After the Cold War: U. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle EastAuthor(s): Noam Chomsky
Source: Cultural Critique, No. 19, The Economies of War (Autumn, 1991), pp. 14-31
Published by: University of Minnesota Press
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After the Cold War: U.S. Foreign Policy
in the Middle East
Noam Chomsky
topic I am addressing might be understood in two ways:
normatively, as a question about what policy should be, or
descriptively, as a question about what it is likely to be. I will keep
to the latter interpretation. Any attempt to consider what may lay
ahead is, of course, speculative. The most we can hope for is
that is, by an attempt to underinformed speculation-informed,
stand what has happened in the past and what new circumstances
exist today. Given time constraints, I will have to keep to a brief
sketch. I have discussed these matters elsewhere, with evidence
and explicit documentation that I cannot introduce here.
U.S. policy toward the Middle East has been framed within a
certain strategic conception of world order that is widely shared,
though there are tactical disagreements; sometimes sharp ones, as
we saw during the debate in the United States over the Gulf crisis.
There are also important changes in the world, to which this
strategic conception must be adapted.
There has been much recent talk about a “new world order.”
Implicit in it is the assumption that there was an “old world order”
The
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1991 by Cultural Critique. 0882-4371 (Fall 1991). All rights reserved.
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16
Noam Chomsky
that is changing. That system of world order was established after
World War II. At the time, the United States was in a position of
power without historical precedent. It had about fifty percent of
the world’s wealth and a position of remarkable security. Political
and economic elites were well aware of these facts, and, not surprisingly, set about to organize a world system favorable to their
they also recognized, quite explicitly, that
interests-although
more noble rhetoric would be useful for propaganda purposes.
In high-level studies, extensive plans were developed for
what was called a “Grand Area,” a world system in which U.S.
interests would be expected to flourish. The plans extended to all
major areas and issues, and were to a large extent implemented in
the early postwar years. In fact, there is a very close similarity
between these studies and top-level government planning documents of later years.
Within the Grand Area, the industrial powers were to reconstruct, under the leadership of the “great workshops,” Japan and
Germany, now under U.S. control. It was necessary to restore
traditional conservative rule, including Nazi and fascist collaborators, to destroy and disperse the antifascist resistance, and to
weaken the labor movement. This was a worldwide project, conducted in various ways depending on local circumstances and
needs. It constitutes chapter one of postwar history, and generally
proceeded on course.
With respect to the Soviet Union, policy divided along two
basic lines, both of which aimed to incorporate the USSR within
the Grand Area-which, for most of the region, meant returning
it to its pre-1917 status as a quasi-colonial dependency of the West,
part of the Third World, in effect. The hard-line “rollback” approach was given its basic formulation in NSC 68 of 1950, written
by Paul Nitze, who succeeded George Kennan as head of the State
Department Policy Planning Staff. The softer Kennan policy of
“containment” proposed reliance on the overwhelming economic
advantages of the U.S. and its allies to achieve more or less the
same ends. Note that these goals have basically been achieved,
with the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1980s.
Few anticipated a Russian military attack. The general assumption was that “it is not Russian military power which is
threatening us, it is Russian political power” (Kennan, October
1947).
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After the Cold War
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The Third World also had its role in the Grand Area: to be
“exploited” for the needs of the industrial societies and to “fulfill
its major function as a source of raw materials and a market.” I am
quoting from documents of George Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff. Kennan was one of the most influential of the postwar
planners, representing generally the “softer” extreme of the spectrum. He emphasized that a major concern was “the protection of
our resources”-our resources, which happen, by geological accident, to lie in other lands. Since the main threat to our interests is
indigenous, we must, he explained in secret, accept the need for
“police repression by the local government.” “Harsh government
measures of repression” should cause us no qualms as long as “the
results are on balance favorable to our purposes.” In general, “it is
better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government
if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by Communists.”
The term Communistrefers in practice to labor leaders, peasant
organizers, priests organizing self-help groups, and others with
the wrong priorities.
The right priorities are outlined in the highest-level secret
documents. They stress that the major threat to U.S. interests is
“nationalistic regimes” that are responsive to popular pressures
for “immediate improvement in the low living standards of the
masses” and for diversification of the economies for domestic
needs. Such initiatives interfere with the protection of our resources and our efforts to encourage “a climate conducive to private investment,” which will allow foreign capital “to repatriate a
reasonable return.” The threat of Communism, as explained by a
prestigious conservative study group, is the economic transformation of the Communist powers “in ways that reduce their willingness and ability to complement the industrial economies of the
West,” and thus to fulfill the Third World function. This is the
real basis for the intense hostility to the Soviet Union and its
imperial system from 1917, and the reason why independent nationalism in the Third World, whatever its political cast, has been
seen as a “virus” that must be eradicated.
Plans for the Middle East developed within this context. The
major concern was (and remains) the incomparable energy reserves of the region. These were to be incorporated within the
U.S.-dominated system. As in Latin America, it was necessary to
displace traditional French and British interests and to establish
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Noam Chomsky
U.S. control over what the State Department described as “a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history,” “probably the richest economic prize
in the world in the field of foreign investment.” President
Eisenhower described the Middle East as the most “strategically
important area in the world.”
France was quickly excluded by legal legerdemain, leaving a
U.S.-British condominium. There was conflict for a time, but it
was soon resolved within the framework of U.S. power. U.S. corporations gained the leading role in Middle East oil production,
while dominating the Western Hemisphere, which remained the
major producer until 1968. The United States did not then need
Middle East oil for itself. Rather, the goal was to dominate the
world system, ensuring that others would not strike an independent course. There was, at the time, general contempt for the
Japanese, and few anticipated that they would ever be a serious
economic competitor. But some were more farsighted. In 1948,
Kennan observed that U.S. control over Japanese oil imports
would help to provide “veto power” over Japan’s military and
industrial policies. His advice was followed. Japan was helped to
industrialize, but the United States maintained control over its
energy supplies and oil-refining facilities. As late as 1973, the
United States controlled about ninety percent of Japanese oil.
After the oil crisis of the early 1970s, Japan sought more diverse
energy sources and undertook conservation measures. These
moves reduced the power of the veto considerably, but influence
over oil pricing and production, within the range set by market
forces, remains a factor in world affairs.
As elsewhere, the major policy imperative is to block indigenous nationalist forces. A large-scale counterinsurgency operation in Greece in 1947 was partially motivated by the concern that
the “rot” of independent nationalism there might “infect” the
Middle East. A CIA study held that if the rebels were victorious,
the United States would face “the possible loss of the petroleum
resources of the Middle East.” A Soviet threat was concocted in
the usual manner, but the real threat was indigenous nationalism,
with its feared demonstration effects elsewhere.
Similar factors led to the CIA coup restoring the shah in Iran
in 1953. Nasser became an enemy for similar reasons. Later, KhoThis content downloaded from 129.180.1.217 on Sat, 31 Oct 2015 11:32:25 UTC
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After the Cold War
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meini was perceived as posing another such threat, leading the
United States to support Iraq in the Gulf war. The Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein then took over the mantle, shifting status overnight from moderate friend to a new Hitler when he invaded
Kuwait, displacing U.S.-British clients. The primary fear throughout has been that nationalist forces not under U.S. influence and
control might come to have substantial influence over the oilproducing regions of the Arabian peninsula. Saudi Arabian elites,
in contrast, are considered appropriate partners, managing their
resources in conformity to basic U.S. interests and assisting U.S.
terror and subversion throughout the Third World.
The basic points are fairly clear in the secret planning record, and often in the public government record as well. Thus, in
early 1990, the White House presented Congress with its annual
National Security Strategy Report, calling-as always-for a bigger military budget to protect us from the threat of destruction by
enemies of unimaginable power and bestiality. For the last few
years, it has been hard to portray the Russians as the Great Satan,
so other enemies have had to be conjured up. By now, it is conceded that the enemy is Third World nationalism. This report
therefore explains that we have to build up a powerful high-tech
military because of the “technological sophistication” of Third
World powers, intent on pursuing their own course. We must
ensure the means to move forces “to reinforce our units forward
deployed or to project power into areas where we have no permanent presence,” particularly in the Middle East, where the
“threats to our interests” that have required direct military engagement “could not be laid at the Kremlin’s door”-a fact finally
admitted. “In the future, we expect that non-Soviet threats to
these interests will command even greater attention.” In reality,
the “threat to our interests” had always been indigenous nationalism, a fact sometimes acknowledged, as when the architect of President Carter’s Rapid Deployment Force, aimed primarily at the
Middle East, testified before Congress in 1980 that its most likely
use was not to resist a (highly implausible) Soviet attack, but to
deal with indigenous and regional unrest (called “radical nationalism” or “ultranationalism”). Notice that the Bush administration
plans were presented at a time when Saddam Hussein was still
George Bush’s amiable friend and favored trading partner.
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Noam Chomsky
The Anglo-American condominium in the Gulf region received its first major challenge in 1958, when the nationalist military coup in Iraq overthrew a dependent regime. In his history of
the oil industry, Christopher Rand describes the 1958 coup as
“America’s biggest setback in the region since the war,” “a shocking experience for the United States” that “undoubtedly
provok[ed] an agonizing reappraisal of our nation’s entire approach to the Persian Gulf.” Recently released British and American documents help flesh out earlier surmises.
It’s worth mentioning, in passing, that there is an earlier
history, including British terror bombing of civilians after World
War I and the request of the RAF Middle East command for
authorization to use chemical weapons “against recalcitrant Arabs
as experiment.” The request was granted by the secretary of state
at the War Office, who stated that he was “strongly in favour” of
“using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes,” arguing that gas
should “spread a lively terror” and condemning the “squeamishness” of those who objected to “the application of Western science
to modern warfare” (Winston Churchill). Our values have
changed very little over the years.
In 1958, Kuwait was the particular concern. The “new
Hitler” of the day was Gamal Abdel Nasser, and it was feared that
his pan-Arab nationalism might spread to Iraq, Kuwait, and beyond. One reaction was a U.S. Marine landing in Lebanon to prop
up the regime; another was the apparent authorization of nuclear
weapons by President Eisenhower “to prevent any unfriendly
forces from moving into Kuwait.” To deflect the nationalist threat,
Britain decided to grant Kuwait nominal independence, following
the prescriptions designed after World War I when the imperial
managers realized that British rule would be more cost-effective
behind an “Arab facade,” so that “absorption” of the colonies
should be “veiled by constitutional fictions as a protectorate, a
sphere of influence, a buffer State, and so on” (Lord Curzon).
Britain reserved the right of forceful intervention to protect its
interests, with the agreement of the United States, which reserved
the same right for itself elsewhere in the region. The United
States and Britain also agreed on the need to keep the oil fields in
their hands. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had already summarized the major concerns, including free access to Gulf oil proThis content downloaded from 129.180.1.217 on Sat, 31 Oct 2015 11:32:25 UTC
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After the Cold War
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duction “on favourable terms and for sterling,” and “suitable arrangements for the investment of the surplus revenues of Kuwait”
in Britain. Declassified U.S. documents reiterate that Britain’s “financial stability would be seriously threatened if the petroleum
from Kuwait and the Persian Gulf area were not available to the
U.K. on reasonable terms, if the U.K. were deprived of the large
investments made by that area in the U.K., and if sterling were
deprived of the support provided by Persian Gulf oil.”
These factors and others provide reasons for the United
States “to support, or if necessary assist, the British in using force
to retain control of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf.” In November
1958, the National Security Council recommended that the
United States “[b]e prepared to use force, but only as a last resort,
either alone or in support of the United Kingdom,” if these interests were threatened. The documentary record is not available
beyond that point, but there is little reason to suspect that guiding
doctrines, which had been stable over a long period, have undergone more than tactical change.
At the time, a main concern was that Gulf oil and riches be
available to support the ailing British economy. That concern was
extended by the early 1970s to the U.S. economy, which was visibly declining relative to Japan and German-led Europe. As the
United States and Britain lose their former economic dominance,
privileged access to the rich profits of Gulf oil production is a
matter of serious concern. The point was captured by Martin
Walker in the Guardian, reporting the latest joke on Wall Street.
Question: Why do the United States and Kuwait need each other?
Answer: Kuwait is a banking system without a country, and the
U.S. is a country without a banking system. Like many jokes, it is
not a joke.
Capital flow from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf
principalities to the United States and Britain has provided a good
deal of support for their economies, corporations, and financial
institutions. These are among the reasons why the United States
and Britain often have not been averse to increases in oil price.
The sharp price escalation in 1973 was in many ways beneficial to
their economies, as was widely noted in the business press and
scholarly journals; the U.S. trade balance with the oil producers
actually improved and became favorable to the United States as
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Noam Chomsky
the oil price rose, thereby enriching U.S. energy, manufacturing,
and construction corporations and allowing the United States and
Britain to profit from their own high-priced oil in Alaska and the
North Sea. The issues are too intricate to explore here, but these
factors surely remain operative.
When we consider these factors, it should come as no great
surprise that the two states that established the imperial settlement and have been its main beneficiaries followed their own
course in the Gulf crisis, moving at once to undercut sanctions and
block any diplomatic track, thus narrowing the options to the
threat or use of force. In this course they were largely isolated,
apart from the family dictatorships that rule the Gulf oil producers as an “Arab facade.”
The relative isolation of the two radical militarist powers was
sometimes recognized, though in odd and occasionally comical
ways. Thus, the Independent railed against the European Community for undermining “EC solidarity.” The miscreants included
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Spain, while Britain stoutly
maintained solidarity-with itself and, of course, the big guy
across the seas. The U.S. media preferred to condemn “fair
weather allies” who lack the courage of the cowboy-Britain, with
its manly traditions, aside.
One major U.S. concern in the Middle East has been, and
remains, the “stupendous source of strategic power.” A second
has been the relationship with Israel. There is considerable debate
over whether that special relationship derives from the role of
Israel in U.S. strategic planning or from the influence of a “Jewish
lobby.” My own view, for what it is worth, is that the former factor
is by far the more significant and that the so-called “Jewish lobby”
is actually one component of a much broader group, including
liberal intellectuals who were deeply impressed by Israel’s military
victory in 1967, for reasons that had a good deal to do with the
domestic scene. In this judgment, I disagree with many commentators, including the leadership of the lobby, which publicly claims
vast influence. But we needn’t try to settle this issue. However one
weights the factors, both are there. I’ll keep here to the first,
which in my view is the more important. I would expect, frankly,
that the United States would ditch Israel in a moment if U.S.
planners found this in their interest. In that case, the Jewish lobby
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After the Cold War
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would be as ineffective as it was in 1956, when Eisenhower and
Dulles, on the eve of a presidential election, ordered Israel out of
the Sinai.
One can trace the thinking behind the “special relationship”
back to Israel’s early days. In 1948, Israel’s military successes led
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to describe it as the major regional military power after Turkey, offering the United States means to
“gain strategic advantage in the Middle East that would offset the
effects of the decline of British power in that area” (Avi Shlaim).
Abram Sachar, whose interpretation is particularly interesting because he is custodian of the archives of Truman’s influential associate David Niles, alleges that Truman’s ultimate decision to support Israeli expansion was based upon the Israeli military victory,
which showed that Israel “could become a strategic asset-a kind
of stationary aircraft carrier to protect American interests in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East.”
As for the Palestinians, U.S. planners had no reason to doubt
the assessment of Israeli government specialists in 1948 that the
refugees either would be assimilated elsewhere or “would be
crushed”: “some of them would die and most of them would turn
into human dust and the waste of society, and join the most impoverished classes in the Arab countries” (Moshe Sharett’s Middle
East section). Accordingly, there was no need to trouble oneself
about them. U.S. assessments of Israel and the Palestinians have
hardly changed since that time.
In January 1958, the National Security Council concluded
that a “logical corollary” of opposition to radical Arab nationalism
“would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-Western power
left in the Middle East.” That understanding was extended in the
1960s. U.S. intelligence regarded Israeli power as a barrier to
Nasserite pressures on Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing
clients. That role was firmed up with Israel’s smashing victory in
1967, destroying the nationalist threat, and again in 1970, when
Israeli threats played some role-a
major role, according to
account-in
dubious
rather
protecting Jordan from a
Kissinger’s
who were being
to
Palestinians
effort
support
possible Syrian
to
Israel sharply
U.S.
aid
Hussein’s
army.
slaughtered by King
increased at that point.
These moves were in the context of the new Nixon doctrine,
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Noam Chomsky
according to which other powers must deal with regional problems within the “overall framework of order” maintained by the
United States, as Kissinger put it, admonishing Europe to put
aside any ideas about striking out on its own. A few years later,
Kissinger pointed out in private talks with American Jewish leaders, later released, that one of his prime concerns was “to ensure
that the Europeans and Japanese did not get involved in the diplomacy” of the Middle East-a commitment that persists and
that helps explain U.S. opposition to any international conference. In the Middle East, Iran and Israel were to be the “cops
on the beat” (in the phrase of Defense Secretary Melvin Laird),
safeguarding order. Police headquarters, of course, remained in
Washington.
More serious analysts have been clear about these matters. In
May 1973, the Senate’s ranking oil expert, Senator Henry Jackson, emphasized “the strength and Western orientation of Israel
on the Mediterranean and Iran on the Persian Gulf,” two “reliable
friends of the United States,” with powerful military forces, who
worked together with Saudi Arabia “to inhibit and contain those
irresponsible and radical elements in certain Arab States … who,
were they free to do so, would pose a grave threat indeed to our
principal sources of petroleum in the Persian Gulf” and, in reality,
also threaten U.S. control over riches that flowed from these
sources.
The relationship deepened as Israel became, in effect, a mercenary state, beginning in the 1960s, when the CIA provided
Israel with large subsidies to penetrate black Africa in the U.S.
interest and, later, in Asia and particularly Latin America. As one
high official put it during the Iran-contra affair, Israel is “just
another federal agency, onq that’s convenient to use when you
want something done quietly.” Other relationships also developed, including intelligence sharing, weapons development, and
testing of new advanced weapons in live battlefield conditions.
The relations between Israel and Iran were intimate, as later
revealed (in Israel) after the shah fell. The relations of Israel and
Iran to Saudi Arabia are more subtle and sensitive, and direct
evidence is slight. Saudi Arabia was virtually at war with both
Israel and Iran, which had conquered Arab islands in the Gulf.
But as Senator Jackson indicated, there appears to have been at
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After the Cold War
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least a tacit alliance; more, we may learn some day, if the documentary record is ever revealed. That tripartite relationship continued after the fall of the shah, when the U.S. began, virtually at
once, to send arms to Iran via Israel, which were later (and perhaps then) financed by Saudi Arabia. High Israeli officials involved in these transactions revealed that the purpose was to inspire an anti-Khomeini coup and restore the traditional alliance.
This was, incidentally, long before there were any hostages. It is
one of the many features of the Iran-contra affair suppressed in
the congressional-media damage control operation. The same
model of overthrowing an unwanted civilian government had
been pursued successfully in Indonesia, Chile, and elsewhere, and
is, in fact, fairly standard statecraft: if you want to overthrow some
government, support its military, hoping to find elements who will
do the job for you from the inside.
Notice that in accord with this strategic conception, a peaceful political settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict is not of any
great importance and might even be detrimental to U.S. interests.
And not surprisingly, we find that the United States has blocked a
political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict for twenty years.
At that time, there was a policy split, reflected in the dispute
between Secretary of State William Rogers and National Security
Adviser Henry Kissinger. The Rogers Plan was close to the international consensus of the period, based on UN 242 as interpreted
throughout most of the world, with the Palestinians considered
only as refugees. Kissinger, as he later explained in his memoirs,
preferred “stalemate.” The issue came to a head in February
1971, when President Sadat accepted the proposal of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring for a peace settlement along the lines of U.S.
official policy (the Rogers Plan). Israel recognized Sadat’s proposal as a genuine peace offer, but rejected it. In the United
States, Kissinger’s position prevailed. Since that time, U.S.-Israeli
rejectionism has held with only tactical modifications.
The 1973 war convinced the United States and Israel that
Egypt could not simply be dismissed. They therefore moved to
the natural fallback position: to remove the major Arab military
force from the conflict, so that Israel could proceed to integrate
the occupied territories and attack its northern neighbor with
increased U.S. backing. This process was consummated at Camp
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Noam Chomsky
David. Israel’s leading strategic analyst, Avner Yaniv, now writes
that the effect of removing Egypt from the conflict was that “Israel would be free to sustain military operations against the PLO
in Lebanon as well as settlement activity in the West Bank”exactly as was obvious at the time.
Meanwhile, it was necessary to deflect other peace initiatives.
One major case was in January 1976, when the UN Security
Council debated a resolution calling for a two-state settlement,
reiterating the wording of UN 242 on “appropriate arrangements … to guarantee . . .the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of all states in the area and their right
to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.” The
resolution was proposed by the “confrontation states” (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) and publicly backed by the PLO-in fact, “prepared”
by the PLO, according to Israel’s UN ambassador, Haim Herzog.
It was flatly rejected by Israel and vetoed by the United States.
The United States vetoed a similar resolution in 1980 and has
barred every serious effort to achieve a diplomatic settlement. In
this rejectionist stance, the United States is virtually isolated. The
latest UN General Assembly vote (December 1989) was 151-3
(U.S., Israel, Dominica), the NATO allies voting with the majority.
The record is long, and it is consistent.
U.S. opposition to an international conference on the ArabIsraeli conflict is easy to understand: at any such conference,
there will be pressure for a diplomatic settlement that the United
States opposes. The United States might agree to a conference
sponsored by the U.S. and the USSR, on the assumption that
Soviet leaders would do virtually anything to gain U.S. support.
But unless other countries accept U.S. rejectionism, they must be
kept out of the picture, as in Kissinger’s day.
The depth of this rejectionist stance was dramatically revealed on January 14, 1991, when France made a last-minute
proposal at the UN, calling for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait in return for a Security Council commitment to deal with
the Israel-Palestine problem “at some appropriate moment,”
which remained unspecified. The United States, with Britain tagging along, announced at once that it would veto any such resolution. The French proposal reiterated the basic content of a Security Council statement in which members expressed their view
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that “an international conference, at an appropriate time and
properly structured,” might help to “achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.” The statement was a codicil to Security Council resolution 681 of December
20, calling on Israel to observe the Geneva conventions. It was
excluded from the resolution itself to avoid a U.S. veto. Note that
there was no “linkage” to the Iraqi invasion, which went unmentioned. The United States was therefore willing to go to war
rather than allow even a hint that there might someday be an
international effort to deal with the Israel-Palestine problem. The
pretexts advanced need not detain us.
The official U.S. position remains one of support for the
“Shamir plan” (actually, the coalition Labor-Likud plan) as the
only option on the table. That plan bans an “additional Palestinian
state” (Jordan already being one), bars any “change in the status
of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with the
basic guidelines of the [Israeli] Government,” which preclude any
meaningful Palestinian self-determination, rejects negotiations
with the PLO-thus denying Palestinians the right to choose their
own political representation-and
calls for “free elections” under
Israeli military rule with much of the Palestinian leadership in
prison camps. Unsurprisingly, an international conference and
diplomacy generally are not policy options.
It is worth noting that the United States was also firmly opposed to a diplomatic settlement of the second major issue that
was raised during the Gulf crisis: Iraq’s very dangerous military
capacities. Here the U.S. rejection of “linkage” was particularly
remarkable, since it is beyond dispute that disarmament questions
must be addressed in a regional context. Iraq raised the issue
several times since August, but all proposals have been rejected or
ignored, on the pretext that the United States could not accept
“linkage”-in this unique case. Again, we know perfectly well that
“linkage” and “rewarding the aggressor” had nothing to do with
it. In fact, Saddam Hussein had made a similar proposal in April
1990, when he was still George Bush’s friend and ally. He then
offered to destroy his chemical and biological weapons if Israel
agreed to destroy its nonconventional weapons. The State Department rejected the link “to other issues or weapons systems.” Note
that these remained unspecified. Acknowledgment of the exisThis content downloaded from 129.180.1.217 on Sat, 31 Oct 2015 11:32:25 UTC
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Noam Chomsky
tence of Israeli nuclear weapons would have raised the question of
why all U.S. aid to Israel is not illegal under congressional legislation of the 1970s that bars aid to any country engaged in nuclear
weapons development.
There were diplomatic possibilities for resolving the crisis,
including Iraqi offers described by high U.S. officials as “serious”
and “negotiable.” All were rejected out of hand by Washington.
Among them was one disclosed by U.S. officials on January 2: an
Iraqi offer “to withdraw from Kuwait if the United States pledges
not to attack as soldiers are pulled out, if foreign troops leave the
region, and if there is agreement on the Palestinian problem and
on the banning of all weapons of mass destruction in the region”
(Knut Royce, Newsday,Jan. 3). U.S. officials described the offer as
“interesting” because it dropped any border claims, and “signals
Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement.” A State Department
Mideast expert described the proposal as a “serious prenegotiation position.” The United States “immediately dismissed the proposal,” according to Royce.
The next day the New YorkTimesreported that Yasser Arafat,
after consultations with Saddam Hussein, indicated that neither
of them “insisted that the Palestinian problem be solved before
Iraqi troops get out of Kuwait.” According to Arafat, “Mr. Hussein’s statement of August 12, linking an Iraqi withdrawal to an
Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was no
longer operative as a negotiating demand.” All that was necessary
was “a strong link to be guaranteed by the five permanent members of the Security Council that we have to solve all the problems
in the Gulf, in the Middle East and especially the Palestinian
cause.”
Two weeks before the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, then,
the possible contours of a diplomatic settlement appeared to be
these: Iraq would withdraw completely from Kuwait with a U.S.
pledge not to attack withdrawing forces; foreign troops would
leave the region; and the Security Council would indicate a serious commitment to settle two major regional problems: the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the problem of weapons of mass destruction. Disputed border issues would have been left for later consideration. The offers were flatly rejected and scarcely entered the
media or public awareness. The United States and Britain maintained their commitment to force alone.
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After the Cold War
29
The claim that the United States was unwilling to “reward
the aggressor” by allowing future consideration of these two regional issues is undeserving of a moment’s attention. The United
States commonly rewards aggressors and insists upon “linkage,”
even in cases much worse than Saddam Hussein’s latest crimes. It
follows that the reasons presented were not the real ones, and,
furthermore, that no reason at all was presented for going to
war-none whatsoever.
The real reasons, again, were not obscure. The United States
opposed a diplomatic settlement of all the “linked” issues. Therefore, it opposed “linkage,” that is, diplomacy. If that meant a
devastating war, so be it.
From the outset, the president was clear and unambiguous
that therewould be no negotiations.”Diplomacy” would be limited to
delivery of an ultimatum: capitulate or die. It took willful blindness to misunderstand these facts. The reasons had nothing to do
with “rewarding aggressors” or “linkage,” nor with “annexation”
(the United States dismissed at once offers that would have terminated the annexation), nor with the severity of Saddam Hussein’s
crimes, which had been monstrous before, but of no account. His
crimes, furthermore, did not compare with others that the United
States and U.K. cheerfully supported, and continue to support
today, including the near-genocidal Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor, successful thanks to the decisive support
of the United States and U.K.-which continues as we speak, with
the U.K. now having taken over a leading role as arms supplier to
the murderous Indonesian generals. The U.S.-U.K. posturing on
this matter has descended to a level of cynicism that is extraordinary even by the standards of statecraft, and it is an astonishing
commentary on our intellectual culture that it does not merely
inspire ridicule but is even parroted.
These considerations direct us toward the future. I see little
reason to expect the United States to modify its goals with regard
to oil production and profits or to abandon its rejectionism on the
Israeli-Arab conflict. I haven’t been talking about Israeli policy,
but it is well to recall that the Labor and Likud have been united in
their rejectionism since 1967, though they differ on the terms.
Since 1917, the pretext offered for U.S. intervention has
been defense against the Russians. Before the Bolshevik revolution, intervention was justified in defense against the Huns, the
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30
Noam Chomsky
British, “base Canadian fiends,” or the “merciless Indian savages”
of the Declaration of Independence. For the last several years, the
Russians have not been available as a pretext. The U.S. invasion of
Panama last year kept to the normal pattern but was historic in
that it was the first post-Cold War act of aggression; appeal to the
Russian threat was beyond the reach of even the most fevered
imagination. So the United States was defending itself from narcoterrorism. Little has changed apart from rhetoric.
There are, however, real changes in the world system. By the
early 1970s, it was clear that power had diffused considerably
within U.S. domains, partly as a result of the Vietnam war, which
proved to be quite costly to the U.S. economy and highly beneficial to its rivals, who enriched themselves by their participation in
the destruction of Indochina. The world had become “tripolar,”
to use the fashionable phrase. By the mid-1970s, Soviet military
expenditures began to level off, and it was pretty clear that the
USSR was in serious trouble. A few years later, it was out of the
picture. That collapse has several consequences: (1) at the rhetorical level, new pretexts are needed for intervention; (2) the “end
of the Cold War” opens the way to the “Latin Americanization” of
large parts of the former Soviet empire; and (3) the elimination of
the Soviet deterrent leaves the United States freer than before to
use military force.
How, then, can we expect U.S. policy toward the Middle East
to adapt to these changed circumstance? There is no reason to
expect changes in the principles that guide policy. There are no
significant public pressures for policy change. In polls, about twothirds of the public regularly express support for the international consensus on a two-state settlement, but few have the slightest
awareness of U.S. isolation in blocking the peace process, and
even such elementary facts as the official U.S. position and the
record of diplomacy are rigidly excluded from the media and
public discussion. There is, then, little reason to anticipate a shift
in U.S. rejectionism.
This is, of course, not a certainty. The tactical divide of twenty years ago still exists in elite circles, and might lead to internal
pressures for the United States to join the world community on
this matter. If this radical policy shift takes place, hard problems
quickly arise.
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After the Cold War
31
More likely, in my view, is continued support for the position
articulated in February 1989 by Yitzhak Rabin, then defense secretary, when he told a group of Peace Now leaders of his general
satisfaction with the U.S.-PLO dialogue, low-level discussions
without meaning that would divert attention while Israel used
forceful means to crush the Intifada. The Palestinians “will be
broken,” Rabin promised his interlocuters, and he is probably
right. There is a limit to what flesh and blood can endure. If so,
then the United States and Israel can continue to assume, as they
did forty years ago, that the Palestinians will “turn into human
dust and the waste of society,” while Russian Jews, now effectively
barred from the United States by legislation designed to deny
them a free choice, flock to an expanded Israel with U.S. financial
support, leaving the diplomatic issues moot.
Note
This article appears permission of TheJewish Quarterly.
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Between the Eagle and the Dragon:
America, China, and Middle State
Strategies in East Asia
G. JOHN IKENBERRY
FOR MORE THAN HALF A CENTURY, THE UNITED STATES has
played a leading role in shaping order in East Asia. This East Asian order
has been organized around American military and economic dominance,
anchored in the U.S. system of alliances with Japan, South Korea, and
other partners across Asia. Over the decades, the United States found itself
playing a hegemonic role in the region—providing security, underwriting
stability, promoting open markets, and fostering alliance and political
partnerships. It was an order organized around “hard” bilateral security
ties and “soft” multilateral groupings. It was built around security, economic, and political bargains. The United States exported security and
imported goods. Across the region, countries expanded trade, pursued
democratic transitions, and maintained a more or less stable peace.
Today, this regional order is giving way to something new. Within Asia,
a regional power transition is taking place, driven by the rise of China. In
earlier decades, China existed for the most part outside the “old order.”
With rapid growth and transforming patterns of regional trade, China is
now very much within it. The regional power transition can be seen as a
double shift. The region is becoming increasingly interconnected through
trade, investment, and multilateral agreements. And, under the shadow of
the rise of Chinese economic and military capabilities, the region is taking
G. JOHN IKENBERRY is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International
Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for
International Security Studies.
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY | Volume 131 Number 1 2016 | www.psqonline.org
# 2016 Academy of Political Science
DOI: 10.1002/polq.12430
9
10 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
on a more explicit balance of power dynamic. The region is simultaneously
experiencing growth in multilateral trade and cooperation and new signs
of great power competition.
Out of these changes, East Asia is increasingly marked by the emergence
of two hierarchies. One is a security hierarchy dominated by the United
States, and the other is an economic hierarchy dominated by China.
Countries in the region are relying on the United States to provide security.
The American-led alliance system has been playing this “hub and spoke”
role for decades. Allies across the region continue to rely on this alliance
system for security, and for many countries, these security ties are deepening. At the same time, most of the countries in the region are increasingly
tied to China for trade and investment. Over the last decade, countries that
previously had the United States as their major trade partner—countries
such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines—now have
China as their leading trade partner. The United States is still an important
market and leader of the world economy, but China is the economic center
of Asia—and it will be more so in the future.
The emergence of this “dual hierarchy” raises important questions. Past
regional and global orders have tended to have a more singular hierarchy of
economics and security. For weaker or secondary states, the dominant
military power was also the dominant economic power. What happens
when “middle states” are tied to different security and economic lead
states?1 How stable is this sort of dual hierarchical order? What sort of
strategies will middle states pursue within this dual system of order? When
push comes to shove—if it does—will middle states ally with their security
patron or with their economic patron? What are the strategies that the
United States and China will seek to pursue within the context of this dual
hierarchical order? How stable is it as a regional order? Is it best seen as a
transitional order in which one or the other lead state eventually emerges
as the dominant power, or might it persist as a stable geopolitical
equilibrium?2
In this article, I explore the strategies and possible pathways of change
within this dual hierarchical system. All the states—China, the United
States, and the middle states—face complex choices and trade-offs. I focus
In this article, I use the term “middle states” to refer to countries in East Asia that are tied to the United
States for security cooperation and China for trade and investment. These include Japan, South Korea,
Australia, and most of the ASEAN countries.
2
See Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias: In the Battle for Asia’s Soul, Which
Side Will Win—Security or Economics?,” Foreign Policy, 31 October 2012, accessed at http://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/10/31/a-tale-of-two-asias/, 18 October 2015.
1
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 11
on the incentives and constraints that all the states face within the context
of shifting security and economic relationships.
I advance three arguments. First, the dual hierarchical order does create
and reinforce competitive dynamics between the two lead states. There are
increasingly two states offering hegemonic leadership within the region. As
a result, the United States and China will find themselves increasingly
competing for influence and the loyalties of middle states. In this hegemonic competition, the United States and China can both offer the benefits
of their leadership. They will each have carrots and sticks to push and pull
the region in their direction. The United States has its extended security
system as an asset, and China has its trade and investment assets. Each
state will seek to offer the region its hegemonic services. Each state also has
tools with which to apply political pressure. But there are costs and
unwelcome consequences if the United States and China attempt to use,
respectively, their security and economic leverage. In the end, it will be the
middle states that have the ability to shift the regional order in one
direction or the other—or to make choices to preserve the double hierarchy.
Second, all the states have a potentially dominant strategy that could
serve to stabilize and preserve this dual hierarchical order. The middle
states of the region have reason to want this dual hierarchy to persist. They
will not want to make a choice between the United States and China. They
will want to receive the security benefits of allying with the United States
and the economic benefits of trading with China. At the same time, they
will worry about the credibility of America’s security commitment, and
they will worry about the possibility that China will use its growing
economic position to dominate the region. In effect, they will worry about
both their security and economic dependency.
In this context, the United States will have incentives to remain a
security provider in the region. But its allies will not want to engage in
full-scale balancing against China. Again, they will not want to be forced to
choose between the United States and China. So the United States will be
inclined—if it can—to pursue a “not too hot and not too cold” strategy. It
will not want to be too aggressive toward China, seeking to contain and
isolate China, which would force the middle states to pick sides. Nor will it
want to be too soft and accommodating toward China, which would
undercut the role and credibility of the U.S.-led security system. China,
in turn, has an incentive not to trigger a backlash against its growing
power, so it will have incentives to signal restraint and accommodation.
China faces a problem of “self-encirclement.” It will want to find ways to
rise peacefully without galvanizing a counterbalancing response. These
considerations suggest that incentives do exist for all states in the region to
12 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
acknowledge and operate within this dual hierarchical order. It is an order
in which the middle states have some collective influence over the policies
of both the United States and China. As a result, with this underlying
incentive structure, the order has the potential to remain a stable
equilibrium.
Third, the evolution of this dual hierarchy will depend on several
variables. One variable relates to the ability of the United States to remain
a credible security provider. What are the judgments that middle states in
the region will make about the willingness and ability of the United States
to provide security—honoring alliances, forward-positioning forces, and
responding to the emerging security needs of middle states in the region?
What are the terms and conditions for establishing such credible commitments? Can the United States sustain these commitments under conditions of relative economic decline? A second variable relates to the
willingness and ability of China to signal restraint and accommodation
as it grows more powerful. Can China operate in the region as a stabilizing
force? Can it present itself to the region as a status quo power that does not
seek to upend the American-led alliance system? The deeper question here
is really about China’s preferences for regional order. Does China see the
United States as trespassing within East Asia? Will China seek to use its
growing economic position in the region to push middle states into loosening their security ties to the United States? Or is China happy with
economic leadership alone based on the material benefits it brings, without
having to pay the costs of being a hegemon?
A final variable shaping the evolution of this dual hierarchy order relates
to the deeper “fundamentals” of security and economic dependency. This is
actually a series of questions. Do international orders ultimately depend on
a single hegemon that organizes and enforces order? In the theoretical
literature on hegemonic order, the organizer and leader of the order is both
the dominant military and economic state. The willingness of the lead state
to provide security for the wider regional or global order is associated with
the economic benefits that flow from the order. With a dual hierarchical
order, the costs and benefits of security provision and economic gain are
separated, so the willingness of the two lead states to do what they do will
hinge on how they experience and evaluate these costs and benefits.
Beyond this, there is also the deep question of which national interest—
security or economic gain—ultimately drives strategic decision making. If
“push comes to shove,” will middle states in the region side with their
security patron or with their economic patron? Again, the middle states
may not want to face this choice. But if they are forced to make a choice,
which “existential value” trumps the other?
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 13
This article looks first at the emergence of security and economic
hierarchies in East Asia. After this, it explores the strategic logic of the
two lead states—the United States and China. The article follows this
discussion with a focus on the strategic incentives and choices of the middle
states. As we shall see, the choices—as well as the costs and benefits of these
choices—are interdependent. The choices and decisions that the United
States and China make will depend on the other, and the incentives and
choices of both states will depend on the decisions of middle states. In the
end, the way this dual hierarchy system plays out will hinge on the ability of
all the states in the region to craft agreements that establish credible
restraint and commitment.
In this emerging regional order, the United States will not exercise
hegemony as it has in the past. At the same time, however, the future will
not be a simple story of China rising up and pushing the United States out.
The opposite is more likely the case. The rise of China is actually serving to
draw the United States into the region in new ways—particularly in
Southeast Asia. America’s recent entrance into the East Asian Summit
and its closer ties with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
reflect this growing American involvement. At the same time, countries in
the region are integrating into a regional economic system that is dominated by China. This dynamic increases the potential tensions between
these two existing hierarchies. Again, the question presents itself: how will
these security and economic spheres—and the states that inhabit them—
interact?
HEGEMONY, POWER BALANCE, AND POWER TRANSITIONS
Order in East Asia is in transition, but what precisely do we mean by
“order”? Order refers to the settled arrangements—rules, institutions,
alliances, relationships, and patterns of authority—that guide the interaction of states. Order reflects the organizational principles and rules that
shape and direct state relationships. Order breaks down and gives way to
disorder when these settled rules and principles no longer operate. Order
can be imposed by a dominant state, or it can reflect more consensual and
agreed-upon rules and relationships. Orders can be regional or global.3
3
For general theoretical accounts of the logic and character of international order, see Hedley Bull, The
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977);
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and
Andrew Hurrell, On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
14 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
As such, international order can manifest in many ways. Scholars of
international relations have tended to identify two major types of international order—order built around hierarchy and order built around the
balance of power. In an order that is organized around hierarchy, a leading
state presides over weaker and secondary states. Hierarchical orders can
vary in terms of the degree to which hierarchy is based on coercion or
consent. Hierarchical orders with “imperial” characteristics are those that
are built and maintained through coercion and direct domination. Hierarchical orders with “liberal” characteristics are organized around more
consensual rules and relations between the lead state and weaker and
secondary states.4 Hierarchical orders that are not fully imperial, based
instead on leadership and indirect control by a leading state, are often
referred to as hegemonic orders. Hegemonic order is hierarchical and
reflects the dominant power position of a leading state. But relations of
hierarchy are infused with elements of consent and legitimacy. In a hegemonic order, the dominant state establishes its position through leadership, bargains, and the provision of various “goods,” such as security and
markets.5
Robert Gilpin provides the classic theoretical account of the logic of
hegemonic order.6 The leading state uses its commanding capabilities—
power, market, and ideological appeal—to build order. Within a hegemonic order, rules and rights are established and enforced by the power
capacities of the leading state. Compliance and participation within the
4
See David Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Ian
Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1989); and G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the
Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
5
See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International
Economic Regimes, 1967–1977,” in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George,
eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 131–162; Stephen Krasner,
“State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (April 1976): 217–247; Duncan
Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (September 1985):
579–614; Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International
Economic Order,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984): 355–386; G. John Ikenberry and Charles
A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44 (Summer 1990): 283–
315; David A. Lake, “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered
Monarch with Potential?,” International Studies Quarterly 37 (December 1993): 459–489; and Ian Clark,
Hegemony in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). On the British and
American experiences as hegemonic leaders, see Robert Gilpin, “The Rise of American Hegemony,” in
Patrick Karl O’Brien and Armand Clesse, eds., Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States
1941–2001 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of
American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Carla Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage: U.S.
Hegemony and International Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
6
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics.
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 15
order is ultimately ensured by the range of power capabilities available to
the hegemon—military power, financial capital, market access, technology,
and so forth. Direct coercion is always an option in the enforcement of
order, but less direct “carrots and sticks” are also mechanisms to maintain
hegemonic control. Over time, power and wealth eventually diffuse, new
challengers emerge, and hegemonic war follows—and a new order is forged
in its wake. States rise up and build international order—and they rule over
that order until they grow weak and are challenged by a newly powerful
state. In one way or another, a leading state becomes powerful and builds
international order.
The other major type of order is organized around a balance of power. In
an order based on balance, order is maintained through an equilibrium of
power among major states. No state dominates or controls the system.
Order emerges from a power stalemate. States compete, build alliances,
and maneuver to prevent a strong and threatening state from establishing
dominance. Kenneth Waltz has been a leading theorist of balance of power
order. In his rendering, states resist the dominating ambitions of powerful
states.7 In a decentralized world of sovereign states, the best way to ensure
survival and security is to keep power balanced. Weak and secondary states
will find themselves allying together to resist powerful states. Power is
safest when it is counterbalanced.8
Both the hegemonic and balance of power logics are relevant for understanding the character of order in East Asia. As I will discuss later, over the
last half century, order in East Asia has been maintained through American hegemonic leadership. The United States has presided over the regional order as its most powerful state, an order that, at least until recently,
has been organized around American-led economic and security hierarchical relationships. With the rise of China, the regional order has begun to
exhibit the balance of power logic. There is a growing mixture of hegemony
and balance within the region.
The logic of international order is most clearly revealed during dramatic
shifts in the distribution of power. These “power transitions” are moments
when the dominant state begins to weaken and lose power. Other states are
rising and growing powerful—and they begin to challenge the leading state
7
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Wiley, 1979).
Balance of power refers to order built around competition and counterbalancing between two or more
major states. The theory and history of balance of power orders is the subject of a vast scholarly literature.
See Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996); Richard
Little, The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, eds.,
The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
8
16 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
for dominance and control of the order. During the late nineteenth century, for example, British dominance of international order was increasingly challenged by the rise of Germany economic and military power. The
United States was also slowly passing Britain as an emerging global power.
As power shifts, the underpinnings of the old order begin to weaken. Rising
states have their own agendas. Struggles ensue over leadership and—at a
deeper level—over the basic rules, institutions, and principles of order
itself. At these power transition moments, great powers find themselves
maneuvering for authority and influence.9
The dynamics of international order are also reflected in the strategies
that states—large and small—adopt in the face of shifting power distributions. These strategies run along a spectrum from “balancing” to “bandwagoning.” States that face a rising and increasingly dominant great power
can oppose and resist that power—doing so, at the extreme, by organizing a
balancing coalition against it. Or states that face a rising great power might
attempt to engage and work with that rising power. States might simply
seek to appease the rising state or take steps to “tame” its power by binding
it to regional or global institutions.10
These logics and strategies are useful in illuminating the changing
character of order in East Asia. The United States remains the leading
hegemonic power in Asia, but hegemonic leadership is eroding and fragmenting in various ways. A power transition is under way in the region.
China is a rising state that will increasingly have capacities for hegemonic
leadership. The power transition under way creates uncertainties and
insecurities across the region. Within this dynamic setting, the leading
and middle states in East Asia—the United States, China, and the states in
between—are engaged in a sort of grand geopolitical adjustment process.
We can look more closely at the emerging dual hierarchical character of
regional order and the choices and strategies of the states within it.
EAST ASIA’S DUAL HIERARCHY
During the Cold War decades and into the 1990s, the United States was the
hegemonic leader of East Asia. The United States was both the leading
security provider in the region and the leading source of trade and
9
For classic accounts of the problem of power transitions, see Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics;
and A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).
10
For discussions of strategies of response to rising power, see Randall Schweller, “Managing the Rise of
Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China:
Managing a Rising Power (London: Routledge, 1999); and Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell, and Neal
Jesse, Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 17
investment. The United States was hegemonic in that it took on overarching responsibilities for managing order in the region. By building alliances
and projecting power into the region, the United States dampened security
competition between China and Japan, addressed the security concerns of
smaller states, and affirmed the territorial status quo in the region. In
building transpacific trade relations and opening its markets to East Asian
exports, the United States encouraged trade-oriented development and
dampened nationalist economic competition.11 During these decades,
China was to a large extent outside the security and economic realms of
the region.
Order in the region was led and maintained by the United States—and
in this sense, order in the region was organized around hierarchical
relationships rather than a balance of power. The United States provided
security, open markets, and working political relationships with its partners, and in return, these countries agreed to affiliate with the United
States, providing logistical, economic, and diplomatic assistance to the
United States as it operated as a global superpower.
At the heart of this “old” East Asian regional order was the American-led
alliance system—which is still the centerpiece of regional order. Since the
end of World War II, and again in the 1950s and onward, the United States
built and extended defense ties with countries across the region. These ties
have tended to be bilateral, and together they constitute what has frequently been referred to as a “hub and spoke” system. The United States’
security treaties with Japan and Korea are the core of this security system,
but these security ties extend outward as well to Australia, Thailand, and
Taiwan.12
This American-led order in East Asia had a sort of stable functional
logic. This is true for several reasons. First, the bilateral system of alliances
provided the political and geographic foundations for the projection of
American influence in the region. With forward bases and security
11
For depictions of this American hegemonic order in East Asia, see Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order:
Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (New York: Oxford University Press,
2013); David Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations,” in G. John Ikenberry and
Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003); Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security
Order in Asia,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 141–170; and G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony
and East Asia Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58 (September 2004): 353–367.
12
See Evelyn Goh, “Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order,”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (September 2008): 353–377; Victor Cha, “Complex
Patchworks: U.S. Alliances as Part of Asia’s Regional Architecture,” Asia Policy 11 (January 2011): 27–
50; and Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34 (Winter
2009/1010): 158–196.
18 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
commitments across the region, the United States established itself as the
leading power in East Asia. Second, the bilateral alliances served to bind
the United States to the region, establishing fixed commitments and
mechanisms that have increased certainty and predictability about the
exercise of American power. With treaty-based alliance commitments and
forward-deployed American forces, worry has been reduced in the region
about American comings and goings. Third, the alliance ties have created
channels of access for Japan and other security partners to Washington. In
effect, the alliances have provided institutionalized “voice opportunities”
for these countries. Finally, the U.S.–Japan alliance has played a more
specific and crucial role—namely, it has allowed Japan to be secure without
the necessity of becoming a traditional military power. Japan could rebuild
and reenter the region without triggering dangerous security dilemmas
with China and other states.13
For most of the last half century, the United States was also the leading
economic partner to most of the countries in the region. In fact, from the
outset, the bilateral security order has been intertwined with the evolution
of regional economic relations. The United States facilitated Japanese
economic reconstruction after the war and created markets for Japanese
exports. The American security guarantee to its partners in East Asia
provided a national security rationale for Japan to open its markets.
Free trade helped cement the alliance, and in turn, the alliance helped
settle economic disputes. The export-oriented development strategies of
Japan and other Asian “tigers” depended on America’s willingness to
accept imports and huge trade deficits, which alliance ties made politically
tolerable.14
While the American-led security order is still largely in place, economic
relationships are shifting. The growth of China’s economy and the expansion of its trade and investment ties within the region and worldwide are
well known. As China, India, and other non-Western developing states
have grown in recent decades, their shares of gross domestic product
(GDP) have risen and America’s share has declined—and these trends
13
For accounts of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the building of postwar order in East Asia, see Richard
Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2007); Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era
of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Kenneth Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power
and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996); and Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo
Okawara, “Japan and Asia-Pacific Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking
Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004),
97–130.
14
See T.J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1998).
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 19
seem destined to continue. According to Arvind Subramanian’s muchdiscussed study, China, India, and several other market-oriented developing countries are fast emerging as the largest economies:
According to the projections, between 2010 and 2039 emerging markets
and developing economies will increase their share of world GDP (at
market-based exchange rates) by a whopping 19 percentage points and
by 15 percentage points at PPP [purchasing power parity] exchange rates
. . . China’s share of world GDP (in PPP dollars) will increase from 17
percent in 2010 to 24 percent in 2030, and India’s share will increase from
5 to 10 percent. China’s economy (in PPP dollars) will be more than twice
that of the United States by 2030.15
Even if these trends are not realized, the future will surely be one in which
the U.S. economy—and perhaps its larger basket of power assets—will be
smaller relative to the rest of the world than it is today.16 This remarkable
Chinese economic growth has been achieved within the postwar open
multilateral world economy led by the United States.
There are several features associated with the rise of China’s economic
dominance within the region. First, there is the rapid growth of the Chinese
economy itself. Over the last two decades, China has been growing at near
or at double-digit rates, although it has come down from these highs in
recent years. A second feature is the expansion of trade and investment
integration within the region. Extended production chains and assembly
networks increasingly tie countries in the region together in complex forms
of economic interdependence. Finally, a third feature of China’s economic
ascent is the growth of China’s share of trade with countries in the region.
Over the last two decades, most of the countries in the region that previously had the United States as their leading trade partner now have China
as their leading trade partner.
As Figure 1 shows, most of the countries in East Asia over the last two
decades have slowly shifted their trade orientation from the United States
to China. While the United States was Japan’s and South Korea’s leading
trade partner for many decades, China is now the leading trade partner of
both. The same pattern holds for Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and
other countries in Southeast Asia. As Figure 2 shows, ASEAN as a group
15
Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington, DC:
Peter Institute for International Economics, 2011), 81–83.
16
For a more skeptical look at future Chinese growth—as well as the growth of other emerging market
economies—see Ruchir Sharma, “The Ever-Emerging Markets: Why Economic Forecasts Fail,” Foreign
Affairs, January/February 2014, 52–56.
20 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
FIGURE 1
Merchandise Imports to China and the United States as a Percentage of Total Merchandise Imports
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 21
FIGURE 2
Total ASEAN Trade with China and the United States as a Percentage of Total ASEAN Trade
has also made the transition in its trading patterns from the United States
to China.
Out of these developments, the United States and China find themselves
rival leaders in East Asia. Each sits at the top of a regional hierarchy. The
United States still dominates the region in military capabilities and security relationships. Indeed, the rise of Chinese power has in fact increased
the “demand” for American-led security assistance within the region. Yet if
countries in the region look to the United States for security, they look to
China for economic opportunity. China is a source of economic gain for
most of East Asia. It is in this sense that countries are ambivalent about
China. Its economy—and the trade and investment that flow from it—is
propelling economic growth and integration within the region. But Chinese power is also—at least potentially—worrisome. Countries want the
benefits that come from the rise of China. But they also want to guard
against Chinese domination of the region. This, in turn, is a major reason
America’s extended alliance system in the region is welcomed.
The emerging dual hierarchy in East Asia presents each of these parties
with opportunities and dilemmas. The United States has lost its full-scale
hegemonic position in the region because of the economic rise of China. Yet
it is in many respects more “indispensable” than ever before to many, if not
most, countries in the region. China has increasing economic presence and
political influence in the region, but it is uncertain how it can translate its
22 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
growing material capabilities into wider regional leadership. If China seeks
to push the United States out of the region and establish itself as the fullscale regional hegemonic power, the pathway forward is not clear. And the
middle states in East Asia also have opportunities and dilemmas. They are
beneficiaries—up to some point—of competition between the United
States and China for regional leadership. They get the benefits of security
from the United States and economic opportunity from China. But these
benefits flow most readily if there is a sort of “hegemonic stalemate”
between the United States and China. A dual hierarchy in East Asia is
attractive as long as it is stable. As such, the middle powers have a deep
interest in the preservation of the dual hierarchy system, and so we can
expect them to play a stabilizing role. We can look more closely at the
choices and strategies of these states.
AMERICA’S HEGEMONIC CHOICES
The United States is in transition from its “unipolar” position within the
global system and its singularly dominant position within East Asia.
Globally and regionally, this movement is being propelled by unequal
rates of growth and the diffusion of wealth and power. The distribution
of economic activity and capabilities has spread from the advanced Western capitalist democracies outward to the wider world. China, India, Brazil,
Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia, and South Korea are among the wide
array of countries outside the West that have been growing rapidly and
altering the global balance of power. At least in the economic realm, the
unipolar era is giving way to a more decentralized and multipolar world
system of markets and production. Within Asia, this global shift has been
pushed forward by rapid Chinese economic growth and the wider growth
and integration of the regional economy.
This global and regional shift is starting to have important implications
for America’s half-century hegemonic position within East Asia. The
United States will be less fully hegemonic. As noted, countries in the region
are increasingly orienting themselves toward China’s trade and investment
decisions. To the extent that hegemonic leadership is built on commanding
economic capabilities, American leadership will weaken. The United States
will not be in the economic position it once was to provide the full range of
public goods—stabilizing markets, managing crises, and upholding multilateral economic openness. The full-scale character of American hegemonic leadership in East Asia will give way to more narrow or limited
leadership, or at least leadership that is shared with China.
The shift in the distribution of economic capacities away from the
United States will also lead to more uncertainty within the region about
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 23
America’s capacities for remaining a hegemonic leader in political and
security areas. There are two considerations here. One is simply a question
of capacities for leadership. Can the United States continue to shoulder its
security alliance burdens under conditions of relative economic decline?
How will budget deficits and debt constrain American strategic choices in
Asia? Even if American administrations give priority to U.S. security
commitments in Asia—and makes cuts elsewhere—there will no doubt
be questions within the region about how sustainable the U.S. extended
alliance system will be over the coming decades. The other consideration is
on the American side. The postwar U.S. hegemonic presence in the region
was built on both security and economic bargains with states in the region.
The United States provided security to partners and received economic
benefits in return. Countries such as Japan accommodated themselves to
Washington’s economic agenda—such as holding U.S. dollars, adjusting
exchange rates, pursuing accommodating macroeconomic policies, and so
forth. In other words, America’s security role in the region was at least
partly attractive to the United States because it had this wider set of
benefits. The hegemonic bargains between the United States and its junior
partners involved both security and economic benefits and burdens. What
happens when the economic components of the old hegemonic bargains
fall away? How will this affect the American cost–benefit calculation? Will
the United States be willing to maintain its leadership in providing security
despite the erosion of its economic position in the region?
Under these conditions, the United States has a variety of choices and
strategies. The most important question the United States faces will be
whether to maintain its alliance commitments in East Asia. The “costs” and
“benefits” of this American-led security system are hard to determine.17
And it is not simply the actual costs and benefits that matter. It is also the
political salience—and perceptions—of these costs and benefits in American foreign policy circles and domestic politics. There is widespread agreement within the U.S. foreign policy community that the forward-deployed
alliance system in East Asia does advance American long-term strategic
interests. The benefits exceed the costs. Moreover, in the context of a rising
China, the alliance system may actually have increasing value to the United
States. If countries in the region cannot balance growing Chinese power
17
For an attempt to calculate net costs and benefits for the United States of its extended security system, see
Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case against
Retrenchment,” International Security 37 (Winter 2012/2013): 7–51. For a view that emphasizes the
growing domestic constraints and pressures on American international leadership and commitments, see
Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the
United States,” International Security 32 (Fall 2007): 7–44.
24 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
without American assistance, the alliance system becomes indispensable.
The price of maintaining the alliance system in East Asia is more than
offset by ensuring that the region is not completely dominated by China.18
The United States may not receive all the economic gains from the alliance
system that it once did. But to the extent that the United States wants to
remain a dominant great power in Asia and prevent the realization of
Chinese hegemonic aspirations in the region, the alliance system remains
strategically valuable.
If this is so, the United States will increasingly find itself competing with
China for influence and leadership within this dual hierarchical system. In
doing so, the United States has a variety of strategies it can pursue. First, it
will want to engage in “strategic reassurance” with its allies in the region.
The “hub and spoke” alliance system is an American asset, so the United
States does not want to let it erode. This is all the more important because
of the background shifts in the distribution of economic capabilities and
the power transition that is under way in Asia. States in the region that
have been junior security partners with the United States for decades will
want to be confident that the security commitments are credible and long
lasting. With the rise of China, these countries will want to know that the
United States “has their back.” The forward-based American forces, the
bilateral security agreements, the region-wide deployments, the military
doctrines and exercises, active diplomacy and consultations, presidential
speeches and state visits—these are all aspects of signaling strategic
reassurance.19
There is an important question about how the United States can actually
establish and reaffirm the credibility of its security commitments. Governments do come and go, strategic visions do change, and “agonizing reassessments” do occur. The Barack Obama administration has clearly
attempted to engage in strategic reassurance with its announcement of
a “strategic pivot” to Asia.20 But questions persist in many capitals
18
Arguably, America’s most basic grand strategic goal since World War II has been to prevent Eurasia from
being dominated by a hostile hegemonic power. Despite shifts in other costs and benefits, this goal probably
remains the ultimate rationale for the maintenance of a United States security commitment to East Asia.
See Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
19
See James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.–China Relations
in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).
20
For an official statement describing the Obama administration’s strategic pivot, see President Obama’s
speech to the Australian parliament, 17 November 2011, accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament, 16 October 2015. For Chinese
reactions, see Keith B. Richburg, “U.S. Pivot to Asia Makes China Nervous,” Washington Post, 16
November 2011.
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 25
throughout the region. Speeches and announcements are fine, but what
about the longer term? Bases and fixed investments in the region would
seem to be the most durable sorts of strategic commitments—and therefore
the most credible. Military procurement and costly naval “platforms” that
are the leading edge of American security commitments to the region also
are indicators of long-term commitment. The durability of American
security commitments might also be reflected in the prevailing consensus
within the American foreign policy community over the importance of the
alliances and maintaining a leading strategic presence in Asia. In contrast,
those who are skeptical of America’s “staying power” in Asia tend to look at
looming budget and debt crises as well as political polarization and stalemate within the American government. Countries in East Asia that ponder
the credibility of America’s security commitments will also weight any
uncertainties against their assessment of the dangers that might follow
from being left alone in the region with a rising China. These countries may
want the American security guarantee as a “hedge” against an aggressive
China, but they may also seek to “hedge” against a future in which the
United States simply cannot sustain its existing forward-deployed presence. Beyond these considerations, countries in the region might also have
an incentive to express public uncertainty about America’s strategic commitment, if only to create pressure on the United States to do more—spend,
deploy, commit—to overcome that uncertainty.21
The second strategy that the United States can pursue is to seek to
reduce the economic dependence of its allies on China. The shifts in trade
and investment flows associated with the rise of China are deeply rooted in
structural changes in the world economy. The United States cannot alter
the overall direction of growth and integration of markets. But it can take
steps to keep markets open, multilateral, and transregional. The worst
outcome for the United States would be if China is not simply the dominant economy in Asia but if the regional economy becomes closed and
tightly dependent on China. So the United States should champion a
global “open door” policy. It should reaffirm its commitment to the multilateral trade system—embodied in the World Trade Organization—and
universal standards for trade and investment. Within Asia, a patchwork of
bilateral and mini-lateral trade agreements are tying China to its neighbors
as well as tying other Asian countries together. The United States should
seek to extend these agreements across the Pacific. The U.S.–Korean Free
21
This is a point emphasized in Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
26 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
Trade Agreement is an example of this. The United States is also seeking
bilateral trade agreements with Singapore, Australia, and other East Asian
countries. Perhaps most importantly, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
trade agenda offers an opportunity to reinforce open and transregional
flows of trade.22 The overall goal is to undercut the growth of a small and
inward-looking East Asian regional trade system with China as its hub. If
China continues to grow rapidly, its economy will inevitably be at the
center of the regional economy. But America’s strategic objective should be
to use trade agreements to bias the evolution of the region in an open and
transpacific direction.
A third strategy that the United States might pursue is to seek political
solidarity and cooperation among the democratic countries of Asia. Over
the last several decades, countries across Asia have undergone transitions
to liberal democracy. South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines have all thrown off military or authoritarian rule and established democracies. Countries such as India, Australia, and New Zealand
have been democratic from their founding. Taiwan has become a stable
democracy. Altogether, there are 11 democracies across Asia. There is an
opportunity in this fact for the United States. It can try to turn this
“grouping” of democracies into something closer to a “community” of
democracies. It can appeal to shared values and institutions so as to foster
closer relations in areas of economic, politics, and security. The United
States has long invoked shared democratic values in its foreign policy.
During the late 1990s, the Bill Clinton administration worked with newer
democracies in Eastern Europe, South America, and Asia to launch the
Community of Democracies, a periodic gathering of foreign ministers of
the world’s democracies to discuss the problems and prospects of liberal
democracy. There have also been calls by American foreign policy experts
for the formation of more strategic cooperation among the world’s democracies.23 American officials have invoked shared democratic values in
22
For overviews of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations and their strategic implications for the
United States, see Ellen Frost, “Strategic Implications of TPP: Answering the Crisis,” Asia Pacific Bulletin,
no. 220 (9 July 2013): 1–2; and Ian F. Ferguson, Mark A. McMinimy, and Brock R. Williams, “The TransPacific Partnership (TPP): Negotiations and Issues for Congress” (Report R42694, Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 20 March 2015). For China’s view of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, see Keith
Bradsher, “Once Concerned, China Is Quiet about Trans-Pacific Trade Deal,” New York Times, 28
April 2015.
23
See John McCain’s call for a League of Democracies (speech to the Hoover Institution, Stanford
University, Stanford, CA, 2 May 2007); Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “Democracies of the World,
Unite,” The American Interest, January/February 2007, 5–15; and G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty under Law (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, 2006).
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 27
speeches and diplomatic engagements within Asia. The idea of shared
democratic values has been put at the center of America’s ties with Japan,
Australia, and, more recently, India. As the United States finds itself
competing with China for regional leadership, there will be incentives to
make appeals to democratic solidarity and search for ways to strengthen
strategic cooperation among the democracies within Asia.
A fourth strategy that the United States will want to pursue is to
expand the geopolitical space of Asia. Countries in the region are engaged
in a debate about what constitutes Asia. Who is in and who is out? What
are the boundaries of Asia? In this struggle over regional identity and
organizational shape, the United States should seek the widest and most
expansive definitions. A “small” Asia would be a region composed of
China, Japan, South Korea, and the 10 ASEAN countries. This is a
regional grouping in which China looms large. A wider Asia would be
a region that also includes India, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States. This enlarged regional grouping is one in which there is more
room for the United States and more opportunities for it to build
coalitions. This wider regional formation also includes more democracies, thereby further reinforcing America’s position. The debate over the
membership of the East Asian Summit is in part a struggle over the
question of Asia’s geopolitical space. A region that is large, open, and
inclusive works to America’s advantage.
A final strategy is the diplomatic engagement of China, seeking to
provide Beijing with incentives and tools to signal restraint and reassurance. The United States cannot be certain that China will want to integrate
peacefully into the existing regional and global order. China does know
that as its power grows, other countries in the region will worry about how
that power will be used. The danger for China is that its rise will provoke an
unintended backlash, generating hostility and counterbalancing rather
than influence. This is a future that China will want to prevent, even if
it does seek to use its growing power to reduce the American presence in
the region. One way that powerful states can signal restraint and benign
intentions to other states is by agreeing to join and operate within regional
and global institutions. The United States did this after World War II as it
sought to build a postwar order. By embedding itself in an array of
economic and security institutions, the United States made its power
less worrisome to others and attracted allies and partners.24 This fifth
strategy involves efforts by the United States to allow China to do the same
24
See Ikenberry, After Victory.
28 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
thing. It involves efforts to open regional and global institutions to Chinese
participation, allowing China opportunities to integrate and gain positions
in multilateral institutions. It is a strategy of drawing China into the
existing order, giving China opportunities to demonstrate their peaceful
and status quo intentions.25
Taken together, the United States will have incentives to stay involved in
the region and seek to prevent the establishment of a China-centered
hegemonic order. The shifts in patterns of economic growth and trade
and investment are deeply rooted. The United States will not be able to
fully recoup its old position as hegemonic leader. But it still has assets—not
least its entrenched alliance system and capacities for security assistance—
that allow it to prevent a complete hegemonic transition. The United States
will find itself moving—as it already is—to a role as a geopolitical counterweight to China. It will seek to provide middle states with options as they
themselves hedge against the possibilities of an aggressive China. If this is
the case, the United States will not get “pushed out of Asia.” It will actually
get pulled further into Asia, weaving itself into bilateral and multilateral
political and security relationships. Neither China nor the United States
ultimately will emerge as a comprehensive and fully dominant hegemonic
state in the region. Instead, the region will evolve into a more mixed
system of shared and competing hegemonic leaders and counterweight
partnerships.
CHINA’S HEGEMONIC CHOICES
China’s rapid economic growth is the leading edge of the power transition
currently under way in East Asia. As China has grown, so, too, has East
Asia. The region has prospered and become increasingly integrated. While
the United States was once the leading trade partner for many of the
countries in the region, now it is China. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
most of the ASEAN countries are all increasingly tied to China through
trade and investment. The economic prospects for these countries increasingly hinge on China’s economic prospects. This ongoing economic transition within East Asia is also unfolding at the global level. China recently
passed Japan as the second-largest economy in the world, and if trends
continue, it will pass the United States in the next decade. Both within East
Asia and globally, the United States has now acquired an economic peer
25
For China’s evolving views on the strategic uses of international institutions, see Rosemary Foot and
Andrew Walter, China, the United States and Global Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011);
and David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
BETWEEN THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON | 29
competitor. Within this evolving region, what are China’s strategic options
and choices?26
It is widely observed that China’s most fundamental interest is to
maintain the integrity of the Chinese state and to manage the country’s
rapid growth and modernization. Foreign policy and strategic interests in
the region flow from this basic consideration. But beyond this, China surely
has incentives to expand its political influence and leadership within the
region. China will increasingly compete with the United States for hegemonic leadership. This is true for several reasons. First, China is, after all,
the leading economy in the region, and so it will inevitably seek to translate
its economic importance to the region into political importance. Chinese
elites look at East Asia and see the United States as a declining power and
China as a rising power. The future of East Asia is increasingly in China’s
hands.27 Turning economic gains into political gains is an old and wellestablished goal of rising great powers. The United States pursued this goal
as a rising great power within its region and later at the global level.
Second, China’s incentive to turn growing economic power into political
power also follows from China’s changing geo-economic predicament.
China’s economy—including trade, raw materials, and energy—is increasingly dependent on the regional and global economy. This gives China the
incentive to seek greater influence and control over its external environment.
For example, China will no doubt be increasingly reluctant to depend on
other states for the protection of the South Asian and Southeast Asian sea
lanes, which are vital to the flow of trade. China now gets almost half of its oil
from the Persian Gulf region. In a November 2014 speech at the Chinese
Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Work Conference, Xi Jinping systematically emphasized the interconnectedness of China’s developm…