” appears in green font, so while the correct response is “green,”
    people will initially want to respond with “red” and have to overcome that tendency.
    In the study conducted by Michael Robinson and Gerald Clore (2007),
    participants first completed this Stroop task while a computer measured how fast
    they completed the task. After completing the computer task, participants also
    completed a standard self-report measure of neuroticism. Then participants were
    asked to record their mood at the end of every day for 2 weeks. According to
    past research, neuroticism should predict daily negative mood, but Robinson and
    Clore (2007) predicted that this would be the case only for those who were
    relatively slow at the categorization task (Stroop task). The reasoning for this
    prediction is that those who are fast at processing things in their environment do
    not need to rely on traits such as neuroticism to interpret events and thereby
    cause negative mood. In other words, fast processors objectively interpret their
    environment whereas slow processors are more subjective in their evaluations by
    relying on trait dispositions to interpret events.
    Indeed, this is exactly what the researchers found: Neuroticism did pre-
    dict experiencing more negative mood over the course of the 2-week reporting
    period but only for those who were slow at the computer task. Those who were
    high on neuroticism but fast at the computer task did not report any more
    negative emotion over the course of the 2-week period than their low neuroti-
    cism counterparts.
    Taken together, the research on traits and emotion shows that although
    the early research in this area showing that extraversion and neuroticism are
    related to positive and negative mood respectively is not inaccurate, it does not

    Part IV Dispositional Theories404
    portray the complete picture of the complex relationship between traits and
    emotion. The research by McNiel and Fleeson (2006) showed that acting extra-
    verted, even if you are not high on extraversion, can increase positive mood.
    Furthermore, although neuroticism is related to experiencing more negative
    mood, Robinson and Clore (2007) demonstrated that this was the case only for
    those who not only were high on neuroticism but also were relatively slow at
    categorizing incoming information. Traits are good predictors of grades in
    school, SAT scores, compulsive internet use, and even daily mood, but traits
    are not an immutable destiny. Even if your traits predispose you toward certain
    types of behavior, your actions can subvert those dispositions.
    Critique of Trait and Factor Theories
    Trait and factor methods—especially those of Eysenck and advocates of the Big
    Five model—provide important taxonomies that organize personality into meaning-
    ful classifications. As pointed out in Chapter 1, however, taxonomies alone do not
    explain or predict behavior, two important functions of useful theories.
    Do these theories go beyond taxonomies and produce important personality
    research? The trait and factor theories of Costa and McCrae are examples of a strictly
    empirical approach to personality investigation. These theories were built by collect-
    ing as much data as possible on a large number of people, intercorrelating the scores,
    factor analyzing correlation matrices, and applying appropriate psychological sig-
    nificance to the resultant factors. A psychometric approach, rather than clinical judg-
    ment, is the cornerstone of trait and factor theories. Nevertheless, like other theories,
    trait and factor theories must be judged by six criteria of a useful theory.
    First, do trait and factor theories generate research? On this criterion, the
    Five-Factor Model of Costa and McCrae must be rated very high. The trait theory
    of McCrae and Costa and other advocates of the Big Five personality structure
    have also generated large amounts of empirical research. That research has shown
    that the traits of extraversion, neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness,
    and conscientiousness are not limited to Western nations, but are found in a wide
    variety of cultures, using myriad translations of the revised NEO-PI (McCrae,
    2002). In addition, McCrae and Costa have found that basic personality traits are
    somewhat flexible up to about age 30, but, after that time, they remain quite stable
    over the lifespan.
    Second, are trait and factor theories falsifiable? On this criterion, trait and
    factor theories receive a moderate to high rating. The work of McCrae and Costa
    lends itself to falsification, even though some of the research coming from non-
    Western countries suggests that traits other than the Big Five may be needed to
    explain personality in Asian countries.
    Third, trait and factor theories are rated high on their ability to organize
    knowledge. Anything that is truly known about personality should be reducible to
    some quantity. Anything that can be quantified can be measured, and anything that
    can be measured can be factor analyzed. The extracted factors then provide a
    convenient and accurate description of personality in terms of traits. These traits,
    in turn, can present a framework for organizing many disparate observations
    about human personality.

    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory 405
    Fourth, a useful theory has the power to guide the actions of practitioners,
    and on this criterion, trait and factor theories receive mixed reviews. Although
    these theories provide a comprehensive and structured taxonomy, such a classifica-
    tion is less useful to parents, teachers, and counselors than it is to researchers.
    Are trait and factor theories internally consistent? The Big Five theory and
    research is internally quite consistent, even if there are some (e.g., Eysenck, see
    next chapter) who disagree with the number of basic dimensions of personality.
    Cross-cultural research tends to lend support for the universality of these five dimen-
    sions all over the world, which suggests these are consistent dimensions of human
    personality (McCrae, 2002; Schmitt, Allik, McCrae, & Benet-Martínez, 2007; Trull
    & Geary, 1997; Zheng et al., 2008). We should point out, however, that cross-
    cultural research is not unanimous in its findings supporting the Big Five, partly
    due to the difficulties in translating the questions into many different languages. For
    instance, the internal reliability of the Big Five Inventory-Agreeableness scale is
    only .57 in South and Southeast Asia, suggesting the items are not completely
    measuring one dimension among Asians (Schmitt et al., 2007).
    The final criterion of a useful theory is parsimony. Ideally, trait and factor
    theories should receive an excellent rating on this standard, because factor analysis
    is predicated on the idea of the fewest explanatory factors possible. In other words,
    the very purpose of factor analysis is to reduce a large number of variables to as
    few as possible. This approach is the essence of parsimony.
    Concept of Humanity
    How do trait and factor theorists view humanity? The Five-Factor theorists
    were not concerned with traditional themes such as determinism versus free
    choice, optimism versus pessimism, and teleological versus causal influ-
    ences. In fact, their theories do not lend themselves to speculation of these
    topics. What, then, can we say concerning their view of humanity?
    First, we know that factor analysts see humans as being different from
    other animals. Only humans have the ability to report data about themselves.
    From this fact, we can infer that McCrae and Costa believed that humans pos-
    sess not only consciousness, but self-consciousness as well. People are also
    able to evaluate their performance and to render reasonably reliable reports
    concerning their attitudes, temperament, needs, interests, and behaviors.
    Second, McCrae and Costa placed emphasis on genetic factors of per-
    sonality. They believe that traits and factors are both inherited and have strong
    genetic and biological components and hence are universal. But they also
    believed that environment plays a crucial role in shaping a person’s disposi-
    tions. Therefore, we rate the Five-Factor model as medium on social influences.
    On the dimension of individual differences versus similarities, trait and
    factor theories lean toward individual differences. Factor analysis rests on
    the premise of differences among individuals and thus variability in their
    scores. Thus, trait theories are more concerned with individual differences
    than with similarities among people.

    Part IV Dispositional Theories406
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Trait and factor theories of personality are based on factor analysis, a
    procedure that assumes that human traits can be measured by correlational
    studies.
    ∙ Extraverts are characterized by sociability and impulsiveness; introverts,
    by passivity and thoughtfulness.
    ∙ High scores on the neuroticism scale may indicate anxiety, hysteria,
    obsessive-compulsive disorders, or criminality; low scores tend to predict
    emotional stability.
    ∙ McCrae and Costa placed equal emphasis on biological and environmental
    influences on personality.
    ∙ The Five-Factor Theory has been used to assess personality traits in
    cultures throughout the world.
    ∙ The NEO-PI-R shows a high level of stability in personality factors as
    people advance from about 30 years old to old age.

    407
    Biological/
    Evolutionary
    Theories
    C h a p t e r 1 4 Eysenck
    Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 408
    C h a p t e r 1 5 Buss
    Evolutionary Theory of Personality 430
    P A R T F I V E

    408
    C H A P T E R 1 4
    Eysenck’s
    Biologically Based
    Factor Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Biologically Based Trait Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Hans J. Eysenck
    ⬥ Eysenck’s Factor Theory
    Criteria for Identifying Factors
    Hierarchy of Behavior Organization
    ⬥ Dimensions of Personality
    Extraversion
    Neuroticism
    Psychoticism
    ⬥ Measuring Personality
    ⬥ Biological Bases of Personality
    ⬥ Personality as a Predictor
    Personality and Behavior
    Personality and Disease
    ⬥ Related Research
    The Biological Basis of Extraversion
    The Biological Basis of Neuroticism
    ⬥ Critique of Eysenck’s Biologically Based Theory
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Eysenck © Chris Ware/Hulton Archive/
    Keystone/Getty Images

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 409
    Chance and fortuity often play a decisive role in people’s lives. One such chance event happened to an 18-year-old German youth who had left his
    native country as a consequence of Nazi tyranny. He eventually settled in
    England, where he tried to enroll in the University of London. He was an avid
    reader, interested in both the arts and the sciences, but his first choice of
    curriculum was physics.
    However, a chance event altered the flow of his life and consequently the
    course of the history of psychology. In order to be accepted into the university, he
    was required to pass an entrance examination, which he took after a year’s study
    at a commercial college. After passing the exam, he confidently enrolled in the
    University of London, intending to major in physics. However, he was told that
    he had taken the wrong subjects in his entrance exam and therefore was not eli-
    gible to pursue a physics curriculum. Rather than waiting another year to take the
    right subjects, he asked if there was some scientific subject that he was qualified
    to pursue. When told he could always take psychology, he asked, “What on earth
    is psychology?” He had never heard of psychology, although he had some vague
    idea about psychoanalysis. Could psychology possibly be a science? However, he
    had little choice but to pursue a degree in psychology, so he promptly entered the
    university with a major in a discipline about which he knew almost nothing. Years
    later the world of psychology would know a great deal about Hans J. Eysenck,
    probably the most prolific writer in the history of psychology. In his autobiography,
    Eysenck (1997b) simply noted that by such chance events “is one’s fate decided
    by bureaucratic stupidity” (p. 47).
    Throughout his life, Eysenck battled bureaucratic stupidity and any other type
    of stupidity he came across. In his autobiography, he described himself as “a
    sanctimonious prig . . . who didn’t suffer fools (or even ordinarily bright people)
    gladly” (Eysenck, 1997b, p. 31).
    Overview of Biologically Based
    Trait Theory
    Every theory of personality discussed so far has downplayed, ignored, or even
    argued against the biological basis of human personality. Only McCrae and
    Costa (see Chapter 13) placed even mild emphasis on genetic and biological
    influences on personality.
    With Eysenck that changed. Eysenck developed a factor theory much like
    McCrae and Costa, but because he fundamentally based his taxonomy in both
    factor analysis and biology, he derived only three, rather than five, dimensions
    of personality—extraversion/introversion, neuroticism/stability, and psychoticism/
    superego. We’ll discuss these more later in the chapter, but the key for Eysenck
    was that the individual differences in people’s personalities were biological,
    and not merely psychological, aspects of personality. That is, genetic differences
    lead to structural differences in the central nervous system, including brain struc-
    tures, hormones, and neurotransmitters, and these differences in biology lead to
    differences along the three factors of personality—extraversion, neuroticism, and
    psychoticism.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories410
    Evidence for the biological basis of personality comes from many differ-
    ent sources, including temperament, behavioral genetics, and brain measure
    research. First, temperament is the biologically based tendency to behave in
    particular ways from very early in life. In one study, for example, Janet DiPietro
    and her colleagues (1996) showed that fetal activity and fetal heart rate predict
    temperament differences over the first year of life. In particular, a high heart
    rate in a 36-week-old fetus foreshadowed less predictable eating and sleeping
    habits at 3 and 6 months after birth. A high heart rate also predicted a less
    emotional infant at 6 months after birth. The prenatal environment may play an
    important role in shaping personality. In fact, the amount of stress the mother
    experiences during pregnancy may alter the infant’s own stress response. That
    is, infants born to mothers who have experienced an unusual amount of stress
    during pregnancy tend to have impaired stress function; higher baseline levels
    of stress hormones; and a faster, stronger, and more pronounced physiological
    response to stress, all of which persist into childhood (Barbazanges et al., 1996;
    Clark & Schneider, 1997).
    Secondly, to understand how heredity affects behavior and personality,
    psychologists turn to the science of behavioral genetics or the scientific study
    of the role of heredity in behavior (Fuller & Thompson, 1960). The extent to
    which a characteristic is influenced by genetics is known as heritability, as we
    saw in the McCrae and Costa chapter. Researchers use twin-adoption studies
    and gene-by-environment studies to study heritability. Twin-adoption studies
    research into hereditary influence on twins, both identical and fraternal, who
    were raised apart (adopted) and who were raised together. A second technique
    in the study of heritability, gene-by-environment interaction research, allows
    researchers to assess how genetic differences interact with environment to pro-
    duce certain behavior in some people but not in others (Moffitt, Caspi, &
    Rutter, 2005; Thapar, Langley, & Asherson, 2007). Instead of using twins,
    family members, and adoptees to vary genetic similarity, gene-by-environment
    studies directly measure genetic variation in parts of the genome itself and
    examine how such variation interacts with different kinds of environments to
    produce different behaviors.
    Thirdly, biological aspects of personality are assessed using brain imaging
    techniques, the two most common forms of which are the electroencephalography
    (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Researchers use elec-
    troencephalography (EEG) to record the electrical activity of the brain. The pro-
    cedure involves placing electrodes on a person’s scalp. The electrodes, metal disks
    attached to wires, are usually mounted in a fabric cap that fits snugly over the
    head. Typically, the person is conducting certain tasks while electrical activity is
    recorded. EEG is superior to other brain imaging techniques in showing when brain
    activity occurs. It is not very accurate at indicating precisely where activity occurs.
    Functional MRI (fMRI), does, however, tell us about brain activity. Images from
    fMRI tell us where activity in the brain is occurring during particular tasks by
    tracking blood oxygen use in brain tissue. In this way, researchers can see which
    areas of the brain are using the most oxygen (and presumably are most active)
    during certain tasks (Lagopoulos, 2007).

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 411
    Biography of Hans J. Eysenck
    Hans Jurgen Eysenck was born in Berlin on March 4, 1916, the only child of a
    theatrical family. His mother was Ruth Werner, a starlet at the time of Eysenck’s
    birth. Ruth Werner later became a German silent film star under the stage name
    of Helga Molander. Eysenck’s father, Anton Eduard Eysenck, was a comedian,
    singer, and actor. Eysenck (1991b) recalled: “[I] saw very little of my parents, who
    divorced when I was 4, and who had little feeling for me, an emotion I recipro-
    cated” (p. 40).
    After his parents’ divorce, Eysenck went to live with his maternal grand-
    mother, who had also been in the theater, but whose promising career in opera was
    cut short by a crippling fall. Eysenck (1991b) described his grandmother as “unself-
    ish, caring, altruistic, and altogether too good for this world” (p. 40). Although his
    grandmother was a devout Catholic, neither parent was religious, and Eysenck
    grew up without any formal religious commitment (Gibson, 1981).
    He also grew up with little parental discipline and few strict controls over
    his behavior. Neither parent seemed interested in curtailing his actions, and his
    grandmother had a quite permissive attitude toward him. This benign neglect is
    exemplified by two incidents. In the first, his father had bought Hans a bicycle
    and had promised to teach him to ride. “He took me to the top of a hill, told me
    that I had to sit on the saddle and pump the pedals and make the wheels go round.
    He then went off to release some balloons . . . leaving me to learn how to ride all
    by myself” (Eysenck, 1997b, p. 12). In the second incident, an adolescent Eysenck
    told his grandmother that he was going to buy some cigarettes, expecting her to
    forbid it. However, his grandmother simply said: “If you like it, do it by all means”
    (p. 14). According to Eysenck, environmental experiences such as these two have
    little to do with personality development. To him, genetic factors have a greater
    impact on subsequent behavior than do childhood experiences. Thus, his permis-
    sive upbringing neither helped nor hindered him in becoming a famous maverick
    scientist.
    Even as a schoolboy, Eysenck was not afraid to take an unpopular stand,
    often challenging his teachers, especially those with militaristic leanings. He was
    skeptical of much of what they taught and was not always reluctant to embarrass
    them with his superior knowledge and intellect.
    Eysenck suffered the deprivation of many post–World War I Germans who
    were faced with astronomical inflation, mass unemployment, and near starvation.
    Eysenck’s future appeared no brighter after Hitler came to power. As a condition
    of studying physics at the University of Berlin, he was told that he would have to
    join the Nazi secret police, an idea he found so repugnant that he decided to
    leave Germany.
    This encounter with the fascist right and his later battles with the radical left
    suggested to him that the trait of tough-mindedness, or authoritarianism, was
    equally prevalent in both extremes of the political spectrum. He later found some
    scientific support for this hypothesis in a study that demonstrated that although
    communists were radical and fascists were conservative on one dimension of per-
    sonality, on the tough-minded versus tender-minded dimension, both groups were

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories412
    authoritarian, rigid, and intolerant of ambiguity (tough-minded) (Eysenck, 1954;
    Eysenck & Coulter, 1972).
    As a consequence of Nazi tyranny, Eysenck, at age 18, left Germany and even-
    tually settled in England, where he tried to enroll in the University of London. As we
    saw in the chapter opening vignette, he went into psychology completely by accident.
    At that time, the psychology department at the University of London was basically
    pro-Freudian, but it also had a strong emphasis on psychometrics, with Charles Spear-
    man having just left and with Cyril Burt still presiding. Eysenck received a bachelor’s
    degree in 1938, about the same time that he married Margaret Davies, a Canadian
    with a degree in mathematics. In 1940, he was awarded a PhD from the University
    of London, but by this time England and most European nations were at war.
    As a German national, he was considered an enemy alien and not allowed
    to enter the Royal Air Force (his first choice) or any other branch of the military.
    Instead, with no training as a psychiatrist or as a clinical psychologist, he went to
    work at the Mill Hill Emergency Hospital, treating patients who were suffering
    from a variety of psychological symptoms, including anxiety, depression, and hys-
    teria. Eysenck, however, was not comfortable with most of the traditional clinical
    diagnostic categories. Using factor analysis, he found that two major personality
    factors—neuroticism/emotional stability and extraversion/introversion—could
    account for all the traditional diagnostic groups. These early theoretical ideas led to
    the publication of his first book, Dimensions of Personality (Eysenck, 1947).
    After the war, he became director of the psychology department at Maudsley
    Hospital and later became a reader in psychology at the University of London.
    In 1949, he traveled to North America to examine the clinical psychology pro-
    grams in the United States and Canada with the idea of setting up a clinical
    psychology profession in Great Britain. He obtained a visiting professorship at
    the University of Pennsylvania for the year 1949–1950, but he spent much of that
    year traveling throughout the United States and Canada looking over clinical psy-
    chology programs, which he found to be totally inadequate and unscientific
    (Eysenck, 1980, 1997b).
    Eysenck and his wife had been growing steadily apart, and his marriage was
    not improved when his traveling companion to Philadelphia was Sybil Rostal, a
    beautiful quantitative psychologist. On returning to England, Eysenck obtained a
    divorce from his first wife and married Sybil. Hans and Sybil Eysenck coauthored
    several publications, and their marriage produced three sons and a daughter.
    Eysenck’s son from his first marriage, Michael, is a widely published author of
    psychology articles and books.
    After returning from North America, Eysenck established a clinical psychol-
    ogy department at the University of London and in 1955 became professor of
    psychology. While in the United States, he had begun The Structure of Human
    Personality (1952b), in which he argued for the efficacy of factor analysis as the
    best method of representing the known facts of human personality.
    Eysenck was perhaps the most prolific writer in the history of psychology,
    having published some 800 journal articles or book chapters and more than 75 books.
    Several have titles with popular appeal, such as Uses and Abuses of Psychology (1953);
    The Psychology of Politics (1954, 1999); Sense and Nonsense in Psychology (1956);
    Know Your Own IQ (1962); Fact and Fiction in Psychology (1965); Psychology

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 413
    Is About People (1972); You and Neurosis (1977b); Sex, Violence and the Media
    (with D. K. B. Nias, 1978); Smoking, Personality, and Stress (1991d); Genius: The
    Natural History of Creativity (1995); and Intelligence: A New Look (1998a).
    Eysenck’s range of interests was exceedingly broad, and his willingness to step
    into almost any controversy was legendary. He was a gadfly to the conscience of
    psychology since he first entered its ranks. He upset many psychoanalysts and other
    therapists in the early 1950s with his contention that no evidence existed to suggest
    that psychotherapy was more effective than spontaneous remission. In other words,
    those people who receive no therapy were just as likely to get better as were those
    who underwent expensive, painful, prolonged psychotherapy with expertly trained
    psychoanalysts and psychologists (Eysenck, 1952a). Eysenck maintained that belief
    for the remainder of his life. In 1996, he told an interviewer that “psychotherapies
    are no more effective than . . . placebo treatments” (Feltham, 1996, p. 424).
    Eysenck was not afraid to take an unpopular stand, as witnessed by his
    defense of Arthur Jensen, whose contention was that IQ scores cannot be signifi-
    cantly increased by well-intentioned social programs because they are largely
    genetically determined. Eysenck’s book The IQ Argument (1971) was so contro-
    versial that elements in the United States “threatened booksellers with arson if they
    dared to stock the book; well-known ‘liberal’ newspapers refused to review it; and
    the outcome was that it was largely impossible in the land of free speech to dis-
    cover the existence of the book or to buy it” (Eysenck, 1980, p. 175).
    In 1983, Eysenck retired as professor of psychology at the Institute of Psy-
    chiatry, University of London, and as senior psychiatrist at the Maudsley and
    Bethlehem Royal hospitals. He then served as professor emeritus at the University
    of London until his death from cancer on September 4, 1997. Eysenck, who fre-
    quently argued that cigarette smoking was not a major risk factor for cancer, had
    been a heavy smoker until middle age when he gave up cigarettes because he
    believed that they affected his tennis game.
    During his later years, his research continued to reflect a variety of topics,
    including creativity (Eysenck, 1993, 1995; Frois & Eysenck, 1995), behavioral
    interventions in cancer and heart disease (Eysenck, 1991d, 1996; Eysenck &
    Grossarth-Maticek, 1991), and intelligence (Eysenck, 1998a).
    Eysenck won many awards, including the 1991 Distinguished Contributions
    Award of the International Society for the Study of Individual Differences. The
    American Psychological Association presented him with its Distinguished Scientist
    Award (1988), the Presidential Citation for Scientific Contribution (1993), the
    William James Fellow Award (1994), and the Centennial Award for Distinguished
    Contributions to Clinical Psychology (1996).
    Eysenck’s Factor Theory
    The personality theory of Hans Eysenck has strong psychometric and biological
    components. However, Eysenck (1977a, 1997a) contended that psychometric
    sophistication alone is not sufficient to measure the structure of human personality
    and that personality dimensions arrived at through factor analytic methods are ster-
    ile and meaningless unless they have been shown to possess a biological existence.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories414
    Criteria for Identifying Factors
    With these assumptions in mind, Eysenck listed four criteria for identifying a fac-
    tor. First, psychometric evidence for the factor’s existence must be established. A
    corollary to this criterion is that the factor must be reliable and replicable. Other
    investigators, from separate laboratories, must also be able to find the factor, and
    these investigators consistently identify Eysenck’s extraversion, neuroticism, and
    psychoticism.
    A second criterion is that the factor must also possess heritability and must fit
    an established genetic model. This criterion eliminates learned characteristics, such as
    the ability to mimic the voices of well-known people or a religious or political belief.
    Third, the factor must make sense from a theoretical view. Eysenck employed
    the deductive method of investigation, beginning with a theory and then gathering
    data that are logically consistent with that theory.
    The final criterion for the existence of a factor is that it must possess social
    relevance; that is, it must be demonstrated that mathematically derived factors have
    a relationship (not necessarily causal) with such socially relevant variables as drug
    addiction, proneness to unintentional injuries, outstanding performance in sports,
    psychotic behavior, criminality, and so on.
    Hierarchy of Behavior Organization
    Eysenck (1947, 1994c) recognized a four-level hierarchy of behavior organization.
    At the lowest level are specific acts or cognitions, individual behaviors or thoughts
    that may or may not be characteristic of a person. A student finishing a reading
    assignment would be an example of a specific response. At the second level are
    the habitual acts or cognitions, that is, responses that recur under similar condi-
    tions. For example, if a student frequently keeps at an assignment until it is fin-
    ished, this behavior becomes a habitual response. As opposed to specific responses,
    habitual responses must be reasonably reliable or consistent.
    Several related habitual responses form a trait—the third level of behavior.
    Eysenck (1981) defined traits as “important semi-permanent personality disposi-
    tions” (p. 3). For example, students would have the trait of persistence if they
    habitually complete class assignments and keep working at other endeavors until
    they are finished. Although traits can be identified intuitively, trait and factor
    theorists rely on a more systematic approach, namely factor analysis. Trait-level
    behaviors are extracted through factor analysis of habit-level responses just as
    habitual responses are mathematically extracted through factor analysis of specific
    responses. Traits, then, are “defined in terms of significant intercorrelations between
    different habitual behaviors” (Eysenck, 1990, p. 244). Most of Cattell’s 35 normal
    and abnormal primary source traits are at this third level of organization, which
    accounts for the fact that he identified far more personality dimensions than either
    Eysenck or advocates of the Five-Factor Theory (see Chapter 13).
    Eysenck concentrated on the fourth level, that of types or superfactors. A
    type is made up of several interrelated traits. For example, persistence may be
    related to inferiority, poor emotional adjustment, social shyness, and several other
    traits, with the entire cluster forming the introverted type. Each of the four levels
    of behavior organization are shown in Figure 14.1.

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 415
    Dimensions of Personality
    We have seen that Eysenck and Cattell arrived at a different number of personal-
    ity dimensions because they worked at different levels of factoring. Cattell’s 35
    traits are all at the third level of the hierarchical structure, whereas Eysenck’s
    superfactors are at the fourth level (see p. 384, Chapter 13).
    How many general superfactors exist? Many current factor theorists insist
    that ample evidence exists that five—and no more and no fewer—general factors
    will emerge from nearly all factor analyses of personality traits. Eysenck, however,
    extracted only three general superfactors. His three personality dimensions are
    extraversion (E), neuroticism (N), and psychoticism (P), although he did not rule
    out “the possibility that further dimensions may be added later” (Eysenck, 1994b,
    p. 151). Figure 14.2 shows the hierarchical structure of Eysenck’s P, E, and N.
    Neuroticism and psychoticism are not limited to pathological individuals,
    although disturbed people tend to score higher than normal people on scales mea-
    suring these two factors. Eysenck regarded all three factors as part of normal
    personality structure. All three are bipolar, with extraversion being at one end of
    Factor E and introversion occupying the opposite pole. Similarly, Factor N
    includes neuroticism at one pole and stability at the other, and Factor P has psy-
    choticism at one pole and the superego function at the other.
    The bipolarity of Eysenck’s factors does not imply that most people are at
    one end or the other of the three main poles. Each factor is unimodally, rather than
    Type:
    Habits:
    Specific Behaviors:
    Introversion
    Persistence
    Social
    shyness
    Keeps at
    school
    work
    Persists
    with
    hobbies
    Finishes
    a job
    Studies
    alone
    Turns
    down
    invitations
    Works on
    hobbies
    alone
    Traits:
    FIGURE 14.1 The organization of behavior into specific actions, habitual responses, traits, and types.
    Besides persistence and social shyness, other traits such as inferiority, low activity, and serious-mindedness
    contribute to introversion.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories416
    E
    P
    N
    Unempathic
    Cold
    Antisocial
    Aggressive
    Egocentric
    Creative
    Impersonal
    Tough-minded
    Impulsive
    Sensation-
    seeking
    Sociable
    Lively
    Active
    Assertive
    Venturesome
    Surgent
    Dominant
    Carefree
    Low
    self-esteem
    Anxious
    Depressed
    Guilt feelings
    Emotional
    Moody
    Shy
    Irrational
    Tense
    FIGURE 14.2 The hierarchical structure of P (psychoticism), E (extraversion-
    introversion), and N (neuroticism).
    Source: Eysenck, H. J. “Biological dimensions of personality.” In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and
    Research. New York: Guilford Press, 1990, pp. 224–276.

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 417
    bimodally, distributed. Extraversion, for example, is fairly normally distributed in
    much the same fashion as intelligence or height. That is, most people are near the
    center of a bell-shaped distribution of extraversion. Eysenck contended that each
    of these factors meets his four criteria for identifying personality dimensions.
    First, strong psychometric evidence exists for each, especially Factors E and
    N. The P factor (psychoticism) emerged later in Eysenck’s work but was not taken
    seriously by other researchers until the mid-1990s (Eysenck, 1997b). Extraversion
    and neuroticism (or anxiety) are basic factors in nearly all factor analytic studies
    of human personality, including various versions of the Five-Factor Theory
    (McCrae & Costa, 1999, 2002; John & Srivastava, 1999).
    Second, Eysenck (1994a, 1994b) argued that a strong biological base exists
    for each of his three superfactors. At the same time, he claimed that traits such as
    agreeableness and conscientiousness, which are part of the five-factor taxonomy
    (John, 1990; W. T. Norman, 1963; Tupes & Christal, 1961), do not have an under-
    lying biological foundation.
    Third, Eysenck’s three personality dimensions make sense theoretically. Carl
    Jung (see Chapter 4) and others have recognized the powerful effect on behavior
    of extraversion and introversion (Factor E), and Sigmund Freud (see Chapter 2) empha-
    sized the importance of anxiety (Factor N) on shaping behavior. In addition, psy-
    choticism (Factor P) agrees with theorists, such as Abraham Maslow (see Chapter 9),
    who propose that psychological health ranges from self-actualization (a low P score)
    to schizophrenia and psychosis (a high P score).
    Fourth, Eysenck repeatedly demonstrated that his three factors relate to such
    social issues as drug use (Eysenck, 1983), sexual behaviors (Eysenck, 1976), crim-
    inality (Eysenck, 1964, 1998b; Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989), preventing cancer
    and heart disease (Eysenck, 1991c, 1991d; Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck, & Vetter,
    1988), and creativity (Eysenck, 1993).
    Extraversion
    In Chapter 4, we explained that Jung conceptualized two broad personality types,
    called “extraversion” and “introversion.” We also noted some differences between
    his definitions and the prevailing notion of these two terms. Jung saw extraverted
    people as having an objective or nonpersonalized view of the world, whereas intro-
    verts have essentially a subjective or individualized way of looking at things.
    Eysenck’s concepts of extraversion and introversion are closer to the popular usage.
    Extraverts are characterized primarily by sociability and impulsiveness but also by
    jocularity, liveliness, quick-wittedness, optimism, and other traits indicative of peo-
    ple who are rewarded for their association with others (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1969).
    Introverts are characterized by traits opposite those of extraverts. They can
    be described as quiet, passive, unsociable, careful, reserved, thoughtful, pessimis-
    tic, peaceful, sober, and controlled. According to Eysenck (1982), however, the
    principal differences between extraversion and introversion are not behavioral, but
    rather biological and genetic in nature.
    Eysenck (1997a) believed that the primary cause of differences between extra-
    verts and introverts is one of cortical arousal level, a physiological condition that is
    largely inherited rather than learned. Because extraverts have a lower level of cortical

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories418
    arousal than do introverts, they have higher sensory thresholds and thus lesser reactions
    to sensory stimulation. Introverts, conversely, are characterized by a higher level of
    arousal, and as a result of a lower sensory threshold, they experience greater reactions
    to sensory stimulation. To maintain an optimal level of stimulation, introverts, with
    their congenitally low sensory threshold, avoid situations that will cause too much
    excitement. Hence, introverts shun such activities as wild social events, downhill skiing,
    skydiving, competitive sports, leading a fraternity or sorority, or playing practical jokes.
    Conversely, because extraverts have a habitually low level of cortical arousal,
    they need a high level of sensory stimulation to maintain an optimal level of stimu-
    lation. Therefore, extraverts participate more often in exciting and stimulating activ-
    ities. They may enjoy such activities as mountain climbing, gambling, driving fast
    cars, drinking alcohol, and smoking marijuana. In addition, Eysenck (1976) hypoth-
    esized that extraverts, as opposed to introverts, will engage in sexual intercourse
    earlier, more frequently, with a wider range of partners, in a greater number of
    positions, with a larger variety of sexual behaviors, and will indulge in longer pre-
    coital love play. Because extraverts have a lower level of cortical arousal, however,
    they become more quickly accustomed to strong stimuli (sexual or otherwise) and
    respond less and less to the same stimuli, whereas introverts are less likely to become
    bored and uninterested in routine activities carried on with the same people.
    Neuroticism
    The second superfactor extracted by Eysenck is neuroticism/stability (N). Like
    extraversion/introversion, Factor N has a strong hereditary component. Eysenck
    (1967) reported several studies that have found evidence of a genetic basis for such
    neurotic traits as anxiety, hysteria, and obsessive-compulsive disorders. In addition,
    he found a much greater agreement among identical twins than among fraternal
    twins on a number of antisocial and asocial behaviors such as adult crime, child-
    hood behavior disorders, homosexuality, and alcoholism (Eysenck, 1964).
    People who score high on neuroticism often have a tendency to overreact emo-
    tionally and to have difficulty returning to a normal state after emotional arousal. They
    frequently complain of physical symptoms such as headache and backache and of
    vague psychological problems such as worries and anxieties. Eysenck (1967, 1982)
    proposed this emotional reactivity in neuroticism is due to having a highly reactive
    limbic system, including the amgydala and hypothalamus. Neuroticism, however, does
    not necessarily suggest a neurosis in the traditional meaning of that term. People can
    score high on neuroticism and be free of any debilitating psychological symptoms.
    Eysenck accepted the diathesis-stress model of psychiatric illness, which sug-
    gests that some people are vulnerable to illness because they have either a genetic or
    an acquired weakness that predisposes them to an illness. This predisposition (diathesis)
    may interact with stress to produce a neurotic disorder. Eysenck assumed that people
    at the healthy end of the N scale have the capacity to resist a neurotic disorder even in
    periods of extreme stress. High N scorers, however, may suffer a neurotic reaction as
    a result of only a minimal level of stress. In other words, the higher the neuroticism
    score, the lower the level of stress necessary to precipitate a neurotic disorder.
    Because neuroticism can be combined with different points on the extraversion
    scale, no single syndrome can define neurotic behavior. Eysenck’s factor analytic

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 419
    technique assumes the independence of factors, which means that the neuroticism
    scale is at right angles (signifying zero correlation) to the extraversion scale. Thus,
    several people can all score high on the N scale yet display quite different symptoms,
    depending on their degree of introversion or extraversion. Figure 14.3 shows the
    extraversion/introversion pole with zero correlation with the neuroticism/stability
    pole. Consider persons A, B, and C, all equally high on the neuroticism scale, but
    representing three distinct points on the extraversion scale. Person A, an introverted
    neurotic, is characterized by anxiety, depression, phobias, and obsessive-compulsive
    symptoms; Person B, who is high on neuroticism but only average on extraversion,
    is likely to be characterized by hysteria (a neurotic disorder associated with emotional
    instability), suggestibility, and somatic symptoms; Person C, an extraverted neurotic
    individual, will probably manifest psychopathic qualities such as criminality and
    delinquent tendencies (Eysenck, 1967, 1997a). Consider, also, Persons A, D, and E,
    all equally introverted, but with three different levels of emotional stability. Person
    A is the introverted neurotic individual we just described; Person D is equally intro-
    verted but is neither severely neurotic nor emotionally stable; and Person E is both
    extremely introverted and psychologically stable.
    Figure 14.3 shows only five people, all of whom have at least one extreme
    score. Most people, of course, would score near the mean on both extraversion and
    neuroticism. As scores move toward the outer limits of the diagram, they become
    increasingly less frequent, just as scores on the ends of a bell-shaped curve are
    less frequent than those near the midpoint.
    Psychoticism
    Eysenck’s original theory of personality was based on only two personality dimensions—
    extraversion and neuroticism. After several years of alluding to psychoticism (P) as an
    independent personality factor, Eysenck finally elevated it to a position equal to E and
    Neuroticism
    A
    E
    D
    B C
    Stability
    E
    xtrave
    rsio
    nIn
    tr
    o
    ve
    rs
    io
    n
    FIGURE 14.3 Two-dimensional
    scheme depicting several extreme
    points on Eysenck’s E and N scales.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories420
    N (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). Like extraversion and neuroticism, P is a bipolar factor,
    with psychoticism on one pole and superego on the other. High P scorers are often
    egocentric, cold, nonconforming, impulsive, hostile, aggressive, suspicious, psycho-
    pathic, and antisocial. People low on psychoticism (in the direction of superego func-
    tion) tend to be altruistic, highly socialized, empathic, caring, cooperative, conforming,
    and conventional (S. Eysenck, 1997).
    Earlier, we saw that Eysenck accepted the diathesis-stress model for people
    high on the neuroticism scale; that is, stress and high N scores combine to elevate
    people’s vulnerability to psychological disorders. This model also suggests that peo-
    ple who score high on psychoticism and who are also experiencing levels of stress
    have an increased chance of developing a psychotic disorder. Eysenck (1994a)
    hypothesized that people high on psychoticism have a high “predisposition to suc-
    cumb to stress and develop a psychotic illness” (p. 20). This diathesis-stress model
    suggests that high P scorers are genetically more vulnerable to stress than are low P
    scorers. During periods of little stress, high P scorers may function normally, but when
    high psychoticism interacts with high levels of stress, people become vulnerable to
    psychotic disorders. By contrast, people with low P scores are not necessarily vulner-
    able to stress-related psychoses and will resist a psychotic break even in periods of
    extreme stress. According to Eysenck (1994a, 1994b), the higher the psychoticism
    score, the lower the level of stress necessary to precipitate a psychotic reaction.
    Psychoticism/superego (P) is independent of both E and N. Figure 14.4
    shows each of the three factors at right angles with the other two. (Because three-
    dimensional space cannot be faithfully produced on a two-dimensional plane, the
    reader is asked to look at Figure 14.4 as if the solid lines represent the corner of
    a room where two walls meet the floor. Each line can then be seen as perpendicular
    Neuroticism
    Stability
    Extraversion
    Superego
    Psychoticism
    Introversion
    F
    FIGURE 14.4 Three-dimensional scheme depicting one individual’s scores on each
    of Eysenck’s major dimensions of personality.

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 421
    to the other two.) Eysenck’s view of personality, therefore, allows each person to
    be measured on three independent factors and resultant scores to be plotted in space
    having three coordinates. Person F in Figure 14.4, for example, is quite high on
    superego, somewhat high on extraversion, and near the midpoint on the neuroticism/
    stability scale. In similar fashion, scores of each person can be plotted in three-
    dimensional space.
    Measuring Personality
    Eysenck evolved four personality inventories that measure his superfactors. The
    first, the Maudsley Personality Inventory, or MPI (Eysenck, 1959), assessed only
    E and N and yielded some correlation between these two factors. For this reason,
    Eysenck developed another test, the Eysenck Personality Inventory, or EPI. The EPI
    contains a lie (L) scale to detect faking, but more importantly, it measures extraver-
    sion and neuroticism independently, with a near zero correlation between E and N
    (H. J. Eysenck & B. G. Eysenck, 1964, 1968). The Eysenck Personality Inventory
    was extended to children 7 to 16 years of age by Sybil B. G. Eysenck (1965), who
    developed the Junior EPI.
    The EPI was still a two-factor inventory, so consequently Hans Eysenck and
    Sybil Eysenck (1975) published a third personality test, namely the Eysenck Per-
    sonality Questionnaire (EPQ), which included a psychoticism (P) scale. The EPQ,
    which has both an adult and a junior version, is a revision of the still-published
    EPI. Subsequent criticisms of the P scale led to yet another revision, the Eysenck
    Personality Questionnaire-Revised (H. J. Eysenck & S. B. G. Eysenck, 1993).
    Biological Bases of Personality
    According to Eysenck, personality factors P, E, and N all have powerful biological
    determinants. He estimated that about three fourths of the variance of all three
    personality dimensions can be accounted for by heredity and about one fourth by
    environmental factors.
    Eysenck (1990) cited three threads of evidence for a strong biological com-
    ponent in personality. First, researchers (McCrae & Allik, 2002) have found nearly
    identical factors among people in various parts of the world, not only in Western
    Europe and North America but also in Uganda, Nigeria, Japan, China, Russia, and
    other African and European countries. Second, evidence (McCrae & Costa, 2003)
    suggests that individuals tend to maintain their position over time on the different
    dimensions of personality. And third, studies of twins (Eysenck, 1990) show a
    higher concordance between identical twins than between same-gender fraternal
    twins reared together, suggesting that genetic factors play a dominant part in deter-
    mining individual differences in personality.
    In Eysenck’s theory of personality, psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism
    have both antecedents and consequences. The antecedents are genetic and biological,
    whereas the consequences include such experimental variables as conditioning expe-
    riences, sensitivity, and memory as well as social behaviors such as criminality,
    creativity, psychopathology, and sexual behavior. Figure 14.5 shows that P, E, and N

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories422
    are in the middle of a five-step progression from DNA to social behavior, with bio-
    logical intermediaries and experimental evidence anchoring the three major personality
    dimensions. In other words, personality has genetic determinants that indirectly shape bio-
    logical intermediaries, and these biological intermediaries help mold P, E, and N. In turn, P,
    E, and N contribute to a wide variety of laboratory learnings as well as social behaviors.
    Personality as a Predictor
    Eysenck’s complex model of personality shown in Figure 14.5 suggests that the
    psychometric traits of P, E, and N can combine with one another and with genetic
    determinants, biological intermediates, and experimental studies to predict a variety
    of social behaviors, including those that contribute to disease.
    Personality and Behavior
    Do Eysenck’s three general personality dimensions predict behavior? According to
    Eysenck’s model shown in Figure 14.5, psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroti-
    cism should predict results of experimental studies as well as social behaviors.
    Recall that Eysenck’s theory assumes that extraversion is a product of low cortical
    arousability. Therefore, introverts, compared with extraverts, should be more sen-
    sitive to a variety of stimuli and learning conditions. Eysenck (1997a) argued that
    an effective theory of personality should predict both proximal and distal conse-
    quences (see Figure 14.5), and he and his son Michael (H. J. Eysenck & M. W.
    Eysenck, 1985) cited studies that demonstrated extraverts’ greater demand for
    change and novelty in both laboratory studies and studies of social behavior.
    Eysenck (1997a) further argued that many psychology studies have reached
    erroneous conclusions because they have ignored personality factors. For example,
    DNA
    Limbic
    system
    arousal
    P
    E
    N
    Personality
    Conditioning
    Sensitivity
    Vigilance
    Perception
    Memory
    Reminiscence
    Sociability
    Criminality
    Creativity
    Psychopathology
    Sexual behavior
    Distal
    antecedents
    Proximal
    antecedents
    Proximal
    consequences
    Distal
    consequences
    Genetic
    personality
    determinants
    Psychometric
    trait
    constellations
    Biological
    intermediaries
    Experimental
    studies
    Social
    behavior
    FIGURE 14.5 A model of the major components of Eysenck’s theory of personality.

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 423
    studies in education comparing the effectiveness of discovery learning and traditional
    reception learning have often produced either conflicting differences or no differences.
    Eysenck believed that these studies did not consider that extraverted children prefer
    and do better with the more active discovery learning, whereas introverted children
    prefer and do better with the more passive reception learning. In other words, an
    interaction exists between personality dimensions and learning styles. However, when
    investigators ignore these personality factors, they may find no differences in the
    comparative effectiveness of discovery versus reception learning styles.
    Eysenck (1995) also hypothesized that psychoticism (P) is related to genius and
    creativity. Again, the relationship is not simple. Many children have creative ability,
    are nonconforming, and have unorthodox ideas; but they grow up to be noncreative
    people. Eysenck found evidence that these people lack the persistence of high P scorers.
    Children with the same creative potential who are also high in psychoticism (P) are
    able to resist the criticisms of parents and teachers and to emerge as creative adults.
    Similarly, Eysenck and S. B. G. Eysenck (1975) reported that both high P scorers
    and high E scorers are likely to be troublemakers as children. However, parents and
    teachers tend to regard the extraverted children as charming rogues and to forgive
    their misdemeanors, whereas they see high P scorers as more spiteful, disruptive, and
    unlovable. Thus, the high E scoring troublemakers tend to grow into productive adults,
    while the high P scoring troublemakers tend to continue to have learning problems,
    to get into crime, and to have difficulty making friends (S. Eysenck, 1997). Again,
    Eysenck believed strongly that psychologists can be led astray if they do not consider
    the various combinations of personality dimensions in conducting their research.
    Personality and Disease
    Can personality factors predict mortality from cancer and cardiovascular disease
    (CVD)? Beginning during the early 1960s, Eysenck devoted much attention to this
    question. He and David Kissen (Kissen & Eysenck, 1962) found that people who
    scored low on neuroticism (N) on the Maudsley Personality Inventory tended to
    suppress their emotion and were much more likely than high N scorers to receive
    a later diagnosis of lung cancer.
    Later, Eysenck teamed with Yugoslav physician and psychologist Ronald
    Grossarth-Maticek (Eysenck & Grossarth-Maticek, 1991; Grossarth-Matick &
    Eysenck, 1989; Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck, & Vetter, 1988) to investigate not
    only the relationship between personality and disease, but also the effectiveness of
    behavior therapy on prolonging the life of cancer and CVD patients. Grossarth-
    Maticek had used a short questionnaire and a long personal interview to place
    people into one of four groups or types. Type I included people with a hopeless/
    helpless nonemotional reaction to stress; Type II people typically reacted to frustra-
    tion with anger, aggression, and emotional arousal; Type III people were ambiva-
    lent, shifting from the typical reaction of Type I people to the typical reaction of
    Type IIs and then back again; Type IV individuals regarded their own autonomy
    as an important condition to their personal well-being and happiness. In the origi-
    nal study in Yugoslavia, Type I people were much more likely than others to die
    of cancer, and Type II people were much more likely to die of heart disease. Type
    III and Type IV individuals had very low death rates from either cancer or CVD.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories424
    Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck, and Vetter replicated this study in Heidelberg, Germany,
    and found very similar results.
    As Eysenck (1996) pointed out, these and other studies on the relationship
    between personality and disease do not prove that psychological factors cause cancer
    and heart disease. Rather, these diseases are caused by an interaction of many factors.
    For cardiovascular disease, these factors include family history, age, gender, ethnic
    background, hypertension, unfavorable ratio of total cholesterol to high-density lipopro-
    tein (HDL), smoking, diet, inactive lifestyle, and several personality factors. For cancer,
    the risks include smoking, diet, alcohol, sexual practices, family history, ethnic back-
    ground, and personality factors (Brannon & Feist, 2007). Eysenck (1996) contended
    that cigarette smoking alone does not cause cancer or CVD, but when it is combined
    with stress and personality factors, it helps contribute to death from these two diseases.
    For example, Eysenck and his associates (Marusic, Gudjonsson, Eysenck, & Starc,
    1999) developed a complex biopsychosocial model for heart disease that included 11
    biological and 7 psychosocial factors. Their research with men in the Republic of
    Slovenia supported the hypothesis that personality factors interact with a variety of
    biological factors to contribute to heart disease. One such interaction was for smoking,
    neuroticism, and emotional reactivity; that is, high P scorers who smoke and who react
    to stress with anger, hostility, and aggression increase their risk for heart disease.
    Related Research
    Eysenck developed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) and its offshoots
    (Eysenck, 1959; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964, 1968, 1975, 1993). The EPQ has been
    used in conjunction with neurophysiological and genetic measures to assess the
    biological basis of personality.
    The Biological Basis of Extraversion
    One of the major thrusts of Eysenck’s theory is that personality dimensions are
    not arbitrary creations of culture but, rather, result from the basic genetic and
    neurophysiological makeup of the human species. If there were a biological basis
    to personality, two key assumptions should hold true. First, neurophysiological
    differences should exist between people high on one end of a dimension (for
    instance, introversion) and those high on the other end of that dimension (for
    instance, extraverts). Second, the basic personality dimensions should be universal
    and not limited to a given culture.
    The first domain to test Eysenck’s biological model of personality is in neu-
    rophysiology. If, as Eysenck proposed, introverts have lower thresholds of arousal
    than do extraverts, then they should be more reactive (that is, sensitive) to sensory
    stimulation. One way to test this idea is to present both groups with varying inten-
    sities of stimulation and measure their physiological reactivity. If Eysenck’s theory
    is to be supported, then introverts should be more reactive than extraverts.
    Over the past 30 years, a substantial amount of research has explored cognitive,
    behavioral, and physiological measures of reactivity in relation to extraversion-
    introversion (Beauducel, Brocke, & Leue, 2006; Eysenck, 1990; Stelmack, 1990,
    1997). In general, Eysenck’s assumption that introverts are more reactive (have lower

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 425
    thresholds) than extraverts has been supported, with the qualification that it is reac-
    tivity rather than baseline activity levels that distinguishes introverts from extraverts.
    For instance, in a recent study, Beauducel and colleagues (2006) predicted
    that extraverts would be less cortically aroused and show worse performance on a
    boring and monotonous task. The researchers selected students who scored either
    very low or very high on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire–Extraversion scale.
    They then presented the participants with a series of tones every 3 seconds for
    60 minutes. Participants had to press a button as soon as possible after they heard
    a target tone. Computers measured both the speed (reaction time) and accuracy of
    responses. The task was meant to be tedious and boring, and it was. The idea is
    that extraverts will do worse at the tone task because it is so understimulating.
    Finally, the participants’ cortical activity was measured via EEG throughout the
    entire tone task. The predictions again were that extraverts would have lower cor-
    tical arousal and would do worse on the monotonous task. Beauducel and col-
    leagues found support for both of these hypotheses, which support two of the most
    basic of Eysenck’s assumptions about the biological basis of personality traits.
    Similarly, Anthony Gale (1983) summarized the findings from 33 studies
    examining EEG and extraversion and found that introverts showed greater cortical
    arousal than did extraverts in 22 of the 33 studies. Later, Robert Stelmack (1997),
    a major figure in testing Eysenck’s neurophysiological hypothesis, reviewed the
    literature and came to two basic conclusions: First, introverts are more reactive
    than extraverts on various measures of arousal; and second, extraverts are quicker
    to respond on simple motor tasks. The faster motoric response rates of extraverts
    Preferring to be alone at times is one way that introverted people regulate their optimal level
    of arousal. © Image Source/Getty Images

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories426
    correspond well with their greater spontaneity, social disinhibition, and impulsive-
    ness. In a study by Cynthia Doucet and Stelmack (2000), however, it was only
    motoric response rate—not cognitive processing speed—that differentiated intro-
    verts and extraverts. Extraverts were faster motorically but not cognitively. Extra-
    verts may move faster but they do not think faster than introverts.
    Optimal level of arousal is another of Eysenck’s hypotheses that has generated
    some research. Eysenck theorized that introverts should work best in environments of
    relatively low sensory stimulation, whereas extraverts should perform best under con-
    ditions of relatively high sensory stimulation (Dornic & Ekehammer, 1990). In an
    important study conducted by Russell Geen (1984), introverted and extraverted par-
    ticipants were randomly assigned to either a low noise or high noise condition and
    then given a relatively simple cognitive task to perform. Results showed that introverts
    outperformed extraverts under conditions of low noise, whereas extraverts outper-
    formed introverts under conditions of high noise. These findings not only support
    Eysenck’s theory but also suggest that people who prefer to study in public places
    (like a dorm study area) are more likely to be extraverts. Introverts, on the other hand,
    find such noisy environments distracting and therefore tend to avoid them.
    A second source of support for Eysenck’s biologically based theory of per-
    sonality comes from behavioral genetics. Behavioral genetic research is often based
    on the study of twins, both identical and fraternal, who have been raised together
    or apart. Twin studies have found that most basic personality traits have heritabil-
    ity estimates of between 40% and 60% (Plomin & Caspi, 1999). In other words,
    an individual’s genetic makeup goes about halfway toward explaining his or her
    basic traits. For instance, the trait of extraversion, or outgoingness, often correlates
    around .50 for identical twins and around .20 to .25 for fraternal twins, which leads
    to a heritability estimate of between 50% and 60%. Likewise, between 50% and
    55% of the difference in neuroticism is due to genetics (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001;
    Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005; Krueger & Johnson, 2008; Plomin & Caspi, 1999).
    Moreover, other researchers have begun to uncover specific gene locations involved
    in producing neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, that are connected to traits of
    extraversion, neuroticism, and psychoticism (Gillespie et al., 2008).
    In summary, research tends to support Eysenck’s notion that personality fac-
    tors have a biological basis and are not simply dependent on what we have learned.
    Indeed, consistent with a biological basis of personality, the major traits appear to
    be consistent in most countries of the world (McCrae, 2002; Poortinga, Van de
    Vijver, & van Hemert, 2002). How and when personality traits are expressed is
    clearly influenced by our cultural and social context. But that we all can be described
    on similar dimensions of personality (e.g., extraversion or neuroticism) is influenced
    by our biological makeup. Personality, in short, is molded by both nature and nurture.
    The Biological Basis of Neuroticism
    Recall that Eysenck (1967) postulated that neuroticism resulted from increased
    activity or responsiveness and lower activation thresholds in the limbic system. This
    pattern is the same as introversion but the location is different: introversion involves
    increased activity and lower thresholds for cortical and reticular arousal rather than
    limbic system arousal. The limbic system is comprised of the subcortical structures

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 427
    in the brain involved in emotion and motivation, primarily the amygdala and hypo-
    thalamus. Therefore, researchers have explored Eysenck’s hypothesis that differ-
    ences in limbic system activity and physiology are the basis for neuroticism—the
    disposition to experience negative emotions such as stress, anxiety, guilt, and
    depression. In general, there is quite a bit of empirical evidence supporting this
    theory.
    For instance, Mincic (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on the topic of neu-
    roticism and the structure and function of the amygdala. Meta-analyses are the pro-
    cess of collecting all of the published and even as much unpublished literature as
    one can find on one specific topic or question and calculating the overall size of the
    effect on the question at hand. It is a quantitative review of the literature and tells
    us how large of an effect there is across all studies rather than just one. Mincic col-
    lected and analyzed 13 quantitative studies on brain structure and function and neu-
    roticism. Across these 13 studies, there was consistent evidence for more grey
    matter (cell bodies) in the amygdala of people high in neuroticism compared to those
    who were low in neuroticism. More grey matter is consistent with increased activity
    or responsiveness of the amygdala. To be fair, this association is not true for each
    amygdala. Like all subcortical structures the amygdala come in twos: one in the right
    hemisphere and one in the left. Increased amygdala activity is found more in the left
    than right amygdala (Mincic, 2015). Other research suggests that there are reduced
    neural connections between the amygdala and other brain regions involved in control-
    ling thoughts. This lack of connection appears to inhibit the “off switch” in the
    amygdala resulting in its over activity to negative experiences (Canli, 2008; Ormel
    et al., 2012). In short, people high in neuroticism are biased toward and more sensi-
    tive to negative emotional experiences partly due to an overactive amygdala.
    Increased physiological reactivity—as seen in sweating—is also associated
    with neuroticism. In one study, for example, 169 adults (mean age of 27) had their
    physiological responses measured as they watched a 60-minute TV program (House)
    (Brumbaugh, Kothuri, Marci, Siefert, & Pfaff, 2013). This TV episode was chosen
    because it included four separate 1-minute scenes that have been demonstrated to
    portray strong negative emotions (violence-fear, sadness, tension, and threat-hostility).
    Participants wore a vest that continuously measured heart-rate, skin conductance
    (sweating), and respiration (breathing). They also completed a short 10-item measure
    of personality (Gosling et al., 2003). Inspired by Eysenck’s theory, Brumbaugh and
    colleagues predicted that people high in neuroticism would have greater physiologi-
    cal response to each of the four negative emotion scenes. They found partial support
    for these predictions in that the violent-fear scene produced greater galvanic skin
    conductance (sweating) in people high in neuroticism than those low in it. Heart rate
    and respiration differences, however, did not exist. Other research reported that
    greater skin conductance reactivity in people with high compared to low levels of
    neuroticism peaked at 4–5 seconds after the negative stimulus and did not return to
    normal for about 9 seconds (Norris, Larsen, & Cacioppo, 2007). In those low in
    neuroticism, however, the peaks were small and occurred at about 2 seconds after
    the stimulus and reactivity was back to normal by 3–4 seconds after the stimulus.
    So the reactivity is both stronger and longer lasting in people high in neuroticism.
    In sum, the current research on the biology of neuroticism supports Eysenck’s
    theoretical ideas going back to the 1960s, namely that the differences in limbic

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories428
    system and physiology would be the foundation for the personality trait of neu-
    roticism. To be sure, there is more research to be done and not all of the past
    research confirms each aspect of Eysenck’s theory. But overall, a biological basis
    of neuroticism seems to be established.
    Critique of Eysenck’s Biologically Based Theory
    First, does Eysenck’s biologically based theory generate research? On this crite-
    rion, it must be rated very high. Figure 14.5 shows the comprehensiveness of
    Eysenck’s personality theory. The middle square embraces the psychometric prop-
    erties of his theory; that is, psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism. This fig-
    ure also shows that Eysenck’s personality theory is much more than a simple
    classification. The genetic and biological antecedents of behavior are suggested by
    the two squares on the left, whereas some of the consequences, or outcomes, of
    Eysenck’s research are found in the two squares on the right. These consequences
    are a result of experimental studies on conditioning, sensitivity, vigilance, percep-
    tion, memory, and reminiscence. Areas of research on social behavior are shown
    in the box on the far right and include such topics as sociability, criminality,
    creativity, psychopathology, and sexual behavior. Eysenck and his colleagues have
    reported significant amounts of research in these and other fields of research.
    Second, are trait and factor theories falsifiable? On this criterion, trait and fac-
    tor theories receive a moderate to high rating. Some of Eysenck’s research results—
    for example, his investigations of personality and disease—have not been replicated
    by outside researchers. His biological theory, because it makes specific predictions, is
    falsifiable. Results, however, are mixed, with some of his predictions being confirmed
    (e.g., optimal arousal) and some not (e.g., cognitive processing speed).
    Third, trait and factor theories are rated high on their ability to organize
    knowledge. Because Eysenck’s model of personality is one of the few to take biol-
    ogy seriously, it is one of the only theories that can explain the observations that
    individuals differ in behavior at birth and that genetics accounts for roughly half
    of the variability in individual differences.
    Fourth, a useful theory has the power to guide the actions of practitioners,
    and on this criterion, biological theories rank relatively low. Although these theo-
    ries do a good job of explaining the origins of personality differences, they do not
    easily lend themselves to practical guides for teachers, parents, and even counsel-
    ors. On this criterion, biological theory rates relatively low.
    Are trait and factor theories internally consistent? Again, the rating must be
    equivocal. The theory of Eysenck is a model of consistency, but when compared to
    the Five-Factor model, Eysenck’s model is somewhat inconsistent. Eysenck remained
    convinced that his Giant Three factors were superior to the Big Five model. This
    inconsistency presents a problem, especially because factor analysis is a precise
    mathematical procedure and because factor theories are heavily empirical.
    The final criterion of a useful theory is parsimony. Like McCrae and Costa’s
    Five-Factor Model, Eysenck’s model of personality is also based on factor analy-
    sis and therefore provides a very parsimonious explanation of personality. Indeed,
    with only three major dimensions, Eysenck’s model is even more parsimonious
    than the Five-Factor approach.

    Chapter 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory 429
    Concept of Humanity
    On the determinism versus free choice dimension, Eysenck’s theory sides some-
    what toward the deterministic view, but only slightly. Biological foundations are
    difficult to change, but as the diathesis-stress models make clear, both biology
    and environment are needed to create final personality qualities in an individual.
    Regarding optimism versus pessimism Eysenck is mostly silent, but on
    teleology versus causality he comes down on the side of causality. Recall the
    model in Fig ure 14.5, where the chain of causality runs from DNA to limbic
    system to traits to proximal consequences and finally to distal consequences.
    On the question of conscious versus unconscious determinants of
    behavior, Eysenck’s approach leans toward unconscious determinants insofar
    as people are mostly incapable of being aware of how genetics and brain
    processes affect their behavior and personality. Regarding the issue of bio-
    logical versus social influences it may be somewhat surprising to say, but in
    fact, Eysenck very much argued for “both-and”—both nature and nurture. Biol-
    ogy may set the floor and ceiling of our behavior, but environment is needed
    to determine whether we will be closer to the floor or ceiling of our potential.
    On the dimension of individual differences versus similarities, biologi-
    cal theory leans quite a bit toward individual differences. Biological, brain,
    and genetic differences focus on the uniqueness of individuals. Eysenck
    (1981), for example, wrote that “people are above all individuals” (p. xi). And
    yet at the same time, biological theory also demonstrates the commonality
    we all share as members of a single species. In that we are all members of
    the same species, we expect to see and do see commonality in personality
    structure the world over.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Eysenck used a hypothetico-deductive approach to extract three bipolar
    factors—extraversion/introversion, neuroticism/stability, and
    psychoticism/superego.
    ∙ Extraverts are characterized by sociability and impulsiveness; introverts,
    by passivity and thoughtfulness.
    ∙ High scores on the neuroticism scale may indicate anxiety, hysteria,
    obsessive-compulsive disorders, or criminality; low scores tend to predict
    emotional stability.
    ∙ High scores on psychoticism indicate hostility, self-centeredness,
    suspicion, nonconformity, and antisocial behavior; low scores indicate a
    strong superego, empathy, and cooperation.
    ∙ Eysenck insisted that, to be useful, personality must predict behavior,
    and he presented ample evidence to support his three-factor theory.
    ∙ The three main dimensions of personality are biologically based as
    evidenced from temperament, behavioral genetics, and brain research.

    430
    C H A P T E R 1 5
    Buss: Evolutionary
    Theory of
    Personality
    ⬥ Overview of Evolutionary Theory
    ⬥ Biography of David Buss
    ⬥ Principles of Evolutionary Psychology
    ⬥ Evolutionary Theory of Personality
    The Nature and Nurture of Personality
    Adaptive Problems and their Solutions (Mechanisms)
    Evolved Mechanisms
    Origins of Individual Differences
    Neo-Bussian Evolutionary Theories of Personality
    ⬥ Common Misunderstandings in Evolutionary Theory
    Evolution Implies Genetic Determinism (Behavior as
    Set in Stone and Void of Influence From the
    Environment)
    Executing Adaptations Requires Conscious Mechanisms
    Mechanisms Are Optimally Designed
    ⬥ Related Research
    Temperament and the Pre- and Post-Natal Environment
    Genetics and Personality
    Animal Personality
    Buss
    Courtesy David Buss
    ⬥ Critique of Evolutionary Theory of Personality
    ⬥ Concepts of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 431
    David was a 17-year-old high school drop-out, arrested twice on drug charges, and was working the night shift at a truck stop. One night a drunken driver
    threatened to take an ax and chop off his long hair. Another night, a young man
    beat David with a club for no apparent reason other than to start a fight. At this
    point, David decided there must be a better way to make a living and so he enrolled
    in night school to finish his high school diploma. After doing so, he got very lucky:
    He won a random lottery to enter the University of Texas at Austin, for which he
    did not have the required GPA. In college his intellectual curiosity blossomed. As
    he put it, “In my junior year, I knew that I wanted to become a scientist and that
    the human mind was the territory I wanted to explore” (D. Buss, 2004, p. 16). Ten
    years later David was a professor of psychology at Harvard University!
    How does a high school drop-out become a professor at Harvard? One of the
    ideas that sparked this interest in learning and understanding in David was the con-
    cept of evolution, especially when applied to human personality, thought, and behav-
    ior. More specifically, it was his interest in sex and all the behaviors that go with
    it—attraction, lust, jealousy, cheating, flirting, gossip—that focused his career ambi-
    tions. This spark catapulted Buss from high school drop-out to Harvard professor.
    To be fair, David was never a typical drop-out: His father was a distinguished pro-
    fessor of psychology and his whole family was intellectually curious and talented.
    Overview of Evolutionary Theory
    Charles Darwin (1859) laid the foundation for the modern theory of evolution, even
    though the theory itself has been around since the ancient Greeks. Darwin’s major
    contribution was not the theory of evolution but rather an explanation for how evo-
    lution works, namely through selection (natural and sexual) and chance. Chance
    occurs mostly through random genetic mutation, and we won’t have much to say
    about chance. Instead, we focus on selection of three different kinds.
    In order to understand natural and sexual selection, let’s first examine a sim-
    ilar concept created by humans and one that provided Darwin with his key insight:
    artificial selection. Artificial selection (otherwise
    known as “breeding”) occurs when humans select
    particular desirable traits in a breeding species.
    For example, the differences between the very
    large Great Dane and the very small Chihuahua
    have come about by humans selecting these qual-
    ities in these breeds. Humans have been breeding
    plant and animal species for thousands of years.
    Natural selection is simply a more general
    form of artificial selection in which nature rather
    than people select the traits. More specifically, it
    occurs when traits become either more or less
    common in a species over long periods of time
    because they do or do not lead to greater surviv-
    ability (D. Buss, 1999; D. Buss & Greiling,
    1999). In this way, natural selection involves
    “evolved strategies” for a species’ survival. But
    “Traits, such as size, are sometimes artificially selected for by
    humans, and can lead to different breeds of dog.”
    © Brand X Pictures/Getty Images

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories432
    understand that these strategies are not conscious with a plan or foresight in mind,
    but rather are blind (nonconscious). Traits get “selected” simply because they lead
    to greater survivability and hence more offspring with that trait survive to repro-
    ductive age. These individuals, in turn, have more offspring. Darwin’s genius was
    being the first (along with Alfred Wallace) to recognize this was the process that
    drove evolution of all life forms.
    Darwin realized there were certain traits that contradicted natural selection
    because they directly made survival less, not more, likely. The big, bulky, color-
    ful feathers of the peacock were a prime example. Why do such characteristics
    exist if they make survival more difficult? His answer was sexual selection rather
    than natural selection (Darwin, 1859; Miller, 2000). Sexual selection operates
    when members of the opposite sex find certain traits more appealing and attractive
    than others and thereby produce offspring with those traits. The key is that these
    qualities have to be markers of fitness that can’t be easily faked. For instance, in
    the example of the peacock, only males with the healthiest and brightest plumage
    are most attractive to peahens. But plumage cannot be faked—that is, not just any
    male can pretend to have the brightest plumage. In fact, the brightest plumage is
    a true marker of fitness, that is, these really are the strongest and healthiest males
    in the cluster/pride (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). In fact, these traits are handicaps
    that only the truly strong and healthy can pull off. They signal to peahens, “Hey,
    select me; I am the strongest and healthiest.” By mating with these peacocks,
    peahens are unconsciously producing the strongest and healthiest offspring. In
    humans, strength, physical beauty, dominance, intelligence, and status are quali-
    ties many find attractive and are therefore sexually selected for. For example, a
    recent study of over 400 individuals, many of whom were creative artists and
    poets, revealed a positive correlation between creativity and sexual success. That
    is, more creative people were also more sexually active (Nettle & Clegg, 2006).
    The researchers argue that their findings support the theory, first proposed by
    Darwin and more recently by Geoffrey Miller (2000), that human creative ability
    is a sexually selected trait because it is a quality that increases one’s attractiveness
    to members of the opposite sex.
    The evolutionary process (natural and sexual selection and chance) results in
    three distinct outcomes: adaptations, by-products, and noise (D. Buss, 1999; Tooby
    & Cosmides, 1992). Adaptations are evolved strategies that solve important sur-
    vival and/or reproductive problems. Adaptations are often the products of natural
    or sexual selection and must have a genetic or inherited basis to them. Sweat
    glands, for example, are adaptations because they solve the problem of thermal
    regulation. Taste preferences and sexual attraction are also adaptations. We like
    sugary and fatty foods because they are good sources of energy and in earlier
    evolutionary times were relatively scarce. Human intelligence and creativity are
    adaptations because they facilitate adaptive solutions to problems of survival (Feist,
    2006; Miller, 2000).
    By-products are traits that happen as a result of adaptations but are not part
    of the functional design (D. Buss, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). By-products
    “come along for the ride” of natural or sexual selection. Scientific ability or driv-
    ing skill is each a by-product of adaptations. We clearly did not evolve to do

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 433
    science or drive cars, but one by-product of the evolution of human intelligence
    is the capacity to think scientifically (Feist, 2006). Similarly, driving a car is not
    an evolved strategy, but having quick reflexes, hand-eye coordination, and motor
    (muscle) control allows us easily to transfer evolved skills to new, modern appli-
    cations, such as driving.
    Noise, also known as “random effects,” occurs when evolution produces
    random changes in design that do not affect function. Noise tends to be produced
    by chance and not selected for. An example of noise is the shape of a belly button,
    that is, whether it is an “innie” or an “outie.” The belly button itself is a by-
    product of an adaptation, namely the umbilical cord (Buss, 1999).
    Biography of David Buss
    David Buss was born April 14, 1953 in Indianapolis, Indiana, to Arnold
    H. Buss, Sr. and Edith Nolte. Arnold H. Buss, Sr. earned his PhD in Psychology
    from Indiana University in the early 1950s and was a professor of psychology at
    the University of Pittsburgh, Rutgers, and finally the University of Texas, where
    he is currently Professor Emeritus. Arnold Buss’s research focused on aggression,
    psychopathology, self-consciousness, and social anxiety (A. Buss, 2008).
    Even though David Buss grew up in an academic family, in his teens he drifted
    toward mediocre grades in school and got involved in drugs in high school, even
    being arrested twice on drug charges (D. Buss, 2004). Academics simply did not
    appeal to him and by age 17 Buss dropped out of high school. He got the first job
    he applied to—working at a truck stop—because he was willing to work the all-night
    shift. In just 3 months on the job, however, Buss experienced enough to make him
    realize “there must be better ways to make a living” (D. Buss, 2004, p. 16). For
    example, one drunken driver threatened to “take a tomahawk to your long hair” and
    in another incident a young man beat Buss with a club for no apparent reason other
    than to start a fight.
    After these experiences he enrolled in night classes, finished his high school
    degree, and although his grades were too poor for him to be admitted to college,
    in 1971 he was lucky to be admitted to the University of Texas via a random lot-
    tery pick of those not in the top 10% of their graduating class (D. Buss, 1989).
    The lottery was abandoned the following year. It was as an undergraduate that his
    love of knowledge and fascination with human behavior took root. Courses in
    geology and astronomy exposed him to the importance of evolution. By his junior
    year, he knew he wanted to be a scientist and more specifically a scientist of the
    mind. He wrote his first paper on evolution and behavior, entitled “Dominance/
    Access to Women.” In this paper, he proposed that men are highly motivated to
    achieve dominance and high status because those traits are attractive to women.
    Buss acknowledged, however, that his interest in “mating” (i.e., sex) went further
    back in his personal history.
    From an early age, I found myself fascinated with females. At seven or eight, I
    became irresistibly drawn to the girl next door. I had no name for the feelings,
    but later I was sure it was love . . . As I grew up, I found out that nearly every
    one of my peers was mesmerized by mating. School gossip revolved around it:

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories434
    Attractions, repulsions, mate competition, mate poaching, mate switching, and
    sexual conflict permeated our social life beginning in sixth or seventh grade and
    possibly earlier . . . Once I became enchanted by evolutionary theory, however,
    mating became a natural. Differential reproductive success is the engine of
    evolution. (2004, pp. 17–18)
    As we have seen consistently throughout this book, the personality of the
    theorist shapes his or her theory of personality. Buss seems to be no exception.
    “Did these childhood experiences somehow create some causal vector that moti-
    vated me to focus on mating in my professional life? Possibly, yet I doubt that my
    experiences are unique” (D. Buss, 2004, p. 17).
    Moreover, at the same time that David was an undergraduate in psychology
    at the University of Texas at Austin, his father was in the same department as a
    professor and published the first introductory psychology textbook with evolution
    as the unifying theme, Psychology—Man in Perspective. The senior Buss opened
    his book with the following statement:
    The subject matter of psychology is so diverse as to bewilder the student. It
    would help in bringing order out of chaos if there were a simple, all-
    embracing theme that encompassed the various topics of psychology. The only
    perspective that appears sufficiently grand in scope is that of evolution.
    (A. Buss, 1973, p. 2)
    The concept of evolution and its importance in human behavior, therefore,
    was clearly ever-present in the Buss household, and David’s fascination with
    explaining human behavior, especially sexual behavior, from this perspective, was
    an obvious outgrowth of his family environment.
    In contrast to his middle school and high school performance, as an under-
    graduate in college David Buss excelled and developed a passion for psychology
    and human behavior and went on to a PhD program in personality psychology at
    the University of California at Berkeley from 1976 to 1981. At Berkeley he worked
    with Jack and Jeanne Block, Richard Lazarus, and Harrison Gough, and yet his
    most fruitful collaboration was with Ken Craik. Together with Craik, Buss devel-
    oped a behaviorally based assessment to personality they dubbed the “act-frequency”
    approach.
    His first professorship position was at Harvard University, where he con-
    tinued the act-frequency research but increasingly turned his attention to his
    first love in psychology, evolutionary theory. While at Harvard Buss began a
    collaboration with two graduate students—Leda Cosmides and John Tooby—
    who, along with Buss, would go on to establish the field of “evolutionary
    psychology.”
    David Buss has garnered many awards over the course of his career,
    including the Early Career Contribution to Personality Psychology by the Amer-
    ican Psychological Association in 1988 and being elected Fellow to both the
    American Psychological Association and the American Psychological Society.
    In addition, he has authored numerous books, including Evolutionary Psychol-
    ogy (1999), The Evolution of Desire (2003), and The Murderer Next Door
    (2005). Along with Randy Larsen he has also published a textbook, Personality
    Psychology (2002).

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 435
    Principles of Evolutionary
    Psychology
    Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer were the first thinkers to argue for an
    evolutionary perspective of psychological thought and behavior. In 1859 Darwin
    wrote: “In the future, I see open fields for far more important researches. Psy-
    chology will be securely based on the foundation already well laid by Herbert
    Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power by gradation”1
    (Darwin, 1859, p. 355). In other words, in the future, the view that mental
    processes have evolved gradually will be more widely accepted. A few decades
    later the American philosopher and psychologist William James did pick up on
    this view and argued that psychology should focus on the function of the mind
    rather than its parts.
    It took more than 100 years, however, for Darwin’s future to arrive. Until
    the 1970s, evolution and psychology were largely separate ideas. During the
    1970s, finally, things began to change. One of the first signs of change was
    put forth by E.O. Wilson when he argued for a merger of the biological and
    social sciences and dubbed his movement “sociobiology” (Wilson, 1975). The
    term “evolutionary psychology” was coined in 1973 by biologist Michael Ghis-
    elin (1973), and later popularized by the anthropologist John Tooby and psy-
    chologist Leda Cosmides in the early 1990s (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The
    term evolutionary psychology can be defined as the scientific study of human
    thought and behavior from an evolutionary perspective and focuses on four big
    questions (Buss, 1999):
    1. Why is the human mind designed the way it is, and how did it come to
    take its current form?
    2. How is the human mind designed; that is, what are its parts and current
    structure?
    3. What function do the parts of the mind have, and what is it designed to do?
    4. How do the evolved mind and current environment interact to shape
    human behavior?
    In the remainder of the chapter, we see how these questions have been applied to
    the study of human personality in David Buss’s evolutionary theory of personality.
    Evolutionary Theory of Personality
    From the beginning to the end of the 20th century, personality theories went from
    grand theories that attempted to explain all people at all times to smaller, more
    targeted theories that focused on single aspects of personality, such as the structure
    of personality or the nature of self. Starting with Freud in the early 1900s, theories
    of personality had attempted to understand people’s conscious and unconscious
    1In 1855, four years before Darwin’s Origins, Herbert Spencer published Principles of Psychology, in
    which he argued for a biological and even evolutionary view of human thought and behavior.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories436
    thinking, motives, drives, and even their dreams. Most of these theories, as you
    have seen in Parts I to III of the current book, assume that personality is caused
    by environmental events alone and seldom even mention any biological compo-
    nent. Evolutionary theory, however, assumes that the true origins of these traits
    reach far back in ancestral times. The true origin of personality is evolution, mean-
    ing that it is caused by an interaction between an ever changing environment and
    a changing body and brain. Evolutionary theory is one of the few recent theories
    of personality that attempts once again to explain the grand view of human
    personality—its ultimate origins as well as its overall function and structure. “Evo-
    lutionary meta-theory, properly conceived, provides for personality psychology the
    grand framework it seeks, and which has been missing almost entirely from its
    core formulations” (Buss, 1991, p. 486).
    As you have seen throughout this book, personality is primarily concerned
    with how individuals differ consistently in what motivates them and how they act
    and think. Evolution also starts with the assumption that individual members of
    any species differ from one another. In this sense, the two would appear to be
    perfect partners. Given the fact that both personality and evolution have individual
    differences as their starting point, you would have thought that the marriage of the
    two would have been obvious and happened soon after Darwin suggested it would
    in the mid to late 19th century.
    Yet few took up the challenge and the marriage did not happen until the
    1990s. In fact, as two of the main proponents of evolutionary psychology—Tooby
    and Cosmides—pointed out early in the marriage, there was a serious problem:
    natural selection typically works to lessen individual differences insofar that suc-
    cessful traits and qualities become the norm and less adaptive traits die out. Over
    long periods of time, nature is selecting the same trait. To put it most clearly, there
    is a paradox here: “If natural selection winnows out maladaptive traits and over
    the long-term produces a universal human nature then how can individuals consis-
    tently differ in their disposition to think and behave (i.e., have personality)?”
    (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Human adaptations should remain universal and
    species-typical, meaning there should not be significant differences between indi-
    viduals. Indeed, Tooby and Cosmides argue that by definition if a trait shows
    significant individual differences it cannot be an adaptation, because by definition
    adaptations are species typical. To be clear, Tooby and Cosmides were not so much
    denying the existence of personality as they were denying that it was an adaptation.
    And yet few deny that personality and individual differences exist. How do we
    explain this paradox?
    Indeed, early in its development the field of evolutionary personality psy-
    chology itself was divided over how to solve this paradox. Some leading
    evolutionary psychologists argued for two solutions: personality differences were
    either “noise” or they were perhaps “by-products” of evolved adaptive strategies
    (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). More recently, however, other theorists have made
    the case for personality traits being something more than noise or by-products,
    namely adaptations (D. Buss, 1991, 1999; MacDonald, 1995; Nettle, 2006; Nich-
    ols, Sheldon, & Sheldon, 2008). Because David Buss was the first and most
    prominent theorist to take up the cause of developing an evolutionary theory of
    personality, we focus on his theory. Later in the chapter, we briefly review a few

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 437
    of the extensions by neo-Bussian theorists. The essence of Buss’s theory of per-
    sonality revolves around adaptive problems and their solutions or mechanisms.
    Before discussing adaptations and their solutions, let us first review the nature
    and nurture of personality.
    The Nature and Nurture of Personality
    Recall that personality is all about consistent and unique differences between indi-
    viduals in how they think and behave. The question quickly becomes, “What causes
    these individual differences?” As with all questions about human behavior it comes
    down to two fundamental answers: nature and/or nurture. That is, behavior and
    personality are caused by either internal qualities or external-environmental ones. It
    is easy to see, however, that this dichotomy is a false one. Internal states and pro-
    cesses, from biological and physiological systems to personality traits, come about
    from input from the environment. Neither can function without the other, although
    the history of psychology is largely a history of nature versus nurture. On the one
    side, there is what Buss called the fundamental situational error, or the tendency
    to assume that the environment alone can produce behavior void of a stable internal
    mechanism. “Without internal mechanisms there can be no behavior” (D. Buss,
    1991, p. 461). On the other side, there is what social psychologists have called the
    fundamental attribution error to describe our tendency to ignore situational and
    environmental forces when explaining the behavior of other people and instead
    focus on internal dispositions. Indeed, each of these views alone is incomplete
    because there is no such thing as purely internal or purely external explanations of
    behavior. The two must be involved and interact in any behavior.
    Evolved mechanisms are good examples of the interaction of nature and
    nurture because they only exist in response to and with input from the environment.
    There is no split between biological and environmental. Environment does not
    affect behavior without a mechanism to respond. Evolution in general is inherently
    an interaction between biology and environment (nature and nurture). All biologi-
    cal structures and by extension all psychological systems have come about only in
    the context of a particular environment and what was happening in that environ-
    ment. During early stages of evolution, some individuals had qualities that worked
    in that environment at that time and hence were more likely to survive and repro-
    duce. One of the fundamental assumptions of evolutionary theory of personality is
    that these adaptive qualities include consistent and unique dispositions to behave
    in particular ways in particular contexts, in other words, personality traits.
    Adaptive Problems and their Solutions (Mechanisms)
    Ever since Darwin, it has been clear that all life forms are confronted with two
    fundamental problems of adaptation, namely survival (food, danger, predation, etc.)
    and reproduction. In order to survive any living thing has to deal with what he called
    the “hostile forces of nature,” which include disease, parasites, food shortages, harsh
    climate, predators, and other natural hazards (D. Buss, 1991). Individuals who solve
    these problems most efficiently and effectively are most likely to survive, and sur-
    vival is a precondition for reproduction.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories438
    The process of evolution by natural selection has produced solutions to these
    two basic problems of life and they are called mechanisms. More specifically,
    mechanisms
    ∙ operate according to principles in different adaptive domains
    ∙ number in the dozens or hundreds (maybe even thousands)
    ∙ are complex solutions to specific adaptive problems (survival, reproduction)
    Each mechanism works specifically on the problem it solves and not other ones.
    For example, sweat glands solve the problem of regulating body temperature but
    do nothing for disease or wounds. Psychological mechanisms operate by converting
    input into particular actions or decision rules that help solve these adaptive prob-
    lems (D. Buss, 1991).
    There are two specific main classes of mechanism, namely physical and
    psychological. Physical mechanisms are physiological organs and systems that
    evolved to solve problems of survival, whereas psychological mechanisms are
    internal and specific cognitive, motivational, and personality systems that solve
    specific survival and reproduction problems.
    Anatomical and physiological mechanisms are often shared by many species,
    whereas psychological mechanisms are often more specific to species. Evolution-
    ary biology focuses on the origin of physical mechanisms, whereas evolutionary
    psychology focuses on the origin of psychological mechanisms. Indeed, a major
    contribution of evolutionary psychology to evolutionary theory is the introduction
    and development of psychological mechanisms.
    Examples of survival and reproduction problems and their various physical
    and psychological solutions are presented in Table 15.1 (Buss, 1991). For exam-
    ple, animals of different species have evolved similar sensory systems. In most
    vertebrates, and mammals in particular, these take the form of eyes, ears, nose,
    skin, and tongue. Senses are adaptive in that they function to take in different
    kinds of information from the outside world and allow the organism to respond
    appropriately. Sensory mechanisms differ between species of animals. Dogs for
    instance, hear sounds with pitches between 10 and 35,000 cycles per second
    (Hertz), whereas humans only hear sounds in the 20 to 20,000 cycles per second
    (Hertz) range. Humans, however, evolved photoreceptor cells (cones) in the
    retina that are sensitive to three different wavelengths of light, namely red, green,
    and blue (Jacobs & Nathans, 2009). Dogs, like most other mammals, evolved
    cones sensitive to only two wavelengths, namely blue and green (Neitz, Geist,
    & Jacobs, 1989). Humans, in other words, have better color vision than dogs,
    but dogs hear (and smell) much better than humans. Another physical mechanism
    is the immune system, which evolved in response to the problem of parasites
    and disease, just as blood clotting developed to solve the problem of dying from
    wounds or injury.
    An example of a reproductive problem is same-sex competition, which stems
    from the fact individuals must compete with members of the same sex for access
    to reproduce with the opposite sex. The problem, therefore, is same-sex competition,
    or in Buss’s words: “besting members of one’s own sex to gain access to desirable
    members of the opposite sex” (1991, p. 465). One solution, but by no means the
    only solution, to reproduction is dominance. Individuals who successfully compete

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 439
    against same sex members of their species are the dominant members of a group
    and as such they are generally successful at many specific problems, such as acquir-
    ing resources, negotiating social hierarchies, forming successful alliances, and suc-
    cessfully courting a potential mate (D. Buss, 1988, 1991).
    Psychological mechanisms have behavioral consequences, tactics, and actions
    associated with them (Buss, 1991, 1999). For example, intrasex competition results
    from a dominant member in a group being a leader and is a result of someone who
    could successfully negotiate his or her place in a hierarchy, fend off enemies, and
    attract mates. The main job of an evolutionary model of personality is to describe,
    study, and explain these enduring psychological mechanisms.
    Evolved Mechanisms
    Again, psychological mechanisms are internal processes that help solve problems
    of survival and/or reproduction. Psychological mechanisms relevant to personality
    can be grouped into three main categories:
    ∙ goals/drives/motives
    ∙ emotions
    ∙ personality traits
    T A B L E 1 5 . 1
    Examples of Evolutionary Problems and Their Solutions (Mechanisms)
    Problem Solution/Mechanism
    Survival
    Taking in information from the external world Eyes, ears, nose, skin, & tongue
    Temperature regulation Ectothermic system, sweat glands
    Disease and parasites Immune system
    Wounds and injury Blood clotting
    Predators and danger Limbs and locomotion
    Fending off attacks of enemy Strength, aggression, speed
    Trust/Cooperation Conscientiousness, agreeableness
    Alliance and group cohesion Dominance, agreeableness
    Food gathering Creativity, intelligence
    Shelter Creativity, intelligence
    Reproduction
    Mate attraction Dominance, surgency, creativity
    Mate selection Social intelligence, theory of mind
    Trust Conscientiousness, dependability
    Intrasex competition Aggression, drive, achievement,
    resource acquisition, beauty
    Intimacy Love, attachment, agreeableness
    Adapted from Buss, 1991 & MacDonald, 1995.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories440
    We will not say much about goals, drives, and emotions and instead will focus
    mostly on personality traits as evolved mechanisms. We will see, however, that
    goals, motives, and emotions are closely connected to personality. In fact, most
    theories of personality have centered around motivation and drive.
    Motivation and Emotion as Evolved Mechanisms
    Two goals and motives that act as evolved mechanisms are power and intimacy.
    These drives take many different forms, with power taking the form of aggression,
    dominance, achievement, status, “negotiation of hierarchy,” and intimacy taking
    the form of love, attachment, “reciprocal alliance.” Evolutionary psychology refers
    to these drives as “adaptations” because they directly affect the health and well-
    being of the person.
    Similarly, emotions are adaptations because they directly alert the individual
    to situations that are either harmful or beneficial to his or her well-being (Lazarus,
    1991). If an event is harmful to a person’s well-being, some form of negative
    emotion is experienced. For example, if the harm is in the form of loss, then sad-
    ness is experienced, whereas if the harm is in the form of insult then anger is
    experienced. Likewise, if an event occurs that is beneficial to that person’s well-
    being, some kind of positive emotion occurs. For example, pride is experienced
    when one perceives the event as important and successfully carried out.
    Motivation and emotion are directly linked with stable personality traits (Buss,
    1991; cf. MacDonald, 1995). If one regularly is driven to achieve and win in compe-
    titions and is status-oriented, then we label that person as “dominant” or “power-
    oriented.” A person who regularly acts in ways to bring people together is “agreeable.”
    Likewise, if one often experiences sadness, shame, guilt, or anxiety when other peo-
    ple do not, we might say that person is “anxious.” Motivation is part of personality.
    Personality Traits as Evolved Mechanisms
    Buss (1991) starts with the assumption that motivation, emotion, and personal-
    ity are adaptive in that they solve problems of survival and reproduction. He
    argues that the five main dimensions of personality (Big Five) can be best
    thought of as a way of summarizing the social landscape; that is, they signal to
    other people our ability to solve survival and reproductive problems. Buss con-
    ceptualizes individual differences and personality as strategies for solving adap-
    tive problems. More importantly, being sensitive to and aware of these
    differences in personality affords reproductive advantages in the perceiver. If
    you know who is cooperative and/or dominant, you have an advantage over
    those who are oblivious to such traits. “Whenever individuals differ in ways
    relevant to the problems of survival and reproduction that humans must solve,
    a selective advantage would accrue to those whose capacity to discern the dif-
    ferences enabled them to increase their inclusive fitness” (p. 473). Put differ-
    ently, these dispositions are inherently evaluative, that is, they allow others to
    evaluate us on the adaptive problems; dispositions signal to other people their
    ability to solve survival and reproductive problems. For example, conscientious-
    ness signals whom to trust with tasks, and those who do this well accrue a
    selective advantage (i.e., are more attractive to others).

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 441
    Buss’s model of personality very closely resembles the Big Five trait approach
    of McCrae and Costa but it is not identical in structure. Buss argues for essentially
    the same five personality dimensions but with slightly different terminology. More-
    over, his view is that these behavioral dispositions have adaptive significance:
    ∙ Surgency/extraversion/dominance
    ∙ Agreeableness
    ∙ Conscientiousness
    ∙ Emotional stability (opposite of neuroticism)
    ∙ Openness/intellect
    Surgency involves the disposition to experience positive emotional states
    and to engage in one’s environment and to be sociable and self-confident. A
    surgent person is one who is driven to achieve and often tends to dominate and
    lead others. It is nearly synonymous with “extraversion.” In ancestral times, these
    individuals were high in status and were therefore attractive and desirable mates.
    Put into the language of evolution, surgency involves “hierarchy proclivities”;
    that is, how people negotiate and decide who is dominant and who is submissive.
    The negotiations happen, as they do in many animals, through competition and
    power struggles. In ancestral times these competitions were more often than not
    physical and aggressive, but could also be verbal and through accumulation of
    wealth and resources. Leaders are those who take charge and direct others, and
    whether they take charge by force or by persuasion they are acknowledged by
    others to be in charge and are in a dominant social position. Because power and
    dominance are attractive, these individuals also tended to have more children.
    Surgency is also marked by a tendency to take risks and to experience positive
    emotion (i.e., be happy) and initiating and maintaining friendships and relation-
    ships. People high in surgency are also driven and ambitious.
    A second dimension of personality, agreeableness/hostility, is marked by a
    person’s willingness and capacity to cooperate and help the group on the one hand
    or to be hostile and aggressive on the other. Some people are warm, cooperative,
    and group-oriented, but others are more selfish and hostile toward others. Agree-
    able individuals are likely to work to smooth over group conflict and form alliances
    between people. Agreeable people foster group cohesion and tend to conform to
    group norms. They get along and go along with others. In short, agreeableness
    marks a person’s willingness to cooperate.
    The third adaptive personality system revolves around response to danger
    and threat. All animals have alarm systems that warn them of potential danger and
    harm. In humans and other animals this takes the form of anxiety as an emotional
    state and emotional stability/neuroticism as a dispositional trait. Vigilance or
    sensitivity to harm and threat is quite necessary and adaptive. Emotional stability
    involves one’s ability to handle stress or not. Some people are calm under stress
    while others are high-strung much of the time.
    Fear and anxiety are adaptive emotions. Without them we would certainly
    die as individuals and as a species. As we discussed in the McCrae and Costa and
    the Eysenck chapters, neuroticism is the tendency to experience negative emotion
    such as anxiety, guilt, and sadness. The tendency to be sensitive to threats, for
    instance, may well have been adaptive in dangerous environments like those in

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories442
    which our ancestors lived. Heightened anxiety would provide a signal of danger
    and threat; its absence would quickly lead to extinction of the species. Consider a
    hunter on the savannah. He hears the growl of a large animal and becomes fearful.
    He drops back behind the bushes before the animal becomes aware of his presence.
    If he did not feel anxious, he might not hide, with dire consequences for his safety.
    By the same token, the other extreme—hypersensitivity to threats—would be
    debilitating and disruptive to everyday functioning. If the same man who became
    fearful at hearing the growl of a large animal also became fearful with every rus-
    tling of leaves or every sound of the wind, he would have a hard time functioning
    in everyday life. Having some degree of fearfulness is adaptive, and people with
    that quality were more likely to survive, reproduce, and pass on that disposition.
    Naturally selected traits are favored if they increase one’s chances of survival and
    reproductive success.
    Fourth, one’s capacity and commitment to work is the core characteristic of
    conscientiousness. Conscientious people are careful and detail-oriented as well as
    focused and reliable. Less conscientious people are less reliable and dependable
    and tend to lack focus. Conscientiousness signals to others whom we can trust with
    tasks and responsibilities and whom we can depend on in times of need.
    Finally, the evolved strategy of openness involves one’s propensity for inno-
    vation and ability to solve problems. It is closely aligned with intellect and intel-
    ligence but also a willingness to try new things and a willingness to have novel
    experiences rather than sticking with one’s routine. These people are the explorers
    of a group—they forge ahead where others are hesitant. In ancestral times this
    quality might be expressed in willingness to explore new territories for food or
    vegetation, but today it might be expressed in artists and scientists who are at the
    cutting edges of ideas and knowledge.
    Buss (1991) argues that of the five personality dimensions, surgency/dominance,
    agreeableness, and conscientious are the most important traits because they most
    directly provide answers to a host of adaptive problems. For example:
    ∙ Who is high or low in the social hierarchy?
    ∙ Who possesses the resources that I need?
    ∙ With whom should I mate?
    ∙ Who might harm me or betray my trust?
    ∙ Who will make a good member of my group?
    ∙ Whom can I trust and depend on when in need?
    Personality differences function to solve adaptive problems by providing answers
    to these questions for both the individual and for others. In this sense they are
    indicators of fitness, much like the peacock’s plumage.
    Origins of Individual Differences
    As we discussed earlier, evolutionary theory is inherently a nature and nurture
    perspective when it comes to origins. Buss and his colleague Heidi Greiling pro-
    pose four distinct sources of individual differences (D. Buss & Greiling, 1999). In
    essence, these sources of difference come down to nature (biological-genetic) and
    nurture (environmental-social).

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 443
    Environmental Sources
    There are numerous ways in which the
    environment contributes to adaptive indi-
    vidual differences. Adaptive differences
    increase reproductive success and one’s
    chance of survival. One environmental
    source of personality differences is what
    Buss termed early experiential calibra-
    tion, by which he meant that childhood
    experiences make some behavioral strate-
    gies more likely than others. An example
    of such calibration is if people grow up
    without a father present, they are more
    likely to be sexually active at a young age
    and have more sex partners during ado-
    lescence and adulthood. People in this
    situation cultivate a more promiscuous
    sexual strategy because parental attention
    is not reliable and adult relationships are
    viewed as transient (Belsky, Steinberg, &
    Draper, 1991).
    Another example of early calibration
    of adaptive strategies is attachment style, as
    we first discussed in the Klein chapter (5).
    Attachment between care-giver and infant is inherently adaptive—without such an
    attachment the baby does not survive the first few weeks of life (Buss & Greiling,
    1999). Adult attachment increases support, protection, and reassurance, and if attach-
    ment is the model the child experiences, then he or she is likely to develop similar
    relationships in adulthood. Similarly, avoidant attachment signals parental unwilling-
    ness to invest in the child.
    A second origin of environment induced individual differences is alternative
    niche specialization, which means that different people find what makes them stand
    out from others in order to gain attention from parents or potential mates. One
    example of niche specialization is seen in birth order, as we saw in the Adler
    chapter (3). Children of different birth orders gravitate toward different personali-
    ties, interests, and activities because that is the only way to gain attention from
    their parents. Frank Sulloway (1996) argued that first born find their “niche” by
    identifying with parents and authority figures, whereas second and latter borns find
    their “niche” by being focused on overthrowing those in power (i.e., older siblings).
    Heritable/Genetic Sources
    As we saw in the Eysenck and McCrae and Costa chapters, heritability is the extent
    to which a trait is under genetic influence. Body type, facial morphology, and
    degree of physical attractiveness act as heritable sources of individual differences
    (Buss & Greiling, 1999). That is, muscular men or men with masculine, dominant
    looks will garner more female attention, which will lead to more opportunities for
    People who grow up without a father are
    more likely to be sexually active early in
    life. This is an example of what Buss calls
    “early experiential calibration.”
    © ERproductions Ltd./Getty Images

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories444
    sexual activity, than will thin men or men with less dominant looks (Mazur,
    Halpern, & Udry, 1994). These are heritable because the shape of one’s face or
    body is mostly controlled by genetics.
    Nonadaptive Sources
    Some sources of individuals do not benefit survival or reproductive success and
    hence are categorized as “nonadaptive.” The most common nonadaptive source of
    individual differences is neutral genetic variations, which most often take the form
    of genetic mutations. Some mutations are neutral in that they are neither harmful
    nor beneficial to the individual. They may stay in the gene pool indefinitely until
    pressures of natural or sexual selection eliminate them.
    Maladaptive Sources
    Maladaptive traits are those that actively harm one’s chance for survival or
    decrease one’s sexual attractiveness. These can stem from either genetic or
    environmental sources. One genetic source is genetic defect, but in this case the
    mutation is harmful to the person. An environmental source is seen in environmental
    trauma, such as brain or spinal cord injury, which can also lead to maladaptive
    individual differences.
    Neo-Bussian Evolutionary Theories of Personality
    David Buss was the first to formally propose a complete evolutionary theory of
    personality, but others have followed and made advances to the theory. MacDonald
    (1995), for example, furthered Buss’s theory with two main contributions. First,
    he tied personality more closely to evolved motivational and emotional systems,
    and second he argued that the range of personality variation we see on the main
    dimensions of personality are viable alternative strategies for maximizing fitness.
    MacDonald, similar to Buss, also tied personality dimensions to evolved
    strategies for solving adaptive problems. These behavioral strategies are
    connected either with motivation to approach or avoid situations or with the
    emotional system of negative or positive affect. MacDonald, however, only
    had four personality dimensions (dominance, conscientiousness, nurturance,
    and neuroticism) and left out openness.
    MacDonald further argued that it is adaptive for a species to produce
    individuals that vary along a continuum in their responses to important problems
    because changing environments require different responses. That is what
    MacDonald means by “viable alternative strategies for maximizing fitness.” For
    instance, in relatively safe environments, anxiety and vigilance are not as adap-
    tive as they are in relatively dangerous environments. Animals can afford to be
    bold in safer environments. Some environments may favor risk takers and other
    environments may favor risk avoiders. Indeed, in nonhuman animals we see just
    such adaptive changes to changing environments (Nettle, 2006). For example,
    in Guppie fish populations with relatively few predators, boldness is a common
    trait, but if predators are introduced, this trait becomes less common in just a

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 445
    few generations (cf. O’Steen et al., 2002). Note too, these traits are heritable
    and have a genetic basis, which is one criterion for an adaptation.
    Similarly, Nettle (2006) recently expanded on evolutionary theories of
    personality and argued that Tooby and Cosmides’s (1990) argument that personality
    could not be an adaptation failed to appreciate how environmental change and
    variability would ultimately select for individual differences in behavior within a
    given species. Nettle (2006) reviewed numerous studies from the nonhuman animal
    literature that report how sudden changes in the environment (just a few genera-
    tions), increased the proportion of animals that had traits adaptive to that environ-
    ment. When the environment switched back to the original conditions, animals on
    the other end of that dimension became more common again. For example, some
    female chickadees are bold and exploratory, whereas others are inhibited. In food-
    poor years, the more exploratory birds are most likely to survive (Dingemanse,
    Both, Drent, & Tinbergen, 2004). In food-rich years, however, the bolder and more
    exploratory female birds are less likely to survive, possibly because they are more
    likely to become involved in dangerous encounters with predators. In short,
    evolution favors individual differences because one can never predict what the
    future holds and which qualities will best match changes in the environment.
    Furthermore, Nettle (2006) hypothesized there have been fitness costs and
    benefits of each of the Big Five dimensions of personality during ancestral periods
    of evolution (see Table 15.2). For example, benefits of being extraverted include
    being more successful at mating, making social allies, and exploring one’s environ-
    ment, whereas evolutionary costs of extraversion include taking more physical risks
    and having potentially a less stable family (i.e., more affairs). A benefit of being
    open to experience is heightened creativity, and its costs are having more unusual
    beliefs and possibly even developing psychosis. High levels of conscientiousness
    have the benefit of causing one to pay closer attention to the details of physical
    T A B L E 1 5 . 2
    Costs and Benefits of Big Five Dimensions of Personality (Nettle, 2006)
    Domain Benefits Costs
    Extraversion Mating success; social allies; Physical risks; family stability
    exploration of environment
    Neuroticism Vigilance to dangers; striving and Stress and depression, with
    competitiveness interpersonal and health
    consequences
    Openness Creativity, with effect on Unusual beliefs; psychosis
    attractiveness
    Conscientiousness Attention to long-term fitness Missing of immediate fitness
    benefits; life-expectancy and gains; obsessionality; rigidity
    desirable social qualities
    Agreeableness Attention to mental states of Subject to social cheating;
    others; harmonious interpersonal failure to maximize selfish
    relationships; valued coalitional advantage
    partner
    From Nettle (2006), copyright American Psychological Association; reprinted with permission.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories446
    self-care and hence can lead to a longer and healthier life, but also heighten the
    risk of leading to rigid and compulsive behavior.
    Common Misunderstandings in
    Evolutionary Theory
    When evolutionary theory first became popular in the 1980s it caused quite a bit
    of controversy. There was a lot of resistance both from inside and outside univer-
    sity settings against applying evolutionary ideas to human thought and behavior.
    Although much of this resistance has died down over the last 20–30 years, there
    are some misunderstandings that still occur (D. Buss, 1999).
    Evolution Implies Genetic Determinism (Behavior as Set
    in Stone and Void of Influence From the Environment)
    Evolution is all about the body changing due to changes in the environment. In this
    sense it is inherently a “nature and nurture” interaction perspective. Evolution
    occurs from the interaction between adaptations and input from the environment
    that triggers the adaptations. Buss uses calluses as an example: Calluses are evolved
    adaptations but do not get expressed without input from the environment such as
    walking barefoot for long periods of time or playing the guitar. Calluses get
    expressed through genetically induced protein formation and this gene expression
    only occurs with input from the environment (Ulrich-Vinther, Schwarz, Pedersen,
    Soballe, & Andreassen, 2005).
    More generally, the discovery of epigenetics is an even more powerful exam-
    ple of how genetic influence is not set in stone at the moment of conception and
    interacts with input from the environment. Epigenetics is change in gene function
    that does not involve changes in DNA (Meaney, 2010; Rutter, 2006). In other
    words, experiences that animals have create tags that attach to the outside structure
    of DNA and control gene expression. Epigenetics has fundamentally altered our
    view of genetic influence. It makes clear that the experiences we have (such as
    eating, drinking, or being exposed to chemicals) can affect changes in genes
    (Watters, 2006). In fact, cancers are one of the most widespread examples of epi-
    genetic change in gene expression and demonstrate tragically how what we eat,
    drink, and smoke can alter genetic activity (Jones & Baylin, 2002). In fact, in a
    very real sense, changes in organs, physiological systems and bodies that occur
    over long periods of time (i.e., evolution) are the result not only of mutations in
    genes but also epigenetic processes. In short, that DNA is not destiny is perfectly
    consistent with evolutionary theory.
    Executing Adaptations Requires Conscious Mechanisms
    To say that mechanisms (cognitive and personality) evolved to solve important
    problems of survival and reproduction does not mean they require complex (con-
    scious) mathematical abilities to operate. For example, the idea of “inclusive fit-
    ness” revolves around the idea that we are more likely to help out a brother than

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 447
    a cousin and a cousin more than a stranger because the brother is more closely
    related to us and a cousin is more closely related than a stranger. This is not a
    mathematical calculation any more than a spider needs to understand geometry to
    spin a web. Moreover, when evolutionary psychologists talk about “strategies,”
    these are not to be thought of as conscious or willful acts. In fact, people have
    no awareness of these influences and when discussed often even regret them.
    “Ugh, I am not attracted to him because of his resources and fitness!” “Sexual
    strategy” is just a short-hand term for a cumbersome idea that evolution has
    shaped our preferences for mates based on the fact that we are attracted to those
    who produce healthy and fit offspring and ideally continue to provide for them.
    This increases the likelihood that they will survive to reproductive age and pass
    on their healthy genes.
    Mechanisms are Optimally Designed
    People sometimes draw the conclusion that evolution produces solutions that are
    optimal. In fact, some adaptations are rather awkward. Evolutionary change occurs
    over hundreds of generations and there is always a lag between adaptation and
    environment. Human preference for fatty and salty foods is a good example. In
    ancestral environments tens of thousands of years ago, fatty and sugary foods were
    very difficult to obtain. Yet they provide important nutritional benefits. Over the
    last 100 years, fat and sugar have become cheap and plentiful. Our waistlines have
    bulged to the point where two-thirds of adult Americans are now either overweight
    or obese (Flegal et al., 2010). If they were optimally designed they would be more
    efficient and respond more quickly to changes in the environment.
    Related Research
    The evolutionary model of personality cannot be tested directly insofar as we can-
    not conduct studies over hundreds of generations. And yet, just like in biology,
    there is much support for the evolutionary basis of human personality, which can
    be divided into at least three general topics: temperament, genetics, and animal
    personality. All three lines of evidence support the view that personality has a
    biological basis and that these biological systems have evolved.
    Temperament and the Pre- and Post-Natal Environment
    Most every parent of two or more children knows that babies are different from
    one another from their very first day. These differences in behavior have a bio-
    logical basis and are known as temperament (A. Buss, 2012). Temperament lays
    the foundation for later personality traits. Insofar as temperament is expressed
    before and immediately after birth means it develops mostly from biological sys-
    tems, but is modified by input from the environment. Moreover, differences in
    these biological systems between individuals—some are more active and others are
    more sensitive to sensory stimulation—have been shaped by natural and sexual
    selection pressures, that is, by evolution.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories448
    Evidence suggests that temperament and personality differences are manifest
    even before birth, prenatally. Apparently, fetal activity and heart rate can reveal some-
    thing about temperament differences over the first year of life (DiPietro et al., 1996).
    In particular, a high heart rate at 36 weeks’ gestation (nearly full term) foreshadowed
    less predictable eating and sleeping habits 3 and 6 months after birth and less emo-
    tionality at 6 months after birth. Having high activity levels at 36 weeks’ gestation
    predicted being slow to adapt to new people or situations and having more irregular
    eating and sleeping habits at 3 and 6 months as well as being more difficult or fussy
    at 6 months (DiPietro et al., 1996).
    The prenatal environment plays an important role in shaping personality. In
    fact, the amount of stress the mother experiences during pregnancy may alter the
    infant’s own stress response. That is, infants born to mothers who have experienced
    an unusual amount of stress during pregnancy tend to have impaired stress func-
    tion; higher baseline levels of stress hormones; and a faster, stronger, and more
    pronounced physiological response to stress, all of which persist into childhood
    (Barbazanges et al., 1996; Clark & Schneider, 1997).
    After birth, in the immediate post-natal period, newborn infants already dis-
    play regular and consistent differences in behavior; that is, they have distinct tem-
    peraments (A. Buss, 2012). These behavioral differences are most pronounced in
    four dimensions of temperament: activity, emotionality, sociability, and impulsiv-
    ity. Activity is simply how active the baby is and how much energy he or she uses
    in doing things, that is, how quickly or slowly the newborn does things. Emotion-
    ality is seen in how frequently and intensely the baby experiences either positive
    or negative emotion, that is, how happy or fussy the baby is. Some research has
    shown that infant distress is associated with anxiety disorders in mothers soon after
    birth (Reck et al., 2013). Sociability concerns the baby’s response to other people,
    especially strangers. Some babies are sociable and outgoing and others withdraw
    and cry or are reserved and shy in the presence of strangers (Clarke-Stewart, Umeh,
    Snow, & Peterson, 1980). Finally, impulsivity involves the readiness and speed to
    act, without reflection. All infants are relatively impulsive but even in infancy there
    are consistent differences between babies. These differences tend to become more
    noticeable during childhood and adolescence. Moreover, long-term research has
    reported that toddlers who have impulsive temperaments are more likely than other
    toddlers to commit criminal activity and have difficulty with alcohol by the time
    they reach age 21 and also perform worse academically and have lower SAT scores
    (Caspi, 2000; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).
    Temperament assessed in childhood and adolescence can also predict teen
    substance abuse (Tarter, 2002). For example, Neighbors and colleagues (2000)
    recruited more than 400 adolescents (mean age of 16) from an adolescent alcohol
    research center. These teenagers completed a self-report measure of temperament
    (Dimensions of Temperament Survey, DOT) that measures ten dimensions of tem-
    perament: activity, sleep, approach/withdrawal, flexibility/rigidity, quality of mood,
    sleep regularity, eating regularity, daily routine, distractibility, and persistence.
    Researchers classified teens into a “difficult temperament” category if they were
    consistently on the extreme low (activity or sleep) or high end of the scores on
    temperament. Alcohol abuse was assessed via a clinical interview and for each
    “clinically present” symptom the participant received a score of 1. These standards

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 449
    revealed that 70 of the teens met criteria for alcohol abuse and 66 for alcohol
    dependency. Results showed that, for both boys and girls, those with difficult
    temperaments were most likely to abuse alcohol. The relationship held even when
    they statistically held age constant—that is, the relationship holds at all ages from
    12 to 18. In short, these findings paint a portrait of the adolescent with alcohol
    abuse as someone who has the temperament qualities of troubled mood, sleep,
    distractibility, regularity of eating and routine, and is low in activity level.
    Genetics and Personality
    Partly due to how genetics was taught in high-school biology, a common assumption
    many people have is that there is a simple and nearly one-to-one correspondence
    between genes and traits. Recall how you learned to calculate the probability that
    offspring would inherit a trait if its parents were either dominant or recessive car-
    riers of that trait. There are simple categorical traits (e.g., eye color) that get
    transmitted by one gene. But all complex psychological traits that are expressed
    on a continuum from low to high get transmitted by many, many genes. More
    technically, simple categorical traits are “monogenically” (single gene) transmitted,
    whereas traits that range from a little to a lot (e.g., aggression, height, weight,
    anxiety) are “polygenically transmitted” (Ebstein, 2006; Evans et al., 2007). Sim-
    ply put, monogenic transmission happens when single genes produce single traits
    (phenotypes), and polygenic transmission occurs when many genes interact to
    create a single characteristic (Rutter, 2006). This distinction is very important in
    understanding a fundamental idea in modern genetics, namely our genome is the
    starting point, not the end point, for how our genes are expressed (our phenotype).
    There is no “smart” gene, “shy” gene, or “aggressive” gene. Many, many (dozens
    and maybe more) genes are responsible for personality traits.
    When studying behavioral genetics, researchers use two major methods to
    examine the relationship among genetics, behavior, and personality. With the first
    method, the quantitative trait loci (QTL) approach, they look for the location of
    specific bits of DNA on genes that might be associated with particular behaviors. In
    this sense, it is a search for “genetic markers” of behavior. The traits are quantitative
    because they are markers for behaviors that are expressed on a broad continuum,
    from very little to very much. For example, anxiety is a quantitative trait because
    some people are not at all anxious, most people are average, and a few are very
    anxious. The QTL method uncovers the location on particular genes that is associated
    with high or low levels of a trait. These locations are also known as “markers.”
    QTL research points to genetic markers for several basic personality traits, such
    as novelty- or thrill seeking, impulsivity, and neuroticism/anxiety (Benjamin et al.,
    1996; Dina et al., 2005; Hamer & Copeland, 1998; Lesch et al., 1996; Plomin &
    Caspi, 1999; Retz et al., 2010; Rutter, 2006). Consider the case of thrill seeking, a
    trait that entails risk taking. People with this trait may seek out highly exciting activi-
    ties like bungee jumping, mountain climbing, or scuba diving. Thrill-seeking activities
    create a “rush” of excitement—a positive feeling that may be related to the release
    of dopamine, a neurotransmitter associated with physiological arousal. Given the
    possible connection between dopamine and thrill seeking, one theory suggests that
    people who are deficient in dopamine will tend to seek out exciting situations as a

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories450
    way of increasing their dopamine release and making up for deficient levels of
    dopamine.
    In the mid-1990s, researchers presented the first genetic evidence to support
    this theory. The gene DRD4 is involved in dopamine production in the limbic
    system, and the longer the gene sequence, the less efficient dopamine production is.
    In other words, long versions of the DRD4 gene are associated with less efficient
    dopamine production. If the theory is correct, people who seek out thrills and novel
    experiences should have the longer form of this gene, and that is exactly what the
    research has shown (Ebstein et al., 1996; Hamer & Copeland, 1998). In fact, con-
    sistent with human research, DRD4 differences also affect exploratory behavior
    like curiosity and seeking novel experiences in nonhuman animals such as birds
    (Verhulst et al., 2016), apes (Shimada et al., 2004), and dogs (Ito et al., 2004). An
    exciting aspect of this finding is that it was the first to demonstrate a specific
    genetic influence on a normal (nonpathological) personality trait.
    The second method used by behavioral geneticists for untangling the effects of
    genetics and environment on personality was first discussed in Chapter 14 (Eysenck),
    namely twin-adoption studies. Recall that the conclusion from this research is that
    between 40–60% of our personality differences stem from genetic influence
    (Bouchard & Loehlin, 2001; Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2003; Kruger & Johnson, 2008;
    Loehlin et al., 1998; Plomin & Caspi, 1999; Tellegen et al., 1988; Vukasović & Bratko,
    2015). This line of research therefore suggests that about half of the differences that
    exist between people in their personalities is attributable to genetics, leaving the other
    half influenced by environment or other unknown factors. Interestingly, personality
    disorders such as avoidant personality and obsessive-compulsive personality also
    appear to be primarily under genetic influence. Gjerde and colleagues (2015), for
    example, reported 67% of differences in avoidant personality and 53% of differences
    in obsessive-compulsive personality can be explained by genetic factors. These results
    are consistent with the view that personality, intelligence, motivation, and other psy-
    chological qualities are products not only of biological or environmental forces alone,
    but also of the interaction between the two. In short, personality differences are created
    by both nature and nurture.
    Animal Personality
    Most of you who have ever owned pet cats or dogs would readily agree that your
    pets have their own unique personalities. One of your authors (GJF), for example,
    currently has two sibling cats, a male (Scooter) and a female (Belle). These two
    cats could hardly be more different in terms of their behavior and personality.
    Scooter is absolutely curious and sociable. He explored every inch of his new home
    on the first day and forces himself into every one of our activities—eating, watch-
    ing TV, working at the computer, and sleeping. Not once has he been afraid of
    any situation. He approaches everything with glee and wonder. Belle, however,
    has been anxious and shy from the beginning. It took her about 3 days to come
    out of hiding and become comfortable with her new home. She plays, but not so
    much with strangers. She loves playing with her brother, however, and they regu-
    larly tease and chase each other. Now she hangs out with the family and enjoys a
    good massage, but she is still skittish to sudden approaches.

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 451
    To pet owners the question of animal personality seems to have an obvious
    answer: Of course, animals have distinct personalities. But to psychologists the
    question might seem to be stretching the definition of personality too far. But even
    if we can see evidence of personality in animals such as dogs and cats, can we see
    it in other animals? What about birds? reptiles? fish? worms?
    Until the 1990s, most psychologists would have argued that the term personality
    made sense only as applied to humans, but since then numerous studies have supported
    the notion that nonhuman animals not only have distinct personalities but they have
    personalities on dimensions similar to the Big Five in humans (Barnard et al., 2016;
    Dingemanse, Both, Drent, Van Oers, & Van Noordwijk, 2002; Gosling, 1998; Gosling,
    Kwan, & John, 2003; Rayment, Peters, Marston, & DeGroef, 2016; Suwała, Górecka-
    Bruzda, Walczak, Ensminger, & Jezierski, 2016; Weinstein, Capitanio, & Gosling,
    2008). For example, Gosling and Oliver John (1999) conducted a meta-analysis (quan-
    titative review) of 19 studies across 12 nonhuman species. They found evidence for at
    least 14 nonhuman species with personality traits that can be categorized along the
    same dimensions as human personality. The summary of these findings is presented
    in Table 15.3. Keep in mind that the labels from the Big Five are general labels, and
    the specific ones used in these studies vary somewhat. For instance, neuroticism is
    sometimes called emotional stability, excitability, fearfulness, emotional reactivity,
    fear–avoidance, or emotionality. Agreeableness is sometimes labeled aggression, hostil-
    ity, understanding, opportunistic, sociability, affection, or fighting–timidity. In addition,
    dominance–submission is a trait that is often seen and measured in nonhuman animals,
    T A B L E 1 5 . 3
    Table of Personality Dimensions across Species
    Personality Dimension
    Species Neuroticism Extraversion Agreeableness Openness Conscientiousness
    Chimpanzee ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
    Horsea ✓ ✓ ✓ ? ✓
    Rhesus Monkey ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
    Gorilla ✓ ✓ ✓
    Dog ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓b
    Cat ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓b
    Hyena ✓ ✓ ✓
    Pig ✓ ✓ ✓
    Vervet Monkey ✓ ✓
    Donkey ✓ ✓
    Rat ✓ ✓
    Guppy (Fish) ✓ ✓
    Octopus ✓ ✓
    Chickadeec ✓
    aBased on Morris, Gale, & Duffy (2002).
    bCompetence/learning is a mixture of openness and conscientiousness.
    cBased on Dingemanse, Both, Drent, Van Oers, & Van Noordwijk (2002).
    Expanded and adapted from Gosling & John, 1999.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories452
    but it does not fit into any of the Big Five categories. These ratings of animal person-
    ality were made by one of two behavioral observation techniques: either by animal
    trainers who had extensive knowledge of the individual animals or by trained observ-
    ers with no history with the animals but who were trained until they could reliably
    evaluate the dimensions in question.
    It may not surprise you that primates and other mammals tend to share the
    largest number of personality traits with humans (Weinstein et al., 2008). For
    instance, chimpanzees, our closest relative, share with humans a distinct “conscien-
    tiousness” dimension. Such a finding suggests that conscientiousness—which
    involves impulse control and therefore requires highly developed brain regions capa-
    ble of controlling impulses—is the most recently evolved personality trait. Thus, with
    the exception of chimps and horses, animals other than humans do not possess the
    required brain structures to control impulse and organize and plan their activities in
    advance. Even with chimps, the conscientiousness dimension was somewhat nar-
    rowly defined as lack of attention, goal directedness, and disorganized behavior.
    It may be surprising, however, to see wild birds, fish, and even octopus on a
    list of animals that possess humanlike personality traits. For instance, in a study of
    a European bird resembling a chickadee, when researchers placed a foreign object,
    such as a battery or a Pink Panther doll, into the cage, some birds were consistently
    curious and explored the novel object while others consistently withdrew and avoided
    the object (Zimmer, 2005; cf. Dingemanse et al., 2002). The researchers called these
    differences in birds “bold” and “shy.” These differences are much like those psy-
    chologists observe when they place an infant in a room with a stranger. Approach–
    boldness and shyness–avoidance are also dimensions of human temperament.
    Most animals, including a chickadee, have unique and stable ways of behaving—in other words, they
    have personality. © NPS Photo by Jim Peaco

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 453
    Moreover, some researchers have begun to uncover the genetic foundation of
    animal personality traits (van Oers & Mueller, 2010). For instance, using the QTL
    technique we described above, researchers have found genetic locations of exploratory
    behavior and risk-taking behavior in fish (Boehmler et al., 2007; Laine et al., 2014),
    birds (Fidler et al., 2007), and dogs (Ito et al., 2004).
    In sum, just as eyes, ears, brains, and thermoregulation are evolved solutions
    and are shared between species and genera of animals, personality traits are shared
    solutions and found in almost all animals from the invertebrates, fishes, reptiles,
    birds, and mammals (including primates). The more similar the genus and species,
    the more similar the system—and this holds for personality. The personality structure
    of primates is more similar than that of mammals in general, which in turn is more
    similar than birds or invertebrates. This evidence supports the view that personal-
    ity traits evolved long before modern humans and have their origins in a common
    ancestor millions of years ago.
    Critique of Evolutionary Theory of Personality
    Evolutionary psychology in general and evolutionary personality psychology in
    particular have stimulated a lot of controversy but also a relatively large body of
    empirical research. The field has its own scientific society (Human Behavior and
    Evolutionary Society, HBES), and its own scientific journal, Evolution and Human
    Behavior. The discipline also rests upon other scientific disciplines, such as evo-
    lutionary biology, ethology, behavioral genetics, and neuroscience, so there is a
    solid empirical foundation to the field. Similarly, a quick search on GoogleScholar
    generated more than 34,000 articles for the joint term “evolutionary psychology.”
    The same GoogleScholar search on “evolutionary personality psychology” pro-
    duced 660 articles between 1990 and 2012.
    To the question of whether evolutionary personality theory is falsifiable the
    answer is complex. Evolutionary theory in general is difficult to falsify in the strict
    sense of the word (Stamos, 1996). Many critics of evolutionary theory are quick to
    point out that the central tenets of evolutionary theory are inherently non-falsifiable
    and untestable because evolution is a past event and it would take at least thousands
    of years to observe the outcome of evolution in animals. Moreover, they argue that
    evolutionary psychology is mostly after the fact (post hoc) explanations for any
    given phenomenon—in short, evolutionary psychology produces plausible “just-so
    stories” and many different plausible stories can always be constructed to explain
    an evolutionary outcome (Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Horgan, 1995).
    Yet, other scholars have argued this is both somewhat inaccurate and also not
    completely the point. Defenders of evolutionary theory, for instance, have pointed
    out that defeating a theory by contrary facts (falsification) is not the only way that
    science proceeds (Ellis & Ketelaar, 2000; Ketelaar & Ellis, 2000). An alternative
    criterion for scientific progress is whether it generates novel predictions and expla-
    nations. By this standard, evolutionary theory does quite well.
    In terms of how well evolutionary theory of personality organizes known knowl-
    edge, we would argue the theory rates quite highly. Evolutionary theory is very broad
    and long-range in its scope and in that sense it provides a range of explanations

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories454
    seldom seen in social science. It offers explanations for the ultimate origins of not
    only all biological systems, but human thought, behavior, and personality as well.
    As a guide for practitioners however, we give the theory relatively low
    marks. Evolutionary theory says little about how we should raise our children, what
    we should teach them and how, or how to conduct therapy to treat mental disorders.
    The theory is more abstract and pure than concrete and applied.
    Evolutionary theory of personality rates moderate on internal consistency.
    Adaptation is a guiding principle and many ideas stem from this core concept. And
    most scholars agree on how to define adaptation. However, not all agree on what
    is and is not an adaptation. The most glaring example is personality. Although
    Buss, MacDonald, and Nettles all agree that personality variability is an adaptation,
    two other leading theorists, Tooby and Cosmides, do not.
    Evolutionary theory of personality scores high on the criterion of parsimony.
    The idea that you can explain the origins of human personality with a few key
    concepts of adaptation, mechanism, and natural and sexual selection is quite simple.
    Concept of Humanity
    It is difficult to say on which side of the optimism-pessimism debate evolution-
    ary theory would fall. It is mostly descriptive and, in that sense, tends to be
    somewhat neutral about describing human nature. Humans are and have been
    capable of incredibly uplifting acts of heroism and bravery and cooperation,
    inspiring works of creativity, and unbelievable and unspeakable acts of vio-
    lence and cruelty. Both extremes are part of human nature (Pinker, 2002).
    Evolutionary psychology has a complex view on the question of deter-
    minism versus free-will. A common assumption of evolutionary theory by
    critics is that it is harshly deterministic in that it explains behavior in terms
    of an evolved past and genetic influence. Indeed, evolutionary psychology
    is often criticized for condoning traditional sex-roles (e.g., women are
    attracted to high status men and men are attracted to physically attractive
    women). Buss and other evolutionary theorists make clear, however, that
    evolutionary psychology is a theory of how these traits began, not how they
    should be. In other words, it is meant to be more descriptive than prescrip-
    tive. Moreover, as we saw with Buss’s view of the origin of personality,
    biological and environmental explanations are not mutually exclusive. They
    are both necessary. Buss (1999) argues in fact that knowledge and aware-
    ness of our evolved psychological mechanisms and strategies actually give
    us more power to change them if we want to.
    On the question of causality versus teleology it is clear that evolution-
    ary theory comes down heavily on the causality side of the equation. Evolu-
    tion by natural selection above all else is a theory of origins or cause.
    Darwin’s book, after all, was titled Origin of Species.
    Evolutionary theory sides more with the unconscious influences on
    thought, behavior, and personality than on conscious ones. Most of what we

    Chapter 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality 455
    do is inherently beyond our conscious awareness, and this is particularly
    true of evolutionary origins and strategies that shape our behavior. We are
    no more aware of why we prefer sweet and fatty to bitter than we are of
    why we are attracted to one person over another. Similarly, we have no idea
    why we might be anxious and sensitive to stress while someone else is calm
    and collected under duress.
    In fact, one reason why people may resist evolutionary accounts of
    behavior, much as they resisted Freud’s ideas, is that it makes the uncon-
    scious conscious and people’s conscious ideas for why they do what they
    do, like what they like, and are driven by what they are driven by are almost
    always at odds with the evidence from science in general and from evolution-
    ary psychology and biology in particular. And yet, we don’t have to be aware
    of how eyes or hearts evolved in order to use them. We just use them.
    Similarly, we just act, think, feel, and are motivated. Awareness is not neces-
    sary and in many cases would be very disruptive.
    The concept of humanity that will be most surprising to many people
    will be evolutionary psychology’s stance on biological versus social influ-
    ence. Clearly there is a strong emphasis on biological influences, from brain
    systems, neurochemicals, and genetics. But as we have made clear in the
    chapter, evolved mechanisms can only operate with input from the environ-
    ment. Therefore, evolutionary theory is completely balanced on the question
    of biological versus environmental causes of personality.
    Evolutionary theory is also balanced on the question of the uniqueness
    of the individual compared to general commonality among all people. The
    structure of evolved mechanisms, that is, which mechanisms operate, are
    species typical and universal, but the content of the mechanisms is unique
    and shows tremendous differences between individuals.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Artificial selection (otherwise known as “breeding”) occurs when
    humans select particular desirable traits in a breeding species.
    ∙ Natural selection is the process by which evolution happens and is
    simply a more general form of artificial selection in which nature rather
    than people select the traits.
    ∙ Sexual selection operates when members of the opposite sex find certain
    traits more appealing and attractive than others and thereby produce
    offspring with those traits.
    ∙ Adaptations are evolved strategies that solve important survival and/or
    reproductive problems. Adaptations are often the products of natural or
    sexual selection and must have a genetic or inherited basis to them.
    ∙ By-products are traits that happen as a result of adaptations but are not
    part of the functional design.

    Part V Biological/Evolutionary Theories456
    ∙ Noise, also known as “random effects,” occurs when evolution produces
    random changes in design that do not affect function. Noise tends to be
    produced by chance and not selected for.
    ∙ The term evolutionary psychology can be defined as the scientific study
    of human thought and behavior from an evolutionary perspective and
    focuses on four big questions.
    ∙ The process of evolution by natural selection has produced solutions to
    two basic problems of life—survival and reproduction—and they are
    called mechanisms. More specifically, mechanisms operate according to
    principles in different adaptive domains, number in the dozens or
    hundreds (maybe even thousands), and are complex solutions to specific
    adaptive problems.
    ∙ Physical mechanisms are physiological organs and systems that evolved
    to solve problems of survival, whereas psychological mechanisms are
    internal and specific cognitive, motivational, and personality systems that
    solve specific survival and reproductive problems.
    ∙ Psychological mechanisms relevant to personality can be grouped into
    three main categories: goals/drives/motives, emotions, and personality
    traits. They are adaptive because they help solve problems of survival
    and reproduction.
    ∙ Buss’s model of personality very closely resembles the Big Five trait
    approach of McCrae and Costa but it is not identical in structure:
    Surgency/extraversion/dominance, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness,
    Emotional stability, and Openness/Intellect. Buss argues these behavioral
    dispositions have adaptive significance.
    ∙ The two main sources of the origin of personality are environment and
    genetics.
    ∙ There are still numerous misunderstandings of evolutionary theory,
    including the idea that evolution implies genetic determinism or that
    mechanisms are always optimal designs.

    457
    Learning-Cognitive
    Theories
    C h a p t e r 1 6 Skinner
    Behavioral Analysis 458
    C h a p t e r 1 7 Bandura
    Social Cognitive Theory 494
    C h a p t e r 1 8 Rotter and Mischel
    Cognitive Social Learning Theory 528
    C h a p t e r 1 9 Kelly
    Psychology of Personal Constructs 567
    P A R T S I X

    458
    C H A P T E R 1 6
    Skinner: Behavioral
    Analysis
    ⬥ Overview of Behavioral Analysis
    ⬥ Biography of B. F. Skinner
    ⬥ Precursors to Skinner’s Scientific Behaviorism
    ⬥ Scientific Behaviorism
    Philosophy of Science
    Characteristics of Science
    ⬥ Conditioning
    Classical Conditioning
    Operant Conditioning
    ⬥ The Human Organism
    Natural Selection
    Cultural Evolution
    Inner States
    Complex Behavior
    Control of Human Behavior
    ⬥ The Unhealthy Personality
    Counteracting Strategies
    Inappropriate Behaviors
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    How Conditioning Affects Personality
    How Personality Affects Conditioning
    Mutual Influence Between Personality and
    Conditioning
    ⬥ Critique of Skinner
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Skinner © Bachrach/Archive Photos/Getty
    Images

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 459
    Erik Erikson (see Chapter 8) believed that people go through a series of identity crises, or turning points, that leave them vulnerable to major changes in how
    they see themselves. One such person was Fred, a man who experienced at least
    two such crises, and each led to significant turns in his life’s course. His first iden-
    tity crisis occurred during young adulthood, when, armed with an undergraduate
    degree in English, Fred returned to his parents’ home hoping to shape his identity
    in the world of literature. His father reluctantly agreed to allow Fred 1 year to carve
    out a niche for himself as a writer. He warned his son of the necessity of finding
    a job, but he allowed Fred to convert the third-floor attic into a study.
    Every morning, Fred climbed the two flights of steps and began his job as
    a writer. But nothing happened. After only 3 months of trying to become a creative
    writer, Fred realized that the quality of his work was poor. He blamed his parents,
    their home town, and literature itself for his failure to produce any worthwhile
    writing (Elms, 1981). He wasted time with nonproductive activities, sitting in the
    family library for long periods of time, remaining “absolutely motionless in a kind
    of catatonic stupor” (Skinner, 1976a, p. 287). Nevertheless, he felt obligated to
    continue the charade of pursuing a literary career for the one full year he and his
    father had agreed on. Fred eventually lost hope that he could make any contribution
    to literature. In later years, he referred to this nonproductive time as his “Dark
    Year.” Erik Erikson would have called it a time of identity confusion—a time for
    trying to discover who he was, where he was going, and how he was going to get
    there. The young man experiencing this “Dark Year” was B. F. Skinner, who later
    became one of the most influential psychologists in the world but not until he
    experienced a second identity crisis, as we discuss in our biography of Skinner.
    Overview of Behavioral Analysis
    During the early years of the 20th century while Freud, Jung, and Adler were rely-
    ing on clinical practice and before Eysenck and Costa and McCrae were using
    psychometrics to build theories of human personality, an approach called
    behaviorism emerged from laboratory studies of animals and humans. Two of the
    early pioneers of behaviorism were E. L. Thorndike and John Watson, but the person
    most often associated with the behaviorist position is B. F. Skinner, whose
    behavioral analysis is a clear departure from the highly speculative psychody-
    namic theories discussed in Chapters 2 through 8. Skinner minimized speculation
    and focused almost entirely on observable behavior. However, he did not claim
    that observable behavior is limited to external events. Such private behaviors as
    thinking, remembering, and anticipating are all observable—by the person experi-
    encing them. Skinner’s strict adherence to observable behavior earned his approach
    the label radical behaviorism, a doctrine that avoids all hypothetical constructs,
    such as ego, traits, drives, needs, hunger, and so forth.
    In addition to being a radical behaviorist, Skinner can rightfully be regarded
    as a determinist and an environmentalist. As a determinist, he rejected the notion
    of volition or free will. Human behavior does not stem from an act of the will, but
    like any observable phenomenon, it is lawfully determined and can be studied
    scientifically.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories460
    As an environmentalist, Skinner held that psychology must not explain
    behavior on the basis of the physiological or constitutional components of the
    organism but rather on the basis of environmental stimuli. He recognized that
    genetic factors are important, but he insisted that, because they are fixed at concep-
    tion, they are of no help in the control of behavior. The history of the individual,
    rather than anatomy, provides the most useful data for predicting and controlling
    behavior.
    Watson took radical behaviorism, determinism, and environmental forces
    beyond Skinner’s conception by ignoring genetic factors completely and promising
    to shape personality by controlling the environment. In a famous lecture, Watson
    (1926) made this extraordinary promise:
    Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to
    bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to
    become any type of specialist I might select—a doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-
    chief, and, yes, even into beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents,
    penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. (p. 10)
    Although few radical behaviorists currently accept this extreme position,
    Watson’s promise has led to much discussion and debate.
    Biography of B. F. Skinner
    Burrhus Frederic Skinner was born on March 20, 1904, in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania,
    the first child of William Skinner and Grace Mange Burrhus Skinner. His father
    was a lawyer and an aspiring politician while his mother stayed home to care for
    their two children. Skinner grew up in a comfortable, happy, upper-middle-class
    home where his parents practiced the values of temperance, service, honesty, and
    hard work. The Skinners were Presbyterian, but Fred (he was almost never called
    Burrhus or B. F.) began to lose his faith during high school and thereafter never
    practiced any religion.
    When Skinner was 21/2 years old, a second son, Edward, was born. Fred felt
    that Ebbie (as he was known) was loved more by both parents, yet he did not feel
    unloved. He was simply more independent and less emotionally attached to his
    mother and father. But after Ebbie died suddenly during Skinner’s first year at
    college, the parents became progressively less willing to let their older son go.
    They wanted him to become “the family boy” and indeed succeeded in keeping
    him financially obligated even after B. F. Skinner became a well-known name in
    American psychology (Skinner, 1979; Wiener, 1996).
    As a child, Skinner was inclined toward music and literature. From an early
    age, he was interested in becoming a professional writer, a goal he may have
    achieved with his publication of Walden Two when he was well into his 40s.
    At about the time Skinner finished high school, his family moved about 30 miles
    to Scranton, Pennsylvania. Almost immediately, however, Skinner entered Hamilton
    College, a liberal arts school in Clinton, New York. After taking his bachelor’s
    degree in English, Skinner set about to realize his ambition of being a creative writer.
    When he wrote to his father, informing him of his wish to spend a year at home
    working at nothing except writing, his request was met with lukewarm acceptance.

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 461
    Warning his son of the necessity of making a living, William Skinner reluctantly
    agreed to support him for 1 year on the condition that he would get a job if his writ-
    ing career was not successful. This unenthusiastic reply was followed by a more
    encouraging letter from Robert Frost, who had read some of Skinner’s writings.
    Skinner returned to his parents’ home in Scranton, built a study in the attic,
    and every morning went to work at writing. But nothing happened. His efforts
    were unproductive because he had nothing to say and no firm position on any
    current issue. This “Dark Year” exemplified a powerful identity confusion in
    Skinner’s life, but as we discuss later in this biographical sketch, this was not his
    last identity crisis.
    At the end of this unsuccessful Dark Year (actually 18 months), Skinner was
    faced with the task of looking for a new career. Psychology beckoned. After read-
    ing some of the works of Watson and Pavlov, he became determined to be a behav-
    iorist. He never wavered from that decision and threw himself wholeheartedly
    behind radical behaviorism. Elms (1981, 1994) contended that such total dedication
    to an extreme ideology is quite typical of people faced with an identity crisis.
    Although Skinner had never taken an undergraduate psychology course,
    Harvard accepted him as a graduate student in psychology. After he completed his
    PhD in 1931, Skinner received a fellowship from the National Research Council
    to continue his laboratory research at Harvard. Now confident of his identity as a
    behaviorist, he drew up a plan for himself, outlining his goals for the next 30 years.
    The plan also reminded him to adhere closely to behavioristic methodology and
    not to “surrender to the physiology of the central nervous system” (Skinner, 1979,
    p. 115). By 1960, Skinner had reached the most important phases of the plan.
    When his fellowship ended in 1933, Skinner was faced for the first time with
    the chore of hunting for a permanent job. Positions were scarce during this depression
    year and prospects looked dim. But soon his worries were alleviated. In the spring of
    1933, Harvard created the Society of Fellows, a program designed to promote creative
    thinking among young intellectually gifted men at the university. Skinner was selected
    as a Junior Fellow and spent the next 3 years doing more laboratory research.
    At the end of his 3-year term as a Junior Fellow, he was again in the position
    of looking for a job. Curiously, he knew almost nothing of traditional academic
    psychology and was not interested in learning about it. He had a PhD in psychol-
    ogy, 51/2 years of additional laboratory research, but he was ill prepared to teach
    within the mainstream of psychology, having “never even read a text in psychology
    as a whole” (Skinner, 1979, p. 179).
    In 1936, Skinner began a teaching and research position at the University of
    Minnesota, where he remained for 9 years. Soon after moving to Minneapolis and
    following a short and erratic courtship, he married Yvonne Blue. The Skinners had
    two daughters—Julie, born in 1938, and Deborah (Debbie), born in 1944. During
    his Minnesota years, Skinner published his first book, The Behavior of Organisms
    (1938), but beyond that, he was involved with two of his most interesting ventures—
    the pigeon-guided missile and the baby-tender built for his second daughter,
    Debbie. Both projects brought frustration and disappointment, emotions that may
    have led to a second identity crisis.
    Skinner’s Project Pigeon was a clever attempt to condition pigeons to make
    appropriate pecks on keys that would maneuver an explosive missile into an enemy

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories462
    target. Almost 2 years before the United States entered the war, Skinner purchased
    a flock of pigeons for the purpose of training them to guide missiles. To work
    full-time on Project Pigeon, Skinner obtained a grant from the University of
    Minnesota and financial aid from General Mills, the food conglomeration housed
    in Minneapolis. Unfortunately, he still lacked government support.
    In an effort to secure the needed funds, he prepared a film of trained pigeons
    pecking at the controls of a missile and guiding it toward a moving target. After
    viewing the film, government officials rekindled their interest and awarded General
    Mills a substantial grant to develop the project. Nevertheless, frustrations lay
    ahead. In 1944, Skinner dramatically demonstrated to government officials the
    feasibility of the project by producing a live pigeon that unerringly tracked a mov-
    ing target. Despite this spectacular demonstration, some observers laughed and
    most remained skeptical. Finally, after 4 years of work, more than 2 of which were
    full time, Skinner was notified that financial help could no longer be continued,
    and the project came to a halt.
    Shortly after Skinner abandoned Project Pigeon and immediately before the
    birth of his second daughter, Debbie, he became involved in another venture—the
    baby-tender. The baby-tender was essentially an enclosed crib with a large window
    and a continual supply of fresh warm air. It provided a physically and psycho-
    logically safe and healthy environment for Debbie, one that also freed the parents
    from unnecessary tedious labor. The Skinners frequently removed Debbie from her
    crib for play, but for most of the day, she was alone in her baby-tender. After
    Ladies’ Home Journal published an article on the baby-tender, Skinner was both
    condemned and praised for his invention. Interest from other parents persuaded
    him to market the device. However, difficulties in securing a patent and his asso-
    ciation with an incompetent, unscrupulous business partner led to his abandonment
    of the commercial venture. When Debbie outgrew the baby-tender at age 21/2 years,
    Skinner unceremoniously fashioned it into a pigeon cage.
    At this point in his life, Skinner was 40 years old, still dependent on his
    father for financial help, struggling unsuccessfully to write a book on verbal behav-
    ior, and not completely detached from his Dark Year nearly 20 years earlier. Alan
    Elms (1981, 1994) believed that the frustrations Skinner experienced over Project
    Pigeon and the baby-tender led to a second identity crisis, this one at midlife.
    Even as Skinner was becoming a successful and well-known behaviorist, he
    was slow to establish financial independence and in childlike fashion allowed his
    parents to pay for automobiles, vacations, his children’s education in private
    schools, and a house for his family (Bjork, 1993; Wiener, 1996).
    One significant experience occurred while Skinner was still at the University
    of Minnesota. His father offered to pay him the amount of his summer school
    salary if he would forego teaching during the summer months and bring his wife
    and daughter to Scranton. In his autobiography, Skinner (1979, p. 245) questioned
    his father’s motives, saying that the father merely “wanted to see more of his
    adored granddaughter.” Nevertheless, Skinner accepted his father’s offer, went to
    Scranton, set up a table in the basement (as far as possible from the attic that was
    home base during his Dark Year), and began writing. Once again, Scranton proved
    to be a sterile environment, and the book he was writing remained unfinished until
    many years later (Skinner, 1957).

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 463
    In 1945, Skinner left Minnesota to become chair of the psychology depart-
    ment at Indiana University, a move that added more frustrations. His wife had
    ambivalent feelings about leaving friends, his administrative duties proved irk-
    some, and he still felt out of the mainstream of scientific psychology. However,
    his personal crisis was soon to end, and his professional career would take
    another turn.
    In the summer of 1945, while on vacation, Skinner wrote Walden Two, a
    utopian novel that portrayed a society in which problems were solved through
    behavioral engineering. Although not published until 1948, the book provided its
    author with immediate therapy in the form of an emotional catharsis. At last Skinner
    had done what he failed to accomplish during his Dark Year nearly 20 years earlier.
    Skinner (1967) admitted that the book’s two main characters, Frazier and Burris,
    represented his attempt to reconcile two separate aspects of his own personality.
    Walden Two was also a benchmark in Skinner’s professional career. No longer
    would he be confined to the laboratory study of rats and pigeons, but thereafter he
    would be involved with the application of behavioral analysis to the technology of
    shaping human behavior. His concern with the human condition was elaborated in
    Science and Human Behavior (1953) and reached philosophical expression in
    Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971).
    In 1948, Skinner returned to Harvard, where he taught mostly in the College of
    Education and continued with some small experiments with pigeons. In 1964, at age
    60, he retired from teaching but retained faculty status. For the next
    10 years, he took two 5-year federal career grants that allowed him to continue to write
    and to conduct research. He retired as professor of psychology in 1974 but continued
    as professor emeritus, with few changes in his working conditions. After he retired
    from teaching in 1964, Skinner wrote several important books on human behavior that
    helped him attain the status of America’s best-known living psychologist. In addition
    to Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), he published About Behaviorism (1974),
    Reflections on Behaviorism and Society (1978), and Upon Further Reflection (1987a).
    During this period, he also wrote a three-volume autobiography, Particulars of My Life
    (1976a), The Shaping of a Behaviorist (1979), and A Matter of Consequences (1983).
    On August 18, 1990, Skinner died of leukemia. One week before his death,
    he delivered an emotional address to the American Psychological Association
    (APA) convention in which he continued his advocacy of radical behaviorism. At
    this convention, he received an unprecedented Citation for Outstanding Lifetime
    Contribution to Psychology, the only person to receive such an award in the history
    of APA. During his career, Skinner received other honors and awards, including
    serving as William James Lecturer at Harvard, being granted the 1958 APA Dis-
    tinguished Scientific Award, and winning the President’s Medal of Science.
    Precursors to Skinner’s
    Scientific Behaviorism
    For centuries, observers of human behavior have known that people generally do
    those things that have pleasurable consequences and avoid doing those things that
    have punitive consequences. However, the first psychologist to systematically

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories464
    study the consequences of behavior was Edward L. Thorndike, who worked orig-
    inally with animals (Thorndike, 1898, 1913) and then later with humans (Thorndike,
    1931). Thorndike observed that learning takes place mostly because of the effects
    that follow a response, and he called this observation the law of effect. As origi-
    nally conceived by Thorndike, the law of effect had two parts. The first stated that
    responses to stimuli that are followed immediately by a satisfier tend to be “stamped
    in”; the second held that responses to stimuli that are followed immediately by an
    annoyer tend to be “stamped out.” Thorndike later amended the law of effect by
    minimizing the importance of annoyers. Whereas rewards (satisfiers) strengthen
    the connection between a stimulus and a response, punishments (annoyers) do not
    usually weaken this connection. That is, punishing a behavior merely inhibits that
    behavior; it does not “stamp it out.” Skinner (1954) acknowledged that the law of
    effect was crucial to the control of behavior and saw his job as making sure that
    the effects do occur and that they occur under conditions optimal for learning. He
    also agreed with Thorndike that the effects of rewards are more predictable than
    the effects of punishments in shaping behavior.
    A second and more direct influence on Skinner was the work of John B.
    Watson (J. B. Watson, 1913, 1925; J. B. Watson & Rayner, 1920). Watson had
    studied both animals and humans and became convinced that the concepts of con-
    sciousness and introspection must play no role in the scientific study of human
    behavior. In Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, Watson (1913) argued that
    human behavior, like the behavior of animals and machines, can be studied objec-
    tively. He attacked not only consciousness and introspection but also the notions
    of instinct, sensation, perception, motivation, mental states, mind, and imagery.
    Each of these concepts, he insisted, is beyond the realm of scientific psychology.
    Watson further argued that the goal of psychology is the prediction and control of
    behavior and that goal could best be reached by limiting psychology to an objec-
    tive study of habits formed through stimulus-response connections.
    Scientific Behaviorism
    Like Thorndike and Watson before him, Skinner insisted that human behavior
    should be studied scientifically. His scientific behaviorism holds that behavior
    can best be studied without reference to needs, instincts, or motives. Attributing
    motivation to human behavior would be like attributing a free will to natural
    phenomena. The wind does not blow because it wants to turn windmills; rocks
    do not roll downhill because they possess a sense of gravity; and birds do not
    migrate because they like the climate better in other regions. Scientists can eas-
    ily accept the idea that the behavior of the wind, rocks, and even birds can be
    studied without reference to an internal motive, but most personality theorists
    assume that people are motivated by internal drives and that an understanding
    of the drives is essential.
    Skinner disagreed. Why postulate a hypothetical internal mental function?
    People do not eat because they are hungry. Hunger is an inner condition not
    directly observable. If psychologists wish to increase the probability that a person
    will eat, then they must first observe the variables related to eating. If deprivation

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 465
    of food increases the likelihood of eating, then they can deprive a person of food
    in order to better predict and control subsequent eating behavior. Both deprivation
    and eating are physical events that are clearly observable and therefore within the
    province of science. Scientists who say that people eat because they are hungry
    are assuming an unnecessary and unobservable mental condition between the phys-
    ical fact of deprivation and the physical fact of eating. This assumption clouds the
    issue and relegates much of psychology to that realm of philosophy known as
    cosmology, or the concern with causation. To be scientific, Skinner (1953, 1987a)
    insisted, psychology must avoid internal mental factors and confine itself to observ-
    able physical events.
    Although Skinner believed that internal states are outside the domain of sci-
    ence, he did not deny their existence. Such conditions as hunger, emotions, values,
    self-confidence, aggressive needs, religious beliefs, and spitefulness exist; but they
    are not explanations for behavior. To use them as explanations not only is fruitless
    but also limits the advancement of scientific behaviorism. Other sciences have made
    greater advances because they have long since abandoned the practice of attributing
    motives, needs, or willpower to the motion (behavior) of living organisms and inan-
    imate objects. Skinner’s scientific behaviorism follows their lead (Skinner, 1945).
    Philosophy of Science
    Scientific behaviorism allows for an interpretation of behavior but not an explana-
    tion of its causes. Interpretation permits a scientist to generalize from a simple
    learning condition to a more complex one. For example, Skinner generalized from
    animal studies to children and then to adults. Any science, including that of human
    behavior, begins with the simple and eventually evolves generalized principles that
    permit an interpretation of the more complex. Skinner (1978) used principles
    derived from laboratory studies to interpret the behavior of human beings but
    insisted that interpretation should not be confused with an explanation of why
    people behave the way they do.
    Characteristics of Science
    According to Skinner (1953), science has three main characteristics: First, science
    is cumulative; second, it is an attitude that values empirical observation; and third,
    science is a search for order and lawful relationships.
    Science, in contrast to art, philosophy, and literature, advances in a cumula-
    tive manner. The amount and nature of scientific knowledge that today’s high
    school students have of physics or chemistry is vastly more sophisticated than that
    of even the most educated Greeks 2,500 years ago. The same cannot be said for
    the humanities. The wisdom and genius of Plato, Michelangelo, and Shakespeare
    are clearly not inferior to the wisdom and genius of any modern philosopher, art-
    ist, or writer. However, cumulative knowledge is not to be confused with techno-
    logical progress. Science is unique not because of technology but rather because
    of its attitude.
    The second and most critical characteristic of science is an attitude that places
    value on empirical observation above all else. In Skinner’s (1953) words: “It is a

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories466
    disposition to deal with facts rather than with what someone has said about them”
    (p. 12). In particular, there are three components to the scientific attitude: First, it
    rejects authority—even its own authority. Just because some well-respected person,
    such as Einstein, says something, that in itself does not make the statement true. It
    must stand the test of empirical observation. Recall from Chapter 1 our discussion
    of Aristotle’s belief that bodies of different masses fall at different rates. That was
    accepted as fact for roughly 1,000 years simply because Aristotle said it. Galileo,
    however, tested that idea scientifically and discovered that it was not true. Second,
    science demands intellectual honesty, and it requires scientists to accept facts even
    when these facts are opposed to their wishes and desires. This attitude does not
    mean that scientists are inherently more honest than other people. They are not.
    Scientists have been known to fabricate data and misrepresent their findings. How-
    ever, as a discipline, science puts a high premium on intellectual honesty simply
    because the right answer ultimately will be discovered. Scientists have no choice
    but to report results that go against their hopes and hypotheses, because if they do
    not, someone else will, and the new results will show that the scientists who mis-
    represented data were wrong. “Where right and wrong are not so easily or so quickly
    established, there is no similar pressure” (Skinner, 1953, p. 13). Finally, science sus-
    pends judgment until clear trends emerge. Nothing is more damaging to a scientist’s
    reputation than to rush into print findings that are insufficiently verified and tested.
    If a scientist’s report of findings does not hold up to replication, then that scientist
    appears foolish at best and dishonest at worst. A healthy skepticism and willingness
    to suspend judgment are therefore essential to being a scientist.
    A third characteristic of science is a search for order and lawful relationships.
    All science begins with observation of single events and then attempts to infer
    general principles and laws from those events. In short, the scientific method con-
    sists of prediction, control, and description. A scientist makes observations guided
    by theoretical assumptions, develops hypotheses (makes predictions), tests these
    hypotheses through controlled experimentation, describes honestly and accurately
    the results, and finally modifies the theory to match the actual empirical results.
    This circular relationship between theory and research was discussed in Chapter 1.
    Skinner (1953) believed that prediction, control, and description are possible
    in scientific behaviorism because behavior is both determined and lawful. Human
    behavior, like that of physical and biological entities, is neither whimsical nor the
    outcome of free will. It is determined by certain identifiable variables and follows
    definite lawful principles, which potentially can be known. Behavior that appears
    to be capricious or individually determined is simply beyond scientists’ present
    capacity to predict or control. But, hypothetically, the conditions under which it
    occurs can be discovered, thus permitting both prediction and control as well as
    description. Skinner devoted much of his time to trying to discover these condi-
    tions, using a procedure he called operant conditioning.
    Conditioning
    Skinner (1953) recognized two kinds of conditioning, classical and operant. With
    classical conditioning (which Skinner called respondent conditioning), a response
    is drawn out of the organism by a specific, identifiable stimulus. With operant

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 467
    conditioning (also called Skinnerian conditioning), a behavior is made more likely
    to recur when it is immediately reinforced.
    One distinction between classical and operant conditioning is that, in classi-
    cal conditioning, behavior is elicited from the organism, whereas in operant con-
    ditioning, behavior is emitted. An elicited response is drawn from the organism,
    whereas an emitted response is one that simply appears. Because responses do not
    exist inside the organism and thus cannot be drawn out, Skinner preferred the term
    “emitted.” Emitted responses do not previously exist inside the organism; they
    simply appear because of the organism’s individual history of reinforcement or the
    species’ evolutionary history.
    Classical Conditioning
    In classical conditioning, a neutral (conditioned) stimulus is paired with—that is,
    immediately precedes—an unconditioned stimulus a number of times until it is
    capable of bringing about a previously unconditioned response, now called the
    conditioned response. The simplest examples include reflexive behavior. Light
    shined in the eye stimulates the pupil to contract; food placed on the tongue brings
    about salivation; and pepper in the nostrils results in the sneezing reflex. With
    reflexive behavior, responses are unlearned, involuntary, and common not only to
    the species but across species as well. Classical conditioning, however, is not
    limited to simple reflexes. It can also be responsible for more complex human
    learning like phobias, fears, and anxieties.
    An early example of classical conditioning with humans was described by John
    Watson and Rosalie Rayner in 1920 and involved a young boy—Albert B., usually
    referred to as Little Albert. Albert was a normal, healthy child who, at 9 months of
    age, showed no fear of such objects as a white rat, a rabbit, a dog, a monkey with
    masks, and so forth. When Albert was 11 months old, the experimenters presented
    him with a white rat. Just as Albert was beginning to touch the rat, one of the
    experimenters struck a bar behind Albert’s head. The little boy immediately showed
    signs of fear, although he did not cry. Then, just as he touched the rat with his other
    hand, an experimenter struck the bar again. Once more Albert showed fear and began
    to whimper. A week later, Watson and Rayner repeated the procedure several times
    and finally presented the white rat without the loud, sudden sound. By this time,
    Albert had learned to fear the rat by itself and quickly began to crawl away from it.
    A few days later, the experimenters presented Albert with some blocks. He showed
    no fear. Next, they showed him the rat by itself. Albert showed fear. Then, they
    offered him the blocks again. No fear. They followed this part of the experiment by
    showing Albert a rabbit by itself. Albert immediately began to cry and crawl away
    from the rabbit. Watson and Rayner then showed Albert the blocks again, then a
    dog, then blocks again, then a fur coat, and then a package of wool. For all objects
    except the blocks, Albert showed some fear. Finally, Watson brought in a Santa
    Claus mask, to which Albert showed signs of fear. This experiment, which was never
    completed because Albert’s mother intervened, demonstrated at least four points.
    First, infants have few, if any, innate fears of animals; second, they can learn to fear
    an animal if it is presented in association with an aversive stimulus; third, infants
    can discriminate between a furry white rat and a hard wooden block, so that fear of

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories468
    a rat does not generalize to fear of a block; and fourth, fear of a furry white rat can
    generalize to other animals as well as to other white hairy or furry objects.
    The key to this classical conditioning experiment was the pairing of a con-
    ditioned stimulus (the white rat) with an unconditioned stimulus (fear of a loud
    sudden sound) until the presence of the conditioned stimulus (the white rat) was
    sufficient to elicit the unconditioned stimulus (fear).
    Operant Conditioning
    Although classical conditioning is responsible for some human learning, Skinner
    believed that most human behaviors are learned through operant conditioning. The
    key to operant conditioning is the immediate reinforcement of a response. The
    organism first does something and then is reinforced by the environment. Reinforce-
    ment, in turn, increases the probability that the same behavior will occur again. This
    conditioning is called operant conditioning because the organism operates on the
    environment to produce a specific effect. Operant conditioning changes the fre-
    quency of a response or the probability that a response will occur. The reinforcement
    does not cause the behavior, but it increases the likelihood that it will be repeated.
    Shaping
    With most cases of operant conditioning, the desired behavior is too complex to be
    emitted without first being shaped by the environment. Shaping is a procedure in
    which the experimenter or the environment first rewards gross approximations of the
    behavior, then closer approximations, and finally the desired behavior itself. Through
    this process of reinforcing successive approximations, the experimenter or the envi-
    ronment gradually shapes the final complex set of behaviors (Skinner, 1953).
    Shaping can be illustrated by the example of training a severely mentally
    challenged boy to dress himself. The child’s ultimate behavior is putting on all his
    own clothes. If the parent withheld reinforcement until this target behavior occurred,
    the child would never successfully complete the chore. To train the boy, the parent
    must break down the complex behavior of dressing into simple segments. First, the
    parent gives the child a reward, say, candy, whenever the boy approximates the
    behavior of positioning his left hand near the inside of the left sleeve of his shirt.
    Once that behavior is sufficiently reinforced, the parent withholds reward until the
    child places his hand into the proper sleeve. Then the parent rewards the child only
    for putting his left arm entirely through the sleeve. Following this, the same
    procedures are used with the right sleeve, the buttons, trousers, socks, and shoes.
    After the child learns to dress himself completely, reinforcement need not follow
    every successful trial. By this time, in fact, the ability to put on all his clothes will
    probably become a reward in itself. Quite apparently, the child can reach the final
    target behavior only if the parent breaks up the complex behavior into its compo-
    nent parts and then reinforces successive approximations to each response.
    In this example, as in all instances of operant conditioning, three conditions are
    present: the antecedent (A), the behavior (B), and the consequence (C). The anteced-
    ent (A) refers to the environment or setting in which the behavior takes place. In our
    example, this environment would be the home or any other place the child might be
    putting on clothes. The second essential condition in this example is the boy’s behavior

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 469
    (B) of dressing himself.
    This response must be
    within the boy’s reper-
    toire and must not be
    interfered with by com-
    peting or antagonistic
    behaviors, such as dis-
    tractions from siblings or
    television. The conse-
    quence is the reward (C),
    that is, the candy.
    If reinforcement
    in creases the probability
    that a given response
    will recur, then how can
    behavior be shaped from
    the relatively undifferen-
    tiated into the highly complex? In other words, why doesn’t the organism simply
    repeat the old reinforced response? Why does it emit new responses that have never
    been reinforced but that gradually move it toward the target behavior? The answer
    is that behavior is not discrete but continuous; that is, the organism usually moves
    slightly beyond the previously reinforced response. If behavior were discrete, shap-
    ing could not occur because the organism would become locked into simply emit-
    ting previously reinforced responses. Because behavior is continuous, the organism
    moves slightly beyond the previously reinforced response, and this slightly excep-
    tional value can then be used as the new minimum standard for reinforcement.
    (The organism may also move slightly backward or slightly sideways, but only
    movements toward the desired target are reinforced.) Skinner (1953) compared
    shaping behavior to a sculptor molding a statue from a large lump of clay. In both
    cases, the final product seems to be different from the original form, but the history
    of the transformation reveals continuous behavior and not a set of discrete steps.
    Operant behavior always takes place in some environment, and the environment
    has a selective role in shaping and maintaining behavior. Each of us has a history of
    being reinforced by reacting to some elements in our environment but not to others.
    This history of differential reinforcement results in operant discrimination. Skinner
    claimed that discrimination is not an ability that we possess but a consequence of our
    reinforcement history. We do not come to the dinner table because we discern that
    the food is ready; we come because our previous experiences of reacting in a similar
    way have been mostly reinforced. This distinction may seem to be splitting hairs, but
    Skinner felt that it had important theoretical and practical implications. Advocates of
    the first explanation see discrimination as a cognitive function, existing within the
    person, whereas Skinner accounted for this behavior by environmental differences and
    by the individual’s history of reinforcement. The first explanation is beyond the scope
    of empirical observation; the second can be scientifically studied.
    A response to a similar environment in the absence of previous reinforce-
    ment is called stimulus generalization. An example of stimulus generalization is
    provided by a college student’s purchase of a ticket to a rock concert performed
    Even complex behavior, such as learning to work a computer, is
    acquired through shaping and successive approximation.
    © BloomImage RF/Getty Images

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories470
    by a group she has neither seen nor heard but one she has been told is similar to
    her favorite rock group. Technically, people do not generalize from one situation
    to another, but rather they react to a new situation in the same manner that they
    reacted to an earlier one because the two situations possess some identical ele-
    ments; that is, buying a ticket to one rock concert contains elements identical to
    buying a ticket to a different rock concert. Skinner (1953) put it this way: “The
    reinforcement of a response increases the probability of all responses containing
    the same elements” (p. 94).
    Reinforcement
    According to Skinner (1987a), reinforcement has two effects: It strengthens the
    behavior and it rewards the person. Reinforcement and reward, therefore, are not
    synonymous. Not every behavior that is reinforced is rewarding or pleasing to the
    person. For example, people are reinforced for working, but many find their jobs
    boring, uninteresting, and unrewarding. Reinforcers exist in the environment and
    are not something felt by the person. Food is not reinforcing because it tastes good;
    rather, it tastes good because it is reinforcing (Skinner, 1971).
    Any behavior that increases the probability that the species or the individual
    will survive tends to be strengthened. Food, sex, and parental care are necessary
    for the survival of the species, and any behavior that produces these conditions is
    reinforced. Injury, disease, and extremes in climate are detrimental to survival, and
    any behavior that tends to reduce or avoid these conditions is likewise reinforced.
    Reinforcement, therefore, can be divided into that which produces a beneficial
    environmental condition and that which reduces or avoids a detrimental one. The
    first is called positive reinforcement; the second is negative reinforcement.
    Positive Reinforcement Any stimulus that, when added to a situation, increases
    the probability that a given behavior will occur is termed a positive reinforcer
    (Skinner, 1953). Food, water, sex, money, social approval, and physical comfort
    usually are examples of positive reinforcers. When made contingent on behavior,
    each has the capacity to increase the frequency of a response. For example, if clear
    water appears whenever a person turns on the kitchen faucet, then that behavior is
    strengthened because a beneficial environmental stimulus has been added. Much
    human and animal behavior is acquired through positive reinforcement. Under
    controlled conditions, Skinner was able to train animals to perform a multitude of
    relatively complex tasks.
    With humans, however, reinforcement is often haphazard, and therefore
    learning is inefficient. Another problem with conditioning humans is determining
    what consequences are reinforcing and which ones are not. Depending on personal
    history, spankings and scoldings might be reinforcing, and kisses and compliments
    might be punishing.
    Negative Reinforcement The removal of an aversive stimulus from a situation
    also increases the probability that the preceding behavior will occur. This removal
    results in negative reinforcement (Skinner, 1953). The reduction or avoidance of
    loud noises, shocks, and hunger pangs would be negatively reinforcing because
    they strengthen the behavior immediately preceding them. Negative reinforcement

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 471
    differs from positive reinforcement in that it requires the removal of an aversive
    condition, whereas positive reinforcement involves the presentation of a beneficial
    stimulus. The effect of negative reinforcement, however, is identical to that of
    positive reinforcement—both strengthen behavior. Some people eat because they
    like a particular food; others eat to diminish hunger pangs. For the first group of
    people, food is a positive reinforcer; for the second group, removal of hunger is a
    negative reinforcer. In both instances, the behavior of eating is strengthened
    because the consequences are rewarding.
    There is an almost unlimited number of aversive stimuli, the removal of
    which may be negatively reinforcing. Anxiety, for example, is usually an aversive
    stimulus, and any behavior that reduces it is reinforcing. These behaviors might
    include exercising, repressing unpleasant memories, making excuses for inappro-
    priate behavior, smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, and a multitude of other
    behaviors designed intentionally or unintentionally to reduce the unpleasantness of
    anxiety.
    Punishment
    Negative reinforcement should not be confused with punishment. Negative reinforc-
    ers remove, reduce, or avoid aversive stimuli, whereas punishment is the presentation
    of an aversive stimulus, such as an electric shock, or the removal of a positive one,
    such as disconnecting an adolescent’s telephone. A negative reinforcer strengthens
    a response; punishment does not. Although punishment does not strengthen a
    response, neither does it inevitably weaken it. Skinner (1953) agreed with Thorndike
    that the effects of punishment are less predictable than those of reward.
    Effects of Punishment The control of human and animal behavior is better
    served by positive and negative reinforcement than by punishment. The effects of
    punishment are not opposite those of reinforcement. When the contingencies of
    reinforcement are strictly controlled, behavior can be precisely shaped and accu-
    rately predicted. With punishment, however, no such accuracy is possible. The
    reason for this discrepancy is simple. Punishment ordinarily is imposed to prevent
    people from acting in a particular way. When it is successful, people will stop
    behaving in that manner, but they still must do something. What they do cannot
    be accurately predicted because punishment does not tell them what they should
    do; it merely suppresses the tendency to behave in the undesirable fashion. Con-
    sequently, one effect of punishment is to suppress behavior. For example, if a boy
    teases his younger sister, his parents can make him stop by spanking him, but
    unfortunately this punishment will not improve his disposition toward his sister. It
    merely suppresses teasing temporarily or while in the presence of his parents.
    Another effect of punishment is the conditioning of a negative feeling by asso-
    ciating a strong aversive stimulus with the behavior being punished. In the above
    illustration, if the pain of the spanking is strong enough, it will instigate a response
    (crying, withdrawal, attack) that is incompatible with the behavior of teasing a
    younger sibling. In the future, when the boy thinks about mistreating his younger
    sister, that thought may elicit a classical conditioned response, such as fear, anxiety,
    guilt, or shame. This negative emotion then serves to prevent the undesirable behav-
    ior from recurring. Lamentably, it offers no positive instruction to the child.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories472
    A third outcome of punishment is the spread of its effects. Any stimulus
    associated with the punishment may be suppressed or avoided. In our example, the
    boy may simply learn to avoid his younger sister, stay away from his parents, or
    develop negative feelings toward the paddle or the place where the paddling
    occurred. As a result, the boy’s behavior toward his family becomes maladaptive.
    Yet this inappropriate behavior serves the purpose of preventing future punishment.
    Skinner recognized the classical Freudian defense mechanisms as effective means
    of avoiding pain and its attendant anxiety. The punished person may fantasize,
    project feelings onto others, rationalize aggressive behaviors, or displace them
    toward other people or animals.
    Punishment and Reinforcement Compared Punishment has several characteris-
    tics in common with reinforcement. Just as there are two kinds of reinforcements
    (positive and negative), there are two types of punishment. The first requires the
    presentation of an aversive stimulus; the second involves the removal of a positive
    reinforcer. An example of the former is pain encountered from falling as the result
    of walking too fast on an icy sidewalk. An example of the latter is a heavy fine
    levied against a motorist for driving too fast. This first example (falling) results
    from a natural condition; the second (being fined) follows from human interven-
    tion. These two types of punishment reveal a second characteristic common to
    punishment and reinforcement: Both can derive either from natural consequences
    or from human imposition. Finally, both punishment and reinforcement are means
    of controlling behavior, whether the control is by design or by accident. Skinner
    obviously favored planned control, and his book Walden Two (Skinner, 1948)
    presented many of his ideas on the control of human behavior.
    Conditioned and Generalized Reinforcers
    Food is a reinforcement for humans and animals because it removes a condition
    of deprivation. But how can money, which cannot directly remove a condition of
    deprivation, be reinforcing? The answer is that money is a conditioned reinforcer.
    Conditioned reinforcers (sometimes called secondary reinforcers) are those envi-
    ronmental stimuli that are not by nature satisfying but become so because they are
    associated with such unlearned or primary reinforcers as food, water, sex, or
    physical comfort. Money is a conditioned reinforcer because it can be exchanged
    for a great variety of primary reinforcers. In addition, it is a generalized reinforcer
    because it is associated with more than one primary reinforcer.
    Skinner (1953) recognized five important generalized reinforcers that sustain
    much of human behavior: attention, approval, affection, submission of others, and
    tokens (money). Each can be used as reinforcers in a variety of situations. Atten-
    tion, for example, is a conditioned generalized reinforcer because it is associated
    with such primary reinforcers as food and physical contact. When children are
    being fed or held, they are also receiving attention. After food and attention are
    paired a number of times, attention itself becomes reinforcing through the process
    of respondent (classical) conditioning. Children, and adults too, will work for atten-
    tion with no expectation of receiving food or physical contact. In much the same
    way, approval, affection, submission of others, and money acquire generalized

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 473
    reinforcement value. Behavior can be shaped and responses learned with general-
    ized conditioned reinforcers supplying the sole reinforcement.
    Schedules of Reinforcement
    Any behavior followed immediately by the presentation of a positive reinforcer or
    the removal of an aversive stimulus tends thereafter to occur more frequently. The
    frequency of that behavior, however, is subject to the conditions under which train-
    ing occurred, more specifically, to the various schedules of reinforcement (Ferster &
    Skinner, 1957).
    Reinforcement can follow behavior on either a continuous schedule or an
    intermittent one. With a continuous schedule, the organism is reinforced for every
    response. This type of schedule increases the frequency of a response but is an
    inefficient use of the reinforcer. Skinner preferred intermittent schedules not only
    because they make more efficient use of the reinforcer but because they produce
    responses that are more resistant to extinction. Interestingly, Skinner first began
    using intermittent schedules because he was running low on food pellets (Wiener,
    1996). Intermittent schedules are based either on the behavior of the organism or
    on elapsed time; they either can be set at a fixed rate or can vary according to a
    randomized program. Ferster and Skinner (1957) recognized a large number of
    reinforcement schedules, but the four basic intermittent schedules are fixed-ratio,
    variable-ratio, fixed-interval, and variable-interval.
    Fixed-Ratio With a fixed-ratio schedule, the organism is reinforced intermittently
    according to the number of responses it makes. Ratio refers to the ratio of responses
    to reinforcers. An experimenter may decide to reward a pigeon with a grain pellet
    for every fifth peck it makes at a disc. The pigeon is then conditioned at a fixed-
    ratio schedule of 5 to 1, that is, FR 5.
    Nearly all reinforcement schedules begin on a continuous basis, but soon the
    experimenter can move from continuous reward to an intermittent reinforcement. In
    the same way, extremely high fixed-ratio schedules, like 200 to 1, must begin at a
    low rate of responses and gradually build to a higher one. A pigeon can be conditioned
    to work long and rapidly in exchange for one food pellet provided it has been previ-
    ously reinforced at lower rates.
    Technically, almost no pay scale for humans follows a fixed-ratio or any other
    schedule because workers ordinarily do not begin with a continuous schedule of
    immediate reinforcement. An approximation of a fixed-ratio schedule would be the
    pay to bricklayers who receive a fixed amount of money for each brick they lay.
    Variable-Ratio With a fixed-ratio schedule, the organism is reinforced after every
    nth response. With the variable-ratio schedule, it is reinforced after the nth response
    on the average. Again, training must start with continuous reinforcement, proceed
    to a low response number, and then increase to a higher rate of response. A pigeon
    rewarded every third response on the average can build to a VR 6 schedule, then
    VR 10, and so on; but the mean number of responses must be increased gradually
    to prevent extinction. After a high mean is reached, say, VR 500, responses become
    extremely resistant to extinction. (More on rate of extinction in the next section.)

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories474
    For humans, playing slot machines is an example of a variable-ratio schedule.
    The machine is set to pay off at a certain rate, but the ratio must be flexible, that
    is, variable, to prevent players from predicting payoffs.
    Fixed-Interval With the fixed-interval schedule, the organism is reinforced for
    the first response following a designated period of time. For example, FI 5 indicates
    that the organism is rewarded for its first response after every 5-minute interval.
    Employees working for salary or wages approximate a fixed-interval schedule.
    They are paid every week, every 2 weeks, or every month; but this pay schedule
    is not strictly a fixed-interval schedule. Although pigeons typically show a spurt
    in work toward the end of the time period, most human workers distribute their
    efforts fairly evenly rather than loafing most of the time and then showing an end-
    of-the-period spurt. This situation is due in part to such factors as watchful super-
    visors, threats of dismissal, promises of promotion, or self-generated reinforcers.
    Variable-Interval A variable-interval schedule is one in which the organism is
    reinforced after the lapse of random or varied periods of time. For example, VI 5
    means that the organism is reinforced following random-length intervals that aver-
    age 5 minutes. Such schedules result in more responses per interval than do fixed-
    interval schedules. For humans, reinforcement results more often from one’s effort
    rather than the passage of time. For this reason, ratio schedules are more common
    than interval schedules, and the variable-interval schedule is probably the least
    common of all.
    Because slot machines pay off on a variable-ratio schedule, some people become compulsive
    gamblers. © Noel Hendrickson/Blend Images LLC

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 475
    Extinction
    Once learned, responses can be lost for at least four reasons. First, they can simply
    be forgotten during the passage of time. Second, and more likely, they can be lost
    due to the interference of preceding or subsequent learning. Third, they can disap-
    pear due to punishment. A fourth cause of lost learning is extinction, defined as
    the tendency of a previously acquired response to become progressively weakened
    upon nonreinforcement.
    Operant extinction takes place when an experimenter systematically with-
    holds reinforcement of a previously learned response until the probability of that
    response diminishes to zero. Rate of operant extinction depends largely on the
    schedule of reinforcement under which learning occurred.
    Compared with responses acquired on a continuous schedule, behavior
    trained on an intermittent schedule is much more resistant to extinction. Skinner
    (1953) observed as many as 10,000 nonreinforced responses with intermittent
    schedules. Such behavior appears to be self-perpetuating and is practically indis-
    tinguishable from functionally autonomous behavior, a concept suggested by
    Gordon Allport and discussed in Chapter 12. In general, the higher the rate of
    responses per reinforcement, the slower the rate of extinction; the fewer responses
    an organism must make or the shorter the time between reinforcers, the more
    quickly extinction will occur. This finding suggests that praise and other reinforc-
    ers should be used sparingly in training children.
    Extinction is seldom systematically applied to human behavior outside ther-
    apy or behavior modification. Most of us live in relatively unpredictable environ-
    ments and almost never experience the methodical withholding of reinforcement.
    Thus, many of our behaviors persist over a long period of time because they are
    being intermittently reinforced, even though the nature of that reinforcement may
    be obscure to us.
    The Human Organism
    Our discussion of Skinnerian theory to this point has dealt primarily with the
    technology of behavior, a technology based exclusively on the study of animals.
    But do the principles of behavior gleaned from rats and pigeons apply to the human
    organism? Skinner’s (1974, 1987a) view was that an understanding of the behavior
    of laboratory animals can generalize to human behavior, just as physics can be
    used to interpret what is observed in outer space and just as an understanding of
    basic genetics can help in interpreting complex evolutionary concepts.
    Skinner (1953, 1990a) agreed with John Watson (1913) that psychology must
    be confined to a scientific study of observable phenomena, namely behavior. Sci-
    ence must begin with the simple and move to the more complex. This sequence
    might proceed from the behavior of animals to that of psychotics, to that of men-
    tally challenged children, then to that of other children, and finally to the complex
    behavior of adults. Skinner (1974, 1987a), therefore, made no apology for begin-
    ning with the study of animals.
    According to Skinner (1987a), human behavior (and human personality) is
    shaped by three forces: (1) natural selection, (2) cultural practices, and (3) the
    individual’s history of reinforcement, which we have just discussed. Ultimately,

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories476
    however, “it is all a matter of natural selection, since operant conditioning is an
    evolved process, of which cultural practices are special applications” (p. 55).
    Natural Selection
    Human personality is the product of a long evolutionary history. As individuals,
    our behavior is determined by genetic composition and especially by our personal
    histories of reinforcement. As a species, however, we are shaped by the contingen-
    cies of survival. Natural selection plays an important part in human personality
    (Skinner, 1974, 1987a, 1990a).
    Individual behavior that is reinforcing tends to be repeated; that which is not
    tends to drop out. Similarly, those behaviors that, throughout history, were benefi-
    cial to the species tended to survive, whereas those that were only idiosyncratically
    reinforcing tended to drop out. For example, natural selection has favored those
    individuals whose pupils of their eyes dilated and contracted with changes in light-
    ing. Their superior ability to see during both daylight and nighttime enabled them
    to avoid life-threatening dangers and to survive to the age of reproduction. Simi-
    larly, infants whose heads turned in the direction of a gentle stroke on the cheek
    were able to suckle, thereby increasing their chances of survival and the likelihood
    that this rooting characteristic would be passed on to their offspring. These are but
    two examples of several reflexes that characterize the human infant today. Some,
    such as the pupillary reflex, continue to have survival value, whereas others, like
    the rooting reflex, are of diminishing benefit.
    The contingencies of reinforcement and the contingencies of survival inter-
    act, and some behaviors that are individually reinforcing also contribute to the
    survival of the species. For example, sexual behavior is generally reinforcing to
    an individual, but it also has natural selection value because those individuals who
    were most strongly aroused by sexual stimulation were also the ones most likely
    to produce offspring capable of similar patterns of behavior.
    Not every remnant of natural selection continues to have survival value. In
    humans’ early history, overeating was adaptive because it allowed people to sur-
    vive during those times when food was less plentiful. Now, in societies where food
    is continuously available, obesity has become a health problem, and overeating has
    lost its survival value.
    Although natural selection helped shape some human behavior, it is probably
    responsible for only a small number of people’s actions. Skinner (1989a) claimed
    that the contingencies of reinforcement, especially those that have shaped human
    culture, account for most of human behavior.
    We can trace a small part of human behavior . . . to natural selection and the
    evolution of the species, but the greater part of human behavior must be traced
    to contingencies of reinforcement, especially to the very complex social
    contingencies we call cultures. Only when we take those histories into account
    can we explain why people behave as they do. (p. 18)
    Cultural Evolution
    In his later years, Skinner (1987a, 1989a) elaborated more fully on the importance
    of culture in shaping human personality. Selection is responsible for those cultural

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 477
    practices that have survived, just as selection plays a key role in humans’ evolu-
    tionary history and also with the contingencies of reinforcement. “People do not
    observe particular practices in order that the group will be more likely to survive;
    they observe them because groups that induced their members to do so survived
    and transmitted them” (Skinner, 1987a, p. 57). In other words, humans do not make
    a cooperative decision to do what is best for the society, but those societies whose
    members behaved cooperatively tended to survive.
    Cultural practices such as toolmaking and verbal behavior began when
    an individual was reinforced for using a tool or uttering a distinctive sound. Even-
    tually, a cultural practice evolved that was reinforcing to the group, although not
    necessarily to the individual. Both toolmaking and verbal behavior have survival
    value for a group, but few people now make tools and even fewer invent new
    languages.
    The remnants of culture, like those of natural selection, are not all adaptive.
    For example, the division of labor that evolved from the Industrial Revolution
    has helped society produce more goods, but it has led to work that is no longer
    directly reinforcing. Another example is warfare, which in the preindustrialized
    world benefited certain societies, but which now has evolved as a threat to human
    existence.
    Inner States
    Although he rejected explanations of behavior founded on nonobservable hypo-
    thetical constructs, Skinner (1989b) did not deny the existence of internal states,
    such as feelings of love, anxiety, or fear. Internal states can be studied just as any
    other behavior, but their observation is, of course, limited. In a personal commu-
    nication of June 13, 1983, Skinner wrote, “I believe it is possible to talk about
    private events and, in particular, to establish the limits with which we do so accu-
    rately. I think this brings so-called ‘nonobservables’ within reach.” What, then, is
    the role of such inner states as self-awareness, drives, emotions, and purpose?
    Self-Awareness
    Skinner (1974) believed that humans not only have consciousness but are also
    aware of their consciousness; they are not only aware of their environment but are
    also aware of themselves as part of their environment; they not only observe exter-
    nal stimuli but are also aware of themselves observing that stimuli.
    Behavior is a function of the environment, and part of that environment is
    within one’s skin. This portion of the universe is peculiarly one’s own and is
    therefore private. Each person is subjectively aware of his or her own thoughts,
    feelings, recollections, and intentions. Self-awareness and private events can be
    illustrated by the following example. A worker reports to a friend, “I was so frus-
    trated today that I almost quit my job.” What can be made of such a statement?
    First, the report itself is verbal behavior and, as such, can be studied in the same
    way as other behaviors. Second, the statement that she was on the verge of quitting
    her job refers to a nonbehavior. Responses never emitted are not responses and,
    of course, have no meaning to the scientific analysis of behavior. Third, a private

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories478
    event transpired “within the skin” of the worker. This private event, along with
    her verbal report to the friend, can be scientifically analyzed. At the time that the
    worker felt like quitting, she might have observed the following covert behavior:
    “I am observing within myself increasing degrees of frustration, which are raising
    the probability that I will inform my boss that I am quitting.” This statement is
    more accurate than saying “I almost quit my job,” and it refers to behavior that,
    although private, is within the boundaries of scientific analysis.
    Drives
    From the viewpoint of radical behaviorism, drives are not causes of behavior, but
    merely explanatory fictions. To Skinner (1953), drives simply refer to the effects
    of deprivation and satiation and to the corresponding probability that the organism
    will respond. To deprive a person of food increases the likelihood of eating; to
    satiate a person decreases that likelihood. However, deprivation and satiation are
    not the only correlates of eating. Other factors that increase or decrease the prob-
    ability of eating are internally observed hunger pangs, availability of food, and
    previous experiences with food reinforcers.
    If psychologists knew enough about the three essentials of behavior (anteced-
    ent, behavior, and consequences), then they would know why a person behaves,
    that is, what drives are related to specific behaviors. Only then would drives have
    a legitimate role in the scientific study of human behavior. For the present, how-
    ever, explanations based on fictionalized constructs such as drives or needs are
    merely untestable hypotheses.
    Emotions
    Skinner (1974) recognized the subjective existence of emotions, of course, but he
    insisted that behavior must not be attributed to them. He accounted for emotions
    by the contingencies of survival and the contingencies of reinforcement. Through-
    out the millennia, individuals who were most strongly disposed toward fear or
    anger were those who escaped from or triumphed over danger and thus were able
    to pass on those characteristics to their offspring. On an individual level, behav-
    iors followed by delight, joy, pleasure, and other pleasant emotions tend to be
    reinforced, thereby increasing the probability that these behaviors would recur in
    the life of that individual.
    Purpose and Intention
    Skinner (1974) also recognized the concepts of purpose and intention, but again,
    he cautioned against attributing behavior to them. Purpose and intention exist
    within the skin, but they are not subject to direct outside scrutiny. A felt, ongoing
    purpose may itself be reinforcing. For example, if you believe that your purpose
    for jogging is to feel better and live longer, then this thought per se acts as a
    reinforcing stimulus, especially while undergoing the drudgery of jogging or when
    trying to explain your motivation to a nonrunner.
    A person may “intend” to see a movie Friday evening because viewing sim-
    ilar films has been reinforcing. At the time the person intends to go to the movie,

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 479
    she feels a physical condition within the body and labels it an “intention.” What
    are called intentions or purposes, therefore, are physically felt stimuli within the
    organism and not mentalistic events responsible for behavior. “The consequences
    of operant behavior are not what the behavior is now for; they are merely similar
    to the consequences that have shaped and maintained it” (Skinner, 1987a, p. 57).
    Complex Behavior
    Human behavior can be exceedingly complex, yet Skinner believed that even the
    most abstract and complex behavior is shaped by natural selection, cultural evolu-
    tion, or the individual’s history of reinforcement. Once again, Skinner did not deny
    the existence of higher mental processes such as cognition, reason, and recall; nor
    did he ignore complex human endeavors like creativity, unconscious behavior,
    dreams, and social behavior.
    Higher Mental Processes
    Skinner (1974) admitted that human thought is the most difficult of all behaviors
    to analyze; but potentially, at least, it can be understood as long as one does not
    resort to a hypothetical fiction such as “mind.” Thinking, problem solving, and
    reminiscing are covert behaviors that take place within the skin but not inside the
    mind. As behaviors, they are amenable to the same contingencies of reinforcement
    as overt behaviors. For example, when a woman has misplaced her car keys, she
    searches for them because similar searching behavior has been previously rein-
    forced. In like manner, when she is unable to recall the name of an acquaintance,
    she searches for that name covertly because this type of behavior has earlier been
    reinforced. However, the acquaintance’s name did not exist in her mind any more
    than did the car keys. Skinner (1974) summed up this procedure, saying that “tech-
    niques of recall are not concerned with searching a storehouse of memory but with
    increasing the probability of responses” (pp. 109–110).
    Problem solving also involves covert behavior and often requires the person
    to covertly manipulate the relevant variables until the correct solution is found.
    Ultimately these variables are environmental and do not spring magically from the
    person’s mind. A chess player seems to be hopelessly trapped, surveys the board,
    and suddenly makes a move that allows his marker to escape. What brought about
    this unexpected burst of “insight”? He did not solve the problem in his mind. He
    manipulated the various markers (not by touching them but in covert fashion),
    rejected moves not accompanied by reinforcement, and finally selected the one that
    was followed by an internal reinforcer. Although the solution may have been facil-
    itated by his previous experiences of reading a book on chess, listening to expert
    advice, or playing the game, it was initiated by environmental contingencies and
    not manufactured by mental machinations.
    Creativity
    How does the radical behaviorist account for creativity? Logically, if behavior were
    nothing other than a predictable response to a stimulus, creative behavior could not
    exist because only previously reinforced behavior would be emitted. Skinner (1974)

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories480
    answered this problem by comparing creative behavior with natural selection in
    evolutionary theory. “As accidental traits, arising from mutations, are selected by
    their contribution to survival, so accidental variations in behavior are selected by
    their reinforcing consequences” (p. 114). Just as natural selection explains differen-
    tiation among the species without resorting to an omnipotent creative mind, so behav-
    iorism accounts for novel behavior without recourse to a personal creative mind.
    The concept of mutation is crucial to both natural selection and creative
    behavior. In both cases, random or accidental conditions are produced that have
    some possibility of survival. Creative writers change their environment, thus pro-
    ducing responses that have some chance of being reinforced. When their “creativ-
    ity dries up,” they may move to a different location, travel, read, talk to others,
    put words on their computer with little expectancy that they will be the finished
    product, or try out various words, sentences, and ideas covertly. To Skinner, then,
    creativity is simply the result of random or accidental behaviors (overt or covert)
    that happen to be rewarded. The fact that some people are more creative than
    others is due both to differences in genetic endowment and to experiences that
    have shaped their creative behavior.
    Unconscious Behavior
    As a radical behaviorist, Skinner could not accept the notion of a storehouse of
    unconscious ideas or emotions. He did, however, accept the idea of unconscious
    behavior. In fact, because people rarely observe the relationship between genetic
    and environmental variables and their own behavior, nearly all our behavior is
    unconsciously motivated (Skinner, 1987a). In a more limited sense, behavior is
    labeled unconscious when people no longer think about it because it has been sup-
    pressed through punishment. Behavior that has aversive consequences has a ten-
    dency to be ignored or not thought about. A child repeatedly and severely punished
    for sexual play may both suppress the sexual behavior and repress any thoughts
    or memories of such activity. Eventually, the child may deny that the sexual activ-
    ity took place. Such denial avoids the aversive aspects connected with thoughts of
    punishment and is thus a negative reinforcer. In other words, the child is rewarded
    for not thinking about certain sexual behaviors.
    An example of not thinking about aversive stimuli is a child who behaves in
    hateful ways toward her mother. In doing so, she will also exhibit some less antag-
    onistic behaviors. If the loathsome behavior is punished, it will become suppressed
    and replaced by the more positive behaviors. Eventually the child will be rewarded
    for gestures of love, which will then increase in frequency. After a time, her behav-
    ior becomes more and more positive, and it may even resemble what Freud
    (1926/1959a) called “reactive love.” The child no longer has any thoughts of hatred
    toward her mother and behaves in an exceedingly loving and subservient manner.
    Dreams
    Skinner (1953) saw dreams as covert and symbolic forms of behavior that are sub-
    ject to the same contingencies of reinforcement as other behaviors are. He agreed
    with Freud that dreams may serve a wish-fulfillment purpose. Dream behavior is
    reinforcing when repressed sexual or aggressive stimuli are allowed expression. To

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 481
    act out sexual fantasies and to actually inflict damage on an enemy are two behaviors
    likely to be associated with punishment. Even to covertly think about these behav-
    iors may have punitive effects, but in dreams these behaviors may be expressed
    symbolically and without any accompanying punishment.
    Social Behavior
    Groups do not behave; only individuals do. Individuals establish groups because
    they have been rewarded for doing so. For example, individuals form clans so that
    they might be protected against animals, natural disasters, or enemy tribes. Indi-
    viduals also form governments, establish churches, or become part of an unruly
    crowd because they are reinforced for that behavior.
    Membership in a social group is not always reinforcing; yet, for at least three
    reasons, some people remain a member of a group. First, people may remain in a
    group that abuses them because some group members are reinforcing them; second,
    some people, especially children, may not possess the means to leave the group;
    and third, reinforcement may occur on an intermittent schedule so that the abuse
    suffered by an individual is intermingled with occasional reward. If the positive
    reinforcement is strong enough, its effects will be more powerful than those of
    punishment.
    Control of Human Behavior
    Ultimately, an individual’s behavior is controlled by environmental contingencies.
    Those contingencies may have been erected by society, by another individual, or
    by oneself; but the environment, not free will, is responsible for behavior.
    Social Control
    Individuals act to form social groups because such behavior tends to be reinforcing.
    Groups, in turn, exercise control over their members by formulating written or
    unwritten laws, rules, and customs that have physical existence beyond the lives
    of individuals. The laws of a nation, the rules of an organization, and the customs
    of a culture transcend any one individual’s means of countercontrol and serve as
    powerful controlling variables in the lives of individual members.
    A somewhat humorous example of both unconscious behavior and social con-
    trol involved Skinner and Erich Fromm, one of Skinner’s harshest critics. At a pro-
    fessional meeting attended by both men, Fromm argued that people are not pigeons
    and cannot be controlled through operant conditioning techniques. While seated
    across a table from Fromm and while listening to this tirade, Skinner decided to
    reinforce Fromm’s arm-waving behavior. He passed a note to one of his friends that
    read: “ ‘Watch Fromm’s left hand. I am going to shape a chopping motion’ ” (Skinner,
    1983, p. 151). Whenever Fromm raised his left hand, Skinner would look directly
    at him. If Fromm’s left arm came down in a chopping motion, Skinner would smile
    and nod approvingly. If Fromm held his arm relatively still, Skinner would look
    away or appear to be bored with Fromm’s talk. After 5 minutes of such selective
    reinforcement, Fromm unknowingly began to flail his arm so vigorously that his
    wristwatch kept slipping over his hand.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories482
    Like Erich Fromm, each of us is controlled by a variety of social forces and
    techniques, but all these can be grouped under the following headings: (1) operant
    conditioning, (2) describing contingencies, (3) deprivation and satiation, and
    (4) physical restraint (Skinner, 1953).
    Society exercises control over its members through the four principal methods
    of operant conditioning: positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, and the two
    techniques of punishment (adding an aversive stimulus and removing a positive one).
    A second technique of social control is to describe to a person the contingen-
    cies of reinforcement. Describing contingencies involves language, usually verbal,
    to inform people of the consequences of their not-yet-emitted behavior. Many
    examples of describing contingencies are available, especially threats and promises.
    A more subtle means of social control is advertising, designed to manipulate peo-
    ple to purchase certain products. In none of these examples will the attempt at
    control be perfectly successful, yet each of them increases the likelihood that the
    desired response will be emitted.
    Third, behavior can be controlled either by depriving people or by satiating them
    with reinforcers. Again, even though deprivation and satiation are internal states,
    the control originates with the environment. People deprived of food are more likely
    to eat; those satiated are less likely to eat even when delicious food is available.
    Finally, people can be controlled through physical restraints, such as holding
    children back from a deep ravine or putting lawbreakers in prison. Physical restraint
    acts to counter the effects of conditioning, and it results in behavior contrary to that
    which would have been emitted had the person not been restrained.
    Some people might say that physical restraint is a means of denying an
    individual’s freedom. However, Skinner (1971) held that behavior has nothing to
    do with personal freedom but is shaped by
    the contingencies of survival, the effects of
    reinforcement, and the contingencies of the
    social environment. Therefore, the act of
    physically restraining a person does no
    more to negate freedom than does any other
    technique of control, including self-control.
    Self-Control
    If personal freedom is a fiction, then how
    can a person exercise self-control? Skinner
    would say that, just as people can alter the
    variables in another person’s environ-
    ment, so they can manipulate the variables
    within their own environment and thus
    exercise some measure of self-control.
    The contingencies of self-control, how-
    ever, do not reside within the individual
    and cannot be freely chosen. When people
    control their own behavior, they do so by
    manipulating the same variables that they
    Physical restraint is one means of social
    control. © Thinkstock Images/Getty Images

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 483
    would use in controlling someone else’s behavior, and ultimately these variables
    lie outside themselves.
    Skinner and Margaret Vaughan (Skinner & Vaughan, 1983) have discussed
    several techniques that people can use to exercise self-control without resorting to
    free choice. First, they can use physical aids such as tools, machines, and financial
    resources to alter their environment. For example, a person may take extra money
    when going shopping to give herself the option of impulse buying. Second, people
    can change their environment, thereby increasing the probability of the desired
    behavior. For example, a student wanting to concentrate on his studies can turn
    off a distracting television set. Third, people can arrange their environment so that
    they can escape from an aversive stimulus only by producing the proper response.
    For example, a woman can set an alarm clock so that the aversive sound can be
    stopped only by getting out of bed to shut off the alarm.
    Fourth, people can take drugs, especially alcohol, as a means of self-control.
    For example, a man may ingest tranquilizers to make his behavior more placid.
    Fifth, people can simply do something else in order to avoid behaving in an unde-
    sirable fashion. For example, an obsessive woman may count repetitious patterns
    in wallpaper to avoid thinking about previous experiences that would create guilt.
    In these examples, the substitute behaviors are negatively reinforcing because they
    allow a person to avoid unpleasant behaviors or thoughts.
    The Unhealthy Personality
    Unfortunately, the techniques of social control and self-control sometimes produce
    detrimental effects, which result in inappropriate behavior and unhealthy personal-
    ity development.
    Counteracting Strategies
    When social control is excessive, people can use three basic strategies for coun-
    teracting it—they can escape, revolt, or use passive resistance (Skinner, 1953).
    With the defensive strategy of escape, people withdraw from the controlling agent
    either physically or psychologically. People who counteract by escape find it dif-
    ficult to become involved in intimate personal relationships, tend to be mistrustful
    of people, and prefer to live lonely lives of noninvolvement.
    People who revolt against society’s controls behave more actively, counterat-
    tacking the controlling agent. People can rebel through vandalizing public property,
    tormenting teachers, verbally abusing other people, pilfering equipment from
    employers, provoking the police, or overthrowing established organizations such
    as religions or governments.
    People who counteract control through passive resistance are more subtle
    than those who rebel and more irritating to the controllers than those who rely
    on escape. Skinner (1953) believed that passive resistance is most likely to be
    used where escape and revolt have failed. The conspicuous feature of passive
    resistance is stubbornness. A child with homework to do finds a dozen excuses
    why it cannot be finished; an employee slows down progress by undermining the
    work of others.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories484
    Inappropriate Behaviors
    Inappropriate behaviors follow from self-defeating techniques of counteracting
    social control or from unsuccessful attempts at self-control, especially when either
    of these failures is accompanied by strong emotion. Like most behaviors, inap-
    propriate or unhealthy responses are learned. They are shaped by positive and
    negative reinforcement and especially by the effects of punishment.
    Inappropriate behaviors include excessively vigorous behavior, which makes no
    sense in terms of the contemporary situation, but might be reasonable in terms of past
    history; and excessively restrained behavior, which people use as a means of avoiding
    the aversive stimuli associated with punishment. Another type of inappropriate behav-
    ior is blocking out reality by simply paying no attention to aversive stimuli.
    A fourth form of undesirable behavior results from defective self-knowledge
    and is manifested in such self-deluding responses as boasting, rationalizing, or claim-
    ing to be the Messiah. This pattern of behavior is negatively reinforcing because the
    person avoids the aversive stimulation associated with thoughts of inadequacy.
    Another inappropriate behavior pattern is self-punishment, exemplified either
    by people directly punishing themselves or by arranging environmental variables
    so that they are punished by others.
    Psychotherapy
    Skinner (1987b) believed that psychotherapy is one of the chief obstacles blocking
    psychology’s attempt to become scientific. Nevertheless, his ideas on shaping
    behavior not only have had a significant impact on behavior therapy but also extend
    to a description of how all therapy works.
    Regardless of theoretical orientation, a therapist is a controlling agent. Not
    all controlling agents, however, are harmful, and a patient must learn to discrimi-
    nate between punitive authority figures (both past and present) and a permissive
    therapist. Whereas a patient’s parents may have been cold and rejecting, the ther-
    apist is warm and accepting; whereas the patient’s parents were critical and judg-
    mental, the therapist is supportive and empathic.
    The shaping of any behavior takes time, and therapeutic behavior is no
    exception. A therapist molds desirable behavior by reinforcing slightly improved
    changes in behavior. The nonbehavioral therapist may affect behavior accidentally
    or unknowingly, whereas the behavioral therapist attends specifically to this tech-
    nique (Skinner, 1953).
    Traditional therapists generally explain behaviors by resorting to a variety of
    fictional constructs such as defense mechanisms, striving for superiority, collective
    unconscious, and self-actualization needs. Skinner, however, believed that these
    and other fictional constructs are behaviors that can be accounted for by learning
    principles. No therapeutic purpose is served by postulating explanatory fictions and
    internal causes. Skinner reasoned that if behavior is shaped by inner causes, then
    some force must be responsible for the inner cause. Traditional theories must ulti-
    mately account for this cause, but behavior therapy merely skips it and deals
    directly with the history of the organism; and it is this history that, in the final
    analysis, is responsible for any hypothetical internal cause.

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 485
    Behavior therapists have developed a variety of techniques over the years,
    most based on operant conditioning (Skinner, 1988), although some are built
    around the principles of classical (respondent) conditioning. In general, these ther-
    apists play an active role in the treatment process, pointing out the positive con-
    sequences of certain behaviors and the aversive effects of others and also
    suggesting behaviors that, over the long haul, will result in positive reinforcement.
    Related Research
    In its early history, operant conditioning was used mostly in studies with animals,
    then it was applied to simple human responses; but more recently, Skinner’s ideas
    have been used in a multitude of studies dealing with complex human behaviors.
    Some of these studies have been concerned with the relationship between long-term
    behavior patterns (i.e., personality) and contingencies of reinforcement. These studies
    are generally of three kinds: They have asked either how conditioning affects
    personality, how personality affects conditioning, or the mutual influence between
    personality and conditioning.
    How Conditioning Affects Personality
    In Chapter 1, we said that the key elements of personality are stability of behavior
    over time and across different situations. By these criteria, personality change
    occurs when new behaviors become stable over time and/or across different situ-
    ations. One domain in which personality change may be evidenced is in psycho-
    therapy. In fact, a major goal of therapy is to change behavior, and if the changes
    are stable over time and situations, then one could talk about changing personality.
    We say this to make clear that whereas Skinner discussed changing long-term
    behavior, he never really discussed changing personality.
    One basic assumption of Skinnerian conditioning is that reinforcement shapes
    behavior. Yet, what are the factors that change reinforcement; that is, can certain
    stimuli become more or less reinforcing for an individual over time? This is an
    important question in treating people with drug problems, because successful treat-
    ment requires that a reinforcer (drug) lose its reinforcing value. For smokers, for
    example, nicotine gradually becomes a negative reinforcer, as mild states of tension
    are removed by the effects of this drug.
    Some evidence has shown that psychomotor stimulants (such as cocaine or
    d-amphetamines) increase smoking levels in those who smoke. There are two possible
    explanations for the effect: First, perhaps the stimulant specifically increases the rein-
    forcing effect of nicotine; second, perhaps psychomotor stimulants simply increase
    activity levels in general, and smoking is just one of them. In order to test these two
    competing explanations, Jennifer Tidey, Suzanne O’Neill, and Stephen Higgins (2000)
    conducted a study with 13 smokers and put them through an elaborate testing procedure
    (12 separate 5-hour sessions), in which they received either a placebo or the drug
    d-amphetamine. Ninety minutes later the smokers had to choose between two different
    reinforcers, money ($0.25) or smoking (two puffs). If they chose money, a running
    total of the accumulated amount was shown on a computer screen and participants
    were paid that amount at the end of the testing session. If they chose the cigarette, they

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories486
    were allowed two puffs immediately after doing the desired behavior. If the stimulant
    simply increases general activity levels, there should be no systematic preference for
    one reinforcer over the other (compared to baseline preferences). Additionally, after
    the experimental session ended, they were allowed a period in which they could smoke
    as much or as little as they wished (free smoking session).
    However, results showed that smoking levels in both the experimental choice
    (compared to money) and in the free smoking sessions increased in proportion to
    d-amphetamine. The higher the dose of d-amphetamine, the more the participants
    smoked. Even more importantly, however, smoking was chosen over money in the
    choice session in direct proportion to the amount of d-amphetamine administered.
    Therefore, the stimulant must increase the reinforcing value of nicotine specifically
    and not the other reinforcer (money). In short, the answer to the question of whether
    reinforcers can change their value over time and in combination with other stimuli
    is “yes,” and in this case nicotine can become even more reinforcing in the pres-
    ence of psychomotor stimulants.
    How Personality Affects Conditioning
    If conditioning can affect personality, is the reverse also true? That is, can person-
    ality affect conditioning? Several thousand studies with both animals and humans
    have demonstrated the power that conditioning has to change behavior/personality.
    With humans in particular, however, it is clear that different people respond dif-
    ferently to the same reinforcers, and personality may provide an important clue
    about why this may be so.
    Returning to research on d-amphetamine and smoking, for example, there
    appear to be systematic individual differences on the effect; that is, it works for some
    people but not others. Just as in the previous study, Stacey Sigmon and colleagues
    (2003) studied the effects that d-amphetamine has on smoking using two different
    reinforcers: cigarettes and money. In addition to trying to replicate the finding that
    psychomotor stimulants specifically increase the reinforcing value of nicotine com-
    pared to money, they wanted to examine whether there were any individual differ-
    ences in the effect. If there were, then what might be some possible explanations?
    Participants were adult smokers (averaging 20 cigarettes per day) between
    the ages of 18 and 45, with a mean age of 21; 78% were European American
    and 61% were female. To be included in the study, participants had to test neg-
    ative for drugs other than nicotine and report no psychiatric problems, and
    women had to practice a medically acceptable form of birth control and test
    negative for pregnancy. Participants were informed that they could receive vari-
    ous drugs, including placebos, stimulants, and sedatives, and that the purpose of
    the study was to investigate the effects of these drugs on mood, behavior, and
    physiology. Participants were paid $435 if they completed all nine sessions.
    The general procedure included nine sessions, the first of which was a 3.5-hour
    session to acclimate the participants to the procedures and equipment; no drugs were
    administered in the first sessions. Sessions 2 through 9 lasted 5 hours each and
    included breath tests to ensure no prior smoking had occurred. Baseline measures
    included pre-session questionnaires and physiological measures such as heart rate, skin
    temperature, and blood pressure. Also, each participant lit a cigarette and smoked at

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 487
    least one puff in order to ensure equal time for all participants since last exposure to
    nicotine. The experimental drug (or placebo) was then administered followed by base-
    line mood questions and a light meal in order to prevent nausea. Mood questions
    included “Do you feel any good effects?” “Do you feel high?” “Do you feel nervous?”
    and so forth. Using a double-blind procedure, participants received either a placebo
    or d-amphetamine. The participant then completed a multiple-choice test that pitted
    money against smoking to assess baseline levels of the monetary value of smoking.
    For example, the participant was given a series of 45 hypothetical choices between
    smoking and a progressive amount of money. The point at which the participant
    stopped choosing smoking and chose money was referred to as the “crossover point”
    and was considered an index of drug-reinforcement efficacy.
    Next, a 3-hour progressive reinforcement (PR) session began. Progressive rein-
    forcement involves increasing the number of responses that are required before rein-
    forcement. In this case, participants had to do a repetitive motor task n-number of
    times (starting with 160 and going all the way to 8,400 times) to earn either two puffs
    from a cigarette or $1. Which reinforcer they chose was up to them. The idea behind
    the progressive nature of the reinforcement procedure was to see how long it took a
    person to stop responding (give up trying to get a cigarette or money). This breakpoint
    is considered the strength of the reinforcer. If participants’ breakpoint increased more
    in the drug condition than in baseline, they were considered responders (to the drug);
    if not, they were considered nonresponders. As in the study by Tidey et al., the last
    session allowed participants to freely smoke as little or as much as they wished.
    The general result was that there was a small effect of d-amphetamine on
    increasing smoking. However, there were significant individual differences, and
    when one examined the effects for responders compared to nonresponders, the
    effect was clear. Smoking breakpoints for the 10 responders became increasingly
    higher with increased dosages of d-amphetamine, and money breakpoints became
    increasingly lower. In other words, responders were willing to work harder to get
    cigarettes under increasing amounts of d-amphetamine. But this pattern of results
    did not hold for the eight nonresponders; d-amphetamine had no real effect on their
    cigarette smoking. Possible reasons for this effect were seen in the subjective rat-
    ings of the effects of the drug: Responders said they felt high and drowsy and that
    the drug had good effects. On objective measures (physiological effects), however,
    there was no difference between the two groups.
    Although this study had no direct evidence, other research provides one plau-
    sible explanation for the individual differences seen in d-amphetamine: It results
    in individual differences in sensitivities to the neurotransmitter dopamine, which
    is associated with most increases in feeling good or having a positive mood. In
    other words, responders are more likely to be affected by the stimulant, because
    their sensitivity to dopamine is greater. To the extent that personality has a bio-
    logical basis (see Chapters 14 and 15), it can affect sensitivity to conditioning. Indeed,
    many researchers consider dopamine to be the “positive reinforcement” system.
    Mutual Influence Between Personality and Conditioning
    In addition to the independent evidence that conditioning affects personality and
    that personality affects conditioning, there is also mutual evidence for their influence

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories488
    on each other. A neuropsychological theory of personality has emerged within
    behaviorism that helps explain the mutual influence between individuals’ tempera-
    ments and responses to conditioning, known as Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory
    (RST; Corr, 2008; Pickering & Gray, 1999). This theory identifies three emotional-
    motivational systems in individuals: one “approach” system (the behavioral approach
    system, BAS) and two “avoidance” systems (the behavioral inhibition system, BIS,
    and the fight-flight-freeze system, FFFS). The BAS is responsive to rewards,
    impulses, and pleasurable experiences, whereas the BIS is responsive to punish-
    ments and anxiety. The FFFS is responsive to fear and threat. These systems are
    related to both positive (in the case of the BAS) and negative (in the case of the
    BIS and FFFS) emotions, and hence help explain both the development and main-
    tenance of certain features of personality. These reinforcement sensitivities tie into
    Skinner’s theory of operant conditioning and reinforcement by making clear that
    different behavior is shaped by different rewards and punishments—that is, condi-
    tioning shapes personality, but also personality affects conditioning.
    Research supports this mutual relationship between conditioning and personal-
    ity. Corr and colleagues’, for example, used the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory to
    help examine why people differ on a number of personality characteristics. In one
    recent study, Stoeber and Corr (2015) examined the trait of perfectionism, which is
    characterized by exceedingly high standards of performance. Perfectionism comes in
    three different forms: a) self-oriented perfectionists endorse the belief that being per-
    fect is important and are critical of themselves when they fail to meet high standards;
    b) other-oriented perfectionists believe that it is important for others to be perfect and
    are critical of those who fail to meet high expectations; and c) socially prescribed
    perfectionists believe that striving for perfection is important to others and expect that
    others will be highly critical of them if they fail to meet high expectations (Hewitt &
    Flett, 1991). Stoeber and Corr (2015) predicted that reinforcement sensitivity (condi-
    tioning) may help explain different forms of perfectionism (personality) and also that
    these sensitivities are reinforced differently by different emotional responses.
    To test their prediction, Stoeber and Corr (2015) administered three psycho-
    logical measures to 388 university students. First, students completed a measure of
    perfectionism (Hewitt & Flett, 1991); second, a measure of reinforcement sensitivity—
    that is, whether they are likely to approach (BAS), inhibit (BIS), or fight, flee, and
    freeze (FFFS) (Corr & Cooper, 2016); and finally, a measure of positive and negative
    mood over the past two weeks (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
    Results of the study supported the prediction that differences in reinforcement
    sensitivity (conditioning) would predict different forms of perfectionism (personal-
    ity). Each of the three reinforcement sensitivities (approach, inhibition, and fight,
    freeze, or flight) showed positive relationships with self-oriented perfectionism, indi-
    cating that being reactive to both positive and negative reinforcers in one’s environ-
    ment is associated with being a self-oriented perfectionist. Other-oriented
    perfectionism, by contrast, showed a negative relationship with the BIS (and was
    unrelated to the FFFS). Other-oriented perfectionists appear highly defensive and
    show reduced sensitivity to negative reinforcers. Behavioral inhibition and approach
    showed positive relationships with socially prescribed perfectionism, and was unre-
    lated to the FFFS. Social perfectionists have a highly active BIS but are also impul-
    sive and lack goal-oriented persistence.

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 489
    Furthermore, as predicted, the reinforcement sensitivity components of BAS and
    BIS explained differences in how the three forms of perfectionism predicted recent
    positive and negative mood. Self-oriented perfectionism seems to be a double-edged
    sword, in that it predicts higher levels of both positive mood via the BAS and negative
    affect via the BIS. Other oriented perfectionists, having reduced sensitivity to negative
    reinforcers, appear to experience less negative mood overall, compared to self-oriented
    perfectionists. These sorts of perfectionists appear to have overlaps with psychopathy
    with high defensiveness when attacked and a reduced sensitivity to negative reinforc-
    ers. Finally, socially prescribed perfectionism appears to be an entirely maladaptive
    form of perfectionism, with direct negative effects on emotional well-being. These
    people have more negative and less positive affect than their other perfectionist coun-
    terparts, likely because they perceive that they nearly always fail at upholding others’
    exacting standards of perfection and therefore find few rewards in their environment.
    Corr and his colleagues have extended this research in an effort to understand
    the darker side of personality, applying the revised RST to the emergence of psy-
    chopathy (Hughes, Moore, Morris, & Corr, 2012). Psychopathic individuals are char-
    acterized by extreme egocentrism, lack of remorse, impulsivity and, germane to a
    chapter on Skinner, an impaired ability to learn from negative consequences. Most
    studies of psychopathy examine clinical or imprisoned populations, but this one
    surveyed 192 university students in the United Kingdom, so as to provide important
    information about how non-disordered personality can evolve into pathology.
    Corr and colleagues assessed students with the Behavioral Inhibition System/
    Behavioral Activation System Scales (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994) as well
    as the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP; Levenson, Kiehl, &
    Fitzpatrick, 1995), which measures dispositional attitudes and beliefs presumed to
    underlie psychopathy, such as a lack of remorse or a tendency to lie. The results
    were consistent with Corr’s (2010) neuropsychological model, which proposes an
    underactive behavioral inhibition system (BIS) in psychopathic people, who do not
    anticipate or respond typically to potentially punishing events. That is, those who
    scored higher on the LSRP also tended to have low scores on the BIS. The idea
    here is that psychopaths show deficits in their ability to detect goal conflict, and
    hence to learn from aversive experiences.
    Research on reinforcement sensitivity helps us see that all people do not
    respond to reinforcers in the same way. Our basic temperaments are key mecha-
    nisms that moderate the effects of reinforcers. In turn, our habitual responses or
    sensitivities to reinforcements solidify into personality qualities that come to define
    us. More research is sure to emerge from within this paradigm that will further our
    understanding of the mutual relationship between personality and conditioning.
    Critique of Skinner
    The maverick psychologist Hans J. Eysenck (1988) once criticized Skinner for
    ignoring such concepts as individual differences, intelligence, genetic factors, and
    the whole realm of personality. These claims are only partly true, because Skinner
    did recognize genetic factors, and he did offer a somewhat unenthusiastic definition
    of personality, saying that it is “at best a repertoire of behavior imparted by an

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories490
    organized set of contingencies” (Skinner, 1974, p. 149). How does Skinner’s the-
    ory meet the six criteria of a useful theory?
    First, because the theory has spawned a great quantity of research, we rate
    the theory very high on its ability to generate research. Second, most of Skinner’s
    ideas can be either falsified or verified, so we rate the theory high on falsifiability.
    Third, on its ability to organize all that is known about human personality,
    we give the theory only a moderate rating. Skinner’s approach was to describe
    behavior and the environmental contingencies under which it takes place. His pur-
    pose was to bring together these descriptive facts and to generalize from them.
    Many personality traits, such as those of the Five-Factor Model, can be accounted
    for by the principles of operant conditioning. However, other concepts such as
    insight, creativity, motivation, inspiration, and self-efficacy do not fit easily into
    an operant conditioning framework.
    Fourth, as a guide to action, we rate Skinner’s theory very high. The abundance
    of descriptive research turned out by Skinner and his followers has made operant
    conditioning an extremely practical procedure. For example, Skinnerian techniques
    have been used to help phobic patients overcome their fears, to enhance compliance
    to medical recommendations, to help people overcome tobacco and drug addictions,
    to improve eating habits, and to increase assertiveness. In fact, Skinnerian theory can
    be applied to almost all areas of training, teaching, and psychotherapy.
    The fifth criterion of a useful theory is internal consistency, and judged by
    this standard, we rate Skinnerian theory very high. Skinner defined his terms pre-
    cisely and operationally, a process greatly aided by the avoidance of fictionalized
    mentalistic concepts.
    Is the theory parsimonious? On this final criterion, Skinner’s theory is dif-
    ficult to rate. On one hand, the theory is free from cumbersome hypothetical con-
    structs, but on the other, it demands a novel expression of everyday phrases. For
    example, instead of saying, “I got so mad at my husband, I threw a dish at him,
    but missed,” one would need to say, “The contingencies of reinforcement within
    my environment were arranged in such a manner that I observed my organism
    throwing a dish against the kitchen wall.”
    Concept of Humanity
    Without doubt, B. F. Skinner held a deterministic view of human nature, and
    concepts like free will and individual choice had no place in his behavioral
    analysis. People are not free but are controlled by environmental forces.
    They may seem to be motivated by inner causes, but in reality those causes
    can be traced to sources outside the individual. Self-control depends
    ultimately on environmental variables and not on some inner strength. When
    people control their own lives, they do so by manipulating their environment,
    which in turn shapes their behavior. This environmental approach negates
    hypothetical constructs such as willpower or responsibility. Human behavior
    is extremely complex, but people behave under many of the same laws as
    do machines and animals.

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 491
    The notion that human behavior is completely determined is an
    extremely problematic one for many people who believe that they observe
    daily many examples of free choice in both themselves and others. What
    accounts for this illusion of freedom? Skinner (1971) held that freedom
    and dignity are reinforcing concepts because people find satisfaction in
    the belief that they are free to choose and also in their faith in the basic
    dignity of human beings. Because these fictional concepts are reinforcing
    in many modern societies, people tend to behave in ways that increase
    the probability that these constructs will be perpetuated. Once freedom
    and dignity lose their reinforcement value, people will stop behaving as
    if they existed.
    In the days preceding Louis Pasteur, many people believed that mag-
    gots spontaneously generated on the bodies of dead animals. Skinner
    (1974) used this observation to paint an analogy with human behavior, point-
    ing out that the spontaneous generation of behavior is no more of a reality
    than the spontaneous generation of maggots. Haphazard or random behavior
    may appear to be freely chosen, but it is actually the product of haphazard
    or random environmental and genetic conditions. People are not autonomous,
    but the illusion of autonomy persists due to incomplete understanding of an
    individual’s history. When people fail to understand behavior, they assign it
    to some internal concept such as free will, beliefs, intentions, values, or
    motives. Skinner believed that people are capable of reflecting on their own
    nature and that this reflective behavior can be observed and studied just
    like any other.
    Is Skinner’s concept of humanity optimistic or pessimistic? At first
    thought, it may appear that a deterministic stance is necessarily pessimistic.
    However, Skinner’s view of human nature is highly optimistic. Because
    human behavior is shaped by the principles of reinforcement, the species is
    quite adaptable. Of all behaviors, the most satisfying ones tend to increase
    in frequency of occurrence. People, therefore, learn to live quite harmoni-
    ously with their environment. The evolution of the species is in the direction
    of greater control over environmental variables, which results in an increas-
    ing repertoire of behaviors beyond those essential for mere survival. How-
    ever, Skinner (1987a) was also concerned that modern cultural practices
    have not yet evolved to the point at which nuclear war, overpopulation, and
    depletion of natural resources can be stopped. In this sense, he was more
    of a realist than an optimist.
    Nevertheless, Skinner provided a blueprint for a utopian society—
    Walden Two (Skinner, 1948, 1976b). If his recommendations were followed,
    then people could be taught how to arrange the variables in their environ-
    ments so that the probability of correct or satisfying solutions would be
    increased.
    Is humanity basically good or evil? Skinner hoped for an idealistic soci-
    ety in which people behave in ways that are loving, sensible, democratic,
    independent, and good, but people are not by nature this way. But neither
    are they essentially evil. Within limits set by heredity, people are flexible in
    their adaptation to the environment, but no evaluation of good or evil should

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories492
    be placed on an individual’s behavior. If a person typically behaves altruisti-
    cally for the good of others, it is because this behavior, either in the species’
    evolutionary history or in the individual’s personal history, has been previ-
    ously reinforced. If one behaves cowardly, it is because the rewards for
    cowardice outweigh the aversive variables (Skinner, 1978).
    On the dimension of causality versus teleology, Skinner’s theory of
    personality is very high on causality. Behavior is caused by the person’s
    history of reinforcement as well as by the species’ contingencies for survival
    and by the evolution of cultures. Although people behave covertly (within
    the skin) when thinking about the future, all those thoughts are determined
    by past experiences (Skinner, 1990b).
    The complex of environmental contingencies responsible for these
    thoughts, as well as for all other behaviors, is beyond people’s awareness.
    They rarely have knowledge of the relationship between all genetic and
    environmental variables and their own behavior. For this reason, we rate
    Skinner very high on the unconscious dimension of personality.
    Although he believed that genetics plays an important role in per-
    sonality development, Skinner held that human personality is largely
    shaped by the environment. Because an important part of that environ-
    ment is other people, Skinner’s concept of humanity inclines more toward
    social than toward biological determinants of behavior. As a species,
    humans have developed to their present form because of particular
    environmental factors that they have encountered. Climate, geography,
    and physical strength relative to other animals have all helped shape the
    human species. But social environment, including family structure, early
    experiences with parents, educational systems, governmental organiza-
    tion, and so forth, has played an even more important role in the develop-
    ment of personality,
    Skinner hoped that people might be trustworthy, understanding,
    warm, and empathic—characteristics that his friendly adversary Carl
    Rogers (see Chapter 10) believed to be at the core of the psychologically
    healthy personality. In contrast to Rogers, who believed that these pos-
    itive behaviors are at least partially the result of the human capacity to
    be self-directed, Skinner held that they are completely under the control
    of environmental variables. Humans are not by nature good, but they
    can become so if they are exposed to the proper contingencies of rein-
    forcement. Although his view of the ideal person would be similar to
    those of Rogers and Abraham H. Maslow (see Chapter 9), Skinner
    believed that the means of becoming autonomous, loving, and self-
    actualizing must not be left to chance, but should be specifically
    designed into the society.
    The history of a person determines behavior, and because each
    human has a singular history of reinforcement contingencies, behavior and
    personality are relatively unique. Genetic differences also account for
    uniqueness among people. Biological and historical differences mold unique
    individuals, and Skinner emphasized people’s uniqueness more than he did
    their similarities.

    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis 493
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Skinner’s theory of personality is based largely on his behavioral
    analysis of rats and pigeons.
    ∙ Although internal states such as thinking and feeling exist, they cannot
    be used as explanations of behavior; only overt behavior can be studied
    by the scientist.
    ∙ Human behavior is shaped by three forces: (1) the individual’s personal
    history of reinforcement, (2) natural selection, and (3) the evolution of
    cultural practices.
    ∙ Operant conditioning is a process of changing behavior in which
    reinforcement (or punishment) is contingent on the occurrence of a
    particular behavior.
    ∙ A positive reinforcer is any event that, when added to a situation,
    increases the probability that a given behavior will occur.
    ∙ A negative reinforcer is any aversive stimulus that, when removed from
    the environment, increases the probability of a given behavior.
    ∙ Skinner also identified two types of punishment: The first is the
    presentation of an aversive stimulus, and the second involves the
    removal of a positive stimulus.
    ∙ Reinforcement can be either continuous or intermittent, but intermittent
    schedules are more efficient.
    ∙ The four principal intermittent schedules of reinforcement are the fixed-
    ratio, variable-ratio, fixed-interval, and variable-interval.
    ∙ Social control is achieved through (1) operant conditioning, (2) describing
    the contingencies of reinforcement, (3) depriving or satiating a person, or
    (4) physically restraining an individual.
    ∙ People can also control their own behavior through self-control, but all
    control ultimately rests with the environment and not free will.
    ∙ Unhealthy behaviors are learned in the same way as all other behaviors,
    that is, mostly through operant conditioning.
    ∙ To change unhealthy behaviors, behavior therapists use a variety of
    behavior modification techniques, all of which are based on the
    principles of operant conditioning.

    494
    C H A P T E R 1 7
    Bandura: Social
    Cognitive Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Social Cognitive Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Albert Bandura
    ⬥ Learning
    Observational Learning
    Enactive Learning
    ⬥ Triadic Reciprocal Causation
    An Example of Triadic Reciprocal Causation
    Chance Encounters and Fortuitous Events
    ⬥ Human Agency
    Core Features of Human Agency
    Self-Efficacy
    Proxy Agency
    Collective Efficacy
    ⬥ Self-Regulation
    External Factors in Self-Regulation
    Internal Factors in Self-Regulation
    Self-Regulation Through Moral Agency
    ⬥ Dysfunctional Behavior
    Depression
    Phobias
    Aggression
    ⬥ Therapy
    ⬥ Related Research
    Self-Efficacy and Diabetes
    Moral Disengagement and Bullying
    Social Cognitive Theory “Goes Global”
    ⬥ Critique of Bandura
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Bandura © Jon Brenneis/Life Magazine/
    The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 495
    People often have their life path permanently altered by unexpected meetings with others or by unplanned happenings. These chance encounters and fortu-
    itous events frequently determine whom people marry, what career they pursue,
    where they live, and how they will live their lives.
    Many years ago, a young graduate student named Al had a chance encounter
    that altered the course of his life. One Sunday, Al, who was usually a conscientious
    student, became bored with an uninteresting reading assignment and decided that a
    round of golf was preferable to tackling schoolwork. Al checked with a friend, and
    the two young men headed to the golf course. However, they arrived too late to
    make their tee time and therefore were bumped to a later time slot. By chance, this
    male twosome found themselves playing behind two slower-playing female golfers.
    Rather than “playing through,” the two men joined the two women and the two
    twosomes became one foursome. Thus, a boring reading chore and a delayed tee-off
    time put two people together who otherwise would never have met. By this series
    of chance events, Albert Bandura and Ginny (Virginia) Varns met in a sand trap
    on a golf course. The couple eventually married and had two daughters, Mary and
    Carol, who like most of us, were the products of a chance encounter.
    Chance encounters and fortuitous events have been largely ignored by most
    personality theorists, even though most of us recognize that we have had unplanned
    experiences that have greatly changed our lives.
    Overview of Social Cognitive Theory
    Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory takes chance encounters and fortuitous
    events seriously, even while recognizing that these meetings and events do not
    invariably alter one’s life path. How we react to an expected meeting or event is
    usually more powerful than the event itself.
    Social cognitive theory rests on several basic assumptions. First, the out-
    standing characteristic of humans is plasticity; that is, humans have the flexibility
    to learn a variety of behaviors in diverse situations. Bandura agrees with Skinner
    (Chapter 16) that people can and do learn through direct experience, but he places
    much more emphasis on vicarious learning, that is, learning by observing others.
    Bandura also stresses the idea that reinforcement can be vicarious; people can be
    reinforced by observing another person receive a reward. This indirect reinforce-
    ment accounts for a good bit of human learning.
    Second, through a triadic reciprocal causation model that includes behav-
    ioral, environmental, and personal factors, people have the capacity to regulate
    their lives. Humans can transform transitory events into relatively consistent ways
    of evaluating and regulating their social and cultural environments. Without this
    capacity, people would merely react to sensory experiences and would lack the
    capacity to anticipate events, create new ideas, or use internal standards to evalu-
    ate present experiences. Two important environmental forces in the triadic model
    are chance encounters and fortuitous events.
    Third, social cognitive theory takes an agentic perspective, meaning that
    humans have the capacity to exercise control over the nature and quality of their
    lives. People are the producers as well as the products of social systems. An

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories496
    important component of the triadic reciprocal causation model is self-efficacy.
    People’s performance is generally enhanced when they have high self-efficacy: that
    is, the confidence that they can perform those behaviors that will produce desired
    behaviors in a particular situation. In addition to self-efficacy, both proxy agency
    and collective efficacy can predict performance. With proxy agency, people are
    able to rely on others for goods and services, whereas collective efficacy refers to
    people’s shared beliefs that they can bring about change.
    Fourth, people regulate their conduct through both external and internal fac-
    tors. External factors include people’s physical and social environments, whereas
    internal factors include self-observation, judgmental process, and self-reaction.
    Fifth, when people find themselves in morally ambiguous situations, they
    typically attempt to regulate their behavior through moral agency, which includes
    redefining the behavior, disregarding or distorting the consequences of their behav-
    ior, dehumanizing or blaming the victims of their behavior, and displacing or
    diffusing responsibility for their actions.
    Biography of Albert Bandura
    Albert Bandura was born on December 4, 1925, in Mundare, a small town on the
    plains of northern Alberta. He grew up the only boy in a family of five older
    sisters. Both parents had emigrated from eastern European countries while still an
    adolescent—his father from Poland and his mother from the Ukraine. Bandura was
    encouraged by his sisters to be independent and self-reliant. He also learned self-
    directiveness in the town’s tiny school, which had few teachers and little resources.
    His high school had only two instructors to teach the entire curriculum. In such
    an environment, learning was left to the initiative of the students, a situation that
    well suited a brilliant scholar like Bandura. Other students also seemed to flourish
    in this atmosphere; virtually all of Bandura’s classmates went on to attend college,
    a very unusual accomplishment during the early 1940s.
    After graduating from high school, Bandura spent a summer in the Yukon
    working on the Alaska highway. This experience brought him into contact with a
    wide variety of fellow workers, many of whom were fleeing creditors, alimony, or
    their draft board. In addition, several of his coworkers manifested various degrees
    of psychopathology. Although his observations of these workers kindled in him an
    interest in clinical psychology, he did not decide to become a psychologist until
    after he had enrolled in the University of British Columbia in Vancouver.
    Bandura told Richard Evans (Evans, 1989) that his decision to become a
    psychologist was quite accidental; that is, it was the result of a fortuitous event.
    In college, Bandura commuted to school with premed and engineering students
    who were early risers. Rather than do nothing during this early hour, Bandura
    decided to enroll in a psychology class that happened to be offered at that time
    period. He found the class fascinating and eventually decided to take a psychology
    major. Bandura later came to consider fortuitous events (such as riding to school
    with students who were early risers) to be important influences in people’s lives.
    After graduating from British Columbia in just 3 years, Bandura looked for
    a graduate program in clinical psychology that had a strong learning theory base.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 497
    His advisor recommended the University of Iowa, so Bandura left Canada for the
    United States. He completed a master’s degree in 1951 and a PhD in clinical psy-
    chology the following year. Then he spent a year in Wichita completing a post-
    doctoral internship at the Wichita Guidance Center. In 1953, he joined the faculty
    at Stanford University where, except for 1 year as Fellow at the Center for
    Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, he has remained.
    Most of Bandura’s early publications were in clinical psychology, dealing
    primarily with psychotherapy and the Rorschach test. Then, in 1958, he collabo-
    rated with the late Richard H. Walters, his first doctoral student, to publish a paper
    on aggressive delinquents. The following year, their book, Adolescent Aggression
    (1959), appeared. Since then, Bandura has continued to publish on a wide variety
    of subjects, often in collaboration with his graduate students. His most influential
    books are Social Learning Theory (1977), Social Foundations of Thought and
    Action (1986), and Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (1997).
    Bandura has held more than a dozen offices in prestigious scientific societies,
    including president of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1974,
    president of the Western Psychological Association in 1980, and honorary president
    of the Canadian Psychological Association in 1999. In addition, he has received
    more than a dozen honorary degrees from prestigious universities throughout the
    world. Other honors and awards include the Guggenheim Fellowship in 1972, the
    Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award from Division 12 (Clinical) of APA in
    the same year, the Award for Distinguished Scientific Contribution from the APA
    in 1980, and the Distinguished Scientist Award of the Society of Behavior Medicine.
    He was elected fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, in 1980. In addi-
    tion, he has won the Distinguished Contribution Award from the International
    Society for Research on Aggression; the William James Award of the American
    Psychological Science for outstanding achievements in psychological science; the
    Robert Thorndike Award for Distinguished Contribution of Psychology to Educa-
    tion, American Psychological Association; and the 2003–2004 James McKeen
    Cattell Fellow Award from the American Psychological Society. He has also been
    elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and to the Institute of
    Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences. Beginning in 2004, the American
    Psychology Society, in partnership with Psy Chi—The National Honor Society in
    Psychology—began awarding an outstanding psychology graduate student with the
    Albert Bandura Graduate Research Award. Bandura currently holds the David Starr
    Jordan Professorship of Social Science in Psychology at Stanford University.
    Learning
    One of the earliest and most basic assumptions of Bandura’s social cognitive the-
    ory is that humans are quite flexible and capable of learning a multitude of atti-
    tudes, skills, and behaviors and that a good bit of those learnings are a result of
    vicarious experiences. Although people can and do learn from direct experience,
    much of what they learn is acquired through observing others. Bandura (1986)
    stated that “if knowledge could be acquired only through the effects of one’s own
    actions, the process of cognitive and social development would be greatly retarded,
    not to mention exceedingly tedious” (p. 47).

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories498
    Observational Learning
    Bandura believes that observation allows people to learn without performing any
    behavior. People observe natural phenomena, plants, animals, waterfalls, the motion
    of the moon and stars, and so forth; but especially important to social cognitive
    theory is the assumption that they learn through observing the behavior of other
    people. In this respect, Bandura differs from Skinner, who held that enactive behav-
    ior is the basic datum of psychological science. He also departs from Skinner in
    his belief that reinforcement is not essential to learning. Although reinforcement
    facilitates learning, Bandura says that it is not a necessary condition for it. People
    can learn, for example, by observing models being reinforced.
    Bandura (1986, 2003) believes that observational learning is much more effi-
    cient than learning through direct experience. By observing other people, humans
    are spared countless responses that might be followed by punishment or by no
    reinforcement. Children observe characters on television, for example, and repeat
    what they hear or see; they need not enact random behaviors, hoping that some of
    them will be rewarded.
    Modeling
    The core of observational learning is modeling. Learning through modeling
    involves adding and subtracting from the observed behavior and generalizing from
    one observation to another. In other words, modeling involves cognitive processes
    and is not simply mimicry or imitation. It is more than matching the actions of
    another; it involves symbolically representing information and storing it for use at
    a future time (Bandura, 1986, 1994).
    Modeling is an effective way of learning a new skill. © Marc Romanelli/Blend Images LLC

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 499
    Several factors determine whether a person will learn from a model in any
    particular situation. First, the characteristics of the model are important. People are
    more likely to model high-status people rather than those of low status, competent
    individuals rather than unskilled or incompetent ones, and powerful people rather
    than impotent ones.
    Second, the characteristics of the observer affect the likelihood of model-
    ing. People who lack status, skill, or power are most likely to model. Children
    model more than older people, and novices are more likely than experts to
    model.
    Third, the consequences of the behavior being modeled may have an effect
    on the observer. The greater the value an observer places on a behavior, the more
    likely the observer will acquire that behavior. Also, learning may be facilitated
    when the observer views a model receiving severe punishment; for example, seeing
    another person receive a severe shock from touching an electric wire teaches the
    observer a valuable lesson.
    Processes Governing Observational Learning
    Bandura (1986) recognizes four processes that govern observational learning: atten-
    tion, representation, behavioral production, and motivation.
    Attention Before we can model another person, we must attend to that person.
    What factors regulate attention? First, because we have more opportunities to
    observe individuals with whom we frequently associate, we are most likely to
    attend to these people. Second, attractive models are more likely to be observed
    than unattractive ones are—popular figures on television, in sports, or in mov-
    ies are often closely attended. Also, the nature of the behavior being modeled
    affects our attention—we observe behavior that we think is important or valu-
    able to us.
    Representation In order for observation to lead to new response patterns, those
    patterns must be symbolically represented in memory. Symbolic representation
    need not be verbal, because some observations are retained in imagery and can be
    summoned in the absence of the physical model. This process is especially impor-
    tant in infancy when verbal skills are not yet developed.
    Verbal coding, however, greatly speeds the process of observational learning.
    With language we can verbally evaluate our behaviors and decide which ones we
    wish to discard and which ones we desire to try. Verbal coding also helps us to
    rehearse the behavior symbolically: that is, to tell ourselves over and over again
    how we will perform the behavior once given the chance. Rehearsal can also entail
    the actual performance of the modeled response, and this rehearsal aids the reten-
    tion process.
    Behavioral Production After attending to a model and retaining what we have
    observed, we then produce the behavior. In converting cognitive representations
    into appropriate actions, we must ask ourselves several questions about the behav-
    ior to be modeled. First we ask, “How can I do this?” After symbolically rehears-
    ing the relevant responses, we try out our new behavior. While performing, we

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories500
    monitor ourselves with the question “What am I doing?” Finally, we evaluate our
    performance by asking, “Am I doing this right?” This last question is not always
    easy to answer, especially if it pertains to a motor skill, such as ballet dancing or
    platform diving, in which we cannot actually see ourselves. For this reason, some
    athletes use video cameras to help them acquire or improve their motor skills.
    Motivation Observational learning is most effective when learners are motivated
    to perform the modeled behavior. Attention and representation can lead to the
    acquisition of learning, but performance is facilitated by motivation to enact that
    particular behavior. Even though observation of others may teach us how to do
    something, we may have no desire to perform the necessary action. One person
    can watch another use a power saw or run a vacuum cleaner and not be motivated
    to try either activity. Most sidewalk superintendents have no wish to emulate the
    observed construction worker.
    Enactive Learning
    Every response a person makes is followed by some consequence. Some of these
    consequences are satisfying, some are dissatisfying, and others are simply not
    cognitively attended and hence have little effect. Bandura believes that complex
    human behavior can be learned when people think about and evaluate the conse-
    quences of their behaviors.
    The consequences of a response serve at least three functions. First, response
    consequences inform us of the effects of our actions. We can retain this informa-
    tion and use it as a guide for future actions. Second, the consequences of our
    responses motivate our anticipatory behavior; that is, we are capable of symboli-
    cally representing future outcomes and acting accordingly. We not only possess
    insight but also are capable of foresight. We do not have to suffer the discomfort
    of cold temperatures before deciding to wear a coat when going outside in freezing
    weather. Instead, we anticipate the effects of cold, wet weather and dress accord-
    ingly. Third, the consequences of responses serve to reinforce behavior, a function
    that has been firmly documented by Skinner (Chapter 16) and other reinforcement
    theorists. Bandura (1986), however, contends that, although reinforcement may at
    times be unconscious and automatic, complex behavioral patterns are greatly facil-
    itated by cognitive intervention. He maintained that learning occurs much more
    efficiently when the learner is cognitively involved in the learning situation and
    understands what behaviors precede successful responses.
    In summary, Bandura believes that new behaviors are acquired through two
    major kinds of learning: observational learning and enactive learning. The core
    element of observational learning is modeling, which is facilitated by observing
    appropriate activities, properly coding these events for representation in memory,
    actually performing the behavior, and being sufficiently motivated. Enactive learn-
    ing allows people to acquire new patterns of complex behavior through direct
    experience by thinking about and evaluating the consequences of their behaviors.
    The learning process allows people to have some degree of control over the events
    that shape the course of their lives. Control, however, rests with a three-way recip-
    rocal interaction of person variables, behavior, and environment.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 501
    Triadic Reciprocal Causation
    In Chapter 16, we saw that Skinner believed that behavior is a function of the
    environment; that is, behavior ultimately can be traced to forces outside the person.
    As environmental contingencies change, behavior changes. But what impetus
    changes the environment? Skinner acknowledged that human behavior can exercise
    some measure of countercontrol over the environment, but he insisted that, in the
    final analysis, behavior is environmentally determined. Other theorists, such as
    Gordon Allport (Chapter 12) and Hans Eysenck (Chapter 14) emphasized the
    importance of traits or personal disposition in shaping behavior. In general, these
    theorists held that personal factors interact with environmental conditions to
    produce behavior.
    Albert Bandura (1986, 1999b, 2001, 2002b) adopts quite a different stance.
    His social cognitive theory explains psychological functioning in terms of triadic
    reciprocal causation. This system assumes that human action is a result of an
    interaction among three variables—environment, behavior, and person. By
    “ person” Bandura means largely, but not exclusively, such cognitive factors as
    memory, anticipation, planning, and judging. Because people possess and use
    these cognitive capacities, they have some capacity to select or to restructure
    their environment: That is, cognition at least partially determines which
    environmental events people attend to, what value they place on these events,
    and how they organize these events for future use. Although cognition can have
    a strong causal effect on both environment and behavior, it is not an autonomous
    entity, independent of those two variables. Bandura (1986) criticized those
    theorists who attribute the cause of human behavior to internal forces such as
    instincts, drives, needs, or intentions. Cognition itself is determined, being formed
    by both behavior and environment.
    Triadic reciprocal causation is represented schematically in Figure 17.1,
    where B signifies behavior; E is the external environment; and P represents the
    person, including that person’s gender, social position, size, and physical
    attractiveness, but especially cognitive factors such as thought, memory, judgment,
    foresight, and so on.
    Behavior
    Environmental
    factors
    Personal factors
    (Cognitive, a�ective,
    and biological events)
    FIGURE 17.1 Bandura’s concept of reciprocal causation. Human functioning is a
    product of the interaction of (B) behavior, (P) person variables, and (E) environment.
    Source: Bandura, Albert, “Social Cognitive Theory and Mass Communication.” In J. Bryant & D. Zillmann (Eds.),
    Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992, p. 62.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories502
    Bandura uses the term “reciprocal” to indicate a triadic interaction of forces,
    not a similar or opposite counteraction. The three reciprocal factors do not need
    to be of equal strength or to make equal contributions. The relative potency of the
    three varies with the individual and with the situation. At times, behavior might
    be the most powerful, as when a person plays the piano for her own enjoyment.
    Other times, the environment exerts the greatest influence, as when a boat over-
    turns and every survivor begins thinking and behaving in a very similar fashion.
    Although behavior and environment can at times be the most powerful contributors
    to performance, cognition (person) is usually the strongest contributor to perfor-
    mance. Cognition would likely be activated in the examples of the person playing
    the piano for her own enjoyment and the survivors of an overturned boat. The
    relative influence of behavior, environment, and person depends on which of the
    triadic factors is strongest at a particular moment (Bandura, 1997).
    An Example of Triadic Reciprocal Causation
    Consider this example of triadic reciprocal causation. A child begging her father
    for a second brownie is, from the father’s viewpoint, an environmental event. If the
    father automatically (without thought) were to give the child a second brownie, then
    the two would be conditioning each other’s behavior in the Skinnerian sense. The
    behavior of the father would be controlled by the environment; but his behavior, in
    turn, would have a countercontrolling effect on his environment, namely the child.
    In Bandura’s theory, however, the father is capable of thinking about the conse-
    quences of rewarding or ignoring the child’s behavior. He may think, “If I give her
    another brownie, she will stop crying temporarily, but in future cases, she will be
    more likely to persist until I give in to her. Therefore, I will not allow her to have
    another brownie.” Hence, the father has an effect on both his environment (the child)
    and his own behavior (rejecting his daughter’s request). The child’s subsequent
    behavior (father’s environment) helps shape the cognition and the behavior of the
    father. If the child stops begging, the father may then have other thoughts. For
    example, he may evaluate his behavior by thinking, “I’m a good father because I
    did the right thing.” The change in environment also allows the father to pursue
    different behaviors. Thus, his subsequent behavior is partially determined by the
    reciprocal interaction of his environment, cognition, and behavior.
    This example illustrates the reciprocal interaction of behavioral, environmen-
    tal, and personal factors from the father’s point of view. First, the child’s pleas
    affected the father’s behavior (E ⇒ B); they also partially determined the father’s
    cognition (E ⇒ P); the father’s behavior helped shape the child’s behavior, that is,
    his own environment (B ⇒ E); his behavior also impinged on his own thoughts
    (B ⇒ P); and his cognition partially determined his behavior (P ⇒ B). To complete
    the cycle, P (person) must influence E (environment). How can the father’s cogni-
    tion directly shape the environment without first being transformed into behavior?
    It cannot. However, P does not signify cognition alone; it stands for person.
    Bandura (1999b) hypothesized that “people evoke different reactions from their
    social environment by their physical characteristics—such as their age, size, race,
    sex, and physical attractiveness—even before they say or do anything” (p. 158).

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 503
    The father, then, by virtue of his role and status as a father and perhaps in conjunc-
    tion with his size and strength, has a decided effect on the child. Thus, the final
    causal link is completed (P ⇒ E).
    Chance Encounters and Fortuitous Events
    Although people can and do exercise a significant amount of control over their
    lives, they cannot predict or anticipate all possible environmental changes. Bandura
    is the only personality theorist to seriously consider the possible importance of
    these chance encounters and fortuitous events.
    Bandura (1998a) defined a chance encounter as “an unintended meeting of
    persons unfamiliar to each other” (p. 95). A fortuitous event is an environmental
    experience that is unexpected and unintended. The everyday lives of people are
    affected to a greater or lesser extent by the people they chance to meet and by
    random events they could not predict. One’s marital partner, occupation, and place
    of residence may largely be the result of a fortuitous meeting that was unplanned
    and unexpected.
    Just as fortuity has influenced the lives of all of us, it has shaped the lives
    and careers of famous personality theorists. Two such examples are Abraham
    H. Maslow (Chapter 9) and Hans J. Eysenck (Chapter 14). As a young man, Maslow
    was exceedingly shy, especially with women. At the same time, he was passionately
    in love with his cousin Bertha Goodman, but he was too bashful to express his love.
    One day while he was visiting his cousin’s home, Bertha’s older sister pushed him
    toward his beloved cousin, saying: “For the love of Pete, kiss her, will ya!”
    (Hoffman, 1988, p. 29). Maslow did, and to his surprise, Bertha did not fight back.
    She kissed him, and from that moment, Maslow’s previously aimless life became
    transformed.
    Also, Hans Eysenck, the noted British psychologist, came to psychology
    completely by chance. He had intended to study physics at the University of
    London, but first he had to pass an entrance examination. After waiting a year to
    take the exam, he was told that he had prepared for the wrong test, and that he
    would have to wait another year to take the right one. Rather than delaying his
    education further, he asked whether there might be any scientific subject that he
    could pursue. When told that he could enroll in a psychology program, Eysenck
    asked, “What on earth is psychology?” (Eysenck, 1982, p. 290). Eysenck, of course,
    went on to major in psychology and to become one of the world’s most famous
    psychologists.
    Fortuity adds a separate dimension in any scheme used to predict human
    behavior, and it makes accurate predictions practically impossible. However,
    chance encounters influence people only by entering the triadic reciprocal causa-
    tion paradigm at point E (environment) and adding to the mutual interaction of
    person, behavior, and environment. In this sense, chance encounters influence
    people in the same manner as do planned events. Once a chance encounter occurs,
    people behave toward their new acquaintance according to their attitudes, belief
    systems, and interests as well as to the other person’s reaction to them. Thus,
    whereas many chance encounters and unplanned events have little or no influence

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories504
    on people’s behavior, “others have more lasting effects, and still others thrust
    people into new life trajectories” (Bandura, 2001, p. 12).
    Chance encounters and fortuitous events are not uncontrollable. Indeed, peo-
    ple can make chance happen. A divorced man looking for an opportunity to remarry
    will increase his chance of meeting a potential wife by pursuing a proactive course
    of action, for example, by joining a singles club, going to places where he is likely
    to find single women, or asking a friend to introduce him to an eligible potential
    mate. If he meets an eligible and desirable woman, he increases his chances for a
    lasting relationship if he has prepared himself to be  attractive or interesting to
    women. Bandura (2001) quotes Louis Pasteur: “Chance favors only the prepared
    mind” (p. 12). Conversely, the prepared person is able to escape unpleasant chance
    encounters and chance misfortunes by anticipating their possibility and taking steps
    to minimize any negative impact they may have on future development.
    Human Agency
    Social cognitive theory takes an agentic view of personality, meaning that humans
    have the capacity to exercise control over their own lives (2002b). Indeed, human
    agency is the essence of humanness. Bandura (2001) believes that people are self-
    regulating, proactive, self-reflective, and self-organizing and  that they have the
    power to influence their own actions to produce desired consequences. Human
    agency does not mean that people possess a homunculus—that is, an autonomous
    agent—making decisions that are consistent with their view of self. Neither does
    it mean that people react automatically to external and internal events. Human
    agency is not a thing but an active process of exploring, manipulating, and influ-
    encing the environment in order to attain desired outcomes.
    Core Features of Human Agency
    Bandura (2001, 2004) discusses four core features of human agency: intentionality,
    forethought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness.
    Intentionality refers to acts a person performs intentionally. An intention
    includes planning, but it also involves actions. “It is not simply an expectation or
    prediction of future actions but a proactive commitment to bringing them about”
    (2001, p. 6). Intentionality does not mean that all of a person’s plans will be brought
    to fruition. People continually change their plans as they become aware of the
    consequences of their actions.
    People also possess forethought to set goals, to anticipate likely outcomes of
    their actions, and to select behaviors that will produce desired outcomes and avoid
    undesirable ones. Forethought enables people to break free from the constraints of
    their environment. If behavior were completely a function of the environment, then
    behavior would be more variable and less consistent because we would constantly
    be reacting to the great diversity of environmental stimuli. “If actions were deter-
    mined solely by external rewards and punishments, people would behave like
    weathervanes” (Bandura, 1986, p. 335). But people do not behave like weather-
    vanes, “constantly shifting direction to conform to whatever influence happened to
    impinge upon them at the moment” (Bandura, 2001, p. 7).

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 505
    People do more than plan and contemplate future behaviors. They are also
    capable of self-reactiveness in the process of motivating and regulating their own
    actions. People not only make choices but they monitor their progress toward
    fulfilling those choices. Bandura (2001) recognizes that setting goals is not sufficient
    to attaining desired consequences. Goals must be specific, be within a person’s
    ability to achieve, and reflect potential accomplishments that are not too far in the
    future. (We discuss self-regulation more fully in the section titled Self-Regulation.)
    Finally, people have self-reflectiveness. They are examiners of their own func-
    tioning; they can think about and evaluate their motivations, values, and the mean-
    ings of their life goals, and they can think about the adequacy of their own thinking.
    They can also evaluate the effect that other people’s actions have on them. People’s
    most crucial self-reflective mechanism is self-efficacy: that is, their beliefs that they
    are capable of performing actions that will produce a desired effect.
    Self-Efficacy
    How people act in a particular situation depends on the reciprocity of behavioral,
    environmental, and cognitive conditions, especially those cognitive factors that relate
    to their beliefs that they can or cannot execute the behavior necessary to produce
    desired outcomes in any particular situation. Bandura (1997) calls these expectations
    self-efficacy. According to Bandura (1994), “people’s beliefs in their personal
    efficacy influence what courses of action they choose to pursue, how much effort
    they will invest in activities, how long they will persevere in the face of obstacles
    and failure experiences, and their resiliency following setbacks” (p.  65). Although
    self-efficacy has a powerful causal influence on people’s actions,  it is not the sole
    determinant. Rather, self-efficacy combines with environment, prior behavior, and
    other personal variables, especially outcome expectations, to produce behavior.
    In the triadic reciprocal causal model, which postulates that the environment,
    behavior, and person have an interactive influence on one another, self-efficacy
    refers to the P (person) factor.
    What Is Self-Efficacy?
    Bandura (2001) defined self-efficacy as “people’s beliefs in their capability to
    exercise some measure of control over their own functioning and over environ-
    mental events” (p. 10). Bandura contends that “efficacy beliefs are the foundation
    of human agency” (p. 10). People who believe that they can do something that has
    the potential to alter environmental events are more likely to act and more likely
    to be successful than those people with low self-efficacy.
    Self-efficacy is not the expectation of our action’s outcomes. Bandura (1986,
    1997) distinguished between efficacy expectations and outcome expectations. Efficacy
    refers to people’s confidence that they have the ability to perform certain behaviors,
    whereas an outcome expectancy refers to one’s prediction of the likely consequences
    of that behavior. Outcome must not be confused with successful accomplishment of
    an act; it refers to the consequences of behavior, not the completion of the act itself.
    For example, a job applicant may have confidence that she will perform well during
    a job interview, have the ability to answer any possible questions, remain relaxed and

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories506
    controlled, and exhibit an
    appropriate level of
    friendly behavior. There-
    fore, she has high self-
    efficacy with regard to
    the employment inter-
    view. However, despite
    these high efficacy
    expectations, she may
    have low outcome expec-
    tations. A low outcome
    expectancy would exist if
    she believes that she has
    little chance of being
    offered a position. This
    judgment might be due to
    unpromising environmental conditions, such as high unemployment, depressed econ-
    omy, or superior competition. In addition, other personal factors such as age, gender,
    height, weight, or physical health may negatively affect outcome expectancies.
    Besides being different from outcome expectancies, self-efficacy must
    be  distinguished from several other concepts. First, efficacy does not refer to the
    ability to execute basic motor skills such as walking, reaching, or grasping. Also,
    efficacy does not imply that we can perform designated behaviors without anxiety,
    stress, or fear; it is merely our judgment, accurate or faulty, about whether or not we
    can execute the required actions. Finally, judgments of efficacy are not the same as
    levels of aspiration. Heroin addicts, for example, often aspire to be drug free but may
    have little confidence in their ability to successfully break the habit (Bandura, 1997).
    Self-efficacy is not a global or generalized concept, such as self-esteem or
    self-confidence. People can have high self-efficacy in one situation and low self-
    efficacy in another. Self-efficacy varies from situation to situation depending on
    the competencies required for different activities; the presence or absence of other
    people; the perceived competence of these other people, especially if they are
    competitors; the person’s predisposition to attend to failure of performance rather
    than to success; and the accompanying physiological states, particularly the pres-
    ence of fatigue, anxiety, apathy, or despondency.
    High and low efficacy combine with responsive and unresponsive envi-
    ronments to produce four possible predictive variables (Bandura, 1997). When
    efficacy is high and the environment is responsive, outcomes are most likely
    to be successful. When low efficacy is combined with a responsive environ-
    ment, people may become depressed when they observe that others are
    successful at tasks that seem too difficult for them. When people with high
    efficacy encounter unresponsive environmental situations, they usually inten-
    sify their efforts to change the environment. They may use protest, social activ-
    ism, or even force to instigate change; but if all efforts fail, Bandura
    hypothesizes, either they will give up that course and take on a new one or
    they will seek a more responsive environment. Finally, when low self-efficacy
    combines with an unresponsive environment, people are likely to feel apathy,
    Self-efficacy is the extent to which you believe you can or cannot
    do a task. © Ekachai Lohacamonchai/Alamy Stock Photo

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 507
    resignation, and helplessness. For exam-
    ple, a junior executive with low self-
    efficacy who realizes the difficulties of
    becoming company president will develop
    feelings of discouragement, give up, and
    fail to transfer productive efforts toward a
    similar but lesser goal.
    What Contributes to
    Self-Efficacy?
    Personal efficacy is acquired, enhanced, or
    decreased through any one or combination
    of four sources: (1) mastery experiences,
    (2) social modeling, (3) social persuasion, and
    (4) physical and emotional states (Bandura,
    1997). With each method, information about
    oneself and the environment is cognitively
    processed and, together with recollections of
    previous experiences, alters perceived self-
    efficacy.
    Mastery Experiences The most influential sources of self-efficacy are mastery
    experiences, that is, past performances (Bandura, 1997). In general, successful per-
    formance raises efficacy expectancies; failure tends to lower them. This general
    statement has six corollaries.
    First, successful performance raises self-efficacy in proportion to the difficulty
    of the task. Highly skilled tennis players gain little self-efficacy by defeating clearly
    inferior opponents, but they gain much by performing well against superior oppo-
    nents. Second, tasks successfully accomplished by oneself are more efficacious than
    those completed with the help of others. In sports, team accomplishments do not
    increase personal efficacy as much as do individual achievements. Third, failure is
    most likely to decrease efficacy when we know that we put forth our best effort.
    To fail when only half-trying is not as inefficacious as to fall short in spite of our
    best efforts. Fourth, failure under conditions of high emotional arousal or distress
    is not as self-debilitating as failure under maximal conditions. Fifth, failure prior to
    establishing a sense of mastery is more detrimental to feelings of personal efficacy
    than later failure. A sixth and related corollary is that occasional failure has little
    effect on efficacy, especially for people with a generally high expectancy of success.
    Social Modeling A second source of efficacy is social modeling: that is, vicarious
    experiences provided by other people. Our self-efficacy is raised when we observe
    the accomplishments of another person of equal competence, but is lowered when
    we see a peer fail. When the other person is dissimilar to us, social modeling will
    have little effect on our self-efficacy. An old, sedentary coward watching a young,
    active, brave circus performer successfully walk a high wire will undoubtedly have
    little enhancement of efficacy expectations for duplicating the feat.
    The most influential source of self-efficacy
    is performance. © Purestock/SuperStock

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories508
    In general, the effects of social modeling are not as strong as those of per-
    sonal performance in raising levels of efficacy, but they can have powerful effects
    where inefficacy is concerned. Watching a swimmer of equal ability fail to nego-
    tiate a choppy river will likely dissuade the observer from attempting the same
    task. The effects of this vicarious experience may even last a lifetime.
    Social Persuasion Self-efficacy can also be acquired or weakened through social
    persuasion (Bandura, 1997). The effects of this source are limited, but under proper
    conditions, persuasion from others can raise or lower self-efficacy. The first condi-
    tion is that a person must believe the persuader. Exhortations or criticisms from a
    credible source have more efficacious power than do those from a noncredible
    person. Boosting self-efficacy through social persuasion will be effective only if
    the activity one is being encouraged to try is within one’s repertoire of behavior.
    No amount of verbal persuasion can alter a person’s efficacy judgment on the
    ability to run 100 meters in less than 8 seconds.
    Bandura (1986) hypothesizes that the efficacious power of suggestion is directly
    related to the perceived status and authority of the persuader. Status and authority, of
    course, are not identical. For example, a psychotherapist’s suggestion to phobic
    patients that they can ride in a crowded elevator is more likely to increase self-efficacy
    than will encouragement from one’s spouse or children. But if that same psycho-
    therapist tells patients that they have the ability to change a faulty light switch, these
    patients will probably not enhance their self-efficacy for this activity. Also, social
    persuasion is most effective when combined with successful performance. Persuasion
    may convince someone to attempt an activity, and if performance is successful, both the
    accomplishment and the subsequent verbal rewards will increase future efficacy.
    Physical and Emotional States The final source of efficacy is people’s physiologi-
    cal and emotional states (Bandura, 1997). Strong emotion ordinarily lowers perfor-
    mance; when people experience intense fear, acute anxiety, or high levels of stress,
    they are likely to have lower efficacy expectancies. An actor in a school play knows
    his lines during rehearsal but realizes that the fear he feels on opening night may
    block his recall. Incidentally, for some situations, emotional arousal, if not too intense,
    is associated with increased performance, so that moderate anxiety felt by that actor
    on opening night may raise his efficacy expectancies. Most people, when not afraid,
    have the ability to successfully handle poisonous snakes. They merely have to grasp
    the snake firmly behind the head; but for many people, the fear that accompanies
    snake handling is debilitating and greatly lowers their performance expectancy.
    Psychotherapists have long recognized that a reduction in anxiety or an
    increase in physical relaxation can facilitate performance. Arousal information is
    related to several variables. First, of course, is the level of arousal—ordinarily, the
    higher the arousal, the lower the self-efficacy. The second variable is the perceived
    realism of the arousal. If one knows that the fear is realistic, as when driving on
    an icy mountain road, personal efficacy may be raised. However, when one is
    cognizant of the absurdity of the phobia—for example, fear of the outdoors—then
    the emotional arousal tends to lower efficacy. Finally, the nature of the task is an
    added variable. Emotional arousal may facilitate the successful completion of
    simple tasks, but it is likely to interfere with performance of complex activities.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 509
    Although self-efficacy is “the foundation of human agency” (Bandura, 2001,
    p. 10), it is not the only mode of human agency. People can also exercise control
    over their lives through proxy and through collective efficacy.
    Proxy Agency
    Proxy involves indirect control over those social conditions that affect everyday
    living. Bandura (2001) noted that “no one has the time, energy, and resources to
    master every realm of everyday life. Successful functioning necessarily involves a
    blend of reliance on proxy agency in some areas of functioning” (p. 13). In mod-
    ern American society, people would be nearly helpless if they relied solely on
    personal accomplishments to regulate their lives. Most people do not have the
    personal capability to repair an air conditioner, a camera, or an automobile. Through
    proxy agency, however, they can accomplish their goal by relying on other people
    to repair these objects. People attempt to change their daily lives by contacting
    their congressional representative or another potentially influential person; they
    acquire mentors to help them learn useful skills; they hire a young neighbor to
    mow their grass; they rely on international news services to learn of recent events;
    they retain lawyers to solve legal problems; and so on.
    Proxy, however, has a downside. By relying too much on the competence and
    power of others, people may weaken their sense of personal and collective efficacy.
    One spouse may become dependent on the other to care for the household; late
    adolescent or early adult-age children may expect parents to take care of them; and
    citizens may learn to rely on their government to provide for the necessities of life.
    Collective Efficacy
    The third mode of human agency is collective efficacy. Bandura (2000) defined
    collective efficacy as “people’s shared beliefs in their collective power to produce
    desired results” (p. 75). In other words, collective efficacy is the confidence people
    have that their combined efforts will bring about group accomplishments. Bandura
    (2000) suggested two techniques for measuring collective efficacy. The first is to
    combine individual members’ evaluations of their personal capabilities to enact
    behaviors that benefit the group. For example, actors in a play would have high col-
    lective efficacy if all had confidence in their personal ability to adequately perform
    their roles. The second approach proposed by Bandura is to measure the confidence
    each person has in the group’s ability to bring about a desired outcome. For example,
    baseball players may have little confidence in each of their teammates but possess
    high confidence that their team will perform quite well. These two slightly different
    approaches to collective efficacy call for separate measuring techniques.
    Collective efficacy does not spring from a collective “mind” but rather from
    the personal efficacy of many individuals working together. A group’s collective
    efficacy, however, depends not only on the knowledge and skills of its individual
    members but also on their beliefs that they can work together in a coordinated and
    interactive fashion (Bandura, 2000). People may have high self-efficacy but low
    collective efficacy. For example, a woman may have high personal efficacy that she
    can pursue a healthy lifestyle, but she may have low collective efficacy that she can

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories510
    reduce environmental pollution, hazardous working conditions, or the threat of infec-
    tious disease.
    Bandura (1998b) pointed out that different cultures have different levels of
    collective efficacy and work more productively under different systems. For exam-
    ple, people in the United States, an individualistic culture, feel greater self-efficacy
    and work best under an individually oriented system, whereas people in China, a
    collectivist culture, feel greater collective efficacy and work best under a group-
    oriented system.
    Bandura (1997, 1998b, 2001) lists several factors that can undermine collec-
    tive efficacy. First, humans live in a transnational world; what happens in one part
    of the globe can affect people in other countries, giving them a sense of helpless-
    ness. Destruction of the Amazon rain forests, international trade policies, or deple-
    tion of the ozone layers, for example, can affect the lives of people everywhere
    and undermine their confidence to shape a better world for themselves.
    Second, recent technology that people neither understand nor believe that
    they can control may lower their sense of collective efficacy. In past years, many
    motorists, for example, had confidence in their ability to keep their car in running
    condition. With the advent of computerized controls in modern automobiles, many
    moderately skilled mechanics not only have lost personal efficacy for repairing
    their vehicle but also have low collective efficacy for reversing the trend toward
    more and more complicated automobiles.
    A third condition undermining collective efficacy is the complex social
    machinery, with layers of bureaucracy that prevent social change. People who
    attempt to change bureaucratic structures are often discouraged by failure or by
    the long lapse of time between their actions and any noticeable change. Having
    become discouraged, many people, “rather than developing the means for shaping
    their own future, . . . grudgingly relinquish control to technical specialists and to
    public officials” (Bandura, 1995, p. 37).
    Fourth, the tremendous scope and magnitude of human problems can under-
    mine collective efficacy. Wars, famine, overpopulation, crime, and natural disasters
    are but a few of the global problems that can leave people with a sense of power-
    lessness. Despite these huge transnational problems, Bandura believes that positive
    changes are possible if people will persevere with their collective efforts and not
    become discouraged.
    Taking a worldwide view, Bandura (2000) concluded that “as globalization
    reaches ever deeper into people’s lives, a resilient sense of shared efficacy becomes
    critical to furthering their common interests” (p. 78).
    Self-Regulation
    When people have high levels of self-efficacy, are confident in their reliance on
    proxies, and possess solid collective efficacy, they will have considerable capacity
    to regulate their own behavior. Bandura (1994) believes that people use both reactive
    and proactive strategies for self-regulation. That is, they reactively attempt to reduce
    the discrepancies between their accomplishments and their goal; but after they close
    those discrepancies, they proactively set newer and higher goals for themselves.
    “People motivate and guide their actions through proactive control by setting them-
    selves valued goals that create a state of disequilibrium and then mobilizing their

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 511
    abilities and effort based on anticipatory estimation of what is required to reach the
    goals” (p. 63). The notion that people seek a state of disequilibrium is similar to
    Gordon Allport’s belief that people are motivated at least as much to create tension
    as to reduce it (see Chapter 12).
    What processes contribute to this self-regulation? First, people possess lim-
    ited ability to manipulate the external factors that feed into the reciprocal interac-
    tive paradigm. Second, people are capable of monitoring their own behavior and
    evaluating it in terms of both proximate and distant goals. Behavior, then, stems
    from a reciprocal influence of both external and internal factors.
    External Factors in Self-Regulation
    External factors affect self-regulation in at least two ways. First, they provide us
    with a standard for evaluating our own behavior. Standards do not stem solely from
    internal forces. Environmental factors, interacting with personal influences, shape
    individual standards for evaluation. By precept, we learn from parents and teachers
    the value of honest and friendly behavior; by direct experience, we learn to place
    more value on being warm and dry than on being cold and wet; and through observ-
    ing others, we evolve a multitude of standards for evaluating self-performance. In
    each of these examples, personal factors affect which standards we will learn, but
    environmental forces also play a role.
    Second, external factors influence self-regulation by providing the means for
    reinforcement. Intrinsic rewards are not always sufficient; we also need incentives
    that emanate from external factors. An artist, for example, may require more rein-
    forcement than self-satisfaction to complete a large mural. Environmental support
    in the form of a monetary retainer or praise and encouragement from others may
    also be necessary.
    The incentives to complete a lengthy project usually come from the environ-
    ment and often take the form of small rewards contingent upon the completion of
    subgoals. The artist may enjoy a cup of coffee after having painted the hand of
    one of the subjects or break for lunch after finishing another small section of the
    mural. However, self-reward for inadequate performance is likely to result in envi-
    ronmental sanctions. Friends may criticize or mock the artist’s work, patrons may
    withdraw financial support, or the artist may be self-critical. When performance
    does not meet self-standards, we tend to withhold rewards from ourselves.
    Internal Factors in Self-Regulation
    External factors interact with internal or personal factors in self-regulation. Bandura
    (1986, 1996) recognizes three internal requirements in the ongoing exercise of self-
    influence: (1) self-observation, (2) judgmental processes, and (3) self-reaction.
    Self-Observation
    The first internal factor in self-regulation is self-observation of performance. We must
    be able to monitor our own performance, even though the attention we give to it need
    not be complete or even accurate. We attend selectively to some aspects of our behav-
    ior and ignore others altogether. What we observe depends on interests and other

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories512
    preexisting self-conceptions. In achievement situations, such as painting pictures, play-
    ing games, or taking examinations, we pay attention to the quality, quantity, speed,
    or originality of our work. In interpersonal situations, such as meeting new acquain-
    tances or reporting on events, we monitor the sociability or morality of our conduct.
    Judgmental Process
    Self-observation alone does not provide a sufficient basis for regulating behavior.
    We must also evaluate our performance. This second process, judgmental process,
    helps us regulate our behavior through the process of cognitive mediation. We are
    capable not only of reflective self-awareness but also of judging the worth of our
    actions on the basis of goals we have set for ourselves. More specifically, the
    judgmental process depends on personal standards, referential performances, valu-
    ation of activity, and performance attribution.
    Personal standards allow us to evaluate our performances without comparing
    them to the conduct of others. To a profoundly handicapped 10-year-old child, the
    act of tying his shoelaces may be highly prized. He need not devalue his accomplish-
    ment simply because other children can perform this same act at a younger age.
    Personal standards, however, are a limited source of evaluation. For most of
    our activities, we evaluate our performances by comparing them to a standard of
    reference. Students compare their test scores to those of their classmates, and tennis
    players judge their personal skills against those of other players. In addition, we use
    our own previous levels of accomplishment as a reference for evaluating present
    performance: “Has my singing voice improved over the years?” “Is my teaching abil-
    ity better now than ever?” Also, we may judge our performance by comparing it to
    Observing our own performance is a first step in self-regulation. © Image Source/Getty Images

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 513
    that of a single individual—a brother, sister, parent, or even a hated rival—or we can
    compare it to a standard norm such as par in golf or a perfect score in bowling.
    Besides personal and reference standards, the judgmental process is also
    dependent on the overall value we place on an activity. If we place minor value
    on our ability to wash dishes or dust furniture, then we will spend little time or
    effort in trying to improve these abilities. On the other hand, if we place high value
    on getting ahead in the business world or attaining a professional or graduate
    degree, then we will expend much effort to achieve success in these areas.
    Finally, self-regulation also depends on how we judge the causes of our
    behavior, that is, performance attribution. If we believe that our success is due to
    our own efforts, we will take pride in our accomplishments and tend to work harder
    to attain our goals. However, if we attribute our performance to external factors,
    we will not derive as much self-satisfaction and will probably not put forth stren-
    uous effort to attain our goals. Conversely, if we believe that we are responsible
    for our own failures or inadequate performance, we will work more readily toward
    self-regulation than if we are convinced that our shortcomings and our fears are
    due to factors beyond our control (Bandura, 1986, 1996).
    Self-Reaction
    The third and final internal factor in self-regulation is self-reaction. People respond
    positively or negatively to their behaviors depending on how these behaviors mea-
    sure up to their personal standards. That is, people create incentives for their own
    actions through self-reinforcement or self-punishment. For example, a diligent stu-
    dent who has completed a reading assignment may reward herself by watching her
    favorite television program.
    Self-reinforcement does not rest on the fact that it immediately follows a
    response: Rather, it relies in large part on the use of our cognitive ability to medi-
    ate the consequences of behavior. People set standards for performance that, when
    met, tend to regulate behavior by such self-produced rewards as pride and self-
    satisfaction. When people fail to meet their standards, their behavior is followed
    by self-dissatisfaction or self-criticism.
    This concept of self-mediated consequences is a sharp contrast to Skinner’s
    notion that the consequences of behavior are environmentally determined. Bandura
    hypothesizes that people work to attain rewards and to avoid punishments accord-
    ing to self-erected standards. Even when rewards are tangible, they are often
    accompanied by self-mediated intangible incentives such as a sense of accomplish-
    ment. The Nobel Prize, for example, carries a substantial cash award, but its greater
    value to most recipients must be the feeling of pride or self-satisfaction in perform-
    ing the tasks that led to the award.
    Self-Regulation Through Moral Agency
    People also regulate their actions through moral standards of conduct. Bandura
    (1999a) sees moral agency as having two aspects: (1) doing no harm to people and
    (2) proactively helping people. Our self-regulative mechanisms, however, do not
    affect other people until we act on them. We have no automatic internal controlling
    agent such as a conscience or superego that invariably directs our behavior toward

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories514
    morally consistent values. Bandura (2002a) insists that moral precepts predict
    moral behavior only when those precepts are converted to action. In other words,
    self-regulatory influences are not automatic but operate only if they are activated,
    a concept Bandura calls selective activation.
    How can people with strong moral beliefs concerning the worth and dignity of
    all humankind behave in an inhumane manner to other humans? Bandura’s (1994)
    answer is that “people do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they
    have justified to themselves the morality of their actions” (p. 72). By justifying the
    morality of their actions, they can separate or disengage themselves from the conse-
    quences of their behavior, a concept Bandura calls disengagement of internal control.
    Disengagement techniques allow people, individually or working in concert
    with others, to engage in inhumane behaviors while retaining their moral standards
    (Bandura, 2002a). For example, politicians frequently convince their constituents
    of the morality of war. Thus, wars are fought against “evil” people, people who
    deserve to be defeated or even annihilated.
    Selective activation and disengagement of internal control allow people with
    the same moral standards to behave quite differently, just as they permit the same
    person to behave differently in different situations. Figure 17.2 illustrates the var-
    ious mechanisms through which self-control is disengaged or selectively activated.
    First, people can redefine or reconstruct the nature of the behavior itself by such
    techniques as morally justifying it, making advantageous comparisons, or euphe-
    mistically labeling their actions. Second, they can minimize, ignore, or distort the
    detrimental consequences of their behavior. Third, they can blame or dehumanize
    the victim. Fourth, they can displace or diffuse responsibility for their behavior by
    obscuring the relationship between their actions and the effects of those actions.
    Redefine the Behavior
    With redefinition of behavior, people justify otherwise reprehensible actions by a
    cognitive restructuring that allows them to minimize or escape responsibility. They
    can relieve themselves of responsibility for their behavior by at least three tech-
    niques (see upper-left box in Figure 17.2).
    Reprehensible
    conduct
    Detrimental
    e
    ects
    Victim
    Moral justification
    Palliative comparison
    Euphemistic labeling
    Displacement of responsibility
    Di�usion of responsibility
    Minimizing, ignoring,
    or misconstruing
    the consequences
    Dehumanization
    Attribution of blame
    FIGURE 17.2 Mechanisms through which internal control is selectively activated or
    disengaged from reprehensible conduct at different points in the regulatory process.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 515
    The first is moral justification, in which otherwise culpable behavior is made
    to seem defensible or even noble. Bandura (1986) cited the example of World War
    I hero Sergeant Alvin York who, as a conscientious objector, believed that killing
    was morally wrong. After his battalion commander quoted from the Bible the condi-
    tions under which it was morally justified to kill and after a long prayer vigil, York
    became convinced that killing enemy soldiers was morally defensible. Following his
    redefining killing, York proceeded to kill and capture more than 100 German soldiers
    and, as a result, became one of the greatest war heroes in American history.
    A second method of reducing responsibility through redefining wrongful
    behavior is to make advantageous or palliative comparisons between that behavior
    and the even greater atrocities committed by others. The child who vandalizes a
    school building uses the excuse that others broke even more windows.
    A third technique in redefining behavior is the use of euphemistic labels.
    Politicians who have pledged not to raise taxes speak of “revenue enhancement”
    rather than taxes; some Nazi leaders called the murder of millions of Jews the
    “purification of Europe” or “the final solution.”
    Disregard or Distort the Consequences of Behavior
    A second method of avoiding responsibility involves distorting or obscuring the rela-
    tionship between the behavior and its detrimental consequences (see upper-center box
    of Figure 17.2). Bandura (1986, 1999a) recognized at least three techniques of distort-
    ing or obscuring the detrimental consequences of one’s actions. First, people can
    minimize the consequences of their behavior. For example, a driver runs a red light
    and strikes a pedestrian. As the injured party lies bleeding and unconscious on the
    pavement, the driver says, “She’s not really hurt badly. She’s going to be okay.”
    Second, people can disregard or ignore the consequences of their actions,
    as when they do not see firsthand the harmful effects of their behavior. In wartime,
    heads of state and army generals seldom view the total destruction and death result-
    ing from their decisions.
    Finally, people can distort or misconstrue the consequences of their actions,
    as when a parent beats a child badly enough to cause serious bruises but explains
    that the child needs discipline in order to mature properly.
    Dehumanize or Blame the Victims
    Third, people can obscure responsibility for their actions by either dehumanizing
    their victims or attributing blame to them (see upper-right box in Figure 17.2).
    In time of war, people often see the enemy as subhuman, so they need not feel
    guilty for killing enemy soldiers. At various times in U.S. history, Jews, African
    Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, homosexu-
    als, and street people have become dehumanized victims. Otherwise kind, consider-
    ate, and gentle people have perpetrated acts of violence, insult, or other forms of
    mistreatment against these groups while avoiding responsibility for their own
    behavior.
    When victims are not dehumanized, they are sometimes blamed for the per-
    petrator’s culpable conduct. A rapist may blame his victim for his crime, citing
    her provocative dress or behavior.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories516
    Displace or Diffuse Responsibility
    The fourth method of dissociating actions from their consequences is to displace
    or diffuse responsibility (see lower box in Figure 17.2). With displacement, people
    minimize the consequences of their actions by placing responsibility on an outside
    source. Examples include an employee who claims that her boss is responsible for
    her inefficiency and a college student who blames his professor for low grades.
    A related procedure is to diffuse responsibility—to spread it so thin that no
    one person is responsible. A civil servant may diffuse responsibility for her actions
    throughout the entire bureaucracy with such comments as “That’s the way things
    are done around here” or “That’s just policy.”
    Dysfunctional Behavior
    Bandura’s concept of triadic reciprocal causation assumes that behavior is learned
    as a result of a mutual interaction of (1) the person, including cognition and neu-
    rophysiological processes; (2) the environment, including interpersonal relations
    and socioeconomic conditions; and (3) behavioral factors, including previous expe-
    riences with reinforcement. Dysfunctional behavior is no exception. Bandura’s
    concept of dysfunctional behavior lends itself most readily to depressive reactions,
    phobias, and aggressive behaviors.
    Depression
    High personal standards and goals can lead to achievement and self-satisfaction.
    However, when people set their goals too high, they are likely to fail. Failure
    frequently leads to depression, and depressed people often undervalue their own
    accomplishments. The result is chronic misery, feelings of worthlessness, lack of
    purposefulness, and pervasive depression. Bandura (1986, 1997) believes that dysfunc-
    tional depression can occur in any of the three self-regulatory subfunctions: (1) self-
    observation, (2) judgmental processes, and (3) self-reactions.
    First, during self-observation, people can misjudge their own performance or
    distort their memory of past accomplishments. Depressed people tend to exagger-
    ate their past mistakes and minimize their prior accomplishments, a tendency that
    perpetuates their depression.
    Second, depressed people are likely to make faulty judgments. They set
    their standards unrealistically high so that any personal accomplishment will be judged
    as a failure. Even when they achieve success in the eyes of others, they continue to
    berate their own performance. Depression is especially likely when people set goals
    and personal standards much higher than their perceived efficacy to attain them.
    Finally, the self-reactions of depressed individuals are quite different from
    those of nondepressed persons. Depressed people not only judge themselves
    harshly, but they are also inclined to treat themselves badly for their shortcomings.
    Phobias
    Phobias are fears that are strong enough and pervasive enough to have severe
    debilitating effects on one’s daily life. For example, snake phobias prevent people

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 517
    from holding a variety of jobs and from enjoying many kinds of recreational activ-
    ities. Phobias and fears are learned by direct contact, inappropriate generalization,
    and especially by observational experiences (Bandura, 1986). They are difficult to
    extinguish if the phobic person simply avoids the threatening object. Unless the
    fearsome object is somehow encountered, the phobia will endure indefinitely.
    Bandura (1986) credits television and other news media for generating many
    of our fears. Well-publicized rapes, armed robberies, or murders can terrorize a
    community, causing people to live more confined lives behind locked doors. Most
    people have never been raped, robbed, or intentionally injured; yet many live in
    fear of being criminally assaulted. Violent criminal acts that seem random and are
    most likely to instigate phobic reactions.
    Once established, phobias are maintained by consequent determinants: that
    is, the negative reinforcement the phobic person receives for avoiding the fear-
    producing situation. For example, if people expect to receive aversive experiences
    (being mugged) while walking through the city park, they will reduce their feeling
    of threat by not entering the park or even going near it. In this example, dysfunc-
    tional (avoidance) behavior is produced and maintained by the mutual interaction of
    people’s expectancies (belief that they will be mugged), the external environment
    (the city park), and behavioral factors (their prior experiences with fear).
    Aggression
    Aggressive behaviors, when carried to extremes, can also be dysfunctional. Ban-
    dura (1986) contended that aggressive behavior is acquired through observation of
    others, direct experiences with positive and negative reinforcements, training, or
    instruction, and bizarre beliefs.
    Phobias can interfere with daily functioning. © Kevin Landwer-Johan/iStock/Getty Images Plus/Getty
    Images

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories518
    Once established, people continue to aggress for at least five reasons:
    (1) They enjoy inflicting injury on the victim (positive reinforcement); (2) they
    avoid or counter the aversive consequences of aggression by others (negative rein-
    forcement); (3) they receive injury or harm for not behaving aggressively (punish-
    ment); (4) they live up to their personal standards of conduct by their aggressive
    behavior (self-reinforcement); and (5) they observe others receiving rewards for
    aggressive acts or punishment for nonaggressive behavior.
    Bandura believes that aggressive actions ordinarily lead to further aggression.
    This belief is based on the now classic study of Bandura, Dorrie Ross, and Sheila
    Ross (1963), which found that children who observed others behaving aggressively
    displayed more aggression than a control group of children who did not view
    aggressive acts. In this study, the experimenters divided Stanford University nursery
    school boys and girls into three matched experimental groups and one control group.
    Children in the first experimental group observed a live model behaving with
    both verbal and physical aggression toward a number of toys, including a large
    inflated Bobo doll; the second experimental group observed a film showing the
    same model behaving in an identical manner; the third experimental group saw a
    fantasy film in which a model, dressed as a black cat, behaved equally aggressively
    against the Bobo doll. Children in the control group were matched with those in
    the experimental groups on previous ratings of aggression, but they were not sub-
    jected to an aggressive model.
    After children in the three experimental groups observed a model scolding,
    kicking, punching, and hitting the Bobo doll with a mallet, they proceeded into
    another room where they were mildly frustrated. Immediately following this frus-
    tration, each child went into the experimental room, which contained some toys
    (such as a smaller version of the Bobo doll) that could be played with aggressively.
    In addition, some nonaggressive toys (such as a tea set and coloring materials)
    were present. Observers watched the children’s aggressive or nonaggressive
    response to the toys through a one-way mirror.
    As hypothesized, children exposed to an aggressive model displayed more
    aggressive responses than those who had not been exposed. But contrary to expec-
    tations, the researchers found no differences in the amount of total aggression
    shown by children in the three experimental groups. Children who had observed
    the cartoon character were at least as aggressive as those exposed to a live model
    or to a filmed model. In general, children in each experimental group exhibited
    about twice as much aggressive behavior as did those in the control group. In
    addition, the particular kind of aggressive response was remarkably similar to that
    displayed by the adult models. Children scolded, kicked, punched, and hit the doll
    with a mallet in close imitation to the behavior that had been modeled.
    This study, now more than 40 years old, was conducted at a time when
    people still debated the effects of television violence on children and adults. Some
    people argued that viewing aggressive behaviors on television would have a
    cathartic effect on children: That is, children who experienced aggression vicari-
    ously would have little motivation to act in an aggressive manner. The study by
    Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1963) offered some of the earliest experimental evi-
    dence that TV violence does not curb aggression; rather, it produces additional
    aggressive behaviors.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 519
    Therapy
    According to Bandura, deviant behaviors are initiated on the basis of social cogni-
    tive learning principles, and they are maintained because, in some ways, they
    continue to serve a purpose. Therapeutic change, therefore, is difficult because it
    involves eliminating behaviors that are satisfying to the person. Smoking, overeat-
    ing, and drinking alcoholic beverages, for example, generally have positive effects
    initially, and their long-range aversive consequences are usually not sufficient to
    produce avoidance behavior.
    The ultimate goal of social cognitive therapy is self-regulation (Bandura,
    1986). To achieve this end, the therapist introduces strategies designed to induce
    specific behavioral changes, to generalize those changes to other situations, and to
    maintain those changes by preventing relapse.
    The first step in successful therapy is to instigate some change in behavior.
    For example, if a therapist is able to extinguish fear of height in a previously acro-
    phobic person, then change has been induced and that person will have no fear of
    climbing a 20-foot ladder. A more important level of therapy is to generalize spe-
    cific changes. For example, the acrophobic person not only will be able to ascend
    a ladder but also will be able to ride in airplanes or look out windows of tall build-
    ings. Some therapies induce change and facilitate generalization, but in time, the
    therapeutic effects are lost and the person reacquires the dysfunctional behavior.
    This relapse is particularly likely when people are extinguishing maladaptive habits
    such as smoking and overeating. The most effective therapy reaches the third level
    of accomplishment, which is maintenance of newly acquired functional behaviors.
    Bandura (1986) has suggested several basic treatment approaches. The first
    includes overt or vicarious modeling. People who observe live or filmed models
    performing threatening activities often feel less fear and anxiety and are then able
    to perform those same activities.
    In a second treatment mode, covert or cognitive modeling, the therapist trains
    patients to visualize models performing fearsome behaviors. Overt and covert mod-
    eling strategies are most effective, however, when combined with performance-
    oriented approaches.
    A third procedure, called enactive mastery, requires patients to perform those
    behaviors that previously produced incapacitating fears. Enactment, however, is not
    ordinarily the first step in treatment. Patients typically begin by observing models
    or by having their emotional arousal lessened through systematic desensitization,
    which involves the extinction of anxiety or fear through self-induced or therapist-
    induced relaxation. With systematic desensitization, the therapist and patient work
    together to place fearsome situations on a hierarchy from least to most threatening
    (Wolpe, 1973). Patients, while relaxed, enact the least threatening behavior and then
    gradually move through the hierarchy until they can perform the most threatening
    activity, all the while remaining at a low state of emotional arousal.
    Bandura has demonstrated that each of these strategies can be effective and
    that they are most powerful when used in combination with one another. Bandura
    (1989) believes that the reason for their effectiveness can be traced to a common
    mechanism found in each of these approaches, namely, cognitive mediation. When
    people use cognition to increase self-efficacy—that is, when they become convinced

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories520
    that they can perform difficult tasks—then, in fact, they become able to cope with
    previously intimidating situations.
    Related Research
    The social cognitive theory of Albert Bandura continues to produce a great deal
    of research in several domains of psychology, with the concept of self-efficacy
    alone generating several hundred studies a year. Self-efficacy has been applied to
    a wide variety of domains, including academic performance, work production,
    depression, escaping homelessness, coping with terrorism, and health-related
    behaviors. We focus on how self-efficacy can be applied in three important social
    domains, namely promotion of health, bullying, and world population growth.
    Self-Efficacy and Diabetes
    One of the ways in which Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory has had the
    greatest impact on the daily lives of many individuals is in the promotion of health
    and the prevention of disease. Bandura himself has written about the usefulness of
    his theory for encouraging people to engage in healthy behaviors that can increase
    overall well-being, health, and longevity (Bandura, 1998b).
    Recently, William Sacco and colleagues (2007) studied Bandura’s construct of
    self-efficacy as it relates to Type 2 diabetes. Diabetes is a chronic disease that requires
    very careful management including a special diet and exercise regime. Diabetes pres-
    ents people with a variety of physical challenges, but it also is associated with sig-
    nificant mental health challenges. Indeed, the prevalence of depression among those
    with diabetes is double that of the general population (Anderson, Freedland, Clouse,
    & Lustman, 2001). One of the hallmark traits of depression is a lack of motivation
    and, given the strict diet and exercise plan diabetes patients must adhere to, this is
    particularly problematic for those trying to manage diabetes. The less patients adhere
    to their disease management plan the greater their diabetes symptoms become, which
    creates a downward spiral with negative implications for physical and mental health.
    Sacco and his colleagues (2007) therefore sought to explore the role of self-
    efficacy as a variable that could increase adherence to the disease management plan
    and decrease negative physical and mental health symptoms. Their prediction was that
    the greater level of self-efficacy patients felt, the more likely people would be to adhere
    to their disease management plan and therefore the better the patients would feel.
    In order to test their prediction, Sacco and colleagues recruited a sample of
    adults who had been diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes. Participants completed self-
    report measures of how much they adhered to their diet, exercise, glucose testing,
    and medication plan, a measure of depression, and a measure of self-efficacy spe-
    cifically tailored to assess how much self-efficacy they felt with regard to manag-
    ing their diabetes. Additionally, participants completed a measure of the frequency
    and severity of their diabetes symptoms, and their body mass index (BMI) was
    computed based on data from their medical records.
    The results of this study clearly demonstrated just how important self-efficacy
    is to the management of chronic disease. Higher levels of self-efficacy were related
    to lower levels of depression, increased adherence to doctors’ orders, lower BMI,
    and fewer and decreased severity of diabetes symptoms. Given these compelling

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 521
    results for the importance of self-efficacy, the researchers further examined its role
    in the management of diabetes. In other analyses, Sacco and his colleagues found
    that BMI was positively related to depression and that adherence to doctors’ orders
    was negatively related to depression.
    But might self-efficacy play a role in these relationships? To answer this
    question, the researchers conducted more complex analyses and what they found
    only further highlighted how important it is to feel as though you have a sense of
    control over your health when it comes to managing a disease like diabetes. Self-
    efficacy was directly responsible for both the relationship between BMI and
    depression and the relationship between adherence and depression. Specifically,
    having a high BMI led people to feel less self-efficacy, which in turn led to
    increased depression. Conversely, being able to adhere to the disease management
    plan served to increase self-efficacy, and it was this increase in a sense of control
    over the disease that was responsible for decreased depression.
    Moral Disengagement and Bullying
    When we do bad things we can convince ourselves that our behavior really was
    not bad or immoral—that the normal standards of morality do not apply to us in
    that situation. This is what social psychologists call “moral disengagement.” Ban-
    dura (2016) has very recently published a book entitled Moral Disengagement:
    How People Do Harm and Live with Themselves. In his book, Bandura reviews
    decades of research, anecdotal evidence, and intervention efforts grounded in his
    theory of self-regulation through moral agency.
    One area of pressing social concern relevant to moral disengagement is that
    of bullying among youth. We commonly think of “bad” or aggressive kids as lack-
    ing in moral reasoning that enables them to understand right from wrong. But recall
    that Bandura argued that self-regulation of our behavior involves more than reason-
    ing; moral behavior is enacted through a series of self-regulatory mechanisms that
    enable children to develop a sense of moral agency. This developed sense of moral
    agency is not static within us, however, and there are many psychological and
    social processes through which self-restraint or self-sanctions of “bad” behavior
    can be disengaged. This is how bullies can treat others aggressively without ever
    experiencing a sense of its moral “wrongness.” Bandura described mechanisms of
    moral disengagement that fall under
    a) redefining or cognitively restructuring one’s behavior in a positive light,
    b) minimizing the consequences of one’s role in the harm,
    c) disregarding or distorting the consequences of one’s harmful behavior, and finally
    d) stripping the victims of human qualities or blaming them for the harm done
    to them.
    Bandura and colleagues have developed self-report scales to measure
    proneness to moral disengagement that capture these mechanisms, and these
    scales have been modified for use in a variety of populations (e.g., The Moral
    Disengagement Scale, MDS; Bandura et al., 1996).
    Gini, Pozzoli, and Hymel (2014) conducted an important meta-analysis
    of 27 developmental research studies on the relationship between Bandura’s
    predictors of moral disengagement and bullying in school-aged children and

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories522
    adolescents. They concluded that overall levels of moral disengagement and
    aggressive behavior are often higher in boys than in girls, but that the relation-
    ship between moral disengagement and bullying style behaviors was the same
    for both genders. Generally speaking, the meta-analysis revealed that the higher
    children and teens score on the MDS, the more abusively they behave.
    Other studies have explored how bullying can be carried out not just by indi-
    viduals but, more typically, by groups of friends. This is known as collective moral
    disengagement, where classmates or teammates influence each other in a puzzling
    way; somehow the group moral disengagement is greater than all the individuals’
    perspectives added together. For instance, Gini, Pozzoli, and Bussey (2015) studied
    49 Italian public school 6th to 10th grade classes located in both urban and subur-
    ban areas. The total sample of individual middle- and high-school students was 918.
    Students completed individual measures of their own aggressive behavior, defending
    and passive bystanding behavior, as well as the MDS. In addition, the authors
    assessed collective moral disengagement by asking the children to rate 17 items
    using the framing “In your classroom, how many kids think that….” Some items
    included “it is alright to beat someone up who bad mouths your family”; “kids who
    get mistreated usually do things that deserve it” (Gini, Pozzoli, & Bussey, 2014).
    The results of this study showed that both individual and student-perceived
    collective moral disengagement were uniquely predictive of aggressive behavior
    toward peers. They found that bullying is more likely when students are both
    individually liable to use disengaged justifications of their treatment of victims
    (e.g., the victim “deserved” or somehow brought on their own suffering) and also
    believe that others in their classroom commonly engage in these same justifica-
    tions. Furthermore, and fascinatingly, only weak associations were found between
    individual moral disengagement and defending or passive bystander behaviors.
    Instead, a significant positive relationship was found between collective moral
    disengagement and defending on the part of bystanders. Individual students were
    more likely to defend victims of aggressive bullying if they perceived that their
    classmates tended to morally disengage. Gini et al. (2015) suggest that young
    people who step up to defend victims against bullies are able to resist the collective
    pressure to be passive and accept or even justify the bullying behavior. Somehow
    defenders feel more personal responsibility for standing up or calling out the bad
    behavior because others are not. Finally, classroom level collective moral disen-
    gagement predicted greater bullying and passive bystanding, whereas victim-
    defending was more frequent in classrooms with lower shared moral disengagement.
    Unfortunately, active intervention on the part of peers to protect or defend
    victims of bullying is quite rare, but still other work from Bandura’s perspec-
    tive has revealed that not all bystanders are created equal. Thornberg and
    Jungert (2013), for example, studied over 300 teenagers in Sweden and found
    that students’ levels of moral disengagement predicted how they responded to
    witnessing bullying. Those who scored particularly high on moral disengage-
    ment went beyond passive bystanding and actually were more likely to applaud
    or encourage bullies. In contrast, young people who viewed the treatment of
    victims as reprehensible were more likely to come to their aid. This was espe-
    cially true among bystanders who had high feelings of self-efficacy regarding
    their capacity to act as a mediator and to quiet bullies’ rage.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 523
    Bandura’s mechanisms of moral disengagement and theory of efficacy on
    both the individual and the collective level provide an excellent foundation for
    creating intervention efforts to put an end to bullying. An ambitious anti-bullying
    program to do so in Norway addressed the issue at the individual student, parent,
    classroom, school, and even entire community level, and evaluation of the program
    showed excellent results (e.g., Olweus & Limber, 2010).
    Social Cognitive Theory “Goes Global”
    Albert Bandura’s most recent work is taking social cognitive theory in brave, new
    applied directions to find solutions to global problems such as soaring population
    growth. In collaboration with the Population Media Center, a group who brings
    entertainment-education for social change to Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
    Bandura has helped to produce serial dramas that encourage evidence-based pos-
    itive change behaviors for television and radio audiences to model via observa-
    tional learning. These mass media productions have been shown to improve
    viewers’ perceived efficacy to determine their family size, increase the use of
    contraceptives, and promote the status of women in family, social, and educational
    life (Bandura, 2002c). Newer work in this collaborative team is exploring the
    efficacy of similar serial dramas to improve environmental preservation practices.
    In a presentation he gave to the British Psychological Society in 2009 on
    this remarkably effective application of his work, Bandura ended with the follow-
    ing call to action:
    Global problems instill a sense of paralysis in people. They feel that there is
    little they can do to reduce such problems. The mantra ‘think globally, act
    locally’ is an effort to localize the global. Our global applications increase the
    scale and scope of social cognitive theory in promoting personal and social
    changes. They illustrate how a collective effort, combining the expertise of
    different players, can have a worldwide impact on seemingly insurmountable
    problems. As a society, we enjoy the benefits left by those before us who
    collectively worked for social changes that improved our lives. Our own
    collective efficacy will determine whether we pass on a habitable planet to our
    grandchildren and future generations. So, as you bring our knowledge, and your
    personal influence to bear, on saving our battered planet: May the efficacy force
    be with you! (Bandura, 2009, p. 506)
    This exciting new collaborative work is a powerful illustration of how a per-
    sonality theory can frame solutions to global social problems. Self-efficacy is clearly
    a construct with far-reaching implications not only for our own personal lives, but
    for collective action. Given this, it is easy to see why Albert Bandura’s theory
    continues to generate the impressive amount of research and application it does.
    Critique of Bandura
    Albert Bandura has evolved his social cognitive theory by a careful balance of the
    two principal components of theory building—innovative speculation and accurate
    observation. His theoretical speculations have seldom outdistanced his data but have
    been carefully advanced, only one step in front of observations. This scientifically

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories524
    sound procedure increases the likelihood that his hypotheses will yield positive
    results and that his theory will generate additional testable hypotheses.
    The usefulness of Bandura’s personality theory, like that of other theories,
    rests on its ability to generate research, to offer itself to falsification, and to organize
    knowledge. In addition, it must serve as a practical guide to action and be internally
    consistent and parsimonious. How does Bandura’s theory rate on these six criteria?
    Bandura’s theory has generated several thousand research studies and thus
    receives a very high rating on its capacity to generate research. Bandura and his
    student colleagues have conducted much of the work, but other researchers, too,
    have been attracted to the theory. Bandura may be the most meticulous writer of
    all personality theorists. His carefully constructed formulations lend themselves to
    the formation of numerous testable hypotheses.
    On the standard of falsifiability, we rate Bandura’s theory high. Self-efficacy
    theory suggests that “people’s beliefs in their personal efficacy influence what courses
    of action they choose to pursue, how much effort they will invest in activities, how
    long they will persevere in the face of obstacles and failure experiences, and their
    resiliency following setbacks” (Bandura, 1994, p. 65). This statement suggests several
    areas of possible research that could lead to falsification of self-efficacy theory.
    On its ability to organize knowledge, Bandura’s theory receives a high rating.
    Many findings from psychology research can be organized by social cognitive
    theory. The triadic reciprocal causation model is a comprehensive concept that
    offers a viable explanation for the acquisition of most observable behaviors. The
    inclusion of three variables in this paradigm gives Bandura’s theory more flexibil-
    ity to organize and explain behavior than does Skinner’s radical behaviorism,
    which relies heavily on environmental variables.
    How practical is Bandura’s social cognitive theory? To the therapist, teacher,
    parent, or anyone interested in the acquisition and maintenance of new behaviors,
    self-efficacy theory provides useful and specific guidelines. In addition to present-
    ing techniques for enhancing personal and collective efficacy and for efficient use
    of proxies, Bandura’s theory suggests ways in which observational learning and
    modeling can be used to acquire behaviors.
    Is the theory internally consistent? Because Bandura’s social cognitive theory
    is not highly speculative, it has outstanding internal consistency. Bandura is not afraid
    to speculate, but he never ventures far beyond the empirical data available to him.
    The result is a carefully couched, rigorously written, and internally consistent theory.
    The final criterion of a useful theory is parsimony. Again, Bandura’s theory
    meets high standards. The theory is simple, straightforward, and unencumbered by
    hypothetical or fanciful explanations.
    Concept of Humanity
    Bandura sees humans as having the capacity to become many things, and
    most of these things are learned through modeling. If human learning were
    dependent on direct experience of trial and error, it would be exceedingly
    slow, tedious, and dangerous. Fortunately, “humans have evolved an advanced

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 525
    cognitive capacity for observational learning that enables them to shape and
    structure their lives through the power of modeling” (Bandura 2002a, p. 167).
    Bandura believes that people are quite plastic and flexible, and that
    plasticity and flexibility are the essence of humanity’s basic nature. Because
    humans have evolved neurophysiological mechanisms for symbolizing their
    experiences, their nature is marked by a large degree of flexibility. People
    have the capacity to store past experiences and to use this information to
    chart future actions.
    People’s capacity to use symbols provides them with a powerful tool
    for understanding and controlling their environment. It enables them to solve
    problems without resorting to inefficient trial-and-error behavior, to imagine
    the consequences of their actions, and to set goals for themselves.
    Humans are goal-directed, purposive animals who can view the future
    and bestow it with meaning by being aware of the possible consequences
    of future behavior. Humans anticipate the future and behave accordingly in
    the present. The future does not determine behavior, but its cognitive rep-
    resentation can have a powerful effect on present actions. “People set goals
    for themselves, anticipate the likely consequences of prospective actions,
    and select and create courses of action likely to produce desired outcomes
    and avoid detrimental ones” (Bandura, 2001, p. 7).
    Although people are basically goal oriented, Bandura believes that
    they have specific rather than general intentions and purposes. People
    are not motivated by a single master goal such as striving for superiority
    or self-actualization but by a multiplicity of goals, some distant and some
    proximate. These individual intentions, however, are not ordinarily anar-
    chical; they possess some stability and order. Cognition gives people the
    capacity to evaluate probable consequences and to eliminate behaviors
    that do not meet their standards of conduct. Personal standards, there-
    fore, tend to give human behavior a degree of consistency, even though
    that behavior lacks a master motive to guide it.
    Bandura’s concept of humanity is more optimistic than pessimistic, because
    it holds that people are capable of learning new behaviors throughout their lives.
    However, dysfunctional behaviors may persist because of low self-efficacy or
    because they are perceived as being reinforced. Nevertheless, these unhealthy
    behaviors need not continue, because most people have the capacity to change
    by imitating the productive behaviors of others and by using their cognitive
    abilities to solve problems.
    Bandura’s social cognitive theory, of course, emphasizes social factors
    more than biological ones. However, it recognizes that genetics contributes
    to the person (P) variable in the triadic reciprocal causation paradigm. But
    even within this model, cognition ordinarily gains ascendance, so biological
    factors become less important. Moreover, social factors are clearly more
    crucial to the other two variables—environment (E) and behavior (B).
    We rate Bandura high on freedom versus determinism because he
    believes that people can exercise a large measure of control over their lives.
    Although people are affected by both their environment and their experiences
    with reinforcement, they have some power to mold these two external condi-
    tions. To some extent, people can manage those environmental conditions

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories526
    that will shape future behavior and can choose to ignore or augment previous
    experiences. Human agency suggests that people who have high personal
    and collective efficacy and who make efficient use of proxies have a great
    amount of influence on their own actions. However, some people have more
    freedom than others because they are more adept at regulating their own
    behavior. Bandura (1986) defined freedom as “the number of options available
    to people and their right to exercise them” (p. 42). Personal freedom, then, is
    limited; it is restricted by physical constraints such as laws, prejudices, regula-
    tions, and the rights of other people. In addition, personal factors such as
    perceived inefficacy and lack of confidence restrict individual freedom.
    On the issue of causality or teleology, Bandura’s position would be
    described as moderate. Human functioning is a product of environmental factors
    interacting with behavior and personal variables, especially cognitive activity.
    People move with a purpose toward goals that they have set, but motivation
    exists in neither the past nor the future; it is contemporary. Although future
    events cannot motivate people, people’s conception of the future can and
    does regulate present behavior.
    Social cognitive theory emphasizes conscious thought over unconscious
    determinants of behavior. Self-regulation of actions relies on self-monitoring,
    judgment, and self-reaction, all of which are ordinarily conscious during the
    learning situation. “People do not become thoughtless during the learning
    process. They make conscious judgments about how their actions affect the
    environment” (Bandura, 1986, p. 116). After learnings are well established,
    especially motor learnings, they may become unconscious. People do not
    have to be aware of all their actions while walking, eating, or driving a car.
    Bandura (2001) believes that the division of biological and social factors
    is a false dichotomy. Although people are limited by biological forces, they have
    a remarkable plasticity. Their social environments allow them a wide range of
    behaviors, including using other people as models. Each person lives in a num-
    ber of social networks and is thus influenced by a variety of people. Modern
    technology in the form of the World Wide Web and the media facilitates the
    spread of social influences.
    Because people have a remarkable flexibility and capacity for learning,
    vast individual differences exist among them. Bandura’s emphasis on unique-
    ness, however, is moderated by biological and social influences, both of
    which contribute to some similarities among people.
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Observational learning allows people to learn without performing a
    behavior.
    ∙ Observational learning requires (1) attention to a model, (2) organization
    and retention of observations, (3) behavioral production, and (4)
    motivation to perform the modeled behavior.

    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory 527
    ∙ Enactive learning takes place when our responses produce consequences.
    ∙ Human functioning is a product of the mutual interaction of
    environmental events, behavior, and personal factors, a model called
    triadic reciprocal causation.
    ∙ Chance encounters and fortuitous events are two important
    environmental factors that influence people’s lives in unplanned and
    unexpected ways.
    ∙ Human agency means that people can and do exercise a measure of
    control over their lives.
    ∙ Self-efficacy refers to people’s belief that they are capable of performing
    those behaviors that can produce desired outcomes in a particular
    situation.
    ∙ Proxy agency occurs when people have the capacity to rely on others for
    goods and services.
    ∙ Collective efficacy refers to the confidence that groups of people have
    that their combined efforts will produce social change.
    ∙ People have some capacity for self-regulation, and they use both
    external and internal factors to self-regulate.
    ∙ External factors provide us with standards for evaluating our behavior
    as well as external reinforcement in the form of rewards received from
    others.
    ∙ Internal factors in self-regulation include (1) self-observation,
    (2) judgmental processes, and (3) self-reaction.
    ∙ Through selective activation and disengagement of internal control,
    people can separate themselves from the injurious consequences of their
    actions.
    ∙ Four principal techniques of selective activation and disengagement of
    internal control are (1) redefining behavior, (2) displacing or diffusing
    responsibility, (3) disregarding or distorting the consequences of
    behavior, and (4) dehumanizing or blaming the victims for their injuries.
    ∙ Dysfunctional behaviors, such as depression, phobias, and aggression,
    are acquired through the reciprocal interaction of environment, personal
    factors, and behavior.
    ∙ Social cognitive therapy emphasizes cognitive mediation, especially
    perceived self-efficacy.

    528
    C H A P T E R 1 8
    Rotter and Mischel:
    Cognitive Social
    Learning Theory
    ⬥ Overview of Cognitive Social Learning Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Julian Rotter
    ⬥ Introduction to Rotter’s Social Learning Theory
    ⬥ Predicting Specific Behaviors
    Behavior Potential
    Expectancy
    Reinforcement Value
    Psychological Situation
    Basic Prediction Formula
    ⬥ Predicting General Behaviors
    Generalized Expectancies
    Needs
    General Prediction Formula
    Internal and External Control of Reinforcement
    Interpersonal Trust Scale
    ⬥ Maladaptive Behavior
    ⬥ Psychotherapy
    Changing Goals
    Eliminating Low Expectancies
    ⬥ Introduction to Mischel’s Personality Theory
    ⬥ Biography of Walter Mischel
    ⬥ Background of the Cognitive-Affective
    Personality System
    Consistency Paradox
    Person-Situation Interaction
    ⬥ Cognitive-Affective Personality System
    Behavior Prediction
    Situation Variables
    Cognitive-Affective Units
    ⬥ Related Research
    Locus of Control and Holocaust Heroes
    Person-Situation Interaction
    Marshmallows and Self-Regulation Across
    the Lifespan
    ⬥ Critique of Cognitive Social Learning Theory
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Mischel
    Courtesy of Michele Myers

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 529
    Which pair of items most closely matches your beliefs? Check
    either a or b.
    1. a. Luck is the main reason for people’s success.
    b. People make their own luck.
    2. a. One way to bring about a thunder storm is to plan a picnic
    or some other outdoor event.
    b. Weather patterns have nothing to do with people’s wishes.
    3. a. Students’ grades are mostly the result of chance.
    b. Students’ grades are mostly the result of hard work.
    4. a. People have no control over large industries that pollute the
    environment.
    b. People can work together to prevent large industries from
    dumping waste products into the environment.
    5. a. Popularity among high school students is due mostly to
    things beyond their control, for example, good looks.
    b. Popularity among high school students is due mostly to a
    student’s own efforts.
    6. a. Injuries from motor vehicle crashes cannot be prevented.
    When it’s your time, it’s your time.
    b. Wearing seat belts, having air bags in your automobile, and
    driving within the speed limit are proven ways of reducing
    injuries from motor vehicle crashes.
    These items are similar to ones Julian Rotter used in developing his
    Internal-External Control Scale, usually called the locus of control scale. We
    discuss this widely popular instrument in the section on internal and external
    control of reinforcement and offer some analysis on the meaning of these items.
    Overview of Cognitive Social
    Learning Theory
    The cognitive social learning theories of Julian Rotter and Walter Mischel each
    rest on the assumption that cognitive factors help shape how people will react to
    environmental forces. Both theorists object to Skinner’s explanation that behavior
    is shaped by immediate reinforcement and instead suggest that one’s expectations
    of future events are prime determinants of performance.
    Rotter contended that human behavior is best predicted from an understanding
    of the interaction of people with their meaningful environments. As an interactionist,
    he believed that neither the environment itself nor the individual is completely
    responsible for behavior. Instead, he held that people’s cognitions, past histories,
    and expectations of the future are keys to predicting behavior. In this respect, he
    differed from Skinner (Chapter 16), who believed that reinforcement ultimately
    stems from the environment.
    Mischel’s cognitive social theory has much in common with Bandura’s social
    cognitive theory and Rotter’s social learning theory. Like Bandura and Rotter, Mischel
    believes that cognitive factors, such as expectancies, subjective perceptions, values,

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories530
    goals, and personal standards, play important roles in shaping personality. His con-
    tributions to personality theory have evolved from research on delay of gratification,
    to research regarding the consistency or inconsistency of personality, and presently
    to work with Yuichi Shoda on the development of a cognitive-affective personality
    system.
    Biography of Julian Rotter
    Julian B. Rotter, the author of the locus of control scale, was born in Brooklyn on
    October 22, 1916, the third and youngest son of Jewish immigrant parents. Rotter
    (1993) recalled that he fit Adler’s description of a highly competitive, “fighting”
    youngest child. Although his parents observed the Jewish religion and customs,
    they were not very religious. Rotter (1993) described his family’s socioeconomic
    condition as “comfortably middle class until the Great Depression when my father
    lost his wholesale stationery business and we became part of the masses of unem-
    ployed for two years” (pp. 273–274). The depression sparked in Rotter a lifelong
    concern for social injustice and taught him the importance of situational conditions
    affecting human behavior.
    As an elementary school and high school student, he was an avid reader and
    by his junior year had read nearly every book of fiction in the local public library.
    That being the case, he turned one day to the psychology shelves where he found
    Adler’s (1927) Understanding Human Nature, Freud’s (1901/1960) Psychopathology
    of Everyday Life, and Karl Menninger’s (1920) The Human Mind. He was particu-
    larly impressed by Adler and Freud and soon returned for more (Rotter, 1982, 1993).
    When he entered Brooklyn College, he was already seriously interested in
    psychology, but he chose to major in chemistry because it seemed to be a more
    employable degree during the depression of the 1930s. As a junior at Brooklyn
    College, he learned that Adler was a professor of medical psychology at Long Island
    College of Medicine. He attended Adler’s medical lectures and several of his clin-
    ical demonstrations. Eventually, he came to personally know Adler, who invited
    him to attend meetings of the Society for Individual Psychology (Rotter, 1993).
    When Rotter graduated from Brooklyn College in 1937, he had more credits
    in psychology than in chemistry. He then entered graduate school in psychology
    at the University of Iowa, from which he received a master’s degree in 1938. He
    completed an internship in clinical psychology at Worcester State Hospital in
    Massachusetts, where he met his future wife, Clara Barnes. In 1941, Rotter received
    his PhD in clinical psychology from Indiana University.
    That same year Rotter accepted a position as clinical psychologist at Norwich
    State Hospital in Connecticut, where his duties included training interns and assis-
    tants from the University of Connecticut and Wesleyan University. At the advent
    of World War II, he was drafted into the army and spent more than 3 years as an
    army psychologist.
    After the war, Rotter returned briefly to Norwich, but he soon took a job at
    Ohio State University, where he attracted a number of outstanding graduate stu-
    dents, including Walter Mischel. For more than a dozen years, Rotter and George
    Kelly (see Chapter 19) reigned as the two most dominant members of the psychol-
    ogy department at Ohio State. However, Rotter was unhappy with the political

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 531
    effects of McCarthyism in Ohio, and in 1963, he took a position at the University
    of Connecticut as director of the Clinical Training Program. He continued in that
    position until 1987, when he retired as professor emeritus. Rotter and his wife
    Clara (who died in 1986) had two children, a daughter, Jean, and a son, Richard,
    who died in 1995. Julian Rotter passed away at his home in Connecticut on Janu-
    ary 6, 2014, at the age of 97.
    Among Rotter’s most important publications are Social Learning and Clini-
    cal Psychology (1954); Clinical Psychology (1964); Applications of a Social
    Learning Theory of Personality, with J. E. Chance and E. J. Phares (1972); Per-
    sonality, with D. J. Hochreich (1975); The Development and Application of Social
    Learning Theory: Selected Papers (1982); the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Blank
    (Rotter, 1966); and the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967).
    Rotter served as president of the Eastern Psychological Association and of
    the divisions of Social and Personality Psychology and Clinical Psychology of the
    American Psychological Association (APA). He also served two terms on the APA
    Education and Training Board. In 1988, he received the prestigious APA Distin-
    guished Scientific Contribution Award. The following year, he earned the Distin-
    guished Contribution to Clinical Training Award from the Council of University
    Directors of Clinical Psychology.
    Introduction to Rotter’s Social
    Learning Theory
    Social learning theory rests on five basic hypotheses. First, it assumes that humans
    interact with their meaningful environments (Rotter, 1982). People’s reaction to envi-
    ronmental stimuli depends on the meaning or importance that they attach to an event.
    Reinforcements are not dependent on external stimuli alone but are given meaning
    by the individual’s cognitive capacity. Likewise, personal characteristics such as
    needs or traits cannot, by themselves, cause behavior. Rather, Rotter believed that
    human behavior stems from the interaction of environmental and personal factors.
    A second assumption of Rotter’s theory is that human personality is
    learned. Thus, it follows that personality is not set or determined at any par-
    ticular age of development; instead, it can be changed or modified as long as
    people are capable of learning. Although our accumulation of earlier experiences
    gives our personality some stability, we are always responsive to change through
    new experiences. We learn from past experiences, but those experiences are not
    absolutely constant; they are colored by intervening experiences that then affect
    present perceptions.
    The third assumption of social learning theory is that personality has a basic
    unity, which means that people’s personalities possess relative stability. People
    learn to evaluate new experiences on the basis of previous reinforcement. This
    relatively consistent evaluation leads to greater stability and unity of personality.
    Rotter’s fourth basic hypothesis is that motivation is goal directed. He
    rejected the notion that people are primarily motivated to reduce tension or seek
    pleasure, insisting that the best explanation for human behavior lies in people’s
    expectations that their behaviors are advancing them toward goals. For example,

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories532
    most college students have a goal of graduation and are willing to endure stress,
    tension, and hard work in order to reach that goal. Rather than reducing tension,
    the prospect of several difficult years of college classes promises to increase it.
    Other things being equal, people are most strongly reinforced by behaviors
    that move them in the direction of anticipated goals. This statement refers to Rotter’s
    empirical law of effect, which “defines reinforcement as any action, condition,
    or event which affects the individual’s movement toward a goal” (Rotter &
    Hochreich, 1975, p. 95).
    Rotter’s fifth assumption is that people are capable of anticipating events.
    Moreover, they use their perceived movement in the direction of the anticipated event
    as a criterion for evaluating reinforcers. Beginning with these five general assump-
    tions, Rotter built a personality theory that attempts to predict human behavior.
    Predicting Specific Behaviors
    Because Rotter’s primary concern was the prediction of human behavior, he sug-
    gested four variables that must be analyzed in order to make accurate predictions
    in any specific situation. These variables are behavior potential, expectancy, rein-
    forcement value, and the psychological situation. Behavior potential refers to the
    likelihood that a given behavior will occur in a particular situation; expectancy is
    a person’s expectation of being reinforced; reinforcement value is the person’s
    preference for a particular reinforcement; and the psychological situation refers to
    a complex pattern of cues that a person perceives during a specific time period.
    Behavior Potential
    Broadly considered, behavior potential (BP) is the possibility that a particular
    response will occur at a given time and place. Several behavior potentials of vary-
    ing strengths exist in any psychological situation. For example, as Megan walks
    toward a restaurant, she has several behavioral potentials. She might pass by with-
    out noticing the restaurant; actively ignore it; stop to eat; think about stopping to
    eat, but go on; examine the building and contents with a consideration to purchase
    it; or stop, go inside, and rob the cashier. For Megan, in this situation, the poten-
    tial for some of these behaviors would approach zero, some would be very likely,
    and others would be in between these extremes. How can a person predict which
    behaviors are most or least likely to occur?
    The behavior potential in any situation is a function of both expectancy and
    reinforcement value. If a person wishes to know the likelihood that Megan will
    rob the cashier rather than purchase the restaurant or stop to eat, for example, we
    could hold expectancy constant and vary reinforcement value. If each of these
    behavior potentials carried a 70% expectancy of being reinforced, then a person
    could make a prediction about their relative probability of occurrence based solely
    on the reinforcement value of each. If holding up the cashier carries a positive
    reinforcement value greater than ordering food or buying the restaurant, then that
    behavior has the greatest occurrence potential.
    The second approach to prediction is to hold reinforcement value constant
    and vary expectancy. If total reinforcements from each possible behavior are

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 533
    of equal value, then the one with the greatest expectation of reinforcement is
    most likely to occur. More specifically, if reinforcements from robbing the
    cashier, buying the business, and ordering a dinner are all valued equally, then
    the response that is most likely to produce a reinforcement has the highest
    behavior potential.
    Rotter employed a broad definition of behavior, which refers to any response,
    implicit or explicit, that can be observed or measured directly or indirectly. This
    comprehensive concept allowed Rotter to include as behavior such hypothetical
    constructs as generalizing, problem solving, thinking, analyzing, and so forth.
    Expectancy
    Expectancy (E ) refers to a person’s expectation that some specific reinforcement
    or set of reinforcements will occur in a given situation. The probability is not
    determined by the individual’s history of reinforcements, as Skinner contended,
    but is subjectively held by the person. History, of course, is a contributing factor,
    but so too are unrealistic thinking, expectations based on lack of information, and
    fantasies, so long as the person sincerely believes that a given reinforcement or
    group of reinforcements are contingent on a particular response.
    Expectancies can be general or specific. Generalized expectancies (GEs) are
    learned through previous experiences with a particular response or similar responses
    and are based on the belief that certain behaviors will be followed by positive
    reinforcement. For example, college students whose previous hard work has been
    reinforced by high grades will have a generalized expectancy of future reward and
    will work hard in a variety of academic situations.
    Specific expectancies are designated as E9 (E prime). In any situation the
    expectancy for a particular reinforcement is determined by a combination of a
    specific expectancy (E9) and the generalized expectancy (GE ). For example, a
    student may have general expectancy that a given level of academic work will be
    rewarded by good grades but may believe that an equal amount of hard work in a
    French class will go unrewarded.
    Total expectancy of success is a function of both one’s generalized expec-
    tancy and one’s specific expectancy. Total expectancy partially determines the
    amount of effort people will expend in pursuit of their goals. A person with low
    total expectancy for success in obtaining a prestigious job is not likely to apply
    for the position, whereas a person with high expectancy for success will exert much
    effort and persist in the face of setbacks to achieve goals that appear possible.
    Reinforcement Value
    Another variable in the prediction formula is reinforcement value (RV ), which is
    the preference a person attaches to any reinforcement when the probabilities for
    the occurrence of a number of different reinforcements are all equal.
    Reinforcement value can be illustrated by a woman’s interactions with a
    vending machine that contains several possible selections, each costing the same.
    The woman approaches the machine able and willing to pay 75 cents in order to
    receive a snack. The vending machine is in perfect working condition, so there is

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories534
    a 100% probability that the woman’s response will be followed by some sort of
    reinforcement. Her expectancy of reinforcement, therefore, for the candy bar, corn
    chips, potato chips, popcorn, tortilla chips, and Danish pastry are all equal. Her
    response—that is, which button she presses—is determined by the reinforcement
    value of each snack.
    When expectancies and situational variables are held constant, behavior is
    shaped by one’s preference for the possible reinforcements, that is, reinforcement
    value. In most situations, of course, expectancies are seldom equal, and prediction
    is difficult because both expectancy and reinforcement value can vary.
    What determines the reinforcement value for any event, condition, or action?
    First, the individual’s perception contributes to the positive or negative value of
    an event. Rotter calls this perception internal reinforcement and distinguishes it
    from external reinforcement, which refers to events, conditions, or actions on
    which one’s society or culture places a value. Internal and external reinforcements
    may be either in harmony or at a variance with one another. For example, if you
    like popular movies—that is, the same ones that most other people like—then your
    internal and external reinforcements for attending these types of movies are in
    agreement. However, if your taste in movies runs contrary to that of your friends,
    then your internal and external reinforcements are discrepant.
    Another contributor to reinforcement value is one’s needs. Generally, a spe-
    cific reinforcement tends to increase in value as the need it satisfies becomes
    stronger. A starving child places a higher value on a bowl of soup than does a
    moderately hungry one. (This issue is more fully discussed later in this chapter in
    the section titled Needs.)
    Reinforcements are also valued according to their expected consequences for
    future reinforcements. Rotter believed that people are capable of using cognition
    to anticipate a sequence of events leading to some future goal and that the ultimate
    goal contributes to the reinforcement value of each event in the sequence. Rein-
    forcements seldom occur independently of future related reinforcements but are
    likely to appear in reinforcement-reinforcement sequences, which Rotter (1982)
    referred to as clusters of reinforcement.
    Humans are goal oriented; they anticipate achieving a goal if they behave in
    a particular way. Other things being equal, goals with the highest reinforcement
    value are most desirable. Desire alone, however, is not sufficient to predict behav-
    ior. The potential for any behavior is a function of both expectancy and reinforce-
    ment value as well as the psychological situation.
    Psychological Situation
    The fourth variable in the prediction formula is the psychological situation (s),
    defined as that part of the external and internal world to which a person is respond-
    ing. It is not synonymous with external stimuli, although physical events are usu-
    ally important to the psychological situation.
    Behavior is the result of neither environmental events nor personal traits;
    rather, it stems from the interaction of a person with his or her meaningful
    environment. If physical stimuli alone determined behavior, then two individu-
    als would respond in exactly the same way to identical stimuli. If personal

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 535
    traits were solely responsible for behavior, then a person would always respond
    in a consistent and characteristic fashion, even to different events. Because
    neither of these conditions is valid, something other than the environment or
    personal traits must shape behavior. Rotter’s social learning theory hypothe-
    sizes that the interaction between person and environment is a crucial factor in
    shaping behavior.
    The psychological situation is “a complex set of interacting cues acting
    upon an individual for any specific time period” (Rotter, 1982, p. 318). People
    do not behave in a vacuum; instead, they respond to cues within their perceived
    environment. These cues serve to determine for them certain expectancies for
    behavior-reinforcement sequences as well as for reinforcement-reinforcement
    sequences. The time period for the cues may vary from momentary to lengthy;
    thus, the psychological situation is not limited by time. One’s marital situation,
    for example, may be relatively constant over a long period of time, whereas the
    psychological situation faced by a driver’s spinning out of control on an icy road
    may be extremely short. The psychological situation must be considered, along
    with expectancies and reinforcement value, in determining the probability of a
    given response.
    Basic Prediction Formula
    As a hypothetical means of predicting specific behaviors, Rotter proposed a basic
    formula that includes all four variables of prediction. The formula represents an
    idealistic rather than a practical means of prediction, and no precise values can be
    plugged into it. Consider the case of La Juan, an academically gifted college stu-
    dent who is listening to a dull and lengthy lecture by one of her professors. To the
    internal cues of boredom and the external cues of seeing slumbering classmates,
    what is the likelihood that La Juan will respond by resting her head on the desk
    in an attempt to sleep? The psychological situation alone is not responsible for her
    behavior, but it interacts with her expectancy for reinforcement plus the reinforce-
    ment value of sleep in that particular situation. La Juan’s behavior potential can
    be estimated by Rotter’s (1982, p. 302) basic formula for the prediction of goal-
    directed behavior:
    BPx
    1,s1,ra
    = f (Ex
    1
    ,r
    a
    ,s
    1
    + RV
    a
    ,s
    1
    )
    This formula is read: The potential for behavior x to occur in situation 1 in relation
    to reinforcement a is a function of the expectancy that behavior x will be followed
    by reinforcement a in situation 1 and the value of reinforcement a in situation 1.
    Applied to our example, the formula suggests that the likelihood (behavior
    potential, or BP) that La Juan will rest her head on her desk (behavior x) in a dull
    and boring class with other students slumbering (the psychological situation, or s1)
    with the goal of sleep (reinforcement, or ra) is a function of her expectation that
    such behavior (Ex) will be followed by sleep (ra) in this particular classroom situ-
    ation (s1), plus a measure of how highly she desires to sleep (reinforcement value,
    or RVa) in this specific situation (s). Because precise measurement of each of these
    variables may be beyond the scientific study of human behavior, Rotter proposed
    a strategy for predicting general behaviors.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories536
    Predicting General Behaviors
    To predict general behaviors, we look at David, who has worked for 18 years in
    Hoffman’s Hardware Store. David has been informed that, because of a business
    decline, Mr. Hoffman must cut his workforce and that David may lose his job. How can
    we predict David’s subsequent behavior? Will he beg Mr. Hoffman to let him remain
    with the company? Will he strike out in violence against the store or Mr. Hoffman?
    Will he displace his anger and act aggressively toward his wife or children? Will he
    begin drinking heavily and become apathetic toward searching for a new job? Will
    he immediately and constructively begin looking for another position?
    Generalized Expectancies
    Because most of David’s possible behaviors are new to him, how can we predict
    what he will do? At this point, the concepts of generalization and generalized
    expectancy enter into Rotter’s theory. If, in the past, David has generally been
    rewarded for behaviors that have increased his social status, then only a slight
    probability exists that he will beg Mr. Hoffman for a job, because such actions are
    contrary to increased social status. On the other hand, if his previous attempts at
    responsible and independent behaviors have generally been reinforced and if he
    has the freedom of movement—that is, the opportunity to apply for another job —
    then, assuming he needs work, a high probability exists that he will apply for
    another job or otherwise behave independently. This prediction, though not as
    specific as the one predicting the college student’s likelihood of sleeping in a bor-
    ing classroom, is nevertheless more useful in situations where rigorous control of
    pertinent variables is not possible. Predicting David’s reaction to the probable loss
    of a job is a matter of knowing how he views the options available to him and
    also the status of his present needs.
    Needs
    Rotter (1982) defined needs as any behavior or set of behaviors that people see as
    moving them in the direction of a goal. Needs are not states of deprivation or
    arousal but indicators of the direction of behavior. The difference between needs
    and goals is semantic only. When focus is on the environment, Rotter speaks of
    goals; when it is on the person, he talks of needs.
    The concept of needs allows for more generalized predictions than permitted
    by the four specific variables that comprise the basic prediction formula. Ordinarily,
    personality theory deals with broad predictions of human behavior. For example,
    a person with strong needs for dominance will usually try to gain the power posi-
    tion in most interpersonal relationships as well as in a variety of other situations.
    In specific situations, however, a dominant person may behave in a nondominant
    or even submissive fashion. The basic prediction formula permits specific predic-
    tions, with the assumption, of course, that all relevant information is at hand. It is
    the more appropriate formula for controlled laboratory experiments but is inade-
    quate in predicting everyday behaviors. For this reason, Rotter introduced the con-
    cept of needs and their accompanying general prediction formula.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 537
    Categories of Needs
    Rotter and Hochreich (1975) listed six broad categories of needs, with each cate-
    gory representing a group of functionally related behaviors: that is, behaviors that
    lead to the same or similar reinforcements. For example, people can meet their
    recognition needs in a variety of situations and by many different people. There-
    fore, they can receive reinforcement for a group of functionally related behaviors,
    all of which satisfy their need for recognition. The following list is not exhaustive,
    but it represents most of the important human needs.
    Recognition-Status The need to be recognized by others and to achieve status in
    their eyes is a powerful need for most people. Recognition-status includes the need
    to excel in those things that a person regards as important: for example, school,
    sports, occupation, hobbies, and physical appearance. It also includes the need for
    socioeconomic status and personal prestige. Playing a good game of bridge is an
    example of the need for recognition-status.
    Dominance The need to control the behavior of others is called dominance. This
    need includes any set of behaviors directed at gaining power over the lives of
    friends, family, colleagues, superiors, and subordinates. Talking colleagues into
    accepting your ideas is a specific example of dominance.
    Independence Independence is the need to be free of the domination of others.
    It includes those behaviors aimed at gaining the freedom to make decisions, to rely
    Being recognized for our accomplishments is a common need. © Jose Luis Pelaez Inc/Blend
    Images LLC

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories538
    on oneself, and to attain goals without the help of others. Declining help in repair-
    ing a bicycle could demonstrate the need for independence.
    Protection-Dependency A set of needs nearly opposite independence are those
    of protection and dependency. This category includes the needs to be cared for by
    others, to be protected from frustration and harm, and to satisfy the other need
    categories. A specific example of protection-dependency is asking your spouse to
    stay home from work and take care of you when you are ill.
    Love and Affection Most people have strong needs for love and affection: that
    is, needs for acceptance by others that go beyond recognition and status to include
    some indications that other people have warm, positive feelings for them. The
    needs for love and affection include those behaviors aimed toward securing friendly
    regard, interest, and devotion from others. Doing favors for others in anticipation
    of receiving verbal expressions of positive regard and gratitude might be an exam-
    ple of this need.
    Physical Comfort Physical comfort is perhaps the most basic need because other
    needs are learned in relation to it. This need includes those behaviors aimed at
    securing food, good health, and physical security. Other needs are learned as an
    outgrowth of needs for pleasure, physical contact, and well-being. Turning on the
    air conditioner or hugging another person are examples of the need for physical
    comfort.
    Need Components
    A need complex has three essential components—need potential, freedom of move-
    ment, and need value—and these components are analogous to the more specific
    concepts of behavior potential, expectancy, and reinforcement value (Rotter,
    Chance, & Phares, 1972).
    Need Potential Need potential (NP) refers to the possible occurrence of a set of
    functionally related behaviors directed toward satisfying the same or similar goals.
    Need potential is analogous to the more specific concept of behavior potential. The
    difference between the two is that need potential refers to a group of functionally
    related behaviors, whereas behavior potential is the likelihood that a particular
    behavior will occur in a given situation in relation to a specific reinforcement.
    Need potential cannot be measured solely through observation of behavior.
    If different people are seen behaving in apparently the same manner—for example,
    eating in a fancy restaurant—one should not conclude that they are all satisfying
    the same need potential. One person may be satisfying the need for physical com-
    fort, that is, food; another may be more interested in love and affection; and the
    third person may be trying primarily to satisfy the need for recognition-status.
    Probably any of the six broad needs could be satisfied by eating in this restaurant.
    Whether or not one’s need potential is realized, however, depends not only on the
    value or preference one has for that reinforcement but also on one’s freedom of
    movement in making responses leading to that reinforcement.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 539
    Freedom of Movement Behavior is partly determined by our expectancies: that
    is, our best guess that a particular reinforcement will follow a specific response.
    In the general prediction formula, freedom of movement (FM) is analogous to
    expectancy. It is one’s overall expectation of being reinforced for performing those
    behaviors that are directed toward satisfying some general need. To illustrate, a
    person with a strong need for dominance could behave in a variety of ways to
    satisfy that need. She might select her husband’s clothes, decide what college cur-
    riculum her son will pursue, direct actors in a play, organize a professional confer-
    ence involving dozens of colleagues, or perform any one of a hundred other
    behaviors aimed at securing reinforcement for her dominance need. The average
    or mean level of expectancies that these behaviors will lead to the desired satisfac-
    tion is a measure of her freedom of movement in the area of dominance.
    Freedom of movement can be determined by holding need value constant and
    observing one’s need potential. For example, if a person places exactly the same
    value on dominance, independence, love and affection, and each of the other needs,
    then that person will perform those behaviors judged to have the greatest expectancy
    of being reinforced. If the person performs behaviors leading to physical comfort,
    for example, then there will be more freedom of movement in that need complex
    than in any of the other need complexes. Ordinarily, of course, need value is not
    constant, because most people prefer the satisfaction of one need over others.
    Need Value A person’s need value (NV) is the degree to which she or he prefers
    one set of reinforcements to another. Rotter, Chance, and Phares (1972) defined
    need value as the “mean preference value of a set of functionally related reinforce-
    ments” (p. 33). In the general prediction formula, need value is the analog of
    reinforcement value. When freedom of movement is held constant, people will
    perform those behavior sequences that lead to satisfaction of the most preferred
    need. If people have equal expectancies of obtaining positive reinforcement for
    behaviors aimed at the satisfaction of any need, then the value they place on a
    particular need complex will be the principal determinant of their behavior. If they
    prefer independence to any other need complex, and if they have an equal expec-
    tation of being reinforced in the pursuit of any of the needs, then their behavior
    will be directed toward achieving independence.
    General Prediction Formula
    The basic prediction formula is limited to highly controlled situations where expec-
    tancies, reinforcement value, and the psychological situation are all relatively simple
    and discrete. In most situations, however, prediction of behavior is much more com-
    plex because behaviors and reinforcements usually occur in functionally related
    sequences. Consider again the case of La Juan, the gifted student who was having
    difficulty staying awake in a dull and boring class. The basic prediction formula
    offers some indication of the likelihood that, in the specific situation of a boring
    lecture, La Juan will rest her head on her desk. However, a more generalized predic-
    tion formula is needed to predict her need potential for gaining the recognition-status
    that comes from graduating with highest honors. La Juan’s likelihood of satisfying
    this need depends on a complex of behaviors. To make generalized predictions

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories540
    regarding a set of behaviors designed to satisfy needs, Rotter introduced this general
    prediction formula:
    NP = f (FM + NV )
    This equation means that need potential (NP) is a function of freedom of
    movement (FM ) and need value (NV ). The formula is analogous to the basic
    prediction formula, and each factor is parallel to the corresponding factors of that
    basic formula. To illustrate the general prediction formula, we can look at La
    Juan’s situation with regard to her future academic work. To predict her need
    potential for working toward graduation with highest honors, we must measure her
    freedom of movement, that is, her mean expectancy of being reinforced for a series
    of behaviors necessary to reach her goal, plus her need value of all those reinforce-
    ments: that is, the value she places on recognition-status or any other need she
    associates with receiving academic honors. The value La Juan places on recognition-
    status (need value), plus her average expectancy of being reinforced for performing
    the required series of behaviors (freedom of movement), equals her potential for
    pursuing the set of required behaviors (need potential). A comparison of the basic
    (specific) prediction formula and the generalized prediction formula is shown in
    Figure 18.1.
    Rotter’s general prediction formula allows for people’s history of using sim-
    ilar experiences to anticipate present reinforcement. That is, they have a general-
    ized expectancy for success. Rotter’s two most popular scales for measuring
    generalized expectancies are the Internal-External Control Scale and the Interper-
    sonal Trust Scale.
    Basic prediction formula
    BPx1,s1,ra f(Ex1,ra,s1 and RVa,s1)
    Potential for La Juan to rest
    her head in the classroom
    her expectancy that this
    behavior will be followed
    by sleep
    her need for sleep in
    this situation.
    General prediction formula
    NP f(FM and NV)
    Potential for La Juan completing
    all those behaviors necessary
    to receive a PhD in clinical
    psychology and thereby satisfy
    her need for recognition-status
    =
    is a
    function
    of
    =
    is a
    function
    of
    her average expectancy that
    a set of related behaviors
    directed toward recognition-
    status will be reinforced
    her preference for good grades,
    prestige, reputation, acceptance
    by colleagues, praise from profes-
    sors, and other reinforcements
    related to recognition-status.
    +
    +
    FIGURE 18.1 Comparison of the basic prediction formula and the general prediction formula.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 541
    Internal and External Control of Reinforcement
    At the core of Rotter’s social learning theory is the notion that reinforcement does
    not automatically stamp in behaviors but that people have the ability to see a causal
    connection between their own behavior and the occurrence of the reinforcer (Rotter,
    1954; Rotter & Hochreich, 1975). People strive to reach their goals because they
    have a generalized expectancy that such strivings will be successful.
    During the 1950s and early 1960s, Rotter became intrigued by the observa-
    tion that many people did not increase their feelings of personal control after
    experiencing success and that others did not lower their expectancies after repeated
    failure (Rotter, 1990, 1993; Zuroff & Rotter, 1985). In other words, some people
    tended to explain away successful outcomes as being due to luck or chance,
    whereas others retained a high sense of personal control even after several nonre-
    inforced behaviors. These tendencies seemed to be especially true in situations that
    people regarded as ambiguous or novel (Rotter, 1992) or when people were not
    clear whether the outcome of their behavior was due to their skill or to chance.
    Rotter (1990) suggested that both the situation and the person contribute to feelings
    of personal control. Thus, a person with a generalized expectancy for success in
    one situation may have low feelings of personal control in another situation.
    To assess internal and external control of reinforcement, or locus of control,
    Rotter (1966) developed the Internal-External Control Scale, basing it on the doc-
    toral dissertations of two of his students, E. Jerry Phares (1955) and William H.
    James (1957). The I-E Scale consists of 29 forced-choice items, 23 pairs of which
    are scored and 6 of which are filler statements designed to disguise the purpose of
    the scale. The scale is scored in the direction of external control so that 23 is the
    highest possible external score and 0 is the highest possible internal score. Table 18.1
    shows several sample items from the I-E Scale. People must select either alterna-
    tive “a” or alternative “b” from each pair of items. Although the internal or exter-
    nal direction of these items may seem obvious, Rotter (1990) reported that scores
    have only a modest correlation with a social desirability scale.
    The I-E Scale attempts to measure the degree to which people perceive a causal
    relationship between their own efforts and environmental consequences. People who
    score high on internal control generally believe that the source of control resides within
    themselves and that they exercise a high level of personal control in most situations.
    People who score high on external control generally believe that their life is largely
    controlled by forces outside themselves, such as chance, destiny, or the behavior of
    other people (see Table 18.2). At the beginning of this chapter, we asked you to check
    either “a” or “b” for six items that might assess internal or external locus of control.
    Marking “b” for all times except Number 2 might indicate internal locus of control.
    However, as Rotter (1975, 1990) pointed out, too much internal control is not always
    socially desirable. For example, Item 2 of the chapter opener taps into a person’s
    generalized expectancy for omnipotence, hardly a socially desirable attitude.
    Rotter’s Internal-External Control Scale has become one of the most thoroughly
    investigated topics in psychology as well as in other social sciences, having sparked
    several thousand publications since its inception. Despite this popularity, the concepts
    of internal and external control are not always clearly understood. Although Rotter
    (1975) pointed out several common misconceptions concerning internal and external

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories542
    control of reinforcement (he seldom referred to it as “locus of control”), people continue
    to misuse and misinterpret the instrument. One misconception is that scores on the scale
    are determinants of behavior. Rotter insisted that they should not be seen as causes of
    behavior but as indicators of generalized expectancies (GEs). As such, they must be
    considered along with reinforcement value (RV ) when predicting behavior potential.
    A second misconception is that locus of control is specific and can predict
    achievement in a specific situation. Again, the concept refers to generalized expec-
    tancies of reinforcement and indicates the degree to which people generally believe
    that they are in control of their lives.
    T A B L E 1 8 . 1
    Sample Items From Rotter’s Internal-External Control Scale
    1. a. Many of the unhappy things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck.
    b. People’s misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
    2. a. One of the major reasons we have wars is that people don’t take enough interest
    in politics.
    b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
    3. a. In the long run, people get the respect they deserve in this world.
    b. Unfortunately, an individual’s worth often passes unrecognized no matter how
    hard he or she tries.
    4. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
    b. The world is run by the few people in power and there isn’t much the little guy
    can do about it.
    5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
    b. Most students don’t realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by
    accidental happenings.
    6. a. No matter how hard you try, some people just don’t like you.
    b. People who can’t get others to like them don’t understand how to get along with
    others.
    From J. B. Rotter, 1966. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement.
    Psychological Monographs, 80 (Whole No. 609), p. 11.
    T A B L E 1 8 . 2
    Internal and External Control of Reinforcement
    Internal Locus of Control: In general…
    ∙ I make things happen
    ∙ I control my life
    ∙ I explain personal outcomes as a result
    of hard work and skill
    External Locus of Control: In general…
    ∙ Things happen to me
    ∙ My life is controlled by forces outside
    of me
    ∙ I explain personal outcomes as a result
    of luck, chance, God, other people, or
    the situation
    Source: From J. B. Rotter, 1966. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
    reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80 (Whole No. 609), p. 11.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 543
    A third common misconception is that the scale divides people into two distinct
    types—internals and externals. Rotter (1975, 1990) insisted that generalized expectan-
    cies imply a gradient of generalization and that, in certain specific situations, a person
    with generally high feelings of internal control may believe that the outcome of his
    or her behavior is due mostly to fate, chance, or the behavior of powerful others.
    Fourth, many people seem to believe that high internal scores signify socially
    desirable traits and that high external scores indicate socially undesirable charac-
    teristics. Actually, extreme scores in either direction would be undesirable. Very
    high external scores might be related to apathy and despair, with people believing
    that they have no control over their environments, whereas extremely high internal
    scores would mean that people accept responsibility for everything that happens
    to them—business failure, delinquent children, other people’s misery, and thunder
    storms that interfere with planned outdoor activities. Scores somewhere in between
    these extremes, but inclined in the direction of internal control, would probably be
    most healthy or desirable.
    Interpersonal Trust Scale
    Another example of a generalized expectancy (GE) that has provoked considerable
    interest and research is the concept of interpersonal trust. Rotter (1980) defined
    interpersonal trust as “a generalized expectancy held by an individual that the word,
    promise, oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on”
    (p. 1). Interpersonal trust does not refer to the belief that people are naturally good
    or that they live in the best of all possible worlds. Neither should it be equated
    with gullibility. Rotter saw interpersonal trust as a belief in the communications
    of others when there is no evidence for disbelieving, whereas gullibility is foolishly
    or naively believing the words of other people.
    Because many of our rewards and punishments come from other people, we
    develop generalized expectancies that some type of reinforcement will follow from
    verbal promises or threats made by others. Sometimes these promises and threats
    are kept; other times they are broken. In this way, each person learns to trust or
    distrust the words of others. Because we have differential experiences with the
    words of others, it follows that individual differences will exist among people with
    regard to interpersonal trust.
    To measure differences in interpersonal trust, Rotter (1967) developed an Inter-
    personal Trust Scale, which asked people to agree or disagree to 25 items that assessed
    interpersonal trust and 15 filler items designed to conceal the nature of the instrument.
    The scale is scored on a 5-point gradation from strongly agree to strongly disagree
    so that strongly agree and agree responses would indicate trust on 12 items and
    strongly disagree and disagree responses would indicate trust on the other 13 items.
    Table 18.3 reveals several sample items from Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale.
    Scores for each of the 25 items are added so that high scores indicate the presence
    of interpersonal trust and low scores mean a generalized expectancy of distrust.
    Is it more desirable to score high or low on the scale, to be trustful or dis-
    trustful? When trust is defined independently of gullibility, as Rotter (1980) con-
    tended, then high trust is not only desirable but essential for the survival of
    civilization. People trust that the food they buy is not poisoned; that the gasoline
    in their cars will not explode on ignition; that airline pilots know how to fly the

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories544
    plane in which they travel; and even that the postal service will deliver the mail
    without tampering with it. Societies can function smoothly only when people have
    at least a moderate amount of trust in each other.
    Rotter (1980) summarized results of studies that indicate that people who
    score high in interpersonal trust, as opposed to those who score low, are (1) less
    likely to lie; (2) probably less likely to cheat or steal; (3) more likely to give oth-
    ers a second chance; (4) more likely to respect the rights of others; (5) less likely
    to be unhappy, conflicted, or maladjusted; (6) somewhat more likable and popular;
    (7) more trustworthy; (8) neither more nor less gullible; and (9) neither more nor
    less intelligent. In other words, high trusters are not gullible or naive, and rather
    than being harmed by their trustful attitude, they seem to possess many of the
    characteristics that other people regard as positive and desirable.
    Maladaptive Behavior
    Maladaptive behavior in Rotter’s social learning theory is any persistent behavior
    that fails to move a person closer to a desired goal. It frequently, but not inevita-
    bly, arises from the combination of high need value and low freedom of movement:
    that is, from goals that are unrealistically high in relation to one’s ability to achieve
    them (Rotter, 1964).
    For example, the need for love and affection is realistic, but some people unre-
    alistically set a goal to be loved by everyone. Hence, their need value will nearly
    certainly exceed their freedom of movement, resulting in behavior that is likely to be
    defensive or maladaptive. When people set their goals too high, they cannot learn
    productive behaviors because their goals are beyond reach. Instead, they learn how
    to avoid failure or how to defend themselves against the pain that accompanies failure.
    For example, a woman whose goal is to be loved by everyone inevitably will be
    ignored or rejected by someone. To obtain love, she may become socially aggressive
    T A B L E 1 8 . 3
    Sample Items From Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale
    1. In dealing with strangers, one is better off to be cautious until they have provided
    evidence that they are trustworthy.
    2. Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises.
    3. Parents and teachers are likely to say what they believe themselves and not just what
    they think is good for the child to hear.
    4. Most elected public officials are really sincere in their campaign promises.
    5. In these competitive times, one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage
    of you.
    6. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
    7. Most salesmen are honest in describing their products.
    From J. B. Rotter, 1967. A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal trust. Journal of Personality, 35,
    p. 654; and M. R. Gurtman, 1992. Trust, distrust, and interpersonal problems: A circumplex analysis. Journal of
    Personality and Social Psychology, 62, p. 997.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 545
    (a nonproductive, self-defeating strategy), or she may withdraw from people, which
    prevents her from being hurt by them but which is also nonproductive.
    Setting goals too high is only one of several possible contributors to maladap-
    tive behavior. Another frequent cause is low freedom of movement. People may have
    low expectancies of success because they lack information or the ability to perform
    those behaviors that will be followed by positive reinforcement. A person who val-
    ues love, for example, may lack the interpersonal skills necessary to obtain it.
    People may also have low freedom of movement because they make a faulty
    evaluation of the present situation. For example, people sometimes underestimate their
    intellectual abilities because, in the past, they have been told that they were stupid.
    Even though their need values are not unrealistically high, they have a low expectation
    of success because they wrongly believe that they are incapable, for example, of
    performing well in school or competing successfully for a higher level job.
    Another possibility is that people have low freedom of movement because
    they generalize from one situation in which, perhaps, they are realistically inade-
    quate to other situations in which they could have sufficient ability to be success-
    ful. For example, a physically weak adolescent who lacks the skills to be an
    accomplished athlete may erroneously see himself as unable to compete for a role
    in the school play or to be a leader in a social club. He inappropriately generalizes
    his inadequacies in sports to lack of ability in unrelated areas.
    In summary, maladjusted individuals are characterized by unrealistic goals,
    inappropriate behaviors, inadequate skills, or unreasonably low expectancies of
    being able to execute the behaviors necessary for positive reinforcement. Although
    they have learned inadequate ways of solving problems within a social context,
    they can unlearn these behaviors and also learn more appropriate ones within the
    controlled social environment provided by psychotherapy.
    Psychotherapy
    To Rotter (1964), “the problems of psychotherapy are problems of how to effect
    changes in behavior through the interaction of one person with another. That is,
    they are problems in human learning in a social situation” (p. 82). Although Rotter
    adopted a problem-solving approach to psychotherapy, he did not limit his concern
    to quick solutions to immediate problems. His interest was more long range,
    involving a change in the patient’s orientation toward life.
    In general, the goal of Rotter’s therapy is to bring freedom of movement
    and need value into harmony, thus reducing defensive and avoidance behaviors.
    The therapist assumes an active role as a teacher and attempts to accomplish the
    therapeutic goal in two basic ways: (1) changing the importance of goals and
    (2) eliminating unrealistically low expectancies for success (Rotter, 1964, 1970,
    1978; Rotter & Hochreich, 1975).
    Changing Goals
    Many patients are unable to solve life’s problems because they are pursuing skewed
    or distorted goals. The role of the therapist is to help these patients understand the
    faulty nature of their goals and to teach them constructive means of striving toward

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories546
    realistic goals. Rotter and Hochreich (1975) listed three sources of problems that
    follow from inappropriate goals.
    First, two or more important goals may be in conflict. For example, adoles-
    cents frequently value both independence and protection-dependency. On the one
    hand, they wish to be free from their parents’ domination and control, but on the
    other, they retain their need for a nurturing person to care for them and protect
    them from painful experiences. Their ambivalent behaviors are often confusing
    both to themselves and to their parents. In this situation, the therapist may try to
    help adolescents see how specific behaviors are related to each of these needs and
    proceed to work with them in changing the value of one or both needs. By altering
    need value, patients gradually begin to behave more consistently and to experience
    greater freedom of movement in obtaining their goals.
    A second source of problems is a destructive goal. Some patients persistently
    pursue self-destructive goals that inevitably result in failure and punishment. The
    job of the therapist is to point out the detrimental nature of this pursuit and the
    likelihood that it will be followed by punishment. One possible technique used by
    a therapist in these cases is to positively reinforce movements away from destruc-
    tive goals. Rotter, however, is both pragmatic and eclectic and is not bound to a
    specific set of techniques for each conceivable problem. To him, the appropriate
    procedure is the one that works with a given patient.
    Third, many people find themselves in trouble because they set their goals too
    high and are continually frustrated when they cannot reach or exceed them. High goals
    lead to failure and pain, so instead of learning constructive means of obtaining a goal,
    people learn nonproductive ways of avoiding pain. For example, a person may learn
    to avoid painful experiences by physically running away or by psychologically repress-
    ing the experience. Because these techniques are successful, the person learns to use
    flight and repression in a variety of situations. Therapy in this case would consist of
    getting the patient to realistically reevaluate and lower exaggerated goals by reducing
    the reinforcement value of these goals. Because high reinforcement value is often
    learned through generalization, the therapist would work toward teaching patients
    to discriminate between past legitimate values and present spurious ones.
    Eliminating Low Expectancies
    In addition to changing goals, the therapist tries to eliminate patients’ low expec-
    tancies of success and its analog, low freedom of movement. People may have low
    freedom of movement for at least three reasons.
    First, they may lack the skills or information needed to successfully strive
    toward their goals (Rotter, 1970). With such patients, a therapist becomes a teacher,
    warmly and emphatically instructing them in more effective techniques for solving
    problems and satisfying needs. If a patient, for example, has difficulties in inter-
    personal relationships, the therapist has an arsenal of techniques, including extin-
    guishing inappropriate behaviors by simply ignoring them; using the therapist-patient
    relationship as a model for an effective interpersonal encounter that may then
    generalize beyond the therapeutic situation; and advising the patient of specific
    behaviors to try out in the presence of those other people who are most likely
    to be receptive.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 547
    A second source of low freedom of movement is faulty evaluation of the
    present situation. For example, an adult may lack assertiveness with her colleagues
    because, during childhood, she was punished for competing with her siblings. This
    patient must learn to differentiate between past and present as well as between
    siblings and colleagues. The therapist’s task is to help her make these distinctions
    and to teach her assertiveness techniques in a variety of appropriate situations.
    Finally, low freedom of movement can spring from inadequate generaliza-
    tion. Patients often use failure in one situation as proof that they cannot be suc-
    cessful in other areas. Take the example of the physically feeble adolescent who,
    because he was unsuccessful in sports, generalized his failure to nonathletic areas.
    His present problems come from faulty generalization, and the therapist must rein-
    force even small successes in social relationships, academic achievements, and
    other situations. The patient will eventually learn to discriminate between realistic
    shortcomings in one area and successful behaviors in other situations.
    Although Rotter recognized that therapists should be flexible in their tech-
    niques and should utilize different approaches with different patients, he suggested
    several interesting techniques that he found to be effective. The first is to teach
    patients to look for alternative courses of action. Patients frequently complain that
    their spouse, parent, child, or employer does not understand them, treats them
    unjustly, and is the source of their problems. In this situation, Rotter would simply
    teach the patient to change the other person’s behavior. This change can be accom-
    plished by examining those behaviors of the patient that typically lead to negative
    reactions by spouse, parent, child, or employer. If the patient can find an alternative
    method of behaving toward important others, then those others will probably
    change their behavior toward the patient. Thereafter, the patient will be rewarded
    for behaving in a more appropriate fashion.
    Rotter also suggested a technique to help patients understand other people’s
    motives. Many patients have a suspicious or distrustful attitude toward others,
    believing that a spouse, teacher, or boss is intentionally and spitefully trying to
    harm them. Rotter would attempt to teach these patients to look at ways in which
    they may be contributing to the other person’s defensive or negative behavior and
    to help them realize that the other person is not simply nasty or spiteful but may
    be frightened or threatened by the patient.
    Therapists can also help patients look at the long-range consequences of their
    behaviors and to understand that many maladaptive behaviors produce secondary
    gains that outweigh the patients’ present frustration. For example, a woman may
    adopt the role of a helpless child in order to gain control over her husband. She
    complains to her therapist that she is dissatisfied with her helplessness and would
    like to become more independent, both for her sake and for the benefit of her
    husband. What she may not realize, however, is that her current helpless behavior
    is satisfying her basic need for dominance. The more helpless she acts, the more
    control she exercises over her husband, who must respond to her helplessness. The
    positive reinforcement she receives from her husband’s recognition is stronger than
    her accompanying negative feelings. In addition, she may not clearly see the long-
    range positive consequences of self-confidence and independence. The task of
    therapists is to train patients to postpone minor contemporary satisfactions for more
    important future ones.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories548
    Another novel technique suggested by Rotter is to have patients enter into a
    previously painful social situation, but rather than speaking as much as usual, they
    are asked to remain as quiet as possible and merely observe. By observing other
    people, the patient has a better chance of learning their motives. Patients can use
    that information in the future to alter their own behavior, thereby changing the
    reactions of others and reducing the painful effects of future encounters with those
    other persons.
    In summary, Rotter believed that a therapist should be an active participant
    in a social interaction with the patient. An effective therapist possesses the char-
    acteristics of warmth and acceptance not only because these attitudes encourage
    the patient to verbalize problems but also because reinforcement from a warm,
    accepting therapist is more effective than reinforcement from a cold, rejecting one
    (Rotter, Chance, & Phares, 1972). The therapist attempts to minimize the discrep-
    ancy between need value and freedom of movement by helping patients alter their
    goals or by teaching effective means of obtaining those goals. Even though the
    therapist is an active problem solver, Rotter (1978) believed that eventually patients
    must learn to solve their own problems.
    Introduction to Mischel’s
    Personality Theory
    In general, personality theories are of two types—those who see personality as a
    dynamic entity motivated by drives, perceptions, needs, goals, and expectancies
    and those who view personality as a function of relatively stable traits or personal
    dispositions. The first category includes the theories of Adler (Chapter 3), Maslow
    (Chapter 9), and Bandura (Chapter 17). This approach emphasizes cognitive and
    affective dynamics that interact with the environment to produce behavior.
    The second category emphasizes the importance of relatively stable traits of
    personal dispositions. The theories of Allport (Chapter 12), Eysenck (Chapter 14),
    and McCrae and Costa (Chapter 13) are in this category. This approach sees peo-
    ple as being motivated by a limited number of drives or personal traits that tend
    to render a person’s behavior somewhat consistent. Walter Mischel (1973) origi-
    nally objected to this trait theory explanation of behavior. Instead, he supported
    the idea that cognitive activities and specific situations play a major role in deter-
    mining behavior. However, more recently, Mischel and his colleagues (Mischel &
    Shoda, 1998, 1999; Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002) have advocated a
    reconciliation between the processing dynamics approach and the personal disposi-
    tions approach. This cognitive-affective personality theory holds that behavior
    stems from relatively stable personal dispositions and cognitive-affective processes
    interacting with a particular situation.
    Biography of Walter Mischel
    Walter Mischel, the second son of upper-middle-class parents, was born on Feb-
    ruary 22, 1930, in Vienna. He and his brother Theodore, who later became a phi-
    losopher of science, grew up in a pleasant environment only a short distance from
    Freud’s home. The tranquillity of childhood, however, was shattered when the Nazis

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 549
    invaded Austria in 1938. That same year, the Mischel family fled Austria and moved
    to the United States. After living in various parts of the country, they eventually
    settled in Brooklyn, where Walter attended primary and secondary schools. Before
    he could accept a college scholarship, his father suddenly became ill, and Walter
    was forced to take a series of odd jobs. Eventually, he was able to attend New York
    University, where he became passionately interested in art (painting and sculpture)
    and divided his time among art, psychology, and life in Greenwich Village.
    In college, Mischel was appalled by the rat-centered introductory psychology
    classes that seemed to him far removed from the everyday lives of humans. His
    humanistic inclinations were solidified by reading Freud, the existential thinkers,
    and the great poets. After graduation, he entered the MA program in clinical psy-
    chology at City College of New York. While working on his degree, he was
    employed as a social worker in the Lower East Side slums, work that led him to
    doubt the usefulness of psychoanalytic theory and to see the necessity of using
    empirical evidence to evaluate all claims of psychology.
    Mischel’s development as a cognitive social psychologist was further
    enhanced by his doctoral studies at Ohio State University from 1953 to 1956. At
    that time, the psychology department at Ohio State was informally divided into the
    supporters of its two most influential faculty members—Julian Rotter and George
    Kelly. Unlike most students, who strongly supported one or the other position,
    Mischel admired both Rotter and Kelly and learned from each of them. As a con-
    sequence, Mischel’s cognitive social theory shows the influence of Rotter’s social
    learning theory as well as Kelly’s cognitively based theory of personal constructs
    (see Chapter 19). Rotter taught Mischel the importance of research design for
    improving assessment techniques and for measuring the effectiveness of therapeu-
    tic treatment; Kelly taught him that participants in psychology experiments are like
    the psychologists who study them in that they are thinking, feeling human beings.
    From 1956 to 1958, Mischel lived much of the time in the Caribbean, study-
    ing religious cults that practiced spirit possession and investigating delay of grati-
    fication in a cross-cultural setting. He became determined to learn more about why
    people prefer future valuable rewards over immediate less valuable ones. Much of
    his later research has revolved around this issue.
    Next, Mischel taught for 2 years at the University of Colorado. He then
    joined the Department of Social Relations at Harvard, where his interest in per-
    sonality theory and assessment was further stimulated by discussions with Gordon
    Allport (see Chapter 12), Henry Murray, David McClelland, and others. In 1962,
    Mischel moved to Stanford and became a colleague of Albert Bandura (see Chap-
    ter 17). After more than 20 years at Stanford, Mischel returned to New York,
    joining the faculty at Columbia University, where he remains as an active researcher
    and continues to hone his cognitive social learning theory.
    While at Harvard, Mischel met and married Harriet Nerlove, another graduate
    student in cognitive psychology. Before their divorce, the Mischels collaborated to
    produce three daughters and several scientific projects (H. N. Mischel & W. Mischel,
    1973; W. Mischel & H. N. Mischel, 1976, 1983). Mischel’s most important early
    work was Personality and Assessment (1968), an outgrowth of his efforts to identify
    successful Peace Corps volunteers. His experiences as consultant to the Peace Corps
    taught him that under the right conditions, people are at least as capable as standard-
    ized tests at predicting their own behavior. In Personality and Assessment, Mischel

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories550
    argued that traits are weak predictors of performance in a variety of situations and
    that the situation is more important than traits in influencing behavior. This book
    upset many clinical psychologists, who argued that the inability of personal dispo-
    sitions to predict behavior across situations was due to the unreliability and impre-
    cision of the instruments that measure traits. Some believed that Mischel was trying
    to undo the concept of stable personality traits and even deny the existence of
    personality. Later, Mischel (1979) answered his critics, saying that he was not
    opposed to traits as such, but only to generalized traits that negate the individuality
    and uniqueness of each person.
    Much of Mischel’s research has been a cooperative effort with a number of
    his graduate students. In recent years, many of his publications have been col-
    laborations with Yuichi Shoda, who received his PhD from Columbia in 1990 and
    is presently at the University of Washington. Mischel’s most popular book, Intro-
    duction to Personality, was published originally in 1971 and underwent a 7th
    revision in 2004, with Yuichi Shoda and Ronald D. Smith as coauthors. Mischel
    has won several awards, including the Distinguished Scientist award from the
    clinical division of the American Psychological Association (APA) in 1978 and
    the APA’s award for Distinguished Scientific Contribution in 1982.
    Background of the Cognitive-Affective
    Personality System
    Some theorists, such as Hans Eysenck (Chapter 14) and Gordon Allport (Chapter 12),
    believed that behavior was mostly a product of relatively stable personality traits.
    However, Walter Mischel objected to this assumption. His early research (Mischel,
    1958, 1961a, 1961b) led him to believe that behavior was largely a function of the
    situation.
    Consistency Paradox
    Mischel saw that both laypersons and professional psychologists seem to intuitively
    believe that people’s behavior is relatively consistent, yet empirical evidence sug-
    gests much variability in behavior, a situation Mischel called the consistency par-
    adox. To many people, it seems self-evident that such global personal dispositions
    as aggressiveness, honesty, miserliness, punctuality, and so forth account for much
    of our behavior. People elect politicians to office because they see them as having
    honesty, trustworthiness, decisiveness, and integrity; employers and personnel man-
    agers select workers who are punctual, loyal, cooperative, hardworking, organized,
    and sociable. One person is generally friendly and gregarious, whereas another is
    usually unfriendly and taciturn. Psychologists as well as laypeople have long sum-
    marized people’s behavior by using such descriptive trait names. Thus, many peo-
    ple assume that global personality traits will be manifested over a period of time
    and also from one situation to another. Mischel suggested that, at best, these people
    are only half right. He contended that some basic traits do persist over time, but
    little evidence exists that they generalize from one situation to another. Mischel
    strongly objected to attempts to attribute behavior to these global traits. Any attempt
    to classify individuals as friendly, extraverted, conscientious, and so forth may be

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 551
    one way of defining personality, but it is a sterile taxonomy that fails to explain
    behavior (Mischel, 1990, 1999, 2004; Mischel et al., 2002; Shoda & Mischel, 1998).
    For many years, research has failed to support the consistency of personality
    traits across situations. Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, in their classic 1928
    study, found that schoolchildren who were honest in one situation were deceitful
    in another. For example, some children would cheat on tests but not steal party
    favors; others would break rules in an athletic contest but not cheat on a test. Some
    psychologists, such as Seymour Epstein (1979, 1980), have argued that studies
    such as Hartshorne and May’s used behaviors that are too specific. Epstein con-
    tended that, rather than relying on single behaviors, researchers must aggregate
    measures of behavior; that is, they must obtain a sum of many behaviors. In other
    words, Epstein would say that even though people do not always display a strong
    personal trait, for example, conscientiousness, the sum total of their individual
    behaviors will reflect a generally conscientious core.
    However, Mischel (1965) had earlier found that a three-person assessment
    committee, which used aggregated information from a variety of scores, could not
    reliably predict performance of Peace Corps teachers. The correlation between the
    committee’s judgment and the performance of the teachers was a nonsignificant
    0.20. Moreover, Mischel (1968) contended that correlations of about 0.30 between
    different measures of the same trait as well as between trait scores and subsequent
    behaviors represented the outer limits of trait consistency. Thus, these relatively
    low correlations between traits and behavior are not due to the unreliability of the
    assessment instrument but to the inconsistencies in behavior. Even with perfectly
    reliable measures, Mischel argued, specific behaviors will not accurately predict
    personality traits.
    Person-Situation Interaction
    In time, however, Mischel (1973, 2004) came to see that people are not empty
    vessels with no enduring personality traits. He acknowledged that most people have
    some consistency in their behavior, but he continued to insist that the situation has
    a powerful effect on behavior. Mischel’s objection to the use of traits as predictors
    of behaviors rested not with their temporal instability but with their inconsistency
    from one situation to another. He saw that many basic dispositions can be stable
    over a long period of time. For example, a student may have a history of being
    conscientious with regard to academic work but fail to be conscientious in cleaning
    his apartment or maintaining his car in working condition. His lack of conscien-
    tiousness in cleaning his apartment may be due to disinterest, and his neglect of
    his car may be the result of insufficient knowledge. Thus, the specific situation
    interacts with the person’s competencies, interests, goals, values, expectancies, and
    so forth to predict behavior. To Mischel, these views of traits or personal disposi-
    tions, though important in predicting human behavior, overlook the significance of
    the specific situation in which people function.
    Personal dispositions influence behavior only under certain conditions and in
    certain situations. This view suggests that behavior is not caused by global personal
    traits but by people’s perceptions of themselves in a particular situation. For exam-
    ple, a young man who typically is very shy around young women may behave in

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories552
    an outgoing, extraverted manner when he is with men or with older women. Is this
    young man shy or is he extraverted? Mischel would say that he is both—depending
    on the conditions affecting the young man during a particular situation.
    The conditional view holds that behavior is shaped by personal dispositions plus
    a person’s specific cognitive and affective processes. Whereas trait theory would sug-
    gest that global dispositions predict behavior, Mischel argues that a person’s beliefs,
    values, goals, cognitions, and feelings interact with those dispositions to shape behav-
    ior. For example, traditional trait theory suggests that people with the trait of consci-
    entiousness will usually behave in a conscientious manner. However, Mischel points
    out that in a variety of situations, a conscientious person may use conscientiousness
    along with other cognitive-affective processes to accomplish a specific outcome.
    In an exploratory study to test this model, Jack Wright and Mischel (1988)
    interviewed 8- and 12-year-old children as well as adults and asked them to report
    everything they knew about “target” groups of children. Both adults and children
    recognized the variability of other people’s behavior, but adults were more certain
    about the conditions under which particular behaviors would occur. Whereas children
    would hedge their descriptions in such terms as “Carlo sometimes hits other kids,”
    adults would be more specific: for example, “Carlo hits when provoked.” These find-
    ings suggest that people readily recognize the interrelationship between situations
    and behavior and that they intuitively follow a conditional view of dispositions.
    Neither the situation alone nor stable personality traits alone determine behav-
    ior. Rather, behavior is a product of both. Therefore, Mischel and Shoda have
    proposed a cognitive-affective personality system that attempts to reconcile these
    two approaches to predicting human behaviors.
    Cognitive-Affective Personality System
    To solve the classical consistency paradox, Mischel and Shoda (Mischel, 2004;
    Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 1998, 1999; Shoda & Mischel, 1996, 1998) proposed a
    cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS; also called a cognitive-affective
    processing system) that accounts for variability across situations as well as stabil-
    ity of behavior within a person. Apparent inconsistencies in a person’s behavior
    are due neither to random error nor solely to the situation. Rather, they are poten-
    tially predictable behaviors that reflect stable patterns of variation within a person.
    The cognitive-affective personality system predicts that a person’s behavior will
    change from situation to situation but in a meaningful manner.
    Mischel and Shoda (Mischel, 1999, 2004; Mischel & Ayduk, 2002; Shoda,
    LeeTiernan, & Mischel, 2002) believe that variations in behavior can be conceptu-
    alized in this framework: If A, then X; but if B, then Y. For example, if Mark is
    provoked by his wife, then he will react with aggression. However, when the “if”
    changes, so does the “then.” If Mark is provoked by his boss, then he will react
    with submission. Mark’s behavior may seem inconsistent because he apparently
    reacts differently to the same stimulus. Mischel and Shoda, however, would argue
    that being provoked by two different people does not constitute the same stimulus.
    Mark’s behavior is not inconsistent and may well reflect a stable lifetime pattern of
    reacting. Such an interpretation, Mischel and Shoda believe, solves the consistency

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 553
    paradox by taking into account both the long history of observed variability in
    behavior and the intuitive conviction of both psychologists and laypeople that per-
    sonality is relatively stable. The frequently observed variability in behavior is sim-
    ply an essential part of a unifying stability of personality.
    This theory does not suggest that behaviors are an outgrowth of stable, global
    personality traits. If behaviors were a result of global traits, then there would be
    little individual variation in behavior. In other words, Mark would react in much the
    same manner to provocation, regardless of the specific situation. However, Mark’s
    long-standing pattern of variability attests to the inadequacy of both the situation
    theory and the trait theory. His pattern of variability is his behavioral signature of
    personality, that is, his consistent manner of varying his behavior in particular situ-
    ations (Shoda, LeeTiernan, & Mischel, 2002). His personality has a signature that
    remains stable across situations even as his behavior changes. Mischel (1999) believes
    that an adequate theory of personality should “try to predict and explain these sig-
    natures of personality, rather than to eliminate or ignore them” (p. 46).
    Behavior Prediction
    In Chapter 1, we advocated that effective theories should be stated in an if-then
    framework, but Mischel (1999, 2004) is one of only a few personality theorists to
    do so. His basic theoretical position for predicting and explaining is stated as follows:
    “If personality is a stable system that processes the information about the situations,
    external or internal, then it follows that as individuals encounter different situations,
    their behaviors should vary across the situations” (p. 43). This theoretical position
    can generate a number of hypotheses about behavior outcomes. It assumes that per-
    sonality may have temporal stability and that behaviors may vary from situation to
    situation. It also assumes that prediction of behavior rests on a knowledge of how
    and when various cognitive-affective units are activated. These units include encod-
    ings, expectancies, beliefs, competencies, self-regulatory plans and strategies, and
    affects and goals.
    Situation Variables
    Mischel believes that the relative influence of situation variables and personal
    qualities can be determined by observing the uniformity or diversity of people’s
    responses in a given situation. When different people are behaving in a very sim-
    ilar manner—for example, while watching an emotional scene in an engrossing
    movie—situation variables are more powerful than personal characteristics. On the
    other hand, events that appear the same may produce widely different reactions
    because personal qualities override situational ones. For example, several workers
    may all be laid off from their jobs, but individual differences will lead to diverse
    behaviors, depending on the workers’ perceived need to work, confidence in their
    level of skill, and perceived ability to find another job.
    Early in his career, Mischel conducted studies demonstrating that the interac-
    tion between the situation and various personal qualities was an important deter-
    minant of behavior. In one study, for example, Mischel and Ervin Staub (1965)
    looked at conditions that influenced a person’s choice of a reward and found that

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories554
    both the situation and an individual’s expectancy for success were important. These
    investigators first asked 8th-grade boys to rate their expectancies for success on
    verbal reasoning and general information tasks. Later, after the students worked
    on a series of problems, some were told that they had succeeded on those prob-
    lems; some were informed that they had failed; and the third group received no
    information. The boys were then asked to choose between an immediate, less
    valuable, noncontingent reward and a delayed, more valuable, contingent reward.
    Consistent with Mischel’s interaction theory, students who had been told that they
    had succeeded on the earlier similar task were more likely to wait for the more
    valued reward that was contingent on their performance; those who were informed
    that they had previously failed tended to choose an immediate, less valuable
    reward; and those who had received no earlier feedback made choices based on
    their original expectancies for success; that is, students in the no-information group
    who originally had high expectancies for success made choices similar to those
    who believed that they were successful, whereas those who originally had low
    expectancies for success made choices similar to those who believed that they had
    failed. Figure 18.2 shows how situational feedback interacts with expectancy for
    success to influence choice of rewards.
    Mischel and his associates have also shown that children can use their cog-
    nitive processes to change a difficult situation into an easier one. For example,
    Mischel and Ebbe B. Ebbesen (1970) found that some children were able to use
    their cognitive ability to change an unpleasant wait for a treat into a more pleasant
    situation. In this delay-of-gratification study, nursery school children were told that
    they would receive a small reward after a short period of time, but a larger treat
    if they could wait longer. Children who thought about the treat had difficulty wait-
    ing, whereas children who were able to wait the longest used a variety of self-
    distractions to avoid thinking about the reward. They looked away from the treat,
    closed their eyes, or sang songs in order to change the aversive waiting situation
    into a more pleasant one. These and other research results led Mischel to conclude
    that both the situation and various cognitive-affective components of personality
    play a role in determining behavior.
    Made choices based on
    earlier expectancy
    for success
    Chose less valuable
    noncontingent rewards
    Chose more valuable
    contingent rewards
    No informationObtained failure
    Everyone works on a series of problems
    Everyone measured for expectancy for success
    Obtained success
    FIGURE 18.2 Model used by Mischel and Staub (1965).

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 555
    Cognitive-Affective Units
    In 1973, Mischel proposed a set of five overlapping, relatively stable person vari-
    ables that interact with the situation to determine behavior. More than 30 years of
    research have caused Mischel and his associates to broaden their conception of
    these variables, which they call cognitive-affective units (Mischel, 1999, 2004;
    Mischel & Ayduk, 2002; Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 1998, 1999). These person
    variables shifted the emphasis from what a person has (i.e., global traits) to what
    a person does in a particular situation. What a person does includes more than
    actions; it includes cognitive and affective qualities such as thinking, planning,
    feeling, and evaluating.
    Cognitive-affective units include all those psychological, social, and physi-
    ological aspects of people that cause them to interact with their environment with
    a relatively stable pattern of variation. These units include people’s (1) encoding
    strategies, (2) competencies and self-regulatory strategies, (3) expectancies and
    beliefs, (4) goals and values, and (5) affective responses.
    Encoding Strategies
    One important cognitive-affective unit that ultimately affects behavior is people’s per-
    sonal constructs and encoding strategies: that is, people’s ways of categorizing informa-
    tion received from external stimuli. People use cognitive processes to transform these
    stimuli into personal constructs, including their self-concept, their view of other people,
    and their way of looking at the world. Different people encode the same events in dif-
    ferent ways, which accounts for individual differences in personal constructs. For exam-
    ple, one person may react angrily when insulted, whereas another may choose to ignore
    the same insult. In addition, the same person may encode the same event differently in
    different situations. For example, a woman who ordinarily construes a telephone call from
    her best friend as a pleasant experience may in one situation perceive it as a nuisance.
    Stimulus inputs are substantially altered by what people selectively attend,
    how they interpret their experience, and the way in which they categorize those
    inputs. Mischel and former PhD student Bert Moore (1973) found that children
    can transform environmental events by focusing on selected aspects of stimulus
    inputs. In this delay-of-gratification study, children exposed to pictures of rewards
    (snacks or pennies) were able to wait longer for the rewards than were children
    who were encouraged to cognitively construct (imagine) real rewards while view-
    ing the pictures. A previous study (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972) had demon-
    strated that children exposed to real rewards during a wait period had more
    difficulty waiting than those exposed to no reward. Results of these two studies
    suggested that, in at least some situations, cognitive transformations of stimuli can
    have about the same effect as actual stimuli.
    Competencies and Self-Regulatory Strategies
    How we behave depends in part on the potential behaviors available to us, our beliefs
    of what we can do, our plans and strategies for enacting behaviors, and our expectan-
    cies for success (Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). Our beliefs in what we can do
    relate to our competencies. Mischel (1990) used the term “competencies” to refer
    to that vast array of information we acquire about the world and our relationship to

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories556
    it. By observing our own behaviors and those of others, we learn what we can do
    in a particular situation as well as what we cannot do. Mischel agreed with Bandura
    that we do not attend to all stimuli in our environment; rather, we selectively con-
    struct or generate our own version of the real world. Thus, we acquire a set of beliefs
    about our performance capabilities, often in the absence of actual performance. For
    example, an outstanding student may believe that she has the competence to do well
    on the Graduate Record Exam (GRE) even though she has never taken that test.
    Cognitive competencies, such as doing well on the GRE, are generally more
    stable temporally and cross-situationally than other cognitive-affective units are. That
    is, people’s scores on mental ability tests do not ordinarily show large fluctuations
    from one time to the next or from one situation to another. In fact, Mischel (1990)
    has argued that one of the reasons for the apparent consistency of traits is the relative
    stability of intelligence, a basic trait that underlies many personal dispositions. He
    contended that cognitive competencies, as measured by traditional mental ability
    tests, have proven to be some of the best predictors of social and interpersonal adjust-
    ment and thus give social and interpersonal traits some appearance of stability. More-
    over, Mischel suggested that when intelligence is assessed by nontraditional measures
    that include a person’s potential for seeing alternate solutions to problems, it accounts
    for even larger portions of the consistency found in other traits.
    In Chapter 17, we discussed Bandura’s concept of self-regulation, by which
    people control their own behavior. Similarly, Mischel believes that people use
    self-regulatory strategies to control their own behavior through self-imposed
    goals and self-produced consequences. People do not require external rewards and
    punishments to shape their behavior; they can set goals for themselves and then
    reward or criticize themselves contingent upon whether their behavior moves them
    in the direction of those goals.
    People’s self-regulatory system enables them to plan, initiate, and maintain
    behaviors even when environmental support is weak or nonexistent. People such
    as Abraham Lincoln and Mohandas Gandhi were able to regulate their own behav-
    ior in the face of a nonsupportive and hostile environment, but each of us can
    persist without environmental encouragement if we have powerful self-produced
    goals and values. However, inappropriate goals and ineffective strategies increase
    anxiety and lead to failure. For example, people with inflexible, exaggerated goals
    may persist in trying to realize those goals, but their lack of competence and envi-
    ronmental support prevent them from achieving those goals.
    Expectancies and Beliefs
    Any situation presents an enormous number of behavioral potentials, but how
    people behave depends on their specific expectancies and beliefs about the conse-
    quences of each of the different behavioral possibilities. Knowledge of people’s
    hypotheses or beliefs concerning the outcome of any situation is a better predictor
    of behavior than is knowledge of their ability to perform (Mischel et al., 2002).
    From previous experience and by observing others, people learn to enact
    those behaviors that they expect will result in the most subjectively valued outcome.
    When people have no information about what they can expect from a behavior,
    they will enact those behaviors that received the greatest reinforcement in past

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 557
    similar situations. For example, a college student who has never taken the GRE
    nevertheless has had experience preparing for other tests. What that student does
    in getting ready for the GRE is partially influenced by what previous test prepara-
    tion behaviors resulted in the most valuable outcome. A student who has previously
    been rewarded for using self-relaxation techniques to prepare for tests will expect
    that the same techniques will help in doing well on the GRE. Mischel (1990, 2004)
    referred to this type of expectancy as a behavior-outcome expectancy. People often
    construe behavior-outcome expectancies in an “if . . . , then . . .” framework. “If
    I use self-relaxation procedures, then I can expect to do well on the GRE.” “If I
    tell my boss what I really think of her, then I might lose my job.”
    Mischel also identified a second type of expectancy—stimulus-outcome
    expectancies, which refers to the many stimulus conditions that influence the prob-
    able consequences of any behavior pattern. Stimulus-outcome expectancies help us
    predict what events are likely to occur following certain stimuli. Perhaps the most
    obvious example is an expectancy of loud, unpleasant thunder following the obser-
    vance of lightning (the stimulus). Mischel believes that stimulus- outcome expec-
    tancies are important units for understanding classical conditioning. For example,
    a child who has been conditioned to associate pain with nurses in a hospital begins
    to cry and show fear when she sees a nurse with a hypodermic syringe.
    Mischel (1990) believes that one reason for the inconsistency of behavior is
    our inability to predict other people’s behavior. We have little hesitancy in attrib-
    uting personal traits to others, but when we notice that their behavior is inconsis-
    tent with those traits, we become less certain about how to react to them. Our
    behavior will be cross-situationally consistent to the extent that our expectancies
    are unchanging. But our expectancies are not constant; they change because we
    can discriminate and evaluate the multitude of potential reinforcers in any given
    situation (Mischel & Ayduk, 2002).
    Goals and Values
    People do not react passively to situations but are active and goal directed. They
    formulate goals, devise plans for attaining their goals, and in part create their own
    situations. People’s subjective goals, values, and preferences represent a fourth
    cognitive-affective unit. For example, two college students may have equal aca-
    demic ability and also equal expectancy for success in graduate school. The first,
    however, places more value on entering the job market than on going to graduate
    school, while the second chooses to go to graduate school rather than to pursue an
    immediate career. The two may have had many similar experiences during college,
    but because they have different goals, they have made very different decisions.
    Values, goals, and interests, along with competencies, are among the most
    stable cognitive-affective units. One reason for this consistency is the emotion-
    eliciting properties of these units. For instance, a person may place a negative value
    on a certain food because he associates it with the nausea he once experienced while
    eating that food. Without counterconditioning, this aversion is likely to persist due
    to the strong negative emotion elicited by the food. Similarly, patriotic values may
    last a lifetime because they are associated with positive emotions such as security,
    attachment to one’s home, and love of one’s mother.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories558
    Affective Responses
    During the early 1970s,
    Mischel’s theory was
    mostly a cognitive the-
    ory. It was based on the
    assumption that people’s
    thoughts and other cog-
    nitive processes interact
    with a particular situa-
    tion to determine behav-
    ior. Since then, however,
    Mischel and colleagues
    (Mischel & Ayduk,
    2002; Mischel & Shoda,
    1998, 1999) have added
    affective responses to
    the list of important
    cognitive- affective units.
    Affective responses
    include emotions, feel-
    ings, and physiological
    reactions. Mischel sees
    affective responses as
    inseparable from cogni-
    tions and regards the
    interlocking cognitive-
    affective units as more
    basic than the other
    cognitive- affective units.
    Affective responses,
    then, do not exist in isola-
    tion. Not only are they inseparable from cognitive processes, but also they influence
    each of the other cognitive-affective units. For example, the encoding of a person’s
    view of self includes certain positive and negative feelings. “I see myself as a com-
    petent psychology student and that pleases me.” “I’m not very good at mathematics
    and I don’t like that.” Similarly, people’s competencies and coping strategies, their
    beliefs and expectancies, and their goals and values are all colored by their affective
    responses.
    Mischel and Shoda (1995) stated:
    Cognitive-affective representations are not unconnected discrete units that are
    simply elicited as “responses” in isolation: These cognitive representations and
    affective states interact dynamically and influence each other reciprocally, and it
    is the organization of the relationships among them that forms the core of the
    personality structure and that guides and constrains their impact. (p. 253)
    In summary, interrelated cognitive-affective units contribute to behavior as
    they interact with stable personality traits and a receptive environment. The most
    One reason for the inconsistency in people’s behavior is their
    inability to predict the behavior of others. © ThinkStock/SuperStock

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 559
    important of these variables include (1) encoding strategies, or how people con-
    strue or categorize an event; (2) competencies and self-regulating strategies: that
    is, what people can do and their strategies and plans to accomplish a desired
    behavior; (3) behavior-outcome and stimulus-outcome expectancies and beliefs
    regarding a particular situation; (4) subjective goals, values, and preferences that
    partially determine selective attention to events; and (5) affective responses, includ-
    ing feelings and emotions as well as the affects that accompany physiological
    reactions.
    Related Research
    Rotter’s ideas on internal and external control have generated considerable research
    in psychology with many researchers from across disciplines drawing upon Rotter’s
    concepts for their own research. Mischel’s CAPS model, though a relatively new
    model of personality (it was first proposed in its entirety in the mid-1990s) has
    generated a strong body of work considering its age with several studies focusing
    on the if-then framework previously discussed.
    Locus of Control and Holocaust Heroes
    As you have read throughout this book, personality variables can be used to predict
    innumerable outcomes. Some outcomes are rather mundane and routine such as
    whether La Juan will rest her head during a dull lecture, whereas others are extraor-
    dinary such as whether La Juan will earn a PhD in psychology. But perhaps no
    outcome is more extraordinary than the outcome selected by psychologist Elizabeth
    Midlarsky and her colleagues. Midlarsky sought to use personality variables to
    predict who was a Holocaust hero and who was a bystander during the tragic years
    of World War II (Midlarsky, Fagin Jones, & Corley, 2005). The genocide of
    6 million Jews by the Nazis was so extreme, so awful, that it is hard to imagine
    that just one half of 1% of the people in Nazi-occupied territory elected to assist
    their Jewish neighbors when their neighbors’ lives were in such great peril (Oliner
    & Oliner, 1988). But the danger posed to those who assisted Jews was equal to
    the danger of being Jewish, so the acts of non-Jewish civilians who put their own
    lives on the line to assist their persecuted neighbors were truly rare and heroic acts.
    To investigate the power of personality to predict such rare, heroic acts,
    Midlarsky and her colleagues assembled a remarkable sample of people consisting
    of 80 rescuers of Jews during World War II, 73 bystanders who lived in Europe
    during World War II but did not assist Jews, and a comparison sample of 43 people
    who were from Europe but immigrated to North America before the war. The
    participants were about 72 years of age on average at the time the study was con-
    ducted, which means most of them were in their twenties during World War II.
    Rescuer status was verified by the testimony of Holocaust survivors who were
    actually rescued by the participants in this study.
    The researchers included several personality variables in their effort to pre-
    dict who was a hero and who was a bystander; one such variable was locus of
    control. Being oriented more toward an internal sense of control was predicted to
    relate to being a Holocaust hero because such individuals believe they have control

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories560
    over life events and success is not due to luck or chance (as people with an exter-
    nal sense of control would believe). To use Rotter’s language (Rotter, 1966), those
    with internal controls are people who have a generalized expectancy that their acts
    would be successful in saving the lives of their persecuted neighbors. Other vari-
    ables Midlarsky and her colleagues examined were autonomy (having a sense of
    independence), risk taking, social responsibility, authoritarianism (related to holding
    prejudiced attitudes toward minority groups and the opposite of tolerance), empathy,
    and altruistic moral reasoning (high levels of which require abstract reasoning
    including the use of internalized values). All personality variables were measured
    using standard self-report measures, and participants completed the measures, dur-
    ing face-to-face interviews with one of the researchers in the participant’s home.
    The researchers found that possessing an internal sense of control was posi-
    tively related to all the personality variables measured, which means that those who
    had a high sense of internal control also were more autonomous, took more risks,
    had a stronger sense of social responsibility, were more tolerant (less authoritarian),
    were more empathetic, and exhibited higher levels of altruistic moral reasoning.
    To test their primary prediction that personality could predict hero status, the
    researchers used a statistical procedure that allowed them to pool all the partici-
    pants (heroes, bystanders, and the comparison sample of pre-war immigrants) and
    then use each person’s scores on the personality variables to predict to which
    category each participant belonged. In support of the researchers’ hypothesis, per-
    sonality correctly predicted who was a hero and who was not 93% of the time,
    which is a very high accuracy rate for this type of analysis.
    Further analysis revealed that those who put their own life on the line to
    assist their persecuted neighbors had a higher sense of internal control than those
    who did not offer assistance. And this makes perfect sense: If a person has an
    external sense of control, believing that the outcome of events is all chance, then
    why would that person ever risk his or her own safety to take action to help ensure
    the safety of others? Having a generalized expectancy that your actions will have
    a positive effect, and that the outcome of events is not all chance, is a critical
    element to being able to help others under extraordinary conditions.
    Person-Situation Interaction
    Walter Mischel has conducted a great deal of research on the complexities associ-
    ated with personality, situations, and behavior. His research and theory of cognitive
    social learning has generated even more research by many scholars in the field.
    Perhaps the most important of these has been the recent research on the person-
    situation interaction. The essence of this approach is summed up by the contextual
    contingency between behavior and context in the statement “If I am in this situa-
    tion, then I do X; but if I am in that situation, then I do Y.” As we discussed
    in the section on the cognitive-affective personality system, Mischel and Shoda
    developed conceptual and empirical methods of investigating the person-situation
    interaction by simply having participants respond to if-then situations.
    In a recent study, elegant in its simplicity, one of Mischel’s students, Lara
    Kammrath, and her colleagues demonstrated the “If . . . then . . .” framework
    very clearly (Kammrath, Mendoza-Denton, & Mischel, 2005). The goal of the
    study was to show that people understand the if-then framework and use it when

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 561
    making judgments about others. Participants in this study were given just one
    trait of a fictional female student and then asked to predict how warmly the
    student would behave in several different situations. The single trait descriptor
    each participant received was determined randomly from the following list:
    friendly, a kiss-up, flirtatious, shy, or unfriendly. With just one of these traits in
    mind, participants then had to predict how the fictional student would behave
    with peers, with professors, with women, with men, with familiar people, and
    with unfamiliar people.
    What the researchers found perfectly supported the if-then framework of
    person-situation interactions. For example, when the trait descriptor for the fic-
    tional student was kiss-up, participants predicted that she would act very warmly
    toward professors but not exceptionally warmly toward peers. In other words, if
    the target of the interaction was of a high status (professor), then the student was
    very warm; but if the target was not of high status, then the student was not warm.
    Similarly, when the student was described as unfriendly, participants predicted she
    would be rather warm toward people she knew well but not at all warm toward
    unfamiliar people. These findings clearly demonstrate the average person under-
    stands that people do not behave in the same manner in all situations—depending
    on their personality, people adjust behavior to match the situation.
    Mischel and colleagues concluded that the social-cognitive interactionist
    conceptualization of the person-situation environment is a more appropriate way
    of understanding human behavior than the traditional “decontextualized” views
    of personality in which people behave in a given way regardless of the context.
    Marshmallows and Self-Regulation Across the Lifespan
    As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Walter Mischel’s earliest research in personality
    psychology was on delay of gratification. Recall that in his early studies with Ebbesen
    (1970), Mischel found that children who were able to resist temptation (in this case,
    not eating one marshmallow but rather waiting to receive two marshmallows later)
    did so with the use of a variety of cognitive and behavioral strategies. Since that early
    work, decades of longitudinal research has followed those preschoolers across their
    lifespan to explore the mechanisms that enable effective self-regulation.
    In a recent review of these follow-up studies, Walter Mischel, Yuichi Shoda,
    and colleagues (2012) provide evidence for surprisingly significant predictive
    validity of the “marshmallow test” for important social, cognitive, and mental
    health outcomes across the lifespan. The list of remarkable consequences is long.
    For example, the number of seconds preschoolers were able to wait to obtain the
    preferred two marshmallows predicted significantly higher SAT scores when they
    were in high school, and, later, higher educational achievement overall, greater self-
    worth, and a better ability to cope with stress (Ayduk et al., 2000; Shoda et al., 1990).
    Further, those preschoolers who gave in to the temptation of one marshmallow
    were 30% more likely to be overweight by the age of 11 (Seeyave et al., 2009),
    and more likely to develop features of borderline personality in adulthood (Ayduk
    et al., 2008) than those who were able to wait for the delayed reward.
    What enables this amazing willpower in some, but not all, of us? Mischel and
    colleagues have published extensively on this question, and have concluded that
    those who can resist temptation in favor of long-term goals do so with the use of

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories562
    two broad strategies: redirection of attention or cognitive reframing (Mischel et al.,
    2010). Looking away or attending to something besides the tempting object helps
    delayers. Reframing a situation away from what Mischel and colleagues call the
    “hot” features (the marshmallow’s yumminess, for example) and toward “cooler”
    representations (the marshmallow’s shape) also boosts ability to delay.
    Nearly all readers have heard of the now-famous marshmallow test, and many
    of us have seen YouTube videos of little kids sitting alone at tables in agony, bend-
    ing themselves into pretzels to not eat that marshmallow. Sesame Street even fea-
    tured the Cookie Monster learning to delay gratification so he can later join the
    “Cookie Connoisseurs Club.” Unfortunately, when the popular press gets hold of
    research like this, both the details and the fundamentals of the message often get
    lost. Many naïve readers have assumed that the longitudinal research findings that
    some kids had the “grit” back in the 1960s to delay their gratification, and that grit
    later predicted a lifetime of success, meant this trait of self-control was highly
    genetic; one either has it or does not have it. But Mischel’s cognitive-affective
    personality theory was and remains always about the dynamic interaction of the
    cognitive, affective and behavioral actions people make in given situations. As such,
    self-control involves skills and these skills can be exercised in some situations and
    not others, and they can be taught and enhanced.
    Walter Mischel (2014a) recently published a book reviewing his research over
    the decades on willpower and self-regulation, and setting the record straight, in a
    conversational style, regarding the takeaways from this work entitled The Marshmallow
    Test: Mastering Self-Control. In it, he argues that self-control and the ability to delay
    gratification is like a
    muscle that we can
    strengthen by training,
    and that we can choose to
    flex or not. He and his
    colleagues discovered
    two important strategies
    that enable us to resist
    temptation in favor of
    long-term goals: redirec-
    tion of attention and cog-
    nitive reframing (Mischel
    et al., 2010). The kids in
    the original marshmallow
    studies who succeeded in
    delaying employed these
    strategies, and all of us
    can learn to do so. Look-
    ing away or attending to
    something besides the
    tempting object helps
    delayers, whether we are
    facing a sweet treat like a
    marshmallow or a pack
    The marshmallow test is a classic measure of self-regulation
    in children and predicts many long-term outcomes such as
    academic performance in high school and college.
    © Bill Aron/PhotoEdit—All rights reserved.

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 563
    of cigarettes at the store checkout when we are trying to quit smoking. Reframing a
    situation away from what Mischel and his colleagues call the “hot” features that our
    emotional, limbic system encodes (the marshmallow’s delicious chewiness or nico-
    tine’s calming effect) and toward “cooler” representations that our prefrontal cortex
    is in charge of (“the marshmallow’s shape resembles a cloud” or “what else could I
    buy instead with the money a pack of cigarettes costs?”) boosts our capacity to delay
    or even overcome unhealthy immediate gratifications. The ultimate goal is to get the
    cool cognitive system, through practice, to take over what typically is activated in
    the hot system. In a recent interview, Mischel said, “The cool system allows us to
    regulate the emotional thermostat so that in ‘hot’ situations our response is cooler
    and reflective rather than hot and reflexive. It helps to have ‘if-then’ implementation
    plans so that when, say, the dessert arrives, I choose the fruit rather than fill myself
    with sugar” (Mischel, 2014b, p. 943).
    These simple strategies can be taught to dramatically improve people’s capacity
    to delay gratification and improve self-regulation and hence our lives. Walter Mischel’s
    seemingly simple demonstrations of early life self-regulatory competencies have
    proven to be powerful predictors of healthy, flexible personality well into midlife.
    Critique of Cognitive Social
    Learning Theory
    Cognitive social learning theory is attractive to those who value the rigors of learn-
    ing theory and the speculative assumption that people are forward-looking, cogni-
    tive beings. Rotter and Mischel have both evolved learning theories for thinking,
    valuing, goal-directed humans rather than for laboratory animals. Like that of other
    theories, cognitive social learning theory’s value rests on how it rates on the six
    criteria for a useful theory.
    First, have the theories of Rotter and Mischel sparked a significant body
    of research? On this criterion, cognitive social learning theories have generated
    both quantity and quality of research. For example, Rotter’s concept of locus of
    control has been, and continues to be, one of the most widely researched topics
    in psychological literature. Locus of control, however, is not the core of Rotter’s
    personality theory, and the theory itself has not generated a comparable level of
    research. In contrast to Rotter’s concept of locus of control, Mischel’s theory has
    generated somewhat less research, but that research is more relevant to his core
    ideas.
    Second, are cognitive social learning theories falsifiable? The empirical
    nature of both Rotter’s and Mischel’s work exposes these theories to possible
    falsification and verification. However, Rotter’s basic prediction formula and
    general prediction formula are completely hypothetical and cannot be accurately
    tested.
    By comparison, Mischel’s theory lends itself somewhat more adequately to
    falsification. Indeed, research on delay of gratification drove Mischel to place
    greater emphasis on situation variables and less on the inconsistency of behavior.
    This de-emphasis on delay of gratification has allowed Mischel to avoid the narrow
    methodological approaches used in his early research.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories564
    On the criterion of organizing knowledge, cognitive social theory rates a
    little above average. Theoretically at least, Rotter’s general prediction formula and
    its components of need potential, freedom of movement, and need value can provide
    a useful framework for understanding much of human behavior. When behavior is
    seen as a function of these variables, it takes on a different hue. Mischel’s theory
    now rates above average on this criterion, because he has continued to broaden the
    scope of his theory to include both personal dispositions and dynamic cognitive-
    affective units that are able to predict and explain behavior.
    Does cognitive social learning theory serve as a useful guide to action? On
    this criterion, we rate the theory only moderately high. Rotter’s ideas on psycho-
    therapy are quite explicit and are a helpful guide to the therapist, but his theory
    of personality is not as practical. The mathematical formulas serve as a useful
    framework for organizing knowledge, but they do not suggest any specific course
    of action for the practitioner because the value of each factor within the formula
    cannot be known with mathematical certainty. Likewise, Mischel’s theory is only
    moderately useful to the therapist, teacher, or parent. It suggests to practitioners
    that they should expect people to behave differently in different situations and
    even from one time to another, but it provides them with few specific guidelines
    for action.
    Are the theories of Rotter and Mischel internally consistent? Rotter is care-
    ful in defining terms so that the same term does not have two or more meanings.
    In addition, separate components of his theory are logically compatible. The basic
    prediction formula, with its four specific factors, is logically consistent with the
    three broader variables of the general prediction formula. Mischel, like Bandura
    (see Chapter 17), has evolved a theory from solid empirical research, a procedure
    that greatly facilitates consistency.
    Finally, is cognitive social learning theory parsimonious? In general, it is rela-
    tively simple and does not purport to offer explanations for all human personality.
    Again, the emphasis on research rather than philosophical speculation has contributed
    to the parsimony of the cognitive social learning theories of both Rotter and Mischel.
    Concept of Humanity
    Rotter and Mischel both see people as cognitive animals whose perceptions
    of events are more important than the events themselves. People are capa-
    ble of construing events in a variety of ways, and these cognitive percep-
    tions are generally more influential than the environment in determining the
    value of the reinforcer. Cognition enables different people to see the same
    situation differently and to place different values on reinforcement that fol-
    lows their behavior.
    Both Rotter and Mischel see humans as goal-directed animals who do
    not merely react to their environments but who interact with their psycho-
    logically meaningful environments. Hence, cognitive social learning theory is
    more teleological, or future oriented, than it is causal. People place positive

    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory 565
    value on those events that they perceive as moving them closer to their
    goals, and they place negative value on those events that prevent them from
    reaching their goals. Goals, then, serve as criteria for evaluating events. Peo-
    ple are motivated less by past experiences with reinforcement than by their
    expectations of future events.
    Cognitive social learning theory holds that people move in the direction of
    goals they have established for themselves. These goals, however, change as
    people’s expectancies for reinforcement and their preference for one reinforce-
    ment over another changes. Because people are continually in the process of
    setting goals, they have some choice in directing their lives. Free choice is not
    unlimited, however, because past experiences and limits to personal competen-
    cies partially determine behavior.
    Because both Rotter and Mischel are realistic and pragmatic, they are
    difficult to rate on the optimism versus pessimism dimension. They believe
    that people can be taught constructive strategies for problem solving and
    that they are capable of learning new behaviors at any point in life. How-
    ever, these theorists do not hold that people have within themselves an
    inherent force that moves them inevitably in the direction of psychological
    growth.
    On the issue of conscious versus unconscious motives, cognitive social
    learning theory generally leans in the direction of conscious forces. People
    can consciously set goals for themselves and consciously strive to solve old
    and new problems. However, people are not always aware of the underlying
    motivations for much of their present behavior.
    On the issue of personality being shaped by social or biological influ-
    ences, cognitive social learning theory emphasizes social factors. Rotter
    especially stressed the importance of learning within a social environment.
    Mischel also highlighted social influences, but he does not overlook the
    importance of genetic factors. He and Shoda (Mischel & Shoda, 1999) main-
    tained that people have both a genetic and a social predisposition to act in
    a given manner. The genetic predisposition, of course, flows from their
    genetic endowment, whereas their social predisposition results from their
    social history.
    As for stressing uniqueness or similarities, we place Rotter in a middle
    position. People have individual histories and unique experiences that allow
    them to set personalized goals, but there are also enough similarities among
    people to allow for the construction of mathematical formulas that, if suffi-
    cient information were available, would permit reliable and accurate predic-
    tion of behavior.
    By comparison, Mischel clearly places more emphasis on uniqueness than
    on similarities. Differences among people are due to each individual’s behavioral
    signature and to unique patterns of variation in each person’s behavior. In sum-
    mary, cognitive social learning theory views people as forward-looking, purpo-
    sive, unified, cognitive, affective, and social animals who are capable of
    evaluating present experiences and anticipating future events on the basis of
    goals they have chosen for themselves.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories566
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ The cognitive social learning theories of both Rotter and Mischel
    attempt to synthesize the strengths of reinforcement theory with those of
    cognitive theory.
    ∙ According to Rotter, people’s behavior in a specific situation is a
    function of their expectations of reinforcements and the strength of the
    needs satisfied by those reinforcements.
    ∙ In specific situations, behavior is estimated by the basic prediction
    formula that suggests that the potential for a given behavior to occur is a
    function of the person’s expectancy plus the value of the reinforcement.
    ∙ The general prediction formula states that need potential is a function of
    freedom of movement and need value.
    ∙ Need potential is the possible occurrence of a set of functionally related
    behaviors directed toward the satisfaction of a goal or a similar set of
    goals.
    ∙ Freedom of movement is the average expectancy that a set of related
    behaviors will be reinforced.
    ∙ Need value is the degree to which a person prefers one set of
    reinforcements to another.
    ∙ In many situations, people develop generalized expectancies for success
    because a similar set of experiences has been previously reinforced.
    ∙ Locus of control is a generalized expectancy that refers to people’s
    belief that they can or cannot control their lives.
    ∙ Interpersonal trust is a generalized expectancy that the word of another
    is reliable.
    ∙ Maladaptive behavior refers to those actions that fail to move a person
    closer to a desired goal.
    ∙ Rotter’s method of psychotherapy aims toward changing goals and
    eliminating low expectancies.
    ∙ Mischel’s cognitive-active personality system (CAPS) suggests that
    people’s behavior is largely shaped by an interaction of stable
    personality traits and the situation, which include a number of personal
    variables.
    ∙ Personal dispositions have some consistency over time but little
    consistency from one situation to another.
    ∙ Relatively stable personality dispositions interact with cognitive-affective
    units to produce behavior.
    ∙ Cognitive-affective units include people’s encoding strategies, or their
    way of construing and categorizing information; their competencies and
    self-regulatory plans, or what they can do and their strategies for doing
    it; their expectancies and beliefs about the perceived consequences of
    their actions; their goals and values; and their affective responses.

    567
    Kelly: Psychology
    of Personal
    Constructs
    ⬥ Overview of Personal Construct Theory
    ⬥ Biography of George Kelly
    ⬥ Kelly’s Philosophical Position
    Person as Scientist
    Scientist as Person
    Constructive Alternativism
    ⬥ Personal Constructs
    Basic Postulate
    Supporting Corollaries
    ⬥ Applications of Personal Construct Theory
    Abnormal Development
    Psychotherapy
    The Rep Test
    ⬥ Related Research
    Gender as a Personal Construct
    Applying Personal Construct Theory to Intra-Personal
    Questions of Identity
    Personal Constructs and the Big Five
    ⬥ Critique of Kelly
    ⬥ Concept of Humanity
    ⬥ Key Terms and Concepts
    Kelly
    © Science Source
    C H A P T E R 1 9

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories568
    Arlene, a 21-year-old college student majoring in engineering, was balancing a heavy academic schedule with a full-time job. Her life suddenly became even
    more hectic when her 10-year-old car broke down. Now she faces an important
    decision. As she interprets her world, she sees that she has several choices. She
    could have her old car repaired; she could borrow money to purchase a nearly new
    used car; she could walk to and from school and work; she could ask friends for
    transportation; she could quit school and move back home with her parents; or she
    could choose among several other options.
    The process by which Arlene (or anyone) makes a decision is comparable to
    those processes followed by scientists when they approach a problem. Like a good
    scientist, Arlene followed several steps of decision making. First, she observed her
    environment (“I see that my car won’t run”). Next, she asked questions (“How
    can I stay in school and keep my job if my car won’t run?” “Should I have my
    old car repaired?” “Should I buy a newer car?” “What other options do I have?”).
    Third, she anticipated answers (“I can have my old car fixed, buy a newer one,
    rely on friends for transportation, or quit school”). Fourth, she perceived relation-
    ships between events (“Quitting school would mean moving back home, postpon-
    ing or giving up my goal of becoming an engineer, and losing much of my
    independence”). Fifth, she hypothesized about possible solutions to her dilemma
    (“If I have my old car repaired, it might cost more than the car is worth, but if I
    buy a late-model used one, I’ll have to borrow money”). Sixth, she asked more
    questions (“If I buy a different car, what make, model, and color do I want?”).
    Next, she predicted potential outcomes (“If I buy a reliable car, I will be able to
    stay in school and continue my job”). And finally, she attempted to control events
    (“By purchasing this car, I will be free to drive to work and earn enough money
    to stay in school”). Later, we return to Arlene’s dilemma, but first we look at an
    overview of personal construct theory as postulated by George Kelly.
    Overview of Personal Construct Theory
    George Kelly’s theory of personal constructs is like no other personality theory. It
    has been variously called a cognitive theory, a behavioral theory, an existential
    theory, and a phenomenological theory. Yet it is none of these. Perhaps the most
    appropriate term is “metatheory,” or a theory about theories. According to Kelly,
    all people (including those who build personality theories) anticipate events by
    the meanings or interpretations they place on those events (Stevens & Walker,
    2002). These meanings or interpretations are called constructs. People exist in a
    real world, but their behavior is shaped by their gradually expanding interpretation
    or construction of that world. They construe the world in their own way, and every
    construction is open to revision or replacement. People are not victims of circum-
    stances, because alternative constructions are always available. Kelly called this
    philosophical position constructive alternativism.
    Constructive alternativism is implied by Kelly’s theory of personal con-
    structs, a theory he expressed in one basic postulate and 11 supporting corollaries.
    The basic postulate assumes that people are constantly active and that their activ-
    ity is guided by the way they anticipate events.

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 569
    Biography of George Kelly
    Of all the personality theorists discussed in this book, George Kelly had the most
    unusual variegated experiences—mostly involving education, as either a student or
    a teacher.
    George Alexander Kelly was born April 28, 1905, on a farm near Perth,
    Kansas, a tiny, almost nonexistent town 35 miles south of Wichita. George was
    the only child of Elfleda M. Kelly, a former schoolteacher, and Theodore V. Kelly,
    an ordained Presbyterian minister. By the time Kelly was born, his father had given
    up the ministry in favor of becoming a Kansas farmer. Both parents were well
    educated, and both helped in the formal education of their son, a fortunate circum-
    stance because Kelly’s schooling was rather erratic.
    When Kelly was 4 years old, the family moved to eastern Colorado, where
    his father staked a claim on some of the last free land in that part of the country.
    While in Colorado, Kelly attended school only irregularly, seldom for more than
    a few weeks at a time (Thompson, 1968).
    Lack of water drove the family back to Kansas, where Kelly attended four dif-
    ferent high schools in 4 years. At first he commuted to high school, but at age 13, he
    was sent away to school in Wichita. From that time on, he mostly lived away from
    home. After graduation, he spent 3 years at Friends University in Wichita and 1 year
    at Park College in Parkville, Missouri. Both schools had religious affiliations, which
    may explain why many of Kelly’s later writings are sprinkled with biblical references.
    Kelly was a man of many and diverse interests. His undergraduate degree
    was in physics and mathematics, but he was also a member of the college debate
    team and, as such, became intensely concerned with social problems. This interest
    led him to the University of Kansas, where he received a master’s degree with a
    major in educational sociology and a minor in labor relations and sociology.
    During the next few years, Kelly moved several times and held a variety of
    positions. First, he went to Minneapolis, where he taught soapbox oratory at a
    special college for labor organizers, conducted classes in speech for the American
    Bankers Association, and taught government to an Americanization class for pro-
    spective citizens (Kelly, 1969a). Then in 1928, he moved to Sheldon, Iowa, where
    he taught at a junior college and coached drama. While there, he met his future wife,
    Gladys Thompson, an English teacher at the same school. After a year and a half,
    he moved back to Minnesota, where he taught a summer session at the University
    of Minnesota. Next, he returned to Wichita to work for a few months as an aero-
    nautical engineer. From there, he went to the University of Edinburgh in Scotland
    as an exchange student, receiving an advanced professional degree in education.
    At this point in his life, Kelly “had dabbled academically in education, soci-
    ology, economics, labor relations, biometrics, speech pathology, and anthropology,
    and had majored in psychology for a grand total of nine months” (Kelly, 1969a,
    p. 48). After returning from Edinburgh, however, he began in earnest to pursue a
    career in psychology. He enrolled at the State University of Iowa and, in 1931, com-
    pleted a PhD with a dissertation on common factors in speech and reading disabilities.
    Once again, Kelly returned to Kansas, beginning his academic career in 1931
    at Fort Hays State College in Hays, Kansas, by teaching physiological psychology.
    With the dust bowl and the Great Depression, however, he soon became convinced

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories570
    that he should “pursue something more humanitarian than physiological psychol-
    ogy” (Kelly, 1969a, p. 48). Consequently, he decided to become a psychotherapist,
    counseling college and high school students in the Hays community. True to his
    psychology of personal constructs, Kelly pointed out that his decision was not
    dictated by circumstances but rather by his interpretation of events; that is, his
    own construction of reality altered his life course.
    Everything around us “calls,” if we choose to heed. Moreover, I have never been
    completely satisfied that becoming a psychologist was even a very good idea in
    the first place. . . . The only thing that seems clear about my career in psychology
    is that it was I who got myself into it and I who have pursued it. (p. 49)
    Now a psychotherapist, Kelly obtained legislative support for a program of
    traveling psychological clinics in Kansas. He and his students traveled widely
    throughout the state, providing psychological services during those hard economic
    times. During this period, he evolved his own approach to therapy, abandoning the
    Freudian techniques that he had previously used (Fransella, 1995).
    During World War II, Kelly joined the Navy as an aviation psychologist. After
    the war, he taught at the University of Maryland for a year and then, in 1946, joined
    the faculty at Ohio State University as a professor and director of their psycho-
    logical clinic. There he worked with Julian Rotter (see Chapter 18), who succeeded
    him as director of the clinic. In 1965, he accepted a position at Brandeis University,
    where, for a brief time, he was a colleague of A. H. Maslow (see Chapter 9).
    From his days at Fort Hays State, Kelly began to formulate a theory of per-
    sonality. Finally, in 1955, he published his most important work, The Psychology
    of Personal Constructs. This two-volume book, reprinted in 1991, contains the
    whole of Kelly’s personality theory and is one of only a few of his works published
    during his lifetime.
    Kelly spent several summers as a visiting professor at such schools as the
    University of Chicago, the University of Nebraska, the University of Southern
    California, Northwestern University, Brigham Young University, Stanford Univer-
    sity, University of New Hampshire, and City College of New York. During those
    postwar years, he became a major force in clinical psychology in the United States.
    He was president of both the Clinical and the Consulting Divisions of the American
    Psychological Association and was also a charter member and later president of
    the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology.
    Kelly died on March 6, 1967, before he could complete revisions of his
    theory of personal constructs.
    Kelly’s diverse life experiences, from the wheat fields of Kansas to some of
    the major universities of the world, from education to labor relations, from drama
    and debate to psychology, are consistent with his theory of personality, which
    emphasizes the possibility of interpreting events from many possible angles.
    Kelly’s Philosophical Position
    Is human behavior based on reality or on people’s perception of reality? George
    Kelly would say both. He did not accept Skinner’s (see Chapter 16) position that
    behavior is shaped by the environment, that is, reality. On the other hand, he also

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 571
    rejected extreme phenomenology (see Combs & Snygg, 1959), which holds that
    the only reality is what people perceive. Kelly (1955, 1991) believed that the
    universe is real, but that different people construe it in different ways. Thus, peo-
    ple’s personal constructs, or ways of interpreting and explaining events, hold the
    key to predicting their behavior.
    Personal construct theory does not try to explain nature. Rather, it is a theory
    of people’s construction of events: that is, their personal inquiry into their world.
    It is “a psychology of the human quest. It does not say what has or will be found,
    but proposes rather how we might go about looking for it” (Kelly, 1970, p. 1).
    Person as Scientist
    When you decide what foods to eat for lunch, what television shows to watch, or
    what occupation to enter, you are acting in much the same manner as a scientist.
    That is, you ask questions, formulate hypotheses, test them, draw conclusions, and
    try to predict future events. Like all other people (including scientists), your per-
    ception of reality is colored by your personal constructs—your way of looking at,
    explaining, and interpreting events in your world.
    In a similar manner, all people, in their quest for meaning, make observations,
    construe relationships among events, formulate theories, generate hypotheses, test those
    that are plausible, and reach conclusions from their experiments. A person’s conclu-
    sions, like those of any scientist, are not fixed or final. They are open to reconsidera-
    tion and reformulation. Kelly was hopeful that people individually and collectively will
    find better ways of restructuring their lives through imagination and foresight.
    Scientist as Person
    If people can be seen as scientists, then scientists can also be seen as people.
    Therefore, the pronouncements of scientists should be regarded with the same
    skepticism with which we view any behavior. Every scientific observation can be
    looked at from a different perspective. Every theory can be slightly tilted and
    viewed from a new angle. This approach, of course, means that Kelly’s theory is
    not exempt from restructuring. Kelly (1969b) presented his theory as a set of half-
    truths and recognized the inaccuracy of its constructions. Like Carl Rogers (see
    Chapter 10), Kelly hoped that his theory would be overthrown and replaced by a
    better one. Indeed, Kelly, more than any other personality theorist, formulated a
    theory that encourages its own demise. Just as all of us can use our imagination
    to see everyday events differently, personality theorists can use their ingenuity to
    construe better theories.
    Constructive Alternativism
    Kelly began with the assumption that the universe really exists and that it functions
    as an integral unit, with all its parts interacting precisely with each other. Moreover,
    the universe is constantly changing, so something is happening all the time. Added
    to these basic assumptions is the notion that people’s thoughts also really exist and
    that people strive to make sense out of their continuously changing world. Differ-
    ent people construe reality in different ways, and the same person is capable of
    changing his or her view of the world.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories572
    In other words, people always have alternative ways of looking at things.
    Kelly (1963) assumed “that all of our present interpretations of the universe are
    subject to revision or replacement” (p. 15). He referred to this assumption as
    constructive alternativism and summed up the notion with these words: “The
    events we face today are subject to as great a variety of constructions as our wits
    will enable us to contrive” (Kelly, 1970, p. 1). The philosophy of constructive
    alternativism assumes that the piece-by-piece accumulation of facts does not add
    up to truth; rather, it assumes that facts can be looked at from different perspec-
    tives. Kelly agreed with Adler (see Chapter 3) that a person’s interpretation of
    events is more important than the events themselves. In contrast to Adler, however,
    Kelly stressed the notion that interpretations have meaning in the dimension of
    time, and what is valid at one time becomes false when construed differently at a
    later time. For example, when Freud (see Chapter 2) originally heard his patients’
    accounts of childhood seduction, he believed that early sexual experiences were
    responsible for later hysterical reactions. If Freud had continued to construe his
    patients’ reports in this fashion, the entire history of psychoanalysis would have
    been quite different. But then, for a variety of reasons, Freud restructured his data
    and gave up his seduction hypothesis. Shortly thereafter, he tilted the picture a
    little and saw a very different view. With this new view, he concluded that these
    seduction reports were merely childhood fantasies. His alternative hypothesis was
    the Oedipus complex, a concept that permeates current psychoanalytic theory, and
    one that is 180 degrees removed from his original seduction theory. If we view
    Freud’s observations from yet another angle, such as Erikson’s perspective (see
    Chapter 7), then we might reach a still different conclusion.
    Kelly believed that the person, not the facts, holds the key to an individual’s
    future. Facts and events do not dictate conclusions; rather, they carry meanings for
    us to discover. We are all constantly faced with alternatives, which we can explore
    if we choose, but in any case, we must assume responsibility for how we construe
    our worlds. We are victims of neither our history nor our present circumstances.
    That is not to say that we can make of our world whatever we wish. We are “lim-
    ited by our feeble wits and our timid reliance upon what is familiar” (Kelly, 1970,
    p. 3). We do not always welcome new ideas. Like scientists in general and per-
    sonality theorists in particular, we often find restructuring disturbing and thus hold
    on to ideas that are comfortable and theories that are well established.
    Personal Constructs
    Kelly’s philosophy assumes that people’s interpretation of a unified, ever-changing
    world constitutes their reality. In the chapter opener, we introduced Arlene, the
    student with the broken-down automobile. Arlene’s perception of her transportation
    problem was not a static one. As she talked to a mechanic, a used-car dealer, a
    new-car dealer, a banker, her parents, and others, she was constantly changing her
    interpretation of reality. In similar fashion, all people continually create their own
    view of the world. Some people are quite inflexible and seldom change their way
    of seeing things. They cling to their view of reality even as the real world changes.
    For example, people with anorexia nervosa continue to see themselves as fat while

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 573
    their weight continues to drop to a life-threatening level. Some people construe a
    world that is substantially different from the world of other people. For example,
    psychotic patients in mental hospitals may talk to people whom no one else can
    see. Kelly (1963) would insist that these people, along with everyone else, are
    looking at their world through “transparent patterns or templates” that they have
    created in order to cope with the world’s realities. Although these patterns or
    templates do not always fit accurately, they are the means by which people make
    sense out of the world. Kelly referred to these patterns as personal constructs:
    They are ways of construing the world. They are what enables [people], and
    lower animals too, to chart a course of behavior, explicitly formulated or
    implicitly acted out, verbally expressed or utterly inarticulate, consistent with
    other courses of behavior or inconsistent with them, intellectually reasoned or
    vegetatively sensed. (p. 9)
    A personal construct is one’s way of seeing how things (or people) are alike
    and yet different from other things (or people). For example, you may see how
    Ashly and Brenda are alike and how they are different from Carol. The comparison
    and the contrast must occur within the same context. For example, to say that Ashly
    and Brenda are attractive and Carol is religious would not constitute a personal
    construct, because attractiveness is one dimension and religiosity is another. A
    construct would be formed if you see that Ashly and Brenda are attractive and
    Carol is unattractive, or if you view Ashly and Brenda as irreligious and Carol as
    religious. Both the comparison and the contrast are essential.
    Whether they are clearly perceived or dimly felt, personal constructs shape
    an individual’s behavior. As an example, consider Arlene with her broken-down
    car. After her old car stopped running, her personal constructs shaped her subse-
    quent course of action, but not all her constructs were clearly defined. For instance,
    she may have decided to buy a late-model automobile because she interpreted the
    car dealer’s friendliness and persuasiveness as meaning that the car was reliable.
    Arlene’s personal constructs may be accurate or inaccurate, but in either case, they
    are her means of predicting and controlling her environment.
    Arlene tried to increase the accuracy of her predictions (that the car would
    provide reliable, economical, and comfortable transportation) by increasing her store
    of information. She researched her purchase, asked others’ opinions, tested the car,
    and had it checked by a mechanic. In much the same manner, all people attempt to
    validate their constructs. They look for better-fitting templates and thus try to improve
    their personal constructs. However, personal improvement is not inevitable, because
    the investment people make in their established constructs blocks the path of forward
    development. The world is constantly changing, so what is accurate at one time may
    not be accurate at another. The reliable blue bicycle Arlene rode during childhood
    should not mislead her to construe that all blue vehicles are reliable.
    Basic Postulate
    Personal construct theory is expressed in one fundamental postulate, or assumption,
    and elaborated by means of 11 supporting corollaries. The basic postulate assumes
    that “a person’s processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories574
    [that person] anticipates events” (Kelly, 1955, p. 46). In other words, people’s
    behaviors (thoughts and actions) are directed by the way they see the future. This
    postulate is not intended as an absolute statement of truth but is a tentative assump-
    tion open to question and scientific testing.
    Kelly (1955, 1970) clarified this fundamental assumption by defining its
    key terms. First, the phrase person’s processes refers to a living, changing,
    moving human being. Kelly was not concerned here with animals, with society,
    or with any part or function of the person. He did not recognize motives, needs, drives,
    or instincts as forces underlying motivation. Life itself accounts for one’s movement.
    Kelly chose the term channelized to suggest that people move with a direc-
    tion through a network of pathways or channels. The network, however, is flexible,
    both facilitating and restricting people’s range of action. In addition, the term
    avoids the implication that some sort of energy is being transformed into action.
    People are already in movement; they merely channelize or direct their processes
    toward some end or purpose.
    The next key phrase is ways of anticipating events, which suggests that
    people guide their actions according to their predictions of the future. Neither the
    past nor the future per se determines our behavior. Rather, our present view of
    the future shapes our actions. Arlene did not buy a blue car because she had a
    blue bicycle when she was a child, although that fact may have helped her to
    construe the present so that she anticipated that her blue late-model car would be
    a reliable one in the future. Kelly (1955) said that people are tantalized not by
    their past but by their view of the future. People continuously “reach out to the
    future through the window of the present” (p. 49).
    Supporting Corollaries
    To elaborate his theory of personal constructs, Kelly proposed 11 supporting cor-
    ollaries, all of which can be inferred from his basic postulate.
    Similarities Among Events
    No two events are exactly alike, yet we construe similar events so that they are
    perceived as being the same. One sunrise is never identical to another, but our
    construct dawn conveys our recognition of some similarity or some replication of
    events. Although two dawns are never exactly alike, they may be similar enough
    for us to construe them as the same event. Kelly (1955, 1970) referred to this
    similarity among events as the construction corollary.
    The construction corollary states that “a person anticipates events by con-
    struing their replications” (Kelly, 1955, p. 50). This corollary again points out that
    people are forward looking; their behavior is forged by their anticipation of future
    events. It also emphasizes the notion that people construe or interpret future events
    according to recurrent themes or replications.
    The construction corollary may seem little more than common sense: People
    see similarities among events and use a single concept to describe the common
    properties. Kelly, however, felt that it was necessary to include the obvious when
    building a theory.

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 575
    Differences Among People
    Kelly’s second corollary is equally obvious. “Persons differ from each other in
    their construction of events” (Kelly, 1955, p. 55). Kelly called this emphasis on
    individual differences the individuality corollary.
    Because people have different reservoirs of experiences, they construe the
    same event in different ways. Thus, no two people put an experience together in
    exactly the same way. Both the substance and the form of their constructs are dif-
    ferent. For example, a philosopher may subsume the construct truth under the
    rubric of eternal values; a lawyer may view truth as a relative concept, useful for
    a particular purpose; and a scientist may construe truth as an ever-elusive goal,
    something to be sought, but never attained. For the philosopher, the lawyer, and
    the scientist, truth has a different substance, a different meaning. Moreover, each
    person arrived at his or her particular construction in a different manner and thus
    gives it a different form. Even identical twins living in nearly identical environ-
    ments do not construe events exactly the same. For example, part of Twin A’s
    environment includes Twin B, an experience not shared by Twin B.
    Although Kelly (1955) emphasized individual differences, he pointed out that
    experiences can be shared and that people can find a common ground for constru-
    ing experiences. This allows people to communicate both verbally and nonverbally.
    However, due to individual differences, the communication is never perfect.
    Relationships Among Constructs
    Kelly’s third corollary, the organization corollary, emphasizes relationships
    among constructs and states that people “characteristically evolve, for [their] con-
    venience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal relation-
    ships between constructs” (Kelly, 1955, p. 56).
    The first two corollaries assume similarities among events and differences
    among people. The third emphasizes that different people organize similar events
    in a manner that minimizes incompatibilities and inconsistencies. We arrange our
    constructions so that we may move from one to another in an orderly fashion,
    which allows us to anticipate events in ways that transcend contradictions and
    avoid needless conflicts.
    The organization corollary also assumes an ordinal relationship of constructs
    so that one construct may be subsumed under another. Figure 19.1 illustrates a
    hierarchy of constructs as they might apply to Arlene, the engineering major. In
    deciding a course of action after her car broke down, Arlene may have seen her
    situation in terms of dichotomous superordinate constructs such as good versus bad.
    At that point in her life, Arlene regarded independence (of friends or parents) as
    good and dependence as bad. However, her personal construct system undoubtedly
    included a variety of constructs subsumed under good and bad. For example, Arlene
    probably construed intelligence and health as good and stupidity and illness as bad.
    Furthermore, Arlene’s views of independence and dependence (like her constructs
    of good and bad) would have had a multitude of subordinate constructs. In this
    situation, Arlene construed staying in school as independence and living with her
    parents as dependence. In order to remain in school and continue her job, Arlene
    needed transportation. There were many possible means of transportation, but

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories576
    Arlene considered only four: riding a public bus, walking, relying on friends, or
    driving her own car. Subsumed under the construct of car were three subordinate
    constructs: repairing her old car, buying a new one, or purchasing a late-model used
    car. This example suggests that constructs have not only a complex ordinal relation-
    ship with each other but a dichotomous relationship as well.
    Dichotomy of Constructs
    Now we come to a corollary that is not so obvious. The dichotomy corollary
    states that “a person’s construction system is composed of a finite number of
    dichotomous constructs” (Kelly, 1955, p. 59).
    Kelly insisted that a construct is an either-or proposition—black or white,
    with no shades of gray. In nature, things may not be either-or, but natural events
    have no meanings other than those attributed to them by an individual’s personal
    construct system. In nature, the color blue may have no opposite pole (except on
    a color chart), but people attribute contrasting qualities to blue, such as light blue
    versus dark blue or pretty versus ugly.
    In order to form a construct, people must be able to see similarities between
    events, but they must also contrast those events with their opposite pole. Kelly (1955)
    stated it this way: “In its minimum context a construct is a way in which at least
    two elements are similar and contrast with a third” (p. 61). As an example, return to
    Figure 19.1. How are intelligence and independence alike? Their common element has
    no meaning without contrasting it to an opposite. Intelligence and independence have
    no overlapping element when compared to a hammer or a chocolate bar. By contrasting
    intelligence with stupidity and independence with dependence, you see how they are
    alike and how they can be organized under the construct “good” as opposed to “bad.”
    vs.
    Intelligence Health
    Bus Walk Friends
    Repair old car Buy used car Buy new car
    Stupidity Illness
    School
    Independence
    Transportation
    Car
    Dependence
    Home
    Good Bad
    FIGURE 19.1 Complexity of relationships among constructs.

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 577
    Choice Between
    Dichotomies
    If people construe events
    in dichotomized fashion,
    then it follows that they
    have some choice in
    following alternative
    courses of action. This is
    Kelly’s choice corollary,
    paraphrased as follows:
    People choose for them-
    selves that alternative in
    a dichotomized construct
    through which they
    anticipate the greater
    possibility for extension
    and definition of future constructs.
    This corollary assumes much of what is stated in Kelly’s basic postulate and
    in the preceding corollaries. People make choices on the basis of how they antic-
    ipate events, and those choices are between dichotomous alternatives. In addition,
    the choice corollary assumes that people choose those actions that are most likely
    to extend their future range of choices.
    Arlene’s decision to buy a used car was based on a series of previous choices,
    each of which was between dichotomized alternatives and each of which broadened
    her range of future choices. First she chose the independence of school over the
    dependence of going home to live with her parents. Next, buying a car offered
    more freedom than relying on friends or on bus schedules or walking (which she
    perceived as time consuming). Repairing her old car was financially risky com-
    pared to the greater safety of buying a used one. Purchasing a new car was too
    expensive compared to the relatively inexpensive used car. Each choice was between
    alternatives in a dichotomized construct, and with each choice, Arlene anticipated
    the greater possibility for extending and defining future constructs.
    Range of Convenience
    Kelly’s range corollary assumes that personal constructs are finite and not relevant
    to everything. “A construct is convenient for the anticipation of a finite range of
    events only” (Kelly, 1955, p. 68). In other words, a construct is limited to a par-
    ticular range of convenience.
    The construct independence was within Arlene’s range of convenience when
    she was deciding to buy a car, but on other occasions independence would be out-
    side those boundaries. Independence carries with it the notion of dependence.
    Arlene’s freedom to remain in school, freedom to continue her job, and freedom
    to move quickly from place to place without relying on others all fall within her
    independence/dependence range of convenience. However, Arlene’s construct of
    independence excludes all irrelevancies such as up/down, light/dark, or wet/dry;
    that is, it is convenient only for a finite range of events.
    People choose between alternatives based on their anticipation of
    future events. © Erik Isakson/Getty Images

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories578
    The range corollary allowed Kelly to distinguish between a concept and a
    construct. A concept includes all elements having a common property, and it
    excludes those that do not have that property. The concept tall includes all those
    people and objects having extended height and excludes all other concepts, even
    those that are outside its range of convenience. Therefore, fast or independent or
    dark are all excluded from the concept tall because they do not have extended
    height. But such exclusions are both endless and needless. The idea of construct
    contrasts tall with short, thus limiting its range of convenience. “That which is
    outside the range of convenience of the construct is not considered part of the
    contrasting field but simply an area of irrelevancy” (Kelly, 1955, p. 69). Thus,
    dichotomies limit a construct’s range of convenience.
    Experience and Learning
    Basic to personal construct theory is the anticipation of events. We look to the
    future and make guesses about what will happen. Then, as events become revealed
    to us, we either validate our existing constructs or restructure these events to match
    our experience. The restructuring of events allows us to learn from our experiences.
    The experience corollary states: “A person’s construction system varies as he
    [or she] successively construes the replications of events” (Kelly, 1955, p. 72). Kelly
    used the word “successively” to point out that we pay attention to only one thing at a
    time. “The events of one’s construing march single file along the path of time” (p. 73).
    Experience consists of the successive construing of events. The events them-
    selves do not constitute experience—it is the meaning we attach to them that
    changes our lives. To illustrate this point, return to Arlene and her personal construct
    of independence. When her old car (a high school graduation gift from her parents)
    broke down, Arlene decided to remain in school rather than to return to the security
    and dependent status of living at home. As Arlene subsequently encountered suc-
    cessive events, she had to make decisions without benefit of parental consultation,
    a task that forced her to restructure her notion of independence. Earlier, she had
    construed independence as freedom from outside interference. After deciding to go
    into debt for a used car, she began to alter her meaning of independence to include
    responsibility and anxiety. The events themselves did not force a restructuring.
    Arlene could have become a spectator to the events surrounding her. Instead, her
    existing constructs were flexible enough to allow her to adapt to experience.
    Adaptation to Experience
    Arlene’s flexibility illustrates Kelly’s modulation corollary. “The variation in a
    person’s construction system is limited by the permeability of the constructs within
    whose range of convenience the variants lie” (Kelly, 1955, p. 77). This corollary
    follows from and expands the experience corollary. It assumes that the extent to
    which people revise their constructs is related to the degree of permeability of
    their existing constructs. A construct is permeable if new elements can be added
    to it. Impermeable or concrete constructs do not admit new elements. If a man
    believes that women are inferior to men, then contradictory evidence will not find
    its way into his range of convenience. Instead, he will attribute the achievements
    of women to luck or unfair social advantage. A change in events means a change
    in constructs only if those constructs are permeable.

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 579
    Arlene’s personal construct of independence versus dependence was suffi-
    ciently permeable to take in new elements. When, without parental consultation,
    she made the decision to buy a used car, the construct of maturity versus childish-
    ness penetrated independence versus dependence and added a new flavor to it.
    Previously, the two constructs had been separated, and Arlene’s notion of indepen-
    dence was limited to the idea of doing as she chose, whereas dependence was
    associated with parental domination. Now she construed independence as meaning
    mature responsibility and dependence as signifying a childish leaning on parents.
    In such a manner, all people modulate or adjust their personal constructs.
    Incompatible Constructs
    Although Kelly assumed an overall stability or consistency of a person’s construc-
    tion system, his fragmentation corollary allows for the incompatibility of specific
    elements. “A person may successively employ a variety of constructive subsystems
    which are inferentially incompatible with each other” (Kelly, 1955, p. 83).
    At first it may seem as if personal constructs must be compatible, but if we
    look to our own behavior and thinking, we can easily see some inconsistencies. In
    Chapter 18, we pointed out that Walter Mischel (a student of Kelly) believed that
    behavior is usually more inconsistent than trait theorists would have us believe.
    Children are often patient in one situation yet impatient in another. Similarly, a
    person may be brave while confronting a vicious dog but cowardly when confront-
    ing a boss or teacher. Although our behaviors often seem inconsistent, Kelly
    saw underlying stability in most of our actions. For example, a man might be protec-
    tive of his wife, yet encourage her to be more independent. Protection and indepen-
    dence may be incompatible with each other on one level, but on a larger level, both
    are subsumed under the construct of love. Thus, the man’s actions to protect his
    wife and to encourage her to be more independent are consistent with a larger,
    superordinate construct.
    Superordinate systems may also change, but those changes take place within
    a still larger system. In the previous example of the protective husband, for instance,
    the man’s love for his wife may gradually shift to hatred, but that change remains
    within a larger construct of self-interest. The previous love for his wife and the
    present hatred are both consistent with his view of self-interest. If incompatible
    constructs could not coexist, people would be locked into a fixed construct, which
    would make change nearly impossible.
    Similarities Among People
    Although Kelly’s second supporting corollary assumes that people are different
    from each other, his commonality corollary assumes similarities among people.
    His slightly revised commonality corollary reads: “To the extent that one person
    employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another,
    [that person’s] processes are psychologically similar to those of the other person”
    (Kelly, 1970, p. 20).
    Two people need not experience the same event or even similar events for their
    processes to be psychologically similar; they must merely construe their experiences
    in a similar fashion. Because people actively construe events by asking questions,
    forming hypotheses, drawing conclusions, and then asking more questions, different

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories580
    people with widely different experiences may construe events in very similar ways.
    For example, two people might arrive at similar political views although they come
    from disparate backgrounds. One may have come from a wealthy family, having lived
    a life of leisure and contemplation, while the other may have survived a destitute
    childho od, struggling constantly for survival. Yet both adopt a liberal political view.
    Although people of different backgrounds can have similar constructs, people
    with similar experiences are more likely to construe events along similar lines.
    Within a given social group, people may employ similar constructions, but it is
    always the individual, never society, who construes events. This is similar to Albert
    Bandura’s notion of collective efficacy: It is the individual, not society, who has
    varying levels of high or low collective efficacy (see Chapter 17). Kelly also
    assumes that no two people ever interpret experiences exactly the same. Americans
    may have a similar construction of democracy, but no two Americans see it in
    identical terms.
    Social Processes
    “People belong to the same cultural group, not merely because they behave alike,
    nor because they expect the same things of others, but especially because they
    construe their experience in the same way” (Kelly, 1955, p. 94).
    The final supporting corollary, the sociality corollary can be paraphrased to
    read as follows: To the extent that people accurately construe the belief system of
    others, they may play a role in a social process involving those other people.
    People do not communicate with one another simply on the basis of common
    experiences or even similar constructions; they communicate because they construe
    the constructions of one another. In interpersonal relations, they not only observe the
    behavior of the other person; they also interpret what that behavior means to that
    person. When Arlene was negotiating with the used-car dealer, she was aware of
    not only his words and actions but also their meanings. She realized that to him
    she was a potential buyer, someone who might provide him with a substantial
    commission. She construed his words as exaggerations and, at the same time, real-
    ized that he construed her indifference as an indication that she construed his
    motivations differently from her own.
    All this seems rather complicated, but Kelly was simply suggesting that
    people are actively involved in interpersonal relations and realize that they are part
    of the other person’s construction system.
    Kelly introduced the notion of role with his sociality corollary. A role refers
    to a pattern of behavior that results from a person’s understanding of the constructs
    of others with whom that person is engaged in a task. For example, when Arlene
    was negotiating with the used-car dealer, she construed her role as that of a poten-
    tial buyer because she understood that that was his expectation of her. At other
    times and with other people, she construes her role as student, employee, daughter,
    girlfriend, and so on.
    Kelly construed roles from a psychological rather than a sociological per-
    spective. One’s role does not depend on one’s place or position in a social setting
    but rather on how one interprets that role. Kelly also stressed the point that one’s
    construction of a role need not be accurate in order for the person to play that role.

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 581
    Arlene’s roles as student, employee, and daughter would be considered
    peripheral roles. More central to her existence would be her core role. With our
    core role, we define ourselves in terms of who we really are. It gives us a sense
    of identity and provides us with guidelines for everyday living.
    Applications of Personal
    Construct Theory
    Like most personality theorists, Kelly evolved his theoretical formulations from
    his practice as a psychotherapist. He spent more than 20 years conducting therapy
    before he published The Psychology of Personal Constructs in 1955. In this sec-
    tion, we look at his views of abnormal development, his approach to psychother-
    apy, and, finally, his Role Construct Repertory (Rep) Test.
    Abnormal Development
    In Kelly’s view, psychologically healthy people validate their personal constructs
    against their experiences with the real world. They are like competent scientists
    who test reasonable hypotheses, accept the results without denial or distortion, and
    then willingly alter their theories to match available data. Healthy individuals not
    only anticipate events but are also able to make satisfactory adjustments when
    things do not turn out as they expected.
    Unhealthy people, on the other hand, stubbornly cling to outdated personal
    constructs, fearing validation of any new constructs that would upset their present
    comfortable view of the world. Such people are similar to incompetent scientists
    who test unreasonable hypotheses, reject or distort legitimate results, and refuse to
    amend or abandon old theories that are no longer useful. Kelly (1955) defined a
    disorder as “any personal construction which is used repeatedly in spite of con-
    sistent invalidation” (p. 831).
    A person’s construction system exists in the present—not the past or future.
    Psychological disorders, therefore, also exist in the present; they are caused neither
    by childhood experiences nor by future events. Because construction systems are
    personal, Kelly objected to traditional classifications of abnormalities. Using the
    Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) of the Ameri-
    can Psychiatric Association (2002) to label a person is likely to result in miscon-
    struing that person’s unique constructions.
    Psychologically unhealthy people, like everyone else, possess a complex
    construction system. Their personal constructs, however, often fail the test of
    permeability in one of two ways: They may be too impermeable or they may be
    too flexible. In the first instance, new experiences do not penetrate the construction
    system, so the person fails to adjust to the real world. For example, an abused
    child may construe intimacy with parents as bad and solitude as good. Psychologi-
    cal disorders result when the child’s construction system rigidly denies the value of
    any intimate relationship and clings to the notion that either withdrawal or attack is
    a preferred mode of solving interpersonal problems. Another example is a man seri-
    ously dependent on alcohol who refuses to see himself as addicted to alcohol even
    as his drinking escalates and his job and marriage disintegrate (Burrell, 2002).

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories582
    On the other hand, a construction system that is too loose or flexible leads
    to disorganization, an inconsistent pattern of behavior, and a transient set of values.
    Such an individual is too easily “shaken by the impact of unexpected minor daily
    events” (Kelly, 1955, p. 80).
    Although Kelly did not use traditional labels in describing psychopathology,
    he did identify four common elements in most human disturbance: threat, fear,
    anxiety, and guilt.
    Threat
    People experience threat when they perceive that the stability of their basic constructs
    is likely to be shaken. Kelly (1955) defined threat as “the awareness of imminent
    comprehensive change in one’s core structures” (p. 489). One can be threatened by
    either people or events, and sometimes the two cannot be separated. For example,
    during psychotherapy, clients often feel threat from the prospect of change, even change
    for the better. If they see a therapist as a possible instigator of change, they will view
    that therapist as a threat. Clients frequently resist change and construe their therapist’s
    behavior in a negative fashion. Such resistance and “negative transference” are means
    of reducing threat and maintaining existing personal constructs (Stojnov & Butt, 2002).
    Fear
    By Kelly’s definition, threat involves a comprehensive change in a person’s core
    structures. Fear, on the other hand, is more specific and incidental. Kelly (1955)
    illustrated the difference between threat and fear with the following example. A man
    may drive his car dangerously as the result of anger or exuberance. These impulses
    become threatening when the man realizes that he may run over a child or be arrested
    for reckless driving and end up as a criminal. In this case, a comprehensive portion
    of his personal constructs is threatened. However, if he is suddenly confronted with
    the probability of crashing his car, he will experience fear. Threat demands a com-
    prehensive restructuring—fear, an incidental one. Psychological disturbance results
    when either threat or fear persistently prevents a person from feeling secure.
    Anxiety
    Kelly (1955) defined anxiety as “the recognition that the events with which one
    is confronted lie outside the range of convenience of one’s construct system”
    (p. 495). People are likely to feel anxious when they are experiencing a new event.
    For example, when Arlene, the engineering student, was bargaining with the used-
    car dealer, she was not sure what to do or say. She had never before negotiated
    over such a large amount of money, and therefore this experience was outside the
    range of her convenience. As a consequence, she felt anxiety, but it was a normal
    level of anxiety and did not result in incapacitation.
    Pathological anxiety exists when a person’s incompatible constructs can no
    longer be tolerated and the person’s construction system breaks down. Recall that
    Kelly’s fragmentation corollary assumes that people can evolve construction
    subsystems that are incompatible with one another. For example, when a person
    who has erected the rigid construction that all people are trustworthy is blatantly
    cheated by a colleague, that person may for a time tolerate the ambiguity of the

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 583
    two incompatible subsystems. However,
    when evidence of the untrustworthiness of
    others becomes overwhelming, the person’s
    construct system may break down. The
    result is a relatively permanent and debili-
    tating experience of anxiety.
    Guilt
    Kelly’s sociality corollary assumes that peo-
    ple construe a core role that gives them a
    sense of identity within a social environ-
    ment. However, if that core role is weakened
    or dissolved, a person will develop a feeling
    of guilt. Kelly (1970) defined guilt as “the
    sense of having lost one’s core role struc-
    ture” (p. 27). That is, people feel guilty
    when they behave in ways that are inconsis-
    tent with their sense of who they are.
    People who have never developed a
    core role do not feel guilty. They may be
    anxious or confused, but without a sense
    of personal identity, they do not experi-
    ence guilt. For example, a person with an underdeveloped conscience has little or
    no integral sense of self and a weak or nonexistent core role structure. Such a
    person has no stable guidelines to violate and hence will feel little or no guilt even
    for depraved and shameful behavior (Kelly, 1970).
    Psychotherapy
    Psychological distress exists whenever people have difficulty validating their
    personal constructs, anticipating future events, and controlling their present envi-
    ronment. When distress becomes unmanageable, they may seek outside help in the
    form of psychotherapy.
    In Kelly’s view, people should be free to choose those courses of action most
    consistent with their prediction of events. In therapy, this approach means that
    clients, not the therapist, select the goal. Clients are active participants in the
    therapeutic process, and the therapist’s role is to assist them to alter their construct
    systems in order to improve efficiency in making predictions.
    As a technique for altering the clients’ constructs, Kelly used a procedure
    called fixed-role therapy. The purpose of fixed-role therapy is to help clients
    change their outlook on life (personal constructs) by acting out a predetermined
    role, first within the relative security of the therapeutic setting and then in the
    environment beyond therapy where they enact the role continuously over a period
    of several weeks. Together with the therapist, clients work out a role, one that
    includes attitudes and behaviors not currently part of their core role. In writing the
    fixed-role sketch, the client and therapist are careful to include the construction
    systems of other people. How will the client’s spouse or parents or boss or friends
    Guilt occurs when we behave inconsistently
    with a core role we have developed of
    ourselves. © Eric Simard/Alamy

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories584
    construe and react to this new role? Will their reactions help the client reconstrue
    events more productively?
    This new role is then tried out in everyday life in much the same manner
    that a scientist tests a hypothesis—cautiously and objectively. In fact, the fixed-role
    sketch is typically written in the third person, with the actor assuming a new iden-
    tity. The client is not trying to be another person but is merely playing the part of
    someone who is worth knowing. The role should not be taken too seriously; it is
    only an act, something that can be altered as evidence warrants.
    Fixed-role therapy is not aimed at solving specific problems or repairing
    obsolete constructs. It is a creative process that allows clients to gradually discover
    previously hidden aspects of themselves. In the early stages, clients are introduced
    only to peripheral roles; but then, after they have had time to become comfortable
    with minor changes in personality structure, they try out new core roles that permit
    more profound personality change (Kelly, 1955).
    Prior to developing the fixed-role approach, Kelly (1969a) stumbled on an
    unusual procedure that strongly resembles fixed-role therapy. After becoming
    uncomfortable with Freudian techniques, he decided to offer his clients “preposter-
    ous interpretations” for their complaints. Some were far-fetched Freudian interpre-
    tations, but nevertheless, most clients accepted these “explanations” and used them
    as guides to future action. For example, Kelly might tell a client that strict toilet
    training has caused him to construe his life in a dogmatically rigid fashion but that
    he need not continue to see things in this way. To Kelly’s surprise, many of his
    clients began to function better! The key to change was the same as with fixed-role
    therapy—clients must begin to interpret their lives from a different perspective and
    see themselves in a different role.
    The Rep Test
    Another procedure used by Kelly, both inside and outside therapy, was the Role
    Construct Repertory (Rep) test. The purpose of the Rep test is to discover ways in
    which people construe significant people in their lives.
    With the Rep test, a person is given a Role Title list and asked to designate
    people who fit the role titles by writing their names on a card. For example, for “a
    teacher you liked,” the person must supply a particular name. The number of role
    titles can vary, but Kelly (1955) listed 24 on one version (see Table 19.1 for a few
    examples of roles). Kelly’s Rep Test has been used in countless different contexts
    ∙ A teacher (whom you liked)
    ∙ A teacher (whom you disliked)
    ∙ Husband or boyfriend
    ∙ A girl (with whom you got along well in high school)
    ∙ Sister (nearest to you in age)
    T A B L E 1 9 . 1
    Example Roles in the Rep Test

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 585
    and many variations of the original test have evolved. One example is seen in
    the top Figure 19.2. The experimenter provides certain roles and the test-taker
    or rater provides the specific names for the roles. Roles include yourself, your
    mother, father, spouse/partner, etc. In this case, there are 15 different roles.
    The major goal of the test involves developing the constructs a person has
    about the important people in their life by asking the person (rater) to choose any
    three people from the list at one time. Then the rater thinks about how two of the
    three are alike and how they differ from the third person. If, for example, the rater
    thinks that they and their father are shy but their mother is not, then the first con-
    struct is “shy”. They then write “shy” to the right. Then they choose three other
    people from the list and create their second construct from them. For example,
    their mother and father may be “confident,” but not their sibling. The person now
    has two constructs, shy and confident. The number of constructs created from sets
    of three roles is up to test-taker, but the suggested minimum is six. Examples of
    three sets of roles and their corresponding constructs may be:
    Roles Construct
    You, Mother, Father shy
    Mother, Father, Sibling confident
    You, Partner, Best Friend friendly
    You, Best Friend, Ex-Friend smart
    Partner, Ex-Partner, Best Friend hostile
    Rejecting Person, Threatening Person, Best Friend warm
    Successful Person, Happy Person, Ethical Person happy
    These constructs now tell the rater (and the test-giver) how they see the
    world. In this case, shyness, confidence, and friendliness are important ways this
    person has of seeing their world and the people in it.
    FIGURE 19.2 Example of a repertory grid.
    Source: J. Silvester and M. McDermott, “Kelly’s Repertory Grid,” All in the Mind, BBC Radio 4, October 9, 2002, http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/
    science/allinthemind_20021009.shtml
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    2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories586
    The second major step is optional, and is shown in the lower grid portion of
    Figure 19.2. Here, the person rates every role/person on every construct. After
    doing so on all constructs, the rater can then see how different constructs are
    similar to each other or not examining which ones match on Xs and Os. For
    instance, if people who are rated shy are seldom rated as confident, then the person
    believes these two constructs are different.
    There are several versions of the Rep test and the repertory grid, but all are
    designed to assess personal constructs. For example, a woman can see how her
    father and boss are alike or different; whether or not she identifies with her mother;
    how her boyfriend and father are alike; or how she construes men in general. Also,
    the test can be given early in therapy and then again at the end. Changes in personal
    constructs reveal the nature and degree of movement made during therapy.
    Kelly and his colleagues have used the Rep test in a variety of forms, and
    no set scoring rules apply. Reliability and validity of the instrument are not very
    high, and its usefulness depends largely on the skill and experience of the examiner
    (Fransella & Bannister, 1977).
    Related Research
    Even though George Kelly wrote only one seminal work (1955, 1991), his impact
    on personality psychology is remarkable. His personal construct theory has gener-
    ated a sizable number of empirical investigations, including nearly 600 empirical
    studies on his repertory test, which suggests that his theory has fared quite well
    in generating research. Because he was among the first psychologists to emphasize
    cognitive sets, such as schema, Kelly’s idea of personal constructs in a very real
    sense was instrumental in forming the field of social cognition, one of the most
    influential perspectives in social and personality psychology today. Social cogni-
    tion examines the cognitive and attitudinal bases of person perception, including
    schemas, biases, stereotypes, and prejudiced behavior. Social schemas, for
    instance, are ordered mental representations of the qualities of others and are
    considered to contain important social information. Although many researchers in
    the field of social cognition use conventional questionnaires, some have followed
    Kelly’s lead and use phenomenological or idiographic measures such as the Rep
    test or some modified version of it (Neimeyer & Neimeyer, 1995). More recent
    applications of the Rep test methodology, for instance, have analyzed the different
    construct systems of sexually abused and non-abused individuals (Lewis-Harter,
    Erbes, & Hart, 2004).
    In the following three sections, we review some research on gender as a
    personal construct, understanding internalized prejudice through personal construct
    theory, and how personal constructs relate to Big Five measures of personality.
    Gender as a Personal Construct
    Marcel Harper and Wilhelm Schoeman (2003) argued that although gender is per-
    haps one of the most fundamental and universal schemas in person perception, not
    all people are equal in the extent to which they organize their beliefs and attitudes
    about others around gender. In other words, there are individual differences in

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 587
    the degree to which people internalize cultural views of gender. Moreover,
    Harper and Schoeman hypothesized that those who do use gender to organize
    their social perceptions will do so in a more stereotypic fashion than those who do
    not regularly use gender to organize social perceptions. “Gender thus becomes a
    primary means of resolving social ambiguity” (Harper & Schoeman, 2003, p. 518).
    Lastly, these authors predicted that the less information someone has about a person,
    the more likely he or she will use stereotypic gender schemas to evaluate and per-
    ceive that person. In other words, with well-known individuals, we should expect
    more complex and less stereotypic attitudes.
    In the Harper and Schoeman study, participants were mostly female students
    from a university in South Africa. The version of the Rep test used by the researchers
    required that participants say whether their person portraits were descriptive of women,
    of men, of neither, or of both women and men. In the first stage of the Rep test
    procedure, participants wrote down names of people who best represented one of 15
    different role titles, such as “liked lecturer/teacher,” a person with whom they worked,
    and “the most successful person known personally.” In the second stage of the pro-
    cedure, people who fit each role title were compared to each other in groups of three,
    with two role titles being compared to a third. Finally, in the third stage of the pro-
    cedure, participants rated role titles on whether they were more descriptive of women
    than of men, men than of women, or neither/both. Gendered ratings were scored 1
    and nongendered ratings (either of both or neither) were scored 0, with possible scores
    ranging from 0 to 20. In addition to the Rep test, participants completed a question-
    naire concerning gender stereotyping and whether they applied gender stereotypes to
    strangers in social situations and a questionnaire on sexist gender attitudes.
    Results showed that gender was a basic category for many participants, with
    no one scoring 0, and the mean was slightly less than 10 out of 20. Additionally,
    those who used gender most as a way of categorizing people on the Rep also were
    more likely to apply gender stereotypes to strangers in social situations. Harper
    and Schoeman (2003) concluded that “participants who frequently engaged in gen-
    der stereotyping also organized their person schemas in terms of gender. This
    suggests that participants who use gender stereotypes in perceiving strangers also
    tend to circumscribe their perceptions of family members and acquaintances along
    gendered lines” (p. 523).
    Applying Personal Construct Theory to Intra-Personal
    Questions of Identity
    Kelly’s original Rep test was designed to assess how individuals construe signifi-
    cant people in their lives. In this way, it serves as a test of interpersonal com-
    parisons that reveal meaningful personal constructs, like gender in the previous
    section. Recently, however, Bonnie Moradi and her colleagues have begun to use
    the Rep test in an exciting new way to assess how individuals identify or disiden-
    tify with elements of themselves. That is, this research uses the Rep test to exam-
    ine intra-personal questions of identity within individuals. Using personal constructs
    theory and the Rep test in this unusual way, Moradi and her colleagues have
    examined internalized homophobia among gay and lesbian participants (2009) and
    also explored the predictors of college students’ identification as feminists (2012).

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories588
    Understanding Internalized Prejudice Through
    Personal Construct Theory
    Perhaps the most insidious characteristic of being a person who belongs to a stig-
    matized group occurs when individuals in that group internalize the prejudice and
    think negatively of themselves. Studies show that internalized antigay and lesbian
    prejudice (typically referred to as internalized homophobia), for example, is asso-
    ciated in gay and lesbian individuals with high stress and poor mental health out-
    comes (c.f. Szymanski, Kashubeck-West, & Meyer, 2008). Given this, it is
    important to understand internalized prejudice in order for clinical and counseling
    psychologists to effectively treat suffering individuals.
    In 2009, Bonnie Moradi, Jacob van den Berg, and Franz Epting used Kelly’s
    personal construct theory to do just that. Internalized homophobia has been concep-
    tualized as containing two features: identity separation and identity denigration. These
    researchers applied Kelly’s (1991) notions of threat and guilt to the two features of
    internalized homophobia. That is, Kelly’s concept of threat, the experience of people
    who perceive their basic personal constructs to be unstable, may lead gays and lesbi-
    ans to separate their homosexual identity from their self in order to avoid frightening
    change in their self-construal. Kelly defined guilt as occurring when individuals per-
    ceive that core aspects within themselves are incongruent with how they ought to be.
    Guilt, then, may lead gays and lesbians to denigrate homosexual identity.
    The study involved 102 participants who ranged in age from 18 to 73, and
    who identified themselves as lesbian or gay. They completed questionnaires that
    included measures of impression management, internalized anti-lesbian and gay
    prejudice, and a measure of 30 bipolar personal constructs derived from a previous
    study of 160 participants using the Rep Test (Landfield, 1971). Moradi and col-
    leagues’ gay and lesbian participants circled the pole with which they are most
    associated, and they did this three times: first for how they see themselves, second
    for how they would prefer to see themselves, and last for how they see themselves
    while focusing on the fact that they are gay or lesbian. Threat was computed as
    the number of self and preferred-self splits from lesbian or gay self. Guilt was
    computed as the number of self and lesbian or gay splits from the preferred-self.
    Their findings were indeed consistent with Kelly’s concepts of threat and
    guilt, and showed that these play distinct roles in internalized prejudice. Kelly’s
    idea that individuals remove themselves from threatening constructs was verified
    here as threat scores in this sample were associated with lower preference for gay
    or lesbian sexual orientation. In keeping with Kelly’s idea that guilt is felt when
    individuals perceive undesirable aspects within the self, these gay and lesbian
    participants who had high guilt were more denigrating of gay and lesbian identity.
    Moradi and colleagues (2009) offer suggestions for personal construct ther-
    apy interventions to specifically address threat and guilt in individuals with inter-
    nalized prejudice. For example, counselors might draw out contrasts in clients’
    construals, asking them to imagine what kind of person would not be anxious
    about being gay, enabling a shift from a self-construal that is unacceptable to one
    that is acceptable. Guilt reduction techniques would focus on replacing negative
    self-construals with more positive ones. Threat reduction might focus on enabling
    gay and lesbian clients to see that integrating being homosexual into their desired
    self-construal might not mean they must change who they are in fundamental

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 589
    ways. This work represents truly exciting ways that Kelly’s personality theory
    may be applied to enable healing in those who suffer from the internalization of
    culturally prejudiced construals within themselves.
    Reducing the Threat to Feminist Identification
    A puzzling phenomenon in social justice research is the widespread tendency of
    many people to agree with feminist values but not to identify as feminists. Often this
    is referred to as the “I’m not a feminist but” phenomenon, wherein individuals deny
    feminist identification but follow up immediately with stated agreement with many
    specific feminist values such as the belief that men and women and boys and girls
    should have equal opportunities and choices (e.g., Zucker, 2004). Why should this
    matter? Studies show that feminist identification is associated with a host of psycho-
    social benefits. Those who call themselves feminists, compared with nonfeminist
    self-labelers, are less socially dominant, have less hostile and benevolent sexist atti-
    tudes, have greater self-efficacy, and have a better capacity to reject sexist and body
    objectifying attitudes (e.g., Leaper & Arias, 2011; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).
    Moradi, Martin, and Brewster (2012) sought to use personal construct theory’s
    notion of threat to predict who does and does not identify with being a feminist.
    To understand this, the authors provided the example that if a person considers
    being assertive as a desirable character trait, views him- or herself as assertive, and
    construes feminists as assertive, then integrating feminist identity into the self-
    concept would not be threatening. If, on the other hand, the person thinks of
    assertiveness as undesirable and incongruent with her or his ideal self and construes
    feminists as assertive, then integrating feminist identity into the self-concept would
    introduce Kelly’s notion of threat because it would be perceived as an intolerable
    challenge to that person’s existing core construct of self.
    In their first study, Moradi and colleagues (2012) used the same Rep test
    method as in their previous study of internalized homophobia. In this case, 91 college
    students rated the 30 bipolar constructs three times: first, in terms of their actual self,
    second in terms of their preferred or ideal self, and third, “if you were a feminist.”
    So, imagine that one pole is “selfish versus unselfish.” Students first circled whether
    they associated themselves more with the term selfish or unselfish. Next, they circled
    whether they would prefer to see themselves as associated with the term selfish or
    unselfish. Finally they circled whether, if they were a feminist, they would associate
    themselves with the term selfish or unselfish. As in the other study, threat scores
    were calculated by counting the number of times a student’s actual-self matched their
    ideal-self but differed from their feminist-self. The results showed, as hypothesized,
    that greater discrepancy between actual-self, ideal-self, and feminist-self (greater
    “threat” to the self-construct), resulted in lower feminist identification. In other
    words, the more someone’s actual and ideal selves are removed from their view of
    a feminist self, the lower the likelihood of identifying as a feminist.
    Next, Moradi and colleagues intervened to reduce threat by changing students’
    construals of the threatening construct of “feminist.” In Kelly’s terms, they sought to
    increase the range of convenience and permeability of the threatening construct. To
    do so, 115 college students received either an intervention or not (a control). Both
    groups received pre- and post- measures of feminist threat and feminist identification.
    The intervention was an interaction, in the context of a class period, with a group of

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories590
    self-identified feminists who were diverse in age, gender, race/ethnicity, religious
    affiliation, sexual orientation, and life experiences. Participants in the intervention
    group also participated in an activity that encouraged learning about this diversity
    (they played 20 questions to find out who was a feminist on the panel, to eventually
    discover that all panelists were). Results showed the intervention was effective, with
    students in the intervention group showing a reduced level of threat and an increased
    degree of feminist identification afterwards compared to the control group. Moradi
    and colleagues’ work represents exciting ways that Kelly’s personality theory may be
    applied to change internalized culturally prejudiced construals, and to encourage iden-
    tification with social justice frameworks that move toward a more equitable society.
    Personal Constructs and the Big Five
    Researchers have begun investigating the connections between Kelly’s personal
    constructs and the Big Five traits (Chapter 13). The Big Five traits (neuroticism,
    extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) have received a great
    deal of attention in modern personality research. Kelly’s personal constructs have
    a moderate amount of attention, but not to the same extent as the Big Five model.
    Not all personality psychologists agree with this disproportionate allocation of
    research and the value of each approach. James Grice and colleagues, for example,
    have directly compared Kelly’s personal construct theory with the Big Five (Grice,
    2004; Grice, Jackson, & McDaniel, 2006).
    These two approaches to personality are quite different, and it is worth highlight-
    ing the importance of this comparison. The list of the Big Five traits was created by
    essentially boiling down all the thousands of ways people describe one another into a
    shorter more manageable list that captured the most common themes. It seeks to
    describe everyone along the same continuum. Kelly’s repertory grid approach, con-
    versely, seeks to capture the uniqueness of individuals. Uniqueness is hard to capture
    in the Big Five because everybody is described along just five dimensions, but in the
    repertory grid the rater essentially creates his or her own continuum on which to
    describe people. For example, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the first continuum
    described on the sample repertory grid in Figure 19.2 is shyness-confidence, so clearly
    for the person completing the repertory grid shyness-confidence is an important descrip-
    tor, but it is not a descriptor that is directly captured by many measures of the Big Five.
    The research by James Grice (Grice, 2004; Grice et al., 2006) essentially
    sought to determine just how good the repertory grid approach was at capturing
    uniqueness compared to the Big Five. To do this, Grice (2004) had participants
    complete a modified version of Kelly’s repertory grid and a standard self-report
    measure of the Big Five. Participants rated both themselves and people they knew
    using the repertory grid and the Big Five measure. Using complex statistical pro-
    cedures, the researchers were able to measure the amount of overlap in participants’
    repertory grid ratings and Big Five scores.
    What they found was rather stunning: There was only about 50% overlap
    (Grice, 2004; Grice et al., 2006). This means that the repertory grid was capturing
    aspects of people the Big Five was not and that the Big Five was capturing aspects
    the repertory grid was not. Some of the unique aspects captured by the repertory
    grid were body type, ethnicity, wealth, smoker status, and political affiliation

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 591
    (Grice et al., 2006). These are important aspects of people to consider, and they can
    certainly affect how you would interact with a person, yet they do not appear on a
    typical measure of the Big Five. Despite this, the Big Five is still enormously valu-
    able as a framework for studying personality. In science it is often important, if not
    imperative, that researchers have common tools and common descriptors for which
    to compare their targets of study, people in the case of personality psychology. The
    Big Five framework has provided those common descriptors that have facilitated a
    great deal of research. But personality psychology is about individual differences and
    the importance of the individual, and, compared to the Big Five, Kelly’s personal
    construct theory does a very good job at emphasizing the uniqueness of individuals
    and how individuals define themselves and those around them in their own terms.
    Critique of Kelly
    Most of Kelly’s professional career was spent working with relatively normal,
    intelligent college students. Understandably, his theory seems most applicable to
    these people. He made no attempt to elucidate early childhood experiences (as did
    Freud) or maturity and old age (as did Erikson). To Kelly, people live solely in
    the present, with one eye always on the future. This view, though somewhat opti-
    mistic, fails to account for developmental and cultural influences on personality.
    How does Kelly’s theory rate on the six criteria of a useful theory? First,
    personal construct theory receives a moderate to strong rating on the amount of
    research it has generated. The Rep test and the repertory grid have generated a
    sizable number of studies, especially in Great Britain, although these instruments
    are used less frequently by psychologists in the United States.
    Despite the relative parsimony of Kelly’s basic postulate and 11 supporting
    corollaries, the theory does not lend itself easily to either verification or falsifica-
    tion. Therefore, we rate personal construct theory low on falsifiability.
    Third, does personal construct theory organize knowledge about human
    behavior? On this criterion, the theory must be rated low. Kelly’s notion that our
    behavior is consistent with our current perceptions helps organize knowledge; but
    his avoidance of the problems of motivation, developmental influences, and cul-
    tural forces limits his theory’s ability to give specific meanings to much of what
    is currently known about the complexity of personality.
    We also rate the theory low as a guide to action. Kelly’s ideas on psycho-
    therapy are rather innovative and suggest to the practitioner some interesting tech-
    niques. Playing the role of a fictitious person, someone the client would like to
    know, is indeed an unusual and practical approach to therapy. Kelly relied heavily
    on common sense in this therapeutic practice, and what worked for him might not
    work for someone else. That disparity would be quite acceptable to Kelly, however,
    because he viewed therapy as a scientific experiment. The therapist is like a
    scientist, using imagination to test a variety of hypotheses: that is, to try out new
    techniques and to explore alternate ways of looking at things. Nevertheless, Kelly’s
    theory offers few specific suggestions to parents, therapists, researchers, and others
    who are trying to understand human behavior.
    Fifth, is the theory internally consistent, with a set of operationally defined
    terms? On the first part of this question, personal construct theory rates very high.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories592
    Kelly was exceptionally careful in choosing terms and concepts to explain his
    fundamental postulate and the 11 corollaries. His language, although frequently
    difficult, is both elegant and precise. The Psychology of Personal Constructs
    (Kelly, 1955) contains more than 1,200 pages, but the entire theory is pieced
    together like a finely woven fabric. Kelly seemed to have constantly been aware
    of what he had already said and what he was going to say.
    On the second half of this criterion, personal construct theory falls short,
    because like most theorists discussed in this book, Kelly did not define his terms
    operationally. However, he was exemplary in writing comprehensive and exacting
    definitions of nearly all terms used in the basic postulate and supporting corollaries.
    Finally, is the theory parsimonious? Despite the length of Kelly’s two-
    volume book, the theory of personal constructs is exceptionally straightforward and
    economical. The basic theory is stated in one fundamental postulate and then
    elaborated by means of 11 corollaries. All other concepts and assumptions can be
    easily related to this relatively simple structure.
    Concept of Humanity
    Kelly had an essentially optimistic view of human nature. He saw people as
    anticipating the future and living their lives in accordance with those antici-
    pations. People are capable of changing their personal constructs at any
    time of life, but those changes are seldom easy. Kelly’s modulation corollary
    suggests that constructs are permeable or resilient, meaning that new ele-
    ments can be admitted. Not all people, however, have equally permeable
    constructs. Some accept new experiences and restructure their interpreta-
    tions accordingly, whereas others possess concrete constructs that are very
    difficult to alter. Nevertheless, Kelly was quite optimistic in his belief that
    therapeutic experiences can help people live more productive lives.
    On the dimension of determinism versus free choice, Kelly’s theory leans
    toward free choice. Within our own personal construct system, we are free to
    make a choice (Kelly, 1980). We choose between alternatives within a con-
    struct system that we ourselves have built. We make those choices on the
    basis of our anticipation of events. But more than that, we choose those alter-
    natives that appear to offer us the greater opportunity for further elaboration
    of our anticipatory system. Kelly referred to this view as the elaborative choice;
    that is, in making present choices, we look ahead and pick the alternative that
    will increase our range of future choices.
    Kelly adopted a teleological as opposed to a causal view of human
    personality. He repeatedly insisted that childhood events per se do not
    shape current personality. Our present construction of past experiences may
    have some influence on present behavior, but the influence of past events is
    quite limited. Personality is much more likely to be guided by our present antic-
    ipation of future events. Kelly’s fundamental postulate—the one on which all
    corollaries and assumptions stand—is that all human activity is directed by the

    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs 593
    way that we anticipate events (Kelly, 1955). There can be no question, then,
    that Kelly’s theory is essentially teleological.
    Kelly emphasized conscious processes more than unconscious ones.
    However, he did not stress conscious motivation because motivation plays
    no part in personal construct theory. Kelly speaks of levels of cognitive
    awareness. High levels of awareness refer to those psychological processes
    that are easily symbolized in words and can be accurately expressed to
    other people. Low-level processes are incompletely symbolized and are dif-
    ficult or impossible to communicate.
    Experiences can be at low levels of awareness for several reasons. First,
    some constructs are preverbal because they were formed before a person
    acquired meaningful language, and, hence, they are not capable of being
    symbolized even to oneself. Second, some experiences are at a low level of
    awareness because a person sees only similarities and fails to make mean-
    ingful contrasts. For example, a person may construe all people as trustwor-
    thy. However, the implicit pole of untrustworthiness is denied. Because the
    person’s superordinate construction system is rigid, he or she fails to adopt
    a realistic construct of trustworthy/untrustworthy and tends to see the actions
    of others as completely trustworthy. Third, some subordinate constructs may
    remain at a low level of awareness as superordinate constructs are changing.
    For instance, even after a person realizes that not everyone is trustworthy,
    the person may be reluctant to construe one particular individual as being
    untrustworthy. This hesitation means that a subordinate construct has not yet
    caught up to a superordinate one. Finally, because some events may lie
    outside a person’s range of convenience, certain experiences do not become
    part of that person’s construct system. For example, such involuntary pro-
    cesses as heartbeat, blood circulation, eye blink, and digestion are ordinarily
    outside one’s range of convenience; and one is usually not aware of them.
    On the issue of biological versus social influences, Kelly was inclined more
    toward the social. His sociality corollary assumes that, to some extent, we are
    influenced by others and in turn have some impact on them. When we accu-
    rately construe the constructions of another person, we may play a role in a
    social process involving that other person. Kelly assumed that our interpretation
    of the construction systems of important other people (such as parents, spouse,
    and friends) may have some influence on our future constructions. Recall that,
    in fixed-role therapy, clients adopt the identity of a fictitious person; and by try-
    ing out that role in various social settings, they may experience some change
    in their personal constructs. However, the actions of others do not mold their
    behavior; rather, it is their interpretation of events that changes their behavior.
    On the final dimension for a conception of humanity—uniqueness ver-
    sus similarities—Kelly emphasized the uniqueness of personality. This
    emphasis, however, was tempered by his commonality corollary, which
    assumes that people from the same sociocultural background tend to have
    had some of the same kinds of experience and therefore construe events
    similarly. Nevertheless, Kelly held that our individual interpretations of events
    are crucial and that no two persons ever have precisely the same personal
    constructs.

    Part VI Learning-Cognitive Theories594
    Key Terms and Concepts
    ∙ Basic to Kelly’s theory is the idea of constructive alternativism, or the
    notion that our present interpretations are subject to change.
    ∙ Kelly’s basic postulate assumes that all psychological processes are
    directed by the ways in which we anticipate events. Eleven corollaries
    derive from and elaborate this one fundamental postulate.
    ∙ The construction corollary assumes that people anticipate future events
    according to their interpretations of recurrent themes.
    ∙ The individuality corollary states that people have different experiences
    and therefore construe events in different ways.
    ∙ The organization corollary holds that people organize their personal
    constructs in a hierarchical system, with some constructs in superordinate
    positions and others subordinate to them. This organization allows
    people to minimize incompatible constructs.
    ∙ Kelly’s dichotomy corollary presumes that all personal constructs are
    dichotomous; that is, people construe events in an either-or manner.
    ∙ His choice corollary states that people choose the alternative in a
    dichotomized construct that they see as extending their range of future
    choices.
    ∙ The range corollary assumes that constructs are limited to a particular
    range of convenience; that is, they are not relevant to all situations.
    ∙ The experience corollary holds that people continually revise their
    personal constructs as the result of experience.
    ∙ The modulation corollary maintains that some new experiences do not
    lead to a revision of personal constructs because they are too concrete or
    impermeable.
    ∙ The fragmentation corollary recognizes that people’s behavior is
    sometimes inconsistent because their construct system can readily admit
    incompatible elements.
    ∙ Kelly’s commonality corollary states that, to the extent that we have had
    experiences similar to other people’s experiences, our personal constructs
    tend to be similar to the construction systems of those people.
    ∙ The sociality corollary states that people are able to communicate with
    other people because they can construe other people’s constructions. Not
    only do people observe the behavior of another person but they also
    interpret what that behavior means to that person.
    ∙ Kelly’s fixed-role therapy calls for clients to act out predetermined roles
    continuously until their peripheral and core roles change as significant
    others begin reacting differently to them.
    ∙ The purpose of Kelly’s Rep test is to discover ways in which people
    construe important people in their lives.

    G-1
    A
    accusation Adlerian safeguarding tendency whereby
    one protects magnified feelings of self-esteem by
    blaming others for one’s own failures.
    active imagination Technique used by Jung to
    uncover collective unconscious material. Patients are
    asked to concentrate on an image until a series of
    fantasies are produced.
    actualizing tendency (Rogers) Tendency within all
    people to move toward completion or fulfillment of
    potentials.
    adaptations (Buss) Evolved strategies that solve
    important survival and/or reproductive problems.
    adolescence (Erikson) An important psychosocial
    stage when ego identity should be formed. Adolescence
    is characterized by puberty and the crisis of identity
    versus identity confusion.
    adulthood (Erikson) The stage from about ages 31 to
    60 that is characterized by the psychosexual mode of
    procreativity and the crisis of generativity versus
    stagnation.
    aesthetic needs (Maslow) Needs for art, music, beauty,
    and the like. Although they may be related to the
    basic conative needs, aesthetic needs are a separate
    dimension.
    agape Altruistic love.
    aggression (Adler) Safeguarding tendencies that may
    include depreciation or accusation of others as well as
    self-accusation, all designed to protect exaggerated
    feelings of personal superiority by striking out against
    other people.
    aggression (Freud) One of two primary instincts or
    drives that motivate people. Aggression is the outward
    manifestation of the death instinct.
    agreeableness/hostility (Buss) A person’s willingness
    and capacity to cooperate and help the group on the one
    hand or to be hostile and aggressive on the other.
    alternative niche specialization (Buss) Different
    people find what makes them stand out from others in
    order to gain attention from parents or potential mates.
    anal character Freudian term for a person who is
    characterized by compulsive neatness, stubbornness, and
    miserliness.
    anal phase (Freud) Sometimes called the anal-sadistic
    phase, this second stage of the infantile period is
    characterized by a child’s attempts to gain pleasure from
    the excretory function and by such related behaviors as
    destroying or losing objects, stubbornness, neatness, and
    miserliness. Corresponds roughly to the second year of
    life.
    anal triad (Freud) The three traits of compulsive
    neatness, stubbornness, and miserliness that characterize
    the anal character.
    anal-urethral-muscular Erikson’s term for the young
    child’s psychosexual mode of adapting.
    analytical psychology Theory of personality and
    approach to psychotherapy founded by Carl Jung.
    anima Jungian archetype that represents the feminine
    component in the personality of males and originates
    from men’s inherited experiences with women.
    animus Jungian archetype that represents the
    masculine component in the personality of females and
    originates from women’s inherited experiences with
    men.
    anxiety A felt, affective, unpleasant state accompanied
    by the physical sensation of uneasiness.
    anxiety (Kelly) The recognition that the events with
    which one is confronted lie outside the range of
    convenience of one’s construct system.
    anxiety (May) The experience of the threat of
    imminent nonbeing.
    anxiety (Rogers) Feelings of uneasiness or tension
    with an unknown cause.
    archetypes Jung’s concept that refers to the contents of
    the collective unconscious. Archetypes, also called
    primordial images or collective symbols, represent
    psychic patterns of inherited behavior and are thus
    distinguished from instincts, which are physical impulses
    toward action. Typical archetypes are the anima, animus,
    and shadow.
    Glossary

    GlossaryG-2
    individuals. These theories also posit that brain systems
    and ultimately personality differences have been shaped
    by natural and sexual selection (evolution) over millions
    of years.
    biophilia Love of life.
    bipolar traits Traits with two poles: that is, those traits
    scaled from a minus point to a positive point, with zero
    representing the midpoint.
    B-love (Maslow) Love between self-actualizing
    people and characterized by the love for the being of the
    other.
    B-values (Maslow) The values of self-actualizing
    people, including beauty, truth, goodness, justice,
    wholeness, and the like.
    by-products (Buss) Traits that happen as a result of
    adaptations but are not part of the functional design.
    C
    cardinal disposition (Allport) Personal disposition so
    dominating that it cannot be hidden. Most people do not
    have a cardinal disposition.
    care (Erikson) A commitment to take care of the
    people and things that one has learned to care for.
    castration anxiety (Freud) (See castration complex)
    castration complex (Freud) Condition that accompanies
    the Oedipus complex, but takes different forms in the two
    sexes. In boys, it takes the form of castration anxiety, or
    fear of having one’s penis removed, and is responsible for
    shattering the Oedipus complex. In girls, it takes the form
    of penis envy, or the desire to have a penis, and it precedes
    and instigates the Oedipus complex.
    catharsis The process of removing or lessening
    psychological disorders by talking about one’s problems.
    causality An explanation of behavior in terms of past
    experiences.
    central dispositions (Allport) The 5 to 10 personal
    traits around which a person’s life focuses.
    chance encounter (Bandura) An unintended meeting
    of persons unfamiliar to each other.
    character (Fromm) Relatively permanent acquired
    qualities through which people relate themselves to
    others and to the world.
    character orientation (Fromm) Productive or
    nonproductive patterns of reacting to the world of things
    and the world of people.
    characteristic Unique qualities of an individual that
    include such attributes as temperament, physique,
    intelligence, and other aptitudes.
    characteristic adaptations (McCrae and Costa)
    Acquired personality structures that develop as people
    adapt to their environment.
    artificial selection (Buss) Occurs when humans select
    particular desirable traits in a breeding species (otherwise
    known as “breeding”).
    attitude (Jung) A predisposition to act or react in a
    characteristic manner, that is, in either an introverted or
    an extraverted direction.
    authoritarianism (Fromm) The tendency to give up
    one’s independence and to unite with another person or
    persons in order to gain strength. Takes the form of
    masochism or sadism.
    B
    basic anxiety (Fromm) The feeling of being alone and
    isolated, separated from the natural world.
    basic anxiety (Horney) Feelings of isolation and
    helplessness in a potentially hostile world.
    basic anxiety (Maslow) Anxiety arising from inability
    to satisfy physiological and safety needs.
    basic conflict (Horney) The incompatible tendency to
    move toward, against, and away from people.
    basic hostility (Horney) Repressed feelings of rage
    that originate during childhood when children fear that
    their parents will not satisfy their needs for safety and
    satisfaction.
    basic strength The ego quality that emerges from the
    conflict between antithetical elements in Erikson’s stages
    of development.
    basic tendencies McCrae and Costa’s term for the
    universal raw material of personality.
    behavior potential (Rotter) The possibility of a
    particular response occurring at a given time and place as
    calculated in relation to the reinforcement of that
    response.
    behavioral analysis Skinner’s approach to studying
    behavior that assumes that human conduct is shaped
    primarily by the individual’s personal history of
    reinforcement and secondarily by natural selection and
    cultural practices.
    behavioral signature of personality (Mischel) An
    individual’s unique and stable pattern of behaving
    differently in different situations.
    behaviorism A “school” of psychology that limits
    its subject matter to observable behavior. John B.
    Watson is usually credited with being the founder
    of behaviorism, with B. F. Skinner its most notable
    proponent.
    being-in-the-world (See Dasein)
    biological-evolutionary theories Are the class of
    theories that argue that behavior, thought, feelings, and
    personality are influenced by differences in basic
    genetic, epigenetic, and neurological systems between

    Glossary G-3
    conformity (Fromm) Means of escaping from
    isolation and aloneness by giving up one’s self and
    becoming whatever others desire.
    congruence (Rogers) The matching of organismic
    experiences with awareness and with the ability to
    express those experiences. One of three “necessary and
    sufficient” therapeutic conditions.
    conscience (Freud) The part of the superego that
    results from experience with punishment and that,
    therefore, tells a person what is wrong or improper
    conduct.
    conscientiousness (Buss) One’s capacity and
    commitment to work and to be focused and detail
    oriented.
    conscious (Freud) Those mental elements in
    awareness at any given time.
    conscious (Jung) Mental images that are sensed by the
    ego and that play a relatively minor role in Jungian
    theory.
    consistency paradox Mischel’s term for the
    observation that clinical intuition and the perceptions of
    laypeople suggest that behavior is consistent, whereas
    research finds that it is not.
    constructing obstacles (Adler) Safeguarding tendency
    in which people create a barrier to their own success,
    thus allowing them to protect their self-esteem by either
    using the barrier as an excuse for failure or by
    overcoming it.
    construction corollary Kelly’s assumption that people
    anticipate events according to their interpretations of
    recurrent themes.
    constructive alternativism Kelly’s view that events
    can be looked at (construed) from a different (alternative)
    perspective.
    continuous schedule (Skinner) The reinforcement of
    an organism for every correct trial; opposed to the
    intermittent schedule in which only certain selected
    responses are reinforced.
    core pathology (Erikson) A psychosocial disorder at
    any of the eight stages of development that results from
    too little basic strength.
    core role (Kelly) People’s construction of who they
    really are; their sense of identity that provides a guide for
    living.
    correlation coefficient A mathematical index used to
    measure the direction and magnitude of the relationship
    between two variables.
    cosmology The realm of philosophy dealing with the
    nature of causation.
    countertransference Strong, undeserved feelings that
    the therapist develops toward the patient during the
    choice corollary Kelly’s assumption that people
    choose the alternative in a dichotomized construct that
    they perceive will extend their range of future choices.
    classical conditioning Learning by which a neutral
    stimulus becomes associated with a meaningful stimulus
    and acquires the capacity to elicit a similar response.
    client-centered therapy Approach to psychotherapy
    originated by Rogers, which is based on respect for the
    person’s capacity to grow within a nurturing climate.
    cognitive-affective personality systems (CAPs) Mischel
    and Shoda’s system that accounts for variability of
    behavior across situations as well as stability of behavior
    within a person.
    cognitive-affective personality theory Mischel’s
    theory that views people as active, goal-directed
    individuals capable of exerting influence on both their
    situation and themselves.
    cognitive needs (Maslow) Needs for knowledge and
    understanding; related to basic or conative needs, yet
    operating on a different dimension.
    collective efficacy (Bandura) The confidence people
    have that their combined efforts will produce social
    change.
    collective unconscious Jung’s idea of an inherited
    unconscious, which is responsible for many of our
    behaviors, ideas, and dream images. The collective
    unconscious lies beyond our personal experiences
    and originates with repeated experiences of our
    ancestors.
    common traits (Allport) (See trait)
    commonality corollary Kelly’s theory that personal
    constructs of people with similar experiences tend to be
    similar.
    competencies (Mischel) People’s cognitive and
    behavioral construction of what they can and cannot do,
    based on their observations of the world, themselves, and
    others.
    complex (Jung) An emotionally toned conglomeration
    of ideas that comprise the contents of the personal
    unconscious. Jung originally used the word association
    test to uncover complexes.
    conative needs Needs that pertain to willful and
    purposive striving, for example Maslow’s hierarchy of
    needs.
    conditioned reinforcer (Skinner) Environmental
    event that is not by nature satisfying but becomes so
    because it is associated with unlearned or unconditioned
    reinforcers such as food, sex, and the like.
    conditions of worth (Rogers) Restrictions or
    qualifications attached to one person’s regard for
    another.

    GlossaryG-4
    displacement A Freudian defense mechanism in which
    unwanted urges are redirected onto other objects or
    people in order to disguise the original impulse.
    disposition, cardinal (Allport) Personal traits so
    dominating in an individual’s life that they cannot be
    hidden. Most people do not have a cardinal disposition.
    disposition, central (Allport) The 5 to 10 personal
    traits around which a person’s life focuses.
    disposition, secondary (Allport) The least
    characteristic and reliable personal traits that still appear
    with some regularity in an individual’s life.
    dispositional theories Are the class of theory that
    argue that unique and long-term tendencies to behave in
    particular ways are the essence of our personality.
    distortion (Rogers) Misinterpretation of an experience
    so that it is seen as fitting into some aspect of the self-
    concept.
    D-love (Maslow) Deficiency love or affection
    (attachment) based on the lover’s specific deficiency and
    the loved one’s ability to satisfy that deficit.
    dream analysis (Freud) The therapeutic procedure
    designed to uncover unconscious material by having a
    patient free associate to dream images. (See also free
    association)
    dystonic Erikson’s term for the negative element in
    each pair of opposites that characterizes the eight stages
    of development.
    dynamic processes McCrae and Costa’s term for the
    interconnectedness of central and peripheral components
    of personality.
    E
    early childhood (Erikson) The second stage of
    psychosocial development, characterized by the
    anal-urethral-muscular psychosexual mode and by the
    crisis of autonomy versus shame and doubt.
    early recollections Technique proposed by Adler to
    understand the pattern or theme that runs throughout a
    person’s style of life.
    eclectic Approach that allows selection of usable
    elements from different theories or approaches
    and combines them in a consistent and unified
    manner.
    ego (Freud) The province of the mind that refers to the
    “I” or those experiences that are owned (not necessarily
    consciously) by the person. As the only region of the
    mind in contact with the real world, the ego is said to
    serve the reality principle.
    ego (Jung) The center of consciousness. In Jungian
    psychology, the ego is of lesser importance than the
    more inclusive self and is limited to consciousness.
    course of treatment. These feelings can be either positive
    or negative and are considered by most writers to be a
    hindrance to successful psychotherapy.
    creative power Adler’s term for what he believed to
    be an inner freedom that empowers each of us to create
    our own style of life.
    D
    Dasein An existential term meaning a sense of self as a
    free and responsible person whose existence is embedded
    in the world of things, of people, and of self-awareness.
    deductive method Approach to factor analytical
    theories of personality that gathers data on the basis of
    previously determined hypotheses or theories, reasoning
    from the general to the particular.
    defense mechanisms (Freud) Techniques such as
    repression, reaction formation, sublimation, and the like,
    whereby the ego defends itself against the pain of
    anxiety.
    defensiveness (Rogers) Protection of the self-concept
    against anxiety and threat by denial and distortion of
    experiences that are inconsistent with it.
    delay of gratification A reference to the observation
    that some people some of the time will prefer more
    valued delayed rewards over lesser valued immediate
    ones.
    denial (Rogers) The blocking of an experience or
    some aspect of an experience from awareness because it
    is inconsistent with the self-concept.
    depreciation Adlerian safeguarding tendency whereby
    another’s achievements are undervalued and one’s own
    are overvalued.
    depressive position (Klein) Feelings of anxiety over
    losing a loved object coupled with a sense of guilt for
    wanting to destroy that object.
    desacralization (Maslow) The process of removing
    respect, joy, awe, and rapture from an experience, which
    then purifies or objectifies that experience.
    destructiveness (Fromm) Method of escaping from
    freedom by eliminating people or objects, thus restoring
    feelings of power.
    diathesis-stress model Eysenck accepted this model
    of psychiatric illness, which suggests that some people
    are vulnerable to illness because they have both genetic
    and an acquired weakness that predisposes them to an
    illness.
    dichotomy corollary Kelly’s assumption that people
    construe events in an either/or (dichotomous) manner.
    disengagement of internal control (Bandura) The
    displacement or diffusion of responsibility for the
    injurious effects of one’s actions.

    Glossary G-5
    exclusivity (Erikson) The core pathology of young
    adulthood marked by a person’s exclusion of certain
    people, activities, and ideas.
    excuses Adlerian safeguarding tendencies whereby the
    person, through the use of reasonable sounding
    justifications, becomes convinced of the reality of self-
    erected obstacles.
    existential freedom (May) The freedom of doing one’s
    will. Existential freedom can be limited by chains or bars.
    existential living Rogers’s term indicating a tendency
    to live in the moment.
    existential needs (Fromm) Peculiarly human needs
    aimed at moving people toward a reunification with the
    natural world. Fromm listed relatedness, transcendence,
    rootedness, a sense of identity, and a frame of orientation
    as existential, or human, needs.
    expectancy The subjective probability held by a person
    that any specific reinforcement or set of reinforcements
    will occur in a given situation.
    experience corollary Kelly’s view that people
    continually revise their personal constructs as the result
    of experience.
    exploitative characters (Fromm) People who take
    from others, by either force or cunning.
    external evaluations (Rogers) People’s perception of
    other people’s view of them.
    external influences (McCrae and Costa) Knowledge,
    views, and evaluations of the self.
    external reinforcement (Rotter) The positive or
    negative value of any reinforcing event as seen from the
    view of societal or cultural values.
    extinction The tendency of a previously acquired
    response to become progressively weakened upon
    nonreinforcement.
    extraversion (E) (Eysenck) One of three types of
    superfactors identified by Eysenck and consisting of two
    opposite poles—extraversion and introversion.
    Extraverts are characterized behaviorally by sociability
    and impulsiveness and physiologically by a low level of
    cortical arousal. Introverts, by contrast, are characterized
    by unsociability and caution and by a high level of
    cortical arousal.
    extraversion (Jung) An attitude or type marked by the
    turning outward of psychic energy so that a person is
    oriented toward the objective world.
    F
    factor A unit of personality derived through factor
    analysis. However, the term is sometimes used more
    generally to include any underlying aspect of
    personality.
    ego-ideal (Freud) The part of the superego
    that results from experiences with reward and that,
    therefore, teaches a person what is right or proper
    conduct.
    Eigenwelt An existentialist term meaning the world of
    one’s relationship to self. One of three simultaneous
    modes of being-in-the-world.
    elaborative choice (Kelly) Making choices that will
    increase a person’s range of future choices.
    emotional stability (Buss) Involves one’s ability to
    handle stress or not and the disposition to experience
    anxiety, depression, or guilt.
    empathic listening (Rogers) The accurate sensing of
    the feelings of another and the communication of these
    perceptions. One of three “necessary and sufficient”
    therapeutic conditions.
    empirical Based on experience, systematic observation,
    and experiment rather than on logical reasoning or
    philosophical speculation.
    empirical law of effect (Rotter) The assumption that
    behaviors that move people in the direction of their goals
    are more likely to be reinforced.
    encoding strategies (Mischel) People’s ways of
    transforming stimulus inputs into information about
    themselves, other people, and the world.
    enhancement needs (Rogers) The need to develop, to
    grow, and to achieve.
    epigenetic principle Erikson’s term meaning that one
    component grows out of another in its proper time and
    sequence.
    epigenetics (Buss) Change in gene function that does
    not involve changes in DNA.
    epistemology The branch of philosophy that deals with
    the nature of knowledge.
    erogenous zones Organs of the body that are
    especially sensitive to the reception of pleasure. In
    Freudian theory, the three principal erogenous zones are
    the mouth, anus, and genitals.
    eros The desire for an enduring union with a loved one.
    essential freedom (May) The freedom of being or the
    freedom of the conscious mind. Essential freedom cannot
    be limited by chains or bars.
    esteem needs The fourth level on Maslow’s hierarchy
    of needs; they include self-respect, competence, and the
    perceived esteem of others.
    ethology The scientific study of the characteristic
    behavior patterns of animals.
    evolutionary psychology (Buss) The scientific study
    of human thought and behavior that explains human
    thought, behavior, motivation, and personality through
    the concepts of adaptations and mechanisms.

    GlossaryG-6
    that are directed toward the satisfaction of some general
    need.
    Freudian slips Slips of the tongue or pen, misreading,
    incorrect hearing, temporary forgetting of names and
    intentions, and the misplacing of objects, all of which
    are caused by unconscious wishes. Also called
    parapraxes.
    fully functioning person (Rogers) (See person of
    tomorrow)
    functional autonomy (Allport) The tendency for
    some motives to become independent from the original
    motive responsible for the behavior.
    fundamental attribution error (Buss) Our tendency
    to ignore situational and environmental forces when
    explaining the behavior of other people and instead focus
    on internal dispositions.
    fundamental situational error (Buss) The tendency
    to assume that the environment alone can produce
    behavior void of a stable internal mechanism.
    G
    Gemeinschaftsgefühl (See social interest)
    generalization The transfer of the effects of one
    learning situation to another.
    generalized expectancy (Rotter) Expectation based
    on similar past experiences that a given behavior will be
    reinforced.
    generalized reinforcer (Skinner) A conditioned
    reinforcer that has been associated with several primary
    reinforcers. Money, for example, is a generalized
    reinforcer because it is associated with food, shelter, and
    other primary reinforcers.
    genitality (Erikson) Period of life beginning with
    puberty and continuing through adulthood and marked
    by full sexual identity.
    genital-locomotor Erikson’s term for the preschool
    child’s psychosexual mode of adapting.
    genital stage (Freud) Period of life beginning with
    puberty and continuing through adulthood and marked
    by full sexual identity.
    genital stage (Klein) Comparable to Freud’s phallic
    stage: that is, the time around ages 3 to 5 when the
    Oedipus complex reaches its culmination.
    great mother Jungian archetype of the opposing forces
    of fertility and destruction.
    guilt (Kelly) The sense of having lost one’s core role
    structure.
    guilt (May) An ontological characteristic of human
    existence arising from our separation from the natural
    world (Umwelt), from other people (Mitwelt), or from
    oneself (Eigenwelt).
    factor analysis A mathematical procedure for reducing
    a large number of variables to a few; used by Eysenck
    and others to identify personality traits and factors.
    factor loadings The amount of correlation that a score
    contributes to a given factor.
    falsifiable An attribute of a theory that allows research
    to either support or fail to support that theory’s major
    tenets. A falsifiable theory is accountable to experimental
    results.
    fear (Kelly) A specific threat to one’s personal constructs.
    feeling (Jung) A rational function that tells us the
    value of something. The feeling function can be either
    extraverted (directed toward the objective world) or
    introverted (directed toward the subjective world).
    fiction (Adler) A belief or expectation of the future
    that serves to motivate present behavior. The truthfulness
    of a fictional idea is immaterial, because the person acts
    as if the idea were true.
    fixation A defense mechanism that arises when
    psychic energy is blocked at one stage of development,
    thus making change or psychological growth difficult.
    fixation (Fromm) The nonproductive form of
    rootedness marked by a reluctance to grow beyond the
    security provided by one’s mother.
    fixed-interval (Skinner) Intermittent reinforcement
    schedule whereby the organism is reinforced for its first
    response following a designated period of time (e.g., FI
    10 means that the animal is reinforced for its initial
    response after 10 minutes have elapsed since its previous
    reinforcement).
    fixed-ratio (Skinner) Reinforcement schedule in
    which the organism is reinforced intermittently
    according to a specified number of responses it makes
    (e.g., FR 7 means that the organism is reinforced for
    every seventh response).
    formative tendency (Rogers) Tendency in all matter
    to evolve from simpler to more complex forms.
    fortuitous events (Bandura) Environmental events
    that are unexpected and unintended.
    fragmentation corollary Kelly’s assumption that
    behavior is sometimes inconsistent because one’s
    construct systems can admit incompatible elements.
    frame of orientation (Fromm) The need for humans
    to develop a unifying philosophy or consistent way of
    looking at things.
    free association Technique used in Freudian
    psychotherapy in which the therapist instructs the patient
    to verbalize every thought that comes to mind, no matter
    how irrelevant or repugnant it may appear.
    freedom of movement (Rotter) The mean expectancy
    of being reinforced for performing all those behaviors

    Glossary G-7
    idealistic principle (Freud) A reference to the ego-
    ideal, a subsystem of the superego that tells people what
    they should do.
    idealized self-image (Horney) An attempt to solve
    basic conflicts by adopting a belief in one’s godlike
    qualities.
    identity crisis Erickson’s term for a crucial period or
    turning point in the life cycle that may result in either
    more or less ego strength. Identity crises can be found in
    those Eriksonian stages that follow the development of
    identity, ordinarily during adolescence.
    idiographic Approach to the study of personality
    based on the single case.
    incestuous symbiosis (Fromm) Extreme dependence
    on a mother or mother substitute.
    incongruence (Rogers) The perception of
    discrepancies between organismic self, self-concept, and
    ideal self.
    individual psychology Theory of personality and
    approach to psychotherapy founded by Alfred Adler.
    individuality corollary Kelly’s assumption that people
    have different experiences and therefore construe events
    in different ways.
    individuation Jung’s term for the process of becoming
    a whole person, that is, an individual with a high level of
    psychic development.
    inductive method A form of reasoning based on
    observation and measurement without preconceived
    hypotheses.
    infancy (Erikson) The first stage of psychosocial
    development—one marked by the oral-sensory mode and
    by the crisis of basic trust versus basic mistrust.
    infantile stage (Freud) First four or five years of life
    characterized by autoerotic or pleasure-seeking behavior
    and consisting of the oral, anal, and phallic substages.
    inferiority complex (Adler) Exaggerated or
    abnormally strong feelings of inferiority, which usually
    interfere with socially useful solutions to life’s problems.
    instinct (Freud) From the German Trieb, meaning
    drive or impulse; refers to an internal stimulus that
    impels action or thought. The two primary instincts are
    sex and aggression.
    instinct (Jung) An unconscious physical impulse
    toward action. Instincts are the physical counterpart of
    archetypes.
    instinctoid needs (Maslow) Needs that are innately
    determined but that can be modified through learning.
    The frustration of instinctoid needs leads to various types
    of pathology.
    intentionality (May) The underlying structure that
    gives meaning to our experience.
    H
    hero A Jungian archetype representing the myth of the
    godlike man who conquers or vanquishes evil, usually in
    the form of a monster, dragon, or serpent.
    hesitating (Adler) Safeguarding tendency
    characterized by vacillation or procrastination designed
    to provide a person with the excuse “It’s too late now.”
    hierarchy of needs Maslow’s concept that needs are
    ordered in such a manner that those on a lower level
    must be satisfied before higher level needs become
    activated.
    hoarding characters (Fromm) People who seek to
    save and not let go of material possessions, feelings, or
    ideas.
    holistic-dynamic Maslow’s theory of personality,
    which stresses both the unity of the organism and the
    motivational aspects of personality.
    human agency (Bandura) The ability of people to use
    cognitive abilities to control their lives.
    human dilemma (Fromm) The present condition of
    humans who have the ability to reason but who lack
    powerful instincts needed to adapt to a changing world.
    humanistic psychoanalysis Fromm’s personality
    theory that combines the basics of both psychoanalysis
    and humanistic psychology.
    humanistic-existential theories The primary
    assumption of the humanistic (currently known as
    “positive psychology”) approach is that people strive
    toward meaning, growth, well-being, happiness, and
    psychological health. Existential theories assume that not
    only are we driven by a search for meaning, but also
    negative experiences, such as failure, awareness of death,
    death of a loved one, and anxiety are part of the human
    condition and can foster psychological growth.
    hypochondriasis Obsessive attention to one’s health;
    typically characterized by imaginary symptoms.
    hypothesis An assumption or educated guess that can
    be scientifically tested.
    hysteria (Freud) A mental disorder marked by the
    conversion of repressed psychical elements into somatic
    symptoms such as impotency, paralysis, or blindness,
    when no physiological bases for these symptoms exist.
    I
    id (Freud) The region of personality that is alien to the
    ego because it includes experiences that have never been
    owned by the person. The id is the home base for all the
    instincts, and its sole function is to seek pleasure
    regardless of consequences.
    ideal self (Rogers) One’s view of self as one would
    like to be.

    GlossaryG-8
    latent content, which can be revealed only through dream
    interpretation, was more important than the surface or
    manifest content.
    law of effect Thorndike’s principle that responses to
    stimuli followed immediately by a satisfier tend to
    strengthen the connection between those responses and
    stimuli; that is, they tend to be learned.
    learning-(social) cognitive theories Learning theorists
    argue that if you want to understand behavior then focus
    only on behavior, not hypothetical and unobservable
    internals states such as thoughts, feelings, drives, or
    motives. All behavior and ultimately personality are
    learned through association and/or their consequences
    (whether it is reinforced or punished). Social-cognitive
    theories believe personality is a result of the interaction
    between person qualities—especially thoughts and
    assumptions about self and others—and the environment.
    libido (Freud) Psychic energy of the life instinct;
    sexual drive or energy.
    life instinct (Freud) One of two primary drives or
    impulses; the life instinct is also called Eros or sex.
    locus of control (Rotter) The belief people have that
    their attempts to reach a goal are within their control
    (internal locus of control) or are primarily due to
    powerful events such as fate, chance, or other people
    (external locus of control). Locus of control is measured
    by the Internal-External Control Scale.
    love (Erikson) The basic strength of young adulthood
    that emerges from the crisis of intimacy versus isolation.
    love (Fromm) A union with another person in which a
    person retains separateness and integrity of self.
    love (May) To delight in the presence of the other
    person and to affirm that person’s value and development
    as much as one’s own.
    love and belongingness needs The third level on
    Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; they include both the need
    to give love and the need to receive love.
    M
    maintenance needs (Rogers) Those basic needs that
    protect the status quo. They may be either physiological
    (e.g., food) or interpersonal (e.g., the need to maintain
    the current self-concept).
    malignant aggression (Fromm) The destruction of
    life for reasons other than survival.
    mandala (Jung) Symbol representing the striving for
    unity and completion. It is often seen as a circle within a
    square or a square within a circle.
    manifest dream content (Freud) The surface or
    conscious level of a dream. Freud believed that the
    manifest level of a dream has no deep psychological
    interactionist One who believes that behavior results
    from an interaction of environmental variables and
    person variables, including cognition.
    intermittent schedule (Skinner) The reinforcement of
    an organism on only certain selected occurrences of a
    response; opposed to a continuous schedule in which the
    organism is reinforced for every correct trial. The four
    most common intermittent schedules are fixed-ratio,
    variable-ratio, fixed-interval, and variable-interval.
    internal reinforcement (Rotter) The individual’s
    perception of the positive or negative value of any
    reinforcing event.
    internalization (object relations theory) A process in
    which the person takes in (introjects) aspects of the
    external world and then organizes those introjections in a
    psychologically meaningful way.
    interpersonal trust (Rotter) A generalized
    expectancy held by a person that other people can be
    relied on to keep their word. The Interpersonal Trust
    Scale attempts to measure degree of interpersonal trust.
    intimacy (Erikson) The ability to fuse one’s identity
    with that of another person without fear of losing it. The
    syntonic element of young adulthood.
    introjection (Freud) A defense mechanism whereby
    people incorporate positive qualities of another person
    into their ego.
    introjection (Klein) Fantasizing taking external objects,
    such as the mother’s breast, into one’s own body.
    introversion (Eysenck) (See extraversion, Eysenck)
    introversion (Jung) An attitude or type characterized
    by the turning inward of psychic energy with an
    orientation toward the subjective.
    intuition (Jung) An irrational function that involves
    perception of elementary data that are beyond our
    awareness. Intuitive people “know” something without
    understanding how they know.
    isolation (Erikson) The inability to share true intimacy
    or to take chances with one’s identity. The dystonic
    element of young adulthood.
    J
    Jonah complex The fear of being or doing one’s best.
    L
    latency (Erikson) The psychosexual mode of the
    school-age child. A period of little sexual development.
    latency stage (Freud) The time between infancy and
    puberty when psychosexual growth is at a standstill.
    latent dream content (Freud) The underlying,
    unconscious meaning of a dream. Freud held that the

    Glossary G-9
    moving away from people One of Horney’s neurotic
    trends in which neurotics protect themselves against
    feelings of isolation by adopting a detached attitude.
    moving backward (Adler) Safeguarding inflated
    feelings of superiority by reverting to a more secure
    period of life.
    moving toward people One of Horney’s neurotic
    trends in which neurotics develop a need for others as a
    protection against feelings of helplessness.
    myth (May) Belief system that provides explanations
    for personal and social problems.
    N
    narcissism Love of self or the attainment of erotic
    pleasure from viewing one’s own body.
    natural selection (Buss) The process by which evolution
    happens and is simply a more general
    form of artificial selection in which nature rather than
    people select the traits.
    necrophilia Love of death.
    need potential (Rotter) A reference to the possible
    occurrence of a set of functionally related behaviors
    directed toward the satisfaction of the same goal or a
    similar set of goals.
    need value (Rotter) The degree to which a person
    prefers one set of reinforcements to another.
    negative reinforcer Any aversive stimulus that, when
    removed from a situation, increases the probability that
    the immediately preceding behavior will occur.
    negative transference Strong, hostile, and undeserved
    feelings that the patient develops toward the analyst
    during the course of treatment.
    neurosis Somewhat dated term signifying mild
    personality disorders as opposed to the more severe
    psychotic reactions. Neuroses are generally characterized
    by one or more of the following: anxiety, hysteria,
    phobias, obsessive-compulsive reactions, depression,
    chronic fatigue, and hypochondriacal reactions.
    neurotic anxiety (Freud) An apprehension about an
    unknown danger facing the ego but originating from id
    impulses.
    neurotic anxiety (May) A reaction that is dispropor-
    tionate to the threat and that leads to repression and
    defensive behaviors.
    neurotic claims (Horney) Unrealistic demands and
    expectations of neurotics to be entitled to special privilege.
    neurotic needs (Horney) Original 10 defenses against
    basic anxiety.
    neurotic needs (Maslow) Nonproductive needs that
    are opposed to the basic needs and that block
    psychological health whether or not they are satisfied.
    significance and that the unconscious or latent level
    holds the key to the dream’s true meaning.
    marketing characters (Fromm) People who see
    themselves as commodities, with their personal value
    dependent on their ability to sell themselves.
    masculine protest Adler’s term for the neurotic and
    erroneous belief held by some men and women that men
    are superior to women.
    masochism A condition characterized by the reception
    of sexual pleasure from suffering pain and humiliation
    inflicted either by self or by others.
    maturity (Freud) The final psychosexual stage
    following infancy, latency, and the genital period.
    Hypothetically, maturity would be characterized by a
    strong ego in control of the id and the superego and by
    an ever-expanding realm of consciousness.
    mechanisms (Buss) The process of evolution by
    natural selection has produced solutions to the two basic
    problems of life, survival, and reproduction.
    metamotivation (Maslow) The motives of self-
    actualizing people, including especially the B-values.
    metapathology (Maslow) Illness, characterized by
    absence of values, lack of fulfillment, and loss of meaning,
    that results from deprivation of self-actualization needs.
    Mitwelt An existentialist term meaning the world
    of one’s relationship to other people. One of three
    simultaneous modes of being-in-the-world.
    modeling (Bandura) One of two basic sources of
    learning; involves the observation of others and thus
    learning from their actions. More than simple imitation,
    modeling entails the addition and subtraction of specific
    acts and the observation of consequences of others’
    behavior.
    modulation corollary (Kelly) Theory that states that
    personal constructs are permeable (resilient), that they
    are subject to change through experience.
    monogenic transmission (Buss) When single genes
    produce single traits (phenotypes).
    moral anxiety (Freud) Anxiety that results from the
    ego’s conflict with the superego.
    moral hypochondriasis (Fromm) Preoccupation with
    guilt about things one has done wrong.
    moralistic principle (Freud) Reference to the
    conscience, a subsystem of the supergo that tells people
    what they should not do.
    morphogenic science Allport’s concept of science,
    which deals with various methods of gathering data on
    patterns of behavior within a single individual.
    moving against people One of Horney’s neurotic
    trends in which neurotics protect themselves against the
    hostility of others by adopting an aggressive strategy.

    GlossaryG-10
    feelings of love for the mother and hostility toward the
    father. The simple female Oedipus complex exists when
    the girl feels hostility for the mother and sexual love for
    the father.
    old age (Erikson) The eighth and final stage of the
    life cycle, marked by the psychosocial crisis of integrity
    versus despair and the basic strength of wisdom.
    openness (Buss) Involves one’s propensity for
    innovation and ability to solve problems.
    operant conditioning (Skinner) A type of learning in
    which reinforcement, which is contingent upon the
    occurrence of a particular response, increases the
    probability that the same response will occur again.
    operant discrimination Skinner’s observation that an
    organism, as a consequence of its reinforcement history,
    learns to respond to some elements in the environment but
    not to others. Operant discrimination does not exist within
    the organism but is a function of environmental variables
    and the organism’s previous history of reinforcement.
    operant extinction (Skinner) The loss of an operantly
    conditioned response due to the systematic withholding
    of reinforcement.
    operational definition A definition of a concept in
    terms of observable events or behaviors that can be
    measured.
    oral phase (Freud) The earliest stage of the infantile
    period characterized by attempts to gain pleasure through
    the activity of the mouth, especially sucking, eating, and
    biting; corresponds roughly to the first 12 to 18 months
    of life.
    oral-sensory Erikson’s term for the infant’s first
    psychosexual mode of adapting.
    organ dialect (Adler) The expression of a person’s
    underlying intentions or style of life through a diseased
    or dysfunctional bodily organ.
    organismic self (Rogers) A more general term than
    self-concept; refers to the entire person, including those
    aspects of existence beyond awareness.
    organismic valuing process (OVP) Process by which
    experiences are valued according to optimal
    enhancement of organism and self.
    organization corollary Kelly’s notion that people
    arrange their personal constructs in a hierarchical system.
    orthogonal rotation A method of rotating the axes in
    factor analysis that assumes the independence of primary
    factors.
    P
    paranoia Mental disorder characterized by unrealistic
    feelings of persecution, grandiosity, and a suspicious
    attitude toward others.
    neurotic pride (Horney) A false pride based on one’s
    idealized image of self.
    neurotic search for glory Horney’s concept for the
    comprehensive drive toward actualizing the ideal self.
    neurotic trends Horney’s term for the three basic
    attitudes toward self and others—moving toward people,
    moving against people, and moving away from people; a
    revision of her original list of 10 neurotic needs.
    neuroticism (N) (Eysenck) One of three types or
    superfactors identified by Eysenck. Neuroticism is a
    bipolar factor consisting of neuroticism at one pole and
    stability at the other. High scores on N may indicate
    anxiety, hysteria, obsessive-compulsive disorders, or
    criminality. Low scores indicate emotional stability.
    noise (Buss) Also known as “random effects,” occurs
    when evolution produces random changes in design that
    do not affect function. Noise tends to be produced by
    chance and not selected for.
    nomothetic An approach to the study of personality
    that is based on general laws or principles.
    nonbeing The awareness of the possibility of one’s not
    being, through death or loss of awareness.
    normal anxiety (May) The experience of threat that
    accompanies growth or change in one’s values.
    normal autism (Mahler) The stage in an infant’s
    development when all his or her needs are satisfied
    automatically, that is, without the infant having to deal
    with the external world.
    normal symbiosis (Mahler) The second developmental
    stage marked by a dual unity of infant and mother.
    nothingness (See nonbeing)
    O
    object Psychoanalytic term referring to the person or
    part of a person that can satisfy an instinct or drive.
    object relations theory A reference to the work of
    Melanie Klein and others who have extended Freudian
    psychoanalysis with their emphasis on early relations to
    parents (objects) that influence later interpersonal
    relationships.
    objective biography (McCrae and Costa) All
    experiences of a person across the lifespan.
    oblique method A method of rotating the axes in
    factor analysis that assumes some intercorrelation among
    primary factors.
    obsession A persistent or recurrent idea, usually
    involving an urge toward some action.
    Oedipus complex Term used by Freud to indicate the
    situation in which the child of either sex develops
    feelings of love and/or hostility for the parent. In the
    simple male Oedipus complex, the boy has incestuous

    Glossary G-11
    person-centered The theory of personality founded by
    Carl Rogers as an outgrowth of his client-centered
    psychotherapy.
    phallic phase (Freud) The third and last stage of the
    infantile period, the phallic phase is characterized by the
    Oedipus complex. Although anatomical differences
    between the sexes are responsible for important
    differences in the male and female Oedipal periods,
    Freud used the term “phallic phase” to signify both male
    and female development.
    phenomenology A philosophical position emphasizing
    that behavior is caused by one’s perceptions rather than
    by external reality.
    physical mechanisms (Buss) Physiological organs and
    systems that evolved to solve problems of survival.
    physiological needs The most basic level on Maslow’s
    hierarchy of needs; they include food, water, air, etc.
    philia Brotherly or sisterly love; friendship.
    phylogenetic endowment Unconscious inherited
    images that have been passed down to us through many
    generations of repetition. A concept used by both Freud
    and Klein.
    placebo effect Changes in behavior or functioning
    brought about by one’s beliefs or expectations.
    play age (Erikson) The third stage of psychosocial
    development, encompassing the time from about ages 3 to
    5 and characterized by the genital-locomotor psychosexual
    mode and the crisis of initiative versus guilt.
    pleasure principle (Freud) A reference to the
    motivation of the id to seek immediate reduction
    of tension through the gratification of instinctual drives.
    polygenic transmission (Buss) When many genes
    interact to create a single characteristic.
    positions (Klein) Ways in which an infant organizes
    its experience in order to deal with its basic conflict of
    love and hate. The two positions are the paranoid-
    schizoid position and the depressive position.
    positive freedom (Fromm) Spontaneous activity of
    the whole, integrated personality; signals a reunification
    with others and with the world.
    positive psychology A relatively new field of psy-
    chology that combines an emphasis on hope, optimism,
    and well-being with an emphasis on research and
    assessment.
    positive regard (Rogers) The need to be loved, liked,
    or accepted by another.
    positive reinforcer Any stimulus that, when added to a
    situation, increases the probability that a given behavior
    will occur.
    positive self-regard (Rogers) The experience of
    valuing one’s self.
    paranoid-schizoid position (Klein) A tendency of the
    infant to see the world as having the same destructive
    and omnipotent qualities that it possesses.
    parapraxes Freudian slips such as slips of the tongue
    or pen, misreading, incorrect hearing, temporary
    forgetting of names and intentions, and the misplacing of
    objects, all of which are caused by unconscious wishes.
    parsimony Criterion of a useful theory that states that
    when two theories are equal on other criteria, the simpler
    one is preferred.
    peak experience (Maslow) An intense mystical
    experience, often characteristic of self-actualizing people
    but not limited to them.
    penis envy (Freud) (See castration complex)
    perceptual conscious (Freud) The system that
    perceives external stimuli through sight, sound, taste, and
    the like and that communicates them to the conscious
    system.
    permeability (Kelly) A quality of personal constructs
    that allows new information to revise our way of viewing
    things.
    perseverative functional autonomy (Allport)
    Functionally independent motives that are not part
    of the proprium; includes addictions, the tendency
    to finish uncompleted tasks, and other acquired motives.
    person of tomorrow (Rogers) The psychologically
    healthy individual in the process of evolving into all that
    he or she can become.
    persona Jungian archetype that represents the side of
    personality that one shows to the rest of the world. Also,
    the mask worn by ancient Roman actors in the Greek
    theater and thus the root of the word “personality.”
    personal constructs (Kelly) A person’s way of
    interpreting, explaining, and predicting events.
    personal disposition (Allport) A relatively permanent
    neuropsychic structure peculiar to the individual, which
    has the capacity to render different stimuli functionally
    equivalent and to initiate and guide personalized forms
    of behavior.
    Personal Orientation Inventory (POI) Test designed
    by E. L. Shostrom to measure Maslow’s concept of self-
    actualizing tendencies in people.
    personal unconscious Jung’s term for those repressed
    experiences that pertain exclusively to one particular
    individual; opposed to the collective unconscious, which
    pertains to unconscious experiences that originate with
    repeated experiences of our ancestors.
    personality A global concept referring to a relatively
    permanent pattern of traits, dispositions, or
    characteristics that give some degree of consistency to a
    person’s behavior.

    GlossaryG-12
    psychoanalytic social theory Horney’s theory of
    personality that emphasizes cultural influence in shaping
    both normal and neurotic development.
    psychodynamic Loosely defined term usually
    referring to those psychological theories that heavily
    emphasize unconscious motivation. The theories of
    Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Klein, Erikson, and
    perhaps Fromm are usually considered to be
    psychodynamic.
    psychohistory A field of study that combines
    psychoanalytic concepts with historical methods.
    psychological mechanisms (Buss) Internal and
    specific cognitive, motivational, and personality systems
    that solve specific survival and reproductive problems.
    psychological situation (Rotter) That part of the
    external and internal world to which an individual is
    responding.
    psychology of science A subdiscipline of psychology
    that studies both science and the behavior of scientists.
    psychoses Severe personality disorders, as opposed to
    the more mild neurotic reactions. Psychoses interfere
    seriously with the usual functions of life and include both
    organic brain disorders and functional (learned) conditions.
    psychoticism (P) (Eysenck) One of three superfactors
    or types identified by Eysenck. Psychoticism is a bipolar
    factor consisting of psychoticism at one pole and
    superego function at the other. High P scores indicate
    hostility, self-centeredness, suspicion, and
    nonconformity.
    punishment The presentation of an aversive stimulus
    or the removal of a positive one. Punishment sometimes,
    but not always, weakens a response.
    Q
    Q sort Inventory technique originated by William
    Stephenson in which the subject is asked to sort a series
    of self-referent statements into several piles, the size of
    which approximates a normal curve.
    quantitative trait loci (QTL) approach (Buss) A
    technique to uncover genetic markers by finding the
    location of specific bits of DNA on genes that are
    associated with particular behaviors.
    R
    radical behaviorism Skinner’s view that psychology as
    a science can advance only when psychologists stop
    attributing behavior to hypothetical constructs and begin
    writing and talking strictly in terms of observable
    behavior.
    range corollary Kelly’s assumption that personal
    constructs are limited to a finite range of convenience.
    post-Freudian theory Erikson’s theory of personality
    that extended Freud’s developmental stages into old age.
    At each age, a specific psychosocial struggle contributes
    to the formation of personality.
    posttraumatic stress disorder A psychological
    disorder resulting from extremely stressful experiences;
    it includes nightmares and flashbacks of the traumatic
    experience.
    preconscious (Freud) Mental elements that are
    currently not in awareness, but that can become conscious
    with varying degrees of difficulty.
    primary narcissism (Freud) An infant’s investment
    of libido in its own ego; self-love or autoerotic behavior
    of the infant. (See narcissism)
    primary process (Freud) A reference to the id, which
    houses the primary motivators of behavior, called instincts.
    proactive (Allport) Concept that presupposes that
    people are capable of consciously acting upon their
    environment in new and innovative ways, which then
    feed new elements into the system and stimulate
    psychological growth.
    procreativity (Erikson) The drive to have children
    and to care for them.
    progression (Jung) The forward flow of psychic
    energy; involves the extraverted attitude and movement
    toward adaptation to the external world.
    projection A defense mechanism whereby the ego
    reduces anxiety by attributing an unwanted impulse to
    another person.
    projective identification (Klein) A psychic defense
    mechanism in which infants split off unacceptable parts
    of themselves, project them onto another object, and then
    introject them in a distorted form.
    propriate functional autonomy (Allport) Allport’s
    concept of a master system of motivation that confers
    unity on personality by relating self-sustaining motives
    to the proprium.
    propriate strivings (Allport) Motivation toward goals
    that are consistent with an established proprium and that
    are uniquely one’s own.
    proprium (Allport) All those characteristics that
    people see as peculiarly their own and that are regarded
    as warm, central, and important.
    proxy (Bandura) One of three modes of human agency,
    proxy involves self-regulation through other people.
    pseudospecies (Erikson) The illusion held by a
    particular society that it is somehow chosen to be more
    important than other societies.
    psychoanalysis Theory of personality, approach to
    psychotherapy, and method of investigation founded by
    Freud.

    Glossary G-13
    resistance A variety of unconscious responses by
    patients, designed to block therapeutic progress.
    role (Kelly) A pattern of behavior that results from
    people’s understanding of the constructs of others with
    whom they are engaged in some task.
    role repudiation (Erikson) The inability to synthesize
    different self-images and values into a workable identity.
    rootedness (Fromm) The human need to establish
    roots, that is, to find a home again in the world.
    S
    sadism A condition in which a person receives sexual
    pleasure by inflicting pain or humiliation on another person.
    safeguarding tendencies (Adler) Protective
    mechanisms such as aggression, withdrawal, and the like
    that maintain exaggerated feelings of superiority.
    safety needs The second level on Maslow’s hierarchy
    of needs; they include physical security, protection, and
    freedom from danger.
    school age (Erikson) The fourth stage of psychosocial
    development; covers the period from about ages 6 to 12
    or 13 and is characterized by psychosexual latency and
    the psychosocial crisis of industry versus inferiority.
    science A branch of study concerned with observation
    and classification of data and with the verification of
    general laws through the testing of hypotheses.
    secondary dispositions (Allport) The least
    characteristic and reliable personal dispositions that
    appear with some regularity in a person’s life.
    secondary narcissism (Freud) Self-love or autoerotic
    behavior in an adolescent. (See narcissism)
    secondary process (Freud) A reference to the ego,
    which chronologically is the second region of the mind
    (after the id or primary process). Secondary process
    thinking is in contact with reality.
    selective activation Bandura’s belief that self-
    regulatory influences are not automatic but rather operate
    only if they are activated.
    self (Jung) The most comprehensive of all archetypes,
    the self includes the whole of personality, although it is
    mostly unconscious. The self is often symbolized by the
    mandala motif.
    self-accusation Adlerian safeguarding tendency
    whereby a person aggresses indirectly against others
    through self-torture and guilt.
    self-actualization needs (Maslow) The highest level
    of human motivation; they include the need to fully
    develop all of one’s psychological capacities.
    self-actualization (Rogers) A subsystem of the
    actualizing tendency; the tendency to actualize the self as
    perceived.
    reaction formation A defense mechanism in which a
    person represses one impulse and adopts the exact
    opposite form of behavior, which ordinarily is
    exaggerated and ostentatious.
    reactive (Allport) Term for those theories that view
    people as being motivated by tension reduction and by
    the desire to return to a state of equilibrium.
    realistic anxiety (Freud) An unpleasant, nonspecific
    feeling resulting from the ego’s relationship with the
    external world.
    reality principle (Freud) A reference to the ego,
    which must realistically arbitrate the conflicting demands
    of the id, the superego, and the external world.
    receptive characters (Fromm) People who relate to
    the world through receiving love, knowledge, and
    material possessions.
    reciprocal causation (Bandura) Scheme that includes
    environment, behavior, and person as mutually interacting
    to determine personal conduct.
    regression (Freud) A defense mechanism whereby a
    person returns to an earlier stage in order to protect the
    ego against anxiety.
    regression (Jung) The backward flow of psychic
    energy; regression involves the introverted attitude and
    movement toward adaptation to the internal world.
    reinforcement (Skinner) Any condition within the
    environment that strengthens a behavior. (See also
    negative reinforcer and positive reinforcer)
    reinforcement-reinforcement sequences Rotter’s
    term indicating that the value of an event is a function of
    one’s expectation that a reinforcement will lead to future
    reinforcements.
    reinforcement value (Rotter) The preference a person
    attaches to any reinforcement when the probabilities are
    equal for the occurrence of a number of different
    reinforcements.
    relatedness (Fromm) The need for union with another
    person or persons. Expressed through submission, power,
    or love.
    reliability The extent to which a test or other
    measuring instrument yields consistent results.
    repetition compulsion (Freud) The tendency of an
    instinct, especially the death instinct, to repeat or recreate
    an earlier condition, particularly one that was frightening
    or anxiety arousing.
    repression (Freud) The forcing of unwanted, anxiety-
    laden experiences into the unconscious as a defense
    against the pain of that anxiety.
    resacralization (Maslow) The process of returning
    respect, joy, awe, and rapture to an experience in order to
    make that experience more subjective and personal.

    GlossaryG-14
    sociality corollary Kelly’s notion that people can
    communicate with others because they are able to
    construe others’ constructions.
    splitting (object relations theory) A psychic defense
    mechanism in which the child subjectively separates
    incompatible aspects of an object.
    stability (Eysenck) (See neuroticism)
    standing still (Adler) Safeguarding tendency char-
    acterized by lack of action as a means of avoiding failure.
    stimulus generalization (See generalization)
    style of life (Adler) A person’s individuality that
    expresses itself in any circumstance or environment; the
    “flavor” of a person’s life.
    sublimation A defense mechanism that involves the
    repression of the genital aim of Eros and its substitution
    by a cultural or social aim.
    successive approximations Procedure used to shape
    an organism’s actions by rewarding behaviors as they
    become closer and closer to the target behavior.
    superego (Freud) The moral or ethical processes of
    personality. The superego has two subsystems—the
    conscience, which tells us what is wrong, and the ego-
    ideal, which tells us what is right.
    superego function (Eysenck) (See psychoticism)
    suppression The blocking or inhibiting of an activity
    either by a conscious act of the will or by an outside
    agent such as parents or other authority figures. It differs
    from repression, which is the unconscious blocking of
    anxiety-producing experiences.
    surgency (Buss) Involves the disposition to experience
    positive emotional states and to engage in one’s
    environment, and to be sociable and self-confident.
    syntonic Erikson’s term for the positive element in
    each pair of opposites that characterize his eight stages
    of development.
    T
    Taoistic attitude (Maslow) Noninterfering, passive,
    receptive attitude that includes awe and wonder toward
    that which is observed.
    taxonomy A system of classification of data according
    to their natural relationships.
    teleology An explanation of behavior in terms of future
    goals or purposes.
    temperament (Buss) Differences in behavior that have
    a biological basis and are present at birth.
    theory A set of related assumptions that permit
    scientists to use logical deductive reasoning to formulate
    testable hypotheses.
    thinking (Jung) A rational function that tells us the
    meaning of an image that originates either from the
    self-concept (McCrae and Costa) The knowledge,
    views, and evaluations of the self.
    self-concept (Rogers) Aspects of one’s being and
    experiences that an individual is consciously aware of.
    self-efficacy (Bandura) People’s expectation that they
    are capable of performing those behaviors that will
    produce desired outcomes in any particular situation.
    self-hatred (Horney) The powerful tendency for
    neurotics to despise their real self.
    selfobjects (Kohut) Parents or other significant adults
    in a child’s life who eventually become incorporated into
    the child’s sense of self.
    self-realization (Jung) The highest possible level of
    psychic maturation; necessitates a balance between
    conscious and unconscious, ego and self, masculine and
    feminine, and introversion and extraversion. All four
    functions (thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuiting)
    would be fully developed by self-realized people.
    self-regulatory strategies (Mischel) Techniques used
    to control one’s own behavior through self-imposed
    goals and self-produced consequences.
    sensation (Jung) An irrational function that receives
    physical stimuli and transmits them to perceptual
    consciousness. People may rely on either extraverted
    sensing (outside perceptions) or on introverted sensing
    (internal perceptions).
    sense of identity (Fromm) The distinctively human
    need to develop a feeling of “I.”
    separation anxiety Reactions of infants upon losing
    sight of their primary caregiver; at first infants protest,
    then despair, and finally become emotionally detached.
    separation-individuation (Mahler) The third major
    stage of development, marked by the child’s becoming
    an individual, separate from its mother; spans the period
    from ages 4 or 5 months to about 30 to 36 months.
    sexual selection (Buss) Operates when members of the
    opposite sex find certain traits more appealing and
    attractive than others and thereby produce offspring with
    those traits.
    shadow Jungian archetype representing the inferior or
    dark side of personality.
    shaping Conditioning a response by first rewarding
    gross approximations of the behavior, then closer
    approximations, and finally the desired behavior itself.
    social cognitive theory Bandura’s assumption that
    personality is molded by an interaction of behavior,
    personal factors (including thoughts and assumptions we
    make about ourselves and others), and one’s environment.
    social interest (Adler) Translation of the German
    Gemeinschaftsgefühl, meaning a community feeling or a
    sense of feeling at one with all human beings.

    Glossary G-15
    restrictions or qualifications; one of three “necessary and
    sufficient” therapeutic conditions.
    unconscious (Freud) All those mental elements of
    which a person is unaware. Two levels of the unconscious
    are the unconscious proper and the preconscious.
    Unconscious ideas can become conscious only through
    great resistance and difficulty.
    unipolar traits Traits with only one pole: that is, those
    traits scaled from zero to some large amount, as opposed
    to bipolar traits that are scaled from a minus point,
    through zero, to a positive point.
    V
    validity The extent to which a test or other measuring
    instrument measures what it is supposed to measure;
    accuracy.
    variable-interval (Skinner) Intermittent reinforcement
    schedule in which the organism is reinforced after a lapse
    of random and varied periods of time (e.g., VI 10 means
    that the animal is reinforced for its first response following
    random-length intervals that average 10 minutes).
    variable-ratio (Skinner) Intermittent reinforcement
    schedule in which the organism is reinforced for every
    nth response on the average (e.g., VR 50 means that the
    animal is reinforced on the average of one time for every
    50 responses.
    vicarious experience Learning by observing the
    consequences of others’ behavior.
    vulnerable (Rogers) A condition that exists when
    people are unaware of the discrepancy between their
    organismic self and their significant experiences.
    Vulnerable people often behave in ways
    incomprehensible to themselves and to others.
    W
    will (May) A conscious commitment to action.
    wise old man Jungian archetype of wisdom and
    meaning.
    withdrawal (Adler) Safeguarding one’s exaggerated
    sense of superiority by establishing a distance between
    oneself and one’s problems.
    Y
    young adulthood (Erikson) The stage from about ages
    18 to 30 during which a person gains mature genitality
    and experiences the crisis of intimacy versus isolation.
    external world (extraverted) or from the internal world
    (introverted).
    third force Somewhat vague term referring to those
    approaches to psychology that have reacted against the
    older psychodynamic and behavioristic theories. The
    third force is usually thought to include humanistic,
    existential, and phenomenological theories.
    threat (Kelly) The anticipation of danger to the
    stability of one’s personal constructs.
    threat (Rogers) Feeling that results from the
    perception of an experience that is inconsistent with
    one’s organismic self.
    trait A relatively permanent disposition of an
    individual, which is inferred from behavior.
    traits, bipolar (See bipolar traits)
    traits, unipolar (See unipolar traits)
    transcendence (Fromm) The need for humans to rise
    above their passive animal existence through either
    creating or destroying life.
    transference Strong, undeserved feelings that the
    patient develops toward the analyst during the course of
    treatment. These feelings may be either sexual or hostile,
    but they stem from the patient’s earlier experiences with
    parents.
    transformation Psychotherapeutic approach used by
    Jung in which the therapist is transformed into a healthy
    individual who can aid the patient in establishing a
    philosophy of life.
    types (factor theorists) A cluster of primary traits.
    Eysenck recognized three general types—extraversion
    (E), neuroticism (N), and psychoticism (P).
    types (Jung) Classification of people based on the
    two-dimensional scheme of attitudes and functions. The
    two attitudes of extraversion and introversion and the
    four functions of thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuiting
    combine to produce eight possible types.
    tyranny of the should (Horney) A key element in the
    neurotic search for glory; includes an unconscious and
    unrelenting drive for perfection.
    U
    Umwelt An existentialist term meaning the world of
    things or objects. One of three simultaneous modes of
    being-in-the-world.
    unconditional positive regard (Rogers) The need
    to be accepted and prized by another without any

    R-1
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    Bernays, M., 64
    Berridge, K. C., 59
    Bettelheim, B., 66
    Beyers, W., 222–223
    Bhawik, D. P. S., 248
    Billington, R., 166–167
    Bilmes, M., 325
    Binswanger, L., 324, 328
    Bjork, D. W., 462
    Black, M. J., 146, 167
    Blass, R. B., 58
    Blehar, M., 160
    Bleuler, E., 107
    Block, J. H., 434
    Blos, P., 198
    Blum, D., 259–260
    Blum, J. S., 191
    Bluvshtein, M., 96
    Boehmler, W., 453
    Bogaert, A. F., 97
    Bogus, S., 283, 284
    Bonaparte, M., 49–50, 63, 64
    Borowik, B., 62
    Bos, E. H., 427
    Boss, M., 324, 328
    Bosse, R., 389
    Both, C., 3, 445, 451, 451t, 452
    Bottome, P., 71–73
    Bouchard, T. J., Jr., 426, 450
    Bowlby, J., 144, 146, 155, 159–160, 163,
    167, 168
    Boyle, G. J., 138
    Brannon, L., 49, 424
    Bratko, D., 450
    Breger, L., 26, 27, 49, 66
    Breuer, J., 23–25, 52, 134
    Brewster, M. E., 587–588, 589–590
    Brocke, B., 424–425
    Brody, G. H., 448
    Brome, V., 110
    Brown, B. B., 223
    Brown, K. W., 283, 284
    Brozek, J., 263
    Brumbaugh, C. C., 427
    Brummelman, E., 100
    Brunswick, R. M., 63
    Bryant, R. A., 62
    Buber, M., 328
    Buchsbaum, M., 60
    Note: Page numbers followed by f indicate
    figures; those followed by t indicate
    tables.
    Aaker, J., 285
    Abdollahi, A., 346
    Abraham, K., 145, 172
    Adams, G. R., 222
    Addams, J., 270f, 271
    Adler, A., 9t, 14, 17, 25, 26, 70–103, 121,
    123–124, 174, 210, 260, 276, 293, 326,
    342, 396, 530, 548, 572
    Adler, R. E., 74–75, 91
    Adorno, T. W., 250
    Aggen, S. H., 450
    Ainsworth, M., 144, 146, 148,
    160–161, 167
    Akiskal, H. S., 449
    Aleman, A., 427
    Alexander, I. E., 106
    Allen, K. B., 284
    Allik, J., 390, 405, 421
    Allport, A., 357, 362, 369–372
    Allport, F., 356
    Allport, G. W., 9t, 257, 261, 279, 349–350,
    354–381, 383–384, 389, 394–395, 501,
    511, 548–550
    Altemeyer, B., 250
    Amodio, D. M., 192
    Anderson, R. J., 520
    Andreas-Salomé, L., 63, 64
    Andreassen, T. T., 446
    Angel, E., 327
    Ansbacher, H. L., 100
    Appugliese, D., 561
    Arenberg, D., 397
    Arias, D. M., 589
    Aristotle, 12, 318
    Arndt, J., 317, 346–349
    Arnett, J. J., 223
    Arnold, M. L., 223
    Asherson, P., 410
    Averill, A. J., 348
    Aycock, K. J., 97
    Ayduk, O., 552, 555, 557, 558, 561–563
    Bachofen, J. J., 231, 234–235
    Badger, G. J., 486
    Baer, R. A., 284
    Baglioni, C., 62
    Bair, D., 108, 113
    Baldwin, A. F., 371
    Bandura, A., 10t, 395, 494–527, 529, 548,
    549, 556, 580
    Bannister, D., 586
    Barbazanges, A., 410, 448
    Barclay, K. J., 97
    Barenbaum, N. B., 357, 369–370
    Bargh, J. A., 58, 59
    Barnard, S., 451
    Barry, D. T., 283, 284
    Bastiaansen, A., 427
    Baum, L. F., 117
    Bay-Cheng, L. Y., 589
    Baylin, S. B., 446
    Beal, S. A., 318
    Beauducel, A., 424–425
    Becker, B., 166–167
    Name Index

    Gebauer, J. E., 248–249
    Geen, R. G., 426
    Geist, T., 438
    Gelfand, M. J., 248
    Gendlin, E. T., 294, 312
    Gendolla, G. H. E., 62
    Germer, C. K., 10
    Ghannam, J. H., 61
    Ghiselin, M. T., 435
    Gholson, B., 10
    Gibson, H. B., 411
    Gill, M., 410
    Gillespie, N. A., 426
    Giluk, T. L., 399
    Gini, G., 521–522
    Ginsburg, P., 97
    Gjerde, L. C., 450
    Glover, E., 143, 146
    Goble, F. G., 260
    Goethe, J. W. von, 106
    Gold, J. M., 223
    Goldberg, L. R., 389, 392, 405
    Goldenberg, J. L., 345–346, 348
    Goldstein, K., 260
    Goldwert, M., 109
    Good, G., 325, 326
    Goossens, L., 223
    Górecka-Bruzda, A., 451
    Gorky, M., 218
    Gorman, M. E., 10, 11
    Gosch, S., 62
    Gosling, S. D., 3, 427, 451, 451t, 452
    Gotlib, I. H., 561–563
    Gough, H., 434
    Gould, S. J., 453
    Govorun, O., 60
    Grant, A., 138
    Gray, J. A., 488
    Greenberg, J. L., 345–346, 349
    Greenburg, B. D., 449
    Greenwald, A. G., 374–375
    Greenwood, T. A., 449
    Greever, K. B., 101
    Greiling, H., 431, 442–443
    Grey, L., 73
    Grice, J. W., 590–591
    Gritsenko, I., 449
    Gross, E. F., 400
    Grossarth-Maticek, R., 413, 417, 423–424
    Grosskurth, P., 143–145
    Gudjonsson, G. H., 417, 424
    Guest, K., 135
    Gunlicks, M., 165
    Haidt, J., 285, 346
    Hall, C., 130
    Hall, E., 219
    Hall, G. S., 108
    Hall, M. H., 259, 279, 343
    Halpern, C., 444
    Hamberger, J., 374
    Hamer, D. H., 397, 449, 450
    Handlbauer, B., 26, 73
    Hansen, K., 62, 63
    Harlow, H., 259
    Harper, M., 586–587
    Harris, T. G., 325, 326
    Hart, C. C., 586
    Hart, J. J., 10
    Hartshorne, H., 551
    Hausdorff, D., 229
    Havercamp, S. M., 283
    Hayasaka, I., 450
    Hayman, R., 115
    Hazan, C., 163–165
    Costa, P. T., Jr., 7, 9t, 382–406, 409, 410, 417,
    421, 428, 441, 443, 450, 459, 548
    Costigan, K. A., 410, 448
    Coulter, T., 411–412
    Cox, C. R., 346–348
    Cozad, L., 325, 326
    Craik, K., 434
    Cramer, D., 315
    Cramer, P., 60
    Crandall, J. E., 101
    Crandall, R., 281
    Crews, F., 66
    Csikszentmihalyi, M., 284
    Cullum, A. J., 444–445
    Cummings, J. L., 60
    Curtain, L. R., 447
    Czajkowski, N., 450
    da Vinci, L., 218–219
    Damasio, A., 58
    Danielian, J., 190–191
    Darwin, C., 431, 432, 435, 436, 454
    Daukantaitė, D., 318–319
    Davidovitz, R., 165–166
    Davis McCauley, K., 166
    de Geus, E., 397
    De Groef, B., 451
    deMoor, M. H., 397
    Deutsch, H., 63
    Dewey, J., 292
    Diener, E., 285
    Dietrich, A., 113
    Digman, J. M., 390
    Dina, C., 449
    Dingemanse, N. J., 3, 445, 451, 451t, 452
    DiPietro, J. A., 410, 448
    Dollard, J., 173
    Donovan, J. E., 448
    Dornic, S., 426
    Doucet, C., 426
    Downey, G., 561
    Draper, P., 443
    Drent, P. J., 3, 445, 451–453
    Duckworth, A. L., 318
    Duffy, K., 451t
    Dunne, C., 108, 110, 134
    Dymond, R. F., 312, 314, 314f
    Ebbesen, E. B., 554, 555, 561
    Ebersole, P., 281
    Ebstein, R. P., 449, 450
    Eckstein, D., 97
    Efran, J. S., 10
    Einstein, A., 57, 271
    Ekehammer, B., 426
    Elledge, J. Z., 376
    Ellenberger, H. F., 22, 25, 26, 73, 106,
    109, 327
    Ellenbogen, M., 427
    Elliot, L. B., 223
    Ellis, A., 75
    Ellis, B. J., 453
    Elms, A. C., 109, 357, 459, 461, 462
    Elson, M., 158
    Engels, R. C. M. E., 398, 400–401
    Ensminger, J., 451
    Epstein, S., 551
    Epting, F. R., 587–588
    Erbes, C. R., 586
    Erikson, E. H., 9t, 14, 187, 196–226, 325, 350,
    459, 572, 591
    Erikson, J. M., 216
    Erikson, J. S., 198–199
    Eskreis-Winkler, K., 318
    Estey, A. J., 190, 191
    Evans, D. M., 426
    Evans, D. R., 348
    Evans, L. M., 449
    Evans, R. I., 202, 206, 229, 496
    Eysenck, H. J., 9t, 355, 361, 369, 383, 389,
    390, 397, 408–429, 441, 450, 459, 489,
    501, 503, 548, 550
    Eysenck, M. W., 389, 412, 422
    Eysenck, S. B. G., 412, 417, 419–421,
    423, 424
    Fagin Jones, S., 559, 560
    Fairbairn, W. R. D., 166
    Federn, E., 66
    Feige, B., 62
    Feist, G. J., 10, 11, 432–433
    Feist, J., 424
    Feldman, S., 555
    Feltham, C., 413
    Ferenczi, S., 26, 27, 108, 145
    Ferris, P., 23, 26, 27, 107
    Ferster, C. B., 473
    Fidler, A. E., 453
    Fiebert, M. S., 73
    Filyer, R., 223
    Findler, L., 346
    Fitzpatrick, C. M., 489
    Fleeson, W., 398, 402–404
    Flegal, K. M., 447
    Flett, G. L., 488
    Fliess, W., 24–25, 53, 65, 66
    Florian, V., 346–347
    Fotopoulou, A., 58
    Fozard, J. L., 388, 389
    Francis, L. J., 136, 137
    Frankl, V., 324, 328
    Fransella, F., 570, 586
    Freedland, K. E., 520
    Freitag, C. M., 449
    Frenkel-Brunswick, E., 250
    Freud, A., 23f, 27, 39, 63, 146, 162, 198
    Freud, S., 3, 8, 9, 9t, 13–14, 17, 20–69, 71–75,
    80, 90–91, 94, 100, 105, 107–111, 113,
    115, 123–124, 127, 130, 131, 145–148,
    152–154, 156, 168, 171–174, 186–187,
    197–198, 201, 205, 206, 208, 209,
    218–219, 221, 224–225, 229, 230, 234,
    246, 258, 291, 293, 327, 342, 355,
    356–357, 359, 365, 417, 435–436, 480,
    530, 549, 572
    Frick, W. B., 265
    Friedland, B. U., 101
    Friedman, A., 520–521
    Friedman, H. S., 398
    Friedman, L. J., 198–199
    Friedman, M., 164–167
    Frois, J. P., 413
    Fromm, E., 9t, 227–254, 260, 326, 334,
    481–482
    Fromm-Reichmann, F., 173, 230, 234–235
    Frost, R., 461
    Fuegen, K., 60
    Fuller, J. L., 410
    Gable, S. L., 400
    Gage, P., 60
    Gailliot, M. T., 348
    Gale, A., 425, 451t
    Gandhi, M. K., 218, 219–220, 225, 556
    Gardner, H., 100
    Gardner, W., 135
    Gardner, W. L., 166
    Gay, P., 3, 25, 26, 64, 71
    Gaye, M., 346
    Geary, D. C., 405
    N-2Name Index

    N-3 Name Index
    Lewis-Harter, S., 586
    Lewontin, R. C., 453
    Li, L., 449
    Libet, B., 61
    Limber, S. P., 523
    Lincoln, A., 271, 279, 556
    Lindzey, G., 369
    Liu, L., 405
    Lloyd, J. B., 138
    Loehlin, J. C., 397, 426, 450
    Lorenz, K., 159
    Lowry, R. J., 270, 287
    Lustman, P. J., 520
    Luther, M., 218, 219, 225
    Luyckx, K., 223
    Lykins, E. L. B., 348
    Lykken, D. T., 450
    Lyubomirsky, S., 285
    Maccari, S., 410, 448
    Maccoby, M., 245
    MacDonald, K., 436, 439f, 440, 444
    Maddi, S. R., 388
    Maejima, M., 450
    Mahler, M. S., 143–144, 146, 155, 156–158,
    162, 167
    Maio, G. R., 248–249
    Malinowski, J. E., 62
    Maner, J. K., 348
    Maniacci, M., 75
    Marci, C., 427
    Marshall-Pescini, S., 451
    Marston, L. C., 451
    Martin, A., 587–588, 589–590
    Martin, A. M., III, 164–167
    Martin, L. R., 398
    Martin, N. G., 426
    Martinko, M., 135
    Marusic, A., 424
    Marx, K., 228, 230, 231, 235
    Maslow, A. H., 9t, 14, 71, 75, 256–289, 296,
    300, 309, 315, 335, 355, 359, 363, 417,
    492, 503, 548, 570
    Massaglia, V., 96
    Masters, K. S., 377
    Mateman, A. C., 450
    Matthew, R., 520–521
    Matthews, M. D., 318
    May, M. A., 551
    May, R., 9t, 14, 75, 257, 323–352
    Mayseless, O., 166
    Mazur, A., 444
    McAdams, D., 396
    McCarthy, J., 199
    McCauley, C. R., 346
    McClelland, D., 549
    McCrae, R. R., 7, 9t, 382–406, 409, 410, 417,
    421, 426, 428, 441, 443, 450, 459, 548
    McDaniel, B. L., 590–591
    McDermott, M., 585f
    McDonald, J., 97
    McElroy, S. L., 449
    McGlashan, A., 107
    McGuire, W., 26, 107, 109
    McLynn, F., 107, 108
    McNiel, J. M., 398, 402–404
    Mead, M., 173
    Meaney, M. J., 446
    Medland, S. E., 426
    Meerkerk, G.-J., 398, 400–401
    Mehrabian, A., 191
    Mendoza-Denton, R., 548, 556, 560–561
    Menninger, K. A., 530
    Merilä, J., 453
    Meyer, J., 588
    Heflick, N. A., 348
    Heidegger, M., 324, 328, 348
    Heils, A., 449
    Hemingway, E., 291
    Henschel, A., 263
    Herczeg, G., 453
    Heresco-Levy, U., 449
    Hewitt, P. L., 488
    Hewstone, M., 374
    Higgins, E. T., 315–316
    Higgins, S. T., 485, 486
    Hill, R. D., 377
    Hillman, J., 115
    Hinojosa, A. S., 166
    Hirschberger, G., 346–347
    Hirscher, V., 62
    Hitler, A., 218, 244, 246–247, 411
    Hobson, A. A., 58
    Hochreich, D. J., 531, 532, 537, 541, 545–546
    Hodgson, D. M., 410, 448
    Hofer, J., 221–222
    Hoffman, E., 71–74, 94–95, 258–260, 265,
    270, 279, 503
    Höfling, V., 63
    Hofstede, G., 248
    Holder, A., 66
    Holland, J., 98, 99t
    Horgan, J., 453
    Horney, K. D., 9t, 75, 145, 170–195, 228,
    230–231, 234–235, 242, 260
    Horney, O., 172–173
    Hornstein, G. A., 173, 230, 231
    Houser-Marko, L., 317
    Houts, A. C., 10
    Hughes, J. M., 146
    Hughes, K. A., 489
    Hunsberger, B., 221
    Huta, V., 318
    Hyde, J. S., 187–189
    Hymel, S., 521–522
    Inoue-Murayama, M., 450, 453
    Irigaray, L., 49
    Isbister, J. N., 26
    Islam, G., 398, 400
    Ito, H., 450, 453
    Ito, S., 450, 453
    Izsak, R., 165–166
    Jackson, B. J., 590–591
    Jacobs, G. H., 438
    Jacobsen, P. B., 317
    James, W. H., 271, 435, 541
    Janet, P., 107
    Jarlstrom, M., 136
    Jaspers, K., 328
    Jebreal, R., 251
    Jefferson, T., 271
    Jensen, A., 413
    Jezierski, T., 451
    John, O. P., 3, 389, 390, 417, 427, 450, 451, 451t
    Johnson, J. A., 10
    Johnson, T. R. B., 410, 448
    Johnson, W., 426, 450
    Jones, A., 281
    Jones, E., 22, 25, 26, 49–50, 64, 65, 75, 91,
    145, 147
    Jones, P. A., 446
    Jonides, J., 561–563
    Juhl, J., 348, 349
    Jung, C. G., 9t, 14, 17, 25–27, 29, 75,
    104–141, 174, 342, 417
    Jung, E., 107, 108
    Junkert, T., 522
    Juvonen, J., 400
    Kahane, M., 26
    Kaldor, P., 136
    Kammrath, L. K., 560–561
    Kandel, E. R., 58
    Kashubeck-West, S., 588
    Kasler, J., 98
    Keck, P. E., 449
    Kelly, D. R., 318
    Kelly, G. A., 10t, 530, 549, 567–594
    Kelsoe, J. R., 449
    Keltner, D., 285, 401
    Kemeny, M. E., 348
    Kempenaers, B., 453
    Kennedy, D. A., 138
    Kennedy, R. B., 138
    Keroack, L. J., 348
    Ketelaar, T., 453
    Keys, A., 263
    Kiehl, K. A., 489
    Kierkegaard, S., 324, 327–329, 333,
    344–345
    Kiesler, D., 312
    King, K. D., 191
    King, L. A., 285
    King, P., 146
    Kirby, L., 135
    Kircher, J. C., 377
    Kissen, D. M., 423
    Kivnick, H. Q., 216
    Klein, A., 144–145
    Klein, M., 9t, 63, 142–169, 172, 443
    Kluck, B., 345–346
    Knapp, G. P., 230
    Knudsen, G. P., 450
    Koch, S., 292, 295, 310
    Kohler, W., 357
    Kohut, H., 144, 146, 155, 158–159,
    162, 168
    Koshimura, A., 450, 453
    Kothuri, R., 427
    Kozak, M., 62
    Krause, L., 229
    Krausz, E. O., 49
    Kroeger, O., 137
    Kröner-Borowik, T., 62, 63
    Kross, E., 561–563
    Krueger, R. F., 397, 426, 450
    Kruzic, M., 96
    Kuhn, S., 453
    Kurzweil, E., 26
    Kwan, V. S. Y., 427, 451
    LaCasse, L., 60
    Lagopoulos, J., 410
    Laine, V. N., 453
    Landfield, A. W., 588
    Landis, B., 229, 231
    Landis, R., 398, 400
    Langer, E. J., 283
    Langley, K., 410
    Larsen, J. T., 427
    Larsen, R., 434
    Lawford, H., 221
    Lazarus, R. S., 434, 440
    Le Moal, M., 410, 448
    Leaper, C., 589
    LeDoux, J., 58
    LeeTiernan, S., 552, 553
    Lensegrav-Benson, T. L., 377
    Leong, F. T. L., 10
    Lesch, K.-P., 449
    Leue, A., 424–425
    Levenson, M. R., 489
    Levenson, R., 453
    Levinson, D. J., 250

    Riese, H., 427
    Riklin, F., 131
    Roazen, P., 26, 27, 251
    Robbins, M., 136, 137
    Roberts, B. W., 4, 426, 450
    Robins, R. W., 398–399
    Robinson, M. D., 192, 403, 404
    Rodriguez, M. L., 448, 561
    Rogers, C. R., 9t, 14, 75, 257, 283, 284, 290–322,
    326, 328, 330, 342–344, 347, 355, 395,
    492, 571
    Rogers, J. D., 223
    Roosevelt, E., 279
    Rösler, M., 449
    Rosolio, N., 449
    Rosowsky, E., 191
    Ross, D., 518
    Ross, J. M., 375–376
    Ross, S. A., 518
    Rotter, J. B., 10t, 75, 260, 529–548, 549, 559,
    560, 563–565, 570
    Routledge, C., 348, 349
    Rowan, D. G., 281
    Roysam, E., 450
    Rozin, P., 346
    Rudd, M., 285
    Rudikoff, E. C., 314
    Runco, M. A., 281
    Russell, D. E., 294
    Rust, J. O., 281
    Rutjens, B. T., 348, 349
    Rutter, M., 410, 446, 449
    Ryan, R. M., 283, 284
    Sabol, S. Z., 449
    Sacco, W. P., 520–521
    Sachs, H., 230
    Sade, Marquis de, 362
    Sadovnick, A. D., 449
    Sanches, C., 164–165
    Sanford, R. N., 250
    Sartre, J-P., 324, 328, 329
    Saunders, S., 248
    Sayer, A., 165
    Sayers, J., 144
    Schacter, D. L., 58, 59
    Schimel, J., 348–349
    Schmeichel, B. J., 348
    Schmideberg, M., 143, 145–146
    Schmideberg, W., 143, 146
    Schmidt, R. E., 62
    Schmitt, D. P., 405
    Schneider, M. L., 410, 448
    Schoeman, W. J., 586–587
    Scholte, R. H. J., 398, 400–401
    Schork, N. J., 449
    Schredl, M., 62
    Schur, M., 25
    Schwartz, J. E., 398
    Schwartz, S. J., 319
    Schwarz, E. M., 446
    Schweitzer, A., 271
    Sedikedes, C., 100
    Seedall, R. B., 376
    Seeyave, D. M., 561
    Segal, D. L., 190–191
    Segal, H., 144
    Segal, N. L., 450
    Segerstrom, S. C., 348
    Seiffge-Krenke, I., 222–223
    Seligman, M., 284
    Servaas, M., 427
    Shadish, W. R., 10
    Shahabi, L., 377
    Shakespeare, W., 465
    Michelangelo, 42, 465
    Mickelsen, O., 263
    Midlarsky, E., 559, 560
    Mikulincer, M., 165–166, 346–347
    Miller, A. J., 376
    Miller, G. F., 432
    Milton, J., 294
    Mincic, A. M., 427
    Mischel, H. N., 549
    Mischel, W., 10t, 387–388, 448, 529–530,
    548–565, 579
    Mitchell, S. A., 146, 167
    Moffitt, T. E., 410
    Möhler, E., 448
    Moldoveanu, M., 283
    Moor, C., 190
    Moore, B., 555
    Moore, R. A., 489
    Moradi, B., 587–588, 589–590
    Morford, J., 135
    Morris, P. H., 451t, 489
    Mosak, H., 75
    Mossman, A., 285, 401
    Mraz, W., 281
    Mroczek, D., 4
    Mueller, J. C., 453
    Müller, C. R., 449
    Müller, M., 448
    Muller, R. T., 163
    Munro, D., 248
    Murayama, Y., 450
    Murphy, D. L., 449
    Murray, H. A., 163, 313, 549
    Myers, I. B., 135, 389
    Nara, H., 450, 453
    Nathans, J., 438
    Neighbors, B. D., 448
    Neimeyer, G. J., 586
    Neimeyer, R. A., 10, 586
    Neitz, J., 438
    Nemanov, L., 449
    Nettle, D., 432, 436, 444,
    445, 445t
    Neuzil, P. J., 190, 191
    Nevo, O., 98
    Newton, P. M., 23, 26
    Nias, D. K. B., 413
    Nichols, C. P., 436
    Niens, U., 374
    Nietzsche, F., 324, 328
    Nievergelt, C. M., 449
    Nissen, C., 62
    Noftle, E. E., 398–399
    Noland, R. W., 26
    Noll, R., 107
    Norman, W. T., 417
    Normando, S., 451
    Norris, C. J., 427
    Norris, J. E., 223
    Odbert, H. S., 361, 389
    Ode, S., 192
    Ogden, C. L., 447
    Ogden, T. H., 149
    O’Hara, M., 294
    Olczak, P. V., 281
    Oliner, P. M., 559
    Oliner, S. P., 559
    Olweus, D., 523
    O’Neill, S. C., 485
    Ormel, J., 427
    Osher, Y., 449
    O’Steen, S., 444–445
    Oswald, R. M., 137
    Overbeek, G., 398, 400–401
    Overton, W. F., 10
    Paige, J., 371, 372t
    Pancer, S. M., 221
    Panksepp, J., 58, 59
    Paris, B. J., 171–172, 173, 187
    Passalacqua, C., 451
    Pasteur, L., 491, 504
    Patterson, C., 449
    Paulhus, D. L., 97
    Pavlov, I., 461
    Payne, B. K., 60
    Peake, P. K., 561
    Pedersen, F. S., 446
    Perez, S., 520–521
    Pervin, L. A., 416f
    Peters, R. A., 451
    Peterson, C., 318
    Peterson, J. A., 448
    Petot, J-M., 144
    Petri, S., 449
    Pettigrew, T. F., 373–375
    Pfaff, D. D., 427
    Phares, E. J., 531, 538, 539, 541, 548
    Phillips, A. G., 315–316
    Phillips, D., 165
    Piazza, P. V., 410, 448
    Pickering, A. D., 488
    Pietrini, P., 376
    Pietromonaco, P. R., 165
    Pincus, J. H., 60, 454
    Pine, F., 156
    Pittenger, D. J., 138
    Plant, E. A., 348
    Plato, 465
    Plomin, R., 397, 426, 449, 450
    Poortinga, Y., 426
    Popper, K., 57
    Popper, M., 165–166
    Poropat, A. E., 399
    Postlethwaite, B. E., 399
    Powell, L. H., 377
    Powell, R., 136
    Powers, S. I., 165
    Pozzoli, T., 521–522
    Pratt, M. W., 221, 223
    Preiswerk, H., 107
    Pyszczynski, T., 345–346
    Qualls, D. L., 281
    Quinn, S., 145, 172, 173, 231
    Rabinowitz, F. E., 325, 326
    Raine, A., 60
    Ramachandran, V., 58
    Randolph-Seng, B., 166
    Rank, O., 293, 344–345
    Ransom, S., 317
    Rattner, J., 72
    Rayment, D. J., 451
    Rayner, R., 464, 467–468
    Realo, A., 397
    Reck, C., 448
    Reif, A., 449
    Reiss, S., 283
    Reitler, R., 26
    Remick, R. A., 449
    Retz, W., 449
    Retz-Junginger, P., 449
    Rhoades, C. S., 191
    Rholes, W. S., 164–167
    Rich, S., 450
    Rickert, E. J., 250
    Riemann, D., 62
    N-4Name Index

    Vohs, K. D., 285
    Von Ammon, J., 96
    Vukasović, T., 450
    Wagner, U., 373–375
    Walczak, M., 451
    Walker, B. M., 568
    Wall, S., 160
    Wallace, A., 432
    Walters, R. H., 497
    Waterman, A. S., 223, 318, 319
    Waters, E., 160
    Watson, D., 488
    Watson, J. B., 258, 259, 459–461, 464,
    467–468
    Watson, N., 316
    Watters, E., 446
    Watts, R. E., 97
    Webster, R., 66
    Wegner, D. M., 62
    Weinstein, T. A., 3, 451, 452
    Weiss, A. S., 281
    Wells, K. J., 520–521
    Wenzlaff, R. M., 62
    Werner, H., 357
    Wertheimer, M., 260, 270, 271, 279, 357
    Whitbourne, S. K., 223
    White, T. L., 489
    Whitson, E. R., 281
    Wiener, D. N., 460, 462
    Wilcox, K. J., 450
    Wilkowski, B. M., 192
    Williams, A., 137
    Williams, R., 137
    Williams, T., 348–349
    Willing, D. C., 135
    Wilson, E. O., 435
    Wilson, N. L., 561–563
    Wilson, W., 219
    Winnicott, D. W., 166
    Witvliet, C. V., 376
    Wohl, M., 348–349
    Wolff, A., 108–109, 122
    Wolpe, J., 519
    Worthington, E. L., 376
    Wortis, J., 25
    Wright, F. L., 291
    Wright, J. C., 552
    Wright, M. J., 426
    Yalom, I. D., 344, 348
    Yamazaki, T. G., 190
    York, A., 515
    Yovell, Y., 58
    Ystrom, E., 450
    Zachar, P., 10
    Zahavi, A., 432
    Zayas, V., 561–563
    Zeiss, A. R., 555
    Zhao, Y., 405
    Zheng, L., 405
    Zheng, Y., 405
    Zhu, G., 426
    Zilberman, M. L., 164–165
    Zimmer, C., 452
    Ziolkowski, K., 267
    Zucker, A. N., 589
    Zuroff, D. C., 541
    Zuschlag, M. Z., 223
    Zweigenhaft, R. L., 96
    Zwier, M., 450
    Zyphur, M. J., 398, 400
    Shaver, P. R., 163–164, 165–166
    Sheldon, K. M., 317, 436
    Sheldon, M. S., 436
    Shevrin, H., 61
    Shikano, T., 453
    Shimada, M. K., 450, 453
    Shiner, R. L., 426, 450
    Shiota, M. N., 285, 401
    Shoda, Y., 448, 530, 548–553, 555, 556, 558,
    561–563, 565
    Shostrom, E. L., 280–281
    Shulman, E. P., 318
    Siefert, C., 427
    Sigmon, S. C., 486
    Silverstein, B., 26
    Silvester, J., 585f
    Silvia, P. J., 315–316
    Simonton, D. K., 10
    Simpson, J. A., 164–167
    Singelis, T. M., 222, 248
    Singer, J., 107
    Skinner, B. F., 10t, 14, 15, 320, 355, 458–493,
    495, 498, 500, 501, 524, 529, 533, 570
    Skorska, M., 97
    Smith, G. T., 284
    Smith, M. L., 281
    Smith, R. D., 550
    Snow, M. E., 448
    Snygg, D., 570–571
    Soballe, K., 446
    Sobel, D., 231
    Soenens, B., 223
    Solms, M., 58–62
    Solomon, S., 345–346
    Sophia, E. C., 164–165
    Sophocles, 45–46, 341–342
    Spearman, C., 412
    Spencer, H., 435, 435n*
    Sperber, M. A., 97
    Spiegelhalder, K., 62
    Spielrein, S., 108
    Spijkerman, R., 400
    Spinoza, B. de, 271
    Srivastava, S., 389, 390, 417
    Stamos, D. N., 453
    Stangier, U., 63
    Starc, R., 424
    Staub, E., 553–554, 554f
    Steil, R., 62, 63
    Steinberg, L., 443
    Steiner, R., 146, 147
    Stekel, W., 26
    Stelmack, R. M., 424–426
    Stephenson, W., 313, 369
    Stern, W., 357
    Stevens, C. D., 568
    Stewart, S. E., 190
    Stillman, T. F., 348
    Stoeber, J., 488
    Strachey, J., 57, 66
    Strozier, C. B., 158
    Sulliman, J. R., 101
    Sullivan, H. S., 75, 231, 326, 338
    Sulloway, F. J., 24, 26, 66, 96–97, 443
    Sumerlin, J. R., 281, 283
    Suwala, M., 451
    Suzuki, D. T., 231
    Szymanski, D. M., 588
    Tajfel, H., 374
    Takenaka, O., 450
    Tambs, K., 450
    Tang, Y., 405
    Tarter, R. E., 448
    Tauber, E. S., 229, 231
    Taubman-Ben-Ari, O., 346
    Tavares, H., 164–165
    Taylor, H. L., 263
    Taylor, R., 62
    Tedeschi, R. G., 317
    Tellegen, A., 450, 488
    Terracciano, A., 397
    Teslovich, T., 561–563
    Thapar, A., 410
    Thisse, C., 453
    Thomaes, S., 100
    Thompson, C., 231
    Thompson, G. G., 569
    Thompson, W. R., 410
    Thoresen, C. E., 377
    Thornback, K., 163
    Thornberg, R., 522
    Thorndike, E. L., 260, 459,
    463–464
    Tidey, J. W., 485, 486
    Tietz, A., 448
    Tillich, P., 326, 328
    Tinbergen, J. M., 445
    Titchener, E. B., 259
    Tooby, J., 432, 434–436, 445, 454
    Toshiko, T., 397
    Tran, S., 164–167
    Trapnell, P. D., 97
    Triandis, H. C., 248
    Tropp, L. R., 373–375
    Truax, C., 312
    Trull, T. J., 405
    Trump, D., 100, 251
    Tseng, M. S., 101
    Tupes, E. C., 383, 417
    Turnbull, O., 58, 59, 60
    Twenge, J. M., 100
    Udry, J. R., 444
    Ueda, Y., 450, 453
    Ulrich-Vinther, M., 446
    Umeh, B. J., 448
    Updegraff, J. A., 424
    Vaihinger, H., 79
    Vail, K. E., 348, 349
    Vainio, M. M., 318–319
    Valkealahti, K., 136
    Valsecchi, P., 451
    Van de Vijver, F. J. R., 426
    van den Berg, J. J., 587–588
    Van den Eijnden, R. J. J. M., 398,
    400–401
    Van der Aa, N., 398, 400–401
    van Dijken, S., 159
    van Hemert, D. A., 426
    Van Noordwijk, A. J., 3, 451,
    451t, 452
    Van Oers, K., 3, 450–453
    Van Wiesner, V., 97
    Vaughan, C. A., 520–521
    Vaughan, M. E., 483
    Verhoeven, K. J., 450
    Verhulst, E. C., 450
    Vermulst, A. A., 400
    Vernon, P. E., 369
    Vess, M., 348, 349
    Vetter, H., 417, 423–424
    Vilkki, J., 453
    Vitz, P. C., 26
    Voci, A., 374
    N-5 Name Index

    S-1
    Art of Loving, The (Fromm), 231, 233
    artificial selection (Buss), 431
    Association for the Advancement of
    Psychoanalysis (AAP), 173, 230–231
    attachment theory
    of Bowlby, 159–160, 163–166
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 443
    in existential psychology (May), 346–348
    attention, 499
    attitude (Jung), 122–124, 126t
    Authoritarian Personality, The (Adorno), 250
    authoritarianism (Fromm), 237, 246–247,
    249–251
    autonomy
    in autonomy versus shame and doubt,
    204f, 207
    functional (Allport), 365–368, 475
    of self-actualizing people, 274, 278
    awareness, 298–300
    B-love (Maslow), 278
    B-values (Maslow), 271, 272–273
    baby-tender (Skinner), 462
    Bandura, Albert, 494–527. See also social
    cognitive theory (Bandura)
    biography, 495, 496–497
    critique, 523–524
    publications, 497, 521
    basic anxiety. See also anxiety
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 263
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 228,
    237, 252
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    171, 175–177, 179–180, 179f
    basic conflict (Horney), 179–180, 179f, 182t
    basic hostility (Horney), 171, 175–177, 179f
    basic strength (Erikson), 203, 206, 207, 209,
    210, 212, 213–214, 216–217
    basic tendencies (McCrae & Costa), 393–394,
    396–397
    basic trust versus basic mistrust, 203, 204f,
    205–206
    Behavior of Organisms, The (Skinner), 461
    behavior-outcome expectancy, 557
    behavior potential (BP, Rotter), 532–533
    behavior prediction, 553
    behavioral analysis (Skinner), 458–493
    concept of humanity, 490–492
    conditioning, 466–475, 485–489
    critique of Skinner, 489–490
    human organism, 475–483
    overview, 458–460
    precursors, 463–464
    psychotherapy, 484–485
    related research, 485–489
    scientific behaviorism, 458–460,
    464–466
    unhealthy personality, 483–484
    behavioral approach system (BAS), 488–489
    behavioral inhibition system (BIS), 488–489
    Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral
    Activation System Scales
    (BIS/BAS), 489
    behavioral production, 499–500
    behavioral signature of personality
    (Mischel), 553
    behaviorism, 458–460, 464–466
    being-in-the-world (Dasein), 329–330
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 26, 37–38
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura),
    517–518, 521–523
    agreeableness
    in agreeableness/hostility (Buss), 441
    costs and benefits, 445t
    in Five-Factor Theory, 389, 391t, 392
    alchemy, 130
    Allport, Gordon W., 354–381. See also
    psychology of the individual (Allport)
    biography, 355, 356–358
    critique, 378–379
    Sigmund Freud and, 355, 356–357,
    359, 365
    Jenny Gove Masterson (case), 357,
    370–372, 372t
    publications, 357, 369, 370–372
    Marion Taylor (case), 357, 369–370
    alternative niche specialization (Buss), 443
    American Academy of Psychotherapists, 294
    American Association for Applied
    Psychology, 294
    American Psychological Association (APA),
    261, 294, 295, 327, 388, 463, 497
    anal character (Freud), 44
    anal phase (Freud), 44–45
    anal triad (Freud), 44
    anal-urethral-muscular mode (Erikson),
    206–207
    analytical psychology (Jung), 104–141
    archetypes, 105, 112–120, 132, 140–141
    concept of humanity, 121, 140–141
    critique of Jung, 138–140
    dynamics of personality, 121–122
    levels of the psyche, 110–120, 132
    methods of investigation, 130–135
    overview, 105–106
    psychological types, 122–126, 126t
    psychotherapy, 134–135
    related research, 135–138
    stages of personality development,
    127–130, 127f
    anarchic phase of childhood, 127
    Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, The
    (Fromm), 231, 234
    anima archetype (Jung), 105, 115–116
    animal research
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 466–475
    in evolutionary personality theory, 450–453
    animus archetype (Jung), 116
    Anna O (case of Breuer), 24, 134
    annoyers, 464
    anthropological perspective
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 260
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson),
    199, 201, 218
    anxiety. See also basic anxiety
    in existential psychology (May), 327,
    332–334
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 301
    in personal construct theory (Kelly),
    582–583
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 38–39, 55
    anxious-avoidant attachment, 161, 164,
    165–166
    anxious-resistant attachment, 161, 164
    archetypes (Jung), 105, 112–120, 132,
    140–141
    Note: Page numbers followed by f indicate
    figures. Those followed by t indicate
    tables.
    abnormal development/maladjustment
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 483–484
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 415,
    416f, 417, 419–422, 423
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    544–545
    in existential psychology (May), 342
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm),
    241–243, 246–247
    in individual psychology (Adler), 85–90
    in person-centered theory (Rogers),
    300–303
    in personal construct theory (Kelly),
    581–583
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura),
    516–518
    acceptance of self and others, 273
    accusation (Adler), 88
    Achilles myth, 117–118
    activation-synthesis theory, 61–62
    active imagination (Jung), 133–134
    actualizing tendency (Rogers), 296–297
    adaptations (Buss), 432, 436, 437–439,
    446–447
    Adler, Alfred, 70–103. See also individual
    psychology (Adler)
    biography, 71, 72–75, 91
    critique, 101–102
    Sigmund Freud and, 71–75, 80, 87–88,
    90–91, 90t, 94–95, 123–124
    publications, 73–74
    adolescence
    in psychosexual development stages
    (Freud), 43, 50–51
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 204f, 210–212, 217t, 221–223
    temperament in, 448–449
    youth stage (Jung), 127f, 128
    adoption studies, 397, 410, 450
    Adult Attachment Questionnaire, 165
    adulthood
    attachment theory in, 163–166
    mature personality (Allport), 359–361,
    375–378
    maturity stage (Freud), 43, 51
    middle life stage (Jung), 127f, 128
    object relations theory in, 162–163
    old age stage (Jung), 127f, 129
    in psychosexual development stages
    (Freud), 43, 51
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 204f, 214–215, 217t, 222–223
    aesthetic needs (Maslow), 266
    affection/affection needs, 176, 178, 538,
    544–545
    affective responses, in cognitive-affective
    personality theory (Mischel), 558–559
    agape, 338
    agentic perspective, 495–496
    aggression
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 234
    in individual psychology (Adler), 76, 88
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    179f, 180–181, 182t
    Subject Index

    Subject IndexS-2
    in object relations theory (Klein), 153–154,
    162–163
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 175
    in psychosexual development stages
    (Freud), 43–49
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 203f, 204f, 206–210, 217t
    temperament in, 448–449
    Childhood and Society (Erikson), 199, 200
    choice corollary (Kelly), 577
    Cinderella, 117
    Clark University, 26, 108, 388
    classical conditioning, 467–468
    client-centered therapy (Rogers), 291–292,
    303–309, 309t. See also person-centered
    theory (Rogers)
    Client-Centered Therapy (Rogers), 295
    Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child, The
    (Rogers), 293
    cognitive-affective personality systems (CAPs,
    Mischel & Shoda), 550–559
    cognitive-affective personality theory
    (Mischel), 548–565
    cognitive-affective personality system
    (CAPS), 550–559
    concept of humanity, 564–565
    consistency paradox, 550–551, 552–553
    critique, 563–564
    introduction, 548
    overview, 529–530
    person-situation interaction, 551–552,
    560–561
    related research, 559–563
    cognitive-affective units, 555–559
    cognitive mediation, 519–520
    cognitive modeling, 519
    cognitive needs (Maslow), 266–267
    cognitive psychology, 58, 59
    cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    529–548
    concept of humanity, 564–565
    critique, 563–564
    empirical law of effect, 532
    introduction, 531–532
    maladaptive behavior, 544–545
    overview, 529–530
    predicting general behaviors, 536–544
    predicting specific behaviors, 532–535
    psychotherapy, 545–548
    related research, 559–563
    collective efficacy (Bandura), 496, 509–510
    collective unconscious (Jung), 29, 105, 108,
    110, 111–113, 115, 119f
    Columbia University, 74, 260, 292–293, 326,
    549, 550
    common traits (Allport), 361–363. See also
    traits
    commonality corollary (Kelly), 579–580
    competence, 204f, 210
    competencies (Mischel), 555–556
    competition, in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 174–175
    complex (Jung), 111
    complex behavior, 479–481
    Comprehensive Marital Satisfaction Scale
    (CMSS), 191
    compulsive drives (Horney), 177–182
    conative needs, 262–266
    condensation, 54
    conditioned reinforcers (Skinner), 472–473
    conditioning
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 466–475,
    485–489
    impact on personality, 485–486
    capitalism, 229, 235, 248–249, 252–253
    cardinal disposition (Allport), 362
    care
    in existential psychology (May), 336–338
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 278
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 204f, 215
    career choice, 98, 99t, 135–138
    cases
    Anna O (Breuer), 24, 134
    Little Albert (Watson & Raynor), 467–468
    Little Hans (S. Freud), 145
    Jenny Gove Masterson (Allport), 357,
    370–372, 372t
    Philip (May), 324, 332, 334, 340, 342,
    343–344
    Marion Taylor (Allport), 357, 369–370
    castration anxiety. See castration complex
    (Freud)
    castration anxiety (Freud), 46–47
    castration complex (Erikson), 208
    castration complex (Freud), 46–47, 155
    catharsis, 23
    causality, 15, 79. See also causality versus
    teleology
    causality versus teleology
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 121
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 492
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 429
    causality, defined, 15
    in cognitive social learning theory,
    564–565
    in concept of humanity, 15
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 454
    in existential psychology (May), 351
    in Five-Factor Theory, 405
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 288
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 253
    in individual psychology (Adler), 79, 103
    in object relations theory, 168
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 321
    in personal construct theory (Kelly),
    592–593
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 225
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 194
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 68
    in psychology of the individual
    (Allport), 380
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura), 526
    teleology, defined, 15
    censorship, 28–30, 31f, 32f
    Center for Studies of the Person, 294
    central dispositions (Allport), 362
    chance encounters (Bandura), 495, 503–504
    character (Fromm), 238–241
    character orientation (Fromm), 238–241,
    244–245, 247–248
    characteristic adaptations (McCrae & Costa),
    394–395, 398
    characteristics
    defined, 4
    in psychology of the individual (Allport),
    358–361
    Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, 158
    Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute, 173, 230
    Chicago Studies, 312–315
    childhood
    aggression experiments of Bandura, 518
    in analytical psychology (Jung),
    127–128, 127f
    early recollections (ERs), 92–94, 98–99, 99t
    in Horney’s theory. See psychoanalytic
    social theory (Horney)
    latency stage (Freud), 43, 50
    beliefs, in cognitive-affective personality
    theory (Mischel), 556–557
    Bell Object Relations Inventory (BORI),
    166–167
    Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, 230
    Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner), 463
    Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud), 37
    Big Five traits (McCrae & Costa), 7, 387,
    440–441, 445t, 450–451, 590–591. See
    also Five-Factor Theory
    biological bases, of Five-Factor Theory, 395
    biological-evolutionary theories, 8, 9t
    biological versus social influences
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 141
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 492
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 429
    in cognitive social learning theory, 565
    in concept of humanity, 15
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 455
    in existential psychology (May), 351
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow),
    288–289
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 253
    in individual psychology (Adler), 103
    in object relations theory, 168
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 321
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 593
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 225
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    194–195
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 69
    in psychology of the individual
    (Allport), 380
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura),
    525, 526
    biologically based factor theory (Eysenck),
    408–429
    biological bases of personality, 421–422
    biological factor theory (Eysenck), 413–415
    concept of humanity, 429
    criteria for identifying factors, 414
    critique of Eysenck, 428
    dimensions of personality, 409, 415–421
    measuring personality, 421
    overview, 409–410
    personality as predictor, 422–424
    related research, 424–428
    biophilia, 241, 242, 243f
    bipolar traits, 385
    birth order effects, 91–92, 93, 93t, 96–98
    blame, 88
    blaming the victim, 515
    Bobo doll experiments, 518
    body ego (Erikson), 200–201
    Born to Rebel (Sulloway), 96–97
    Boston University, 387–388
    Brandeis University, 260–261, 265
    Brief Index of Self-Actualization (BISA), 281,
    283–284
    British Psycho-Analytical Society, 143, 146
    British Psychological Society, 523
    Buddhism/Zen Buddhism, 231, 283, 284
    bullying, 521–523
    burden of freedom, 236–238
    Burghöltzli Mental Hospital (Zurich), 107,
    113, 130
    Buss, David M., 430–456. See also
    evolutionary psychology (Buss)
    biography, 431, 433–434
    critique, 453–454
    publications, 434
    by-products, 432–433, 436
    Cambridge University, 159
    cancer, 423–424

    Subject Index S-3
    diffuse responsibility, 516
    Dimensions of Personality (Eysenck), 412
    discriminant validity, 16–17
    disdain, 216–217
    disengagement of internal control
    (Bandura), 514
    Disgust Sensitivity scale, 346
    disorganization, in person-centered theory
    (Rogers), 302–303
    displace responsibility, 516
    displacement (Freud), 40, 54–55
    Dispositional Positive Emotions Scale
    (DPES), 401
    dispositional theories, 8, 9t
    dispositions (Allport), 362–363
    distortion (Rogers), 302
    divergent validity, 16–17
    dominance needs, 537
    dopamine system, 59
    Downstate Medical School, State University
    of New York, 74
    dream analysis
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 105, 113,
    131–132
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 480–481
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 244
    in individual psychology (Adler), 94–95
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    189–190
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 24–26, 53,
    54–56, 61–63, 66, 107, 108, 145, 258
    dream-rebound effect, 62–63
    drive toward a vindictive triumph, 184
    drives
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 478
    in object relations theory, 146–147
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    177–182
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 36–38
    dualistic phase of childhood, 128
    dynamic processes (McCrae & Costa),
    393, 394f
    dystonic element (Erikson), 203
    early childhood (Erikson), 203f, 204f,
    206–207, 217t
    early experiential calibration, 443
    Early Memories Test, 61
    early recollections (ERs, Adler), 92–94,
    98–99, 99t
    efficient perception of reality, 273
    ego
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 110
    in object relations theory (Klein), 152–153
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 200–203
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 31, 32f,
    33–34, 35f, 59–60
    Ego and the Id, The (Freud), 65
    ego-ideal (Freud), 34, 200–201
    ego identity (Erikson), 200–201, 204, 209,
    221–222
    Eigenwelt, 330, 331f, 334, 335, 336, 342, 343,
    348–349
    elaborative choice (Kelly), 592
    Electra complex, 48
    Emerging Lives, Enduring Dispositions
    (McCrae & Costa), 388
    emotional stability (Buss), 441
    emotional states, 508–509
    emotions
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 478
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 440
    in trait and factor theories, 401–404
    empathic listening (Rogers), 306
    empirical law of effect (Rotter), 532
    Cry for Myth, The (May), 340–341
    cultural evolution (Skinner), 476–477
    culture
    collective efficacy (Bandura), 496, 509–510
    cultural evolution (Skinner), 476–477
    ego identity status across cultures, 221–222
    estrangement and alienation (Fromm),
    248–249
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    174–175
    D-love (deficiency love, Maslow), 278
    Dasein (being-in-the-world), 329–330
    death
    death instinct, 148, 149
    fear of, 129, 134, 332, 344–349
    mortality salience/awareness, 344–349
    necrophilia, 242, 243, 243f, 246–247
    nonbeing/nothingness, 330–332
    deductive method, 7, 384
    defense mechanisms
    in object relations theory (Klein), 150–152
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 34, 39–43,
    60–61, 87–88, 90t, 472
    defensiveness (Rogers), 302
    dehumanization, 515
    delay of gratification, 530, 561–563
    democratic character structure, 277
    denial (Rogers), 302
    depreciation (Adler), 88
    depression
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 242
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura), 516
    depressive position (Klein), 150
    deprivation of needs, 268
    desacralization (Maslow), 279
    descriptive research, 12
    destiny, in existential psychology (May),
    339–340
    destructiveness (Fromm), 237–238
    determinism versus free choice
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 490–491
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 429
    in cognitive social learning theory, 565
    in concept of humanity, 14–15
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 454
    in existential psychology (May), 350–351
    in Five-Factor Theory, 405
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 288
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 253
    in individual psychology (Adler), 103
    in object relations theory, 168
    in person-centered theory (Rogers),
    320–321
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 592
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 225
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 194
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 67–68
    in psychology of the individual (Allport),
    380
    in social cognitive theory
    (Bandura), 525–526
    development stages
    analytical psychology (Jung), 127–130, 127f
    psychosexual development stages (Freud),
    43–51
    psychosocial development stages (Erikson),
    203–218, 217t, 221–223
    diabetes, self-efficacy and, 520–521
    Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
    Disorders (DSM-5), 190–191, 303, 581
    diathesis-stress model (Eysenck), 418, 420
    dichotomy corollary, 576
    differentiation, 157
    mutual influence between personality and
    conditioning, 487–489
    personality impact on, 486–487
    conditions of worth (Rogers), 300–301
    conformity (Fromm), 238
    congruence (Rogers), 301, 304–305,
    315–319
    conscience (Freud), 34
    conscientiousness
    costs and benefits, 445t
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 442
    in Five-Factor Theory, 389, 391t, 392,
    399–400, 401
    conscious
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 110,
    118, 119f
    in individual psychology (Adler), 81
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 28, 30,
    31f, 32f, 51
    conscious motivation, 359
    conscious versus unconscious determinants
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 492
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 429
    in cognitive social learning theory, 565
    in concept of humanity, 15
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 454–455
    in existential psychology (May), 351
    in Five-Factor Theory, 405
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 288
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 253
    in individual psychology (Adler), 103
    in object relations theory, 168
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 321
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 593
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 225
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 194
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 68
    in psychology of the individual
    (Allport), 380
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura), 526
    conservative principle, 128
    consistency, 14, 80–81
    consistency paradox (Mischel), 550–551,
    552–553
    construct validity, 16–17
    constructing obstacles (Adler), 89
    construction corollary (Kelly), 574
    constructive alternativism (Kelly), 568,
    571–572
    constructs
    versus concepts, 578
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 568
    contact hypothesis, 372–375
    continuous schedule (Skinner), 473
    control group, 313
    convergent validity, 16–17
    coping behavior, 268
    core pathology (Erikson), 203
    core role (Kelly), 581
    correlation coefficient, 385
    cortical arousal level, 417–418
    cosmology, 465
    Costa, Paul T., Jr., 382–406. See also
    Five-Factor Theory
    biography, 388
    publications, 388
    Counseling and Psychotherapy (Rogers), 293
    countertransference, 135, 244
    covert modeling, 519
    creative power (Adler), 76, 85, 101–102, 103
    creativity
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 479–480
    creativeness of self-actualizing people,
    277–278

    Subject IndexS-4
    fragmentation corollary (Kelly), 579
    frame of orientation (Fromm), 235–236, 236t
    Francis Psychological Type Scale, 136–138
    free association technique, 23, 53, 189–190
    freedom
    in existential psychology (May), 338–339
    freedom of movement (FM, Rotter), 536,
    538–539, 540
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm),
    236–238
    freshness of appreciation, 275
    Freud, Sigmund, 20–69. See also
    psychoanalytic theory (Freud)
    Alfred Adler and, 71–75, 80, 87–88, 90–91,
    90t, 94–95, 123–124
    Gordon Allport and, 355, 356–357,
    359, 365
    biography, 21, 22–27, 63–65, 90–91
    critique, 63–67
    Eric Erikson and, 197–198, 201, 205, 206,
    208, 209, 221, 224–225
    Erich Fromm and, 229–230, 231, 234–235,
    240, 244
    Karen Horney and, 171, 172–173, 174, 186
    Carl Gustav Jung and, 105, 107–111, 115,
    123–124, 127, 130, 131
    Melanie Klein and, 146–147, 152–155
    Little Hans (case), 145
    psychotherapeutic technique, 52–57
    publications, 24–27, 37, 52–53, 57, 62–63,
    65, 66, 107, 145, 258
    Freudian slips (parapraxes), 56–57
    Fromm, Erich, 227–254. See also humanistic
    psychoanalysis (Fromm)
    biography, 228, 229–231, 234–235
    critique, 251–252
    Sigmund Freud and, 229–230, 231,
    234–235, 240, 244
    Karen Horney and, 173, 228, 230–231,
    234–235
    Karl Marx and, 228, 230, 231, 235
    publications, 231, 233, 234, 237, 246–251,
    252–253
    fully functioning person (Rogers), 309–311
    functional autonomy (Allport), 365–368, 475
    functions (Jung), 124–126, 126t
    fundamental attribution error (Buss), 437
    fundamental situational error (Buss), 437
    Gandhi’s Truth (Erikson), 219–220
    Gemeinschaftsgefühl, 81–84, 276, 360
    gender. See also feminine psychology;
    homosexual identity
    as personal construct, 586–587
    General Mills, 462
    generalization, 536
    generalized expectancies (GE, Rotter), 533,
    536, 540, 541, 542
    generalized reinforcers (Skinner), 472–473
    generalized sensuality, 215, 216
    generativity versus stagnation, 204f, 214–215
    genetic determinism, 446
    genital-locomotor mode (Erikson), 208
    genital stage (Freud), 43, 50–51
    genital stage (Klein), 154
    genitality (Erikson), 213
    German nationalism, 229–230
    goals
    in cognitive-affective personality theory
    (Mischel), 557
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    545–546
    in individual psychology (Adler), 102–103
    in person-centered theory (Rogers),
    316–319
    external influences (McCrae & Costa), 396
    external reinforcement (Rotter), 534
    extinction (Skinner), 475
    extraversion
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 122,
    123–126, 126t
    biological basis of, 424–426
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck),
    415–418, 416f, 421–422
    costs and benefits, 445t
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 441
    in Five-Factor Theory, 389, 390–391, 391t,
    401–404
    extrinsic religious orientation, 375–378
    Eysenck, Hans J., 408–429. See also
    biologically based factor theory
    (Eysenck)
    biography, 409, 411–413, 503
    critique, 428
    publications, 412–413
    Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI), 389, 421
    Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ),
    421, 424, 425
    factor analysis, 371–372, 385–387. See also
    trait and factor theories
    factor loadings, 385
    factor theories. See trait and factor theories
    falsifiable theory, 12–13
    family constellation (Adler), 91–92, 93, 93t,
    96–98
    fear
    of death, 129, 134, 332, 344–349
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 582
    feeling (Jung), 124–125, 126t
    feminine psychology
    Adler and, 76, 90–91, 100
    Freud and, 23–24, 25, 47–50, 52, 63–65,
    90–91
    Fromm and, 234–235
    Horney and, 186–189
    Jung and, 116–117
    Kelly and, 589–590
    Klein and, 154–155
    self-discrepancy theory, 316
    fetal period
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 410
    temperament in, 410, 447–448
    fiction (Adler), 79
    fidelity, 204f, 210, 212
    fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS), 488–489
    final censor, 28, 30, 32f
    Five-Factor Theory, 382–406
    basic postulates, 396–398
    basics of factor analysis, 385–387
    biographies of McCrae and Costa, 387–388
    concept of humanity, 405
    core components of personality, 393–395
    critique, 404–405
    evolution of, 392–398
    factors in, 389–392
    overview of trait and factor theories,
    383–384
    peripheral components, 395–396
    personal constructs and, 590–591
    related research, 398–404
    taxonomy versus, 7, 387
    fixation, 41, 234
    fixed-interval schedule (Skinner), 474
    fixed-ratio schedule (Skinner), 473
    fixed-role therapy, 583–584
    forethought, 504
    forgiveness, 376–377
    formative tendency (Rogers), 295
    fortuitous events (Bandura), 495, 503–504
    empirical observation, 465–466
    enactive learning, 500
    enactive mastery, 519
    encoding strategies (Mischel), 555
    enculturation resistance, 278
    enhancement needs (Rogers), 296
    environmental sources, of individual
    differences, 443
    epigenetic principle (Erikson), 201–203, 203f,
    204f, 207
    epigenetics (Buss), 446
    epistemology, 6
    Erikson, Eric, 196–226. See also post-Freudian
    theory (Erikson)
    biography, 197, 198–200, 212
    critique, 223–224
    Sigmund Freud and, 197–198, 201, 205,
    206, 208, 209, 221, 224–225
    publications, 199, 200, 219–220
    erogenous zones, 36–37
    eros
    in existential psychology (May), 337
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 36–37, 42,
    51, 68
    Escape from Freedom (Fromm), 231, 237,
    249–250, 251
    essential freedom (May), 339
    esteem needs (Maslow), 262f, 265
    ethology, 159
    euphemistic labels, 515
    evolutionary perspective, 309–311. See also
    evolutionary psychology (Buss)
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 475–477
    Five-Factor Theory in, 392–398
    evolutionary psychology (Buss), 430–456
    common misunderstandings, 446–447
    components of, 431–433, 435–436, 445t
    concept of humanity, 454–455
    critique of Buss, 453–454
    neo-Bussian evolutionary models, 444–446
    overview, 431–433
    principles of, 435
    related research, 447–453
    exclusivity (Erikson), 213–214
    excuses (Adler), 88
    Existence (May et al.), 327
    existential freedom (May), 339
    existential living (Rogers), 310
    existential needs (Fromm), 232–236, 236t
    existential psychology (May), 323–352
    anxiety, 327, 332–334
    background of existentialism, 328–332
    care, love, and will, 336–338
    concept of humanity, 350–351
    critique of May, 349–350
    destiny, 339–340
    freedom, 338–339
    guilt, 334–335
    intentionality, 335
    overview, 324–325
    power of myth, 340–342
    psychopathology, 342
    psychotherapy, 342–344
    related research, 344–349
    expectancy
    in cognitive-affective personality theory
    (Mischel), 556–557
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    533, 546–548
    experience corollary (Kelly), 578
    exploitative characters (Fromm), 239, 245
    expressive behavior, 268
    Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity
    Status (EOMEIS), 222
    external evaluations (Rogers), 301

    Subject Index S-5
    inferiority complex (Adler), 78
    initiative versus guilt, 204f, 208–209
    inner states, 477–479
    instinctoid needs (Maslow), 268–269
    instincts, 112, 146–147
    Institute for Child Guidance, 293
    integrity versus despair, 204f, 216
    intentionality
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 478–479
    in existential psychology (May), 335
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura), 504
    interaction of opposites, 203
    interactionists, 529
    intermittent schedule (Skinner), 473
    Internal-External (I-E) Control Scale, 529,
    530, 540, 541–543
    internal reinforcement (Rotter), 534
    internalization (Klein), 152–155
    International Institute of Social Research, 230
    International Psychoanalytic Association, 26,
    73, 108, 109
    interpersonal relations, of self-actualized
    people, 276–277
    interpersonal trust (Rotter), 540, 543–544
    Interpretation of Dreams (Freud), 25–27,
    62–63, 66, 107, 258
    intimacy versus isolation, 204f, 213,
    222–223
    intrapsychic conflicts, 171, 182–186
    intrinsic religious orientation, 375–378
    Introduction to Personality (Mischel), 550
    introjection (Freud), 42
    introjection (Klein), 147, 148, 150–151
    introversion
    in analytical psychology (Jung),
    122–126, 126t
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 415,
    415f, 416f, 421–422
    intuition (Jung), 125–126, 126t
    Iowa State University, 569
    IQ Argument (Eysenck), 413
    isolation
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    179f, 181–182, 182t
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 204f, 213, 222–223
    jealousy, 164–165
    Jonah complex, 281–282, 335
    judgmental process, 512–513
    Jung, Carl Gustav, 104–141. See also
    analytical psychology (Jung)
    biography, 105, 106–110
    critique, 138–140
    Sigmund Freud and, 105, 107–111, 115,
    123–124, 127, 130, 131
    publications, 105, 108, 109, 115, 131–132,
    133–134
    Karen Horney Psychoanalytic Institute, 173
    Kelly, George A., 567–594. See also personal
    construct theory (Kelly)
    biography, 569–570
    critique, 591–592
    philosophy of science, 570–572
    publications, 570, 581, 592
    Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills
    (KIMS), 284
    Klein, Melanie, 142–169. See also object
    relations theory (Klein)
    biography, 143, 144–146
    Anna Freud and, 143, 146, 162
    Sigmund Freud and, 146–147, 152–155
    Karen Horney and, 145
    publications, 145
    methods of investigation, 244–247
    overview, 228–229
    personality disorders, 241–243, 246–247
    psychotherapy, 244
    related research, 247–251
    humor, 277, 360–361
    hypochondriasis, 242
    hypothesis, 6–7
    in Chicago Studies, 312
    testing, 12
    hysteria (Freud), 23–24, 25, 52
    Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire, 61
    id
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 200
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 31, 32–33,
    32f, 34, 35f, 59–60
    ideal breast, 149
    ideal self (Rogers), 298
    idealistic principle (Freud), 34–35
    idealized parent image, 159
    idealized self-image (Horney), 183–185
    identification, 45
    identity confusion (Erikson), 197, 210,
    211–212, 221–222
    identity crisis (Erikson), 197, 204
    identity versus identity confusion, 204f,
    210–212, 221–222
    idiographic, 368–369
    If-then framework, 6, 295, 553, 560–561. See
    also theory
    Imperial Society of Physicians (Vienna), 23–24
    incestuous feelings, 234
    incestuous symbiosis (Fromm), 242–243, 243f,
    246–247
    inclusive fitness, 440, 446–447
    incongruence (Rogers), 298, 301, 304–305
    independence needs, 537–538
    Indiana University, 463
    individual differences, in evolutionary theory
    (Buss), 442–444
    individual psychology (Adler), 70–103
    abnormal development, 85–90
    applications, 91–96
    concept of humanity, 102–103
    creative power, 76, 85, 101–102, 103
    critique of Adler, 101–102
    dreams, 94–95
    early recollections (ERs), 92–94, 98–99, 99t
    family constellation, 91–92, 93, 93t, 96–98
    introduction to, 75–76
    masculine protest, 76, 90–91, 100
    overview, 71–72
    psychotherapy, 95–96
    related research, 96–100
    safeguarding tendencies, 87–90, 90t
    social interest, 81–84, 86, 101
    striving for success or superiority, 76–78,
    84f, 100
    style of life, 84–85, 87
    subjective perceptions, 79–80
    unity and self-consistency of personality,
    80–81
    individuality corollary, 575
    individuation (Jung), 110, 129–130
    inductive method, 7, 384
    industry versus inferiority, 204f, 209–210
    infancy
    infantile stage (Freud), 32–33, 43–50
    narcissistic needs, 158–159
    object relations in. See object relations
    theory (Klein)
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 203f, 204f, 205–206, 217t
    temperament in, 410, 448
    Graduate Record Exams (GREs), 556–557
    grandiose-exhibitionistic self, 158–159
    great mother archetype (Jung), 116–117
    grit, 318–319
    guilt
    in existential psychology (May), 334–335
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 583,
    588–589
    habits, in biological factor theory (Eysenck),
    414, 415f
    Harvard University, 356, 357, 431,
    434, 463, 549
    heart disease, 21, 423–424
    helplessness, 180
    heritable/genetic sources
    of individual differences, 443–444, 446
    twin-adoption studies, 397, 410, 418, 421,
    426, 450
    hero archetype (Jung), 117–118
    hesitating (Adler), 89
    hierarchy of behavior organization, 414,
    415f, 416f
    hierarchy of needs (Maslow), 262–266, 262f,
    270–278
    higher mental processes, 479
    hoarding characters (Fromm), 239–240, 245
    holistic approach to motivation
    additional needs, 266–267
    general discussion of needs, 267–270
    hierarchy of needs/conative needs, 262–266,
    262f, 270–278
    holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 256–289
    concept of humanity, 287–289
    critique of Maslow, 286–287
    hierarchy of needs, 262–266, 262f, 270–278
    Jonah complex, 281–282, 335
    motivation, 257, 261–270
    overview, 257–258
    psychotherapy, 282–283
    related research, 283–286
    self-actualization, 257, 262f, 265–266,
    270–278, 280–281, 283–284
    Holland vocational interest types, 98, 99t
    Holocaust, 559–560
    homosexual identity
    in individual psychology (Adler), 97
    internalized prejudice and, 588–589
    in object relations theory (Klein), 154, 155
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 65
    hope, 204f, 206, 216
    Horney-Coolidge Tridimensional Inventory
    (HCTI), 190–191
    Horney, Karen, 170–195. See also
    psychoanalytic social theory (Horney)
    biography, 172–173
    critique, 193
    Sigmund Freud and, 171, 172–173,
    174, 186
    Erich Fromm and, 173, 228, 230–231,
    234–235
    Melanie Klein and, 145
    publications, 172, 173–174, 193
    human agency (Bandura), 496, 504–510
    Human Behavior and Evolutionary Society
    (HBES), 453
    human dilemma (Fromm), 232
    humanistic-existential theories, 8, 9t
    humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 227–254
    basic assumptions, 231–232
    character orientations, 238–241, 244–245,
    247–248
    concept of humanity, 252–253
    critique of Fromm, 251–252
    human needs, 232–236, 236t

    Subject IndexS-6
    National Institutes of Health (NIH), 388
    natural selection
    Buss and, 431–432
    Darwin and, 431, 454
    Skinner and, 476
    naturalness, 273–274
    Nazi Germany, 201, 246–247, 409, 411–412,
    548–549, 559–560
    necrophilia, 242, 243, 243f, 246–247
    need potential (NP, Rotter), 538, 540
    need value (NV, Rotter), 539, 540
    needs
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    536–539
    existential, 232–236, 236f
    hierarchy of, 262–266, 262f, 270–278
    narcissistic, 158–159
    neurotic (Horney), 171, 177–178, 179f, 192f
    neurotic (Maslow), 267
    negative reinforcement, 470–471
    negative transference, 54, 162
    neglected style of life, 87
    neo-Bussian evolutionary models of
    personality, 444–446
    NEO-Personality Inventory (NEO-PI), 384,
    389, 398, 404
    Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 58
    neuroscience
    biological aspects of personality and, 410
    psychoanalytic theory and, 57–58, 59,
    61–63
    Neurosis and Human Growth (Horney),
    173–174, 193
    neurotic anxiety (Freud), 38
    neurotic anxiety (May), 333–334
    neurotic claims (Horney), 184–185, 242
    neurotic needs (Horney), 171, 177–178,
    179f, 182t
    neurotic needs (Maslow), 267
    neurotic pride (Horney), 185
    neurotic search for glory (Horney), 183–184
    neurotic trends (Horney), 178–182, 182t,
    190–191
    neuroticism. See also psychoanalytic social
    theory (Horney)
    biological basis of, 426–428
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 415,
    416f, 417, 418–419, 421–422
    costs and benefits, 445t
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 441–442
    in Five-Factor Theory, 389, 390–391, 391t,
    400, 402, 403–404
    positive aspects of, 191–193
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 25
    neutral genetic variations, 444
    New School for Social Research, 74, 173, 260
    New Ways in Psychoanalysis (Horney), 173
    New York Psychoanalytic Institute, 173
    New York University, 231, 327, 549
    noise (Buss), 433
    nomothetic methods, 355
    nonbeing/nothingness, 330–332
    normal anxiety (May), 333
    normal autism (Mahler), 156
    normal symbiosis (Mahler), 156–157
    Northern Blackfoot tribe, 260
    nothingness. See nonbeing/nothingness
    object relations theory (Klein), 142–169
    adult relationships and, 162–166
    concept of humanity, 167–168
    critique, 166–167
    internalizations, 152–155
    introduction, 146–147
    later views, 143–144, 146, 155–161
    May, Rollo, 323–352. See also existential
    psychology (May)
    biography, 325–328
    critique, 349–350
    Philip (case), 324, 332, 334, 335, 340, 343–344
    publications, 327, 332–333, 340–341
    McCrae, Robert R., 382–406. See also
    Five-Factor Theory
    biography, 387–388
    publications, 388
    Meaning of Anxiety, The (May), 327, 332–333
    means versus ends, self-actualized people
    and, 277
    mechanism (Buss), 437–442, 446–447
    Memories, Dreams, Reflections (Jung), 105,
    108, 109, 115, 131–132
    meta-analysis, 187–189
    metamotivation (Maslow), 272–273
    metapathology (Maslow), 268
    Michigan State University, 231
    mindfulness, 283–284
    minimal group paradigm, 374–375
    mirroring, 159
    Mischel, Walter, 548–565. See also cognitive-
    affective personality theory (Mischel)
    biography, 548–550
    critique of cognitive social learning theory,
    563–564
    publications, 549–550, 562
    related research, 559–563
    Mithraic cult, 113
    Mitwelt, 330, 331f, 334, 335, 336, 342, 343,
    346–348
    modeling (Bandura), 498–499
    modulation corollary (Kelly), 578–579
    monarchic phase of childhood, 127–128
    monogenic transmission (Buss), 449
    moral agency, 496, 513–516
    moral anxiety (Freud), 38
    Moral Disengagement Scale (MDS), 521–522
    moral hypochondriasis (Fromm), 242
    moral justification, 515
    moralistic principle (Freud), 34–35
    morphogenic science, 355, 368–369
    mortality salience/awareness, 344–349
    mother fixation, 242–243
    motivation
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    531–532
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 440
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 257,
    261–270
    in individual psychology (Adler), 76–78
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 316–319
    in psychology of the individual (Allport),
    359, 364–368
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura), 500
    motivational dispositions, 363
    moving against people (Horney), 179f,
    180–181, 182t
    moving away from people (Horney), 179f,
    181–182, 182t
    moving backward (Adler), 89
    moving toward people (Horney), 179f,
    180, 182t
    Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI),
    135–138, 139, 389
    myth (May), 340–342
    narcissism
    malignant, 242, 243, 246–247, 250–251
    narcissistic needs of infants, 158–159
    primary, 37, 156
    secondary, 37
    as striving for superiority, 100, 250–251
    latency (Erikson), 209, 210
    latency stage (Freud), 43, 50
    latent dream content (Freud), 54, 55
    law of effect (Thorndike), 464
    law of the low doorway (Adler), 85
    leadership
    attachment style and, 165–166
    personality type and, 135–136
    learning, 497–500
    enactive, 500
    observational, 498–500
    learning-(social) cognitive theories, 8–9, 10t
    Letters from Jenny (Allport), 370–372
    levels of mental life (Freud), 28–31,
    31f, 32f
    levels of the psyche (Jung), 110–120, 132
    Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale
    (LSRP), 489
    libidinal object constancy, 157–158
    libido (Freud), 36
    life-cycle approach (Erikson), 197–198,
    203–218, 221–223
    Little Albert (case of Watson & Raynor),
    467–468
    Little Hans (case of S. Freud), 145
    locus of control
    in cognitive-affective personality theory
    (Mischel), 559–560
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    529, 530, 540, 541–543
    love
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    538, 544–545
    in existential psychology (May), 336–338
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 278
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm),
    233, 241
    love and belongingness needs (Maslow),
    262f, 264–265
    as productive orientation, 241
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    174–175
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 37
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 204f, 213–214
    Love and Will (May), 327
    maintenance needs (Rogers), 296
    maladjustment. See abnormal development/
    maladjustment
    malignant aggression (Fromm), 234
    malignant narcissism, 242, 243, 246–247,
    250–251
    Man for Himself (Fromm), 231, 252–253
    mandala (Jung), 118, 119f
    manifest dream content (Freud), 54, 55
    Man’s Search for Himself (May), 327
    marketing character (Fromm), 240–241, 245,
    247–248
    “marshmallow test,” 561–563
    masculine protest (Adler), 76, 90–91,
    100, 187
    Maslow, Abraham, 256–289. See also holistic-
    dynamic theory (Maslow)
    biography, 257, 258–261, 503
    critique, 286–287
    philosophy of science, 279–280
    masochism, 37, 237
    mastery experiences, 507
    matrix, 385
    mature personality (Allport), 359–361,
    375–378
    maturity stage (Freud), 43, 51
    Maudsley Hospital, 412, 413
    Maudsley Personality Inventory, 421, 423

    Subject Index S-7
    in individual psychology (Adler), 103
    in object relations theory, 168
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 320
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 592
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 225
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 194
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 68
    in psychology of the individual (Allport),
    379, 380
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura), 525
    phallic phase (Freud), 45–50, 49f
    phantasies, 53, 147–148
    phenomenology, 570–571
    philia (May), 337–338
    Philosophy of “As If,” The (Vaihinger), 79
    philosophy, theory versus, 5–6
    phobias, in social cognitive theory (Bandura),
    516–517
    phylogenetic endowment (Freud), 28–29,
    47, 113
    physical comfort needs, 538
    physical inferiorities (Adler), 79–80, 86
    physical mechanisms (Buss), 438–439
    physical states, 508–509
    physiological needs (Maslow), 262f, 263
    placebo effect, 313
    plasticity, 495
    play age (Erikson), 203f, 208–209, 217t
    play therapy, 162
    pleasure principle (Freud), 32–33, 59–60,
    174, 365
    polygenic transmission (Buss), 449
    Population Media Center, 523
    positions (Klein), 148–150
    positive freedom (Fromm), 238
    positive psychology, 8, 284–286, 315
    positive regard (Rogers), 300, 305–306,
    308, 347
    positive reinforcement, 470
    positive self-regard (Rogers), 300, 347
    possession, 177
    post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 196–226
    concept of humanity, 224–226
    critique of Erikson, 223–224
    ego, 200–203
    methods of investigation, 218–220
    overview, 197–198
    related research, 221–223
    stages of psychosocial development,
    203–218, 217t, 221–223
    Posttraumatic Growth
    (Tedeschi & Calhoun), 317
    posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
    54, 163
    power, 177, 178, 233
    Power and Innocence (May), 327
    power of myth (May), 340–342
    practicing, 157
    preconscious (Freud), 28, 29–30, 31f, 32f
    predictive validity, 17
    prejudice reduction, 372–375
    prestige, 177, 178
    primary censor, 28, 30
    primary narcissism (Freud), 37, 156
    primary process (Freud), 33
    primary reinforcers, 472
    privacy needs, 274
    proactive behavior (Allport), 359–360,
    364–365
    problem-centering, 274
    procreativity (Erikson), 214
    progression (Jung), 121–122
    progressive reinforcement (PR), 487
    Project Pigeon (Skinner), 461–462
    concept of humanity, 320–321
    critique of Rogers, 319–320
    overview, 291–292
    person of tomorrow, 309–311
    psychotherapy, 291–292, 293,
    303–309, 309t
    related research, 315–319
    self and self-actualization, 297–298
    person of tomorrow (Rogers), 309–311
    person-situation interaction, 551–552,
    560–561
    persona
    defined, 3, 358
    of Jung, 113–114
    personal construct theory (Kelly), 567–594
    applications, 581–586
    concept of humanity, 592–593
    critique of Kelly, 591–592
    overview, 568
    personal constructs, 571, 572–581, 586–591
    psychotherapy, 583–586
    related research, 586–591
    personal constructs, 572–581, 586–591
    basic postulate, 573–574
    and the Big Five, 590–591
    defined, 571
    gender as personal construct, 586–587
    internalized prejudice and, 588–589
    Role Construct Repertory (Rep) test,
    584–590
    supporting corollaries, 574–581
    personal dispositions (Allport), 361–363
    Personal Orientation Inventory (POI),
    280–281
    personal standards, 512
    personal structure analysis, 371
    personal unconscious (Jung), 110, 111, 119f
    personality
    defining, 5, 358–359
    measuring, 421
    nature of, 3–4
    as predictor, 422–424
    Personality and Assessment (Mischel),
    549–550
    personality disorders, 241–243, 246–247
    personality dynamics (Freud), 36–39
    Personality in Adulthood
    (McCrae & Costa), 388
    personality theory, 2–17. See also specific
    theories and theorists
    biological-evolutionary theories, 8, 9t
    concept of humanity and, 14–15
    criteria for useful theory, 11–14
    dispositional theories, 8, 9t
    humanistic-existential theories, 8, 9t
    learning-(social) cognitive theories, 8–9, 10t
    need for different theories, 7
    overview, 9–10t
    perspectives in, 7–10
    psychodynamic theories, 8, 9t
    research in, 16–17
    theorist personalities and, 10–11
    theory, defined, 5
    personality traits (Buss), 440–442
    pessimism versus optimism
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 491–492
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 429
    in cognitive social learning theory, 565
    in concept of humanity, 15
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 454
    in existential psychology (May), 351
    in Five-Factor Theory, 405
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 288
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm),
    252–253
    object in, 147, 148
    overview, 143–144
    positions, 148–150
    psychic defense mechanisms, 150–152
    psychic life of the infant, 147–148
    psychotherapy, 162
    related research, 162–166
    objective biography (McCrae & Costa), 396
    oblique method, 386–387
    observational learning, 498–500
    obsession, 25
    Oedipal phase of development, 34
    Oedipus complex
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm),
    234–235, 243
    in object relations theory (Klein), 153,
    154–155
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 187
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 25, 42,
    45–50, 53, 65, 68, 113
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 208
    Oedipus story, 45–46, 341–342
    Ohio State University, 293, 530–531,
    549, 570
    old age (Erikson), 215–217, 217t
    On Dreams (Freud), 26, 145
    openness
    costs and benefits, 445t
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 442
    in Five-Factor Theory, 389, 391t, 392,
    399–400, 401–402
    operant conditioning (Skinner), 468–475
    operant discrimination (Skinner), 469
    operant extinction (Skinner), 475
    operational definition, 14
    opioid system, 59
    optimal contact in reducing prejudice,
    372–375
    oral phase (Freud), 43–44
    oral-sensory mode (Erikson), 205
    organ dialect (Adler), 80–81
    organismic self (Rogers), 297
    organismic valuing process (OVP), 317–319
    organization corollary (Kelly), 575–576
    Origin of Species (Darwin), 454
    orthogonal rotation, 385–386
    overt modeling, 519
    palliative comparisons, 515
    pampered style of life, 87
    paranoia, 41–42
    paranoid-schizoid position (Klein), 148–149
    parapraxes (Freudian slips), 56–57
    parsimony, 14
    passive resistance, 219–220, 483
    peak experiences (Maslow), 275–276,
    279–280, 283–284, 285–286
    penis envy (Freud), 44–45, 47–49, 187
    perceptual conscious (Freud), 30
    perfection, 178, 184
    performance attribution, 513
    permeability (Kelly), 578–579
    persecutory breast, 149
    perseverative functional autonomy (Allport),
    366–367
    person-centered theory (Rogers), 290–322
    awareness, 298–300
    barriers to psychological health, 300–303
    basic assumptions, 295–297
    becoming a person, 299–300
    Chicago Studies, 312–315
    client-centered therapy in, 291–292,
    303–309, 309t

    Subject IndexS-8
    critique of cognitive social learning theory,
    563–564
    publications, 530, 531
    related research, 559–563
    sadism, 37, 237
    safeguarding tendencies (Adler), 87–90, 90t
    safety needs (Maslow), 262f, 263
    Sane Society, The (Fromm), 231, 247
    SAT scores, 399–400
    satisfiers, 464
    Saunders Consumer Orientation Index
    (SCOI), 248
    schedules of reinforcement, 473–474
    schizoid personality, 294
    school age (Erikson), 209–210, 217t
    science
    philosophy of, 279–280, 311–312, 570–572
    theory versus, 6
    Science and Human Behavior (Skinner), 463
    secondary dispositions (Allport), 362–363
    secondary narcissism (Freud), 37
    secondary process (Freud), 33
    secure attachment, 161, 164, 165–166
    selective activation (Bandura), 514
    selective reinforcement, 481–482
    self (Jung), 118–120
    self-accusation, 185–186
    self-actualization (Rogers), 297–298
    self-actualization needs (Maslow), 257, 262f,
    265–266, 270–278, 280–281, 283–284
    Self-Analysis (Horney), 172
    self-awareness, 477–478
    self-concept
    in Five-Factor Theory, 395
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 297
    self-consistency of personality, 80–81
    Self-Construal Scale (SCS), 222
    self-contempt, 186
    self-control (Skinner), 482–483
    self-destructive actions and impulses, 186
    Self-Directed Search (SDS), 98
    self-discrepancy theory, 315–316
    self-efficacy (Bandura), 495–496, 505–509,
    520–521
    self-frustration, 186
    self-hatred (Horney), 183, 185–186
    self-observation, 511–512
    Self-Other Attitude Scale (S-O Scale),
    312–313
    self-reaction, 513
    self-reactiveness, 505
    self-realization
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 114, 118,
    119–120, 127, 129–130, 131
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 232
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    183, 189–190
    self-reflectiveness, 505
    self-regulation, 510–516
    across the lifespan, 561–563
    external factors, 511
    internal factors, 511–513
    self-regulatory strategies (Mischel), 556
    through moral agency, 496, 513–516
    self-sufficiency, 178
    self-torment, 186
    selfobjects (Kohut), 158
    sensation (Jung), 125, 126t
    sense of identity (Fromm), 235, 236t
    sense of identity (Horney), 183
    separation anxiety, 159–160
    separation guilt, 334
    separation-individuation (Mahler),
    157–158
    psychoticism (P, Eysenck), 415, 416f, 417,
    419–422, 423
    puberty
    defined, 210
    genital stage (Freud), 43, 50–51
    youth stage (Jung), 127f, 128
    punishment, 471–472
    purpose
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 478–479
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 204f, 209
    Q sort technique, 313, 369
    quantitative trait loci (QTL) approach,
    449–450, 453
    Questionnaire of Affective Relationships
    (QAR), 165
    radical behaviorism (Skinner), 459–460, 463
    range corollary (Kelly), 577–578
    rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, 61–62
    rapprochement, 157
    reaction formation (Freud), 29, 38, 40
    reactive behavior (Allport), 364
    realistic anxiety (Freud), 38–39
    reality principle (Freud), 33–34
    receptive characters (Fromm), 239, 245
    recognition-status needs, 537
    regression
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 121–122
    in individual psychology (Adler), 89
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 41, 89
    reinforcement, 470–471
    brain and, 488–489
    compared with punishment, 472
    conditioned/generalized reinforcers,
    472–473
    internal/external control of, 540, 541–543
    schedules of, 473–474
    reinforcement-reinforcement sequences, 534
    Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST),
    488–489
    reinforcement value (RV, Rotter), 533–534, 542
    rejectivity, 215
    relatedness (Fromm), 232–233, 236t
    reliability, 16
    religion
    intrinsic/extrinsic orientation, 375–378
    personality type of clergy and churchgoers,
    136–138
    REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, 61–62
    Rep (Role Construct Repertory) test, 584–590
    repetition compulsion (Freud), 54
    representation, 499
    repression (Freud), 28, 34, 39–40, 60–61
    resacralization (Maslow), 279
    resistance, 54
    Revised NEO Personality Inventory, 388
    Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA),
    250, 251
    Rochester Society for the Prevention of
    Cruelty to Children, 293
    Rogers, Carl R., 290–322. See also person-
    centered theory (Rogers)
    biography, 291, 292–295
    critique, 319–320
    philosophy of science, 311–312
    publications, 293, 295
    role (Kelly), 580–581
    Role Construct Repertory (Rep) test, 584–590
    role repudiation (Erikson), 212
    rootedness (Fromm), 234–235, 236t
    Rorschach Inkblot Test, 61, 163, 245, 497
    Rotter, Julian B., 529–548. See also cognitive
    social learning theory (Rotter)
    biography, 530–531
    projection
    in object relations theory (Klein), 151,
    152, 163
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 41–42
    projective identification (Klein), 152
    propriate functional autonomy (Allport), 367
    propriate strivings (Allport), 364
    proprium (Allport), 363–364
    protection-dependency needs, 538
    provinces of the mind (Freud), 31–35
    proxy (Bandura), 496, 509
    pseudospecies (Erikson), 201, 215
    Psycho-Analysis of Children, The (Klein), 145
    psychoanalysis, defined, 21
    psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    170–195
    basic hostility/basic anxiety, 171, 175–177,
    179–180, 179f
    compulsive drives, 177–182, 182t
    concept of humanity, 194–195
    critique of Horney, 193
    cultural influences, 174–175
    feminine psychology, 186–189
    intrapsychic conflicts, 171, 182–186
    introduction, 174–175
    overview, 171–172
    psychotherapy, 189–190
    related research, 190–193
    psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 20–69
    applications, 52–57
    concept of humanity, 67–69
    critique of Freud, 63–67
    defense mechanisms, 34, 39–43, 60–61
    levels of mental life, 28–31, 31f, 32f
    overview, 21–22
    personality dynamics, 36–39
    provinces of the mind, 31–35, 32f
    related research, 57–63
    stages of psychosexual development, 43–51
    psychodynamic theories, 8, 9t
    psychohistory/psychobiography
    of Mahatma Gandhi, 219–220
    of Adolf Hitler, 246–247
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm),
    246–247
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson),
    218–220
    psychological mechanisms (Buss), 438–439
    psychological situation (Rotter), 534–535
    Psychology (Koch), 292, 295
    Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It
    (Skinner), 464
    Psychology of Personal Constructs, The
    (Kelly), 570, 581, 592
    psychology of science, 10–11
    psychology of the individual (Allport),
    354–381
    approach to personality theory, 358–361
    characteristics of healthy person, 359–361
    concept of humanity, 379–380
    critique of Allport, 378–379
    definition of personality, 358–359
    motivation, 359, 364–368
    overview, 355–356
    related research, 372–378
    structure of personality, 361–364
    study of the individual, 368–372
    Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Freud), 57
    psychoses, 54
    psychosexual development stages (Freud),
    43–51
    psychosocial development stages (Erikson),
    203–218, 217t, 221–223
    psychosocial struggle (Erikson), 197
    psychotherapy. See therapy/psychotherapy

    Subject Index S-9
    pioneering work of Cattell, 384
    well-being and, 400–401
    traits. See also trait and factor theories
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck),
    414, 415f
    bipolar, 385
    defined, 4, 385
    in dispositional theories, 8
    in psychology of the individual (Allport),
    361–363
    unipolar, 385
    transcendence (Fromm), 233–234, 236t
    transference, 53–54, 134–135, 162, 244
    transformation (Jung), 134
    trauma
    object relations theory and, 162–163
    posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
    54, 163
    triadic reciprocal causation, 495, 501–504
    chance encounters, 495, 503–504
    example of, 502–503
    fortuitous events, 495, 503–504
    trust
    basic trust versus basic mistrust, 203, 204f,
    205–206
    interpersonal trust (Rotter), 540, 543–544
    twin studies, 397, 410, 418, 421, 426, 450
    types
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 124–126,
    126t
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck),
    414–421
    tyranny of the should (Horney), 184
    Umwelt, 330, 331f, 334, 336, 342, 345–346
    unconditional positive regard (Rogers), 296,
    305–306, 308
    unconscious
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 110,
    111–112, 115, 119f
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 480
    in individual psychology (Adler), 81
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 28–29,
    31f, 32f, 58–59
    unconscious motivation, 267–268
    Union Theological Seminary, 292, 326
    unipolar traits, 385
    uniqueness versus similarity
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 141
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 492
    in biological factor theory (Eysenck), 429
    in cognitive social learning theory, 565
    in concept of humanity, 15
    in evolutionary theory (Buss), 455
    in existential psychology (May), 351
    in Five-Factor Theory, 405
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 288
    in object relations theory, 168
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 321
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 593
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson),
    225–226
    in psychoanalytic social theory
    (Horney), 195
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 69
    in psychology of the individual (Allport),
    355, 380
    unity of personality, 80–81
    University of Basel, 107, 110
    University of Berlin, 411–412
    University of British Columbia, 496–497
    University of California at Berkeley,
    199–200, 434
    University of Chicago, 158, 293, 312–315,
    319, 388
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 31, 32f,
    34–35, 35f, 59–60
    superego function (Eysenck), 415, 419–420
    suppression, 28, 62–63, 480
    surgency (Buss), 441
    symbiotic relationship, 233
    syndrome of decay, 243, 243f, 246–247
    syndrome of growth, 243, 243f
    syntonic element (Erikson), 203
    Taoistic attitude (Maslow), 279
    Tavistock Clinic, 159
    taxonomy, 7, 387. See also Big Five traits
    (McCrae & Costa)
    Teachers College, Columbia University, 260,
    292–293
    teleology, 15, 79. See also causality versus
    teleology
    temperament (Buss), 447–449
    temperament (Eysenck), 410
    terror management theory (TMT), 344–349
    Thanatos, 36, 68
    Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), 163, 245,
    312–313
    theory, 5–14. See also personality theory and
    specific theories
    criteria for useful, 11–14
    defined, 5
    need for different theories, 7
    psychology of science and, 10–11
    related concepts, 5–7
    therapeutic change, 307–308, 309t
    therapy group, 313
    therapy/psychotherapy
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 134–135
    in behavioral analysis (Skinner), 484–485
    client-centered therapy (Rogers), 291–292,
    293, 303–309, 309t
    in cognitive social learning theory (Rotter),
    545–548
    in existential psychology (May), 342–344
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow),
    282–283
    in humanistic psychoanalysis (Fromm), 244
    in individual psychology (Adler), 95–96
    in object relations theory (Klein), 162
    in personal construct theory (Kelly),
    583–586
    in psychoanalytic approach (Freud), 52–57
    in psychoanalytic social theory (Horney),
    189–190
    in social cognitive theory (Bandura),
    519–520
    thinking
    in analytical psychology (Jung), 124, 126t
    as productive orientation, 241
    threat
    in person-centered theory (Rogers), 301
    in personal construct theory (Kelly), 582,
    588–590
    toilet training
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson),
    206–207
    in psychosexual development stages
    (Freud), 44, 45
    trait and factor theories. See also biologically
    based factor theory (Eysenck); Five-
    Factor Theory
    academic performance and, 398–400
    basics of factor analysis, 385–387
    concept of humanity, 405
    critique, 404–405
    emotions and, 401–404
    Internet use and, 400–401
    overview, 383–384
    sex/sex drive
    in existential psychology (May), 337
    in holistic-dynamic theory (Maslow), 278
    in psychoanalytic theory (Freud), 36–37, 40,
    42, 51, 68
    sexual selection (Buss), 432
    shadow archetype (Jung), 114–115
    shaping, 468–470
    Short Index of Self-Actualization (SISA), 281
    simplicity, 273–274
    Sioux nation, 199, 201, 218
    situation variables, 553–554
    Sixteen Personality Factors Questionnaire
    (16 PF Scale), 384
    Skinner, B. F., 458–493. See also behavioral
    analysis (Skinner)
    biography, 459, 460–463
    critique, 489–490
    publications, 460, 461, 463, 464, 472, 491
    smoking, 27, 358, 388, 413, 424, 485–487, 519
    social action, 84–85
    social behavior (Skinner), 481
    social cognitive theory (Bandura), 494–527
    concept of humanity, 524–526
    critique of Bandura, 523–524
    dysfunctional behavior, 516–518
    human agency, 504–510
    learning, 497–500
    overview, 495–496
    related research, 520–523
    self-regulation, 510–516
    therapy, 519–520
    triadic reciprocal causation, 495, 501–504
    social control (Skinner), 481–482
    social interest (Adler), 81–84, 86, 101
    Social Interest Index (Greever et al.), 101
    Social Interest Scale (Crandall), 101
    social modeling, 507–508
    social persuasion, 508
    sociality corollary (Kelly), 580–581
    Society for Free Psychoanalytic Study, 74
    Society for Individual Psychology, 73, 74, 530
    sociobiology (Wilson), 435
    South German Institute for
    Psychoanalysis, 230
    speculation, theory versus, 6
    splitting (object relations theory), 151–152
    spontaneity, 273–274
    stability (Eysenck), 415
    standard of reference, 512–513
    standing still (Adler), 89
    Stanford University, 159, 497, 549
    stimulus generalization, 469–470
    stimulus-outcome expectancy, 557
    Strange Situation, 160–161
    striving for success/superiority, 76–78,
    84f, 100
    Stroop task, 403
    Structure of Human Personality, The
    (Eysenck), 412
    Studies on Hysteria (Breuer & Freud), 24,
    25, 52
    Study of Organ Inferiority and Its Psychical
    Compensation (Adler), 73–74
    Study of Values (Allport et al.), 369
    style of life (Adler), 84–85, 87
    stylistic dispositions, 363
    subjective perceptions, 79–80
    sublimation, 42
    submissiveness, 176, 233
    successive approximations, 468
    Sulliman Scale of Social Interest, 101
    superego
    in object relations theory (Klein), 153–154
    in post-Freudian theory (Erikson), 200

    Subject IndexS-10
    Willoughby Emotional Maturity Scale (E-M
    Scale), 312–313
    wisdom, 204f, 216–217
    wise old man archetype, 117
    wish fulfillment, 54–56
    withdrawal (Adler), 89
    withdrawal (Erikson),
    203, 206
    withdrawal (Horney), 177
    Wizard of Oz (Baum), 117
    women. See feminine psychology
    word association test,
    130–131
    work, as productive orientation, 241
    York University, 163
    young adulthood (Erikson),
    212–214, 217t
    Yurok nation, 199, 201, 218
    vicarious modeling, 519
    Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, 26, 73, 74
    Vocabulary Test of WAIS, 61
    vocational interest types, 98, 99t
    vulnerability (Rogers), 301
    Walden Two (Skinner), 460, 463, 472, 491
    Wednesday Psychological Society, 26, 63,
    72, 73
    Western Behavioral Sciences Institute
    (WBSI), 294
    Wichita Guidance Center, 497
    will
    in existential psychology (May), 336–338
    in psychosocial development stages
    (Erikson), 204f, 207
    William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry,
    Psychoanalysis, and Psychology, 231,
    326, 338
    University of Connecticut, 530, 531
    University of Freiburg, 172–173
    University of Iowa, 497, 530
    University of Kansas, 569
    University of London, 409, 412, 413
    University of Massachusetts-Boston, 388
    University of Minnesota, 461–462, 569
    University of Rochester, 293
    University of Texas at Austin, 431, 433, 434
    University of Vienna, 22, 23, 74
    University of Wisconsin, 259–260, 292, 294,
    312, 319
    University of Zurich, 107
    unmotivated behavior, 268
    validity, 16–17
    variable-interval schedule (Skinner), 474
    variable-ratio schedule (Skinner), 473–474
    vicarious experiences, 507–508

    Cover
    Title Page
    Copyright Page
    About the Authors
    Contents
    Preface
    Acknowledgments
    PART I Introduction��������������������������
    Chapter 1 Introduction to Personality Theory���������������������������������������������������
    What Is Personality?���������������������������
    What Is a Theory?������������������������
    Theory Defined���������������������
    Theory and Its Relatives�������������������������������
    Philosophy�����������������
    Speculation������������������
    Hypothesis�����������������
    Taxonomy���������������
    Why Different Theories?������������������������������
    Perspectives in Theories of Personality����������������������������������������������
    Psychodynamic Theories�����������������������������
    Humanistic-Existential Theories��������������������������������������
    Dispositional Theories�����������������������������
    Biological-Evolutionary Theories���������������������������������������
    Learning-(Social) Cognitive Theories�������������������������������������������
    Theorists’ Personalities and Their Theories of Personality
    What Makes a Theory Useful?����������������������������������
    Generates Research�������������������������
    Is Falsifiable���������������������
    Organizes Data���������������������
    Guides Action��������������������
    Is Internally Consistent�������������������������������
    Is Parsimonious����������������������
    Dimensions for a Concept of Humanity�������������������������������������������
    Research in Personality Theory�������������������������������������

    PART II Psychodynamic Theories�������������������������������������
    Chapter 2 Freud: Psychoanalysis��������������������������������������
    Overview of Psychoanalytic Theory����������������������������������������
    Biography of Sigmund Freud���������������������������������
    Levels of Mental Life����������������������������
    Unconscious������������������
    Preconscious�������������������
    Conscious����������������
    Provinces of the Mind����������������������������
    The Id�������������
    The Ego��������������
    The Superego�������������������
    Dynamics of Personality������������������������������
    Drives�������������
    Sex����������
    Aggression�����������������
    Anxiety��������������
    Defense Mechanisms�������������������������
    Repression�����������������
    Reaction Formation�������������������������
    Displacement�������������������
    Fixation���������������
    Regression�����������������
    Projection�����������������
    Introjection�������������������
    Sublimation������������������
    Stages of Development����������������������������
    Infantile Period�����������������������
    Oral Phase�����������������
    Anal Phase�����������������
    Phallic Phase��������������������
    Male Oedipus Complex���������������������������
    Female Oedipus Complex�����������������������������
    Latency Period���������������������
    Genital Period���������������������
    Maturity���������������
    Applications of Psychoanalytic Theory��������������������������������������������
    Freud’s Early Therapeutic Technique������������������������������������������
    Freud’s Later Therapeutic Technique������������������������������������������
    Dream Analysis���������������������
    Freudian Slips���������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Unconscious Mental Processing������������������������������������
    Pleasure and the Id, Inhibition and the Ego��������������������������������������������������
    Repression, Inhibition, and Defense Mechanisms�����������������������������������������������������
    Research on Dreams�������������������������
    Critique of Freud������������������������
    Did Freud Understand Women, Gender, and Sexuality?���������������������������������������������������������
    Was Freud a Scientist?�����������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 3 Adler: Individual Psychology���������������������������������������������
    Overview of Individual Psychology����������������������������������������
    Biography of Alfred Adler��������������������������������
    Introduction to Adlerian Theory��������������������������������������
    Striving for Success or Superiority������������������������������������������
    The Final Goal���������������������
    The Striving Force as Compensation�����������������������������������������
    Striving for Personal Superiority����������������������������������������
    Striving for Success���������������������������
    Subjective Perceptions�����������������������������
    Fictionalism�������������������
    Physical Inferiorities�����������������������������
    Unity and Self-Consistency of Personality������������������������������������������������
    Organ Dialect��������������������
    Conscious and Unconscious��������������������������������
    Social Interest����������������������
    Origins of Social Interest���������������������������������
    Importance of Social Interest������������������������������������
    Style of Life��������������������
    Creative Power���������������������
    Abnormal Development���������������������������
    General Description��������������������������
    External Factors in Maladjustment����������������������������������������
    Exaggerated Physical Deficiencies����������������������������������������
    Pampered Style of Life�����������������������������
    Neglected Style of Life������������������������������
    Safeguarding Tendencies������������������������������
    Excuses��������������
    Aggression�����������������
    Withdrawal�����������������
    Masculine Protest������������������������
    Origins of the Masculine Protest���������������������������������������
    Adler, Freud, and the Masculine Protest����������������������������������������������

    Applications of Individual Psychology��������������������������������������������
    Family Constellation���������������������������
    Early Recollections��������������������������
    Dreams�������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Birth Order Effects��������������������������
    Early Recollections and Career Choice��������������������������������������������
    Distinguishing Narcissism as Striving for Superiority, versus Self-Esteem as Striving for Success��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Critique of Adler������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 4 Jung: Analytical Psychology��������������������������������������������
    Overview of Analytical Psychology����������������������������������������
    Biography of Carl Jung�����������������������������
    Levels of the Psyche���������������������������
    Conscious����������������
    Personal Unconscious���������������������������
    Collective Unconscious�����������������������������
    Archetypes�����������������
    Persona��������������
    Shadow�������������
    Anima������������
    Animus�������������
    Great Mother�������������������
    Wise Old Man�������������������
    Hero�����������
    Self�����������

    Dynamics of Personality������������������������������
    Causality and Teleology������������������������������
    Progression and Regression���������������������������������
    Psychological Types��������������������������
    Attitudes����������������
    Introversion�������������������
    Extraversion�������������������
    Functions����������������
    Thinking���������������
    Feeling��������������
    Sensing��������������
    Intuiting����������������

    Development of Personality���������������������������������
    Stages of Development����������������������������
    Childhood����������������
    Youth������������
    Middle Life������������������
    Old Age��������������
    Self-Realization�����������������������
    Jung’s Methods of Investigation��������������������������������������
    Word Association Test����������������������������
    Dream Analysis���������������������
    Active Imagination�������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Personality Type and Leadership��������������������������������������
    Personality Type Among Clergy and Churchgoers����������������������������������������������������
    A Critical Look at the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)����������������������������������������������������������������
    Critique of Jung�����������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 5 Klein: Object Relations Theory�����������������������������������������������
    Overview of Object Relations Theory������������������������������������������
    Biography of Melanie Klein���������������������������������
    Introduction to Object Relations Theory����������������������������������������������
    Psychic Life of the Infant���������������������������������
    Phantasies�����������������
    Objects��������������
    Positions����������������
    Paranoid-Schizoid Position���������������������������������
    Depressive Position��������������������������
    Psychic Defense Mechanisms���������������������������������
    Introjection�������������������
    Projection�����������������
    Splitting����������������
    Projective Identification��������������������������������
    Internalizations�����������������������
    Ego����������
    Superego���������������
    Oedipus Complex����������������������
    Female Oedipal Development���������������������������������
    Male Oedipal Development�������������������������������

    Later Views on Object Relations��������������������������������������
    Margaret Mahler’s View�����������������������������
    Heinz Kohut’s View�������������������������
    John Bowlby’s Attachment Theory��������������������������������������
    Mary Ainsworth and the Strange Situation�����������������������������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Childhood Trauma and Adult Object Relations��������������������������������������������������
    Attachment Theory and Adult Relationships������������������������������������������������
    Critique of Object Relations Theory������������������������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 6 Horney: Psychoanalytic Social Theory�����������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Psychoanalytic Social Theory�����������������������������������������������
    Biography of Karen Horney��������������������������������
    Introduction to Psychoanalytic Social Theory���������������������������������������������������
    Horney and Freud Compared��������������������������������
    The Impact of Culture����������������������������
    The Importance of Childhood Experiences����������������������������������������������
    Basic Hostility and Basic Anxiety����������������������������������������
    Compulsive Drives������������������������
    Neurotic Needs���������������������
    Neurotic Trends����������������������
    Moving Toward People���������������������������
    Moving Against People����������������������������
    Moving Away From People������������������������������

    Intrapsychic Conflicts�����������������������������
    The Idealized Self-Image�������������������������������
    The Neurotic Search for Glory������������������������������������
    Neurotic Claims����������������������
    Neurotic Pride���������������������
    Self-Hatred������������������
    Feminine Psychology��������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Developing and Validating a New Measure of Horney’s Neurotic Trends��������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Can Neuroticism Ever Be a Good Thing?��������������������������������������������
    Critique of Horney�������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 7 Erikson: Post-Freudian Theory����������������������������������������������
    Overview of Post-Freudian Theory���������������������������������������
    Biography of Erik Erikson��������������������������������
    The Ego in Post-Freudian Theory��������������������������������������
    Society’s Influence��������������������������
    Epigenetic Principle���������������������������
    Stages of Psychosocial Development�����������������������������������������
    Infancy��������������
    Oral-Sensory Mode������������������������
    Basic Trust Versus Basic Mistrust����������������������������������������
    Hope: The Basic Strength of Infancy������������������������������������������
    Early Childhood����������������������
    Anal-Urethral-Muscular Mode����������������������������������
    Autonomy Versus Shame and Doubt��������������������������������������
    Will: The Basic Strength of Early Childhood��������������������������������������������������
    Play Age���������������
    Genital-Locomotor Mode�����������������������������
    Initiative Versus Guilt������������������������������
    Purpose: The Basic Strength of the Play Age��������������������������������������������������
    School Age�����������������
    Latency��������������
    Industry Versus Inferiority����������������������������������
    Competence: The Basic Strength of the School Age�������������������������������������������������������
    Adolescence������������������
    Puberty��������������
    Identity Versus Identity Confusion�����������������������������������������
    Fidelity: The Basic Strength of Adolescence��������������������������������������������������
    Young Adulthood����������������������
    Genitality�����������������
    Intimacy Versus Isolation��������������������������������
    Love: The Basic Strength of Young Adulthood��������������������������������������������������
    Adulthood����������������
    Procreativity��������������������
    Generativity Versus Stagnation�������������������������������������
    Care: The Basic Strength of Adulthood��������������������������������������������
    Old Age��������������
    Generalized Sensuality�����������������������������
    Integrity Versus Despair�������������������������������
    Wisdom: The Basic Strength of Old Age��������������������������������������������
    Summary of the Life Cycle��������������������������������
    Erikson’s Methods of Investigation�����������������������������������������
    Anthropological Studies������������������������������
    Psychohistory��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Ego Identity Status in Adolescents Across Cultures���������������������������������������������������������
    Does Identity Precede Intimacy?��������������������������������������
    Critique of Erikson��������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 8 Fromm: Humanistic Psychoanalysis�������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Humanistic Psychoanalysis��������������������������������������������
    Biography of Erich Fromm�������������������������������
    Fromm’s Basic Assumptions��������������������������������
    Human Needs������������������
    Relatedness������������������
    Transcendence��������������������
    Rootedness�����������������
    Sense of Identity������������������������
    Frame of Orientation���������������������������
    Summary of Human Needs�����������������������������
    The Burden of Freedom����������������������������
    Mechanisms of Escape���������������������������
    Authoritarianism�����������������������
    Destructiveness����������������������
    Conformity�����������������
    Positive Freedom�����������������������
    Character Orientations�����������������������������
    Nonproductive Orientations���������������������������������
    Receptive����������������
    Exploitative�������������������
    Hoarding���������������
    Marketing����������������
    The Productive Orientation���������������������������������
    Personality Disorders����������������������������
    Necrophilia������������������
    Malignant Narcissism���������������������������
    Incestuous Symbiosis���������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Fromm’s Methods of Investigation���������������������������������������
    Social Character in a Mexican Village��������������������������������������������
    A Psychohistorical Study of Hitler�����������������������������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Testing the Assumptions of Fromm’s Marketing Character�������������������������������������������������������������
    Estrangement From Culture and Well-Being�����������������������������������������������
    Authoritarianism and Fear��������������������������������
    Critique of Fromm������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������

    PART III Humanistic/Existential Theories�����������������������������������������������
    Chapter 9 Maslow: Holistic-Dynamic Theory������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Holistic-Dynamic Theory������������������������������������������
    Biography of Abraham H. Maslow�������������������������������������
    Maslow’s View of Motivation����������������������������������
    Hierarchy of Needs�������������������������
    Physiological Needs��������������������������
    Safety Needs�������������������
    Love and Belongingness Needs�����������������������������������
    Esteem Needs�������������������
    Self-Actualization Needs�������������������������������
    Aesthetic Needs����������������������
    Cognitive Needs����������������������
    Neurotic Needs���������������������
    General Discussion of Needs����������������������������������
    Reversed Order of Needs������������������������������
    Unmotivated Behavior���������������������������
    Expressive and Coping Behavior�������������������������������������
    Deprivation of Needs���������������������������
    Instinctoid Nature of Needs����������������������������������
    Comparison of Higher and Lower Needs�������������������������������������������

    Self-Actualization�������������������������
    Maslow’s Quest for the Self-Actualizing Person�����������������������������������������������������
    Criteria for Self-Actualization��������������������������������������
    Values of Self-Actualizers���������������������������������
    Characteristics of Self-Actualizing People�������������������������������������������������
    More Efficient Perception of Reality�������������������������������������������
    Acceptance of Self, Others, and Nature���������������������������������������������
    Spontaneity, Simplicity, and Naturalness�����������������������������������������������
    Problem-Centering������������������������
    The Need for Privacy���������������������������
    Autonomy���������������
    Continued Freshness of Appreciation������������������������������������������
    The Peak Experience��������������������������
    Gemeinschaftsgefühl��������������������������
    Profound Interpersonal Relations���������������������������������������
    The Democratic Character Structure�����������������������������������������
    Discrimination Between Means and Ends��������������������������������������������
    Philosophical Sense of Humor�����������������������������������
    Creativeness�������������������
    Resistance to Enculturation����������������������������������
    Love, Sex, and Self-Actualization����������������������������������������
    Maslow’s Psychology and Philosophy of Science����������������������������������������������������
    Measuring Self-Actualization�����������������������������������
    The Jonah Complex������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Mindfulness and Self-Actualization�����������������������������������������
    Positive Psychology��������������������������
    Critique of Maslow�������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 10 Rogers: Person-Centered Theory������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Client-Centered Theory�����������������������������������������
    Biography of Carl Rogers�������������������������������
    Person-Centered Theory�����������������������������
    Basic Assumptions������������������������
    Formative Tendency�������������������������
    Actualizing Tendency���������������������������
    The Self and Self-Actualization��������������������������������������
    The Self-Concept�����������������������
    The Ideal Self���������������������
    Awareness����������������
    Levels of Awareness��������������������������
    Denial of Positive Experiences�������������������������������������
    Becoming a Person������������������������
    Barriers to Psychological Health���������������������������������������
    Conditions of Worth��������������������������
    Incongruence�������������������
    Vulnerability��������������������
    Anxiety and Threat�������������������������
    Defensiveness��������������������
    Disorganization����������������������

    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Conditions�����������������
    Counselor Congruence���������������������������
    Unconditional Positive Regard������������������������������������
    Empathic Listening�������������������������
    Process��������������
    Stages of Therapeutic Change�����������������������������������
    Theoretical Explanation for Therapeutic Change�����������������������������������������������������
    Outcomes���������������
    The Person of Tomorrow�����������������������������
    Philosophy of Science����������������������������
    The Chicago Studies��������������������������
    Hypotheses�����������������
    Method�������������
    Findings���������������
    Summary of Results�������������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Self-Discrepancy Theory������������������������������
    Motivation and Pursuing One’s Goals������������������������������������������
    Critique of Rogers�������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 11 May: Existential Psychology���������������������������������������������
    Overview of Existential Psychology�����������������������������������������
    Biography of Rollo May�����������������������������
    Background of Existentialism�����������������������������������
    What Is Existentialism?������������������������������
    Basic Concepts���������������������
    Being-in-the-World�������������������������
    Nonbeing���������������

    The Case of Philip�������������������������
    Anxiety��������������
    Normal Anxiety���������������������
    Neurotic Anxiety�����������������������
    Guilt������������
    Intentionality���������������������
    Care, Love, and Will���������������������������
    Union of Love and Will�����������������������������
    Forms of Love��������������������
    Sex����������
    Eros�����������
    Philia�������������
    Agape������������

    Freedom and Destiny��������������������������
    Freedom Defined����������������������
    Forms of Freedom�����������������������
    Existential Freedom��������������������������
    Essential Freedom������������������������
    What Is Destiny?�����������������������
    Philip’s Destiny�����������������������
    The Power of Myth������������������������
    Psychopathology����������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Threats in the Umwelt: Mortality Salience and Denial of Our Animal Nature��������������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Finding Meaning in the Mitwelt: Attachment and Close Relationships�������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Growth in the Eigenwelt: There Is an Upside to Mortality Awareness�������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Critique of May����������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������

    PART IV Dispositional Theories�������������������������������������
    Chapter 12 Allport: Psychology of the Individual�������������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Allport’s Psychology of the Individual���������������������������������������������������������
    Biography of Gordon Allport����������������������������������
    Allport’s Approach to Personality Theory�����������������������������������������������
    What Is Personality?���������������������������
    What Is the Role of Conscious Motivation?������������������������������������������������
    What Are the Characteristics of a Healthy Person?��������������������������������������������������������
    Structure of Personality�������������������������������
    Personal Dispositions����������������������������
    Levels of Personal Dispositions��������������������������������������
    Cardinal Dispositions����������������������������
    Central Dispositions���������������������������
    Secondary Dispositions�����������������������������
    Motivational and Stylistic Dispositions����������������������������������������������
    Proprium���������������
    Motivation�����������������
    A Theory of Motivation�����������������������������
    Functional Autonomy��������������������������
    Perseverative Functional Autonomy����������������������������������������
    Propriate Functional Autonomy������������������������������������
    Criterion for Functional Autonomy����������������������������������������
    Processes That Are Not Functionally Autonomous�����������������������������������������������������

    The Study of the Individual����������������������������������
    Morphogenic Science��������������������������
    The Diaries of Marion Taylor�����������������������������������
    Letters From Jenny�������������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Understanding and Reducing Prejudice�������������������������������������������
    Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation����������������������������������������������������
    Religious Motivation and Mental Health���������������������������������������������
    Religious Motivation and Physical Health�����������������������������������������������

    Critique of Allport��������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 13 McCrae and Costa’s Five-Factor Trait Theory�������������������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Trait and Factor Theories��������������������������������������������
    The Pioneering Work of Raymond B. Cattell������������������������������������������������
    Basics of Factor Analysis��������������������������������
    The Big Five: Taxonomy or Theory?����������������������������������������
    Biographies of Robert R. McCrae and Paul T. Costa, Jr.�������������������������������������������������������������
    In Search of the Big Five��������������������������������
    Five Factors Found�������������������������
    Description of the Five Factors��������������������������������������
    Evolution of the Five-Factor Theory������������������������������������������
    Units of the Five-Factor Theory��������������������������������������
    Core Components of Personality�������������������������������������
    Basic Tendencies�����������������������
    Characteristic Adaptations���������������������������������
    Self-Concept�������������������
    Peripheral Components����������������������������
    Biological Bases�����������������������
    Objective Biography��������������������������
    External Influences��������������������������
    Basic Postulates�����������������������
    Postulates for Basic Tendencies��������������������������������������
    Postulates for Characteristic Adaptations������������������������������������������������

    Related Research�����������������������
    Personality and Academic Performance�������������������������������������������
    Traits, Internet Use, and Well-Being�������������������������������������������
    Traits and Emotions��������������������������
    Critique of Trait and Factor Theories��������������������������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������

    PART V Biological/Evolutionary Theories����������������������������������������������
    CHAPTER 14 Eysenck’s Biologically Based Factor Theory������������������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Biologically Based Trait Theory��������������������������������������������������
    Biography of Hans J. Eysenck�����������������������������������
    Eysenck’s Factor Theory������������������������������
    Criteria for Identifying Factors���������������������������������������
    Hierarchy of Behavior Organization�����������������������������������������
    Dimensions of Personality��������������������������������
    Extraversion�������������������
    Neuroticism������������������
    Psychoticism�������������������
    Measuring Personality����������������������������
    Biological Bases of Personality��������������������������������������
    Personality as a Predictor���������������������������������
    Personality and Behavior�������������������������������
    Personality and Disease������������������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    The Biological Basis of Extraversion�������������������������������������������
    The Biological Basis of Neuroticism������������������������������������������
    Critique of Eysenck’s Biologically Based Theory������������������������������������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    CHAPTER 15 Buss: Evolutionary Theory of Personality����������������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Evolutionary Theory��������������������������������������
    Biography of David Buss������������������������������
    Principles of Evolutionary Psychology��������������������������������������������
    Evolutionary Theory of Personality�����������������������������������������
    The Nature and Nurture of Personality��������������������������������������������
    Adaptive Problems and their Solutions (Mechanisms)���������������������������������������������������������
    Evolved Mechanisms�������������������������
    Motivation and Emotion as Evolved Mechanisms���������������������������������������������������
    Personality Traits as Evolved Mechanisms�����������������������������������������������
    Origins of Individual Differences����������������������������������������
    Environmental Sources����������������������������
    Heritable/Genetic Sources��������������������������������
    Nonadapative Sources���������������������������
    Maladaptive Sources��������������������������
    Neo-Bussian Evolutionary Theories of Personality�������������������������������������������������������
    Common Misunderstandings in Evolutionary Theory������������������������������������������������������
    Evolution Implies Genetic Determinism (Behavior as Set in Stone and Void of Influence From the Environment)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Executing Adaptations Requires Conscious Mechanisms����������������������������������������������������������
    Mechanisms Are Optimally Designed����������������������������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Temperament and the Pre- and Post-Natal Environment����������������������������������������������������������
    Genetics and Personality�������������������������������
    Animal Personality�������������������������
    Critique of Evolutionary Theory of Personality�����������������������������������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������

    PART VI Learning-Cognitive Theories������������������������������������������
    Chapter 16 Skinner: Behavioral Analysis����������������������������������������������
    Overview of Behavioral Analysis��������������������������������������
    Biography of B. F. Skinner���������������������������������
    Precursors to Skinner’s Scientific Behaviorism�����������������������������������������������������
    Scientific Behaviorism�����������������������������
    Philosophy of Science����������������������������
    Characteristics of Science���������������������������������
    Conditioning�������������������
    Classical Conditioning�����������������������������
    Operant Conditioning���������������������������
    Shaping��������������
    Reinforcement��������������������
    Positive Reinforcement�����������������������������
    Negative Reinforcement�����������������������������
    Punishment�����������������
    Effects of Punishment����������������������������
    Punishment and Reinforcement Compared��������������������������������������������
    Conditioned and Generalized Reinforcers����������������������������������������������
    Schedules of Reinforcement���������������������������������
    Fixed-Ratio������������������
    Variable-Ratio���������������������
    Fixed-Interval���������������������
    Variable-Interval������������������������
    Extinction�����������������

    The Human Organism�������������������������
    Natural Selection������������������������
    Cultural Evolution�������������������������
    Inner States�������������������
    Self-Awareness���������������������
    Drives�������������
    Emotions���������������
    Purpose and Intention����������������������������
    Complex Behavior�����������������������
    Higher Mental Processes������������������������������
    Creativity�����������������
    Unconscious Behavior���������������������������
    Dreams�������������
    Social Behavior����������������������
    Control of Human Behavior��������������������������������
    Social Control���������������������
    Self-Control�������������������

    The Unhealthy Personality��������������������������������
    Counteracting Strategies�������������������������������
    Inappropriate Behaviors������������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    How Conditioning Affects Personality�������������������������������������������
    How Personality Affects Conditioning�������������������������������������������
    Mutual Influence Between Personality and Conditioning������������������������������������������������������������
    Critique of Skinner��������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 17 Bandura: Social Cognitive Theory��������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Social Cognitive Theory������������������������������������������
    Biography of Albert Bandura����������������������������������
    Learning���������������
    Observational Learning�����������������������������
    Modeling���������������
    Processes Governing Observational Learning�������������������������������������������������
    Attention����������������
    Representation���������������������
    Behavioral Production����������������������������
    Motivation�����������������
    Enactive Learning������������������������
    Triadic Reciprocal Causation�����������������������������������
    An Example of Triadic Reciprocal Causation�������������������������������������������������
    Chance Encounters and Fortuitous Events����������������������������������������������
    Human Agency�������������������
    Core Features of Human Agency������������������������������������
    Self-Efficacy��������������������
    What Is Self-Efficacy?�����������������������������
    What Contributes to Self-Efficacy?�����������������������������������������
    Mastery Experiences��������������������������
    Social Modeling����������������������
    Social Persuasion������������������������
    Physical and Emotional States������������������������������������
    Proxy Agency�������������������
    Collective Efficacy��������������������������
    Self-Regulation����������������������
    External Factors in Self-Regulation������������������������������������������
    Internal Factors in Self-Regulation������������������������������������������
    Self-Observation�����������������������
    Judgmental Process�������������������������
    Self-Reaction��������������������
    Self-Regulation Through Moral Agency�������������������������������������������
    Redefine the Behavior����������������������������
    Disregard or Distort the Consequences of Behavior��������������������������������������������������������
    Dehumanize or Blame the Victims��������������������������������������
    Displace or Diffuse Responsibility�����������������������������������������

    Dysfunctional Behavior�����������������������������
    Depression�����������������
    Phobias��������������
    Aggression�����������������
    Therapy��������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Self-Efficacy and Diabetes���������������������������������
    Moral Disengagement and Bullying���������������������������������������
    Social Cognitive Theory “Goes Global”��������������������������������������������
    Critique of Bandura��������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 18 Rotter and Mischel: Cognitive Social Learning Theory����������������������������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Cognitive Social Learning Theory���������������������������������������������������
    Biography of Julian Rotter���������������������������������
    Introduction to Rotter’s Social Learning Theory������������������������������������������������������
    Predicting Specific Behaviors������������������������������������
    Behavior Potential�������������������������
    Expectancy�����������������
    Reinforcement Value��������������������������
    Psychological Situation������������������������������
    Basic Prediction Formula�������������������������������
    Predicting General Behaviors�����������������������������������
    Generalized Expectancies�������������������������������
    Needs������������
    Categories of Needs��������������������������
    Recognition-Status�������������������������
    Dominance����������������
    Independence�������������������
    Protection-Dependency����������������������������
    Love and Affection�������������������������
    Physical Comfort�����������������������
    Need Components����������������������
    Need Potential���������������������
    Freedom of Movement��������������������������
    Need Value�����������������
    General Prediction Formula���������������������������������
    Internal and External Control of Reinforcement�����������������������������������������������������
    Interpersonal Trust Scale��������������������������������
    Maladaptive Behavior���������������������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    Changing Goals���������������������
    Eliminating Low Expectancies�����������������������������������
    Introduction to Mischel’s Personality Theory���������������������������������������������������
    Biography of Walter Mischel����������������������������������
    Background of the Cognitive-Affective Personality System���������������������������������������������������������������
    Consistency Paradox��������������������������
    Person-Situation Interaction�����������������������������������
    Cognitive-Affective Personality System���������������������������������������������
    Behavior Prediction��������������������������
    Situation Variables��������������������������
    Cognitive-Affective Units��������������������������������
    Encoding Strategies��������������������������
    Competencies and Self-Regulatory Strategies��������������������������������������������������
    Expectancies and Beliefs�������������������������������
    Goals and Values�����������������������
    Affective Responses��������������������������

    Related Research�����������������������
    Locus of Control and Holocaust Heroes��������������������������������������������
    Person-Situation Interaction�����������������������������������
    Marshmallows and Self-Regulation Across the Lifespan�����������������������������������������������������������
    Critique of Cognitive Social Learning Theory���������������������������������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������
    Chapter 19 Kelly: Psychology of Personal Constructs����������������������������������������������������������
    Overview of Personal Construct Theory��������������������������������������������
    Biography of George Kelly��������������������������������
    Kelly’s Philosophical Position�������������������������������������
    Person as Scientist��������������������������
    Scientist as Person��������������������������
    Constructive Alternativism���������������������������������
    Personal Constructs��������������������������
    Basic Postulate����������������������
    Supporting Corollaries�����������������������������
    Similarities Among Events��������������������������������
    Differences Among People�������������������������������
    Relationships Among Constructs�������������������������������������
    Dichotomy of Constructs������������������������������
    Choice Between Dichotomies���������������������������������
    Range of Convenience���������������������������
    Experience and Learning������������������������������
    Adaptation to Experience�������������������������������
    Incompatible Constructs������������������������������
    Similarities Among People��������������������������������
    Social Processes�����������������������

    Applications of Personal Construct Theory������������������������������������������������
    Abnormal Development���������������������������
    Threat�������������
    Fear�����������
    Anxiety��������������
    Guilt������������
    Psychotherapy��������������������
    The Rep Test�������������������
    Related Research�����������������������
    Gender as a Personal Construct�������������������������������������
    Applying Personal Construct Theory to Intra-Personal Questions of Identity���������������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Understanding Internalized Prejudice Through Personal Construct Theory�����������������������������������������������������������������������������
    Reducing the Threat to Feminist Identification�����������������������������������������������������
    Personal Constructs and the Big Five�������������������������������������������
    Critique of Kelly������������������������
    Concept of Humanity��������������������������

    Glossary���������������
    References�����������������
    Name Index�����������������
    Subject Index��������������������

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