A== work, No plagairism, quality work, on time

Assignment in  Science

WEEK 7

( No more than 1 page or 350 words)

Perform an Internet search to find the results of at least one economic impact study conducted for a sport event,  facility, team, or city. Then answer the following questions.

1. Who conducted the study?

2. How was the study conducted?

3. What were the key findings and conclusions of the study?

4. What alternative conclusions exist?

Advice: Economic impact studies can be found on specific sporting events, teams, facilities, and cities. The Internet has a variety of articles, reports, and presentations dedicated to the economic impact of sport events and facilities.

References

Burns, Elizabeth Booksh. “When the Saints Went Marching In: Social Identity in the World Champion New Orleans Saints Football Team and Its Impact on Their Host City.” Journal of Sport & Social Issues 38.2 (2014): 148–163. Web.

Chen, C.-Y., Lin, Y.-H., & Chang, W.-M. (2013). Impulsive Purchasing Behavior for Professional Sports Team-Licensed Merchandise–From the Perspective of Group Effects. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 22(2), 83–91.

Constantinescu, M. (2013). Segmentation in Sports – Analyzing the Behavior of the Sport’s Consumer. Romanian Journal of Marketing, 4, 38–45.

Kahn, L. M. (2000). The sports business as a labor market laboratory. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 75-94. Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/212087587?accountid=8289

Shoham, A., Dalakas, V., & Lahav, L. (2015). Consumer Misbehavior: Aggressive Behavior by Sports Fans. Services Marketing Quarterly, 36(1), 22–36. https://doi-org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/10.1080/15332969.2015.976506

Sports retail consumer behavior: Why they won’t buy online. (2005). Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 76(1), A127-A128. Retrieved from

https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/218504329?accountid=8289

Santo, C. (2005). The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums: Recasting the Analysis in Context. Journal of Urban Affairs, 27(2), 177–192. https://doi-org.ezproxy2.apus.edu/10.1111/j.0735-2166.2005.002

Services Marketing Quarterly, 36:

22

–36, 2015
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1533-2969 print / 1533-2977 online
DOI: 10.1080/15332969.2015.976506

Consumer Misbehavior: Aggressive Behavior
by Sports Fans

AVIV SHOHAM
Department of Business Administration, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

VASSILIS DALAKAS
Department of Marketing, California State University, San Marcos, California

LIA LAHAV
Department of Business Administration, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

Aggressive behaviors by sport spectators have become a major so-
cial problem in multiple sports and numerous countries. This study
examines several team-related antecedents, as well as personality
traits that may be related with physical and verbal aggressive fan
behaviors. Interestingly, there appears to be relatively little crossover
effects of personality trait verbal aggression on actual physical ag-
gressive behaviors. Similarly, trait physical aggression effects also
do not cross over and do not appear to affect verbal aggressive be-
haviors. These and additional drivers of aggressive fan behavior
are discussed and their theoretical and practical implications are
provided.

KEYWORDS sports fans, aggression, team identification

Attending live sporting events is a unique and exciting service experience for
consumers worldwide. Just in the United States, it was estimated that specta-
tor spending generates about $26 billion in terms of ticket sales, concession
sales, and fan travel (Street and Smith’s Sports Business Journal, 2002).

Unfortunately, aggressive behavior expressed either as verbal aggression
or as some form of physical violence is often witnessed in sporting events
among spectators. Although many associate aggression and violence by fans
simply with “hooliganism” in British soccer, it is especially noteworthy that

Address correspondence to Vassilis Dalakas, Department of Marketing, California State
University San Marcos, 333 South Twins Oaks Valley Road, San Marcos, CA 92096-0001.
E-mail: vdalakas@csusm.edu

22

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 23

such behaviors can be seen throughout the world and across many different
sports (Wann, Melnick, Russell, & Pease, 2001; Young, 2000). In a review
of fan surveys, Keating (2009) reported several cases of fans’ admission of
their own aggressive behavior like yelling obscenities, heckling a referee or
umpire, cheering an opposing player’s injury, threatening injury to someone,
or using a racial slur against an opposing player or fan. In fact, it has been
suggested that outside of wartime, “sports is perhaps the only setting in which
acts of interpersonal aggression are not only tolerated but enthusiastically
applauded by large segments of society” (Russell, 1993, p. 11).

Considerable research attention has been given to studying aggression
of players or coaches participating in the competition (e.g., Keeler, 2007;
Martin, Rocca, Cayanus, & Weber, 2009; Storch, Werner, & Storch, 2003).
Our study focuses on the issue of aggressive behaviors by sports spectators
in terms of both verbal and physical aggression. More specifically, it iden-
tifies potential antecedents for such tendencies and examines their relative
effect on predicting likelihood of sport spectators engaging in verbally and
physically aggressive behavior. Understanding what may cause sports spec-
tators to act in such ways can be helpful in helping service providers in
sports addressing the issue and finding potential solutions for preventing it
or curtailing it.

Team Attachment: Identification and Fan Aggression

Aggression is defined as “the infliction of an aversive stimulus, either physi-
cal, verbal, or gestural, upon one person by another” (Tenenbaum, Stewart,
Singer, & Duda, 1996, p. 229). Much of the discussion on antecedents of
sport spectators’ aggression revolves around fans’ identification and psycho-
logical attachment with their teams and, in broader terms, the concept of so-
cial identity (Dimmock & Grove, 2005; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Wann, 1993;
Wann, Culver, Akanda, Daglar, De Divitis, & Smith, 2005; Wann, Haynes,
McLean, & Pullen, 2003; Wann & Wilson, 1999). Consistently, research sug-
gests that the higher a fan’s attachment to a team, the more likely the fan
is to exhibit aggressive behavior or willingness to engage in aggressive be-
havior. Besides behavior exhibiting aggression, high fan identification has
been associated with other questionable attitudes and behaviors that could
be linked to aggression. For example, Dalakas and Melancon (2012) found a
relationship between fan identification and schadenfreude (joy at misfortune)
toward rivals, while Wann and his colleagues found that team identification
influenced fans’ willingness to consider illegally assisting their team (Wann,
Hunter, Ryan, & Wright, 2001).

Wann and his colleagues have consistently found that strong attach-
ment to a sport team contributes to fans’ willingness to engage in aggressive
behavior (e.g., Wann, Carlson, & Schrader, 1999; Wann et al., 2003; Wann

24 A. Shoham et al.

et al., 2005). In some respects, sports facilitate aggression due to their com-
petitive nature and the clear distinction between two opposing sides vying
for victory. Predictably, strong attachment to one side vilifies the oppos-
ing side (Simons & Taylor, 1992). The in-group versus out-group distinction
inevitably influences fans’ perceptions in a way that is favorable for one’s
own side and unfavorable for the opponent (Havard, Gray, Gould, Sharp, &
Schaffer, 2013; Madrigal & Dalakas, 2008). Sometimes, fans direct aggression
to the opposing side as a way to help their team win, known as “instru-
mental aggression” (Tenenbaum et al., 1996; Wann et al., 1999), whereas
in other cases it is simply intended to inflict harm on the other side for its
own sake (“hostile aggression”; Tenenbaum et al., 1996; Wann et al., 2003).
Shockingly, in one study, a (thankfully small) number of participants with
strong attachment to their teams reported a willingness to even murder an
opposing player or coach (Wann et al., 2005)!

Aggression literature suggests that certain factors like high levels of
arousal, high levels of stress, bad moods, and frustrations tend to elicit ag-
gressive behavior (see Anderson & Huesmann, 2007 for a review). Given that
for identified fans, the team becomes an extension of one’s self, it comes
as no surprise that strong identification with a sports team increases arousal
and stress while watching sporting events and makes fans more likely to
react in a violent manner (Branscombe & Wann, 1992, 1994; Wann et al.,
1999). Branscombe and Wann (1992) found that highly identified fans’ di-
astolic and systolic blood pressure increased after watching a competition
they cared about while there was no change in the blood pressure of those
who were not attached to the competitors. Moreover, a negative outcome
to a sporting competition often creates bad moods and causes frustration;
highly identified fans reported a higher likelihood to consider anonymous
acts of hostile aggression subsequent to their team’s loss (Wann et al., 2005).
The desire for specific outcomes of sporting events depends largely on the
fans’ feelings toward the competing teams. The disposition theory of sport
spectatorship (Zillmann, Bryant, & Sapolsky, 1989) suggests that fans’ emo-
tional reactions are strongly tied to outcomes of games; highly identified fans
experience bad moods when their team loses but also when a disliked rival
wins.

Therefore, based on the conceptual link between team attach-
ment/identification and aggression it is expected that:

H1a: Strong attachment to a team will be associated with higher levels
of verbal aggression behavior.

H1b: Strong attachment to a team will be associated with higher levels
of physical aggression behavior.

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 25

Self-Esteem and Fan Aggression

Aggression literature also suggests personal factors like one’s personality and
behavioral tendencies as important potential causes for aggression (Ander-
son & Huesmann, 2007; Ruvio & Shoham, 2011). However, when it comes
to aggression by sports spectators, individual-difference variables are often
overlooked; researchers acknowledge that such variables could be impor-
tant predictors of spectator aggression and call for research to incorporate
them (Dimmock & Grove, 2005). Specific factors along those lines include
self-esteem, impulsivity, and overall tendencies regarding verbal aggression
and physical aggression (Arms & Russell, 1997; Dimmock & Grove, 2005;
Russell & Arms, 1995, 1998).

In regard to self-esteem, popular belief traditionally associates low self-
esteem with propensity to aggression. However, research evidence suggests
that high self-esteem may be more likely to lead to aggressive or violent be-
haviors, especially when one’s highly favorable views of self are challenged
by other people or circumstances (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007; Baumeis-
ter, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Such
situations are especially likely to occur in a sports context, where fans affil-
iate with teams and the outcomes of those teams’ games reflect directly on
the fans (Fisher & Wakefield, 1998). Research has established that fans use
team victories as ways to enhance their own self-image and self-esteem by
basking in the reflective glory of the team (Cialdini et al., 1976). When fans
feel their image is threatened, they may resort to aggression toward rival
out-group members as an image maintenance or enhancement mechanism
(Dimmock & Grove, 2005; Wann et al., 2001). The phenomenon of “blasting”
is directly associated with verbal aggression; fans try to increase their esteem
by denigrating the perceived value of an opponent’s achievements (Madri-
gal & Dalakas, 2008). Consequently, fans may engage in verbal aggression
after their team’s defeat as a way of restoring their own damaged sense of
identity and self-esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Cialdini & Richardson,
1980; End, 2001). This may be especially likely for fans that have a strong
attachment to their team; Branscombe and Wann (1992) found that, follow-
ing a loss, fans with strong attachment to their team to engage in blasting
behavior directed at players and fans of the opposing team. Consequently,
it is hypothesized that:

H2a: High self-esteem will be associated with higher levels of verbal
aggression behavior.

H2b: High self-esteem will be associated with higher levels of physical
aggression behavior.

26 A. Shoham et al.

Impulsivity and Fan Aggression

The concept of impulsivity is complex and can affect numerous behavioral
tendencies, including consumption behaviors (for a review see Kaufman-
Scarborough & Cohen, 2004). In regard to the relationship between impul-
sivity and aggression, Wheeler and Caggiula (1966) found that high-impulsive
participants exhibited more aggression than low-impulsive participants fol-
lowing exposure to aggressive models, suggesting that impulsive individuals
have lower inhibitions against violating social norms. Building on this work,
research with hockey spectators found a strong connection between im-
pulsivity and willingness to escalate in disturbance (Arms & Russell, 1997).
In fact, “impulsive aggression” is considered a common type of aggression
whereas individuals engage in aggressive behaviors that were not premed-
itated (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007), making impulsive individuals more
likely to engage in such types of aggression. Impulsivity becomes especially
relevant because, in many cases, aggressive behaviors may be a function
of triggers in a situation and a person’s ability to engage in self-control re-
garding response to such triggers (Anderson & Huesmann, 2007). Given that
impulsivity reduces the potential control one may exert over one’s behavior,
it is logical to expect that high-impulsive individuals would be less likely
to control themselves in a situation of high arousal like a sporting event.
Subsequently, it is hypothesized that:

H3a: High impulsivity will be associated with higher levels of verbal
aggression behavior.

H3b: High impulsivity will be associated with higher levels of physical
aggression behavior.

Openness to Out-Group and Fan Aggression

As discussed earlier, high attachment to a sports team (or any social group)
usually carries an in-group versus out-group dichotomy, where the out-group
(i.e., opposing team) is vilified. However, from a personality trait standpoint,
individuals differ on their openness to and tolerance of out-groups. There-
fore, it is possible for fans to have a strong liking and attachment to their
own team without necessarily disparaging or denigrating other teams. In
fact, Dalakas and Melancon (2012) found that high fan identification was
connected to higher schadenfreude toward opponents through the mediat-
ing variable associated with importance of winning. In other words, not all
highly identified fans took pleasure at their opponents’ misfortunes. Along
these lines, it is expected that the trait of openness will have a relationship
with fans’ propensity to engage in aggressive behaviors:

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 27

H4a: Openness to out-group will be associated with lower levels of
verbal aggression behavior.

H4b: Openness to out-group will be associated with lower levels of
physical aggression behavior.

Aggression History and Traits

Lastly, people’s own history of past verbal aggressive behavior and physical
aggressive behavior is likely to be a predictor of potential future aggression
(Arms & Russell, 1997; Wakefield & Wann, 2006). In their study of hockey
spectators, Arms and Russell (1997) found that, in addition to impulsivity,
people’s previous fight history was strongly associated with their willingness
to participate in more aggressive behavior. We view such past history and
tendencies also as an individual difference type of variable and propose that
there should be a strong association between past and future behavior for
each type of aggression. Therefore, it is expected that:

H5a: Verbal aggression trait will be associated with higher levels of verbal
aggression behavior.

H5b: Physical aggression trait will be associated with higher levels of
physical aggression behavior.

Previous research has not examined how one’s past history with verbal
aggression may relate to future acts of physical aggression and vice versa.
While the two forms of aggression are related to an extent, they remain two
different types of behavior. It may be logical to assume that because physical
aggression is more intense than verbal aggression, people who have engaged
in physical aggression in the past would be likely to engage in physical
as well as verbal aggression in the future. However, the reverse may not
be true and one’s past verbal aggression may be less likely to influence
physical aggression in the future. Given the lack of previous research on this
area, we did not formulate a formal hypothesis regarding the effect of past
verbal aggression on future physical aggression or the effect of past physical
aggression on future verbal aggression.

METHOD

Sample and Procedures

Questionnaires were distributed to 350 fans in four different games of Israel’s
top football (soccer) league across four different stadiums during the early

28 A. Shoham et al.

season phases. Data were gathered in the stands by two research students,
thoroughly instructed in research methodology.

An effort was made to recruit heterogeneous respondents on age, gen-
der, and education. Age averaged 31.7 (SD = 12.6), 10.5% were females
(which was similar to their ratio in the stands according to the data collec-
tors’ estimate, and education averaged 13.1 years (SD = 2.4).

Response rate was high; specifically, 315 complete questionnaires were
gathered for an effective response rate of 90%. Hence, nonresponse bias
does not appear to be a problem in this study.

Measures

While identification is often used as the measure to assess psychological
attachment to a team, we used three different summary measures to assess
fans’ connection with their teams and overall attachment to them: team
involvement, team internalization, and team cohesion. They all contribute to
a strong attachment to their team but each incorporates a unique aspect of
how such attachment is expressed.

Team involvement captured behavior in terms of games attended,
spending time and money on the team, knowing team’s players. Team inter-
nalization focused on an emotional connection with the team using items that
addressed how personalized the team is to a fan (e.g., “feel better about your-
self when winning” or “lost sleep over the team”). Both the team involvement
and team internalization scales were based on the work of Capella (2002)
and were found to have good reliability in our study (Cronbach’s alpha of
.81 for involvement and .75 for internalization).

For team cohesion we adapted a scale on neighborhood cohesion by
Perkins, Florin, Rich, Wandersman, & Chavis (1990). The eight scale items
measure overall the relationships with other fans of the team and assess
the extent to which fans feel a sense of belonging with the team and share
same values as other fans of the same team. Sample items include, “Other
team fans and I want the same things for the team” and “Fans of this team
generally do not get along” (reverse-coded). Cronbach’s alpha for the scale
was .80.

In addition to the three scales measuring connection to the team, there
were also scales measuring five personality traits: impulsivity, verbal ag-
gression, physical aggression, openness to out-group, and self-esteem. For
impulsivity/impatience, verbal aggression, and physical aggression we used
scales by Gladue (1991). The reliabilities were .84, .79, and .79, respectively.
The work by Bosworth and Espelage (1995) on ethnic identity and conflict
was used for measuring openness to out-group. Items were modified ac-
cordingly to reflect a respondent’s openness to out-groups associated with
a sport team rather than with an ethnic group. Reliability for the three-item

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 29

scale was .60. Finally, self-esteem was assessed by a five-item scale based
on Rosenberg’s self-esteem inventory (1965). The scale’s reliability was .78.

The scales for the two outcomes (on-field physical and verbal aggres-
sion behaviors were taken from Capella (2002). The five items for verbal
aggression and the four items for physical aggression formed reliable scales
(.80 and .68, respectively).

Finally, averages were created for the regression models described be-
low. Scales’ means, standard deviations, and reliabilities, as well as interscale
correlations are provided in Table 1.

RESULTS

In order to assess the relative effect of the different proposed variables
on verbal and physical aggressive behavior, regression analyses were used.
First a regression was conducted with verbal aggression as the dependent
variable. The model was significant and the predictor variables were able
to explain 36% of the variance (adjusted R2 = 0.36, F(8,261) = 19.68, p < .001). When examining the effects of all variables within the framework of the hypotheses, past verbal aggression was the only individual-difference variable with a significant effect. All three team-attachment variables, team internalization (β = 0.24, p < .001), team involvement (β = 0.15, p = .02), and team cohesion (β = 0.12, p = .03) were found significant with team internalization having the strongest effect of the three. Table 2 summarizes the regression model for verbal aggression.

The regression model for physical aggression was also significant and
again the predictor variables were able to explain a substantial percent of
the variance (adjusted R2 of 0.34, F(8,262) = 16.70, p < .001). In this case, three of the five personality traits were significant: past physical aggres- sion (β = 0.25, p < .001) and impulsivity (β = 0.14, p = .01) were posi- tively associated with physical aggression whereas openness to out-groups (β = −0.22, p < .001) had a negative relationship with physical aggression. Team internalization (β = 0.18, p = .01) was the only significant team- attachment variables. Table 3 summarizes the regression model for physical aggression.

Our first hypothesis predicted that strong attachment to a team would
be associated with high levels of both verbal and physical aggression. The
results showed that only one aspect of team attachment, team internaliza-
tion, was significant for both types of aggression. Team involvement and
team internalization were significant for verbal aggression but not for phys-
ical. Therefore, there was partial support for H1 in regard to the emotional
connection to a team (through internalization) associated with both types of
aggression.

T
A

B
LE

1
Sc

al
es

’M
ea

n
s,

St
an

d
ar

d
D

ev
ia

t

i

o
n

s,

R
el

ia
b
ili

tie
s,

an
d

I

n
te

rs
ca

le
C
o
rr

el
at

io

n
s

Sc
al

es
C
ro

n
b
ac

h
’s

al
p
h
a

M
(S

D
)

In
te
rs
ca

le
co

rr
el

at
io

n
s

T
ea

m
at

ta
ch

m
en

t
•C

o
h
es

io
n

0.
80

3.
13

(0
.8

0)
1.

00

•I

n
vo

lv
em

en
t

0.
81

3.
47

(0
.8

8)
0.

52
1.

00
•I

n
te

rn
al

iz
at

io
n

0.
75

2.
99

(0
.9

7)
0.

58
0.

60
1.

00

P
er

so
n
al

ity
tr
ai

ts
•S

el
f-
es

te
em

0.
78

4.
40

(0
.7

5)
0.

21
0.

03
0.

18
1.

00
•I

m
p
u
ls

iv
ity

0.
84

2.
57

(0
.8
8)
0.

18
0.

29
0.

1

9
−0

.1
9

1.
00

•V
er

b
al

ag
gr

es
si

o
n

0.
79

3.
12

(0
.8

6)
0.

34
0.

34
0.

31
0.

05
0.

40
1.

00
•P

h
ys

ic
al

ag
gr
es
si
o
n
0.
79

1.
77

(0
.9

1)
0.

21
0.
18
0.

17
−0

.1
3

0.
42

0.
45

1.
00

•O
p
en

n
es

s
to

o
u
t-
gr

o
u
p

0.
60

3.
78

(0
.9

3)
0.

02
−0

.1
2

−0
.0

9
−0

.0
1

−0
.1

2
0.

03
−0

.1
9
1.
00

O
n
-fi

el
d

ag
gr
es
si

ve
b
eh

av
io

rs
•V

er
b
al

ag
gr
es
si
o
n
0.
80

2.
59

(1
.0

7)
0.

42
0.

45
0.

46
−0

.0
1

0.
27

0.
42
0.
27
−0
.0

3
1.

00
•P
h
ys
ic
al
ag
gr
es
si
o
n

0.
68

1.
44

(0
.6

9)
0.

29
0.

32
0.

34
−0

.0
3

0.
36

0.
32

0.
43

−0
.2

7
0.

42
1.

00

30

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 31

TABLE 2 Factors Affecting Verbal Aggression

Variables Beta p-values

Team attachment variables
Team cohesion 0.12 0.03
Team internalization 0.24 0.00
Team involvement 0.15 0.02

Personality trait variables
Self-esteem −0.03 0.32
Impulsivity 0.08 0.86
Openness to out-group 0.02 0.34
Past verbal aggression 0.23 0.00
Past physical aggression 0.04 0.27

Note. p-values are based on one-way tests.

H2 hypothesized a relationship between both types of aggression and
high self-esteem. However, self-esteem was not found to have a significant
effect on either dependent variable. Consequently, H2 was not supported.

H3, which predicted that impulsivity would influence verbal aggression
and physical aggression, was partly supported. Impulsivity was found to be
significant for physical aggression but not for verbal aggression.

H4 proposed a negative relationship between openness to out-groups
and aggression and was also partly supported. Such relationship was found
for physical aggression but not for verbal.

Lastly, H5 hypothesized a relationship between past verbal aggression
and verbal aggression tendencies as well as between past physical aggression
and physical aggression tendencies. There was a significant relationship for
both providing support for H4.

TABLE 3 Factors Affecting Physical Aggression

Beta P-values

Team attachment variables
Team cohesion 0.07 0.14
Team internalization 0.18 0.01
Team involvement 0.01 0.47

Personality trait variables
Self esteem −0.01 0.44
Impulsivity 0.14 0.01
Openness to out-group −0.22 0.00
Past verbal aggression 0.09 0.08
Past physical aggression 0.25 0.00

Note. p-values are based on one-way tests.

32 A. Shoham et al.

DISCUSSION

Both regression models had high R2 and were able to predict considerable
amount of variance for verbal and physical aggression. It is noteworthy that
the antecedents for verbal aggression and physical aggression were similar
in some respects but overall not identical. From a practical standpoint, it
is important to identify the specific variables that are associated with each
type of aggressive behavior in order to focus on these factors to potentially
suppress aggressive behavior.

Team internalization was the only factor that was found to be significant
and had a strong effect on both types of aggression. Given that internaliza-
tion reflects a strong emotional and personalized relationship between a fan
and their favorite team, essentially the team becomes part of the fan’s self.
That type of relationship inevitably increases a fan’s emotional involvement
in sport competitions where the favorite team participates. Fans who inter-
nalize their team are more likely to care about the outcome (Madrigal &
Dalakas, 2008) and more likely to take personally everything that involves
the team, which increases the likelihood for aggressive behaviors to emerge.
Passionate fans that internalize their relationship with their team can be very
beneficial for sports teams as they are more likely to attend games and pur-
chase team merchandise (Bristow & Sebastian, 2001; Fisher & Wakefield,
1998). However, as our findings suggest, it is important to keep in mind
that there can also be negative consequences by strong team internalization.
Teams should encourage fans to be emotionally attached to their team but
in a socially responsible manner, a balance that may not always be easy to
achieve. Team personnel (e.g., coaches, players, administrators) should lead
by example and be cautious about their actions or words (especially now
that social media can communicate one’s thoughts to thousands of people
within seconds) that intensify fans’ already high emotions and may add fuel
to the fire. Similarly, in an effort to increase ratings, media may contribute to
further charging already passionate fans by accentuating rivalry-related sto-
ries, especially before big games; consequently, they may also have, however
unintentional, a contribution to elevated levels of aggression of fans.

The second important finding is the strong role that one’s individual
traits and personality play in terms of influencing aggressive behavior. Not
surprisingly, there is a strong connection between one’s tendency for verbal
aggression and actual behaviors of verbal aggression just like there is a
similar connection between the trait of physical aggression and behaviors
of physical aggression. However, it is interesting to note that there was no
effect of the verbal aggression trait on physical aggression behavior and no
effect of the physical aggression trait on verbal aggression behavior. In other
words, those two seem to be indeed two different traits and their effect is
relatively limited on specific behaviors rather than being diffused and making
someone overall aggressive.

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 33

Obviously, individual traits and personality are difficult, if not impos-
sible, to be controlled by sports organizations. However, their significance
highlights even more the need for sports teams to avoid creating situa-
tions/triggers that may facilitate and encourage such traits to be exhibited.
For example, while Internet forums can be a great way to engage sports fans
and increase their attachment to their team, their anonymous nature facili-
tates abusive and inappropriate language by several fans, which reinforces
verbal aggression behaviors. Therefore, there is a critical need to monitor
such forums regularly to prevent postings and content that motivates fans
to engage in verbal aggression. Similarly, in their effort to build team spirit,
sports teams may sometimes cross the line and vilify opponents and rivals, a
seemingly innocent practice that may again facilitate and encourage aggres-
sive behaviors by fans with traits and personalities conducive to aggressive
behavior. Such concerns need to be kept in mind also during games and
influence policies regarding alcohol serving and other practices that may
contribute, however unintentionally, to fans exhibiting their tendencies for
aggressive behavior. Along those lines, other factors, unrelated to the actual
contest, may trigger or heighten aggression (e.g., long waits for admission
to the sport facility, at concession stands or at the restrooms). Such factors
can indeed be managed by the service provider and, thus, should be an
important priority for sports organizations as, in addition to ensuring higher
customer satisfaction, may also decrease incidents of fan aggression.

Another interesting finding was that impulsivity affected physical aggres-
sion but not verbal aggression. The significance of this finding is that physical
violence at a sporting event does not need to be the result of premeditated
planning by hooligans; any impulsive fan may find himself or herself in a
situation where they could become physically aggressive. Therefore, it is
important for sports teams and organizations to always have alert security
personnel in sporting events, even ones that may appear, on paper at least,
as “safe” and unlikely for unruly behavior by fans.

Limitations and Future Research

This study provides interesting insight regarding the antecedents of aggres-
sive behavior, in terms of both verbal and physical aggression. It is impor-
tant to note that the data were collected in Israel and, therefore, there may
be questions regarding how representative they may be of fans in other
countries. Future research efforts should examine the phenomenon in differ-
ent cultural contexts to assess potential similarities or differences regarding
antecedents of aggressive behaviors by fans across the world. Given the
issues with unruly fan behavior worldwide, such insight can be especially
beneficial.

34 A. Shoham et al.

REFERENCES

Anderson, C. A., & Huesmann, L. R. (2007). Human aggression: A social-cognitive
view. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp.
259–287). London, England: Sage.

Arms, R. L., & Russell, G. W. (1997). Impulsivity, fight history, and camaraderie as
predictors of a willingness to escalate a disturbance. Current Psychology, 15,
279–285. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12144-997-1005-0

Baumeister, R. F., Bushman, B. J., & Campbell, W. K. (2000). Self-esteem, narcissism,
and aggression: Does violence result from low self-esteem or from threatened
egotism? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9, 26–29.

Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L., & Boden, J. M. (1996). Relation of threatened egotism
to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem. Psychological
Review, 103, 5–33. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1037/0033-295X.103.1.5

Bosworth, K., & Espelage, D. (1995). Teen conflict survey. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Center for Adolescent Studies.

Branscombe, N. R., & Wann, D. L. (1992). Role of identification with a group, arousal
categorization processes, and self-esteem in sport spectator aggression. Human
Relations, 45, 1013–1033. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001872679204501001

Branscombe, N. R., & Wann, D. L. (1994). Collective self-esteem consequences of
outgroup derogation when a valued social identity is on trial. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 24, 641–657. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420240603

Bristow, D. N., & Sebastian, R. J. (2001). Holy cow! Wait ‘til next year! A closer
look at the brand loyalty of Chicago Cubs baseball fans. Journal of Consumer
Marketing, 18, 256–275.

Capella, M. E. (2002). Measuring sports fans’ involvement: The fan behavior ques-
tionnaire. Southern Business Review, 27, 30–36.

Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R.
(1976). Basking in reflected glory: Three (football) field studies. Journal of Per-
sonality & Social Psychology, 34, 366–375. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.
34.3.366

Cialdini, R. B., & Richardson, K. D. (1980). Two indirect tactics of image management:
Basking and blasting. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 39, 406–415.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.39.3.406

Dalakas, V., & Melancon, J. P. (2012). Fan identification, Schadenfreude toward
hated rivals, and the mediating effects of IWIN (Importance of Winning
Index). Journal of Services Marketing, 26, 51–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/
08876041211199724

Dimmock, J., & Grove, J. (2005). Relationship of fan identification to determinants
of aggression. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 17, 37–47. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/10413200590907559

End, C. M. (2001). An examination of NFL fans’ computer mediated BIRGing. Journal
of Sport Behavior, 24, 162–181.

Fisher, R. J., & Wakefield, K. (1998). Factors leading to group identification: A
field study of winners and losers. Psychology & Marketing, 15, 23–40. http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6793(199801)15:1<23::AID-MAR3>3.0.CO;2-P

Fans’ Aggressive Behavior 35

Gladue, B. A. (1991). Qualitative and quantitative sex differences in self-reported
aggressive behavioral characteristics. Psychological Reports, 68, 675–684. http:
//dx.doi.org/10.2466/PR0.68.2.675-684

Havard, C. T., Gray, D. P., Gould, J., Sharp, L. A., & Schaffer, J. J. (2013). Development
and validation of the Sport Rivalry Fan Perception Scale (SRFPS). Journal of Sport
Behavior, 36, 45–65.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). Social identifications: A social psychology of
intergroup relations and group processes. London, England: Routledge.

Kaufman-Scarborough, C., & Cohen, J. (2004). Unfolding consumer impulsivity: An
existential-phenomenological study of consumers with attention deficit disorder.
Psychology & Marketing, 21, 637–669. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.20022

Keating, P. (2009). Pulse of the nation. ESPN The Magazine, 12, 29.
Keeler, L. A. (2007). The differences in sport aggression, life aggression, and life

assertion among adult male and female collision contact, and non-contact sport
athletes. Journal of Sport Behavior, 30, 57–76.

Madrigal, R., & Dalakas, V. (2008). Consumer psychology of sport: More than just
a game. In C. P. Haugtvedt, P. M. Herr, & F. R. Kardes (Eds.), Handbook of
consumer psychology (pp. 857–876). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Group.

Martin, M. M., Rocca, K. A., Cayanus, J. L., & Weber, K. (2009). Relationship between
coaches’ use of behavior alteration techniques and verbal aggression on athletes’
motivation and affect. Journal of Sport Behavior, 32, 227–241.

Perkins, D. D., Florin, P., Rich, R. C., Wandersman, A., & Chavis, D. M. (1990).
Participation and the social and physical environment of residential blocks:
Crime and community context. American Journal of Community Psychology,
18, 83–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00922690

Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.

Russell, G. W. (1993). The social psychology of sport. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.
Russell, G. W., & Arms, R. L. (1995). False consensus effect, physical aggression,

anger, and a willingness to escalate a disturbance. Aggressive Behavior, 21,
381–386.

Russell, G. W., & Arms, R. L. (1998). Toward a social psychological profile of would-
be rioters. Aggressive Behavior, 24, 219–226.

Ruvio, A., & Shoham, A. (2011). Aggressive driving: A consumption experience.
Psychology & Marketing, 28, 1089–1114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mar.20429

Simons, Y., & Taylor, J. (1992). A psychosocial model of fan violence in sports.
International Journal of Sport Psychology, 23, 207–226.

Storch, E. A., Werner, N. E., & Storch, J. B. (2003). Relational aggression and psy-
chosocial adjustment in intercollegiate athletes. Journal of Sport Behavior, 26,
155–167.

Street and Smith’s Sports Business Journal. (2002, March 11). About us—the sports
industry.

Tenenbaum, G., Stewart, E., Singer, R. N., & Duda, J. (1996). Aggression and violence
in sport: an ISSP position stand. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 27,
229–236.

36 A. Shoham et al.

Wakefield, K. L., & Wann, D. L. (2006). An examination of dysfunctional sport fans:
Method of classification and relationships with problem behaviors. Journal of
Leisure Research, 38, 168–186.

Wann, D. L. (1993). Aggression of highly identified spectators as a function of their
need to maintain a positive social identity. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 17,
134–143. http://dx.doi.org/1177/019372359301700207

Wann, D. L., Carlson, J. D., & Schrader, M. P. (1999). The impact of team identification
on the hostile and instrumental verbal aggression of sport spectators. Journal
of Social Behavior and Personality, 14, 279–286.

Wann, D. L., Culver, Z., Akanda, R., Daglar, M., De Divitis, C., & Smith, A. (2005).
The effects of team identification and game outcome on willingness to consider
anonymous acts of hostile aggression. Journal of Sport Behavior, 28, 282–294.

Wann, D. L., Haynes, G, McLean, B., & Pullen, P. (2003). Sport team identification
and willingness to consider anonymous acts of hostile aggression. Aggressive
Behavior, 29, 406–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ab.10046

Wann, D. L., Hunter, J. L., Ryan, J. A., & Wright, L. A. (2001). The relationship
between team identification and willingness of sport fans to consider illegally
assisting their team. Social Behavior and Personality, 29, 531–526. http://dx.
doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2001.29.6.531

Wann, D. L., Melnick, M. J., Russell, G. W., & Pease, D. G. (2001). Sport fans: The
psychology and social impact of spectators. New York, NY: Routledge.

Wann, D. L., & Wilson, A. M. (1999). Relationship between aesthetic motivation
and preferences for aggressive and nonaggressive sports. Perceptual and Motor
Skills, 89, 931–934. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/PMS.89.7.931-934

Wheeler L., & Caggiula A. R. (1966). The contagion of aggression. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
0022-1031(66)90002-3

Young, K. (2000). Sports and violence. In J. Coakley & E. Dunning (Eds.), Handbook
of sports studies (pp. 382–407). London, England: Sage.

Zillmann, D., Bryant, J., & Sapolsky, B. S. (1989). Enjoyment from sports spectator-
ship. In H. H. Goldstein (Ed.), Sports, games and play: Social and psychological
viewpoints (pp. 241–278). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Copyright of Services Marketing Quarterly is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder’s express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.

Journal of Sport and Social Issues
2014, Vol. 38(2) 148 –163

© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0193723513499920

jss.sagepub.com

Trends

When the Saints Went
Marching In: Social Identity
in the World Champion New
Orleans Saints Football Team
and Its Impact on Their Host
City

Elizabeth Booksh Burns1

Abstract
Social identity theory is used to explain behaviors, thoughts, and feelings associated
with group membership. This study focuses on the New Orleans Saints National
Football League (NFL) team and its effect on citizens of its host city as well as fans
from the surrounding region. While a large body of research shows little evidence
that new stadiums and professional sports teams make a significant economic impact
on the region, some findings have shown that sports teams can provide intangible
benefits. These intangible benefits are often related to the positive associations fans of
the team have by considering themselves a part of that particular in-group. This study
applies social identity theory to the New Orleans Saints’ fan base and discusses the
reactions of the team’s fans during the 2009 Super Bowl–winning season as reported
in national, regional, and local publications.

Keywords
sports communication, social identity theory, popular communication

One of the more succinct descriptions of social identity theory (SIT) has been pro-
vided by Hogg, Terry, and White (1995). They describe SIT as a social psychology
theory that focuses on intergroup relations, group processes, and the social self.

1University of Alabama at Birmingham, USA

Corresponding Author:
Elizabeth Booksh Burns, University of Alabama at Birmingham, HHB 302, 1720 2nd Ave. S., Birmingham,
AL 35294-1152, USA.
Email: eburns@uab.edu

499920 JSS38210.1177/0193723513499920Journal of Sport and Social IssuesBurns
research-article2013

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1177%2F0193723513499920&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2013-09-05

Burns 149

According to SIT, people classify themselves into social categories such as national-
ity, political affiliation, or sports team. These categories provide a definition of who
the person is in terms of the defining characteristics of the category. People’s actions,
feelings, and emotions are prescribed by the stereotypical attributes of a particular
group of which they are members, otherwise known as the in-group. Similarly, stereo-
types are applied to members of the out-group as well. There is a strong tendency for
individuals to adopt behaviors and beliefs that favor the in-group over the out-group,
thereby increasing positive perception of the self.

Hargie, Dickson, Mallett, and Stringer (2008) pointed out that the tendency to favor
the in-group over the out-group accentuates the differences between groups as well as
the similarities within groups. Groups or social categories appear difficult or impos-
sible to change. At times, a perceived inferior position of the in-group can lead to
negative social identity that can trigger an attempt to move status position. These
researchers have identified three factors that affect the preference for identity manage-
ment: perceptions of stability of the group, legitimacy of the status inferiority, and the
permeability of the boundaries between groups. Based on these factors, people are
more or less willing to engage in individual or collective modes to change their present
situation. Unstable and illegitimate status relations cause members to think that there
should be an alternative to their present situation while permeability between in-group
and out-group raises the possibility of individual mobility between groups.
Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, and Mielke (1999) listed six identity management strat-
egies individuals and groups use to handle negative social identity. The first two are
individual methods, individual mobility and recategorization, whereby an individual
will choose to switch to a higher status group or choose to consider his own group of
a higher status. The next two are collective methods, social competition and realistic
competition, whereby the in-group as a whole will attempt to reverse their status or to
compete for resources that will allow the in-group to gain higher status. The last two
are creative methods, preference for temporal comparison and reevaluation of the
material dimension, whereby groups will choose another comparison point (instead of
a higher status out-group) that gives them a higher status or devalue the comparison
with the out-group as unimportant to increase their positive social identity (Hargie
et al., 2008; Mummendey et al., 1999).

The process of categorization simplifies the social environment and relationships
between individuals. This theory can be helpful in creating a better understanding of
“the communicative processes upon which judgments about group membership are
made, relationships sustained, or outgroup attitudes ameliorated” (Hargie et al., 2008,
p. 792).

The Relationship Between Cities and Sports

Substantial research has been conducted on the issue of professional sports teams and
the real economic impact made on their host cities. Over the last two decades, numer-
ous studies have shown that investment in sports facilities and teams are not correlated
with regional economic development (Austrian & Rosentraub, 2002). Baade (1996)

150 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

argued that professional sports teams do not increase income or create enough jobs to
justify cities’ staggering financial support. The primary beneficiaries of these invest-
ments are the owners and players, not the tax-paying public. Baade and Dye (1990)
found no evidence that a sports stadium or franchise increases the level of real income
in a sample of nine cities studied between 1965 and 1983. Coates and Humphreys
(1999) found, after studying 37 standard metropolitan statistical areas in the United
States between 1969 and 1994, that the existence of professional sports franchises in
some cities actually reduces the level of per capita personal income with no effect on
growth per capita income. Previous research by Baade and Dye, Baim (1990), and
Euchner (1993) reported that professional sports have an insignificant impact on met-
ropolitan economies.

Several researchers have pointed out that, while it has been proven that sports-led
development strategies are ineffective engines of economic growth, the presence of
professional sports in a city can increase the overall well-being of the city’s residents
(Coates & Humphreys, 1999). Rosentraub’s (1996) study of the US$450 million
sports-led development project in downtown Cleveland confirms that the city will
likely not experience substantial changes in development patterns or a great many new
jobs. However, he argues that Cleveland is now a more exciting place with a greater
sense of civic pride and that the city is creating an increasing impression among young
people that Cleveland is the center of the region, causing them to return to the previ-
ously deserted downtown for recreation. The citizens of Cleveland and Cuyahoga
County should determine if these intangible benefits, not the supposed economic ben-
efits, are worth the price tag.

Rosentraub (1996) posed the question, “What is the cost to cities without major
league sports franchises?” (p. 27). He questioned if the city without a team becomes a
second, third, or fourth tier community and claimed, “Any community or city in our
society that is striving to become a major center must also establish and maintain its
sports identity” (p. 27). He used the example of employers, looking for a high quality
of life for their employees, who might not choose a city that lacks cultural amenities
like theaters, museums, and professionals sporting events. He argued that sports are an
important part of the marketing image of a city with “free” publicity broadcast on a
regular basis to hundreds of thousands, maybe millions depending on the event.

Regardless of the macroview, individual sports fans can be affected strongly by
their sports teams. One study (Wann, Inman, Ensor, Gates, & Caldwell, 1999) demon-
strated that individuals with a strong identification with their local team report health-
ier mood profiles than those with low identification. Individuals can be affected
positively and negatively by this connection. Hirt, Zillman, Erickson, and Kennedy
(1992) found that sports fans’ judgments of their personal capabilities are influenced
by the performance of the team with which they identify; high-identifying fans who
witnessed a victory report higher personal competencies on mental, social, and motor
skill tasks than highly identified fans who witness a defeat (Hirt et al., 1992). Highly
identified individuals also report a decrease in self-esteem following their team’s
defeat (Davis & End, 2010). Another study found that citizens of Germany report
higher levels of life satisfaction after a national soccer team victory than prior to the
game (Schwarz, Starck, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987).

Burns 151

Judge and Watanabe (1993) argued that positive mood in one context (i.e., life
satisfaction) can spill over to other contexts such as work environment. This spillover
effect can account for the strong positive correlations between life satisfaction and job
satisfaction (Tait, Padgett, & Baldwin, 1989). This can be translated to sports fans of
successful teams whose joy may spill over to positively influence job satisfaction and,
subsequently, their performance at work (Davis & End, 2010). Isen (1989) found that
positive mood, similar to the mood experienced by fans of successful sport teams, can
positively impact the economy through increased consumption and spending.

Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) noted other intangible benefits. They pointed out
that “sports teams provide a common denominator among people of different age,
race, and income” (p. 550). Platow et al. (1999) concluded that charitable contribu-
tions increase following a sports team’s successes. Sports also help in the healing
process following a tragedy. Brown (2004) discussed the role Major League Baseball
and National Football League (NFL) games played in the nationwide healing process
after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Instead of merely escaping reality, Brown
claims sport can address the nation’s pain and invite spectators to deal with their feel-
ings from a number of perspectives. He quotes USA Today writer Erik Brady, reflect-
ing on September 11 a year after the attacks, “Ballparks became home to sacramental
ceremony. It seemed natural to salute and sing and cry and then settle in for a game
that meant exactly nothing and everything all at once” (quoted by Brown, 2004, p. 5).

New Orleans and Its Saints

In 2005, the Wall Street Journal summed up the Saints’ history with this statement:
“The Saints have been perennial losers, winning just 40% of their games in 38 seasons.
For years they were dubbed the ‘Aints.’ But their fans have stood by them” (Fatsis,
2005, p. B5). Four years later, the 2009 Saints team would win the ultimate champion-
ship in American football, the Super Bowl, and finally bring legitimacy to the fans
who had stood by them for 43 seasons.

The team was born on November 1, 1966—All Saints Day—and named for the
spiritual jazz song “When the Saints Go Marching In” (Layden, 2007). From that day,
the identities of the largely Catholic city and its football team were permanently inter-
twined (Finney, 2010). Even though the Saints had only nine winning seasons in their
history, the team is “unconditionally loved in its native city” (Layden, 2010b, p. 72).
In 1980, the Saints hit rock bottom, winning only one game. Throughout the early
1980s, the fans still supported the team, although they wore bags over their heads to
express their shame in the team’s poor performance at the prompting of the iconic
sportscaster Buddy “Buddy D” Diliberto (Pope & Nolan, 2010). In 1985, current
owner Tom Benson purchased the Saints (Hogan, 2009). The mid-1980s to early
1990s took a turn for the better with five winning seasons, the first in Saints history
(Layden, 2010b). Returning to mediocrity in 1993, the Saints did not see another win-
ning season until 2000, when they won their first playoff game. The franchise “took
21 years to celebrate its first winning season, 35 years to win its first playoff game, 42
years to have a chance to play for a world championship” (Finney, 2010, p. A01).

152 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

New Orleans is a small, relatively poor city by professional sports standards. It is
the 36th largest city out of the 40 cities hosting a team from one of the five large pro-
fessional sports leagues, and holds the same rank when measuring per capita personal
income (Baade & Matheson, 2007). Lacking in large corporations, New Orleans finds
it more difficult to fill the luxury suites and to achieve the “guaranteed sellout” like
other NFL cities (p. 592).

While New Orleans may seem to be an unlikely choice for a professional sports
team, “the city caters to the tourist trade to an extent that distinguishes itself from
almost every other American city” (Baade & Matheson, 2007, p. 594). Its tourist-
based economy relies on an arts-entertainment-recreation industry that is much more
prevalent than most other United States cities (Baade & Matheson, 2007). With the
addition of the Superdome in 1975, a monumental structure that could fit the Houston
Astrodome comfortably inside, New Orleans could market itself to a growing demand
for convention space and sporting events (Layden, 2010a). The Superdome “would
host concerts and conventions and impact the landscape and economics of New
Orleans like no other institution” (Layden, 2010a, p. 10).

New Orleans has used its infrastructure, including the Superdome and an extensive
convention center, to its advantage, ranking 4th in the United States in number of con-
ventions hosted. Prior to 2005, the city attracted more than 10 million visitors who
spent in excess of US$5 billion per year. For this reason, Baade and Matheson (2007)
suggest that New Orleans may be different than other cities in regard to the lack of
economic activity for host cities of professional sports teams.

The city is smaller and less affluent than other host cities in general, and it may be that the
frequency with which large sports events are hosted by New Orleans makes the area an
exception to the experience of most cities with regard to sports and economic development.
(Baade & Matheson, 2007, pp. 591-592)

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made an indelible mark on New Orleans and
its iconic structure, the Superdome. The largest natural disaster in United States history
flooded almost 80% of New Orleans and caused the deaths of nearly 2,000 people in the
Louisiana and Mississippi Gulf Coast region. The Superdome stood as a visual symbol,
broadcast around the world, of the city’s suffering and the government’s incompetence
(Layden, 2010a). The home field of the Saints served as the center for 30,000 refugees
who could not escape the city; catering freezers in the basement were used as a morgue
for the dead. Flood waters remained in the below-sea-level city for weeks as levees and
pumps were repaired, causing even more extensive damage to residential and business
communities. Approximately 80% of New Orleans’s 188,000 occupied housing units
were severely damaged. The cost of reconstructing New Orleans was estimated at more
than US$100 billion (Baade & Matheson, 2007).

Even before Katrina, New Orleans lagged behind in nearly every measure of eco-
nomic development. By January 2006, New Orleans had lost 29.2% of its residents as
compared with July 2005. The workforce size had decreased by 30.9% by July 2006.
The displaced residents were largely middle-class or economically disadvantaged.

Burns 153

Entire neighborhoods were destroyed, and 45% of those displaced did not live in
homes they owned, leaving many residents with weakened ties to the community and
less incentive to return. Those missing citizens were needed to support the tourism
industry so vital to the economic stability of New Orleans (Baade & Matheson, 2007).

In New York City after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the city had the home
baseball and football teams to help rally the city’s spirits; but New Orleans’s sports
teams did not have a city to rally or even a stadium to play in (Fatsis, 2005). Before
the hurricane in early 2005, Tom Benson, the Saints owner, made it known that he
was interested in moving the Saints to another city. With the severe damage inflicted
on the Superdome in Katrina, the Saints were forced to play “home” games in San
Antonio, Baton Rouge, and even New Jersey (Layden, 2007). It was estimated that
the renovations to the Superdome, and the adjacent arena that housed the National
Basketball Association’s Hornets, would cost US$400 million; according to their
contract, the Saints could opt out of their contract with the Superdome in January
2006 (Fatsis, 2005).

It seemed that New Orleans was about to lose the Saints for good; the city was
downtrodden and the Saints were a vagabond team without a home (Fatsis, 2005). A
Times-Picayune editorial stated, “Before Katrina, Saints fans wanted their team to
stay. Now they need it to stay” (Fatsis, 2005, p. B1). Then in early 2006, Tom Benson
hired Mickey Loomis as general manager; Loomis, in turn, hired Sean Payton as
coach. Payton signed 27 new players (Layden, 2007), including Drew Brees, an
injured quarterback from the San Diego Chargers who hoped to fully recover by the
start of training camp (King, 2006).

After a US$200 million renovation (S. Jenkins, 2010b), the Superdome reopened
for the team’s first home game since Hurricane Katrina on September 25, 2006 with a
Monday Night Football national broadcast (Schwartz, 2010). Set before a national
stage, the country saw New Orleans rising from the ashes. “Then New Orleans cele-
brated its NFL franchise like never before, as the team galvanized the community like
never before, giving the downtrodden a pleasant distraction from their worries about
reparations, FEMA money and the absence of electricity” (DeShazier, 2010a, p. S03).

The city identified with their new team, particularly with Brees. He was unwanted
by his former team or any other team in the NFL. The Miami Dolphins were interested
at one time but thought he had only a 25% chance of regaining full use of his injured
shoulder (Layden, 2007). When Payton first drove Brees through New Orleans, he
gave him the pitch: you can be part of the rebuilding. “When I visited New Orleans, I
saw it all, the good and the bad,” Brees said in a 2010 interview. “I just thought, this
is a chance to be part of something incredible—the rebuilding of an American city. I
felt like it was a calling. Like I was destined to be here” (King, 2010a, p. 58). Brees’s
dedication to the city through his words and his charitable actions, not to mention his
on-field performance, garnered the city’s support and appreciation. “Ninety percent of
people who come up to me on the street don’t say, ‘Great game,’” Brees said in 2006,
when he first arrived in New Orleans. “They say, ‘Thank you for being part of the
city’” (quoted by L. Jenkins, 2010a, p. 30).

154 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

The team went from a 3-win season in 2005 to a 10-win season in 2006. This was
their first winning season since 2002, finishing with the second playoff win in team
history (Layden, 2007). A record number of season tickets were sold in 2006, although
only 40% of the luxury suites were sold by May 2006 (Baade & Matheson, 2007). By
the 2007 season, the Superdome sold out of all 137 suites and 68,000 season seats with
a waiting list of more than 30,000 (Wolff, 2007). The stadium has sold out of season
tickets every year since (Hogan, 2009).

The newly formed team under Sean Payton hit its stride in 2009. The Saints won a
franchise-record 13 games and 2 playoff games including the National Football
Conference (NFC) Championship on January 24, 2010, giving the team its first chance
to play for the ultimate prize, a Super Bowl Championship. After the NFC win, the city
burst into a fury of joy and excitement at a level never reached in this party-loving city.
Without violence or riots, the city celebrated a victory all its own, and grown men had
trouble keeping their emotions in check. “The truth is, if Katrina never had happened,
a river of tears still would flow through the Superdome on Sunday,” according to the
Times-Picayune (Lorando, 2010, p. D01). It was “the ultimate Saints experience . . . a
championship in our house, shared by 70,000 cheering, singing, dancing, hugging,
high-fiving, crunking and, yes, crying Saints fans. Along with a few million more
watching on television” (Lorando, 2010, p. D01).

While the city celebrated another victory, the “Who Dat Nation” joined in vicari-
ously through their television sets (St. Germain, 2010). Bobby Hebert, Saints sports-
caster, coined the phrase in the 2006 season based on the popular chant associated with
the team, “Who dat! Who dat! Who dat say dey gonna beat dem Saints!” (Walker,
2010a, January 13, p. A01). With displaced New Orleanians cheering on from around
the country and new fans joining by the thousands interested by the team’s and the
city’s compelling stories, the Who Dat Nation had grown to epic proportions by the
time the Saints hoisted the Lombardi Trophy.

The Saints defeated the Indianapolis Colts 2 weeks later on February 7 in the most
widely watched Super Bowl, and the most widely watched scheduled program, in
United States television history, attracting more the 106.5 million viewers. The 51.7
million households watching the 2010 Super Bowl topped the previous record holder,
the 1983 finale of the CBS sitcom “M*A*S*H” (Walker, 2010c, February 9).

Throughout the 2009 season, the country saw New Orleans again in a new light.
Instead of death, destruction, and ineptitude, they saw life, energy, and excellence
executed at the highest level. The television cameras swarmed New Orleans; some say
it was difficult to tell the Super Bowl was actually in Miami with all the coverage of
the Saints’ hometown (Walker, 2010b, February 8).

State economic officials hoped to parlay the Saints’ Super Bowl debut into a pow-
erful start to a long-term rebranding of Louisiana’s image. They saw it as their chance
to show that the state is strong and rebuilding. “Unlike the Saints, we’re not necessar-
ily at Super Bowl level, but we’re clearly headed in the right direction,” said Stephen
Moret, secretary of economic development for Louisiana” (quoted by Mowbray, 2010,
p. C11). Austin Marks, chief of staff of Greater New Orleans Inc., used the Saints’

Burns 155

dream season as a recruiting tool, bringing site selection professionals to town for
meetings and visits to the Superdome, courtesy of Saints executives (Mowbray, 2010).

By the end of the season, owner Tom Benson had secured a lease extension to keep
the team playing in the Superdome through the 2025 season and convinced fellow
NFL owners to vote New Orleans as the Super Bowl host city for a record-tying 10th
time in 2013 (Hogan, 2009). By this time, nearly every national-profile sports event
hosted in New Orleans before Katrina, including college football’s Sugar Bowl, col-
lege basketball’s championship tournament, and Professional Golf Association’s
Zurich Classic, had returned or made plans to return to the city (Wolff, 2007).

The history of the relationship between the Saints football franchise and its host
city leads to the following research question:

Research Question 1: What is the association between the positive self-image of
Saints fans and the success of the Saints football team?

Method

National, regional, and local newspapers and sports magazines were reviewed from
August 2009 to February 2010 using the search terms Saints and Super Bowl. The
publications selected for review were Sports Illustrated, The Washington Post, and
The New York Post on the national level; The Baton Rouge Advocate and The Mobile
Register on the regional level; and The Times-Picayune on the local level. In total,
1,885 articles were reviewed to discover the reported association between the positive
self-image of New Orleans citizens, as well as of Saints fans in general, to the success
of the Saints football team. Articles were classified as showing a positive association,
a negative association, positive and negative association, or no association at all.
Articles with no association contained no information about the effect of the football
team on its fans. Post hoc content analysis was undertaken of 1,885 articles by two
coders. The intercoder reliability was .99 (Altheide, 1996; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).

Results

Of the 1,885 articles reviewed, 46 (2.44%) were in Sports Illustrated, 126 (6.68%)
were in The Washington Post, 217 (11.51%) were in The New York Post, 283 (15.01%)
were in The Baton Rouge Advocate, 335 (17.77%) were in The Mobile Register, and
878 (46.58%) were in The Times-Picayune. In Sports Illustrated, 8 (17.39%) articles
were coded to the positive self-image of Saints fans and 38 (82.61%) were not rele-
vant. In The Washington Post, 16 (12.70%) articles were coded to the positive self-
image of Saints fans and 110 (87.30%) were not relevant. In The New York Post, 20
(9.22%) were coded to the positive self-image of Saints fans and 197 (90.78%) were
not relevant. In The Baton Rouge Advocate, 33 (11.66%) articles were correlated to the
positive self-image of Saints fans, 1 (0.35%) was coded to the negative self-image of
Saints fans, 1 (0.35%) was coded to positive and negative self-image of Saints fans,

156 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

and 248 (87.63%) were not relevant. In The Mobile Register, 34 (10.15%) articles
were coded to the positive self-image of Saints fans and 301 (89.85%) were not rele-
vant. In The Times-Picayune, 94 (10.71%) articles were coded to the positive self-
image of Saints fans, 1 (0.11%) was coded to positive and negative self-image of
Saints fans, and 783 (89.18%) were not relevant.

Discussion

Definition of Individual Through In-Group

The articles reviewed showed that the Saints and their fans have had a long-standing
relationship that has been through many more downs than ups. As Lagasse (2010)
wrote in Sports Illustrated,

There’s something about the Saints and their relationship with the city that is indescribable.
Wins and losses aren’t just felt on the field and by the 53 guys on the roster but by everybody
in town. I’ve been all over the country, and there is a correlation between the success of the
Saints and the success of the city unlike any other I’ve seen. (p. 80)

Mickey Loomis, General Manager of the New Orleans Saints, also noted the strong
connection in an article in The Washington Post: “There’s always been a unique rela-
tionship between the fans of the New Orleans Saints and their team . . . There’s a con-
nection between the team and the city that’s unusual” (quoted by Maske, 2009,
p. D01). Toni Trapani, a Saints season-ticket holder and lifelong New Orleans resi-
dent, attempted to explain why the citizens of New Orleans were so connected to the
team. He said,

The team gets into your blood at a young age the same way the city does. This isn’t a
transient town like Dallas or Houston or Atlanta. Everyone who lives here chooses to live
here. It’s not like your company sent you here. You’re here because you want to be here.
(quoted by Vaccaro, 2010, p. 78)

Many residents of the Gulf Coast region were severely impacted by Hurricane
Katrina in 2005. Numerous articles included references to the rise of the city parallel-
ing the rise of the Saints. LeCharles Bentley, drafted by New Orleans in 2002,
described the complementary resurgence of the city and the team in a Times-Picayune
article:

What no camera was able to capture or mouths able to articulate was the emotional and
mental devastation that laid in the wake of Katrina . . . The irony is the city and the people
were made whole in the same building that ended up being a tomb for so many. Fans cheered
the Saints to their first Super Bowl berth at the Superdome—a place that is synonymous with
one of the darkest periods in natural disaster history . . . the Saints and the city of New
Orleans have shown that perseverance and faith eventually will yield sweet rewards.
(Bentley, 2010, p. S73)

Burns 157

Accentuating Similarities Within the In-Group and Differences From the
Out-Group

The successful 2009 season was reported to have a unifying effect on the city and the
region. The Mobile Register wrote,

The Saints brought us together, my family, my community, my coast, my state, my brothers
and sisters in Louisiana, and yes, gathering from the record-breaking television ratings for the
game, my nation. For one great shining moment, we were all Saints fans. (Burtt, 2010, p. C01)

A Times-Picayune article discussed the concept of the Who Dat Nation, described
as “a post-Katrina phenomenon that has tied together Orleanians, suburbanites and
displaced former residents of all ethnicities, ages and socioeconomic classes based on
their love of the Saints” (Hammer, 2010, p. A01).

The players recognize the strong ties their team has to the city, and to its recovery
from Katrina. Quarterback Drew Bees was quoted in a Washington Post article as
saying,

It’s surreal . . . Coming here four years ago, post-Katrina . . . It’s unbelievable, it’s
unbelievable. You can draw so many parallels between our team and our city. In reality
we’ve had to lean on each other in order to survive. The city is on its way to recovery. We’ve
used the strength and resilience of our fans to go out and play with confidence on Sundays.
It’s been one step at a time, and we’ve had to play through plenty of adversity. Just like this
town has. (S. Jenkins, 2010b, p. D01)

Perceived Illegitimate Status of In-Group as Inferior

After the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, the city and the team were ready
for a change in status from losers to winners. The Washington Post wrote, “Had a town
ever craved a victory more than New Orleans? All across the city, people who had lost
everything needed so desperately to win something. Even the cops on street corners
chanted, ‘WHO DAT?’” (S. Jenkins, 2010b, p. D01). After the Super Bowl win, a
Sports Illustrated article said,

The triumph capped a lovefest between the city and the team that began in 2006 with the
hiring of coach Sean Payton and the signing of quarterback-community institution Drew
Brees just months after Hurricane Katrina had devastated New Orleans and left tenuous the
Saints’ future in the town. “This is for everybody in the city who had homes that used to be
wet,” Payton said after the game. “This is for New Orleans.” (King, 2010b, p. 41)

Realistic Competition

The change in the Saints’ self-identification from losers to winners allowed the fans as
a group to change categories themselves, an example of one of the six identity man-
agement strategies for groups with a negative social identity described by Mummendey

158 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

et al. (1999). The Saints and their fans are typical of realistic competition, whereby the
in-group as a whole attempt to compete for resources that will allow the in-group to
gain higher status. This change in status is evident in several articles in The Times-
Picayune. One article stated,

For so many years, we followed what had been our lovable losers. But Sunday’s victory
against the Indianapolis Colts seemed to change the local perspective in an instant. There
seemed to be a greater sense of civic pride on Monday morning. People hugged, they kissed,
they danced, they cried. (Canulette, 2010, p. H01)

Dr. Adrianne Brennan, an assistant professor of clinical psychiatry at LSU Health
Sciences Center, was quoted in The Times-Picayune as saying, “New Orleanians have
this new identity now,” she said. “We’re not the underdogs. We’re on top” (Alexander-
Bloch & Kirkham, 2010, p. A01).

Positive Self-Perception of the In-Group

Most of the articles that mentioned the effect of the Saints on the city of New Orleans
and on Saints fans were positive in nature. Saints fans’ sense of identity is in some
ways prescribed by their sports team. Linebacker Jonathan Vilma said, “The New
Orleans Saints are Super Bowl champions and the city of New Orleans is Super Bowl
champions” (Deshazier, 2010b, p. B03). The Mobile Register article went on to say,
“You hear that kind of sentiment and it’s hard for civic pride to not burst through,
impossible for provincialism to not intensify even more than it already has.” The Baton
Rouge Advocate recorded Saints receiver Robert Meachem as saying,

A few weeks ago, a fan walked up to me and just started crying and said, “Thank you for
what you did for our city.” That makes you know that you are not bigger or better than
anyone else, but you are doing something that’s good for our city. (Cannizzaro, 2010, p. 54)

The Washington Post reported that NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell said,

When you think about the relationship between the Saints and the Gulf Coast and the Saints
and New Orleans, it was more than just a football game and more than just a football team
. . . The hopes and dreams and struggles of the people in that region were reflected in that
team. (Maske, 2010, p. D03)

One article also mentioned the positive effect a winning team can have on the work
environment. The Baton Rouge Advocate reported, “The New Orleans Saints’ Super
Bowl win may have long-lasting, positive effects on the region’s Hurricane Katrina-
damaged psyche, rebuilding residents’ self-confidence and self-esteem, and making
them more productive at work, according to at least one expert (Griggs, 2010, p. B04).
The article went on to quote Seymour Adler, senior vice president in the Human
Capital Practice at Aon Consulting, “Winning the game makes people feel good about
being in New Orleans and around the city . . . Boosting self-confidence, security and

Burns 159

self-esteem have been scientifically proven to increase productivity.” Jean Kelley,
president and founder of Jean Kelly Leadership Consulting in Tulsa, said winning can
also lower productivity temporarily because of the adrenaline rush as well as heavy
drinking and eating. While Consultants Challenger, Gray, and Christmas estimated the
Super Bowl would cost employers as much as US$900 million on the following
Monday, Paul Damiano, president of Good Works Consulting in Summerfield, North
Carolina, said there are too many variables and measurement errors to get a reliable
numerical answer. Although there may be short-term decreases in productivity, the
article said Damiano predicted “a corresponding gain in non-traditional measures such
as better communication and employee relations and even higher short-term motiva-
tion” (Griggs, 2010, p. B04).

Doubters and Near-Believers

Only two articles mentioned a negative effect of the Saints’ presence in the state. One
appeared in The Baton Rouge Advocate and concerned the high price state taxpayers
had to pay to keep the Saints profitable over the years. The article questions if the
Saints, even after such a successful year, are worth the high price tag. Ballard (2010)
wrote,

Since 1985, Louisiana taxpayers have given the Benson family of San Antonio, Texas, almost
a half-billion dollars in subsidies and cash—without ever getting any ownership interest that
would be recognized by a court. In essence, a succession of Louisiana governors used the
state’s treasury to reward managers who apparently could not succeed in the National Football
League, a business that has grown to astounding heights of profitability. (p. B07)

The other appeared in The Times-Picayune and was a mix of positive and negative
references. The article questioned the long-term effect the team’s success could have on
the city. Rice University professor and former New Orleans resident Douglas Brinkley
was quoted as saying, “Saints mania is very exciting, but sports can be an opiate for the
masses . . . You can’t build a sustainable urban community on football wins” (“Jazz and
Razz,” 2010, p. B06). The article goes on to comment, “No one thinks that, but the
Saints do inspire those of us who’ve chosen to stay and rebuild” (p. B06).

Besides these two articles concerning economic factors, the articles reviewed in
this study contain only positive subject matter in reference to the city’s and fans’ con-
nection with the Saints football team. The intangible benefits commonly referenced
are the unity among fans in the “Who Dat Nation” and the ecstatic joy experienced by
the citizens of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region, examples of accentuating simi-
larities within the in-group, as well as the corresponding good feelings about the city
and the region and the positive impression it may create in the rest of the viewing
public around the country, and the world, as a result of the positive media coverage of
the 2009 season, both examples of positive self-perception of the in-group.

160 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

Future Implications

Baade and Matheson (2007) argued that New Orleans will have a difficult time retain-
ing their professional sports teams over the long run. They predict that any efforts to
rebuild sports facilities would hinder development. It is questionable whether the
extensive investment New Orleans made in its sports team was worth it when so many
other essential services and publicly funded projects are still struggling. Baade and
Matheson allow that hosting professional sports and megaevents has symbolic signifi-
cance, but they argue it is an amenity the city simply cannot afford.

Supporters of investment in the sports infrastructure say,

There’s a preservationist case to be made, in which sports in New Orleans muscle their way
alongside cuisine and music—all worth saving because they make life worth living,
especially when people the world over want to sample that very culture. (Wolff, 2007, p. 7)

It remains to be seen if the investment New Orleans has made in the Saints, their
winning season, and the ensuing publicity will make a long-lasting effect on the com-
munity. In the short term, it seems to have created a positive effect for the citizens of
the city and the surrounding region who identify as fans of the team.

Research has shown that professional sports teams can provide intangible benefits
for their host cities, while the economic benefits have been shown to be inconsequen-
tial. In the case of New Orleans and its Super Bowl–winning NFL team, the Saints,
more research needs to be conducted to determine what benefits may be experienced
by the city. A few suggested areas of future research include level of identification
Saints fans have with their team as compared with other teams’ fans, tourism levels
before and after 2009, changes in media coverage post-Katrina compared with post-
Super Bowl win, changes in economic climate, and measurements of life satisfaction,
job satisfaction, and/or work performance post-Super Bowl win. Ultimately, the goal
of such research should be to obtain a better understanding on the relationship of
sports to a variety of intangible benefits to a community.

Author’s Note

This paper was previously presented at the annual meeting of the Southern States Communication
Association in Little Rock (2011).

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.

Burns 161

References

Alexander-Bloch, B., & Kirkham, C. (2010, February 9). All over New Orleans, people shared
the euphoria from a stunning victory. The Times-Picayune, p. A01.

Altheide, D. L. (1996). Qualitative media analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Austrian, Z., & Rosentraub, M. S. (2002). Cities, sports, and economic change: A retrospective

assessment. Journal of Urban Affairs, 24, 549-563.
Baade, R. A. (1996). Professional sports as catalysts for metropolitan economic development.

Journal of Urban Affairs, 18, 1-17.
Baade, R. A., & Dye, R. F. (1990). The impact of stadiums and professional sports on metro-

politan area development. Growth and Change, 21, 1-14.
Baade, R. A. & Matheson, V. (2007). Professional sports, Hurricane Katrina, and the economic

redevelopment of New Orleans. Contemporary Economic Policy, 25, 591-603.
Baim, D. (1990, November). Sports stadiums as wise investments: An evaluation (Heartland

Institute Policy Study No. 32). Chicago, IL: The Heartland Institute.
Ballard, M. (2010, January 24). Are Saints really a winner? The Advocate, p. B07.
Bentley, C. (2010, February 6). It’s the people of New Orleans that make the place so special.

The Times-Picayune, p. S73.
Brown, R. (2004). Sport and healing America. Society, 42, 37-41.
Burtt, S. (2010, February 15). We can learn a lot from our heroes, N.O. Saints. Mobile Register,

p. C01.
Cannizzaro, M. (2010, February 6). No Freeney pass for Indy defense: Manning and company

favorites in name only. The New York Post, p. 54.
Coates, D., & Humphreys, B. R. (1999). The growth effects of sport franchises, stadia, and

arenas. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 18, 601-625.
Canulette, A. (2010, February 11). Community savors magical moment. The Times-Picayune,

p. H01.
Davis, M., & End, C. (2010). A winning proposition: The economic impact of successful

national football league franchises. Economic Inquiry, 48, 39-50.
DeShazier, J. (2010a, January 23). A magical mix; The Saints’ return to the Superdome in 2006

against the Falcons stands as the franchise’s iconic moment at the facility, but all the ingre-
dients are present for that to be topped Sunday. The Times-Picayune, p. S03.

DeShazier, J. (2010b, February 9). Saints carried New Orleans banner high. Mobile Register,
p. B03.

Euchner, C. C. (1993). Playing the field: Why sports teams move and cities fight to keep them.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Fatsis, S. (2005). Football’s Saints ponder whether to relocate. Wall Street Journal (Eastern
Edition), pp. B1, B5.

Finney, P. (2010, January 25). Win was a long time coming. The Times-Picayune, p. A01.
Griggs, T. (2010, February 9). Experts: Win will help productivity. The Advocate, p. B04.
Hammer, D. (2010, February 2). Color blind bond; Racial harmony stands out in Who Dat

Nation. The Times-Picayune, p. A01.
Hargie, O., Dickson, D., Mallett, J., & Stringer, M. (2008). Communicating social identity:

A study of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Communication Research, 35,
792-821.

Hirt, E. R., Zillman, D., Erickson, G. A., & Kennedy, C. (1992). Costs and benefits of alle-
giance: Changes in fans’ self-ascribed competencies after team victory versus team defeat.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 724-738.

162 Journal of Sport and Social Issues 38(2)

Hogan, N. (2009, July 19). The Times-Picayune picks south Louisiana’s 25 most influential
people in sports. The Times-Picayune, p. C01.

Hogg, M., Terry, D., & White, K. (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of iden-
tity theory with social identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58, 255-269.

Isen, A. M. (1989). Some ways in which affect influences cognitive processes: Implications for
advertising and consumer behavior. In P. Cafferata & A. M. Tybout (Eds.), Cognitive and
affective responses to advertising (pp. 91-117). Chicago, IL: Young and Rubicam.

Jazz and razz; Worthy of praise. and not. (2010, February 11). The Times-Picayune, B06.
Jenkins, L. (2010a, February 15). Super Bowl XLIV for you, New Orleans. Sports Illustrated,

p. 30.
Jenkins, S. (2010b, January 25). A city’s biggest moment. Easy. The Washington Post, p. D01.
Judge, T. A., & Watanabe, S. (1993). Another look at the job satisfaction-life satisfaction rela-

tionship. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 939-948.
King, P. (2006, May 8). The future is now. Sports Illustrated, p. 38.
King, P. (2010a, February 11). Patron saint. Sports Illustrated, p. 58.
King, P. (2010b, February 11). Super saints. Sports Illustrated, p. 41.
Lagasse, E. (2010, February 11). A team to savor. Sports Illustrated, p. 80.
Layden, T. (2007, January 22). Marching in. Sports Illustrated, p. 38.
Layden, T. (2010a, February 11). Faithful, joyful, triumphant. Sports Illustrated, p. 10.
Layden, T. (2010b, February 11). March of history. Sports Illustrated, p. 72.
Lindlof, T. R. & Taylor, B. C. (2002). Qualitative communication research methods (2nd ed.).

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lorando, M. (2010, January 24). The crying game; Win or lose today, many who dats won’t be

able to hold back the tears. The Times-Picayune, p. D1.
Maske, M. (2009, December 4). A city and its team enjoy a magical run; The people of New

Orleans revel in the Saints’ 11-0 start. The Washington Post, p. D01.
Maske, M. (2010, February 9). Saints’ Brees, Payton in disbelief a day after win; New Orleans’s

QB, coach say Super Bowl triumph will take time to sink in. The Washington Post, p. D03.
Mowbray, R. (2010, February 6). State eager to ride Saints’ coattails: Team’s success mirrors

La.’s rise officials say. The Times-Picayune, p. C11.
Mummendey, A., Kessler, T., Klink, A., & Mielke, R. (1999). Strategies to cope with nega-

tive social identity: Predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 229-245.

Platow, M. J., Durante, M., Williams, N., Garrett, M., Walshe, J., Cincotta, S., & Brautchu, A.
(1999). The contributions of sport fan social identity to the production of prosocial behav-
ior. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 3, 161-169.

Pope, J., & Nolan, B. (2010, February 9). All over New Orleans, people shared the euphoria
from a stunning victory. The Times-Picayune, p. A01.

Rosentraub, M. (1996). Does the emperor have new clothes? A reply to Robert A. Baade.
Journal of Urban Affairs, 18, 23-31.

Schwartz, P. (2010, January 25). The big Brees-y-Saints QB, and city, each rose from ruin. The
New York Post, p. 72.

Schwarz, N., Starck, F., Kommer, D., & Wagner, D. (1987). Soccer, rooms, and the quality
of life: Mood effects on judgments of satisfaction with life in general and with specific
domains. European Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 69-79.

St. Germain, B. (2010, January 16). Who dat nation shows national pride. Houma Today.
Available from www.houmatoday.com

Burns 163

Tait, M., Padgett, M. Y., & Baldwin, T. T. (1989). Job and life satisfaction: A reevaluation of
the strength of the relationship and gender effects as a function of the date of the study.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 939-948.

Vaccaro, M. (2010, February 8). Supe dreams: They’re aints and dolts no more. The New York
Post, p. 78.

Walker, D. (2010a, January 13). The chant is older than we think. The Times-Picayune, p. A01.
Walker, D. (2010b, February 8). Media magnet: Attracted by the alluring success of the Saints,

the TV world has focused dozens of camera lenses on New Orleans. The Times-Picayune,
p. D16.

Walker, D. (2010c, February 9). Super bowl smashes TV record: More people viewed the
Saints-Colts game than any program in history. The Times-Picayune, p. A01.

Wann, D. L., Inman, S., Ensor, C. L., Gates, R. D., & Caldwell, D. S. (1999, Winter). Assessing
the psychological well-being of sport fans using the profile of mood states: The importance
of team identification. International Sports Journal, 3, 81-90.

Wolff, A. (2007, August 27). Two years after Katrina. Sports Illustrated, p. 80.

Author Biography

Elizabeth Booksh Burns is the assistant director of New Student Orientation at the University
of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB) and holds an MA in communication management from
UAB. She is an adjunct professor at Jefferson State Community College.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS STADIUMS:
RECASTING THE ANALYSIS IN CONTEXT

CHARLES SANTO
Portland State University

ABSTRACT: Independent empirical analyses are often used to refute assertions that sports

stadiums can serve as economic catalysts. Criticisms of recent stadium investments, however,

are commonly based on studies conducted with data that it out of date. Current generation

stadiums typically exhibit a different character and purpose than the multi-use, utilitarian

facilities built in the 1960s and 1970s. This study tests the importance of the new context within

which stadiums are built by recasting a landmark study with current data. Nineteen metropo-

litan areas are included in a cross-section time-series analysis, representing every city that

gained or lost an NFL or MLB team, or experienced a stadium construction for such a team

between 1984 and 2001. These sports-related variables are found to be positively correlated with

regional income share for eight of the nineteen metropolitan areas. A closer look at the findings

suggests that context matters.

Since 1990 over $10 billion in public funds have been allocated for the construction of
major league sports facilities across urban America (Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001).
Throughout this boom, subsidized stadiums have often been promoted as economic
development tools or key elements of urban revitalization strategies. The emergence of
this trend sparked the interest of economists who responded with a host of empirical
research, much of which cast doubt on the validity of the stadium as an economic catalyst
(Baade, 1996; Baade & Dye, 1990; Coates & Humphreys, 1999; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997;
Zimbalist, 1998; Zimmerman, 1997).

As public spending on sports facilities continues into the twenty-first century the
surrounding debate has escalated, and empirical findings formerly confined to the pages
of academic journals have found their way into the mainstream media. With this increased
attention, the nuanced results of numerous individual analyses have become synthesized
into a broad message suitable for mass consumption. The following summary statement
by Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) illustrates how the findings of economic research
regarding stadium investments are typically depicted:

Few fields of empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet,

independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly

*Direct Correspondence to: Charles Santo, School of Urban Studies & Planning, College of Urban and Public
Affairs, Portland State University, P.O. Box 751-USP, Portland, OR 97207-0751. E-mail: santoca@pdx.edu

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 27, Number 2, pages 177–191.

Copyright # 2005 Urban Affairs Association

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

ISSN: 0735-2166.

found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports facility

construction and economic development (p. 98).

Siegfried and Zimbalist declare the case closed, but this is a dangerous generalization
that ignores the importance of context. Criticisms of recent stadium investments are often
based on empirical analyses built on outdated data. Many of the stadiums built in recent
years are constructed with a very different purpose than the multi-use, utilitarian facilities
of the 1960s and 1970s. Sports facilities are now designed to serve as architectural symbols
with tourist appeal and are often built into the urban fabric to facilitate synergy. This is in
contrast to facilities of the previous generation, which were located near interstate
exchanges to facilitate a quicker exit after the game.

This study offers new evidence that contradicts the general conclusion that sports
facilities can have no significant positive impact on local economies. It begins with a
review of two landmark empirical analyses that have contributed to this conclusion
(Baade, 1996; Baade & Dye, 1990). New empirical research, derived from recasting the
frequently cited study of Baade and Dye with current data, is reported. The findings of
this research are supported by a closer examination of previously reported empirical
analyses, which indicate that context plays a key role in determining the impact of sports
development strategies.

THE EX POST FACTO STANDARD

While stadium promoters often use predictive input-output models to project a facility’s
economic impacts, the empirical research produced by economists and other critics is
based on ex post facto evaluation. These studies typically use regression analysis and a
combination of time-series and cross-section data to detect whether the presence of a
sports team or facility significantly impacts statistics that represent the strength of a local
economy.

Baade and Dye (1990) employed this approach in a study that has become a landmark
reference for critics of stadium subsidies. Using two regression equations, the authors
examine the effect of National Football League (NFL) teams, Major League

Baseball

(MLB) teams and new stadiums on metropolitan area income. The methodology is
designed to provide a straightforward test of claims that sports-related spending and
multiplier effects lead to increased area income. The analysis is based on data gathered
from nine metropolitan areas (Cincinnati, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, New Orleans,
Pittsburgh, San Diego, Seattle, and Tampa) during the period of 1965 to 1983. Each of the
metropolitan areas included in the sample either gained a new NFL or MLB team, or
experienced the construction or renovation of a facility for an NFL or MLB team during
the study period.

In the first equation, aggregate standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) income is
regressed on three sports-related variables. These are dummy variables that indicate the
presence of a new or renovated stadium, the presence of a football team, or the presence of
a baseball team for each year in the time series. The dummy variables for football or
baseball teams are omitted for cases in which there is no change in the presence of a team
during the time period. SMSA population and a time trend variable are also included as
control variables. The time trend variable is assigned a value of one for 1965 and increases
to 19 for 1983.

The results this equation indicate a significant relationship between the sports-related
variables and income levels for only one of the metropolitan areas. A new stadium in

178 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

conjunction with the presence of a new baseball team had a significant positive effect in
Seattle. Baade and Dye also conducted an analysis of pooled data from all nine cities,
which indicates a significant negative impact associated with the presence of a football
team and a significant positive impact associated with the presence of a baseball. The
authors draw few conclusions from these ambiguous results.

The second equation is designed to determine whether a metropolitan area gains a
larger share of its region’s income as a result of the presence of a sports team or stadium.
The dependant variable for this equation is defined as SMSA income relative to regional
income. The independent variables remain the same as those used in equation 1, except
that population is replaced with SMSA population relative to regional population.
Examining the statistics of each metropolitan area relative to its region provides an
additional control for unspecified elements that could affect income levels.

Based on the findings of this model, Baade and Dye conclude that sports teams and
facilities have a potentially negative impact on metropolitan area economies. The regres-
sion results indicate a significant negative correlation between the sports-related dummy
variables and regional income share for five of the nine metropolitan areas. The stadium
variable had a significant positive coefficient in New Orleans and Seattle, but the presence
of a new stadium had a significant negative impact in Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City,
and Seattle. The presence of a football team had a negative impact on regional income
share in New Orleans. The pooled regression also shows a significant negative coefficient
for the stadium variable. In all other instances the impact of teams or stadiums were not
significant. Baade and Dye offer the following explanation of the negative impacts
associated with the construction or renovation of stadiums:

Stadiums divert economic development toward labor-intensive, relatively low unskilled

labor (low-wage) activities. To the extent that this developmental path diverges from

less labor-intensive, mire highly skilled (high-wage) activities characteristic of other

economies within the region, it would be expected that the sports-minded area would

experience a falling share of regional income (p. 12).

Baade conducted a similar analysis in 1996, again using time-series cross-section data.
Forty-eight cities were examined over the period of 1958 through 1987. The sample
included all cities that hosted a team from at least one of the four major sports, and 1

3

cities with no teams. A trend-adjusted measure of real per capita income was regressed on
variables representing the number professional sports franchises and the number of new
stadiums (less than 10 years old). As in Baade and Dye’s earlier study, most of the results
in this analysis were not statistically significant. The variable for number of teams was a
statistically significant predictor of per capita income for only two cities: Baltimore, where
it negatively affected per capita income, and Indianapolis, where a positive effect was
found. The presence of a new stadium had a statistically significant negative impact on per
capita income in Washington, DC, San Francisco, and St. Louis. For all other cities, and
in the pooled regression, the team and stadium variables did not have a statistically
significant impact on trend-adjusted per capita income.

RECASTING THE ANALYSIS

While these two studies are frequently cited to criticize stadium investments, they have been
subject to criticism as well; the most notable of which is related to the time periods used in the
analyses. Even in his 1996 study, the time series of Baade’s analysis ended in 1987. This

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 179

precludes evidence from stadiums built during the stadium building boom of the 1990s and
beyond, which many would argue are of a very different character than prior generation
facilities. And although Baade and Dye (1990) conducted their research prior to this trend,
their findings from a time series that ended in 1983 are commonly used to criticize today’s
stadium investments. (Other more recent studies have lumped old and new facilities together. A
1999 study by Coates and Humphreys included all major league sports facilities built between
1969 and 1994.) Chema (1996) expands on the distinction between eras of stadium design:

Baade has researched essentially non-urban facilities which were not intended to be

economic development tools. The multi-use facilities that proliferated in the late 60s and

early 70s were specifically designed to be apart from the city. The design characteristics

give the impression more of a fort than a marketplace. Moreover, during the period

surveyed most new venues were located in suburban or rural locations. The relatively

few urban venues might as well have been in suburbs because they were separated from

their host city by a moat of surface parking (p. 20).

In contrast, the recent wave of stadium construction has been marked by a migration of
such facilities back to the urban core with an emphasis on revitalization and tourist appeal
(Newsome & Comer, 2000). Recall that in his 1996 study, Baade found a positive relation-
ship between sports teams and per capita income for Indianapolis. He ascribes this
relationship to the fact that Indianapolis included sports as part of a larger development
strategy in the 1970s and 1908s. While Indianapolis was the only city to utilize this
strategy during the era that Baade studied, it is now far more common for cities to tie
revitalization efforts to sports-related development.

Chema concludes, ‘‘it is not the sport activity, but the context which is key’’ (p. 20).
Theoretically, a retro-style ballpark in a downtown or retail setting is likely to attract
visitors from a wider area than its more utilitarian suburban counterpart, and is likely to
induce longer stays and greater ancillary spending. If so, it is plausible that the new
generation of sports facilities would have more favorable economic impacts than their
predecessors.

To test this hypothesis, the cross-section time-series analysis designed by Baade and Dye
is recast here with a more current set of data. To the extent that the methodology
employed by Baade and Dye is accepted as sound, the new empirical evidence produced
by this approach should be considered an equally valid update that reflects the current
context of stadium investments.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The new analysis presented here essentially picks up where Baade and Dye left off, with
a time period extending from 1984 to 2001. This research provides the most current cross-
section time-series analysis of the economic impacts of professional sports teams and
facilities. In contrast to other recent studies, this research focuses on the impact of current
generation stadiums, excluding older facilities from the analysis. In a study critical of
stadium investments, Coates and Humphreys (1999) conducted a cross-section time-series
analysis that included data from 1969 to 1994. While this research does incorporate the
impact of some current generation facilities, it does not distinguish those stadiums from
ones built in the 1970s. If the context of current generation stadiums makes them a better
investment than the utilitarian facilities of the previous era, then lumping the two groups
together might cloud the analysis.

180 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

Nineteen metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) are included in the analysis, representing
every city that either experienced a change in the presence of an NFL or MLB team, or
experienced a stadium construction or renovation for an NFL or MLB team during the
time period. The number of cities included in this analysis is more than double that
examined by Baade and Dye, although the period is one year shorter. This is illustrative
of the difference between the two eras, reflecting increased stadium construction, team
expansion, and relocation during the latter period. The larger sample size should also
contribute to enhanced statistical reliability and validity for the pooled regressions. Table 1
lists the metropolitan areas included in this study and indicates the year in which each saw
a change in the presence of a team or experienced the construction or renovation of a
stadium. (Franchise names in parentheses denote teams that left an MSA during the
indicated year.

)

The research design used here contains two slight deviations from that employed by
Baade and Dye, which enhance the utility of the study. The time period of this study saw a

TABLE 1

Sample Metropolitan Areas

MSA

Baseball

Team

Baseball

Stadium

Football

Team
Football
Stadium

Atlanta Turner Field 1997 Georgia Dome

199

2

Baltimore Oriole Park 1992 Ravens 1996 M&T Bank Stadium

199

8

Charlotte Panthers 1996* Ericsson Stadium

199

6

Chicago US Cellular 1991

Cleveland Jacobs Field 1994 (Browns 1995)

Browns

199

9

Cleveland Stadium

1999

Denver Rockies 1993 Coors Field 199

5

Fort Worth-Arlington The Ballpark 199

4

Houston (Oilers 1996)

Jacksonville Jaguars 1995 Alltell Stadium 1995

renovated

Los Angeles (Raiders 1994)

Miami Marlins 1993 Pro Player Stadium

1987

Nashville Titans 1999* The Coliseum 1999

Oakland Raiders 1995

Orange Co. (Anaheim) Edison Int’l Field 1999

renovated

(Rams 1994)

Phoenix Diamondbacks

1998

Bank One Ballpark

1998

Cardinals 1988

St. Louis (Cardinals

1987)

Edward Jones

Dome 1995

Seattle Safeco Field 1999

Tampa Devil Rays 1998 Tropicana Field 1998

renovated

Raymond James

Stad. 1998

Washington, DC Fed Ex Field 1997

Note. Franchise names in parentheses denote teams that left an MSA during the indicated year.
*The Carolina Panthers played at Memorial Stadium in Clemson, South Carolina in 1995. The Tennessee Titans played at the
Liberty Bowl in Memphis in 1997 and at Vanderbilt Stadium in 1998.

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 181

significant amount of movement among NFL teams. To capture these effects, the analysis
includes metropolitan areas that lost teams as well as those that attracted relocated teams
or expansion franchises. The impact on a city’s economy of losing a team should be as
telling as that of gaining one. In addition, rather than using a single dummy variable for
the presence of a new stadium, two unique variables are used to indicate either the
presence of a new football stadium or the presence of a new baseball stadium. This
specification allows the analysis to detect whether a baseball stadium has a different
overall impact than a football stadium. It is also partly a matter of necessity since multi-
purpose facilities are no longer built and four of the sample cities constructed or renovated
separate stadiums for both sports during the study period.

With the exception of the unique football and baseball stadium variables, the two
regression equations used in this analysis are identical to those employed by Baade and
Dye, and are described below.

Equation 1:

Yi ¼ a0 þ �1 BSTADi þ �2 FSTADi þ �3 BASE þ �4 FOOT
þ �5 TREND þ �6 POPi þ ei

where,

Yi ¼ the ith MSA’s real aggregate personal income (in 2001 dollars)
POPi ¼ the ith MSA’s population
BSTADi ¼ 0 before the ith MSA renovates or builds a baseball stadium; 1 after a

stadium is renovated or built
FSTADi ¼ 0 before the ith MSA renovates or builds a football stadium; 1 after a

stadium is renovated or built
BASEi ¼ 0 if an MLB team is not present in the ith MSA; 1 if an MLB team is present
FOOTi ¼ 0 if an NFL team is not present in the ith MSA; 1 if an NFL team is present
TREND ¼ a variable assigned a value of 1 for 1984 and increasing to 18 for 2001
ei ¼ error term

Equation 2:

Yi=YRi ¼ a0 þ �1 BSTADi þ �2 FSTADi þ �3 BASE þ �4 FOOT
þ �5TREND þ �6POPi=POPRi þ ei

where,

Yi/YRi ¼ the ith MSA’s real aggregate personal income as a fraction of the ith
region’s income

POPi/POPR i ¼ the ith MSA’s population as a fraction of the ith region’s population

Income and population data, including regional data, are taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) (n.d.). Calculations for the regional share variables used in
Equation 2 are based on BEA-defined regions (New England, Mideast, Great Lakes,
Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West). Aggregate income figures
have been converted to 2001 dollars using consumer price index conversion factors
published by the Federal Reserve Bank.

182 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

T
A

B
L

E
2

E
q

u
a
ti

o
n

O
n

e
R

e
s
u

lt
s

M
S

A
P

o
p

T
re

n
d

B
S

T
A

D
F

S
T

A
D

B
A

S
E

F
O

O
T

R
-s

q
u

a
re

A
tl
a
n
ta

7
8

.1

3
**

�
3
,2

1
9

,2

9

8
**

1
,7

7
7
,

0

7
6

�
3
,7

8
7

,6

5
7
*

0
.9

9
6

6
.7

3
�

2
.9

5

0
.7

6
�

2
.0

6

B
a
lt
im

o
re

5
0
.7

7
5

9
4

,5

2
7

�
4
,7

8
7
,8

4
7
**

3
,3

3
0

,0

3

4
**

1
,7

0
9
,8

9
3

0
.9

7
9

1
.1

8
0

.5

8
�

3
.2

2
2
.1

1

0
.8

4

C
h
a
rl
o
tt

e
4
6
.2

9
**

8
,6

3
0

1
,0

7
1

,8

3
1

#
0
.9

9
2

3
.0

6
0
.0

2
1

.0

3

C
h
ic

a
g
o

3
2

.7

9
**

5
,3

1
0
,8

0
0
**

�
1
5
,8

1
2
,1

9
9

**

0
.9
9
2

2
.8

1
6

.0

1
�

5
.0

9

C
le

v
e
la

n
d

�
5
6
.3

9
**

7
7

1
,2

5
9
**

1
,1

7
2
,3

9
5

1
,2

5
6
,7

8
1

�
1
,0

3
2
,9

8
0
0
.9

8
2

�

3
.7

2
1

0
.3

1

1
.3

8

1
.5

1
�
1
.5
8

D
e
n
v
e
r

8
9
.4

2
**

�

4
0

5
,6

3
7

�
8
3
1
,0

4
0

�
5
,8

8

2
,0

9
2
**

0
.9
9
4

9
.6

2
�

1
.3
8
�

0
.4

9
�

3
.7
4

F
o
rt

W
o
rt

h
-A

rl
in

g
to

n
8
6
.9

5
**

�
1
,5

7
1
,0

9
5
**

9
3
2
,7

6
7

0
.9
7
8

4
.8

3
�

2
.5

4
0
.4

4

H
o
u
s
to

n
4
4
.1

5
**

2
7

4
,6

6
9

�

1
0
,2

0
1

,9

1
7
**

0
.9
9
3

5
.2

0
0
.5

3
�

4
.5

6

J
a
c
k
s
o
n
v
ill

e
4
.2

6
6
6
9
,9

7
1

1
,3

6
8
,7

6
7
**

#
0
.9
8
2

0
.1

3
1
.0

4

2
.2

3

L
o
s

A

n
g
e

le

s
9
8
.6

2
**

�
6
,4

9
4
,6

2
2
*

�
2
0
8
,9

0
0
,0

0
1
0
.9

2
5

3
.2
6
�

1
.9

6
�

1
.6

9

M
ia

m
i

�
2
2
.9

8
2
,0

8
9
,5

3
2

�
1
,4

5
8
,4

4
9

�
2
,1

6
2
,0

3
7
0
.9
1
9

�
0
.3

3
0
.8

7
�

0
.8

5
�

0
.7
5

N
a
s
h
v
ill

e
2
4
.6

5
8
1
3
,3

8
5

5
,7

2
1
,5

0
0
*

#
0
.8

9
4
0
.3

7
0

.5

6
1
.9

5

O
a
k
la

n
d

1
1
4
.5

8
**

�
2
,0

6
3
,4

5
3

7
,7

1
0
,8

1
3
**

0
.9
6
7
2
.2
8
�
1
.1

7
2
.2

5

O
ra

n
g
e

C
o
.

(A
n
a
h
ie

m
)

1

3
3
.0

5
**

�
2
,6

7
9
,8

2
8
*

7
,2

2
5
,0

4
7
**
�
1
,0

8
3
,2

9
3
0
.9
9
4

3
.9

7
�

1
.7

7
4
.6

0
�

0
.6

4

P
h
o
e
n
ix

5
6
.8

4
**
�
2
,6

2
7
,9

9
4
**

4
,5

5
5

,8

4

1
**

1
,6

6
4
,8

8
2
0
.9
9
5

5
.1

0
�

2
.4

3
3
.0

6
#

0
.8
0

S
t.

L
o
u
is

�
1
0
.4

4
1
,3

5
4
,4

8
0
1
,1

1
6
,3

1
6

6
6
3
,4

9
2
0
.9
7
0

�
0
.1

1
1
.2

4
0
.4
4
0
.4
8

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 183

T
A
B
L
E
2

(C
o

n
ti

n
u

e
d

)

S
e
a
tt
le

2
5
.5

9
1
,5

2
7
,6

9
0

1
0
,0

9
6
,3

5
7
**

0
.9

8
4

0
.8

1
1
.0

7
4
.1

8

T
a
m

p
a

5
5
.5

3
**

�
5
1
3
,4

9
9
2
,0

3
5
,1

9
7

**

2
,0
3
5
,1
9
7
**
#
0
.9
8
7
2
.2
9
�
0
.6

1
4
.3

8
4
.3

8

W
a
s
h
in

g
to

n
,

D
C

1
5
0
.2

1
**

�
6
,7

0
2
,8

0
2
**

1
0
,2

5
9
,8

5
2
**

0
.9
9
7

1
2
.2

2
�

7
.4

5
7
.7

2

P
O

O
L
E

D
4
4
.2

5
**

5
3
1
,1

7
5
**

4
,6

1
9
,8

8
0
**

1
,3

2
1
,0

2
1

�
8
,1

2
6
,2

3
8
**

�
2
5
4
,9

5
5
0
.9
9
3

2
0
.7

2
4
.1

6
3
.8

5
0
.9

9
�

4
.9

3
�
2
.5
0

C
o
e
ff

ic
ie

n
ts

a
re

lis
te

d
a
b
o
v
e

t-
s
c
o
re

s
.

**
in

d
ic

a
te

s
s
ig

n
if
ic

a
n
e

a
t

p
<

.0
5

*i
n
d
ic

a
te
s
s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
e
a
t
p
<

.1
0
.

#
in

d
ic
a
te

s
s
ta

d
iu

m
c
o
n
te

m
p
o
ra

n
e
o
u
s

w
it
h

fr
a
n
c
h
is

e
.

184 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

RESULTS

Equation 1 examines the impact of sports-related variables on aggregate MSA income.
As summarized in Table 2, the results are mixed. Controlling for population and time
trend, sports teams and stadiums are positively related to income in some metropolitan
areas and negatively related in others. For example, the coefficient for the baseball
stadium variable is significant and positive for Anaheim, Phoenix, Seattle, and Tampa,
but significant and negative for Baltimore and Chicago. New football stadiums seem to
have a significant positive impact on income in Baltimore, Jacksonville, Nashville, Tampa,
and Washington, DC, but the Georgia Dome is shown to have a significant negative
impact in Atlanta. The effects associated with the presences of baseball and football teams
are equally mixed.

To test the overall impacts of the sports-related variables on MSA income, data from all
19 areas were pooled. The same regression equation was used, with the addition of dummy
variables for 18 of the 19 areas to control for differences in the scale of income levels
across the areas. The results of the pooled analysis indicate that new baseball stadiums
have a significant positive impact on area income, while the presence of a baseball team
has a significant negative impact. The coefficients for the other two dummy variables are
not significant for the pooled analysis.

Because of the mixed results, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusion from this first
set of regressions. Furthermore, a closer examination of the data reveals a potential flaw
in the design of Equation 1. Despite the inclusion of the population and time trend
variables, this model seems unable to control for unobserved influences on the dependant
variable outside of any changes in the sports landscape. In particular, with the dependant
variable specified as aggregate MSA income, the control variables used cannot account for
the impact of the national recession of the early 1990s.

Chicago, Baltimore, Atlanta, and Denver provide examples of this flaw. Chicago and
Baltimore built new baseball stadiums in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Atlanta built a new

TABLE 3

National Income Trends

Year % Change in Personal Income

1985 3.6

1986 3.8

1987 3.0

1988 3.6

1989 2.7

1990 1.1

1991 �0.5
1992 3.0

1993 1.1

1994 2.4

1995 2.4

1996 2.6

1997 3.6

1998 5.4

1999 2.6

2000 4.5

2001 0.5

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 185

football stadium in 1992, and Denver landed an expansion baseball team in 1993. As
Table 3 indicates, national income growth was slow or stagnant between 1990 and 1993.
Because changes in sports-related variables coincided with slow or stagnant income
growth in these cities, the results of Equation 1 indicate a relationship between the two.
However, it is plausible that unobserved determinants related to the recession had a more
direct impact on area income levels.

In addition, in every case where the sports-related variables were found to have a
significant positive impact on aggregate area income, the related stadium construction
or change in team location occurred in the late 1990s, during a time of nationwide
economic prosperity. Here it is possible that unobserved influences associated with
the surging national economy exerted a more direct impact on area income than did
sports-related changes. In addition to the shortcomings illustrated above, potential
collinearity between the control variables population and time trend creates a
problem.

The transformations used to generate Equation 2 adequately address the design issues
raised above. By redefining the dependant variable as MSA share of regional income, this

TABLE 4

Equation Two Results

MSA Pop/PopR Trend BSTAD FSTAD BASE FOOT R-Square

Atlanta 3.17** �0.0018** 0.0012* 0.0008 0.9930
7.16 �4.58 2.00 1.29

Baltimore 0.23 0.00002 �0.0005 0.0004 0.0001 0.5430
0.70 0.23 �1.43 1.11 0.15

Charlotte 1.35** 0.00004 0.0001 # 0.9860

3.35 0.52 0.46

Chicago 0.28 0.0011** �0.0018 0.9340
0.54 3.23 �1.11

Cleveland �2.13* �0.0009** �0.0007 �0.0015** 0.0008* 0.9810
�1.87 �2.78 �1.66 �2.95 2.00

Denver 3.64** �0.0008* 0.0099** 0.0001 0.9210
6.55 �2.00 3.78 0.03

Fort Worth-Arlington 0.99** 0.00004 �0.0008* 0.9580
8.70 0.73 �2.00

Houston 2.02** 0.0009** �0.0021 0.9480
5.87 5.89 �1.15

Jacksonville 0.85** 0.0000 0.0004** # 0.8880

3.55 �1.29 2.57
Los Angeles 1.09** �0.0009 0.0013 0.9860

3.66 �1.60 0.68
Miami �0.03 �0.0003 �0.0003 0.0001 0.7350

�0.02 �1.43 �0.17 0.04
Nashville 4.99 �0.0016** 0.0030** # 0.9580

1.52 �4.30 2.80
Oakland 2.47** 0.0005** 0.0004 0.8060

4.60 4.43 0.58

Orange Co. (Anahiem) 1.94** �0.00001 �0.0007 0.0027** 0.7730
3.09 �0.12 �0.69 2.39

Phoenix 3.28** �0.0040** 0.0001 # �0.0002 0.9830
11.16 �7.97 0.07 �0.21

St. Louis 1.29** 0.00001 0.0000 �0.0017 0.9440
3.97 0.06 �1.58 �0.01

186 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

model is able to inherently account for regional and national income trends, like those that
affect the results of Equation 1. The population variable is also redefined as regional
population share, which resolves potential issues of collinearity among control variables.
With these improvements, Equation 2 is likely to produce more valid results.

The results produced by this model with current data are not consistent with the
conclusions drawn by Baade and Dye in their original study. This new analysis indicates
a significant positive relationship between sports-related variables and regional income
share for eight metropolitan areas (Atlanta, Cleveland, Denver, Jacksonville, Nashville,
Seattle, and Tampa). These findings are summarized in Table 4. After controlling for time
trend and regional population share, the presence of a new baseball stadium is found to
have a significant positive impact on regional income share for Atlanta, Denver, Seattle,
and Tampa. The impact of football stadium construction or renovation is significant and
positive in Jacksonville, Nashville, and Tampa. The presence of a football team shows a
significant positive effect on income share for Cleveland and Anaheim. Significant nega-
tive coefficients are associated with the presence of a new baseball stadium in Arlington
and the presence of a new football stadium in Cleveland.

The results of the pooled regression indicate that the presence of a new baseball
stadium has a significant positive impact on regional income share. The other sports-
related variables are not significant predictors of regional income share in the pooled
analysis. Using unique dummy variables for the presence of football or baseball facilities
allows the analyses to distinguish the impacts of each. Baseball facilities host ten times as
many home games as football stadiums, and are, therefore, likely to create more
economic activity, as these results indicate. None of the cities included in the original
study by Baade and Dye built baseball-only facilities during the time period of their
study. The results indicate a significant positive correlation between new baseball
stadiums and income, but the coefficient for the baseball team variable is not significant.
This seems to support the theory that even in cities where teams already play, new
stadiums themselves are economic generators, perhaps due to the context of revitaliza-
tion and tourist appeal in which such facilities are now built. (An alternate explanation
focuses on the coefficient associated with the baseball team variable, which is negative
and just outside the range of significance. Coates and Humphreys [1999] find evidence
that some sports franchises reduce the level per capita income growth. They surmise that
this may reflect a compensating differential effect; people might be willing to accept
lower wages, all else being equal, in exchange for the amenities associated with profes-
sional sports. It may be that the compensating differential effect is associated with the
presence of the team, while the stadium is able to generate economic benefits by
exporting sports-related activities to visitors from outside the area.)

Seattle 4.26** 0.0002 0.0031** 0.9850

4.67 1.24 3.60

Tampa 0.74** �0.0001** 0.0004** 0.0004** # 0.4150
2.72 �2.86 2.33 2.33

Washington, DC 1.57** �0.0005 0.0009 0.9830
5.56 �1.62 1.04

POOLED 1.33** �0.0001 0.0022** �0.0008 �0.0011 �0.0006 0.9980
24.94 �0.79 2.93 �0.54 �1.63 �1.44

Note. Coefficients are listed above t-scores.
#Indicates stadium contemporaneous with franchise.
*p < .10. **p < .05.

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 187

The evidence presented here is contradictory to the findings of Baade and Dye as well as
the general sentiment of other empirical analyses as synthesized by critics of stadium
investments. However, instead of offering broad conclusions on the economic merits of
sports facilities, it is more useful to examine the context in which sports related variables
show a significant impact, because the importance of context is the impetus for this study.

For example, facility location seems to affect the success of stadium investments. The
results indicate six cities for which the presence of a new football or baseball stadium is
positively correlated with regional income share (Atlanta, Denver, Jacksonville, Seattle,
and Tampa). In each of these cases the stadiums in question are set in a downtown or
central city environment (Newsome & Comer, 2000). In contrast, The Ballpark in
Arlington, set in a suburban location, is one of two new facilities shown to have a
significant negative impact on regional income share. Cleveland Stadium is also shown
to have a negative impact, but this is offset by the significant positive coefficient associated
with the football team that the facility hosts.

Cities that attracted new teams during the study period also seemed to fair particularly well.
In Tampa the renovation of Tropicana Field, in conjunction with the arrival of the expansion
Devil Rays, shows a significant positive impact on regional income share. The construction of
Coors field, built to host the expansion Rockies, shows a significant positive impact in Denver.
The new football stadium variable has a significant positive correlation with regional income
share in Jacksonville and Nashville, where facilities were built or renovated to host new teams.
The presence of a football team has a significant positive impact in Cleveland, which lost the
Browns to Baltimore in 1995, but gained an expansion team in 1999. The coefficient of the
football team variable is also significant and positive for Anaheim. (Anaheim has not had an
NFL franchise since the Rams relocated to St. Louis in 1994.)

It would be a mistake to simply conclude from these findings that sports facilities
represent wise investments for localities. The analysis does not speak to the efficiency of
such spending, nor does it consider the related opportunity costs. In addition, the positive
coefficients are not very large; however, the findings do conflict with the broadly accepted
generalization that sports facilities have insignificant or negative impacts on metropolitan
area economies. Instead, this analysis supports the claim that context matters. The results
indicate that new stadiums in downtown settings are potentially beneficial, as are stadiums
built to host new teams. Conventional logic supports both of these conclusions. Stadiums
set in downtown locations are more likely to generate ancillary spending before and after
games than their suburban counterparts. A city that gains a new team is likely to attract
an increased number of visitors from within its region. A realignment of leisure spending
within the region could result in a larger share of regional income for the city with the new
team. A new team might also generate some economic benefit through import substitution
if it causes local residents to spend money inside the local economy that they would have
otherwise spent elsewhere. For example, a family might decide to forgo a weekend trip in
order to take in a local baseball game.

An alternative explanation for the conflicting results of the original and current
studies should also be noted. It is possible that the incongruous findings are simply
the result of inherent limitations in the original methodology rather than changes in the
character of stadium investments. For instance, variables representing the construction
of a new stadium or the gain or loss of a team are treated as exogenous, which assumes
that they are not inherently tied to overall economic performance. It could be argued
that teams choose to move to ‘‘booming’’ cities, meaning that economic growth influ-
ences team location. This might produce biased findings of a positive relationship
between the presence of a team and regional income share. (It is more difficult to

188 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

make the case that economic growth influences stadium building decisions. In fact, cities
facing economic decline or stagnation seem more likely to invest in new stadiums than
do prosperous localities.) Bias might also exist due to omitted variables; factors not
accounted for in the model that occurred simultaneous to changes in the sports-related
variables could have also impacted metropolitan income levels. Consider the findings for
Atlanta. Equation 2 indicates a positive relationship between the construction of a
baseball stadium and regional income share. However, what is now Turner Field was
originally built to host events for the 1996 summer Olympic games and converted to
serve as the Braves’ home park before the following season. Part of the positive impact
attributed to the construction of the baseball stadium is likely the result of Atlanta
hosting the Olympic games.

Concluding that the methodology is flawed would indicate that the results of the
original Baade and Dye study are also biased, and are, therefore, a poor foundation for
arguments in opposition to stadium investments. To the extent that the methodology
employed by Baade and Dye is accepted as sound, the new empirical evidence presented
here provides an equally valid update that reflects the current context of stadium invest-
ments. Additional evidence, as presented below, supports the contention that context
matters and that the character of stadium investments has changed.

Supporting Evidence

It is commonly held that independent empirical research has found no evidence of
economic benefits related to sports facilities. The results presented here are to the con-
trary, but this research is not the only incidence of such evidence. The findings of Nelson’s
(2001) cross-section time series analysis support the notion that context matters. Nelson
examined data from 43 MSAs over the period of 1969 to 1994. MSA share of state per
capita income is regressed on variables that represent the number of teams present and the
locations in which they play. A set of control variables designed to represent character-
istics of each MSA’s population, labor force, and economic structure is also used. Nelson
finds that the association between the number of teams playing in the central business
district (CBD) and share of state per capita income is positive, but just out of range of
being statistically significant. The association with teams playing outside the CBD is
negative and statistically significant. Nelson also finds evidence of agglomeration effects,
noting that the coefficient associated with multiple teams playing in the CDB is significant
and positive.

The city-specific case studies of Austrian and Rosentraub provide additional evidence
of the importance context (1997, 2002). Austrian and Rosentraub (1997) assess the micro-
level impacts of sports development in Cleveland. The Gund Arena and Jacobs Field
(elements of a series of capital projects known as the Gateway Complex) both opened in
1994 with an estimated total cost of $467 million. The authors examine the effect of this
substantial investment on development and job creation in the surrounding downtown
area. The study shows that following the construction of the sports facilities real wages per
employee increased in the Gateway area, with a growth rate higher than that of the county
and metropolitan area. This excluded player salaries. The authors also find an increase in
sports-related jobs for the area following construction. These jobs include those in general
merchandise stores, apparel and accessory stores, eating and drinking establishments,
hotels and motels, and amusement and recreation firms. Employment in these industries
increased by 22.6% between 1992 and 1995. The study area also experienced a net increase
in the number of businesses established. While the authors are critical of the cost per job

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 189

created during the study period they do not condemn the city’s stadium investment
strategy. This strategy may or may not have impacted Cleveland’s overall income level,
but it clearly had positive micro-level impacts.

Austrian and Rosentraub (2002) examine the ability of stadium investment strategies to
impact urban revitalization. The authors make an important distinction between such
impacts and impacts on overall economic activity:

If the justification for using public resources to build downtown sports facilities is that

these structures will shift economic activity to an area that that needs redevelopment, then

the issue is not whether overall economic activity increased or decreased, but whether the

vitality or centrality of the downtown area was enhanced or sustained (p. 551).

Their approach calls into question the focus of more general cross-section analyses. Austrian
and Rosentraub investigate development patterns in four metropolitan areas: Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Columbus (Ohio), and Indianapolis. These Midwestern cities have each faced
similar struggles related to the migration of population and economic activity to suburban
localities. Cleveland and Indianapolis both employed sports development strategies in efforts
to revive struggling downtown areas, while Cincinnati and Columbus did not invest in such
facilities until very recently. Austrian and Rosentraub present evidence that Cleveland and
Indianapolis benefited from their early investment in downtown sports facilities, while
Cincinnati and Columbus have continued to struggle. During their study period both
Cleveland and Indianapolis saw an increase in the number of downtown jobs. Cleveland’s
downtown jobs increased despite a continued population loss and a slow regional growth rate.
In contrast, the number of downtown jobs in Cincinnati steadily decreased during the study
period and Columbus lost downtown jobs despite a growth rate in regional jobs exceeding the
national growth rate. Austrian and Rosentraub conclude, ‘‘sports and a hospitality concen-
tration did help focus economic attention and political support for the maintenance of a
downtown presence for employers in both Cleveland and Indianapolis’’ (p. 560).

CONCLUSION

Case studies like those conducted by Austrian and Rosentraub, which focus on one or a few
cities, are able to inherently account for the context in which sports facilities are built. This
focus is important because, as has been illustrated above, a facility’s ability to impact its local
economy is tied to its context. This point can be overlooked in the analysis and reporting of
cross-section time-series research. In addition, when the results of numerous empirical analyses
are synthesized into broad conclusions, the nuances of individual findings are eroded.

The broad interpretation of independent economic research regarding sports stadiums is that
empirical evidence cannot support a positive relationship between such facilities and economic
development. According to many, the case appears to be closed. This study reports new evidence,
derived from recasting the landmark study of Baade and Dye with current data, which contra-
dicts this conclusion. The intent of this research is not to criticize the findings of Baade and Dye,
per se, but to question the use of findings based on stadiums from a past era to criticize the
stadium investments of today. The stadiums of the recent construction boom have been built
amidst a very different context than those of the previous generation. The new findings reported
here, along with a closer examination of previous analyses indicate that context matters.

190 | JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS | Vol. 27/No. 2/2005

REFERENCES

Austrian, Z., & Rosentraub, M. S. (1997). Cleveland’s gateway to the future. In R. Noll & A. Zimbalist

(Eds.), Sports, jobs and taxes: The economic impacts of sports teams and stadiums (pp. 355–384).

Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution Press.

Austrian, Z., & Rosentraub, M. S. (2002). Cities, sports and economic change: A retrospective assessment.

Journal of Urban Affairs, 24(5), 549–563.

Baade, R. A. (1996). Professional sports as catalysts for metropolitan economic development. Journal of

Urban Affairs, 18(1), 1–17.

Baade, R. A., & Dye, R. (1990). The impact of stadiums and professional sports on metropolitan area

development. Growth and Change, Spring(Spring), 1–14.

Bureau of Economic Analysis. (n.d.). Regional economic accounts: Local area personal income. Available:

http://www.bea .gov/bea/regional/reis/ [December 2004].

Carlino, G., & Coulson, N. E. (2002). Working paper No. 02–12: Compensating differentials and the social

benefits of the NFL (No. 02–12). Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Chema, T. (1996). When professional sports justify the subsidy: A reply to Robert Baade. Journal of Urban

Affairs, 18(1), 19–22.

Coates, D., & Humphreys, B. R. (1999). The growth effects of sport franchises, stadia, and arenas. Journal

of Policy Analysis and Management, 18(4), 601–624.

Nelson, A. C. (2001). Prosperity or blight? A question of major league stadia locations. Economic

Development Quarterly, 15(3), 255–265.

Newsome, T. H., & Comer, J. (2000). Changing intra-urban location patterns of major league sports

facilities. Professional Geographer, 52(1), 105–120.

Noll, R., & Zimbalist, A. (1997). The economic impact of sports teams and facilities. In R. Noll &

A. Zimbalist (Eds.), Sports, jobs and taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and facilities

(pp. 55–91). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Rappaport, J., & Wilkerson, C. (2001). What are the benefits of hosting a major league sports franchise?

Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, (First Quarter), 55–86.

Siegfried, J., & Zimbalist, A. (2000). The economics of sports facilities and their communities. Journal of

Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 95–114.

Zimbalist, A. (1998). The economics of stadiums, teams and cities. Policy Studies Review, 15(1), 17–29.

Zimmerman, D. (1997). Subsidizing stadiums: Who benefits, who pays? In R. Noll & A. Zimbalist (Eds.),

Sports jobs and taxes: The economic impact of sports teams and stadiums. Washington, DC:

Brookings Institution Press.

| The Economic Impact of Sports Stadiums | 191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Sports Retail Consumer Behavior: Why They Won’t Buy Online
Anonymous
Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport; Mar 2005; 76, 1; ProQuest
pg. A127

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The sports business as a labor market laboratory
Kahn, Lawrence M
The Journal of Economic Perspectives; Summer 2000; 14, 3; ProQuest Central
pg. 75

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.