Choose ONE
REMEMBER YOU NEED TO REFERENCE 2 CLASS READINGS TO ANSWER ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
1) Describe the 4 types of vulnerabilities discussed in the Coppola chapter 3 reading on Risk and Vulnerability. Explain the relationship between these vulnerabilities and disaster consequences using one other reading from this week.
2) Discuss 2 opportunities and 2 challenges of disaster management in developing countries as discussed by Kunreuther, H., & Useem, M. (2009) and one any other readings from this week.
Requirements: Identify the question you decide to answer at the top of your post. Prompt responses should answer the question and elaborate in a meaningful way using 2 of the weekly class readings (250 words of original content). Do not quote the readings, paraphrase and cite them using APA style in text citations. You can only use ONE multimedia source for your minimum 2 sources each week. The readings must be from the current week. The more sources you use, the more convincing your argument. Include a reference list in APA style at the end of your post, does not count towards minimum word content.
Introduction to International
Disaster Management
Third Edition
Damon P. Coppola
AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON
NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
1Introduction to International Disaster Management. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801477-6.00001-
0
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
CHAPTER
THE MANAGEMENT
OF DISASTERS 1
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of our existence. In response, individuals and societies
alike have made many attempts to decrease their exposure to the consequences of these disasters. All of these
efforts have the same goal: disaster management. The motivating concepts that guide disaster management—the
reduction of harm to life, property, and the environment—are largely the same throughout the world. Whether due
to political, cultural, economic, or other reasons, the unfortunate reality is that some countries and some regions
are more capable than others at addressing the problem. Furthermore, the emergence of a global economy makes
it increasingly difficult to contain the consequences of any disaster within one country’s
borders.
This chapter
examines basic concepts of disaster management and expands upon those concepts to specifically address the
management of international disasters, which is a complex discipline. Like disaster management on the national
level, it involves actions that seek to mitigate the effects of hazards, ensures that populations are prepared for
disasters should they occur, facilitates the response to disasters that do occur, and helps nations and people recover
in the months and years following disaster events. The chapter provides a brief history of disaster management. To
illustrate the disparity in the effects of disasters around the world, an examination of the global impact of disasters
has also been carried out.
Key Terms: civil defense; complex humanitarian emergency; disaster; disaster management; disaster trends;
emergency management; history of emergency management; mitigation; preparedness response; recovery.
INTRODUCTION
Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of our existence. In response, individuals
and societies alike have made many attempts to decrease their exposure to the consequences of these
disasters, developing measures to address initial impact as well as post-disaster response and recov-
ery needs. Regardless of the approach adopted, all of these efforts have the same goal: disaster
management.
The motivating concepts that guide disaster management—the reduction of harm to life, property,
and the environment—are largely the same throughout the world. However, the capacity to carry out
this mission is by no means uniform. Whether due to political, cultural, economic, or other reasons,
the unfortunate reality is that some countries and some regions are more capable than others at
addressing the problem. But no nation, regardless of its wealth or influence, is advanced enough to
be fully immune from disasters’ negative effects. Furthermore, the emergence of a global economy
makes it more and more difficult to contain the consequences of any disaster within one country’s
borders.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS2
This chapter examines basic concepts of disaster management and expands upon those concepts to
specifically address the management of international disasters. A brief history of disaster management
is provided for context. To illustrate the disparity in the effects of disasters around the world, an exami-
nation of the global impact of disasters follows. Finally, several relevant terms used throughout this text
are defined.
DISASTERS THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Disasters are not merely ornamental or interesting events that adorn our collective historical record—
these disruptions have served to guide and shape it. Entire civilizations have been decimated in an
instant. Time and time again, epidemics and pandemics have resulted in sizable reductions of the
world’s population, as much as 50 percent across Europe during the fourteenth century bubonic plague
(Black Plague) pandemic. Theorists have even ventured to suggest that many of history’s great civiliza-
tions, including the Mayans, the Norse, the Minoans, and the Old Egyptian Empire, were ultimately
brought to their knees not by their enemies but by the effects of floods, famines, earthquakes, tsunamis,
El Niño events, and other widespread disasters (Fagan 1999). A worldwide drought in the eighth and
ninth centuries, caused by shifts in the yearly monsoons and resulting in mass crop failure and subse-
quent starvation, is now believed to have been behind the fall of both the Mayan empire in Mexico and
the Tang dynasty in China (Sheridan 2007). From a modern perspective, each of the catastrophic events
that has occurred as of late, including the December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami (over 230,000
killed), the 2005 Kashmir earthquake (80,000 killed), the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in China (68,000
killed), the 2008 Cyclone Nargis (135,000 killed), the 2010 Haiti earthquake (perhaps as many as
200,000 killed), and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (16,000 killed) might seem anomalous, but
these disastrous events are not close to record-breaking, or even unique, in the greater historical context.
(See table 1.1.)
Table 1.1 Selected Notable Disasters throughout History
Disaster Year Number Kille
d
Mediterranean earthquake (Egypt and Syria) 1201 1,100,000
Shaanxi earthquake (China) 1556 830,000
Calcutta typhoon (India) 1737 300,000
Caribbean hurricane (Martinique, St. Eustatius, Barbados) 1780 22,000
Tamboro volcano (Indonesia) 1815 80,000
Influenza epidemic (world) 1917 20,000,000
Yangtze River flood (China) 1931 3,000,000
Famine (Russia) 1932 5,000,000
Bangladesh cyclone (Bangladesh) 1970 300,000
Tangshan earthquake (China) 1976 655,000
Source: St. Louis University, 1997; NBC News, 2004.
3
THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
ANCIENT HISTORY
Hazards, and the disasters that often result, have not always existed. To qualify as a hazard, an action,
event, or object must maintain a positive likelihood of affecting humans or possibly have a consequence
that may adversely affect humans’ existence. Until humans existed on the planet, neither the likelihood
nor the consequence factors of hazards were calculable; thus their presence is negated.
With the appearance of humans, however, followed the incidence of hazards and disasters. Archeo-
logical discovery has shown that our prehistoric ancestors faced many of the same risks that exist today:
starvation, inhospitable elements, dangerous wildlife, violence at the hands of other humans, disease,
accidental injuries, and more. These early inhabitants did not, however, sit idly by and become easy
victims. Evidence indicates that they took measures to reduce, or mitigate, their risks. The mere fact
that they chose to inhabit caves is testament to this theory.
Various applications of disaster management appear throughout the historical record. The story of
Noah’s ark from the Old Testament, for example, is a lesson in the importance of warning, prepared-
ness, and mitigation. In this tale, believed to be based at least partly on actual events, Noah is warned
of an approaching flood. He and his family prepare for the impending disaster by constructing a floating
ark. The protagonist in this story even attempts to mitigate the impact on the planet’s biodiversity by
collecting two of each species and placing them within the safety of the ark. These individuals are
rewarded for their actions by surviving the disastrous flood. Those who did not perform similar actions,
the story tells us, perished.
Evidence of risk management practices can be found as early as 3200 BC. In what is now modern-
day Iraq lived a social group known as the Asipu. When community members faced a difficult decision,
especially one involving risk or danger, they could appeal to the Asipu for advice. The Asipu, using a
process similar to modern-day hazards risk management, would first analyze the problem at hand, then
propose several alternatives, and finally give possible outcomes for each alternative (Covello and
Mumpower 1985). Today, this methodology is referred to as decision analysis, and it is key to any
comprehensive risk management endeavor.
Early history is also marked by incidents of organized emergency response. For example, when in
AD 79 the volcano Vesuvius began erupting, two towns in its shadow—Herculaneum and Pompeii—
faced an impending catastrophe. Although Herculaneum, which was at the foot of the volcano and
therefore directly in the path of its lava flow, was buried almost immediately, the majority of Pompeii’s
population survived. This was because the citizens of Pompeii had several hours before the volcano
covered their city in ash, and evidence suggests that the city’s leaders organized a mass evacuation. The
few who refused to leave suffered the ultimate consequence, and today lie as stone impressions in an
Italian museum.
MODERN ROOTS
All-hazards disaster and emergency management, wherein a comprehensive approach is applied to
address most or all of a community’s hazard risks, are relatively new. However, many of the concepts
that guide today’s practice can be traced to the achievements of past civilizations. While the manage-
ment of disasters during the past few thousand years was limited to single acts or programs addressing
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS4
individual hazards, many of these accomplishments were quite organized, comprehensive, and surpris-
ingly effective at reducing both human suffering and damage to the built environment. See the follow-
ing examples.
Floods have always confounded human settlements. However, archeologists have found evidence in
several distinct and unrelated locations that early civilizations made attempts to formally address the
flood hazard. One of the most celebrated of these attempts occurred in Egypt during the reign of
Amenemhet III (1817–1722 BC). Amenemhet III created what has been described as history’s first
substantial river control project. Using a system of over 200 “water wheels,” some of which remain to
this day, the pharaoh effectively diverted the annual floodwaters of the Nile River into Lake Moeris. In
doing so, the Egyptians were able to reclaim over 153,000 acres of fertile land that would have otherwise
served no use (Quarantelli 1995; ESIS n.d.).
The roots of the modern fire department trace back 2,000 years to when the city of Rome was nearly
destroyed by fire. Before this event, slaves had been tasked with fighting fires, and their poor training, lack
of equipment, and understandable lack of motivation made them highly ineffective. Following the great
fire, Emperor Augustus established a formal, city-wide firefighting unit from within the Roman army
called the Corps of Vigiles. As a result, the firefighting profession became highly respected and, likewise,
highly effective, and was emulated throughout the vast Roman Empire for 500 years. The structure of this
organization was quite similar to many fire departments today, with members filling job-specific roles.
(See exhibit 1.1.) With the fall of Rome, however, came the disappearance of the Corps of Vigiles, and
organized firefighting did not appear anywhere in the world for another 1,000 years.
The Incas, who lived throughout the Andes region in South America during the thirteenth to fif-
teenth centuries, practiced a form of urban planning that focused on their need to defend themselves
from enemy attack. Many of the Incan cities were located at the peaks of rugged, although easily defen-
sible, mountains. The prime example of their architectural achievement is the fortress of Machu Picchu.
However, in locating their cities upon mountaintops and other similar areas, the Incas merely replaced
one man-made hazard with a whole range of environmental hazards. To facilitate life on this extreme
terrain, the Incas developed an innovative form of land terracing that not only conserved water in their
unpredictable climate but also protected their crops—and thus their existence—from the landslides that
occurred during periods of heavy precipitation.
As later eras are examined, still more examples of methods created to address specific hazards
and their consequences emerge. One of the greatest and most effective forms of disaster mitigation
in history is the collective effort of the British and Indian governments, which sought to reduce
Indians’ annual suffering and starvation that occurred as a result of regular drought patterns. These
famines became so devastating during the late nineteenth century that up to a million people were
dying of starvation each year. A government study found that sufficient food existed throughout
EXHIBIT 1.1 JOB TITLES WITHIN THE ROMAN CORPS OF VIGILES
Aquarius: The firefighter whose main duties were the supply of water to the siphos or pumps and the organization of
“bucket chains.”
Siphonarius: The firefighter who was responsible for the supervision and operation of the water pumps.
Uncinarius: The firefighter who was a “hook” man, who carried a large fire hook for pulling off burning roofs.
Source: FFCA, 2014.
5 THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
the country to feed the nation’s entire population at all times, but insufficient capacity to distribute
these resources led to location-specific shortages. To address these problems, planning committees
were formed to develop various preventive measures, including a rapid expansion of the extensive
railway system that crisscrosses the country (to quickly transport food), the adoption of a method
by which indicators of emerging needs were identified and logged in a central repository, and
greater monitoring of public health. So effective at controlling famine were these measures that
many remain in force today. How much of a positive role was played by India’s acclaimed railroad,
which connects almost every settlement nationwide, continues to be debated. (Keniston 2007;
Sweeney 2008).
CIVIL DEFENSE: THE BIRTH OF MODERN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
There is no global formula that explains how the countries of the world developed their disaster
management capacities. However, there is one particular period in recent history that witnessed the
greatest overall move toward a centralized safeguarding of citizens—the Civil Defense era. (See
figure 1.1.)
FIGURE 1.1
Civil defense era poster, Pennsylvania, United
States.
Source: Library of Congress, 2000.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS6
Modern disaster management, in terms of the emergence of global standards and organized efforts
to address preparedness, mitigation, and response activities for a wide range of disasters, did not begin
to emerge until the mid-twentieth century. In most countries, this change materialized as a response to
specific disaster events. At the same time, it was further galvanized by a shift in social philosophy, in
which the government played an increasing role in preventing and responding to disasters. The legal
foundation that allowed for such a shift was the result of advances in warfare technology.
In response to the threat posed by air raids and the ever-present and dreadful prospect of a nuclear
attack, many industrialized nations’ governments began to form elaborate systems of civil defense.
These systems included detection mechanisms, early warning alarms, hardened shelters, search and
rescue teams, and local and regional coordinators. Most nations’ legislatures also established legal
frameworks to guide both the creation and maintenance of these systems through the passage of
laws, the creation of national-level civil defense organizations, and the allocation of funding and
personnel.
Despite these impressive efforts, surprisingly few civil defense units evolved over time into more
comprehensive disaster or emergency management organizations (Quarantelli 1995). But the legal
framework developed to support them remained in place and formed the basis for modern disaster and
emergency management as we know it today. For example:
• Great Britain’s disaster management agency traces its roots to the Civil Defense Act of 1948.
• Canada’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP)
grew out of the Canadian Civil Defense Organization created in 1948.
• The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grew out of the Federal
Civil Defense Act of 1950.
• France’s civil protection is a product of that nation’s 1950 Ordinance and the 1965 Decree Relat-
ing to Civil
Defense.
• Algeria Civil Protection grew out of the 1964 Decree on the Administrative Organization of Civil
Defense.
CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
National emergency management capacity began to take a more centralized role in the 1970s and ‘80s
as countries focused on the creation of national-level emergency management systems. Many devel-
oped their disaster management capabilities out of necessity and an acceptance of the need to formalize
both the authority and budget for an agency to address blatant disaster risk. Other countries formed
their disaster management structures not for civil defense, but after being spurred into action by popular
criticism for poor management of a natural disaster (e.g., Peru in 1970, Nicaragua in 1972, and
Guatemala in 1976 following destructive earthquakes in each country).
And yet others, to a diminishing degree, still have no real emergency management structure to speak
of, irrespective of their disaster history.
THE INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
On December 11, 1987, the United Nations General Assembly declared the 1990s to be the “Interna-
tional Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction” (IDNDR). This action was taken to promote internation-
ally coordinated efforts to reduce material losses and social and economic disruption caused by natural
7 CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
disasters, especially in developing countries, through capacity building. On December 22, 1989,
through UN Resolution 44/236, the General Assembly set forth the goals they wished to achieve during
the Decade. In addition to establishing a special UN office in Geneva to coordinate associated activi-
ties, the resolution directed the various UN agencies to:
• improve the capacity of each country to mitigate the effects of natural disasters expeditiously and
effectively, paying special attention to assisting developing countries in the assessment of disaster
damage potential and in the establishment of early warning systems and disaster-resistant struc-
tures when and where needed;
• devise appropriate guidelines and strategies for applying existing scientific and technical knowl-
edge, taking into account the cultural and economic diversity among nations;
• foster scientific and engineering endeavors aimed at closing critical gaps in knowledge in order to
reduce loss of life and property;
• disseminate existing and new technical information related to measures for the assessment, pre-
diction, and mitigation of natu
ral disasters;
• develop measures for the assessment, prediction, prevention, and mitigation of natural disasters
through programmes of technical assistance and technology transfer, demonstration projects, and
education and training, tailored to specific disasters and locations, and to evaluate the effective-
ness of those programs. (United Nations 1989)
It was expected that all participating governments would, at the national level:
• formulate national disaster-mitigation programmes, as well as economic, land use, and insurance
policies for disaster prevention, and particularly in developing countries, to integrate them fully
into their national development programmes;
• participate during the [IDNDR] in concerted international action for the reduction of natural disas-
ters and, as appropriate, establish national committees in cooperation with the relevant scientific
and technological communities and other concerned sectors with a view to attaining the objective
and goals of the
Decade;
• encourage their local administrations to take appropriate steps to mobilize the necessary sup-
port from the public and private sectors and to contribute the achievement of the purposes of the
Decade;
• keep the Secretary-General informed of the plans of their countries and of assistance that can
be provided so that the United Nations may become an international centre for the exchange of
information and the coordination of international efforts concerning activities in support of the
objective and goals of the Decade, thus enabling each State to benefit from the experience of other
countries;
• take measures, as appropriate, to increase public awareness of damage risk probabilities and of the
significance of preparedness, prevention, relief, and short-term recovery activities with respect to
natural disasters, and to enhance community preparedness through education, training, and other
means, taking into account the specific role of the news media;
• pay due attention to the impact of natural disasters on healthcare, particularly to activities to
reduce the vulnerability of hospitals and health centres, as well as the impact on food storage
facilities, human shelter, and other social and economic infrastructure;
• improve the early international availability of appropriate emergency supplies through the storage
or earmarking of such supplies in disaster-prone areas. (United Nations 1989)
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS8
THE YOKOHAMA STRATEGY – GLOBAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
In May 1994, UN member states met at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in
Yokohama, Japan, to assess the progress attained by the IDNDR. At this meeting, they developed the
Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Through this document, the UN affirmed that:
1. Impact of natural disasters in terms of human and economic losses has risen in recent years, and
society in general has become more vulnerable to natural disasters. Those usually most affected
by natural and other disasters are the poor and socially disadvantaged groups in developing
countries, as they are least equipped to cope with them.
2. Disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and relief are four elements which contribute to
and gain from the implementation of sustainable development policies. These elements, along
with environmental protection and sustainable development, are closely interrelated. Therefore,
nations should incorporate them in their development plans and ensure efficient follow-up mea-
sures at the community, national, subregional, regional, and international levels.
3. Disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness are better than disaster response in achiev-
ing [disaster reduction] goals. . . . Disaster response alone is not sufficient, as it yields only
temporary results at a very high cost. We have followed this limited approach for too long. This
has been further demonstrated by the recent focus on response to complex emergencies, which,
although compelling, should not divert from pursuing a comprehensive approach. Prevention
contributes to lasting improvement in safety and is essential to integrated disaster management.
4. The world is increasingly interdependent. All countries shall act in a new spirit of partnership to
build a safer world based on common interests and shared responsibility to save human lives, since
natural disasters do not respect borders. Regional and international cooperation will significantly
enhance our ability to achieve real progress in mitigating disasters through the transfer of technol-
ogy and the sharing of information and joint disaster prevention and mitigation activities. Bilateral
and multilateral assistance and financial resources should be mobilized to support these efforts.
5. The information, knowledge, and some of the technology necessary to reduce the effects of
natural disasters can be available in many cases at low cost and should be applied. Appropriate
technology and data, with the corresponding training, should be made available to all freely and
in a timely manner, particularly to developing countries.
6. Community involvement and their active participation should be encouraged to gain greater
insight into the individual and collective perception of development and risk, and to have a clear
understanding of the cultural and organizational characteristics of each society as well as of its
behaviour and interactions with the physical and natural environment. This knowledge is of the
utmost importance to determine those things which favour and hinder prevention and mitigation
or encourage or limit the preservation of the environment for the development of future genera-
tions, and in order to find effective and efficient means to reduce the impact of disasters.
7. The adopted Yokohama Strategy and related Plan of Action for the rest of the Decade and
beyond:
a. Will note that each country has the sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens from natu-
ral disasters;
b. Will give priority attention to the developing countries, in particular the least developed,
land-locked countries and the small island developing States;
9 CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
c. Will develop and strengthen national capacities and capabilities and, where appropriate,
national legislation for natural and other disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness,
including the mobilization of non-governmental organizations and participation of local
communities;
d. Will promote and strengthen subregional, regional, and international cooperation in activities
to prevent, reduce, and mitigate natural and other disasters, with particular emphasis on:
– Human and institutional capacity-building and strengthening;
– Technology sharing, the collection, the dissemination, and the utilization of information;
– Mobilization of resources.
8. The international community and the United Nations system in particular must provide adequate
support to [natural disaster reduction].
9. The Yokohama Conference is at a crossroad in human progress. In one direction lie the
meagre results of an extraordinary opportunity given to the United Nations and its Member
States. In the other direction, the United Nations and the world community can change
the course of events by reducing the suffering from natural disasters. Action is urgently
needed.
10. Nations should view the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World as a call to action, individually
and in concert with other nations, to implement policies and goals reaffirmed in Yokohama, and
to use the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction as a catalyst for change. (ISDR
1994)
The participating member states accepted the following principles to be applied to disaster manage-
ment within their own countries. The tenth and final principle formalized the requirement that each
nation’s government accept responsibility for protecting its people from the consequences of
disasters:
1. Risk assessment is a required step for the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction
policies and measures.
2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are of primary importance in reducing the need for disaster
relief.
3. Disaster prevention and preparedness should be considered integral aspects of development
policy and planning at national, regional, bilateral, multilateral, and international levels.
4. Development and strengthening of capacities to prevent, reduce, and mitigate disasters [are] top
priority area[s] to be addressed during the Decade so as to provide a strong basis for follow-up
activities [after that period].
5. Early warnings of impending disasters and their effective dissemination using telecommu-
nications, including broadcast services, are key factors to successful disaster prevention and
preparedness.
6. Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels, from the
local community through the national government to the regional and international levels.
7. Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and patterns of development
focused on target groups by appropriate education and training of the whole community.
8. The international community accepts the need to share the necessary technology to prevent,
reduce, and mitigate disaster; this should be made freely available and in a timely manner as an
integral part of technical cooperation.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS10
9. Environmental protection as a component of sustainable development consistent with poverty
alleviation is imperative in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.
10. Each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, infrastructure, and other
national assets from the impact of natural disasters. The international community should dem-
onstrate strong political determination required to mobilize adequate and make efficient use of
existing resources, including financial, scientific, and technological means, in the field of natural
disaster reduction, bearing in mind the needs of the developing countries, particularly the least
developed countries. (ISDR 1994)
THE UN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION
The international community, through the efforts of the UN, named the 1990s the International Decade
for Natural Disaster Reduction to increase awareness of the importance of risk reduction. Following the
positive advances by the UN and member governments during this time, the UN General Assembly
voted in December of 1999 to further their successes by creating the International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (ISDR).
ISDR was created to help create nations, organizations, and communities that are “disaster resil-
ient” by espousing the idea that disaster reduction must be fully interlinked with development. The
ISDR sought to reduce disasters’ human, social, economic, and environmental toll, which was plaguing
rich and poor countries alike (and continues to). To achieve these goals, the ISDR promoted four objec-
tives as tools toward reaching “disaster reduction for all”:
• Increase public awareness about risk, vulnerability, and disaster reduction. The more people,
regional organizations, governments, NGOs, UN entities, representatives of civil society, and
others know about risk, vulnerability, and how to manage the impacts of natural hazards, the more
disaster reduction measures will be implemented in all sectors of society.
• Obtain commitment from public authorities to implement disaster reduction policies and actions.
The more decision makers at all levels commit themselves to disaster reduction policies and
actions, the sooner communities vulnerable to natural disasters will benefit from applied disaster
reduction policies and actions. This requires, in part, a grassroots approach where communities at
risk are fully informed and participate in risk management initiatives.
• Stimulate interdisciplinary and intersectoral partnerships, including the expansion of risk-
reduction networks. The more disaster reduction entities share information on their research and
practices, the more the global body of knowledge and experience will progress. By sharing a
common purpose and through collaborative efforts, the world’s nations will be more resilient to
natural hazards impacts.
• Improve scientific knowledge about disaster reduction. The more we know about the causes
and consequences of natural hazards and related technological and environmental disasters
on societies, the better prepared we are to reduce risks. Bringing the scientific community
and policymakers together allows them to contribute to and complement each others’ work.
(UNISDR 2001)
The ISDR worked with many different UN agencies and outside organizations, as administered by
the IATF/DR and the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the ISDR. These two bodies were formed by the UN
General Assembly through UN Resolutions 54/219 and 56/195 to implement ISDR.
11
THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK
THE HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (HFA)
In 2005, at The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Kobe, Japan, the 168 countries in
attendance adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations
and Communities to Disasters. This action was endorsed by the General Assembly in UN Resolution
60/195. The HFA outlined a 10-year plan that reflected the intention of the global community to take a
more comprehensive, holistic approach to disaster risk reduction. The HFA called for nations to pursue
three strategic goals during the decade of action in order to bring about a substantial and measurable
reduction of disaster losses (fatalities and social, economic, and environmental losses). These goals
were intended to be aligned with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), signifying a recognition
that disaster risk reduction was closely connected with overall national development. The goals included:
• The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning;
• Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms, and capacities to build resilience to
hazards; and
• The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery programs.
The Hyogo Framework also defined five priorities for action and identified the collective and indi-
vidual roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in its implementation and follow-up. These priori-
ties include:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis
for implementation;
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks—and enhance early warning;
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors; and
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
Following the WCDR, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG)
launched a consultative process to consider practical ways of strengthening the ISDR system, building
on existing mandates, institutions, partnerships, and mechanisms, with the key purpose of implementing
the Hyogo Framework for Action. The rationale for strengthening the ISDR and describing it as a sys-
tem of partnerships was based on the need for making substantial progress in implementing a world-
wide disaster risk reduction agenda, which calls for concerted efforts by all stakeholders. The UN Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR; see chapter 10) developed a standard set of comprehensive
indicators against which regions, nations, and local governments could plan for and measure their
actions. In two-year increments, nations self-assessed their progress against the defined measures of
success, and reported this progress to the world community. The tool was called the HFA Monitor, and
the reports that were submitted were (and remain) available on the UNISDR (http://bit.ly/1mK0Rwe).
THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK
In March of 2015 the global community again meets in Japan—this time in the tsunami-impacted city
of Sendai—to look for a way forward in managing global disaster risk. The Third World Conference on
Disaster Risk Reduction will see the culmination of years of preparation for the follow-up to the Hyogo
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS12
Framework for Action in the development of a new global framework. While at the time of publication
this framework had yet to be given a formal title, it is referred to as the post-2015 framework for disas-
ter risk reduction, or more simply as post-HFA.
The post-2015 framework was called upon by UN General Assembly Resolution 66/199. When
nations meet in Sendai, their actions will represent the culmination of hundreds of meetings held in all
regions of the world and scores of reports drafted to define the outstanding needs. The intention is to
continue progress that has been achieved thus far in international cooperation toward achieving disaster
risk reduction. It will build on the knowledge and practice accumulated through the implementation of
each of the previous efforts, including the IDNDR, the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action, the
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and the HFA.
In June of 2014, the UN General Assembly released a document entitled “Suggested Elements for
the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction” that addressed the structure and content of the
framework to be developed and released in March of 2015. Understandably, the proposed purpose of
the future framework was described as being “to manage disaster and climate risk in development at
local, national, regional, and global levels for the resilience of people, communities, and countries”
(United Nations General Assembly 2014). This document proposes several recommendations for the
new framework inclusive of guiding principles, implementation measures, areas of focus (including
public awareness and education, international cooperation, monitoring, reporting, and reviewing), as
well as how to perform the transition between the existing and the new framework. But perhaps most
telling are the global targets and indicators for the new framework, which include:
• Reducing disaster mortality by half by 2025 (or by a given percentage in a given period of time);
• Reducing disaster economic loss by a given percentage by 2025; and
• Reducing disaster damage to housing, educational, and health facilities by a given percentage by 2025.
MODERN DISASTER MANAGEMENT – A FOUR-PHASE APPROACH
Comprehensive disaster management is based upon four distinct components: mitigation, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery. Although a range of terminology is often used in describing them, effec-
tive disaster management utilizes each component in the following manner:
1. Mitigation. Also called Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), mitigation involves reducing or eliminat-
ing the likelihood or the consequences of a hazard, or both. Mitigation seeks to “treat” the hazard
such that it impacts society to a lesser degree. See chapter 4 for more information.
2. Preparedness. This involves equipping people who may be impacted by a disaster or who may be
able to help those impacted with the tools to increase their chances of survival and to minimize
their financial and other losses. See chapter 5 for more information.
3. Response. This involves taking action to reduce or eliminate the impact of disasters that have
occurred or are currently occurring, in order to prevent further suffering, financial loss, or a
combination of both. Relief, a term commonly used in international disaster management, is one
component of response. See chapter 6 for more information.
4. Recovery. This involves returning victims’ lives back to a normal state following the impact of
disaster consequences. The recovery phase generally begins after the immediate response has
ended, and can persist for months or years thereafter. See chapter 7 for more information.
13
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
Various diagrams illustrate the cyclical nature by which these and other related factors are per-
formed over time, although disagreement exists concerning how such a “disaster management cycle” is
visualized. These diagrams, such as the one in figure 1.2, are generalizations, and it must always be
understood that many exceptions can be identified in each. In practice, all of these factors are inter-
mixed and are performed to some degree before, during, and after disasters. Disasters tend to exist in a
continuum, with the recovery from one often leading straight into another. And while response is often
pictured as beginning immediately after disaster impact, it is not uncommon for the actual response to
begin well before the disaster actually happens.
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
Two separate but interrelated concepts are represented by the term “international disaster manage-
ment”: (1) the study of the diverse emergency and disaster management systems and structures that
exist throughout the world; and (2) the study of disaster management in scenarios where the capacity
of a single nation’s response mechanisms are overwhelmed.
Every country, every government, and every society is unique regarding
• its vulnerabilities and the root causes of such;
• the perception of risk and the methods used to identify and analyze it;
• the institutions, systems, and structures created to manage risk;
• the statutory authorities that guide the management of risk and the management of events that do
actually occur; and
• the mechanisms developed to respond to disaster events and the response capacity of those
mechanisms.
FIGURE 1.2
The disaster management cycle.
Source: Alexander, 2002.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS14
Several times each year, the response requirements of disaster events exceed the disaster manage-
ment abilities of a single nation or several nations. In these instances, the governments of the affected
countries call upon the resources of the international response community. This cooperative interna-
tional response is, by definition, international disaster management.
Over time and through iteration, a recognized and systemic process for responding to interna-
tional disasters has begun to emerge. Standards for response have been developed by multiple
sources, and a recognized group of typical participants has been identified. (See exhibit 1.2.) Through
practice and study, formulaic, methodical processes for assessing both the affected nations’ damage
and their various response needs have been identified, tried, and improved on. What was only 30
years ago a chaotic, ad hoc reaction to international disasters has grown with astounding speed into
a highly effective machine.
It is important to add that disasters do not become international just because they have overwhelmed
a country’s capacity to respond. There must be a commitment on the participants’ part to recognize the
need for international involvement and to accept the appeal made by the host nation’s government. The
sad truth is that, in practice, not all disasters elicit the same level of international interest and response,
whether because of donor fatigue (see chapter 11), media interest, diverted priorities, or other events
that may dilute public interest. The Mozambique floods of 2000 are but one example of a situation in
which the international community was accused of sitting idly by as hundreds of people died. (See
exhibit 1.3.)
Response and recovery alone, however, are not effective means of managing disasters if they are
performed in the absence of a comprehensive regimen of preparedness and mitigation activities.
(See table 1.2.) An important focal shift among the world’s international disaster management
organizations, agencies, and interest groups from disaster response to disaster prevention is evi-
dence of widespread recognition and acceptance of this. Although many national governments,
especially in the developing world, have yet to make a dedicated effort toward initiating or improv-
ing their pre-disaster management activities, many international development and disaster manage-
ment agencies are working to address this issue. The UN, whose members consist of almost every
country in the world, has made a sustained effort to lead its member nations in addressing their
shortfalls: first by dedicating the 1990s to the IDNDR (producing the Yokohama Strategy and the
Plan of Action for a Safer World), and then by following up with the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the Hyogo Framework for Action to ensure that forward momentum
is maintained.
EXHIBIT 1.2 INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PARTICIPANTS
• Victims
• Local first responders
• Governments of the affected countries
• Governments of other countries
• International organizations
• International financial institutions
• Regional organizations and associations
• Nonprofit organizations
• Private organizations—business and industry
• Local and regional donors
15 WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
EXHIBIT 1.3 2000 MOZAMBIQUE FLOODS TIMELINE
February 9 Heavy rain begins falling across most of southern Africa, with Mozambique hit the hardest. The capital,
Maputo, is submerged. Throughout the country, hundreds of thousands of families are left homeless and
stranded. Damage to crops and infrastructure is severe.
February 11 At least 70 people have died due to the flooding. The UN reports that 150,000 people are in immediate
danger from starvation and disease. Dysentery outbreaks are reported outside the capital.
February 22 Tropical cyclone Eline makes a direct hit on the country, worsening the condition in many areas already sub-
merged by the floods. The South African Air Force begins making airlifts to over 23,000 desperate victims.
February 24 The UN makes an appeal for $13 million in immediate relief and $65 million for recovery assistance.
The appeal goes unanswered. Rainfall draining from other parts of southern Africa begins to flow into
Mozambique, worsening already poor conditions.
February 27 More rainfall causes flash floods throughout the country, destroying much of the remaining farmland.
March 2 Floodwaters have risen by up to 26 feet (8 m) in many parts of the country. International aid workers report that
100,000 people are in need of immediate evacuation, and over 7,000 are trapped in trees and need to be rescued
(many have been trapped in the trees for several days without food or clean water). Finally, more than three weeks
after the crisis began, international disaster management agencies begin to send responders and relief assistance.
Source: BBC News, 2000.
Table 1.2 Response and Recovery-Based Management versus Prevention and Risk Reduction-
Based Management
Response and Recovery-Based Efforts Prevention and Risk Reduction-Based Efforts
Primary focus on disaster events Focus on vulnerability and risk issues
Single, event-based scenarios Dynamic, multiple-risk issues and development scenarios
Basic responsibility to respond to an event Fundamental need to assess, monitor, and update expo-
sure to changing conditions
Often fixed, location-specific conditions Extended, changing, shared or regional, local variations
Responsibility in single authority or agency Involves multiple authorities, interests, actors
Command and control, directed operations Situation-specific functions, free and open association
and participation
Established hierarchical relationships Shifting, fluid, and tangential relationships
Often focused on hardware and equipment Dependent on related practices, abilities, and knowledge
base
Dependent on specialized expertise Focused on aligning specialized expertise with public
views and priorities
Urgent, immediate, and short timeframes in outlook,
planning, attention, and returns
Moderate and long timeframes in outlook, planning,
values, and returns
Rapidly changing, dynamic information usage, which is
often conflicting or sensitive in nature
Accumulated, historical, layered, updated, or compara-
tive use of information
Primary, authorized, or singular information sources;
need for definitive facts
Open or public information; multiple, diverse, or chang-
ing sources; differing perspectives and points of view
In-out or vertical flows of information Dispersed, lateral flows of information
Relates to matters of public security, safety Matters of public interest, investment, and safety
Source: Adapted from Jeggle, 2001.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS16
Today, the United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) guides the efforts of the inter-
national community’s overall disaster management mission. (See chapter 10.) Specifically, the UNISDR
seeks to build “disaster resilient communities by promoting increased awareness of the importance of
disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable development, with the goal of reducing
human, social, economic, and environmental losses due to natural hazards and related technological
and environmental disasters” (UNISDR n.d.).
In January 2005, in Hyogo, Japan, the UN held the first World Conference on Disaster Reduc-
tion. More than 4,000 participants attended, including representatives from 168 governments, 78
UN specialized agencies and observer organizations, 161 non-governmental organizations, and
562 journalists from 154 media outlets. The public forum attracted more than 40,000 visitors. The
outcome of the conference was the twenty-four-page Hyogo Framework for Action, adopted by all
member countries, that outlined members’ resolve to pursue “the substantial reduction of disaster
losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and
countries.”
With the adoption of this framework, which coincided with some of the most devastating hazards
and disasters in recent memory, international disaster management climbed to the forefront of the inter-
national policy agenda. UNISDR, through the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, has
increased and maintained international activity to address our growing hazard risk. (See exhibit 1.4.)
For years, the nations of the world have watched as country after country, both rich and poor, have
EXHIBIT 1.4 GLOBAL PLATFORM FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GP) was established by mandate of the UN General Assembly. The GP
is an international meeting that occurs every two years and is attended by the international disaster risk reduction com-
munity, which includes governments, international organizations (including the UN and other regional organizations and
institutions), NGOs, scientific and academic institutions, and the private sector. By mandate, the GP
• assesses progress made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action.
• enhances awareness of disaster risk reduction.
• enables the sharing of experiences and lessons from good practice.
• identifies remaining gaps and recommends targeted action to accelerate national and local implementation.
The first and second sessions of the GP, which occurred in 2007 and 2009, respectively, were attended by more than
152 governments and 137 organizations. These sessions helped to build momentum for national commitments to perform
disaster risk reduction, culminating with the May 2011 GP meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. The benchmarks set out in the
first two meetings focused on five main areas, including the goals to:
1. harmonize disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in the broader context of poverty reduction and sus-
tainable development;
2. reduce community- and local-level risk through partnerships that better recognize the mutual dependence of govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and to promote the role of women as drivers of action (with
special consideration to youth and children’s roles);
3. move toward full implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action through several action targets (e.g., assessments
of and mitigation for educational and health facilities);
4. increase the disaster risk reduction component of national budgets and international development funding (including
humanitarian relief and recovery expenditures), and to improve measurements of the effectiveness of investment in risk
reduction; and
5. continue the efforts of the ISDR in supporting governments and NGOs in their disaster risk reduction efforts.
Based on: PreventionWeb, 2011.
17
DISASTERS, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT
suffered the consequences of terrible disasters. However, it has not been until recently that world lead-
ers have begun to fully grasp that many of these consequences could have been reduced through better
mitigation and preparedness efforts and more effective response capabilities. As a result, the field of
international disaster management is now in a position to influence these leaders in a way not previ-
ously possible.
DISASTERS, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and practice support the theory that there exists a strong correlation between disasters and
poverty. It is well documented that those developing countries repeatedly subject to disasters experi-
ence stagnant or even negative rates of development over time. (See figure 1.3.) Hurricane Mitch,
which destroyed as much as 70 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras and Nicaragua (UNISDR
2004), is a prime example, having been blamed with reversing the rates of development in these and
other Central American countries by at least a decade (and as much as 20 and 30 years in some areas;
Oxfam 1998). The same effect has also been witnessed in many of the areas affected by the 2004 tsu-
nami and earthquake events in Southeast Asia and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. (See exhibit 1.5.) For
countries with developing economies, the financial setbacks these events inflict can be ruinous, in con-
trast to their industrialized counterparts, where a robust economy absorbs such impacts. In 2001, for
example, earthquakes occurred in both El Salvador and the United States (Seattle), each causing
approximately $2 billion in damages. While this amount had little or no noticeable impact on the US
economy, the financial consequences in El Salvador amounted to 15 percent of that country’s GDP
(UNDP 2004a).
The aftermath of a disaster exacerbates the debilitating causes of poverty in developing countries.
Each disaster is unique in its consequences, so there is no single formula that can be used to character-
ize precisely how these problems will play out. The following list, however, provides a general
FIGURE 1.3
Impact of disasters on development.
Adapted from ADRC, 2005.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS18
overview of the many ways in which disasters harm poor countries beyond the initial death, injury, and
destruction:
• National and international development efforts are stunted, erased, or even reversed.
• Sizable portions of GDP often must be diverted from development projects, social programs, or
debt repayment to manage the disaster consequences and begin recovery efforts. (See figure 1.4.)
• Vital infrastructure is damaged or destroyed—including roads, bridges, airports, sea ports, com-
munications systems, power generation and distribution facilities, and water and sewage plants—
requiring years to rebuild.
• Schools are damaged or destroyed, leaving students without an adequate source of education for
months or even years.
• Hospitals and clinics are damaged or destroyed, resulting in an increase in vulnerability to disease
of the affected population.
• Formal and informal businesses are destroyed, resulting in surges in unemployment and decreased
economic stability and strength.
• Reconstruction efforts result in shortages of materials and labor, which in turn drive up construc-
tion costs, inflate salaries, and draw workers away from other sectors where they are needed.
• Residents are forced or impelled to leave the affected zone, often never to return, extracting
institutional knowledge, cultural and social identity, and economic viability from areas that cannot
afford to spare such resources.
• Desperation and poverty lead to a rapid upsurge in crime and insecurity.
• A general feeling of hopelessness afflicts the affected population, leading to increased rates of
depression and a lack of motivation to regain independence from outside assistance.
DISASTER TRENDS
Increased accuracy in the reporting of disaster statistics has helped to provide both greater visualization
and confirmation of something many scientists and disaster managers have been warning of for decades:
the nature of disasters is rapidly changing. These changes are generally regarded as a result of human
EXHIBIT 1.5 TSUNAMI SETS BACK DEVELOPMENT 20 YEARS
IN MALDIVES
Within minutes of the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, much of the economic and social progress in the
Maldives was washed away.
According to government officials, the tsunami caused a 20-year setback in the development of this small country, an
island nation off the coast of India, which only six days before the disaster had been removed from the UN’s list of least-
developed countries. In particular, the tsunami and its resulting floodwaters dealt a serious blow to the tourism sector, the
country’s main source of income. Nearly one-fourth of the 87 resorts in the Maldives were severely damaged and declared
unable to operate. Tourism directly accounts for one-third of the country’s economy, with the resorts alone providing
between 25,000 and 30,000 jobs. When tourism-related tax and customs revenues are included, tourism contributes up to
70 percent of the economy, with the sector expanding each year. These earnings had helped to improve living standards in
the Maldives, including increased school enrollment, lower unemployment, and more students seeking higher education
abroad.
Based on: UNDP, 2005.
19 DISASTER TRENDS
FIGURE 1.4
Selected natural disasters: total damage and share of the GDP between 1991 and 2005.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS20
actions and development patterns. What is troubling is that these trends indicate that more disasters are
occurring each year, with greater intensity, and that a great many more people are affected by them,
either indirectly or directly. And while these disasters are becoming less deadly worldwide, they are
causing a much greater financial impact on both affected and unaffected nations. Finally, and what may
be the most disturbing of these trends, is that the poor countries of the world and their citizens are
assuming a much greater proportion of the impacts of disasters. In sum, recent trends indicate that
• the number of people affected by disasters is rising.
• overall, disasters are becoming less deadly.
• overall, disasters are becoming more costly.
• poor countries are disproportionately affected by disaster consequences.
• the number of disasters is increasing each year.
TREND 1: THE OVERALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS IS RISING
Human settlement has always been directed by the needs of individuals and societies, such as the need
for food, water, defense, and access to commerce. Almost without exception, increased natural hazard
risk has been assumed in favor of these needs, often as result of a confidence that hazard risk can be
accepted as “part of life” or can be effectively managed. Evidence of such behavior is apparent in
almost any example of previous human settlement: communities along rivers build levees; those located
along the sea coasts construct sea walls and jetties; farmers place their houses and sow their crops upon
the fertile slopes of active volcanoes.
However, as the population and size of these settlements grow, the assumed risk becomes more and
more concentrated. The overall rates by which people have relocated from rural areas into cities (urban-
ization) have continued to increase over time. Rising populations in almost all countries of the world
amplify the urbanization effect. In 1950, less than 30 percent of the world’s 2.5 billion people lived in
an urban setting. By 1998, the number of people on earth had grown to 5.7 billion, and 45 percent of
them lived in cities. UN estimates state that by 2025 there will be 8.2 billion people on earth, and more
than 60 percent of them will live in cities (UNFPA 2013; WHO
2014).
When humans settle in high-risk urban areas, the hazard risks they face as individuals increase. As
of the year 2000, it was estimated that at least 75 percent of the world’s population lived in areas at risk
from a major disaster (UNDP 2004a). And because these high-risk areas periodically experience major
disasters, it logically follows that the number of people who are annually affected by disasters (defined
as having their homes, crops, animals, livelihoods, or health impacted) is equally high (UNISDR 2004).
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 display the observed total number of people annually affected by disasters dur-
ing the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Note that, beginning in 1954, there is a significant rise
in the number of people affected. It was during the decade of the 1950s that the mass transition toward
urbanization began in the industrialized nations, a trend that most other nations of the world followed
soon after.
TREND 2: OVERALL, DISASTERS ARE BECOMING LESS DEADLY
The seismic, meteorological, hydrological, and other forces that result in natural hazards are natural
processes that occur irrespective of the actions or existence of humans. Water has overflowed the banks
of rivers since before humans lived beside them. Archeologists and geologists have unearthed evidence
21 DISASTER TRENDS
that earthquake events occurred during every era of the planet’s history. Volcanic activity has been
given as much credit for its role in generating life on earth as it has for destroying it. Natural disasters,
it has therefore been suggested, are merely the result of humans placing themselves directly into the
path of these normal events. (See figures 1.7 and 1.8.) United States Geological Survey (USGS) scien-
tists Susan Hough and Lucile Jones aptly captured this line of thought when they wrote that “earth-
quakes don’t kill people, buildings do” (Hough and Jones 2002).
Humans are adaptable and quickly adjust to the pressures exerted upon them by nature. People have
modified their behaviors and their environments to accommodate their surrounding climate and topog-
raphy, often proving successful at counteracting the negative consequences of common daily hazards
such as rain or extreme temperatures. For less common events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes,
humans have had lower levels of success. Fortunately, modern science has helped to change this fact
significantly, at least in those countries in which the technology and technical expertise is within reach.
Table 1.3 illustrates the success achieved by the United States in adjusting to hurricane risk during the
course of the twentieth century, where death rates fell steadily until the end of the century as explained
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1900–2011
7
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
6
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
5
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
4
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
a
ff
e
c
te
d
1
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 2010
Year
FIGURE 1.5
Total number of people affected by disasters worldwide from 1900 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS22
by several driving forces (including better preparedness, storm tracking, public education, response,
etc.). What is most interesting about this trend is that as we move into the second decade of the twenty-
first century, there is an obvious trend reversal, with the number of US hurricane fatalities reaching
levels that exceed the aggregate of the preceding 60 years. While there are varied theories to explain
such a change, what draws the most support is the belief that this is an unintended consequence of a
post-9/11 shift in US emergency management policy that boosted terrorism prevention at the cost of
natural hazard mitigation and preparedness. Such a consequence only reinforces the theory that global
disaster fatality reduction is the result of our risk reduction efforts.
Globalization and increased international cooperation have helped the world community to more
effectively address risk reduction and limit the human impacts of disasters. Although the number of
disasters has more than tripled since the 1970s, the number of people worldwide who have perished has
fallen by 50 percent (UNISDR 2004). Greater recognition of the importance of emergency management
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1975–2011
7
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
6
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
5
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
4
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
1
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
a
ff
e
c
te
d
Year
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20102005
FIGURE 1.6
Total number of people affected by disasters worldwide from 1975 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
23 DISASTER TRENDS
and sustainable development is turning the tide on disasters. The efforts of the United Nations, the many
non-governmental agencies involved in development and disaster preparedness and response, and the
efforts of individual governments have shown that humans can effectively influence their vulnerability.
There are several explanations for the falling fatality rates of disasters. These include:
• More organized and comprehensive preparedness campaigns are helping individuals and commu-
nities to decrease their vulnerability and to react more appropriately in the face of disaster.
• Early warning systems are giving potential victims more time to leave the dangerous situations
associated with impending disasters.
• Special disaster-specific protection structures, such as tornado safe rooms, are mitigating the
impact that disasters have on human life.
• Building code creation and enforcement are helping to increase the resilience of the various struc-
tures and systems upon which humans depend.
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
k
il
le
d
Number of people reported killed by natural disasters 1900–2011
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 2010
Year
5
0
0
,0
0
0
1
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
1
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
3
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
4
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
FIGURE 1.7
Total number of natural disaster-related deaths reported in the world from 1900 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS24
FIGURE 1.8
Total number of natural disaster-related deaths reported in the world from 1975 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT– International Disaster Database.
Table 1.3 Deaths Attributed to Hurricanes in the United States, 1900–2010
Period Number Killed
1900–1919 10,000 (approximate; exact 1900 Galveston death toll is unknown)
1920–1939 3751
1940–1959 1119
1960–1979 453
1980–1999 82
2000–2014 2200
Source: Thoreau Institute, 2005; FEMA, 1997 (along with other multiple dates).
25 DISASTER TRENDS
• Secondary, post-disaster consequences, such as famine and disease, are more effectively managed
by modern public-health response mechanisms.
• Proper zoning procedures and enforcement are helping to prevent people from moving into the
paths of disasters and helping to remove those who are already there.
• Sustainable development processes are helping to reduce population movement into areas of high-
est risk.
TREND 3: OVERALL, DISASTERS ARE BECOMING MORE COSTLY
The cost of disasters worldwide is increasing at an alarming rate. Twenty-five years ago, the eco-
nomic damage from any given disaster rarely topped the billion-dollar mark, even after accounting
for inflation. Now, several disasters top this mark each year. (See figure 1.9.) By the year 2000, the
FIGURE 1.9
Total amount of reported damages (billion USD at 2009 prices) in the world from 1900 to 2012.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS26
cost of disasters worldwide had topped $60 billion per year, as measured by the international rein-
surance firm Munich Re. In 2013, a new record was set when 41 disasters exceeded $1 billion in
damages worldwide, with all disasters totaling $125 billion. In 2012, while there were fewer bil-
lion-dollar disasters, the total impact of all disasters combined exceeded $175 billion (World Post
2014).
There are many reasons disasters are getting more expensive, including several of the previous
explanations: there are more people in the world, there are more disasters, people are more concentrated
together, and so forth. The fact remains that people continue to move toward urban centers, build
expensive structures and infrastructure in the path of hazards, and try to overcome the risk of disaster
by building structures designed to resist damage. Again consider hurricanes in the United States. Their
basic power and natural characteristics have not changed significantly over time. However, human
settlements in high-risk coastal areas have increased. The result of this human behavior is the rising
costs of hurricane damage during the past 20 years (Riebeek 2005).
There are several explanations for the global increase in financial disaster cost, which include:
• Increasing urbanization in high-risk zones is occurring throughout the world, concentrating
wealth, physical structures, and infrastructure together in high-risk zones.
• Economies are much more dependent upon technologies that tend to fail in times of disaster; one
example is the 2003 northeastern US/Canadian electrical blackout, which resulted in as much as
$6 billion in damages.
• Areas not directly affected are experiencing secondary economic consequences of disaster, as with
many world economies following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.
• A greater number of less deadly but financially destructive disasters are occurring throughout the
world as a result of climate change or other factors.
• Increasing population; the US Census Bureau estimates that the world’s population grew from 3.8
to 6.8 billion between 1950 and 2010.
TREND 4: POOR COUNTRIES ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED
BY DISASTER CONSEQUENCES
Disasters of all kinds strike literally every nation of the world; they do not differentiate between rich
and poor countries. However, developing countries suffer the greatest impact and also most often expe-
rience subsequent internal civil conflict that leads to complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs; see
Definitions). The United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reported in 2011 that 95
percent of the deaths caused by disasters occur in poor countries—a figure that has been steadily rising
for decades. (Lim 2011). What is troubling about this statistic is that the UNDP estimated that only 11
percent of the world’s “at-risk” population can be accounted for in these countries (UNDP 2004a; see
figure 1.10). In fact, on average, 90 percent of disaster-related injuries and deaths are sustained in coun-
tries with per-capita income levels that are below $760 per year (Jha 2010; see figure 1.11).
Based on these facts, inferences can be drawn about a nation’s disaster risk by considering its devel-
opment status. Public health expert Eric Noji identified four primary reasons why the poor in general
are often most at risk.
They (1) are least able to afford housing that can withstand seismic activity; (2) often live along
coasts where hurricanes, storm surges, or earthquake-generated [tsunamis] strike live in
FIGURE 1.10
Total number of deaths and people affected by natural disasters per 100,000 inhabitants from 1974 to 2003.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
FIGURE 1.11
Total amount of economic damages reported in major world aggregates from 1991 to 2005 (billion USD, 2006).
Adapted from EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS28
floodplains subject to inundation; (3) are forced by economic circumstances to live in substandard
housing built on unstable slopes that are susceptible to landslides or are built next to hazardous
industrial sites; and (4) are not educated as to the appropriate lifesaving behaviors or actions that
they can take when a disaster occurs. (Noji 1997)
There are also many secondary reasons that contribute. For instance, injuries sustained in disasters,
and the disease that often follows, are much more likely to lead to death in poor countries, where acute
care may be substandard or nonexistent and the control of disease outbreaks more difficult. The poor
are also likely to suffer greater disaster consequences as the result of minimal or nonexistent enforce-
ment of safety standards, building codes, and zoning regulations. (See figure 1.12.) The full range of
explanations is both extensive and diverse.
Although the importance of disaster preparedness and mitigation is widely recognized by almost all
of the world’s countries, and although these principles are widely applied on a growing basis by inter-
national development agencies, it still comes as no surprise that countries ranking lower on develop-
ment indices place disaster management very low in budgetary priority. These nations’ resources tend
to be focused on social interests such as education and infrastructure or on their military, instead of on
projects that serve a preparatory or mitigation need, such as retrofitting structures with hazard-resistant
construction. Because all disasters, even those that tend to repeat, are chance events and thus not guar-
anteed to happen, disaster management programs in poor countries tend to be viewed as a luxury or
OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Developing countries: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea,
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
Least-developed countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (Western), São Tomé
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu,
Yemen, Zambia.
Source: UNDP, 2004b.
29 DISASTER TRENDS
even superfluous. Compounding this situation, poverty and uncontrolled urbanization force large popu-
lations to concentrate in perilous, high-risk areas that have little or no defense against disasters. Thus,
the difference in the effect of a disaster’s impact in a rich versus poor country is remarkable. Table 1.4
illustrates these differences.
FIGURE 1.12
Number of people killed by disasters by income class between 1991 and 2005 (Note that drought includes
extreme temperature hazards.).
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
Table 1.4 Differences in Disaster Impact between Rich and Poor Countries
Rich Countries Poor Countries
Tend to suffer higher economic losses, but have mecha-
nisms in place to absorb these costs.
Have less at risk in terms of financial value, but maintain
little or no buffer to absorb even low financial impacts.
Economic reverberations can be significant, and social
development ultimately suffers.
Employ mechanisms that reduce loss of life, such as
early warning systems, enforced building codes, and
zoning.
Lack the resources necessary to take advantage of advanced
technologies, and have little ability to enforce building
codes and zoning even if these mechanisms do exist.
Have immediate emergency and medical care that
increase survivability and contain the spread of disease.
Sustain massive primary and secondary casualties.
Transfer much of personal, private, and public risk to
insurance and reinsurance providers.
Generally do not participate in insurance mechanisms.
Divert funds from development programs to emergency
relief and recovery.
Can Poor Countries Afford to Prepare for
Low-Probability Risks?
Michele McNabb, Freeplay Energy
Kristine Pearson, Freeplay Foundation
Overview
This chapter examines how less-developed countries can prepare
for low-probability risks in the face of so many other pressing needs
such as health care, education, clean water, and roads. The case of
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma) is examined, among other
recent disasters. Although it would be easy to vilify the globally
unpopular government of Myanmar and blame it for the deaths of
130,000 people, the truth is more complex. Cyclone Nargis hit a part
of the country with a low probability of cyclones. Can poor countries
like Myanmar build comprehensive cyclone warning systems for
areas that might not face another cyclone for decades or even cen-
turies? What good is a warning system if the people are too poor to
evacuate and roads are nearly nonexistent? With global climate
change, anomalistic weather is projected to increase, meaning
extreme weather events are likely to impact areas previously unaf-
fected. How can early-warning systems be created for every potential
disaster in every region? The authors argue that developing countries
cannot afford to build individual early-warning systems for low-
probability disasters, so they must rely on (1) multihazard warning
systems, (2) disaster risk-reduction education and training, (3) low-
cost/low-technology solutions, and (4) multiuse communication
6
100
From the Library of Daniel Johnson
structures that can serve general development and early-warning
purposes.
Can Poor Countries Afford to Prepare for
Low-Probability Risks?
Natural disasters don’t discriminate between rich people and
poor people. Whether over shacks or mansions, floodwaters rise
evenly, and hurricane winds blow with the same intensity. Yet the
poor, the disenfranchised, and the weak usually suffer the greatest
loss of life and lose a greater proportion of their livelihoods in disas-
ters. The reasons disasters have such disproportional effects on the
poor are clear: They have less ability to prepare for and mitigate the
effects of disasters. They live in flimsy houses. They are likely to hold
any wealth in assets like cattle or jewelry instead of in banks. They
don’t have insurance. Their jobs often depend on the land. They lack
vehicles or money to evacuate quickly. They may lack means of com-
munication to learn of an impending disaster or to plan an escape.
In rich countries, governments normally accept the responsibility
to provide extra assistance to vulnerable groups when a disaster
strikes. When the world’s richest country failed to protect its most
vulnerable citizens as Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, the entire
moral fiber of the country was shaken. Stories of old people aban-
doned by their caregivers and the obvious racial and socioeconomic
composition of people crowded on roof tops and in sports stadiums
caused countless editorials and deep questioning about government’s
duty to protect its own most vulnerable citizens. Barack Obama high-
lighted the moral responsibility of governments when he accepted
the Democratic nomination for president, saying “We are more com-
passionate than a government…that sits on its hands while a major
American city drowns before our eyes.”1
However, what about the governments of poor countries? Do they
not have the same moral responsibility to protect their citizens?
Cyclone Nargis killed 130,000 people in 2008 in Myanmar (Burma).
Although it would be easy to vilify the globally unpopular military gov-
ernment of Myanmar and blame it for the atrocities, the reality is
much more complicated. The government clearly impeded relief
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 101
102 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
operations in the first days after the storm due to a combination of
bureaucracy, paranoia, and paralysis; however, many other factors sug-
gest that blaming the Myanmar government alone would be simplistic.
First, the government’s meteorological department did issue
cyclone warnings, and the excellent international tropical cyclone
warning system functioned well, tracking the storm at sea for 6 days
and sending warnings from the regional center in India to Myanmar
48 hours in advance. It is unclear how many people living in the
Irrawaddy Delta actually received the warnings, but even if they had
received them, the poor roads, lack of transport, and extreme poverty
in the region would have prevented a mass evacuation. If a govern-
ment cannot afford schools, roads, or hospitals, how it is supposed to
protect its citizens from the ravages of nature?
Second, Cyclone Nargis was a highly unusual event, hitting a
part of the country that had not experienced cyclones for decades.2
Parts of Myanmar regularly experience cyclones, but the wide flat
floodplains along the Irrawaddy Delta had not faced a cyclone in
more than 40 years—indeed, the director of a U.S.-based weather
service called Nargis “one of those once-in-every-500-years kind of
things.”3 The storm surge quickly flooded the vast flat plains where
most of the population lives. Although there had been investment
in early warning for high-probability areas, similar investments
were not made in the delta because of the low probability of
cyclones. So how can a poor country prepare itself for events that
might not recur for decades?
Third, some experts claim the unusual trajectory and intensity of
Cyclone Nargis resulted from climate change. The Centre for Science
and Environment in India claimed that Nargis was “not just a natural
disaster, but a human-made disaster caused by climate change.”4
Although most scientists warn again labeling a single event a “sign” of
climate change (extreme, anomalistic events have always occurred),
clear consensus exists that the intensity of severe weather will
increase and that areas previously unaccustomed to cyclones, floods,
heat waves, and so on will face these threats.5 So, does the moral
responsibility for preparing a poor country like Myanmar from
climate-change-induced hazards lie with the poor country or with the
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 103
countries that created the greenhouse gases and caused climate
change?
Finally, some environmentalists pin Nargis’s high death toll on
the destruction of mangrove swamps for rice and shrimp farming;
whereas other experts say years of Western sanctions against the mil-
itary regime had only exacerbated poverty and driven the environ-
mental destruction as millions of desperately poor struggled to
survive. Therefore, protecting the most vulnerable from disasters—
especially low-probability disasters—is exceedingly complex.
State of Early Warning in Developing
Countries: High-Probability Events
Over the past 30 years, significant investment has been made in
early warning throughout the world. Advances in technology have
greatly increased our ability to predict many types of natural hazards.
Scientists have a much greater understanding of the earth’s weather
systems thanks to satellites, sensors, radar, and computer modeling.
Global cooperation has led to major improvements in short- and long-
term forecasting, with rich and poor countries working together to
share resources and knowledge. The global tropical cyclone6 warning
system described next is perhaps the best example of the benefits of
global technical and scientific collaboration in early warning.
Although there is room for improvement in nearly every early-
warning system, most countries have at least rudimentary ability to
provide warnings for high-probability events—events that have hap-
pened regularly in the past and are expected to continue. Many flood-
prone countries operate flood early-warning systems; most cyclone-prone
countries have strong early-warning systems in place; and drought
prone countries in Africa monitor rainfall and crop conditions to
sense the onset of drought before conditions lead to food insecurity
or famine.
For example, Bangladesh, Cuba, and Mozambique, although
some of the world’s poorest countries, have good early-warning
systems to cope with cyclones, which hit all three countries nearly
104 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
every year. Each of the three countries has adopted cyclone-warning
systems tailored to their specific geographic, cultural, and political
situation. In all cases, the strength of their systems is based not only
on expensive technologies but also on the involvement of the vulner-
able populations themselves. Scientific knowledge that a cyclone is
developing in the ocean is meaningless unless there are also systems
to get the warnings out to at-risk populations. But even that is not
enough; vulnerable groups must have options available to protect
themselves when they receive the warning.
One of the reasons Bangladesh’s cyclone-warning system is
widely lauded is that it not only provides official warnings from
authorities and includes an extensive network of volunteers who com-
municate down to the village level, but the country has also built sev-
eral thousand cyclone shelters. The raised shelters provide
emergency accommodation in safe durable buildings not far from
people’s homes. Thousands of the poorest people in the poor nation
of Bangladesh now have a place to go when a cyclone hits. When the
massive Cyclone Sidr struck in November 2007, 3,400 people still
died, but an estimated 1.5 million people sought refuge in 2,168
cyclone shelters.7 The death of more than 3,000 people is a terrible
tragedy, the number of shelters is still woefully inadequate, and main-
tenance is a perpetual challenge, but without the option offered by
the shelters, the death toll would have been much higher.8
The cyclone early-warning systems in many other countries lack
this last component—options of last resort, especially for people who
do not have the means to evacuate or live in poor communities with
no sturdy buildings able to withstand the wind and rain of cyclones.
To advise people to evacuate when they have no vehicles, to take shel-
ter when they have no permanent buildings, or to seek higher ground
on a flat flood plain is of little value.
For high-probability events, successful models exist, and most
countries have implemented early-warning systems. Regional and
global collaboration assist governments with the information,
resources, and tools to build and continuously improve these sys-
tems. If this is true, then how could more than 200,000 people per-
ish in the Indian Ocean tsunami? The answer is simple: The tsunami
was a low-probability event.
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 105
This chapter argues against spending resources to establish
early-warning systems for low-probability events. Highly anomalis-
tic events will continue to happen, and it is impossible to be fully
prepared for every event that might happen once in 50 or 100 or
1,000 years. It is a poor use of scarce development resources to set
up a tsunami early-warning system in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, or
Madagascar—all of which suffered minor impacts in the Indian
Ocean tsunami. It is well documented that early-warning systems
that are not activated regularly lose effectiveness and fall into
disrepair.9,10
State of Early Warning in Developing
Countries: Low-Probability Events
The challenges poor countries face in protecting their poorest citi-
zens from high-probability events are magnified in the case of low-
probability events. If Mozambique struggles to create and maintain
flood and cyclone early-warning systems despite the fact that it faces an
average of 3 cyclones every season and it has 11 international rivers
flowing through its soil, how can it possibly prepare for a tsunami that
might not occur in a lifetime? Should it use scarce resources to educate
its citizens about tsunamis or other low-probability events that may not
strike for decades or even centuries?
The tsunami early-warning system for the Pacific Ocean is more
than 40 years old. One of the drivers of the system was the 1960
Chilean earthquake, the most powerful instrumentally recorded in his-
tory. The resulting tsunami affected Chile, Hawaii, the Aleutian
Islands in Alaska, California, Samoa, Japan, the Philippines, New
Zealand, and Australia. Hilo, Hawaii, was one of the worst effected
cities, where waves as high as 35 feet were recorded.
Based outside of Honolulu, Hawaii, the Pacific Tsunami Warning
Center has provided dozens warnings for the Pacific Ocean countries.
Scientists continuously improve the system, tracking the effects of
underwater earthquakes and landslides to model the potential occur-
rence of tsunamis. But no system was in place in the Indian Ocean
106 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
because tsunamis are relatively rare in that basin. In fact, as millions
of dollars were rushed into creating a tsunami early-warning system
for the Indian Ocean after the fact, some experts were suggesting the
money would be better spent creating a system for the Mediterranean
Sea—statistically more vulnerable to tsunamis than the Indian Ocean,
with 140 million people living near the shoreline, plus millions of
tourists visiting at any given moment. Some basic work has gone into
the Mediterranean tsunami early-warning system, mainly in terms of
data collection through ocean buoys, but little public outreach or edu-
cation has taken place.11 A large undersea earthquake triggering a
tsunami in the Mediterranean today could kill tens of thousands. Based
on probabilities and risk, additional investment in public education
about tsunamis in the Mediterranean is urgently needed.12
After a mega-disaster, there is a strong desire to “do something.”
Immediately after the Indian Ocean disaster, money was put into
tsunami early warning in Tanzania and other East African countries
that suffered only minor losses during the event and had never expe-
rienced a tsunami before. More than $10 million was requested for
tsunami-related activities in Somalia, for example. Such a reaction,
although understandable, is misguided. Money spent on single haz-
ard early-warning systems for low-probability events in poor coun-
tries could be better spent on general development activities that can
contribute to disaster preparedness: improved communications,
roads, education, building codes, and so forth.
High or Low Probability: How Climate
Change Is Changing the Nature of Risk
Risk assessment is considered the first step in risk management.
These risk calculations are often based on available historical data.
The most common type of probability calculations are “return peri-
ods” on flooding—calculations of how often a specific size of flood
occurs, based on data from the past 100 or more years. A rigorous
analysis of data can allow experts to classify floods as a “1 in 100-year
event” or a “1 in 10-year event” with some degree of confidence.
However, it is widely agreed that climate change is making fore-
casts based on historical data less relevant (although how much less
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 107
relevant remains unknown). The past is no longer an accurate predic-
tor of future events—floods are occurring more frequently and
impacting areas previously unaffected. Changes in temperature mean
that vector borne diseases such as malaria may spread to areas
previously free from the disease, unusual heat waves are affecting
Europe, and Australia is suffering severe drought and wild fires, for
example.
Climate change means risk-assessment methodologies must fac-
tor in a greater degree of uncertainty than simply an analysis of histor-
ical data. Increased uncertainty makes it that much more difficult to
label an event “high probability” or “low probability.” Some high-
probability events will become more extreme meaning an even
higher level of preparedness is needed. Some low-probability events
may happen more frequently or affect new areas, blurring the line
between high- and low-probability events.
Who Should Pay for Early Warning?
Just as natural hazards don’t discriminate between rich and poor,
they know no borders. The same hurricanes threaten Cuba, the
United States, and Mexico. Ashes from a volcano eruption in the
Philippines affect rainfall and weather patterns around the world.
Droughts in Africa cause people to cross borders in search of water
and food. Heavy rainfall in landlocked countries floods coastal com-
munities thousands of miles away. So while the state bears primary
role for early warning, responsibility and funding is rightly shared
from the global to the household level.
Arguably the best example of integrated early-warning system
with collaboration from the international to the household level is the
global cyclone early-warning system. The World Meteorological
Organization’s global operational network enables continuous obser-
vation, data exchange, and regional forecasting. Six regional special-
ized meteorological centers around the globe provide forecasts,
alerts, and bulletins to national meteorological services to all coun-
tries at risk with lead times of 24 to 72 hours. The national services
then issue warnings to government, media, and the general public
according to national protocols. Historical risk areas are well
108 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
established (although historical patterns are becoming a less reliable
predictor, as demonstrated in the case of Myanmar), and five
Regional Tropical Cyclone Committees work continuously to
enhance forecasting skills of all members. Costs and responsibilities
are shared and the system works extremely well.
Global Collaboration
Global collaboration in early warning has been driven by both
humanitarian imperatives and self-interest. Often, the two are entan-
gled and difficult to separate. More technologically advanced coun-
tries may support enhanced flood or tsunami warning systems, but
they also sell river gauge or ocean-monitoring equipment, sophisti-
cated computer modeling capacity, and so on.
There is nothing inherently wrong with self-interest playing a role
in global collaboration on disasters—in fact, a greater recognition of
the potential benefits to richer countries can help increase invest-
ment in early warning and disaster risk reduction in poor countries.
Unmitigated disasters often lead to a downward spiral of poverty,
increased social inequities and tensions, and even migration. For
example, families lose their homes and assets in a hurricane or earth-
quake; they are forced to send family members on difficult and dan-
gerous journeys to find work abroad; and unskilled and uneducated
migrants may fail to find work and end up relying on social programs
in the host country or turning to illegal activities to survive and sup-
port family at home. Disaster risk-reduction and -mitigation efforts
can reduce this downward spiral.
Modeling of the global climate system has lead to significant
advances in understanding how sea surface temperatures (El Niño
and La Niña) affect seasonal weather patterns, which, in turn, has
important implications for drought, flood, and malaria early warning
in developing countries. Satellites launched into orbit for weather-
monitoring purposes in developed countries were inadvertently dis-
covered to have the capacity to monitor vegetative vigor on the
ground—which has become a key indicator for drought early warning
in Africa. River systems modeling developed in Japan and the United
States has been shared with developing countries where the under-
standing of rivers and flooding was nonexistent or rudimentary.
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 109
Regional Collaboration
Regional collaboration in early warning is generally weak,
especially in the developing world. There are a few examples of
regional bodies that successfully share information and resources,
leading to better early warning, such as CILSS (Comite Permanent
Inter-Etats de Lutte Contre la Secheresse) for drought in West Africa
and the Mekong Delta River Authority for flooding in Southeast
Asia. But there are many more cases where regional cooperation
is ineffective.
Flood monitoring in sub-Saharan Africa offers an example of how
the weaknesses in regional collaboration negatively impacts early-
warning efforts and increases people’s vulnerability. Many of Africa’s
river basins are international—meaning that rain falling in one country
will eventually find its way into rivers that pass through other coun-
tries, potentially causing flooding downstream even if there is no rain
locally. It is imperative for downstream communities to know how
much rain is falling upstream and how fast the rivers are rising, yet in
many cases, the information is not readily shared. Linking upstream
information with downstream communities can provide 48 to 72
hours’ warning of an impending flood and enough time to evacuate
their assets and move to higher ground. These types of upstream-to-
downstream linkages have been created in some places, notably in
Central America, but examples of multicountry collaboration in con-
tributing to regional early warning are few.
One reason regional collaboration is weak may be a lack of
perceived self-interest. Using the flood early-warning example, four
Southern African countries share the Limpopo river basin, yet all of
the water eventually flows through Mozambique into the Indian
Ocean, presenting regular flood risks to communities living near the
river’s mouth. Even though the flood risk is only in Mozambique,
most of the catchment area is in South Africa, with small parts in
Botswana and Zimbabwe.13 For South Africa, heavy rainfall in the
high elevation catchment areas has little national impact and only lim-
ited local impact. South Africa may accept it has a humanitarian
imperative to help its poorer neighbor (its military has dispatched hel-
icopters to rescue Mozambicans stranded by floodwaters in 2000), but
when South Africa itself has countless internal demands for improved
110 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
housing, health care, and schools, should it prioritize the establish-
ment of an extensive network of rainfall gauges for the main benefit of
its neighbor?
State’s Responsibility
The World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan, in
January 2005 released the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities (HFA).14 The
HFA placed the primary responsibility for implementation of early
warning and disaster risk reduction on national governments. Ensur-
ing its citizens’ safety is a primary responsibility of government, and
national leadership and ownership are keys to effective early warning
and early action.
Even poor countries can mount effective early-warning systems
for high-probability events. The example of Cuba’s hurricane early-
warning system illustrates this clearly. The country is hit by hurri-
canes nearly every year, yet the fatalities in storms are usually far
fewer than on neighboring islands. A combination of effective gov-
ernment planning, annual simulation exercises, and citizen responsi-
bility ensures everyone is aware of a storm’s approach and knows
exactly how to respond.15 Yet nearby Haiti suffers immensely from
storms, and its government is ill equipped to protect its citizens. The
lack of government preparedness coupled with decades of deforesta-
tion has resulted in uncontrolled landslides and flooding, further
exacerbating the problem and making its population even poorer (in
fact, the poorest in the Western Hemisphere).
When a state lacks human or financial resources to protect its cit-
izens or lacks the commitment, what can and should the global com-
munity do to protect the most vulnerable? This issue is addressed in
the final section.
Community Responsibility
In the last decade, significant advances have been made in rec-
ognizing a community’s responsibility for protecting themselves
from disasters. Even the most vulnerable communities should not
be seen as helpless victims of a natural disaster but as the group with
the largest vested interest in early warning and early action.
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 111
Empowering communities to help themselves prevent and mitigate
disasters is many times more effective than any other form of risk
reduction.
Initial advances in early warning had a strongly scientific bias.
Investments were made in technological solutions without much
practical thought about how communities would be warned and how
they would react to warnings. This mistake is still being made as
evidenced by the lack of progress over the past few years in building
a tsunami early-warning system for the Mediterranean. Almost no
resources have been devoted to educating the millions of people
who live near the shores of the Mediterranean about how to recog-
nize a tsunami and what actions to take. This is a disaster waiting to
happen—the threat exists, and little has been done to mitigate the
risks for the vulnerable people.
Community involvement in early warning and early action must
incorporate three levels of preparedness:
1. Communities need to understand their risks. All people,
not just those in developing countries, misjudge their risks
because they don’t have an objective basis for assessing them
over a long time frame. When a catastrophic, low-probability
hazard occurs, like the Indian Ocean tsunami, people along
coastlines worldwide overestimate their risk of another event.
Communities living in floodplains generally have a good con-
ception of how often small, medium, or large floods occur—but
if a large devastating flood occurred recently, they often overes-
timate their risks.
It has been believed that bringing scientific data on historical
disaster patterns (100-year records of rainfall or cyclone tracks)
together with local knowledge about past events gathered from
older residents or collective memory was the best way to assess
risks. However, with climate change, there is a new challenge:
Those historical records or stories passed down over genera-
tions may no longer predict future frequency or intensity. There
is evidence in the Mozambique floods of 2000, for example, that
people were warned on radio the impending floods would be “a
major flood,” which community elders interpreted to mean sim-
ilar in magnitude to the floods experienced in the early 1900s.16
112 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
However, the floods vastly exceeded floods in anyone’s living
memory.
It is essential that communities map their own knowledge of
prior events, incorporate any available data on historical events,
but also understand that climate change adds a level of uncer-
tainty never before experienced. The past is no longer an accu-
rate guide to the future of disaster events.
2. Communities need to understand warnings from out-
side, and their local knowledge needs to be shared and
assessed scientifically. Warnings may be shared from national
authorities down to community level, but insufficient analysis
has been carried out on how the messages are perceived. In
some cases, messages may lack specificity (“floods are likely
along the Mekong”) or be overly technical (“a Category 3 cyclone
with maximum sustained winds of 150km/hour will hit between
2100 and 2300 hours tomorrow”). Although these messages
provide a basic level of alert, they are unlikely to engender any
actions from the vulnerable populations—unless they have
confirming evidence from traditional warning indicators.
Almost all communities have “traditional” hazard warnings
embedded in their culture. In developing countries, many of
these warning signs are based on animal behavior including
birds singing at unusual times of day, monkeys or small animals
fleeing an area, or livestock refusing to approach shorelines.17
In the past, local knowledge about early warning signs has been
largely dismissed as unscientific, but it is increasingly clear that
local knowledge can complement technical warnings. For
example, in Mozambique, downstream communities watch the
color of the river water and the size and type of debris floating
down to judge the magnitude of a potential flood.
In Simeuleu, an island off the coast of Indonesia only about 100
kilometers from the epicenter of the earthquake that triggered
the tsunami, only 7 people of a total population of 83,000 were
killed. The island had suffered from a tsunami in 1907 and
knowledge of the warning signs—especially the ocean receding
after an earthquake—had been passed from generation to
generation through songs and poems. Instead of dismissing this
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 113
local knowledge, it should be studied and integrated into
warning systems as appropriate.
3. Communities need to have options if a warning is
sounded. Although this step sounds obvious, it has received
remarkably little attention by practitioners and is a missing
link in many early-warning systems in developing countries.
In the case of Cyclone Nargis, for example, even if risk assess-
ments had been carried out and warnings had been received
by all people living in the Irrawaddy Delta, there would have
been little concrete action they could have taken to escape
the devastation. The roads were insufficient to handle a mass
evacuation, the population lacked means of transport, and
people were unwilling to leave their assets behind for fear of
theft.
The Bangladesh cyclone early-warning system presents one of
the few examples of warning systems that have found ways to
increase communities’ options for responding to a warning.
Poor populations in Bangladesh face almost the same chal-
lenges that affected the residents of the Irrawaddy Delta. With
few durable buildings, options to shelter from cyclonic winds
were few, and even robustly constructed buildings could be
flooded by the heavy rains accompanying the cyclone. But
Bangladesh has built a series of more than 2,000 raised cyclone
shelters, near the at-risk areas. People no longer have to choose
between leaving all of their belongings and livestock and flee-
ing long distances.
Understanding and supporting traditional means of self-
protection can be an important step. For example, much global
attention was paid to the birth of Baby Rosita in a tree in
Mozambique during the massive floods of 2000. Press reports
created images of a pregnant woman suddenly stranded in a
tree. Almost no acknowledgment of the full story took place—
Rosita’s family began constructing a platform shelter in a tree
several days before the big floods came and storing critical sup-
plies there, following traditional practices. In the low-lying
floodplains of southern Mozambique, there is nearly no high
ground. A few trees are the only thing standing a few meters
above the waterline, and so the idea of building shelters in
114 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
trees is perfectly rational. Efforts to provide options for react-
ing to a disaster could involve developing improved techniques
for building tree shelters, providing durable construction mate-
rials, and advising on sanitation during an extended period in
the tree shelter.
Options for Early Warning for
Devastating Low-Probability Events in
Poor Countries
Can poor countries ever be prepared for catastrophic, low-
probability events? Should they allocate scarce resources to an event
that may not happen for decades or even centuries when they have
critical needs for investment in education, health, and infrastructure?
Or does the industrialized world have a responsibility, given its contribu-
tion to climate change, for funding early warning for low-probability,
high-impact events in developing countries?
The solution to these difficult challenges isn’t fatalism or inaction.
A combination of four actions can help mitigate the effects of anom-
alistic events and also can contribute to general development:
1. Multihazard early-warning systems
2. Disaster risk-reduction education
3. Low-cost/low-technology solutions
4. Multiuse communication structures
Multihazard Early-Warning Systems
The concept of multihazard early-warning systems is gaining favor
around the world, especially for places that face numerous, fairly low-
probability events. In many cases, high-probability events need their
own early-warning systems because every part of the hazard is unique,
from data collection to response options. For example, an area might
face high risks of both volcanoes and droughts. But the chain of
information flow and action is completely different between a volcano
early-warning system and a drought early-warning system, for exam-
ple, so separate systems make sense.
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 115
Multihazard early warning does not advocate for the creation of a
mega-early-warning system but for grouping low-probability hazards
and for sharing data and structures among all systems when it makes
sense. One notable effort is the Global Earth Observation System of
Systems (GEOSS) initiated by the Group on Earth Observation,
which intends to build on existing information systems such as the
Global Telecommunications System and add new initiatives to create
timely, accurate, and interoperable data on all aspects of the earth, for
use in early warning, risk reduction, and other endeavors.
For poor countries facing multiple low-probability hazards, a
multihazard system can increase efficiency and reduce costs. Group-
ing hazards also increases the likelihood that the system will be trig-
gered more frequently—which is absolutely essential for
early-warning systems to improve over time.
Shanghai, China, has pioneered efforts to build a multihazard
early-warning system that can be a useful model for mega-cities in the
developing world. The approach grouped together the many hazards
faced by the 17 million residents—typhoons, tornados, strong winds,
and floods and also chemical spills, nuclear accidents, public health
emergencies, and so on. The Shanghai system has integrated a “top-
down” approach with unified policies, data collection systems, and
multiagency command structures with a “bottom-up” approach that
ensures the community is aware of the risks, understands appropriate
responses, and can channel information upward to emergency
response authorities and receive information transmitted from
authorities.18
Similar principles can be applied to nonurban settings, too, with
the focus on disaster risk-reduction education and low-technology
solutions, and on multiuse communications systems.
Disaster Risk-Reduction Education
Education plays a fundamental role in reducing disaster risks,
whether for high-probability or low-probability events. It could be
argued that education is even more important for low-probability
events because people will have their own firsthand knowledge and
experience with high-probability events, whereas for low-probability
events, this personal experience will be missing.
116 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
This was compellingly illustrated by 11-year-old Tilly Smith during
the Indian Ocean tsunami. The British schoolgirl was vacationing in
Phuket, Thailand, with her family when she saw an event exactly as her
geography teacher had described to her in England a few weeks ear-
lier. The ocean was bubbling “like the foam on a beer,” said Tilly, and
receding—the signs of an impending tsunami. She warned her family
and dozens of other hotel guests on the beach, all of whom escaped to
safety.19 Initially, her mother did not believe her and nearly refused to
leave the beach, because she had never heard the word tsunami and
didn’t understand the risks. If all the local and visiting schoolchildren
in Phuket had studied the same lesson, the death toll could have been
greatly reduced.
Educational programs also teach people about general safety
improvements they can make to their homes to become better pre-
pared for many types of hazards. Various low-cost/low-technology solu-
tions can help prepare people for many types of disasters.
Low-Cost/Technology Solutions
Preparedness for low-probability events does not have to be
expensive. It can involve “normal” development interventions that
have additional benefits if a low-probability event strikes. Supporting
the development of small-scale savings programs, where poor people
trust banks and begin to accumulate money in cash rather than assets,
can play a big role in recovery after a disaster. Improving construction
practices in “nonengineered,” traditionally constructed buildings sim-
ilarly can provide better, safer, and more comfortable living condi-
tions, but also can enhance resilience to disaster events.
Many governments have tightened building codes to stop the
construction of flimsy housing that easily collapses in an earthquake,
cyclone, or flood. After the Bam earthquake in 2003 killed more than
a quarter of the town’s 100,000 people, Iranian authorities banned
traditional mud and adobe houses and prevented the building of
dome structures.20
Avalanches are becoming more common in parts of the Alps, per-
haps due to climate change. The Swiss government operates sophisti-
cated detection and early-warning systems, but local residents near
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 117
Davos have taken their protection into their own hands with low-
technology solutions. Every year, they trek up the mountains to install
snow fences to impede avalanches. At the same time, they have
planted thousands of trees. When the trees grow to full size in 40 to
50 years, they will replace the fences and break the movement of
avalanches.
Although insurance is scarce in developing countries in general,
and insurance against low-probability events even more unlikely,
households can be encouraged to take actions to protect themselves
from future disasters. With climate change, farmers who traditionally
counted on one moderate drought every three years and one major
drought every decade may suddenly face a major drought every three
years. This means that farmers must be encouraged to adapt to the
reality that the future may be even harder to predict than the past.
Engaging farmers in climate change adaptation discussions is essen-
tial. Radio programs, extension messages, and SMS/cell phone text
messaging technologies can help inform farmers about how climate
change may impact the predictability of the seasons and require
changes in farming practices.
Thorough risk assessments at the community level can help iden-
tify mechanisms through which the community can become more
resilient.
Multiuse Communications Systems
Communication saves lives during a disaster. Communications
are also an essential component of a nation’s development. How can
authorities in the national or regional capital get information to the
community level? And how can receivers of information at a commu-
nity level get it out to the most remote members of community—the
so-called last mile? And how can communications flow from the
remote members of the community upward to national authorities, in
the case of a disease outbreak, for example? A communications
assessment can reveal gaps in the ability to reach certain groups of
people. For example, cell phones are becoming common throughout
the developing world. Many communities have cell phone coverage
and at least a few residents own cell phones. Cell phone text
118 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
messages about an impending disaster might reach the residents
with cell phones. But how do those residents spread the word to
others who are less likely to own cell phones such as child-headed
households, rural women, elderly, or disabled? Redundancy in com-
munications structures is essential, too. What happens if the cell
phone network is damaged in an earthquake, for example?
Special attention needs to be paid to the vulnerability of groups
such as women, children (especially girls), and the disabled and ill.
The groups may fall outside the normal flow of information in a
community—HIV/AIDS widows or orphans may be shunned by the
community and have no regular or reliable access to information
flowing into the area. Vulnerable groups have less money to buy cell
phones or radio batteries, so they may live on the margins of the com-
munity. Enhancements to communications systems need to focus on
these traditionally neglected groups.
Various options for “last mile” communications are being tested
around the developing world.21 Cell phone broadcasting of warnings
has potential applications, but with the limitations previously
described. In some densely populated places, volunteers with
megaphones and whistles can pass through the community sounding
an alarm. In many places in the developing world, radio broadcasts
remain the most effective means to reach large numbers of people,
even when they are dispersed widely. Local community radio stations
that broadcast in local languages can receive and rebroadcast warn-
ings effectively, provided they have not been damaged by the event.
The RANET project22 has created models to disseminate infor-
mation via satellite to community radio stations, which then broadcast
them over FM frequencies to local populations. In places where radio
ownership is limited by poverty, or where people cannot afford to buy
disposable batteries every few weeks, windup and solar-powered
radios, like the Freeplay Lifeline radio, provide a low-technology,
low-cost solution. If community radio stations are damaged, these
radios can receive warnings broadcast over regional, national, or
shortwave frequencies.
6 • CAN POOR COUNTRIES AFFORD TO PREPARE FOR LOW-PROBABILITY RISKS? 119
Ensuring communications to at-risk populations has many other
benefits. When no disaster threatens, radios can broadcast health,
agriculture, and educational programming, for example. The RANET
stations described above educate farmers about seasonal forecasts as
well as planting techniques and market prices. Communications
systems put in place for early warning can help medical staff evacuate
injured or ill patients from remote areas.
Conclusion
The world is confronted by almost limitless natural hazards, some
regular and fairly predictable and others extremely rare and
unpredictable. Although it is reasonable to expect all countries to
protect their citizens from disasters that occur regularly, it is difficult,
even for rich countries, to prepare for low-probability events.
Although there are many remaining uncertainties about global
climate change, there is consensus that the number, location, and
intensity of natural hazards will become less predictable. For poor
countries, with critical needs for investment in health, education, and
infrastructure, investments in single-hazard early-warning systems
for low-probability events are unwise.
Following a mega-disaster like the Indian Ocean tsunami, it is
understandable that the world would want to help not only the coun-
tries devastated by the tsunami (for example, Indonesia and Sri
Lanka), but also countries that suffered only slightly from the disaster
(for example, Tanzania and Somalia). This chapter has argued that
investments in tsunami early warning in East Africa could be much
more wisely made in multihazard early-warning systems, disaster
risk-reduction education, or even general development activities that
contribute to risk reduction such as improved building codes or bet-
ter communications. If emotion were completely removed from the
risk-assessment process, post-tsunami investment may have priori-
tized the creation of a tsunami early-warning system in the
Mediterranean Sea rather than in the Indian Ocean, given the fact
that it is statistically more vulnerable.
120 LEARNING FROM CATASTROPHES
Global collaboration, national government commitment, and
community involvement have created excellent early-warning
systems for high-probability disasters even in some of the
world’s poorest countries. Yet for low-probability events, a different
model is needed—one that emphasizes not the hypothetical hazard
but the underlying vulnerabilities.
Introduction to International
Disaster Management
Third Edition
Damon P. Coppola
AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON
NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO
Butterworth-Heinemann is an imprint of Elsevier
1Introduction to International Disaster Management. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801477-6.00001-
0
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
CHAPTER
THE MANAGEMENT
OF DISASTERS 1
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of our existence. In response, individuals and societies
alike have made many attempts to decrease their exposure to the consequences of these disasters. All of these
efforts have the same goal: disaster management. The motivating concepts that guide disaster management—the
reduction of harm to life, property, and the environment—are largely the same throughout the world. Whether due
to political, cultural, economic, or other reasons, the unfortunate reality is that some countries and some regions
are more capable than others at addressing the problem. Furthermore, the emergence of a global economy makes
it increasingly difficult to contain the consequences of any disaster within one country’s
borders.
This chapter
examines basic concepts of disaster management and expands upon those concepts to specifically address the
management of international disasters, which is a complex discipline. Like disaster management on the national
level, it involves actions that seek to mitigate the effects of hazards, ensures that populations are prepared for
disasters should they occur, facilitates the response to disasters that do occur, and helps nations and people recover
in the months and years following disaster events. The chapter provides a brief history of disaster management. To
illustrate the disparity in the effects of disasters around the world, an examination of the global impact of disasters
has also been carried out.
Key Terms: civil defense; complex humanitarian emergency; disaster; disaster management; disaster trends;
emergency management; history of emergency management; mitigation; preparedness response; recovery.
INTRODUCTION
Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of our existence. In response, individuals
and societies alike have made many attempts to decrease their exposure to the consequences of these
disasters, developing measures to address initial impact as well as post-disaster response and recov-
ery needs. Regardless of the approach adopted, all of these efforts have the same goal: disaster
management.
The motivating concepts that guide disaster management—the reduction of harm to life, property,
and the environment—are largely the same throughout the world. However, the capacity to carry out
this mission is by no means uniform. Whether due to political, cultural, economic, or other reasons,
the unfortunate reality is that some countries and some regions are more capable than others at
addressing the problem. But no nation, regardless of its wealth or influence, is advanced enough to
be fully immune from disasters’ negative effects. Furthermore, the emergence of a global economy
makes it more and more difficult to contain the consequences of any disaster within one country’s
borders.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS2
This chapter examines basic concepts of disaster management and expands upon those concepts to
specifically address the management of international disasters. A brief history of disaster management
is provided for context. To illustrate the disparity in the effects of disasters around the world, an exami-
nation of the global impact of disasters follows. Finally, several relevant terms used throughout this text
are defined.
DISASTERS THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Disasters are not merely ornamental or interesting events that adorn our collective historical record—
these disruptions have served to guide and shape it. Entire civilizations have been decimated in an
instant. Time and time again, epidemics and pandemics have resulted in sizable reductions of the
world’s population, as much as 50 percent across Europe during the fourteenth century bubonic plague
(Black Plague) pandemic. Theorists have even ventured to suggest that many of history’s great civiliza-
tions, including the Mayans, the Norse, the Minoans, and the Old Egyptian Empire, were ultimately
brought to their knees not by their enemies but by the effects of floods, famines, earthquakes, tsunamis,
El Niño events, and other widespread disasters (Fagan 1999). A worldwide drought in the eighth and
ninth centuries, caused by shifts in the yearly monsoons and resulting in mass crop failure and subse-
quent starvation, is now believed to have been behind the fall of both the Mayan empire in Mexico and
the Tang dynasty in China (Sheridan 2007). From a modern perspective, each of the catastrophic events
that has occurred as of late, including the December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami (over 230,000
killed), the 2005 Kashmir earthquake (80,000 killed), the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in China (68,000
killed), the 2008 Cyclone Nargis (135,000 killed), the 2010 Haiti earthquake (perhaps as many as
200,000 killed), and the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (16,000 killed) might seem anomalous, but
these disastrous events are not close to record-breaking, or even unique, in the greater historical context.
(See table 1.1.)
Table 1.1 Selected Notable Disasters throughout History
Disaster Year Number Kille
d
Mediterranean earthquake (Egypt and Syria) 1201 1,100,000
Shaanxi earthquake (China) 1556 830,000
Calcutta typhoon (India) 1737 300,000
Caribbean hurricane (Martinique, St. Eustatius, Barbados) 1780 22,000
Tamboro volcano (Indonesia) 1815 80,000
Influenza epidemic (world) 1917 20,000,000
Yangtze River flood (China) 1931 3,000,000
Famine (Russia) 1932 5,000,000
Bangladesh cyclone (Bangladesh) 1970 300,000
Tangshan earthquake (China) 1976 655,000
Source: St. Louis University, 1997; NBC News, 2004.
3
THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
ANCIENT HISTORY
Hazards, and the disasters that often result, have not always existed. To qualify as a hazard, an action,
event, or object must maintain a positive likelihood of affecting humans or possibly have a consequence
that may adversely affect humans’ existence. Until humans existed on the planet, neither the likelihood
nor the consequence factors of hazards were calculable; thus their presence is negated.
With the appearance of humans, however, followed the incidence of hazards and disasters. Archeo-
logical discovery has shown that our prehistoric ancestors faced many of the same risks that exist today:
starvation, inhospitable elements, dangerous wildlife, violence at the hands of other humans, disease,
accidental injuries, and more. These early inhabitants did not, however, sit idly by and become easy
victims. Evidence indicates that they took measures to reduce, or mitigate, their risks. The mere fact
that they chose to inhabit caves is testament to this theory.
Various applications of disaster management appear throughout the historical record. The story of
Noah’s ark from the Old Testament, for example, is a lesson in the importance of warning, prepared-
ness, and mitigation. In this tale, believed to be based at least partly on actual events, Noah is warned
of an approaching flood. He and his family prepare for the impending disaster by constructing a floating
ark. The protagonist in this story even attempts to mitigate the impact on the planet’s biodiversity by
collecting two of each species and placing them within the safety of the ark. These individuals are
rewarded for their actions by surviving the disastrous flood. Those who did not perform similar actions,
the story tells us, perished.
Evidence of risk management practices can be found as early as 3200 BC. In what is now modern-
day Iraq lived a social group known as the Asipu. When community members faced a difficult decision,
especially one involving risk or danger, they could appeal to the Asipu for advice. The Asipu, using a
process similar to modern-day hazards risk management, would first analyze the problem at hand, then
propose several alternatives, and finally give possible outcomes for each alternative (Covello and
Mumpower 1985). Today, this methodology is referred to as decision analysis, and it is key to any
comprehensive risk management endeavor.
Early history is also marked by incidents of organized emergency response. For example, when in
AD 79 the volcano Vesuvius began erupting, two towns in its shadow—Herculaneum and Pompeii—
faced an impending catastrophe. Although Herculaneum, which was at the foot of the volcano and
therefore directly in the path of its lava flow, was buried almost immediately, the majority of Pompeii’s
population survived. This was because the citizens of Pompeii had several hours before the volcano
covered their city in ash, and evidence suggests that the city’s leaders organized a mass evacuation. The
few who refused to leave suffered the ultimate consequence, and today lie as stone impressions in an
Italian museum.
MODERN ROOTS
All-hazards disaster and emergency management, wherein a comprehensive approach is applied to
address most or all of a community’s hazard risks, are relatively new. However, many of the concepts
that guide today’s practice can be traced to the achievements of past civilizations. While the manage-
ment of disasters during the past few thousand years was limited to single acts or programs addressing
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS4
individual hazards, many of these accomplishments were quite organized, comprehensive, and surpris-
ingly effective at reducing both human suffering and damage to the built environment. See the follow-
ing examples.
Floods have always confounded human settlements. However, archeologists have found evidence in
several distinct and unrelated locations that early civilizations made attempts to formally address the
flood hazard. One of the most celebrated of these attempts occurred in Egypt during the reign of
Amenemhet III (1817–1722 BC). Amenemhet III created what has been described as history’s first
substantial river control project. Using a system of over 200 “water wheels,” some of which remain to
this day, the pharaoh effectively diverted the annual floodwaters of the Nile River into Lake Moeris. In
doing so, the Egyptians were able to reclaim over 153,000 acres of fertile land that would have otherwise
served no use (Quarantelli 1995; ESIS n.d.).
The roots of the modern fire department trace back 2,000 years to when the city of Rome was nearly
destroyed by fire. Before this event, slaves had been tasked with fighting fires, and their poor training, lack
of equipment, and understandable lack of motivation made them highly ineffective. Following the great
fire, Emperor Augustus established a formal, city-wide firefighting unit from within the Roman army
called the Corps of Vigiles. As a result, the firefighting profession became highly respected and, likewise,
highly effective, and was emulated throughout the vast Roman Empire for 500 years. The structure of this
organization was quite similar to many fire departments today, with members filling job-specific roles.
(See exhibit 1.1.) With the fall of Rome, however, came the disappearance of the Corps of Vigiles, and
organized firefighting did not appear anywhere in the world for another 1,000 years.
The Incas, who lived throughout the Andes region in South America during the thirteenth to fif-
teenth centuries, practiced a form of urban planning that focused on their need to defend themselves
from enemy attack. Many of the Incan cities were located at the peaks of rugged, although easily defen-
sible, mountains. The prime example of their architectural achievement is the fortress of Machu Picchu.
However, in locating their cities upon mountaintops and other similar areas, the Incas merely replaced
one man-made hazard with a whole range of environmental hazards. To facilitate life on this extreme
terrain, the Incas developed an innovative form of land terracing that not only conserved water in their
unpredictable climate but also protected their crops—and thus their existence—from the landslides that
occurred during periods of heavy precipitation.
As later eras are examined, still more examples of methods created to address specific hazards
and their consequences emerge. One of the greatest and most effective forms of disaster mitigation
in history is the collective effort of the British and Indian governments, which sought to reduce
Indians’ annual suffering and starvation that occurred as a result of regular drought patterns. These
famines became so devastating during the late nineteenth century that up to a million people were
dying of starvation each year. A government study found that sufficient food existed throughout
EXHIBIT 1.1 JOB TITLES WITHIN THE ROMAN CORPS OF VIGILES
Aquarius: The firefighter whose main duties were the supply of water to the siphos or pumps and the organization of
“bucket chains.”
Siphonarius: The firefighter who was responsible for the supervision and operation of the water pumps.
Uncinarius: The firefighter who was a “hook” man, who carried a large fire hook for pulling off burning roofs.
Source: FFCA, 2014.
5 THE HISTORY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
the country to feed the nation’s entire population at all times, but insufficient capacity to distribute
these resources led to location-specific shortages. To address these problems, planning committees
were formed to develop various preventive measures, including a rapid expansion of the extensive
railway system that crisscrosses the country (to quickly transport food), the adoption of a method
by which indicators of emerging needs were identified and logged in a central repository, and
greater monitoring of public health. So effective at controlling famine were these measures that
many remain in force today. How much of a positive role was played by India’s acclaimed railroad,
which connects almost every settlement nationwide, continues to be debated. (Keniston 2007;
Sweeney 2008).
CIVIL DEFENSE: THE BIRTH OF MODERN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
There is no global formula that explains how the countries of the world developed their disaster
management capacities. However, there is one particular period in recent history that witnessed the
greatest overall move toward a centralized safeguarding of citizens—the Civil Defense era. (See
figure 1.1.)
FIGURE 1.1
Civil defense era poster, Pennsylvania, United
States.
Source: Library of Congress, 2000.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS6
Modern disaster management, in terms of the emergence of global standards and organized efforts
to address preparedness, mitigation, and response activities for a wide range of disasters, did not begin
to emerge until the mid-twentieth century. In most countries, this change materialized as a response to
specific disaster events. At the same time, it was further galvanized by a shift in social philosophy, in
which the government played an increasing role in preventing and responding to disasters. The legal
foundation that allowed for such a shift was the result of advances in warfare technology.
In response to the threat posed by air raids and the ever-present and dreadful prospect of a nuclear
attack, many industrialized nations’ governments began to form elaborate systems of civil defense.
These systems included detection mechanisms, early warning alarms, hardened shelters, search and
rescue teams, and local and regional coordinators. Most nations’ legislatures also established legal
frameworks to guide both the creation and maintenance of these systems through the passage of
laws, the creation of national-level civil defense organizations, and the allocation of funding and
personnel.
Despite these impressive efforts, surprisingly few civil defense units evolved over time into more
comprehensive disaster or emergency management organizations (Quarantelli 1995). But the legal
framework developed to support them remained in place and formed the basis for modern disaster and
emergency management as we know it today. For example:
• Great Britain’s disaster management agency traces its roots to the Civil Defense Act of 1948.
• Canada’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP)
grew out of the Canadian Civil Defense Organization created in 1948.
• The United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grew out of the Federal
Civil Defense Act of 1950.
• France’s civil protection is a product of that nation’s 1950 Ordinance and the 1965 Decree Relat-
ing to Civil
Defense.
• Algeria Civil Protection grew out of the 1964 Decree on the Administrative Organization of Civil
Defense.
CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
National emergency management capacity began to take a more centralized role in the 1970s and ‘80s
as countries focused on the creation of national-level emergency management systems. Many devel-
oped their disaster management capabilities out of necessity and an acceptance of the need to formalize
both the authority and budget for an agency to address blatant disaster risk. Other countries formed
their disaster management structures not for civil defense, but after being spurred into action by popular
criticism for poor management of a natural disaster (e.g., Peru in 1970, Nicaragua in 1972, and
Guatemala in 1976 following destructive earthquakes in each country).
And yet others, to a diminishing degree, still have no real emergency management structure to speak
of, irrespective of their disaster history.
THE INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR NATURAL DISASTER REDUCTION
On December 11, 1987, the United Nations General Assembly declared the 1990s to be the “Interna-
tional Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction” (IDNDR). This action was taken to promote internation-
ally coordinated efforts to reduce material losses and social and economic disruption caused by natural
7 CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
disasters, especially in developing countries, through capacity building. On December 22, 1989,
through UN Resolution 44/236, the General Assembly set forth the goals they wished to achieve during
the Decade. In addition to establishing a special UN office in Geneva to coordinate associated activi-
ties, the resolution directed the various UN agencies to:
• improve the capacity of each country to mitigate the effects of natural disasters expeditiously and
effectively, paying special attention to assisting developing countries in the assessment of disaster
damage potential and in the establishment of early warning systems and disaster-resistant struc-
tures when and where needed;
• devise appropriate guidelines and strategies for applying existing scientific and technical knowl-
edge, taking into account the cultural and economic diversity among nations;
• foster scientific and engineering endeavors aimed at closing critical gaps in knowledge in order to
reduce loss of life and property;
• disseminate existing and new technical information related to measures for the assessment, pre-
diction, and mitigation of natu
ral disasters;
• develop measures for the assessment, prediction, prevention, and mitigation of natural disasters
through programmes of technical assistance and technology transfer, demonstration projects, and
education and training, tailored to specific disasters and locations, and to evaluate the effective-
ness of those programs. (United Nations 1989)
It was expected that all participating governments would, at the national level:
• formulate national disaster-mitigation programmes, as well as economic, land use, and insurance
policies for disaster prevention, and particularly in developing countries, to integrate them fully
into their national development programmes;
• participate during the [IDNDR] in concerted international action for the reduction of natural disas-
ters and, as appropriate, establish national committees in cooperation with the relevant scientific
and technological communities and other concerned sectors with a view to attaining the objective
and goals of the
Decade;
• encourage their local administrations to take appropriate steps to mobilize the necessary sup-
port from the public and private sectors and to contribute the achievement of the purposes of the
Decade;
• keep the Secretary-General informed of the plans of their countries and of assistance that can
be provided so that the United Nations may become an international centre for the exchange of
information and the coordination of international efforts concerning activities in support of the
objective and goals of the Decade, thus enabling each State to benefit from the experience of other
countries;
• take measures, as appropriate, to increase public awareness of damage risk probabilities and of the
significance of preparedness, prevention, relief, and short-term recovery activities with respect to
natural disasters, and to enhance community preparedness through education, training, and other
means, taking into account the specific role of the news media;
• pay due attention to the impact of natural disasters on healthcare, particularly to activities to
reduce the vulnerability of hospitals and health centres, as well as the impact on food storage
facilities, human shelter, and other social and economic infrastructure;
• improve the early international availability of appropriate emergency supplies through the storage
or earmarking of such supplies in disaster-prone areas. (United Nations 1989)
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS8
THE YOKOHAMA STRATEGY – GLOBAL RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
In May 1994, UN member states met at the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction in
Yokohama, Japan, to assess the progress attained by the IDNDR. At this meeting, they developed the
Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. Through this document, the UN affirmed that:
1. Impact of natural disasters in terms of human and economic losses has risen in recent years, and
society in general has become more vulnerable to natural disasters. Those usually most affected
by natural and other disasters are the poor and socially disadvantaged groups in developing
countries, as they are least equipped to cope with them.
2. Disaster prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and relief are four elements which contribute to
and gain from the implementation of sustainable development policies. These elements, along
with environmental protection and sustainable development, are closely interrelated. Therefore,
nations should incorporate them in their development plans and ensure efficient follow-up mea-
sures at the community, national, subregional, regional, and international levels.
3. Disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness are better than disaster response in achiev-
ing [disaster reduction] goals. . . . Disaster response alone is not sufficient, as it yields only
temporary results at a very high cost. We have followed this limited approach for too long. This
has been further demonstrated by the recent focus on response to complex emergencies, which,
although compelling, should not divert from pursuing a comprehensive approach. Prevention
contributes to lasting improvement in safety and is essential to integrated disaster management.
4. The world is increasingly interdependent. All countries shall act in a new spirit of partnership to
build a safer world based on common interests and shared responsibility to save human lives, since
natural disasters do not respect borders. Regional and international cooperation will significantly
enhance our ability to achieve real progress in mitigating disasters through the transfer of technol-
ogy and the sharing of information and joint disaster prevention and mitigation activities. Bilateral
and multilateral assistance and financial resources should be mobilized to support these efforts.
5. The information, knowledge, and some of the technology necessary to reduce the effects of
natural disasters can be available in many cases at low cost and should be applied. Appropriate
technology and data, with the corresponding training, should be made available to all freely and
in a timely manner, particularly to developing countries.
6. Community involvement and their active participation should be encouraged to gain greater
insight into the individual and collective perception of development and risk, and to have a clear
understanding of the cultural and organizational characteristics of each society as well as of its
behaviour and interactions with the physical and natural environment. This knowledge is of the
utmost importance to determine those things which favour and hinder prevention and mitigation
or encourage or limit the preservation of the environment for the development of future genera-
tions, and in order to find effective and efficient means to reduce the impact of disasters.
7. The adopted Yokohama Strategy and related Plan of Action for the rest of the Decade and
beyond:
a. Will note that each country has the sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens from natu-
ral disasters;
b. Will give priority attention to the developing countries, in particular the least developed,
land-locked countries and the small island developing States;
9 CAPACITY BY DEMAND: THE 1970S AND ‘80S
c. Will develop and strengthen national capacities and capabilities and, where appropriate,
national legislation for natural and other disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness,
including the mobilization of non-governmental organizations and participation of local
communities;
d. Will promote and strengthen subregional, regional, and international cooperation in activities
to prevent, reduce, and mitigate natural and other disasters, with particular emphasis on:
– Human and institutional capacity-building and strengthening;
– Technology sharing, the collection, the dissemination, and the utilization of information;
– Mobilization of resources.
8. The international community and the United Nations system in particular must provide adequate
support to [natural disaster reduction].
9. The Yokohama Conference is at a crossroad in human progress. In one direction lie the
meagre results of an extraordinary opportunity given to the United Nations and its Member
States. In the other direction, the United Nations and the world community can change
the course of events by reducing the suffering from natural disasters. Action is urgently
needed.
10. Nations should view the Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World as a call to action, individually
and in concert with other nations, to implement policies and goals reaffirmed in Yokohama, and
to use the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction as a catalyst for change. (ISDR
1994)
The participating member states accepted the following principles to be applied to disaster manage-
ment within their own countries. The tenth and final principle formalized the requirement that each
nation’s government accept responsibility for protecting its people from the consequences of
disasters:
1. Risk assessment is a required step for the adoption of adequate and successful disaster reduction
policies and measures.
2. Disaster prevention and preparedness are of primary importance in reducing the need for disaster
relief.
3. Disaster prevention and preparedness should be considered integral aspects of development
policy and planning at national, regional, bilateral, multilateral, and international levels.
4. Development and strengthening of capacities to prevent, reduce, and mitigate disasters [are] top
priority area[s] to be addressed during the Decade so as to provide a strong basis for follow-up
activities [after that period].
5. Early warnings of impending disasters and their effective dissemination using telecommu-
nications, including broadcast services, are key factors to successful disaster prevention and
preparedness.
6. Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels, from the
local community through the national government to the regional and international levels.
7. Vulnerability can be reduced by the application of proper design and patterns of development
focused on target groups by appropriate education and training of the whole community.
8. The international community accepts the need to share the necessary technology to prevent,
reduce, and mitigate disaster; this should be made freely available and in a timely manner as an
integral part of technical cooperation.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS10
9. Environmental protection as a component of sustainable development consistent with poverty
alleviation is imperative in the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters.
10. Each country bears the primary responsibility for protecting its people, infrastructure, and other
national assets from the impact of natural disasters. The international community should dem-
onstrate strong political determination required to mobilize adequate and make efficient use of
existing resources, including financial, scientific, and technological means, in the field of natural
disaster reduction, bearing in mind the needs of the developing countries, particularly the least
developed countries. (ISDR 1994)
THE UN INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION
The international community, through the efforts of the UN, named the 1990s the International Decade
for Natural Disaster Reduction to increase awareness of the importance of risk reduction. Following the
positive advances by the UN and member governments during this time, the UN General Assembly
voted in December of 1999 to further their successes by creating the International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction (ISDR).
ISDR was created to help create nations, organizations, and communities that are “disaster resil-
ient” by espousing the idea that disaster reduction must be fully interlinked with development. The
ISDR sought to reduce disasters’ human, social, economic, and environmental toll, which was plaguing
rich and poor countries alike (and continues to). To achieve these goals, the ISDR promoted four objec-
tives as tools toward reaching “disaster reduction for all”:
• Increase public awareness about risk, vulnerability, and disaster reduction. The more people,
regional organizations, governments, NGOs, UN entities, representatives of civil society, and
others know about risk, vulnerability, and how to manage the impacts of natural hazards, the more
disaster reduction measures will be implemented in all sectors of society.
• Obtain commitment from public authorities to implement disaster reduction policies and actions.
The more decision makers at all levels commit themselves to disaster reduction policies and
actions, the sooner communities vulnerable to natural disasters will benefit from applied disaster
reduction policies and actions. This requires, in part, a grassroots approach where communities at
risk are fully informed and participate in risk management initiatives.
• Stimulate interdisciplinary and intersectoral partnerships, including the expansion of risk-
reduction networks. The more disaster reduction entities share information on their research and
practices, the more the global body of knowledge and experience will progress. By sharing a
common purpose and through collaborative efforts, the world’s nations will be more resilient to
natural hazards impacts.
• Improve scientific knowledge about disaster reduction. The more we know about the causes
and consequences of natural hazards and related technological and environmental disasters
on societies, the better prepared we are to reduce risks. Bringing the scientific community
and policymakers together allows them to contribute to and complement each others’ work.
(UNISDR 2001)
The ISDR worked with many different UN agencies and outside organizations, as administered by
the IATF/DR and the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the ISDR. These two bodies were formed by the UN
General Assembly through UN Resolutions 54/219 and 56/195 to implement ISDR.
11
THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK
THE HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (HFA)
In 2005, at The World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Kobe, Japan, the 168 countries in
attendance adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations
and Communities to Disasters. This action was endorsed by the General Assembly in UN Resolution
60/195. The HFA outlined a 10-year plan that reflected the intention of the global community to take a
more comprehensive, holistic approach to disaster risk reduction. The HFA called for nations to pursue
three strategic goals during the decade of action in order to bring about a substantial and measurable
reduction of disaster losses (fatalities and social, economic, and environmental losses). These goals
were intended to be aligned with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), signifying a recognition
that disaster risk reduction was closely connected with overall national development. The goals included:
• The integration of disaster risk reduction into sustainable development policies and planning;
• Development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms, and capacities to build resilience to
hazards; and
• The systematic incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery programs.
The Hyogo Framework also defined five priorities for action and identified the collective and indi-
vidual roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in its implementation and follow-up. These priori-
ties include:
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis
for implementation;
2. Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks—and enhance early warning;
3. Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors; and
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.
Following the WCDR, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG)
launched a consultative process to consider practical ways of strengthening the ISDR system, building
on existing mandates, institutions, partnerships, and mechanisms, with the key purpose of implementing
the Hyogo Framework for Action. The rationale for strengthening the ISDR and describing it as a sys-
tem of partnerships was based on the need for making substantial progress in implementing a world-
wide disaster risk reduction agenda, which calls for concerted efforts by all stakeholders. The UN Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR; see chapter 10) developed a standard set of comprehensive
indicators against which regions, nations, and local governments could plan for and measure their
actions. In two-year increments, nations self-assessed their progress against the defined measures of
success, and reported this progress to the world community. The tool was called the HFA Monitor, and
the reports that were submitted were (and remain) available on the UNISDR (http://bit.ly/1mK0Rwe).
THE POST-2015 FRAMEWORK
In March of 2015 the global community again meets in Japan—this time in the tsunami-impacted city
of Sendai—to look for a way forward in managing global disaster risk. The Third World Conference on
Disaster Risk Reduction will see the culmination of years of preparation for the follow-up to the Hyogo
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS12
Framework for Action in the development of a new global framework. While at the time of publication
this framework had yet to be given a formal title, it is referred to as the post-2015 framework for disas-
ter risk reduction, or more simply as post-HFA.
The post-2015 framework was called upon by UN General Assembly Resolution 66/199. When
nations meet in Sendai, their actions will represent the culmination of hundreds of meetings held in all
regions of the world and scores of reports drafted to define the outstanding needs. The intention is to
continue progress that has been achieved thus far in international cooperation toward achieving disaster
risk reduction. It will build on the knowledge and practice accumulated through the implementation of
each of the previous efforts, including the IDNDR, the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action, the
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and the HFA.
In June of 2014, the UN General Assembly released a document entitled “Suggested Elements for
the Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction” that addressed the structure and content of the
framework to be developed and released in March of 2015. Understandably, the proposed purpose of
the future framework was described as being “to manage disaster and climate risk in development at
local, national, regional, and global levels for the resilience of people, communities, and countries”
(United Nations General Assembly 2014). This document proposes several recommendations for the
new framework inclusive of guiding principles, implementation measures, areas of focus (including
public awareness and education, international cooperation, monitoring, reporting, and reviewing), as
well as how to perform the transition between the existing and the new framework. But perhaps most
telling are the global targets and indicators for the new framework, which include:
• Reducing disaster mortality by half by 2025 (or by a given percentage in a given period of time);
• Reducing disaster economic loss by a given percentage by 2025; and
• Reducing disaster damage to housing, educational, and health facilities by a given percentage by 2025.
MODERN DISASTER MANAGEMENT – A FOUR-PHASE APPROACH
Comprehensive disaster management is based upon four distinct components: mitigation, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery. Although a range of terminology is often used in describing them, effec-
tive disaster management utilizes each component in the following manner:
1. Mitigation. Also called Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), mitigation involves reducing or eliminat-
ing the likelihood or the consequences of a hazard, or both. Mitigation seeks to “treat” the hazard
such that it impacts society to a lesser degree. See chapter 4 for more information.
2. Preparedness. This involves equipping people who may be impacted by a disaster or who may be
able to help those impacted with the tools to increase their chances of survival and to minimize
their financial and other losses. See chapter 5 for more information.
3. Response. This involves taking action to reduce or eliminate the impact of disasters that have
occurred or are currently occurring, in order to prevent further suffering, financial loss, or a
combination of both. Relief, a term commonly used in international disaster management, is one
component of response. See chapter 6 for more information.
4. Recovery. This involves returning victims’ lives back to a normal state following the impact of
disaster consequences. The recovery phase generally begins after the immediate response has
ended, and can persist for months or years thereafter. See chapter 7 for more information.
13
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
Various diagrams illustrate the cyclical nature by which these and other related factors are per-
formed over time, although disagreement exists concerning how such a “disaster management cycle” is
visualized. These diagrams, such as the one in figure 1.2, are generalizations, and it must always be
understood that many exceptions can be identified in each. In practice, all of these factors are inter-
mixed and are performed to some degree before, during, and after disasters. Disasters tend to exist in a
continuum, with the recovery from one often leading straight into another. And while response is often
pictured as beginning immediately after disaster impact, it is not uncommon for the actual response to
begin well before the disaster actually happens.
WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
Two separate but interrelated concepts are represented by the term “international disaster manage-
ment”: (1) the study of the diverse emergency and disaster management systems and structures that
exist throughout the world; and (2) the study of disaster management in scenarios where the capacity
of a single nation’s response mechanisms are overwhelmed.
Every country, every government, and every society is unique regarding
• its vulnerabilities and the root causes of such;
• the perception of risk and the methods used to identify and analyze it;
• the institutions, systems, and structures created to manage risk;
• the statutory authorities that guide the management of risk and the management of events that do
actually occur; and
• the mechanisms developed to respond to disaster events and the response capacity of those
mechanisms.
FIGURE 1.2
The disaster management cycle.
Source: Alexander, 2002.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS14
Several times each year, the response requirements of disaster events exceed the disaster manage-
ment abilities of a single nation or several nations. In these instances, the governments of the affected
countries call upon the resources of the international response community. This cooperative interna-
tional response is, by definition, international disaster management.
Over time and through iteration, a recognized and systemic process for responding to interna-
tional disasters has begun to emerge. Standards for response have been developed by multiple
sources, and a recognized group of typical participants has been identified. (See exhibit 1.2.) Through
practice and study, formulaic, methodical processes for assessing both the affected nations’ damage
and their various response needs have been identified, tried, and improved on. What was only 30
years ago a chaotic, ad hoc reaction to international disasters has grown with astounding speed into
a highly effective machine.
It is important to add that disasters do not become international just because they have overwhelmed
a country’s capacity to respond. There must be a commitment on the participants’ part to recognize the
need for international involvement and to accept the appeal made by the host nation’s government. The
sad truth is that, in practice, not all disasters elicit the same level of international interest and response,
whether because of donor fatigue (see chapter 11), media interest, diverted priorities, or other events
that may dilute public interest. The Mozambique floods of 2000 are but one example of a situation in
which the international community was accused of sitting idly by as hundreds of people died. (See
exhibit 1.3.)
Response and recovery alone, however, are not effective means of managing disasters if they are
performed in the absence of a comprehensive regimen of preparedness and mitigation activities.
(See table 1.2.) An important focal shift among the world’s international disaster management
organizations, agencies, and interest groups from disaster response to disaster prevention is evi-
dence of widespread recognition and acceptance of this. Although many national governments,
especially in the developing world, have yet to make a dedicated effort toward initiating or improv-
ing their pre-disaster management activities, many international development and disaster manage-
ment agencies are working to address this issue. The UN, whose members consist of almost every
country in the world, has made a sustained effort to lead its member nations in addressing their
shortfalls: first by dedicating the 1990s to the IDNDR (producing the Yokohama Strategy and the
Plan of Action for a Safer World), and then by following up with the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the Hyogo Framework for Action to ensure that forward momentum
is maintained.
EXHIBIT 1.2 INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PARTICIPANTS
• Victims
• Local first responders
• Governments of the affected countries
• Governments of other countries
• International organizations
• International financial institutions
• Regional organizations and associations
• Nonprofit organizations
• Private organizations—business and industry
• Local and regional donors
15 WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT?
EXHIBIT 1.3 2000 MOZAMBIQUE FLOODS TIMELINE
February 9 Heavy rain begins falling across most of southern Africa, with Mozambique hit the hardest. The capital,
Maputo, is submerged. Throughout the country, hundreds of thousands of families are left homeless and
stranded. Damage to crops and infrastructure is severe.
February 11 At least 70 people have died due to the flooding. The UN reports that 150,000 people are in immediate
danger from starvation and disease. Dysentery outbreaks are reported outside the capital.
February 22 Tropical cyclone Eline makes a direct hit on the country, worsening the condition in many areas already sub-
merged by the floods. The South African Air Force begins making airlifts to over 23,000 desperate victims.
February 24 The UN makes an appeal for $13 million in immediate relief and $65 million for recovery assistance.
The appeal goes unanswered. Rainfall draining from other parts of southern Africa begins to flow into
Mozambique, worsening already poor conditions.
February 27 More rainfall causes flash floods throughout the country, destroying much of the remaining farmland.
March 2 Floodwaters have risen by up to 26 feet (8 m) in many parts of the country. International aid workers report that
100,000 people are in need of immediate evacuation, and over 7,000 are trapped in trees and need to be rescued
(many have been trapped in the trees for several days without food or clean water). Finally, more than three weeks
after the crisis began, international disaster management agencies begin to send responders and relief assistance.
Source: BBC News, 2000.
Table 1.2 Response and Recovery-Based Management versus Prevention and Risk Reduction-
Based Management
Response and Recovery-Based Efforts Prevention and Risk Reduction-Based Efforts
Primary focus on disaster events Focus on vulnerability and risk issues
Single, event-based scenarios Dynamic, multiple-risk issues and development scenarios
Basic responsibility to respond to an event Fundamental need to assess, monitor, and update expo-
sure to changing conditions
Often fixed, location-specific conditions Extended, changing, shared or regional, local variations
Responsibility in single authority or agency Involves multiple authorities, interests, actors
Command and control, directed operations Situation-specific functions, free and open association
and participation
Established hierarchical relationships Shifting, fluid, and tangential relationships
Often focused on hardware and equipment Dependent on related practices, abilities, and knowledge
base
Dependent on specialized expertise Focused on aligning specialized expertise with public
views and priorities
Urgent, immediate, and short timeframes in outlook,
planning, attention, and returns
Moderate and long timeframes in outlook, planning,
values, and returns
Rapidly changing, dynamic information usage, which is
often conflicting or sensitive in nature
Accumulated, historical, layered, updated, or compara-
tive use of information
Primary, authorized, or singular information sources;
need for definitive facts
Open or public information; multiple, diverse, or chang-
ing sources; differing perspectives and points of view
In-out or vertical flows of information Dispersed, lateral flows of information
Relates to matters of public security, safety Matters of public interest, investment, and safety
Source: Adapted from Jeggle, 2001.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS16
Today, the United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) guides the efforts of the inter-
national community’s overall disaster management mission. (See chapter 10.) Specifically, the UNISDR
seeks to build “disaster resilient communities by promoting increased awareness of the importance of
disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable development, with the goal of reducing
human, social, economic, and environmental losses due to natural hazards and related technological
and environmental disasters” (UNISDR n.d.).
In January 2005, in Hyogo, Japan, the UN held the first World Conference on Disaster Reduc-
tion. More than 4,000 participants attended, including representatives from 168 governments, 78
UN specialized agencies and observer organizations, 161 non-governmental organizations, and
562 journalists from 154 media outlets. The public forum attracted more than 40,000 visitors. The
outcome of the conference was the twenty-four-page Hyogo Framework for Action, adopted by all
member countries, that outlined members’ resolve to pursue “the substantial reduction of disaster
losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and
countries.”
With the adoption of this framework, which coincided with some of the most devastating hazards
and disasters in recent memory, international disaster management climbed to the forefront of the inter-
national policy agenda. UNISDR, through the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, has
increased and maintained international activity to address our growing hazard risk. (See exhibit 1.4.)
For years, the nations of the world have watched as country after country, both rich and poor, have
EXHIBIT 1.4 GLOBAL PLATFORM FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
The Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (GP) was established by mandate of the UN General Assembly. The GP
is an international meeting that occurs every two years and is attended by the international disaster risk reduction com-
munity, which includes governments, international organizations (including the UN and other regional organizations and
institutions), NGOs, scientific and academic institutions, and the private sector. By mandate, the GP
• assesses progress made in the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action.
• enhances awareness of disaster risk reduction.
• enables the sharing of experiences and lessons from good practice.
• identifies remaining gaps and recommends targeted action to accelerate national and local implementation.
The first and second sessions of the GP, which occurred in 2007 and 2009, respectively, were attended by more than
152 governments and 137 organizations. These sessions helped to build momentum for national commitments to perform
disaster risk reduction, culminating with the May 2011 GP meeting in Geneva, Switzerland. The benchmarks set out in the
first two meetings focused on five main areas, including the goals to:
1. harmonize disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in the broader context of poverty reduction and sus-
tainable development;
2. reduce community- and local-level risk through partnerships that better recognize the mutual dependence of govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and to promote the role of women as drivers of action (with
special consideration to youth and children’s roles);
3. move toward full implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action through several action targets (e.g., assessments
of and mitigation for educational and health facilities);
4. increase the disaster risk reduction component of national budgets and international development funding (including
humanitarian relief and recovery expenditures), and to improve measurements of the effectiveness of investment in risk
reduction; and
5. continue the efforts of the ISDR in supporting governments and NGOs in their disaster risk reduction efforts.
Based on: PreventionWeb, 2011.
17
DISASTERS, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT
suffered the consequences of terrible disasters. However, it has not been until recently that world lead-
ers have begun to fully grasp that many of these consequences could have been reduced through better
mitigation and preparedness efforts and more effective response capabilities. As a result, the field of
international disaster management is now in a position to influence these leaders in a way not previ-
ously possible.
DISASTERS, POVERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT
Research and practice support the theory that there exists a strong correlation between disasters and
poverty. It is well documented that those developing countries repeatedly subject to disasters experi-
ence stagnant or even negative rates of development over time. (See figure 1.3.) Hurricane Mitch,
which destroyed as much as 70 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras and Nicaragua (UNISDR
2004), is a prime example, having been blamed with reversing the rates of development in these and
other Central American countries by at least a decade (and as much as 20 and 30 years in some areas;
Oxfam 1998). The same effect has also been witnessed in many of the areas affected by the 2004 tsu-
nami and earthquake events in Southeast Asia and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. (See exhibit 1.5.) For
countries with developing economies, the financial setbacks these events inflict can be ruinous, in con-
trast to their industrialized counterparts, where a robust economy absorbs such impacts. In 2001, for
example, earthquakes occurred in both El Salvador and the United States (Seattle), each causing
approximately $2 billion in damages. While this amount had little or no noticeable impact on the US
economy, the financial consequences in El Salvador amounted to 15 percent of that country’s GDP
(UNDP 2004a).
The aftermath of a disaster exacerbates the debilitating causes of poverty in developing countries.
Each disaster is unique in its consequences, so there is no single formula that can be used to character-
ize precisely how these problems will play out. The following list, however, provides a general
FIGURE 1.3
Impact of disasters on development.
Adapted from ADRC, 2005.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS18
overview of the many ways in which disasters harm poor countries beyond the initial death, injury, and
destruction:
• National and international development efforts are stunted, erased, or even reversed.
• Sizable portions of GDP often must be diverted from development projects, social programs, or
debt repayment to manage the disaster consequences and begin recovery efforts. (See figure 1.4.)
• Vital infrastructure is damaged or destroyed—including roads, bridges, airports, sea ports, com-
munications systems, power generation and distribution facilities, and water and sewage plants—
requiring years to rebuild.
• Schools are damaged or destroyed, leaving students without an adequate source of education for
months or even years.
• Hospitals and clinics are damaged or destroyed, resulting in an increase in vulnerability to disease
of the affected population.
• Formal and informal businesses are destroyed, resulting in surges in unemployment and decreased
economic stability and strength.
• Reconstruction efforts result in shortages of materials and labor, which in turn drive up construc-
tion costs, inflate salaries, and draw workers away from other sectors where they are needed.
• Residents are forced or impelled to leave the affected zone, often never to return, extracting
institutional knowledge, cultural and social identity, and economic viability from areas that cannot
afford to spare such resources.
• Desperation and poverty lead to a rapid upsurge in crime and insecurity.
• A general feeling of hopelessness afflicts the affected population, leading to increased rates of
depression and a lack of motivation to regain independence from outside assistance.
DISASTER TRENDS
Increased accuracy in the reporting of disaster statistics has helped to provide both greater visualization
and confirmation of something many scientists and disaster managers have been warning of for decades:
the nature of disasters is rapidly changing. These changes are generally regarded as a result of human
EXHIBIT 1.5 TSUNAMI SETS BACK DEVELOPMENT 20 YEARS
IN MALDIVES
Within minutes of the December 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, much of the economic and social progress in the
Maldives was washed away.
According to government officials, the tsunami caused a 20-year setback in the development of this small country, an
island nation off the coast of India, which only six days before the disaster had been removed from the UN’s list of least-
developed countries. In particular, the tsunami and its resulting floodwaters dealt a serious blow to the tourism sector, the
country’s main source of income. Nearly one-fourth of the 87 resorts in the Maldives were severely damaged and declared
unable to operate. Tourism directly accounts for one-third of the country’s economy, with the resorts alone providing
between 25,000 and 30,000 jobs. When tourism-related tax and customs revenues are included, tourism contributes up to
70 percent of the economy, with the sector expanding each year. These earnings had helped to improve living standards in
the Maldives, including increased school enrollment, lower unemployment, and more students seeking higher education
abroad.
Based on: UNDP, 2005.
19 DISASTER TRENDS
FIGURE 1.4
Selected natural disasters: total damage and share of the GDP between 1991 and 2005.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS20
actions and development patterns. What is troubling is that these trends indicate that more disasters are
occurring each year, with greater intensity, and that a great many more people are affected by them,
either indirectly or directly. And while these disasters are becoming less deadly worldwide, they are
causing a much greater financial impact on both affected and unaffected nations. Finally, and what may
be the most disturbing of these trends, is that the poor countries of the world and their citizens are
assuming a much greater proportion of the impacts of disasters. In sum, recent trends indicate that
• the number of people affected by disasters is rising.
• overall, disasters are becoming less deadly.
• overall, disasters are becoming more costly.
• poor countries are disproportionately affected by disaster consequences.
• the number of disasters is increasing each year.
TREND 1: THE OVERALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS IS RISING
Human settlement has always been directed by the needs of individuals and societies, such as the need
for food, water, defense, and access to commerce. Almost without exception, increased natural hazard
risk has been assumed in favor of these needs, often as result of a confidence that hazard risk can be
accepted as “part of life” or can be effectively managed. Evidence of such behavior is apparent in
almost any example of previous human settlement: communities along rivers build levees; those located
along the sea coasts construct sea walls and jetties; farmers place their houses and sow their crops upon
the fertile slopes of active volcanoes.
However, as the population and size of these settlements grow, the assumed risk becomes more and
more concentrated. The overall rates by which people have relocated from rural areas into cities (urban-
ization) have continued to increase over time. Rising populations in almost all countries of the world
amplify the urbanization effect. In 1950, less than 30 percent of the world’s 2.5 billion people lived in
an urban setting. By 1998, the number of people on earth had grown to 5.7 billion, and 45 percent of
them lived in cities. UN estimates state that by 2025 there will be 8.2 billion people on earth, and more
than 60 percent of them will live in cities (UNFPA 2013; WHO
2014).
When humans settle in high-risk urban areas, the hazard risks they face as individuals increase. As
of the year 2000, it was estimated that at least 75 percent of the world’s population lived in areas at risk
from a major disaster (UNDP 2004a). And because these high-risk areas periodically experience major
disasters, it logically follows that the number of people who are annually affected by disasters (defined
as having their homes, crops, animals, livelihoods, or health impacted) is equally high (UNISDR 2004).
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 display the observed total number of people annually affected by disasters dur-
ing the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Note that, beginning in 1954, there is a significant rise
in the number of people affected. It was during the decade of the 1950s that the mass transition toward
urbanization began in the industrialized nations, a trend that most other nations of the world followed
soon after.
TREND 2: OVERALL, DISASTERS ARE BECOMING LESS DEADLY
The seismic, meteorological, hydrological, and other forces that result in natural hazards are natural
processes that occur irrespective of the actions or existence of humans. Water has overflowed the banks
of rivers since before humans lived beside them. Archeologists and geologists have unearthed evidence
21 DISASTER TRENDS
that earthquake events occurred during every era of the planet’s history. Volcanic activity has been
given as much credit for its role in generating life on earth as it has for destroying it. Natural disasters,
it has therefore been suggested, are merely the result of humans placing themselves directly into the
path of these normal events. (See figures 1.7 and 1.8.) United States Geological Survey (USGS) scien-
tists Susan Hough and Lucile Jones aptly captured this line of thought when they wrote that “earth-
quakes don’t kill people, buildings do” (Hough and Jones 2002).
Humans are adaptable and quickly adjust to the pressures exerted upon them by nature. People have
modified their behaviors and their environments to accommodate their surrounding climate and topog-
raphy, often proving successful at counteracting the negative consequences of common daily hazards
such as rain or extreme temperatures. For less common events, such as earthquakes and hurricanes,
humans have had lower levels of success. Fortunately, modern science has helped to change this fact
significantly, at least in those countries in which the technology and technical expertise is within reach.
Table 1.3 illustrates the success achieved by the United States in adjusting to hurricane risk during the
course of the twentieth century, where death rates fell steadily until the end of the century as explained
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1900–2011
7
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
6
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
5
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
4
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
a
ff
e
c
te
d
1
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 2010
Year
FIGURE 1.5
Total number of people affected by disasters worldwide from 1900 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS22
by several driving forces (including better preparedness, storm tracking, public education, response,
etc.). What is most interesting about this trend is that as we move into the second decade of the twenty-
first century, there is an obvious trend reversal, with the number of US hurricane fatalities reaching
levels that exceed the aggregate of the preceding 60 years. While there are varied theories to explain
such a change, what draws the most support is the belief that this is an unintended consequence of a
post-9/11 shift in US emergency management policy that boosted terrorism prevention at the cost of
natural hazard mitigation and preparedness. Such a consequence only reinforces the theory that global
disaster fatality reduction is the result of our risk reduction efforts.
Globalization and increased international cooperation have helped the world community to more
effectively address risk reduction and limit the human impacts of disasters. Although the number of
disasters has more than tripled since the 1970s, the number of people worldwide who have perished has
fallen by 50 percent (UNISDR 2004). Greater recognition of the importance of emergency management
Number of people reported affected by natural disasters 1975–2011
7
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
6
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
5
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
4
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
1
0
0
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
a
ff
e
c
te
d
Year
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20102005
FIGURE 1.6
Total number of people affected by disasters worldwide from 1975 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
23 DISASTER TRENDS
and sustainable development is turning the tide on disasters. The efforts of the United Nations, the many
non-governmental agencies involved in development and disaster preparedness and response, and the
efforts of individual governments have shown that humans can effectively influence their vulnerability.
There are several explanations for the falling fatality rates of disasters. These include:
• More organized and comprehensive preparedness campaigns are helping individuals and commu-
nities to decrease their vulnerability and to react more appropriately in the face of disaster.
• Early warning systems are giving potential victims more time to leave the dangerous situations
associated with impending disasters.
• Special disaster-specific protection structures, such as tornado safe rooms, are mitigating the
impact that disasters have on human life.
• Building code creation and enforcement are helping to increase the resilience of the various struc-
tures and systems upon which humans depend.
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
e
o
p
le
r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
k
il
le
d
Number of people reported killed by natural disasters 1900–2011
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980 2000 2010
Year
5
0
0
,0
0
0
1
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
1
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
2
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
3
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
3
,5
0
0
,0
0
0
4
,0
0
0
,0
0
0
0
FIGURE 1.7
Total number of natural disaster-related deaths reported in the world from 1900 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS24
FIGURE 1.8
Total number of natural disaster-related deaths reported in the world from 1975 to 2011.
Source: EM-DAT– International Disaster Database.
Table 1.3 Deaths Attributed to Hurricanes in the United States, 1900–2010
Period Number Killed
1900–1919 10,000 (approximate; exact 1900 Galveston death toll is unknown)
1920–1939 3751
1940–1959 1119
1960–1979 453
1980–1999 82
2000–2014 2200
Source: Thoreau Institute, 2005; FEMA, 1997 (along with other multiple dates).
25 DISASTER TRENDS
• Secondary, post-disaster consequences, such as famine and disease, are more effectively managed
by modern public-health response mechanisms.
• Proper zoning procedures and enforcement are helping to prevent people from moving into the
paths of disasters and helping to remove those who are already there.
• Sustainable development processes are helping to reduce population movement into areas of high-
est risk.
TREND 3: OVERALL, DISASTERS ARE BECOMING MORE COSTLY
The cost of disasters worldwide is increasing at an alarming rate. Twenty-five years ago, the eco-
nomic damage from any given disaster rarely topped the billion-dollar mark, even after accounting
for inflation. Now, several disasters top this mark each year. (See figure 1.9.) By the year 2000, the
FIGURE 1.9
Total amount of reported damages (billion USD at 2009 prices) in the world from 1900 to 2012.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS26
cost of disasters worldwide had topped $60 billion per year, as measured by the international rein-
surance firm Munich Re. In 2013, a new record was set when 41 disasters exceeded $1 billion in
damages worldwide, with all disasters totaling $125 billion. In 2012, while there were fewer bil-
lion-dollar disasters, the total impact of all disasters combined exceeded $175 billion (World Post
2014).
There are many reasons disasters are getting more expensive, including several of the previous
explanations: there are more people in the world, there are more disasters, people are more concentrated
together, and so forth. The fact remains that people continue to move toward urban centers, build
expensive structures and infrastructure in the path of hazards, and try to overcome the risk of disaster
by building structures designed to resist damage. Again consider hurricanes in the United States. Their
basic power and natural characteristics have not changed significantly over time. However, human
settlements in high-risk coastal areas have increased. The result of this human behavior is the rising
costs of hurricane damage during the past 20 years (Riebeek 2005).
There are several explanations for the global increase in financial disaster cost, which include:
• Increasing urbanization in high-risk zones is occurring throughout the world, concentrating
wealth, physical structures, and infrastructure together in high-risk zones.
• Economies are much more dependent upon technologies that tend to fail in times of disaster; one
example is the 2003 northeastern US/Canadian electrical blackout, which resulted in as much as
$6 billion in damages.
• Areas not directly affected are experiencing secondary economic consequences of disaster, as with
many world economies following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.
• A greater number of less deadly but financially destructive disasters are occurring throughout the
world as a result of climate change or other factors.
• Increasing population; the US Census Bureau estimates that the world’s population grew from 3.8
to 6.8 billion between 1950 and 2010.
TREND 4: POOR COUNTRIES ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED
BY DISASTER CONSEQUENCES
Disasters of all kinds strike literally every nation of the world; they do not differentiate between rich
and poor countries. However, developing countries suffer the greatest impact and also most often expe-
rience subsequent internal civil conflict that leads to complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs; see
Definitions). The United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reported in 2011 that 95
percent of the deaths caused by disasters occur in poor countries—a figure that has been steadily rising
for decades. (Lim 2011). What is troubling about this statistic is that the UNDP estimated that only 11
percent of the world’s “at-risk” population can be accounted for in these countries (UNDP 2004a; see
figure 1.10). In fact, on average, 90 percent of disaster-related injuries and deaths are sustained in coun-
tries with per-capita income levels that are below $760 per year (Jha 2010; see figure 1.11).
Based on these facts, inferences can be drawn about a nation’s disaster risk by considering its devel-
opment status. Public health expert Eric Noji identified four primary reasons why the poor in general
are often most at risk.
They (1) are least able to afford housing that can withstand seismic activity; (2) often live along
coasts where hurricanes, storm surges, or earthquake-generated [tsunamis] strike live in
FIGURE 1.10
Total number of deaths and people affected by natural disasters per 100,000 inhabitants from 1974 to 2003.
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
FIGURE 1.11
Total amount of economic damages reported in major world aggregates from 1991 to 2005 (billion USD, 2006).
Adapted from EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
CHAPTER 1 THE MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS28
floodplains subject to inundation; (3) are forced by economic circumstances to live in substandard
housing built on unstable slopes that are susceptible to landslides or are built next to hazardous
industrial sites; and (4) are not educated as to the appropriate lifesaving behaviors or actions that
they can take when a disaster occurs. (Noji 1997)
There are also many secondary reasons that contribute. For instance, injuries sustained in disasters,
and the disease that often follows, are much more likely to lead to death in poor countries, where acute
care may be substandard or nonexistent and the control of disease outbreaks more difficult. The poor
are also likely to suffer greater disaster consequences as the result of minimal or nonexistent enforce-
ment of safety standards, building codes, and zoning regulations. (See figure 1.12.) The full range of
explanations is both extensive and diverse.
Although the importance of disaster preparedness and mitigation is widely recognized by almost all
of the world’s countries, and although these principles are widely applied on a growing basis by inter-
national development agencies, it still comes as no surprise that countries ranking lower on develop-
ment indices place disaster management very low in budgetary priority. These nations’ resources tend
to be focused on social interests such as education and infrastructure or on their military, instead of on
projects that serve a preparatory or mitigation need, such as retrofitting structures with hazard-resistant
construction. Because all disasters, even those that tend to repeat, are chance events and thus not guar-
anteed to happen, disaster management programs in poor countries tend to be viewed as a luxury or
OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States.
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Developing countries: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea,
Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea,
Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe.
Least-developed countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (Western), São Tomé
and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu,
Yemen, Zambia.
Source: UNDP, 2004b.
29 DISASTER TRENDS
even superfluous. Compounding this situation, poverty and uncontrolled urbanization force large popu-
lations to concentrate in perilous, high-risk areas that have little or no defense against disasters. Thus,
the difference in the effect of a disaster’s impact in a rich versus poor country is remarkable. Table 1.4
illustrates these differences.
FIGURE 1.12
Number of people killed by disasters by income class between 1991 and 2005 (Note that drought includes
extreme temperature hazards.).
Source: EM-DAT – International Disaster Database.
Table 1.4 Differences in Disaster Impact between Rich and Poor Countries
Rich Countries Poor Countries
Tend to suffer higher economic losses, but have mecha-
nisms in place to absorb these costs.
Have less at risk in terms of financial value, but maintain
little or no buffer to absorb even low financial impacts.
Economic reverberations can be significant, and social
development ultimately suffers.
Employ mechanisms that reduce loss of life, such as
early warning systems, enforced building codes, and
zoning.
Lack the resources necessary to take advantage of advanced
technologies, and have little ability to enforce building
codes and zoning even if these mechanisms do exist.
Have immediate emergency and medical care that
increase survivability and contain the spread of disease.
Sustain massive primary and secondary casualties.
Transfer much of personal, private, and public risk to
insurance and reinsurance providers.
Generally do not participate in insurance mechanisms.
Divert funds from development programs to emergency
relief and recovery.
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