Four (4) double-spaced pages on the topic below:
Compare and contrast Aristotle’s and John Locke’s ideals of citizenship. How do these differing ideals of citizenship reflect different ideas about human flourishing—about what makes a good life? Whose vision of citizenship is more convincing, and why? Substantiate your answer with textual evidence.
Read the following before writing:
Aristotle, Politics (c. 347-322 B.C.E.), Book III:
Chapters 6-9, 11-12, 15-18, Book IV: Chapters 7-
11, Book VI: Chapters 2-3, Book VII: Chaps. 1-3,
13-14, 17, Book VIII: Chapters 1-2 (48pp.)
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1690),
Chapters 1-5, 7-9 Chapters 10-15, 18-19
Benjamin Constant(Attached)
CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
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BENJAMIN CONSTANT
Political Writings
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Constant, Benjamin
The political writings of Benjamin Constant.
I. Political science
I. Title II. Fontana, Biancamaria
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Library ofCongress Cataloguing in Publication data
Constant, Benjamin, 1767-1830
The political writings of Benjamin Constant.
(Cambridge texts in the history of political thought)
Bibliography.
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Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
ix
THE SPIRIT OF CONQUEST AND
USURPATION AND THEIR RELATION
TO EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION
Bibliographical note
Preface to the first edition
Preface to the third edition
Foreword to the fourth edition
44
45
46
48
Part I . The spirit ofconquest
I The virtues compatible with war at given stages of social
development
2 The character of modem nations in relation to war
3 The spirit of conquest in the present condition of Europe
4 Of a military race acting on self-interest alone
5 A further reason for the deterioration of the military class
within the system of conquest
6 The influence of this military spirit upon the internal
condition of nations
7 A further drawback of the formation of this military spirit
51
52
55
56
59
60
62
v
http:htrp:llwww.cambridge.org
THE LIBERTY
OF THE ANCIENTS
COMPARED WITH THAT
OF THE MODERNS
SPEECH GIVEN AT
THE ATHENEE ROYAL
IN PARIS
Bibliographical note
This translation of Constant’s speech of 18 I 9 on the
liberty of the ancients and the moderns reproduces the
text published in his Co/leaion complete des ouvrages
publits sur Ie gouvemement representatif et 111, constitution
aetuel/e, ou Cout’S de po/itique constitutionnelle, 4 vols.
(Paris and Rouen, 1820), vol 4, pp. 238-74.
The speech contains numerous repetitions and refor
mulations of passages which appeared in the Spirit of
Conquest and Usurpation and in the Principles ofPolitics.
The general significance of these reformulations is dis
cussed in the Introduction to this volume. It seemed too
pedantic to indicate the repeated passages one by one in
the annotation, as their presence does not affect the
overall originality and interest of this text.
…
Gendemen,
I wish to submit for your attention a few distinctions, still rather new,
between two kinds of liberty: these differences have thus far remained
unnoticed, or at least insufficiendy remarked. The first is the liberty the
exercise ofwhich was so dear to the ancient peoples; the second the one
the enjoyment ofwhich is especially precious to the modem nations. If
1 am right, this investigation will prove interesting from two different
angles.
Firsdy, the confusion of these two kinds ofliberty has been amongst
us, in the all too famous days of our revolution, the cause of many an
evil. France was exhausted by useless experiments, the authors of
which, irritated by their poor success, sought to force her to enjoy the
good she did not want, and denied her the good which she did want.
Secondly, called as we are by our happy revolution (I call it happy,
despite its excesses, because I concentrate my attention on its results)
to enjoy the benefits of representative government, it is curious and
interesting to discover why this form of government, the only one in the
shelter of which we could find some freedom and peace today, was
totally unknown to the free nations of antiquity.
I know that there are writers who have claimed to distinguish traces
ofit among some ancient peoples, in the Lacedaemonian republic for
example, or amongst our ancestors the Gauls; but they are mistaken.
The Lacedaemonian government was a monastic aristocracy, and in
no way a representative government. The power of the kings was
limited, but it was limited by the ephors, and not by men invested with a
30 9
The liberty ojthe ancients compared with that ojthe moderns
~
mission similar to that which election confers today on the defenders of
our liberties. The ephors, no doubt, though originally created by the
kings, were elected by the people. But there were only five of theln.
Their authority was as much religious as political; they even shared in
the administration of government, that is, in the executive power. Thus
their prerogative, like that of almost all popular magistrates in the
ancient republics, far from being simply a barrier against tyranny,
became sometimes itself an insufferable tyranny.
The regime of the Gauls, which quite resembled the one that a
certain party would like to restore to us,. was at the same time theocratic
and warlike. The priests enjoyed unlimited power. The military class or
nobility had markedly insolent and oppressive privileges; the people
had no rights and no safeguards.
In Rome the tribunes had, up to a point, a representative mission.
They were the organs ofthose plebeians whom the oligarchy – which is
the same in all ages – had submitted, in overthrowing the kings, to so
harsh a slavery. The people, however, exercised a large part of the
political rights directly. They met to vote on the laws and to judge the
patricians against whom charges had been levelled: thus there were, in
Rome, only feeble traces of a representative system.
This system is a discovery of the moderns, and you will see, Gentle
men, that the condition of the human race in antiquity did not allow for
the introduction or establishment of an institution of this nature. The
ancient peoples could neither feel the need for it, nor appreciate its
advantages. Their social organization led them to desire an entirely
different freedom from the one which this system grants to us.
Tonight’s lecture will be devoted to demonstrating this truth to you.
First ask yourselves, Gentlemen, what an Englishman, a French
man, and a citizen ofthe United States ofAmerica understand today by
the word ‘liberty’.
For each of them it is the rightto be subjected only to the laws, and to
be neither arrested, detained, put to death or maltreated in any way by
the arbitrary will ofone or more individuals. It is the right ofeveryone to
• If the model of the ancient republics had dominared the politics of the Jacobins,
during the Restoration the return to feudal liberty became the ideal of the mon
archical ‘reformers’. The most influential contemporary source is: Robert de
Montlosier, D~ II/. “,onarrhitfrlJ.1lflJ.is~. For a survey of the political interpretations of
France’s feudal past, see: Stanley Mellon, Tht Poli/iCIJI UstS ofHistory, I/. Sludy of
HislorialfJ in II” Frmch Resloration (Stanford, California, 1958); Shirley M. Gruner,
‘Political Historiography in Restoration France’, Hislory IJ.1Id Th{(lry, 8 (1969),
346-65·
310
Speech given at the Athettie Royal
express their opinion, choose a profession and practise it, to dispose of
property, and even to abuse it; to come and go without permission, and
without having to account for their motives or undertakings. It is
everyone’s right to associate with other individuals, either to discuss
their interests, or to profess the religion which they and their associates
prefer, or even simply to occupy their days or hours in a way which is
most compatible with their inclinations or whims. Finally it is
everyone’s right to exercise some influence on the administration of the
government, either by electing all or particular officials, or through
representations, petitions, demands to which the authorities are more
or less compelled to pay heed. Now compare this liberty with that of the
ancients.
The latter consisted in exercising collectively, but directly, several
parts of the complete sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square,
over war and peace; in forming alliances with foreign governments; in
voting laws, in pronouncing judgements; in examining the accounts,
the acts, the stewardship of the magistrates; in calling them to appear in
front of the assembled people, in accusing, condemning or absolving
them. But if this was what the ancients called liberty, they admitted as
compatible with this collective freedom the complete subjection of the
individual to the authority of the community. You find among them
almost none of the enjoyments which we have just seen form part ofthe
liberty of the modems. All private actions were submitted to a severe
surveillance. No importance was given to individual independence,
neither in relation to opinions, nor to labour, nor, above all, to religion.
The right to choose one’s own religious affiliation, a right which we
regard as one ofthe most precious, would have seemed to the ancients a
crime and a sacrilege. In the domains which seem to us the most useful,
the authority of the social body interposed itself and obstructed the will
of individuals. Among the Spartans, Therpandrus could not add a
string to his lyre without causing offence to the ephors. In the most
domestic of relations the public authority again intervened. The young
Lacedaemonian could not visit his new bride freely. In Rome, the
censors cast a searching eye over family life. The laws regulated
customs, and as customs touch on everything, there was hardly any
thing that the laws did not regulate.
Thus among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign in
public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations. As a citizen, he
decided on peace and war; as a private individual, he was constrained,
3 11
http:frlJ.1lflJ.is
~
The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the moderns
watched and repressed in all his movements; as a member of the
collective body, he interrogated, dismissed, condemned, beggared,
exiled, or sentenced to death his magistrates and superiors; as a subject
of the collective body he could himself be deprived of his status,
stripped of his privileges, banished, put to death, by the discretionary
will of the whole to which he belonged. Among the modems, on the
contrary, the individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the
freest of states, sovereign only in appearance. His sovereignty is re
stricted and almost always suspended. If, at fixed and rare intervals, in
which he is again surrounded by precautions and obstacles, he exer
cises this sovereignty, it is always only to renounce it.
I must at this point, Gentlemen, pause for a moment to anticipate an
objection which may be addressed to me. There was in antiquity a
republic where the enslavement ofindividual existence to the collective
body was not as complete as I have described it. This republic was the
most famous of all: you will guess that I am speaking of Athens. I shall
return to it later, and in subscribing to the truth of this fact, I shall also
indicate its cause. We shall see why, ofall the ancient states, Athens was
the one which most resembles the modem ones. Everywhere else social
jurisdiction was unlimited. The ancients, as Condorcet says, had no
notion of individual rights.- Men were, so to speak, merely machines,
whose gears and cog-wheels were regulated by the law. The same
subjection characterized the golden centuries of the Roman republic;
the individual was in some way lost in the nation, the citizen in the city.
We shall now trace this essential difference between the ancients
and ourselves back to its source.
All ancient republics were restricted to a narrow territory. The most
populous, the most powerful, the most substantial among them, was
not equal in extension to the smallest ofmodem states. As an inevitable
consequence of their narrow territory, the spirit of these republics was
bellicose; each people incessantly attacked their neighbours or was
attacked by them. Thus driven by necessity against one another, they
fought or threatened each other constantly. Those who had no ambi
tion to be conquerors, could still not lay down their weapons, lest they
should themselves be conquered. All had to buy their security, their
independence, their whole existence at the price of war. This was the
constant interest, the almost habitual occupation of the free states of
• J. A. N. Caritat de Condorcet, Sur /’inslnu:twn puhliqu., p. 47.
3 12
Speech given at the Athenie Royal
antiquity. Finally, by an equally necessary result of this way ofbeing, all
these states had slaves.” The mechanical professions and even, among
some nations, the industrial ones, were committed to people in chains.
The modem world offers us a completely opposing view. The
smallest states of our day are incomparably larger than Sparta or than
Rome was over five centuries. Even the division of Europe into several
states is, thanks to the progress of enlightenment, more apparent than
real. While each people, in the past, formed an isolated family, the born
enemy of other families, a mass of human beings now exists, that under
different names and under different forms of social organization are
essentially homogeneous in their nature. This mass is strong enough to
have nothing to fear from barbarian hordes. It is sufficiently civilized to
find war a burden. Its uniform tendency is towards peace.
This difference leads to another one. War precedes commerce. War
and commerce are only two different means of achieving the same end,
that of getting what one wants. Commerce is simply a tribute paid to the
strength of the possessor by the aspirant to possession. It is an attempt
to conquer, by mutual agreement, what one can no longer hope to
obtain through violence. A man who was always the stronger would
never conceive the idea of commerce. It is experience, by proving to
him that war, that is the use of his strength against the strength of
others, exposes him to a variety of obstacles and defeats, that leads him
to resort to commerce, that is to a milder and surer means of engaging
the interest of others to agree to what suits his own. War is all impulse,
commerce, calculation. Hence it follows that an age must come in
which commerce replaces war. We have reached this age.
I do not mean that amongst the ancients there were no trading
peoples. But these peoples were to some degree an exception to the
general rule. The limits of this lecture do not allow me to illustrate all
the obstacles which then opposed the progress ofcommerce; you know
them as well as I do; I shall only mention one of them.
Their ignorance of the compass meant that the sailors of antiquity
always had to keep close to the coast. To pass through the pillars of
Hercules, that is, the straits of Gibraltar, was considered the most
daring of enterprises. The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians, the
• In the 1806 draft, Constant observed: ‘ … slavery, universally practised by the
ancients gave to their mores a severe and cruel imprint, which made it easy for them
to sacrifice gentle affections to political interests.’ E. Hofmann (ed.), Les ‘Principes de
Poliliqul, vol. z, p. 428.
3 13
The liberty of the ancients compared with that of the moderns
most able ofnavigators, did not risk it until very late, and their eX8.Jnplf*r’
for long remained without imitators. In Athens, of which we shall ~:'{~
soon, the interest on maritime enterprises was around 60%, while\~i
current interest was only 12 %: that was how dangerous the idea of ..
distant navigation seemed.”
{..~,
Moreover, if I could permit myself a digression which would uat’
fortunately prove too long, I would show you, Gentlemen, through the
details of the customs, habits, way of trading with others of the tradina
peoples of antiquity, that their commerce was itself impregnated by ~.
spirit of the age, by the atmosphere of war and hostility which sur
rounded it. Commerce then was a lucky accident, today it is the nOnnal
state of things, the only aim, the universal tendency, the true IifeQf:
nations. They want repose, and with repose comfort, and as a sourceofi:
comfort, industry. Every day war becomes a more ineffective means of
satisfying their wishes. Its hazards no longer offer to individuals bene,: .
fits that match the results of peaceful work and regular exchanges,
Among the ancients, a successful war increased both private and publiq
outcome of these
on
..
wealth in slaves, tributes and lands shared out. For the moderns, even.
successful war costs infallibly more than it is worth.
Finally, thanks to commerce, to religion, to the moral and in:
tellectual progress of the human race, there are no longer slaves amOIlJ
the European nations. Free men must exercise all professions,
for all the needs of society.
It is easy to see, Gentlemen, the inevitable
differences.
Firstly, the size of a country causes a corresponding decrease of the
political importance allotted to each individual. The most obscure
republican of Sparta or Rome had power. The same is not true of the
simple citizen of Britain or ofthe United States. His personal influence
is an imperceptible part of the social will which impresses
government its direction.
Secondly, the abolition of slavery has deprived the free population
all the leisure which resulted from the fact that slaves took care of mOSl
ofthe work. Without the slave population of Athens, 20,000 Athenian14
could never have spent every day at the public square in discussions.
Thirdly, commerce does not, like war, leave in men’s lives intervals
of inactivity. The constant exercise of political rights, the daily dis
cussion of the affairs of the state, disagreements, confabulations, the
whole entourage and movement of factions, necessary agitations, the
3 14
Speech given at the Athettie Royal
compulsory filling, if I may use the term, of the life of the peoples of
antiquity, who, without this resource would have languished under the
weight of painful inaction, would only cause trouble and fatigue to
modem nations, where each individual, occupied with his speculations,
his enterprises, the pleasures he obtains or hopes for, does not wish to
be distracted from them other than momentarily, and as little as
possible.
Finally, commerce inspires in men a vivid love ofindividual indepen
dence. Commerce supplies their needs, satisfies their desires, without
the intervention of the authorities. This intervention is almost always
and I do not know why I say almost – this intervention is indeed always a
trouble and an embarrassment. Every time collective power wishes to
meddle with private speculations, it harasses the speculators. Every
time governments pretend to do our own business, they do it more
incompetently and expensively than we would.
I said, Gentlemen, that I would return to Athens, whose example
tnight be opposed to some of my assertions, but which will in fact
confirm all of them.
Athens, as I have already pointed out, was of all the Greek republics
the most closely engaged in trade:” thus it allowed to its citizens an
infinitely greater individual liberty than Sparta or Rome. If I could
enter into historical details, I would show you that, among the Athe
nians, commerce had removed several of the differences which dis
tinguished the ancient from the modem peoples. The spirit of the
Athenian merchants was similar to that of the merchants of our days.
Xenophon tells us that during the Peloponnesian war, they moved their
capitals from the continent of Attica to place them on the islands of the
archipelago. Commerce had created among them the circulation of
money. In Isocrates there are signs that bills of exchange were used.
Observe how their customs resemble our own. In their relations with
women, you will see, again I cite Xenophon, husbands, satisfied when
peace and a decorous friendship reigned in their households, make
allowances for the wife who is too vulnerable before the tyranny of
nature, dose their eyes to the irresistible power ofpassions, forgive the
first weakness and forget the second. In their relations with strangers,
we shall see them extending the rights ofcitizenship to whoever would,
• Constant’s notes to the 1806 draft show that he derived most of his illustrations and
examples about Athens in this passage from Cornelius de Pauw, Rechl1Tches phi/OSo
phiques su’ ks Crt”” vol. I, pp. 93ff.
3 1 5
The liberty of the ancients compared with that ofthe moderns
by moving among them with his family, establish some trade or
try. Finally, we shall be struck by their excessive love of individual
independence. In Sparta, says a philosopher, the citizens quicken
step when they are called by a magistrate; but an Athenian would be
desperate if he were thought to be dependent on a magistrate.
However, as several of the other circumstances which determined’
the character of ancient nations existed in Athens as well; as there was’i ”
slave population and the territory was very restricted; we find there too
the traces of the liberty proper to the ancients. The people made the
laws, examined the behaviour of the magistrates, called Pericles to
account for his conduct, sentenced to death the generals who had
commanded the battle of the Arginusae. Similarly ostracism, that legal.
arbitrariness, extolled by all the legislators of the age; ostracism, which
appears to us, and rightly so, a revolting iniquity, proves that the
individual was much more subservient to the supremacy of the social ,
body in Athens, than he is in any of the free states of Europe today,
It follows from what I have just indicated that we can no longer enjoy
the liberty of the ancients, which consisted in an active and constant
participation in collective power. Our freedom must consist ofpeaceful
enjoyment and private independence. The share which in antiquity
everyone held in national sovereignty was by no means an abstract
presumption as it is in our own day. The will of each individual had real
influence: the exercise of this will was a vivid and repeated pleasure.
Consequently the ancients were ready to make many a sacrifice to
preserve their political rights and their share in the administration of
the state. Everybody, feeling with pride all that his suffrage was worth,
found in this awareness of his personal importance a great
compensation.
This compensation no longer exists for us today. Lost in the multi
tude, the individual can almost never perceive the influence he exer
cises. Never does his will impress itself upon the whole; nothing
confirms in his eyes his own cooperation.
The exercise ofpolitical rights, therefore, offers us but a part of the
pleasures that the ancients found in it, while at the same time the
progress of civilization, the commercial tendency of the age, the com
munication amongst peoples, have infinitely multiplied and varied the
means of personal happiness.
• Xenophon, De Republi((J L~iu”., VIn, 2 in: J. M:.Moore (ed.), Aristotle and
Xmophon on dtrnocracy and oIigardry (London, 1975).
316
Speech given at the Athence Royal
It follows that we must be far more attached than the ancients to our
individual independence. For the ancients when they sacrificed that
independence to their political rights, sacrificed less to obtain more;
while in making the same sacrifice, we would give more to obtain less.
The aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power among the
citizens of the same fatherland: this is what they called liberty. The aim
of the modems is the enjoyment of security in private pleasures; and
they call liberty the guarantees accorded by institutions to these
pleasures.
I said at the beginning that, through their failure to perceive these
differences, otherwise well-intentioned men caused infinite evils
during our long and stormy revolution. God forbid that I should
reproach them too harshly. Their error itself was excusable. One could
not read the beautiful pages of antiquity, one could not recall the
actions of its great men, without feeling an indefinable and special
emotion, which nothing modem can possibly arouse. The old elements
of a nature, one could almost say, earlier than our own, seem to awaken
in us in the face of these memories. It is difficult not to regret the time
when the faculties ofman developed along an already trodden path, but
in so wide a career, so strong in their own powers, with such a feeling of
energy and dignity. Once we abandon ourselves to this regret, it is
impossible not to wish to imitate what we regret. This impression was
very deep, especially when we lived under vicious governments, which,
without being strong, were repressive in their effects; absurd in their
principles; wretched in action; governments which had as their
strength arbitrary power; for their purpose the belittling of mankind;
and which some individuals still dare to praise to us today, as ifwe could
ever forget that we have been the witnesses and the victims of their
obstinacy, of their impotence and of their overthrow. The aim of our
reformers was noble and generous. Who among us did not feel his
heart beat with hope at the outset of the course which they seemed to
open up? And shame, even today, on whoever does not feel the need to
declare that acknowledging a few errors committed by our first guides
does not mean blighting their memory or disowning the opinions which
the friends of mankind have professed throughout the ages.
But those men had derived several oftheir theories from the works of
two philosophers who had themselves failed to recognize the changes
brought by two thousand years in the dispositions of mankind. I shall
perhaps at some point examine the system of the most illustrious of
31 7
The liberty ojthe ancients compared with that ofthe moderns
Speech given at the Athenee Royal
these philosophers, ofJean-Jacques Rousseau, and I shall show that, by
transposing into our modern age an extent ofsocial power, ofcollective:.
sovereignty, which belonged to other centuries, this sublime genius,
animated by the purest love of liberty, has nevertheless fUrnished
deadly pretexts for more than one kind of tyranny. No doubt, in
pointing out what I regard as a misunderstanding which it is imPOrtant
to uncover, I shall be careful in my refutation, and respectful in my
criticism. I shall certainly refrain from joining myself to the detractors
of a great man. When chance has it that I find myself apparently in
agreement with them on some one particular point, I suspect myself;
and to console myself for appearing for a moment in agreement with
them on a single partial question, I need to disown and denounce with
all my energies these pretended allies.
Nevertheless, the interests of truth must prevail over considerations
which make the glory of a prodigious talent and the authority of an
immense reputation so powerful. Moreover, as we shall see, it is not to
Rousseau that we must chiefly attribute the error against which I am
going to argue; this is to be imputed much more to one of his suc
cessors, less eloquent but no less austere and a hundred times more
exaggerated. The latter, the abbe de Mably, can be regarded as the
representative of the system which, according to the maxims of ancient
liberty, demands that the citizens should be entirely subjected in order
for the nation to be sovereign, and that the individual should be
enslaved for the people to be free.
The abbe de Mably,” like Rousseau and many others, had mistaken,
just as the ancients did, the authority of the social body for liberty; and
to him any means seemed good ifit extended his area of authority over
that recalcitrant part of human existence whose independence he
deplored. The regret he expresses everywhere in his works is that the
law can only cover actions. He would have liked it to cover the most
fleeting thoughts and impressions; to pursue man relentlessly, leaving
him no refuge in which he might escape from its power. No sooner did
he learn, among no matter what people, of some oppressive measure,
than he thought he had made a discovery and proposed it as a model.
He detested individual liberty like a personal enemy; and whenever in
history he came across a nation totally deprived of it, even if it had no
political liberty, he could not help admiring it. He went into ecstasies
• Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, De la /lgiJlatlon ou principes tks lois.
3 18
over the Egyptians, because, as he said, among them everything was
prescribed by the law, down to relaxations and needs: everything
was subjected to the empire of the legislator. Every moment of the day
was filled by some duty; love itself was the object of this respected
intervention, and it was the law that in turn opened and closed the
curtains of the nuptial bed.
Sparta, which combined republican forms with the same enslave
ment of individuals, aroused in the spirit of that philosopher an even
more vivid enthusiasm. That vast monastic barracks to him seemed the
ideal of a perfect republic. He had a profound contempt for Athens,
and would gladly have said of this nation, the first of Greece, what an
academician and great nobleman said of the French Academy: ‘What
an appalling despotism! Everyone does what he likes there.” I must add
that this great nobleman was talking of the Academy as it was thirty
years ago.
Montesquieu, who had a less excitable and therefore more observant
mind, did not fall into quite the same errors. He was struck by the
differences which I have related; but he did not discover their true
cause. The Greek politicians who lived under the popular government
did not recognize, he argues, any other power but virtue. Politicians of
today talk only of manufactures, of commerce, of finances, of wealth
and even ofluxury.b He attributes this difference to the republic and the
monarchy. It ought instead to be attributed to the opposed spirit of
ancient and modern times. Citizens of republics, subjects of mon
archies, all want pleasures, and indeed no-one, in the present condition
of societies can help wanting them. The people most attached to their
liberty in our own days, before the emancipation ofFrance, was also the
most attached to all the pleasures of life; and it valued its liberty
especially because it saw in this the guarantee of the pleasures which it
cherished. In the past, where there was liberty, people could bear
hardship. Now, wherever there is hardship, despotism is necessary for
people to resign themselves to it. It would be easier today to make
Spartans of an enslaved people than to turn free men into Spartans.
The men who were brought by events to the head of our revolution
were, by a necessary consequence of the education they had received,
steeped in ancient views which are no longer valid, which the philoso
phers whom I mentioned above had made fashionable. The meta
• The Duke of Richelieu .
• C. L. S. de Montesquieu, Esprit tks Lois, Book 3·
3 1 9
The liberty of the ancients compared with that ofthe moderns
physics of Rousseau, in the midst of which flashed the occasionaL
sublime thought and passages of stirring eloquence; the austerity of.
Mably, his intolerance, his hatred of all human passions, his eagerness
to enslave them all, his exaggerated principles on the competence ofthe
law, the difference between what he recommended and what had ever
previously existed, his declamations against wealth and even agaimn
property; all these things were bound to charm men heated by their
recent victory, and who, having won power over the law, were only too.
keen to extend this power to all things. It was a source of invaluable
support that two disinterested writers anathematizing human despo
tism, should have drawn up the text of the law in axioms. They wished
to exercise public power as they had learnt from their guides it had once
been exercised in the free states. They believed that everything should
give way before collective will, and that all restrictions on individual
rights would be amply compensated by participation in social power.
We all know, Gentlemen, what has come of it. Free institutions,
resting upon the knowledge ofthe spirit ofthe age, could have survived.
The restored edifice of the ancients collapsed, notwithstanding many
efforts and many heroic acts which. call for our admiration. The fact is
that social power injured individual independence in every possible
way, without destroying the need for it. The nation did not find that an
ideal share in an abstract sovereignty was worth the sacrifices required
from her.’ She was vainly assured, on Rousseau’s authority, that the
laws of liberty are a thousand times more austere than the yoke of
tyrants. She had no desire for those austere laws, and believed some
times that the yoke of tyrants would be preferable to them. Experience
has come to undeceive her. She has seen that the arbitrary power of
men was even worse than the worst of laws. But laws too must have.
their limits.
IfI have succeeded, Gentlemen, in making you share the persuasion
which in my opinion these facts must produce, you will acknowledge
with me the truth of the following principles.
• In the 1806 draft, Constant commented; • All legislation which exacts the sacrifice of
these enjoyments is incompatible with the present conditions of the human race.
From this viewpoint, nothing is mOle curious to observe than the rhetoric of French
demagogues. The most intelligent among them, St Just, made all his speeches in
shOIt sentences, calculated to arouse tired minds. Thus while he seemed to suppose
the nation capable of the most painful sacrifices, he acknowledged her, by his style,
incapable even of paying attention.’ E. Hofmann (ed.), Les .’Prind~ de Polilique’, voL
2, p. 432.
320
Speech given at the Athenee Royal
Individual independence is the first need of the moderns: conse
quently one must never require from them any sacrifices to establish
political liberty.
It follows that none of the numerous and too highly praised insti
tutions which in the ancient republics hindered individual liberty is any
longer admissible in the modern times.
You may, in the first place, think, Gentlemen, thatit is superfluous to
establish this truth. Several governments of our days do not seem in the
least inclined to imitate the republics of antiquity. However, little as
they may like republican institutions, there are certain republican
usages for which they feel a certain affection. It is disturbing that they
should be precisely those which allow them to banish, to exile, or to
despoil. I remember that in 1802, they slipped into the law on special
tribunals an article which introduced into France Greek ostracism;’
and God knows how many eloquent speakers, in order to have this
article approved, talked to us about the freedom of Athens and all the
sacrifices that individuals must make to preserve this freedom! Simi
larly, in much more recent times, when fearful authorities attempted,
with a timid hand, to rig the elections, a journal which can hardly be
suspected of republicanism proposed to revive Roman censorship to
eliminate all dangerous candidates.
I do not think therefore that I am engaging in a useless discussion if,
to support my assertion, I say a few words about these two much
vaunted institutions.
Ostracism in Athens rested upon the assumption that society had
complete authority over its members. On this assumption it could be
justified; and in a small state, where the influence ofa single individual,
strong in his credit, his clients, his glory, often balanced the power of
the mass, ostracism may appear useful. But amongst us individuals
have rights which society must respect, and individual interests are, as I
have already observed, so lost in a multitude of equal or superior
influences, that any oppression motivated by the need to diminish this
influence is useless and consequently unjust! No-one has the right to
exile a citizen, if he is not condemned by a regular tribunal, according
to a formal law which attaches the penalty of exile to the action ofwhich
• The law of 23 Floreal, Year x (13 May .802) which extended the functions and
powers of special tribunals.
• ‘The Jarge States have created in our day a new guarantee: obscurity. This guarantee
diminishes the dependence of individuals on the nation.’ E. Hofmann (ed.), LIIS
‘PrincipIIS de Politiqru’, vol. 2, p. 42 L
321
The liberty ofthe ancients compared with that ofthe moderns
he is guilty. No-one has the right to tear the citizen from his country,
the owner away from his possessions, the merchant away from his
trade, the husband from his wife, the father from his children, the
writer from his studious meditations, the old man from his accustomed
way of life.
All political exile is a political abuse. All exile pronounced by an
assembly for alleged reasons of public safety is a crime which the
assembly itself commits against public safety, which resides only in
respect for the laws, in the observance offonns, and in the maintenance
of safeguards.
Roman censorship implied, like ostracism, a discretionary power. In
a republic where all the citizens, kept by poverty to an extremely simple
moral code, lived in the same town, exercised no profession which
might distract their attention from the affairs of the state, and thus
constantly found themselves the spectators and judges of the usage of
public power, censorship could on the one hand have greater influence:
while on the other, the arbitrary power of the censors was restrained by
a kind of moral surveillance exercised over them. But as soon as the size
of the republic, the complexity ofsocial relations and the refinements of
civilization deprived this institution of what at the same time served as
its basis and its limit, censorship degenerated even in Rome. It was not
censorship which had created good morals; it was the simplicity of
those morals which constituted the power and efficacy of censorship.
In France, an institution as arbitrary as censorship would be at once
ineffective and intolerable. In the prest:nt conditions ofsociety, morals
are fonned by subtle, fluctuating, elusive nuances, which would be
distorted in a thousand ways if one attempted to define them more
precisely. Public opinion alone can reach them; public opinion alone
can judge them, because it is of the same nature. It would rebel against
any positive authority which wanted to give it greater precision. If the
government of a modem people wanted, like the censors in Rome, to
censure a citizen arbitrarily, the entire nation would protest against this
arrest by refusing to ratilY the decisions of the authority.
What I have just said of the revival qf censorship in modem times
applies also to many other aspects of social organization, in relation to
which antiquity is cited even more frequently and with greater empha
sis. As for example, education; what do we not hear of the need to allow
the government to take possession of new generations to shape them to
its pleasure, and how many erudite quotations are employed to support
3 22
Speech given at the AtMnee Royal
this theory! The Persians, the Egyptians, Gaul, Greece and Italy are
one after another set before us. Yet, Gentlemen, we are neither Per
sians subjected to a despot, nor Egyptians subjugated by priests, nor
Gauls who can be sacrificed by their druids, nor, finally, Greeks or
Romans, whose share in social authority consoled them for their
private enslavement. We are modem men, who wish each to enjoy our
own rights, each to develop our own faculties as we like best, without
harming anyone; to watch over the development ofthese faculties in the
children whom nature entrusts to our affection, the more enlightened
as it is more vivid; and needing the authorities only to give us the
general means ofinstruction which they can supply, as travellers accept
from them the main roads without being told by them which route to
take.
Religion is also exposed to these memories of bygone ages. Some
brave defenders of the unity of doctrine cite the laws of the ancients
against foreign gods, and sustain the rights of the Catholic church by
the example of the Athenians, who killed Socrates for having under
mined polytheism, and that of Augustus, who wanted the people to
remain faithful to the cult of their fathers; with the result, shortly after
wards, that the first Christians were delivered to the lions.
Let us mistrust, Gentlemen, this admiration for certain ancient
memories. Since we live in modem times, I want a liberty suited to
modem times; and since we live under monarchies, I humbly beg these
monarchies not to borrow from the ancient republics the means to
oppress us.
Individual liberty, I repeat, is the true modern liberty. Political liberty
is its guarantee, consequently political liberty is indispensable. But to
ask the peoples of our day to sacrifice, like those of the past, the whole
of their individual liberty to political liberty, is the surest means of
detaching them from the fonner and, once this result has been
achieved, it would be only too easy to deprive them of the latter.
As you see, Gentlemen, my observations do not in the least tend to
diminish the value ofpolitical liberty . I do not draw from the evidence I
have put before your eyes the same conclusions that some others have.
From the fact that the ancients were free, and that we cannot any longer
be free like them, they conclude that we are destined to be slaves. They
would like to reconstitute the new social state with a small number of
elements which, they say, are alone appropriate to the situation of the
world today. These elements are prejudices to frighten men, egoism to
3 2 3
The liberty ofthe anct’ents compared with that ofthe moderns
corrupt them, frivolity to stupety them, gross pleasures to degrade
them, despotism to lead them; and, indispensably, constructive knowl~
edge and exact sciences to serve despotism the more adroidy. It would
be odd indeed if this were the outcome of forty centuries during which
mankind has acquired greater moral and physical means: I cannot
believe it. I derive from the differences which distinguish us from
antiquity totally different conclusions. It is not security which we must
weaken; it is ,enjoyment which we must extend. It is not political liberty
which I wish to renounce; it is civil liberty which I claim, along with
other forms of political liberty. Governments, no more than they did
before, have the right to arrogate to themselves an illegitimate power.
But the governments which emanate from a legitimate source have
even less right than before to exercise an arbitrary supremacy Over
individuals. We still possess today the rights we have always had, those
eternal rights to assent to the laws, to deliberate on our interests, to be
an integral part of the social body of which we are members. But
governments have new duties; the progress of civilization, the changes
brought by the centuries require from the authorities greater respect
for customs, for affections, for the independence of individuals. They
must handle all these issues with a lighter and more prudent hand.
This reserve on the part of authority, which is one of its strictest
duties, equally represents its well-conceived interest; since, if the
liberty that suits the moderns is different from that which suited the
ancients, the despotism which was possible amongst the ancients is no
longer possible amongst the moderns. Because we are often less
concerned with political liberty than they could be, and in ordinary
circumstances less passionate about it, it may follow that we neglect,
sometimes too much and always wrongly, the guarantees which this
assures us. But at the same time, as we are much more preoccupied
with individual liberty than the ancients, we shall defend it, if it is
attacked, with much more skill and persistence; and we have means to
defend it which the ancients did not.
Commerce makes the action of arbitrary power over our existence
more oppressive than in the past, because, as our speculations are more
varied, arbitrary power must multiply itself to reach them. But com
merce also makes the action ofarbitrary power easier to elude, because
it changes the nature of property, which becomes, in virtue of this
change, almost impossible to seize.
Commerce confers a new quality on property, circulation. Without
3 2 4
Speech given at the Athinee Royal
circulation, property is merely a usufruct; political authority can always
affect usufruct, because it can prevent its enjoyment; but circulation
creates an invisible and invincible obstacle to the actions of social
power.
The effects of commerce extend even further: not only does it
emancipate individuals, but, by creating credit, it places authority itself
in a position of dependence.
Money, says a French writer,’ ‘is the most dangerous weapon of
despotism; yet it is at the same time its most powerful restraint; credit is
subject to opinion; force is useless; money hides itself or flees; all the
operations of the state are suspended’. Credit did not have the same
influence amongst the ancients; their governments were stronger than
individuals: while in our time individuals are stronger than the political
powers. Wealth is a power which is more readily available in all
circumstances, more readily applicable to all interests, and conse
quendy more real and better obeyed. Power threatens; wealth rewards:
one eludes power by deceiving it; to obtain the favours of wealth one
must serve it: the latter is therefore bound to win.
As a result, individual existence is less absorbed in political exist
ence. Individuals carry their treasures far away; they take with them all
the enjoyments ofprivate life. Commerce has brought nations closer, it
has given them customs and habits which are almost identical; the
heads of states may be enemies: the peoples are compatriots.
Let power therefore resign itself: we must have liberty and we shall
have it. But since the liberty we need is different from that of the
ancients, it needs a different organization from the one which would
suit ancient liberty. In the latter, the more time and energy man
dedicated to the exercise of his political rights, the freer he thought
himself; on the other hand, in the kind of liberty of which we are
capable, the more the exercise of political rights leaves us the time for
our private interests, the more precious wiJlliberty be to us.
Hence, Sirs, the need for the representative system. The repre
sentative system is nothing but an organization by means of which a
nation charges a few individuals to do what it cannot or does not wish to
do herself. Poor men look after their own business; rich men hire
• Charles Ganilh, Essai poliliq”e, vol. I, pp. 64-5.
, ‘A deficit of 60 million caused the French revolution. Under Vespasian, a deficit of
600 million did not produce the slightest unrest in the empire.’ E. Hofmann (ed.),
Les ‘Principes de Polilique’, vol. 1, p. 426.
32 5
The liberty of the ancients compared with that ofthe moderns Speech given at the Athenee Royal
stewards.a This is the history of ancient and modem nations. The
representative system is a proxy given to a certain number of men by the
mass of the people who wish their interests to be defended and who
nevertheless do not have the time to defend them themselves. But,
unless they are idiots, rich men who employ stewards keep a close
watch on whether these stewards are doing their duty, lest they should
prove negligent, corruptible, or incapable; and, in order to judge the
management ofthese proxies, the landowners, ifthey are prudent, keep
themselves well-informed about affairs, the management ofwhich they
entrust to them. Similarly, the people who, in order to enjoy the liberty
which suits them, resort to the representative system, must exercise an
active and constant surveillance over their representatives, and reserve
for themselves, at times which should not be separated by too lengthy
intervals, the right to discard them if they betray their trust, and to
revoke the powers which they might have abused.
For from the fact that modern liberty differs from ancient liberty, it
follows that it is also threatened by a different sort of danger.
The danger of ancient liberty was that men, exclusively concerned
with securing their share of social power, might attach too little value to
individual rights and enjoyments.
The danger of modem liberty is that, absorbed in the enjoyment of
our private independence, and in the pursuit of our particular interests,
we should surrender our right to share in political power too easily.
The holders of authority are only too anxious to encourage us to do
so. They are so ready to spare us all sort of troubles, except those of
obeying and paying! They will say to us: what, in the end, is the aim of
your efforts, the motive ofyour labours, the object of all your hopes? Is
it n9t happiness? Well, leave this happiness to us and we shall give it to
you: No, Sirs, we must not leave it to them. No matter how touching
such a tender commitment may be, let us ask the authorities to keep
within their limits. Let them confine themselves to being just. We shall
assume the responsibility of being happy for ourselves.
Could we be made happy by diversions, if these diversions were
without guarantees? And where should we find guarantees, without
political liberty? To renounce it, Gentlemen, would be a folly like that
ofa man who, because he only lives on the first floor, does not care if the
house itself is built on sand.
• This concept is derived from Sieyb: see footnote Ii, p. 23.
326
Moreover, Gentlemen, is it so evident that happiness, of whatever
kind, is the only aim of mankind? If it were so, our course would be
narrow indeed, and our destination far from elevated. There is not one
single one of us who, if he wished to abase himself, restrain his moral
faculties, lower his desires, abjure activity, glory, deep and generous
emotions, could not demean himself and be happy. No, Sirs, I bear
witness to the better part of our nature, that noble disquiet which
pursues and torments us, that desire to broaden our knowledge and
develop our faculties. It is not to happiness alone, it is to self-devel
opment that our destiny calls us; and political liberty is the most
powerful, the most effective means of self-development that heaven
has given us.
Political liberty, by submitting to all the citizens, without exception,
the care and assessment of their most sacred interests, enlarges their
spirit, ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of
intellectual equality which forms the glory and power of a people.
Thus, see how a nation grows with the first institution which restores
to her the regular exercise ofpolitical liberty . See our countrymen of all
classes, of all professions, emerge from the sphere of their usual
labours and private industry, find themselves suddenly at the level of
important functions which the constitutions confers upon them,
choose with discernment, resist with energy, brave threats, nobly with
stand seduction. See a pure, deep and sincere patriotism triumph in
our towns, revive even our smallest villages, permeate our workshops,
enliven our countryside, penetrate the just and honest spirits of the
useful farmer and the industrious tradesman with a sense of our rights
and the need for safeguards; they, learned in the history ofthe evils they
have suffered, and no less enlightened as to the remedies which these
evils demand, take in with a glance the whole of France and, bestowing
a national gratitude, repay with their suffrage, after thirty years, the
fidelity to principles embodied in the most illustrious of the defenders
ofliberty.t
Therefore, Sirs, far from renouncing either of the two sorts of
freedom which I have described to you, it is necessary, as I have shown,
to learn to combine the two together. Institutions, says the famous
author of the history of the republics in the Middle Ages,’ must
I M. de Lafayette, deputy of the department of the Sarthe .
• J. C. Simonde de Sismondi.
32 7
1If
)\1)
The liberty ofthe ancients compared with that ofthe moderns
accomplish the destiny of the human race; they can best achieve their
aim if they elevate the largest possible number ofcitizens to the highest
moral position.
The work of the legislator is not complete when he has simply
brought peace to the people. Even when the people are satisfied, there
is much left to do. Institutions must achieve the moral education ofthe
citizens. By respecting their individual rights, securing their indepen
dence, refraining from troubling their work, they must nevertheless
consecrate their influence over public affairs, call them to contribute by
their votes to the exercise of power, grant them a right of control and
supervision by expressing their opinions; and, by forming them
through practice for these elevated functions, give them both the desire
and the right to discharge these.
328
Bibliography
This bibliography presents a selection of Constant’s published writings and
correspondence, and a necessarily limited choice of the existing studies on
Constant.
For a complete list of his published works, see:
Rudler, Gustave. Bibliographie critique des oeuvres de Benjamin Constant, Paris,
1909·
Courtney, Cecil Patrick. A checklist ofthe published 1lJOrks ofBenjamin Constant to
1833, Cambridge, 1979.
A fuller account of the secondary literature can be found in:
Lowe, David K. Benjamin Constant, an annotated bibliography ofcritical editions
and studies, 1946-1978, London, 1979.
Wandel, B., Tiercy, J. F., Furrer, N., Amoos, A. M. Biblwgraphie analytique des
ecrits sur Benjamin Constant (IJ96-198o), Voltaire Foundation, Lausanne
and Oxford, 1980.
The bibliography does not include all the works which appear in the annota
tion to this volume, but only those which are relevant to the study of Constant’s
life and thought. Thus it omits a few classical and literary sources cited by
Constant in his writings which do not bear on the content of his arguments.
I. Selected works of Constant
Essai sur les moeurs hhoiques de Ia Grece – Tire de l’HisflJire greCifue de J. Gillies,
London and Paris, 1787.
De Ia force du Gouvernement actuel et de Ia necessite de $ Y rallier, Year IV, Paris,
1796.
Des reactions po/itiques, Year V, Paris, 1797.
Des effits de Ia Terreur, Year V, Paris, 1797.
Wallstein, tragedie en cinq actes et en vers, precedee deQuelques rejlexions sur It theiiJre
allemand, Geneva and Paris, 1809; repro ed. by Jean-Rene Derre, Paris,
1965.
329
- Constant – 312-313
- Constant – Ancient & Modern
- Constant Copyright
Politics
Aristotle
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Batoche Books
Kitchener
1999
Contents
BOOK ONE …………………………………………………………………… 3
BOOK TWO ………………………………………………………………… 22
BOOK THREE …………………………………………………………….. 51
BOOK FOUR ………………………………………………………………. 80
BOOK FIVE ………………………………………………………………. 108
BOOK SIX ………………………………………………………………… 140
BOOK SEVEN …………………………………………………………… 152
BOOK EIGHT ……………………………………………………………. 180
BOOK ONE
Part I
Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is es-
tablished with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to
obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some
good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and
which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any
other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, house-
holder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but
only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is
called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still
larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference be-
tween a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made
between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government
is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the politi-
cal science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a
statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be
evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method
which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in
politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple ele-
ments or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements
of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the
different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scien-
tific result can be attained about each one of them.
4/Aristotle
Part II
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a
state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first
place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each
other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this
is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in
common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural
desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural
ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can fore-
see by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master,
and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a sub-
ject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same inter-
est. Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For
she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for
many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument
is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because
there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves,
male and female. Wherefore the poets say,
“It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;”
as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master
and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when
he says,
“First house and wife and an ox for the plough,”
for the ox is the poor man’s slave. The family is the association estab-
lished by nature for the supply of men’s everyday wants, and the mem-
bers of it are called by Charondas ‘companions of the cupboard,’ and
by Epimenides the Cretan, ‘companions of the manger.’ But when sev-
eral families are united, and the association aims at something more
than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the vil-
lage. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a
colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren,
who are said to be suckled ‘with the same milk.’ And this is the reason
why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the
Politics/5
Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbar-
ians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the
colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because
they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
“Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.”
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times.
Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves
either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they
imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like
their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community,
large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in exist-
ence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of
society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the
nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed,
we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a
family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be
self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man
is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere
accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is
like the
“Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,”
whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of
war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in
vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of
speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain,
and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the
perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one an-
other, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the
expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the un-
just. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of
6/Aristotle
good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of
living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the
individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example,
if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in
an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when de-
stroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by
their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same
when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have
the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior
to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-suffic-
ing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is
unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for
himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social
instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded
the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is
the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the
worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is
equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue,
which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue,
he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full
of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the
administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is
the principle of order in political society.
Part III
Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of
the state we must speak of the management of the household. The parts
of household management correspond to the persons who compose the
household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen.
Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible
elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master
and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to
consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be: I mean the
relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the conjunction of
man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly, the procreative rela-
tion (this also has no proper name). And there is another element of a
household, the so-called art of getting wealth, which, according to some,
is identical with household management, according to others, a princi-
Politics/7
pal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.
Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of prac-
tical life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation
than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master
is a science, and that the management of a household, and the master-
ship of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the
outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over
slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and
freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference
with nature is therefore unjust.
Part IV
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property is
a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or
indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the
arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper
instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the man-
agement of a household. Now instruments are of various sorts; some are
living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in
the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind
of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining
life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living posses-
sion, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is
himself an instrument which takes precedence of all other instruments.
For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or an-
ticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods
of Hephaestus, which, says the poet,
“of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;”
if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the
lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want ser-
vants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be
drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of produc-
tion, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for
example, is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of
a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and
action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instru-
ments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action
8/Aristotle
and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action.
Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is
not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is
also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he
does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his
master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and
office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another’s man, is
by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another’s man who, being a
human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as
an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.
Part V
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom
such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a
violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of
reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a
thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth,
some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule
is the better which is exercised over better subjects—for example, to
rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the work is
better which is executed by better workmen, and where one man rules
and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work); for in all things
which form a composite whole and which are made up of parts, whether
continuous or discrete, a distinction between the ruling and the subject
element comes to fight. Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not
in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe; even in
things which have no life there is a ruling principle, as in a musical
mode. But we are wandering from the subject. We will therefore restrict
ourselves to the living creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul
and body: and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other
the subject. But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things
which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And
therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of
body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two;
although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule
over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At all
events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical and a
Politics/9
constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical rule,
whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal
rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the
mind and the rational element over the passionate, is natural and expe-
dient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always
hurtful. The same holds good of animals in relation to men; for tame
animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better
off when they are ruled by man; for then they are preserved. Again, the
male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules,
and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all man-
kind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to
use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by
nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should
be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is,
another’s and he who participates in rational principle enough to appre-
hend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by nature. Whereas the
lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle; they obey their in-
stincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not
very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life.
Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and
slaves, making the one strong for servile labor, the other upright, and
although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts
both of war and peace. But the opposite often happens—that some have
the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men
differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as
the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the
inferior class should be slaves of the superior. And if this is true of the
body, how much more just that a similar distinction should exist in the
soul? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul
is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others
slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.
Part VI
But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on
their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used
in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature.
The law of which I speak is a sort of convention—the law by which
10/Aristotle
whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this
right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought for-
ward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion that, because
one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength,
another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is
a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and what makes the
views invade each other’s territory, is as follows: in some sense virtue,
when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercis-
ing force; and as superior power is only found where there is superior
excellence of some kind, power seems to imply virtue, and the dispute to
be simply one about justice (for it is due to one party identifying justice
with goodwill while the other identifies it with the mere rule of the stron-
ger). If these views are thus set out separately, the other views have no
force or plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to
rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle
of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery
in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law, but at the same
moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? And
again, no one would ever say he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave.
Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the
children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken
captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves,
but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they
really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be
admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The same
principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble every-
where, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians
noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of
nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of
Theodectes says:
“Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung
from the stem of the Gods?”
What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery,
noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They
think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good men
a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it,
cannot always accomplish.
Politics/11
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opin-
ion, and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature, and
also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between the two
classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be slaves and the
others to be masters: the one practicing obedience, the others exercising
the authority and lordship which nature intended them to have. The abuse
of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole,
of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a
living but separated part of his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation
of master and slave between them is natural they are friends and have a
common interest, but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse
is true.
Part VII
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a
master is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of rule
are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For there is one rule
exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another over subjects
who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is a monarchy, for
every house is under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a govern-
ment of freemen and equals. The master is not called a master because
he has science, but because he is of a certain character, and the same
remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science
for the master and science for the slave. The science of the slave would
be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing
slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge may be carried
further, so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For some du-
ties are of the more necessary, others of the more honorable sort; as the
proverb says, ‘slave before slave, master before master.’ But all such
branches of knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of the
master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is con-
cerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-
called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need
only know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute.
Hence those who are in a position which places them above toil have
stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves
with philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean
of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the
art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war. Enough of the distinc-
12/Aristotle
tion between master and slave.
Part VIII
Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting
wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been shown
to be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of getting
wealth is the same with the art of managing a household or a part of it,
or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that the art of
making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that
the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary, for they
are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the
other material; and by material I mean the substratum out of which any
work is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the
statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is
not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material
which the other provides. For the art which uses household stores can
be no other than the art of household management. There is, however, a
doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household manage-
ment or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence
wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of prop-
erty and riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food
in general, parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again, there
are many sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both
of animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their
food have made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are
gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted
to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or herbivorous or
omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by nature in such
a manner that they may obtain with greater facility the food of their
choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the same things
are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the lives of car-
nivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among themselves. In the
lives of men too there is a great difference. The laziest are shepherds,
who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence without trouble from
tame animals; their flocks having to wander from place to place in search
of pasture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of liv-
ing farm. Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different
kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or
marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and
Politics/13
others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number
obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes
of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up of
itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail trade—
there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman, the
hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments,
eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life of a
shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer
with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined in any
way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a
bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when
they are first born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring
forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they
are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous
animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain
time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is called
milk. In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants
exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man,
the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of
them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instru-
ments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain,
the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man.
And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisi-
tion, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought
to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended
by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is
naturally just.
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a
part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household
management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things
necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as
can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of
property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon
in one of his poems says that
“No bound to riches has been fixed for man.”
But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for
the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size,
14/Aristotle
and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a
household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of
acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and by states-
men, and what is the reason of this.
Part IX
There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly and
rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the
notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected
with the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not
very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is
given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art.
Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following con-
siderations:
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to
the thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and
the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is
used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He
who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one,
does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary
purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may
be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them,
and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that
some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail
trade is not a natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so,
men would have ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first
community, indeed, which is the family, this art is obviously of no use,
but it begins to be useful when the society increases. For the members of
the family originally had all things in common; later, when the family
divided into parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in
different things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted,
a kind of barter which is still practiced among barbarous nations who
exchange with one another the necessaries of life and nothing more;
giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for coin, and the
like. This sort of barter is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not
contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men’s natural
wants. The other or more complex form of exchange grew, as might
have been inferred, out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of one country
became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what
Politics/15
they needed, and exported what they had too much of, money necessar-
ily came into use. For the various necessaries of life are not easily car-
ried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each
other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to
the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the
value was at first measured simply by size and weight, but in process of
time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to
mark the value.
When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of
necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail
trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more
complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what
exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of
coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly con-
cerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth; hav-
ing to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is as-
sumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting
wealth and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that
coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional
only, because, if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worth-
less, and because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of
life, and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of neces-
sary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great
abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose
insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?
Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of
getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For
natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different thing;
in their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas
retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by
exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the
unit of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to
the riches which spring from this art of wealth getting. As in the art of
medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts
there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at
accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a
limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of wealth-
getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the spurious kind,
and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of wealth-getting which con-
16/Aristotle
sists in household management, on the other hand, has a limit; the un-
limited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And, therefore, in one
point of view, all riches must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of
fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all getters of wealth in-
crease their hoard of coin without limit. The source of the confusion is
the near connection between the two kinds of wealth-getting; in either,
the instrument is the same, although the use is different, and so they
pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property, but with a
difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but there is a further
end in the other. Hence some persons are led to believe that getting
wealth is the object of household management, and the whole idea of
their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit,
or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that
they are intent upon living only, and not upon living well; and, as their
desires are unlimited they also desire that the means of gratifying them
should be without limit. Those who do aim at a good life seek the means
of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears
to depend on property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there
arises the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in
excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if
they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth,
they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to
nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make
wealth, but to inspire confidence; neither is this the aim of the general’s
or of the physician’s art; but the one aims at victory and the other at
health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of
getting wealth; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of
the end they think all things must contribute.
Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is
unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-
getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a
natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the
provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but
having a limit.
Part X
And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether the art
of getting wealth is the business of the manager of a household and of
the statesman or not their business? viz., that wealth is presupposed by
Politics/17
them. For as political science does not make men, but takes them from
nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with earth or sea or
the like as a source of food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager
of a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies; he
may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but to use wool,
and to know, too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and
unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the
art of getting wealth is a part of the management of a household and the
art of medicine not; for surely the members of a household must have
health just as they must have life or any other necessary. The answer is
that as from one point of view the master of the house and the ruler of
the state have to consider about health, from another point of view not
they but the physician; so in one way the art of household management,
in another way the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But,
strictly speaking, as I have already said, the means of life must be pro-
vided beforehand by nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food
to that which is born, and the food of the offspring is always what re-
mains over of that from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of get-
ting wealth out of fruits and animals is always natural.
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of
household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary
and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured;
for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The
most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a
gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money
was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And
this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is ap-
plied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the par-
ent. Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.
Part XI
Enough has been said about the theory of wealth-getting; we will now
proceed to the practical part. The discussion of such matters is not un-
worthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal
and irksome. The useful parts of wealth-getting are, first, the knowl-
edge of livestock—which are most profitable, and where, and how—as,
for example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals
are most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of these
pay better than others, and which pay best in particular places, for some
18/Aristotle
do better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which
may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish, or
fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. These are the
divisions of the true or proper art of wealth-getting and come first. Of
the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important divi-
sion is commerce (of which there are three kinds—the provision of a
ship, the conveyance of goods, exposure for sale—these again differing
as they are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third,
service for hire—of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts,
the other in unskilled and bodily labor. There is still a third sort of wealth
getting intermediate between this and the first or natural mode which is
partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange, viz., the industries
that make their profit from the earth, and from things growing from the
earth which, although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for
example, the cutting of timber and all mining. The art of mining, by
which minerals are obtained, itself has many branches, for there are
various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of
wealth-getting I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them
might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them
at greater length now.
Those occupations are most truly arts in which there is the least
element of chance; they are the meanest in which the body is most dete-
riorated, the most servile in which there is the greatest use of the body,
and the most illiberal in which there is the least need of excellence.
Works have been written upon these subjects by various persons;
for example, by Chares the Parian, and Apollodorus the Lemnian, who
have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of other
branches; any one who cares for such matters may refer to their writ-
ings. It would be well also to collect the scattered stories of the ways in
which individuals have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is
useful to persons who value the art of getting wealth. There is the anec-
dote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which involves a
principle of universal application, but is attributed to him on account of
his reputation for wisdom. He was reproached for his poverty, which
was supposed to show that philosophy was of no use. According to the
story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there
would be a great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little
money, he gave deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and
Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one bid against him.
Politics/19
When the harvest-time came, and many were wanted all at once and of
a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, and made a
quantity of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers can
easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition is of another sort. He is
supposed to have given a striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was
saying, his device for getting wealth is of universal application, and is
nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art often practiced by
cities when they are want of money; they make a monopoly of provi-
sions.
There was a man of Sicily, who, having money deposited with him,
bought up an the iron from the iron mines; afterwards, when the mer-
chants from their various markets came to buy, he was the only seller,
and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which
when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might take away his money,
but that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had
discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own
interests. He made the same discovery as Thales; they both contrived to
create a monopoly for themselves. And statesmen as well ought to know
these things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such
devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some
public men devote themselves entirely to finance.
Part XII
Of household management we have seen that there are three parts—one
is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already,
another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father,
we saw, rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the
rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule.
For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is
by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-
grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most con-
stitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of
a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal,
and do not differ at all. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is
ruled we endeavor to create a difference of outward forms and names
and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis
about his foot-pan. The relation of the male to the female is of this kind,
but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his chil-
dren is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to
20/Aristotle
age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appro-
priately called Zeus ‘father of Gods and men,’ because he is the king of
them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should
be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder
and younger, of father and son.
Part XIII
Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to
the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than
to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of
freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be
raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher
than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities—whether he can have
the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether
slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever
way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue,
in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are
men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they
have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and
children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate
and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemper-
ate, or note So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the
natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a
noble nature is equally required in both, why should one of them always
rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a ques-
tion of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a differ-
ence of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how
strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought
not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he
rule well? If the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and
cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that
both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects
also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has
shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject,
and the virtue of the ruler we in maintain to be different from that of the
subject; the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the
irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies gener-
ally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to na-
ture. But the kind of rule differs; the freeman rules over the slave after
Politics/21
another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the
man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in an of
them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no delib-
erative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the
child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be supposed to be
with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such
manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his duty.
Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his func-
tion, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle
is such an artificer; the subjects, oil the other hand, require only that
measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral
virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a
woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as
Socrates maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in com-
manding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as
will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say
generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in
doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such
definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the
virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as
the poet says of women,
“Silence is a woman’s glory,”
but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and
therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the
perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave
is relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave is useful for the
wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much vir-
tue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or
lack of self-control. Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is
true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in
their work through the lack of self control? But is there not a great
difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master’s life; the
artisan is less closely connected with him, and only attains excellence in
proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a
special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not
so the shoemaker or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master
ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere
22/Aristotle
possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his duties.
Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and
say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in
need of admonition than children.
So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one an-
other is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and
good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the
different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part
of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue
of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and
children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution, if
the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the
virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children
grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.
Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us
speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete,
we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various
theories of a perfect state.
BOOK TWO
Part I
Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of
all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must
therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as
actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which
are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light.
And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we
are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake
this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted
are faulty.
We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alter-
natives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have (1) all
things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and
some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impos-
sible, for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a
common place—one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those
who share in that one city. But should a well ordered state have all
Politics/23
things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For
the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in
common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato. Which is bet-
ter, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society.
Part II
There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the prin-
ciple on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evi-
dently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the
end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is imprac-
ticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. I am
speaking of the premise from which the argument of Socrates proceeds,
‘that the greater the unity of the state the better.’ Is it not obvious that a
state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a
state? since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to
greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a
family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more than the
state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain
this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the
state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of differ-
ent kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a
military alliance The usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity
even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the
end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a
less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has
not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort of
life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind.
Wherefore the principle of compensation, as I have already remarked in
the Ethics, is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals
this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot an rule
together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of
time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan
they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange
their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoe-
makers and carpenters. And since it is better that this should be so in
politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the
same persons in power where this is possible, yet where this is not pos-
sible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at the same
time it is just that an should share in the government (whether to govern
24/Aristotle
be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to this is that equals should
in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be
treated alike. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as
if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner when they hold
office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city
is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that
what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruc-
tion; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them.
Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is
clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual,
and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the
community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency
is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the
greater.
Part III
But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the
greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from
the fact ‘of all men saying “mine” and “not mine” at the same instant of
time,’ which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity in a
state. For the word ‘all’ is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every
individual says ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ at the same time, then perhaps the
result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished;
each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his
wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however,
is not the way in which people would speak who had their had their
wives and children in common; they would say ‘all’ but not ‘each.’ In
like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not
severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term ‘all’:
like some other words, ‘both,’ ‘odd,’ ‘even,’ it is ambiguous, and even
in abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all per-
sons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be
a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other
sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony. And there is another
objection to the proposal. For that which is common to the greatest
number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of
his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is him-
self concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, every-
body is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to
Politics/25
fulfill; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few.
Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons indi-
vidually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will there-
fore be neglected by all alike. Further, upon this principle, every one
will use the word ‘mine’ of one who is prospering or the reverse, how-
ever small a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same
boy will be ‘so and so’s son,’ the son of each of the thousand, or what-
ever be the number of the citizens; and even about this he will not be
positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or
whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But which is bet-
ter—for each to say ‘mine’ in this way, making a man the same relation
to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word ‘mine’ in
the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same person is
called by one man his own son whom another calls his own brother or
cousin or kinsman—blood relation or connection by marriage either of
himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or tribes-
man; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to
be a son after Plato’s fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing broth-
ers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing
one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will neces-
sarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geog-
raphers declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of Upper Libya,
where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born
are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness.
And some women, like the females of other animals—for example, mares
and cows—have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their
parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Honest.
Part IV
Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a com-
munity to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as
involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when
committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally
unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more
likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have oc-
curred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made. Again, how
strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should
hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should permit love and
familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother,
26/Aristotle
than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them love
of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no
other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship
of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.
This community of wives and children seems better suited to the
husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children
in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a
subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel. In
a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of which
good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these
regulations about women and children would defeat itself. For friend-
ship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of
them against revolutions; neither is there anything which Socrates so
greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world declare
to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commends would be
like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says,
desire to grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being
two to become one, in which case one or both would certainly perish.
Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be
watery; and the father will certainly not say ‘my son,’ or the son ‘my
father.’ As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is
imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the idea of
relationship which is based upon these names will be lost; there is no
reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son
about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities
which chiefly inspire regard and affection—that a thing is your own and
that it is your only one—neither can exist in such a state as this.
Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the
rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the
rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the
givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and trans-
ferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, such as as-
saults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those
who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned
to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members
of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and moth-
ers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by rea-
son of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children,
let this be our conclusion.
Politics/27
Part V
Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property:
should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common
or not? This question may be discussed separately from the enactments
about women and children. Even supposing that the women and chil-
dren belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at present
universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using posses-
sions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appro-
priated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the com-
mon stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may
be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided
among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common prop-
erty which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or (3), the soil and
the produce may be alike common.
When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different
and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the
question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share
equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will
necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume
much. But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and
having all human relations in common, but especially in their having
common property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example
to the point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quar-
rel about any trifle which turns up. So with servants: we are most able
to take offense at those with whom we most we most frequently come
into contact in daily life.
These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the commu-
nity of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by
good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advan-
tages of both systems. Property should be in a certain sense common,
but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest,
men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress,
because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by
reason of goodness, and in respect of use, ‘Friends,’ as the proverb
says, ‘will have all things common.’ Even now there are traces of such
a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered
states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For,
although every man has his own property, some things he will place at
28/Aristotle
the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them.
The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another’s slaves, and horses,
and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a
journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the
country. It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use
of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in
men this benevolent disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is
the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the love
of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although
selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not the mere love of
self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser’s love of money; for all,
or almost all, men love money and other such objects in a measure. And
further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to
friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a
man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive uni-
fication of the state. The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly
annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it is an
honorable action to abstain from another’s wife for temperance’ sake);
secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all
things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any
liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of prop-
erty.
Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence;
men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some
wonderful manner everybody will become everybody’s friend, especially
when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states,
suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and
the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property.
These evils, however, are due to a very different cause—the wickedness
of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling
among those who have all things in common, though there are not many
of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private prop-
erty.
Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citi-
zens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life
which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable. The error of
Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he
starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in
some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such
Politics/29
a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually
ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing
into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The
state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made
into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a
system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should
expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by
philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta
and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator has made
property common. Let us remember that we should not disregard the
experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were
good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything
has been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in
other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light
would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of govern-
ment in the actual process of construction; for the legislator could not
form a state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into
associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all
this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a
prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.
But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in
such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who
are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been
determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in com-
mon? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the wives and
children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians, they are to
have all things in common, what do they differ from them, or what will
they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle
would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the inge-
nious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions
as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of
arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities
in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the com-
munity? Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to the other
He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the hus-
bandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens. But if so the
suits and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in
other states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, having
so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for example
30/Aristotle
laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines his educa-
tion to the guardians. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the
property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they
are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited than the Helots,
or Penestae, or slaves in general. And whether community of wives and
property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not,
and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of gov-
ernment, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined:
neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small impor-
tance if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.
Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private
property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house?
And who will do so if the agricultural class have both their property and
their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the anal-
ogy of the animals, that men and women should follow the same pur-
suits, for animals have not to manage a household. The government,
too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes
the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of disturbance
among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited warriors?
But that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is evident;
for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time
given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he
says, ‘God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very
birth; but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and
husbandmen.’ Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and
says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the
whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy
happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in
numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts;
not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely
not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates
discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as great.
Part VI
The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato’s later work, the
Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which
is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in
all a few questions only; such as the community of women and children,
the community of property, and the constitution of the state. The popu-
Politics/31
lation is divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of
warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of counselors and rulers
of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen
and artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether they,
too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly
thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians,
and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with
digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the
education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly anything but
laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had in-
tended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to
the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of
women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both
states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live
free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in
both. The only difference is that in the Laws, the common meals are
extended to women, and the warriors number 5000, but in the Republic
only 1000.
The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always
exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything
can hardly be expected. We must not overlook the fact that the number
of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as
Babylon, or some other huge site, if so many persons are to be sup-
ported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will
be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume
what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities.
It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two
points—the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must
not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates
is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must have such
a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors, and not
merely useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the
best, either for individuals or states, still a city should be formidable to
enemies, whether invading or retreating.
There is another point: Should not the amount of property be de-
fined in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates
says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to live
temperately, which is only a way of saying ‘to live well’; this is too
general a conception. Further, a man may live temperately and yet mis-
32/Aristotle
erably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much
property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally; if
the two are parted, liberally will combine with luxury; temperance will
be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the only eli-
gible qualities which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot
use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he
may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from prop-
erty. There is an inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property
and not regulating the number of the citizens; the population is to re-
main unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a
certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born
to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states. But
greater care will be required than now; for among ourselves, whatever
may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among
them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were inca-
pable of division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or
many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more
necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be
fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of
sterility in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in exist-
ing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the
citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. Pheidon the
Corinthian, who was one of the most ardent legislators, thought that the
families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although
originally all the lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws
the opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right
arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.
There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us
how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should
be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different
wools. He allows that a man’s whole property may be increased five-
fold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again,
will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrange-
ment of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual two homesteads
in separate places, and it is difficult to live in two houses.
The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor
oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called
a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he in-
tended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of
Politics/33
states, he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this
constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many
would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristo-
cratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a com-
bination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian be-
cause it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king
forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy while the
democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are
selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a
tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in
the habits of daily life. In the Laws it is maintained that the best consti-
tution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not consti-
tutions at all, or are the worst of all. But they are nearer the truth who
combine many forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of
more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no
element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy,
leaning rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing mag-
istrates; for although the appointment of them by lot from among those
who have been already selected combines both elements, the way in
which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for
magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may do as
they like, and the endeavor to have the greater number of the magis-
trates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest officers se-
lected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these are oligar-
chical features. The oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of
the council, for all are compelled to choose, but the compulsion extends
only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out of
the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to
all the voters but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of
candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first and
second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says that there ought to be
an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be
given to the better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because
many of the lower classes, not being compelled will not vote. These
considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes
for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato’s should
not be composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a danger in
electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected; for, if
but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as
34/Aristotle
they desire. Such is the constitution which is described in the Laws.
Part VII
Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, oth-
ers by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established
or existing ones than either of Plato’s. No one else has introduced such
novelties as the community of women and children, or public tables for
women: other legislators begin with what is necessary. In the opinion of
some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the
question upon which all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized
by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of
a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony
the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily
when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of
compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to
receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive
them.
Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumu-
lation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any
citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification But
those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to for-
get—that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix
the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property,
the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad
thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined
fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That the equalization of prop-
erty exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood
even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and
others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he
pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of prop-
erty: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to
sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune
has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preser-
vation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas,
and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the
rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again, where there is
equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small,
and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly,
then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of proper-
Politics/35
ties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this
moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is
not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equal-
ized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by
the laws. But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he
means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only
equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely what
he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in be in having one
and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or
ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the
inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honor, though in op-
posite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of
property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the poet says,
“The bad and good alike in honor share.”
There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas
expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take
away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is
hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also
wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire—they wish to
cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of life, which preys upon
them; nay, this is not the only reason—they may desire superfluities in
order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they
commit crimes.
Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moder-
ate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as
to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they
will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for
all other pleasures we are dependent on others. The fact is that the great-
est crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not be-
come tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is
the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a
tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against
petty crimes.
There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to
promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should con-
sider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all who are outside
of it. The government must be organized with a view to military strength;
36/Aristotle
and of this he has said not a word. And so with respect to property: there
should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but
also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state
should not be so large that more powerful neighbors may be tempted by
it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small
that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal
power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule;
but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage.
The best limit will probably be, that a more powerful neighbor must
have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of
your wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed
less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to
besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would
take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time.
‘For,’ said he, ‘I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus
at once.’ These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates,
and he desisted from the siege.
The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent
the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this direction is very
great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves
worthy of more than an equal share of honors; and this is often found to
be a cause of sedition and revolution. And the avarice of mankind is
insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this
sum has become customary, men always want more and more without
end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live
only for the gratification of it. The beginning of reform is not so much to
equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire
more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they
must be kept down, but not ill-treated. Besides, the equalization pro-
posed by Phaleas is imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a
man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abun-
dance of what are called his movables. Now either all these things must
be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must an be
let alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city
only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to
form a supplementary part of the body of citizens. But if there is a law
that artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those en-
gaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which
Diophantus once introduced.
Politics/37
From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was
wrong or right in his ideas.
Part VIII
Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who
invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the Piraeus—a
strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general ec-
centricity of life, which made some think him affected (for he would
wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; but these were worn on a
cheap but warm garment both in winter and summer); he, besides aspir-
ing to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was the first person not a
statesman who made inquiries about the best form of government.
The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided
into three parts—one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a third of
armed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into three parts,
one sacred, one public, the third private: the first was set apart to main-
tain the customary worship of the Gods, the second was to support the
warriors, the third was the property of the husbandmen. He also divided
laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are
three subjects of lawsuits—insult, injury, and homicide. He likewise
instituted a single final court of appeal, to which all causes seeming to
have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed of
elders chosen for the purpose. He was further of opinion that the deci-
sions of the courts ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble,
but that every one should have a tablet on which he might not only write
a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal;
but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was to distinguish
accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to
be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He also enacted that
those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be hon-
ored; and he provided that the children of citizens who died in battle
should be maintained at the public expense, as if such an enactment had
never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens and in other
places. As to the magistrates, he would have them all elected by the
people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and those who
were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers,
and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of
Hippodamus. There is not much else.
The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the
38/Aristotle
threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the husbandmen,
and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husband-
men have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore
they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share
in all the offices is an impossibility; for generals and guardians of the
citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken from the
class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no
share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens? It may be said
that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other
classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous;
and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at
all, or have power to appoint magistrates? Further, what use are farm-
ers to the city? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city,
and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too,
if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share
in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are sup-
posed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private
benefit. Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are
maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior
class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator in-
tended to make a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be
other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of
their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which
has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same per-
sons are to cultivate their own lands, and those of the public as well,
they will have difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will
maintain two households: and why, in this case, should there be any
division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors
from the same land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion
in all this.
Neither is the law to commended which says that the judges, when a
simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement;
for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration,
although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about
the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this
is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the
judges from holding any communication with one another. Again, will
there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given,
but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae,
Politics/39
and the judge allows him ten minae (or in general the suitor asks for
more and the judge allows less), while another judge allows five, an-
other four minae. In this way they will go on splitting up the damages,
and some will grant the whole and others nothing: how is the final reck-
oning to be taken? Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple
acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been
laid in an unqualified form; and this is just, for the judge who acquits
does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not
owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the
defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.
To honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is
a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by
law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political
commotions. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether
it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country,
even if another law be better. Now, if an changes are inexpedient, we
can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretense of
doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really
destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we have touched
upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I
was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem
desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences
have certainly been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic,
and every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage. And,
if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art.
That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs
are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went
about armed and bought their brides of each other. The remains of an-
cient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; for example,
at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser
produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen,
the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good,
and not merely what their fathers had. But the primeval inhabitants,
whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some de-
struction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary or even
foolish people among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition concern-
ing the earth-born men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented
with their notions. Even when laws have been written down, they ought
not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is
40/Aristotle
impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for
enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particu-
lars. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be
changed; but when we look at the matter from another point of view,
great caution would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly chang-
ing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors
both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain
so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedi-
ence. The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very differ-
ent thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power to command
obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that
a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the
law. Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be
changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody
who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important ques-
tions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a
more suitable occasion.
Part IX
In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in all govern-
ments, two points have to be considered: first, whether any particular
law is good or bad, when compared with the perfect state; secondly,
whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the
lawgiver has set before his citizens. That in a well-ordered state the
citizens should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants
is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this
leisure is to be attained. The Thessalian Penestae have often risen against
their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the Lacedaemonians,
for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however,
of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; the reason probably is
that the neighboring cities, even when at war with one another, never
form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their in-
terest, since they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas all
the neighbors of the Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or
Arcadians, were their enemies. In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of
the slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at war with the
neighboring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and Magnesians. Besides, if there
were no other difficulty, the treatment or management of slaves is a
troublesome affair; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think
Politics/41
that they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly treated, they hate
and conspire against them. Now it is clear that when these are the re-
sults the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing
their subject population.
Again, the license of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the inten-
tion of the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness of the
state. For, a husband and wife being each a part of every family, the
state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women;
and, therefore, in those states in which the condition of the women is
bad, half the city may be regarded as having no laws. And this is what
has actually happened at Sparta; the legislator wanted to make the whole
state hardy and temperate, and he has carried out his intention in the
case of the men, but he has neglected the women, who live in every sort
of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state
wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizen fall under the do-
minion of their wives, after the manner of most warlike races, except the
Celts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old
mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite,
for all warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women.
This was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness;
many things were managed by their women. But what difference does it
make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women? The result
is the same. Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life,
and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian women
has been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban inva-
sion, when, unlike the women other cities, they were utterly useless and
caused more confusion than the enemy. This license of the Lacedaemonian
women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be
expected. For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the
Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men
were long away from home, and, on the return of peace, they gave them-
selves into the legislator’s hand, already prepared by the discipline of a
soldier’s life (in which there are many elements of virtue), to receive his
enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the
women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt. These
then are the causes of what then happened, and this defect in the consti-
tution is clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however, consider-
ing what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, and the
disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only gives an air of
42/Aristotle
indecorum to the constitution considered in itself, but tends in a measure
to foster avarice.
The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the in-
equality of property. While some of the Spartan citizen have quite small
properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed into
the hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws; for, although the
legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inherit-
ance, he allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it. Yet both prac-
tices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country
are held by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses and to the
large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been better to
have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As
the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he
pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away de-
scends to his heir. Hence, although the country is able to maintain 1500
cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens fell
below 1000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting
property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was
their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings,
they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and
therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experi-
enced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not
less than 10,000 citizens Whether this statement is true or not, it would
certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equal-
ization of property. Again, the law which relates to the procreation of
children is adverse to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator,
wanting to have as many Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens
to have large families; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of
three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has four
from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were
many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them must
necessarily fall into poverty.
The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean
the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but
the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to
fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, are open to
bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former
times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the
Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and
Politics/43
tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to
court them, so that, in this way as well together with the royal office, the
whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has
turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state
together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the
highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance,
has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the
parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrange-
ments be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire
its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons; the
nobles because they are represented in the council of elders (for the
office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people, because all are
eligible to the Ephoralty. The election of Ephors out of the whole people
is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion,
which is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes,
although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not
determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to written
rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with
the spirit of the constitution—they have a deal too much license; whereas,
in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable
that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual
pleasures.
Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said
that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that,
therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that
judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable
thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. And when men have
been educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself cannot
trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to
have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs.
And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are
so. But (it may be replied), ‘All magistracies are accountable to the
Ephors.’ Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain
that the control should be exercised in some other manner. Further, the
mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is im-
proper that the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the
worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the
legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other
parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he
44/Aristotle
has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for no one
would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost
more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.
Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider
at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now,
but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself
obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at
least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spar-
tans used to join enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quar-
rels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.
Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called ‘phiditia,’
regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at
the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is
expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the
expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common
meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of
regulating them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely
take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot
contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.
The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and
with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual
generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king.
The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws, against the intention of
the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to
one part of virtue only—the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in
war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was preserved,
but when they had attained empire they fell for of the arts of peace they
knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than
war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have fallen.
Although they truly think that the goods for which men contend are to
be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that
these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.
Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no
money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars,
and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in
the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another’s
contributions. The result which the legislator has produced is the re-
verse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy.
Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the
Politics/45
principal defects.
Part X
The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in some few
points is quite as good; but for the most part less perfect in form. The
older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the
Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great measure,
a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, Lycurgus, when he ceased
to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his
time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians
are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came
to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the
inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete,
are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have
enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in
Hellas, and to be well situated; it extends right across the sea, around
which nearly all the Hellenes are settled; and while one end is not far
from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia
about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the
sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he in-
vaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus.
The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots
are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and both Cretans
and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called
by the Lacedaemonians not ‘phiditia’ but ‘andria’; and the Cretans have
the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals origi-
nally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are similar; for
the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only
difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in
number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed
by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete,
but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in
war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of
the elders and the Cosmi.
The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the
Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head,
or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exer-
cise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular
character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised on the
46/Aristotle
public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one por-
tion is assigned to the Gods and to the service of the state, and another to
the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported
out of a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of
securing moderation in eating, which he conceives to be a gain; he like-
wise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should
have too many children, and the companionship of men with one an-
other—whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of
considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are bet-
ter ordered than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.
On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the
Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors,
they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by
a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and
the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the
constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of
certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of
those who have been Cosmi.
The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been
already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility
and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of
acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is
dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people
are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there is no profit to
be made out of the office as out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors,
the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.
The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an
extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitu-
tional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their
own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed also to
resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this
kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very
unsafe rule. Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a
device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not sub-
mit to justice. This shows that the Cretan government, although pos-
sessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a
close oligarchy.
The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together
a party among the common people and their own friends and then quar-
Politics/47
rel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruc-
tion of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous
condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as
I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; dis-
tance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strang-
ers; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why
the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually
revolting. But when lately foreign invaders found their way into the
island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of
the government of Crete.
Part XI
The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of gov-
ernment, which differs from that of any other state in several respects,
though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states—
the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian—nearly resemble
one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the
Carthaginian institutions are excellent The superiority of their constitu-
tion is proved by the fact that the common people remain loyal to the
constitution the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speak-
ing of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.
Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles
the Lacedaemonian are the following: The common tables of the clubs
answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to the
Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magis-
trates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit—this is an
improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of
elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings,
unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that an ordi-
nary one, but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out
of it and not appointed by senority—this is far better. Such officers have
great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great
deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.
Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which
the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all
the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflec-
tions from aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline more
to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unani-
mous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before
48/Aristotle
the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such
matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the
people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who
likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That
the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters
should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of 100,
and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtu-
ally rulers both before and after they hold office)—these are oligarchi-
cal features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any
similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the mag-
istrates, and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by
another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy. The
Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oli-
garchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For
men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their
merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule
well—he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their
wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristoc-
racy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage
is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and
particularly the highest of them—their kings and generals—with an eye
both to merit and to wealth.
But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy,
the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely neces-
sary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but
when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in
any way; and to this his attention should be first directed. Even if you
must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a
bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals,
should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of
more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For,
whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other
citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the
first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who
have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit
of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and
honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of
man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should
rule who are able to rule best. And even if the legislator does not care to
Politics/49
protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for
them when in office.
It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should
hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians,
for one business is better done by one man. The legislator should see to
this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a
shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance
both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices
of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said, this
arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is
better and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval
matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services
extend to all.
The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they suc-
cessfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the
people after another by sending them to their colonies. This is their
panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Acci-
dent favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against
revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfor-
tune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no
way of restoring peace by legal methods.
Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and
Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.
Part XII
Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any
part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private sta-
tion; about most of them, what was worth telling has been already told.
Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose
affairs they have administered; and of these some have only made laws,
others have framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did
both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. As to
Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an
end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, estab-
lished the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different
elements of the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus
was an oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and
the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the council
and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were
50/Aristotle
retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of an the
citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is
sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts,
which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-demo-
cratic element. When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people
who were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was changed into
the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of
the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, and
thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy
until it became what we now see. All this is true; it seems, however, to
be the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon.
For the people, having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the
sea in the Persian War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed
worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon, himself,
appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to of-
fices and calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely neces-
sary; for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and en-
mity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the no-
tables and the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni,
or from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called knights
or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no share in any
magistracy.
Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian
Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana,
and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people at-
tempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any
special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was
trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that
Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were dis-
ciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is
quite inconsistent with chronology.
There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the
Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a
lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the
incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him,
and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days.
The inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one
another, but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not.
Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, Diocles out of horror
Politics/51
at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from
his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is the reason why they settled at
Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some
other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children,
which they call the ‘Laws of Adoption.’ These laws were peculiar to
him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots.
In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, except
the suits against false witnesses. He is the first who instituted denuncia-
tion for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed
than even those of our modern legislators.
(Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of Plato,
the community of women, children, and property, the common meals of
women, and the law about drinking, that the sober shall be masters of
the feast; also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill
with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the other.)
Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution which
already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth men-
tioning, except the greatness and severity of the punishments.
Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a constitu-
tion; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a drunken man do
something wrong, he shall be more heavily punished than if he were
sober; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunk-
ard, but only to expediency, for drunken more often than sober people
commit acts of violence.
Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace.
Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is nothing
remarkable in them.
And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions
which either actually exist, or have been devised by theorists.
BOOK THREE
Part I
He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of
governments must first of all determine ‘What is a state?’ At present
this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain
act; others, no, not the state, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the
legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitu-
tion or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state.
52/Aristotle
But a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts;
these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we
must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the
term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a
citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leav-
ing out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who
have obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner, we may
say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain
place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen
who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right
may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. Nay, resident aliens in
many places do not possess even such rights completely, for they are
obliged to have a patron, so that they do but imperfectly participate in
citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we
might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register,
or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do
not say quite simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that
they are not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, or some-
thing of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning
is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be
raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But the
citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense,
against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special charac-
teristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices.
Now of offices some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not
allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval;
others have no limit of time—for example, the office of a dicast or
ecclesiast. It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all,
and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely
it is ridiculous to say that those who have the power do not govern. Let
us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question; what
we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. Let us,
for the sake of distinction, call it ‘indefinite office,’ and we will assume
that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most com-
prehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are gener-
ally so called.
But we must not forget that things of which the underlying prin-
ciples differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, another
third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything,
Politics/53
worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in
kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those
which are faulty or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which
are perfect. (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained.)
The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government;
and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not
necessarily to other states. For in some states the people are not ac-
knowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordi-
nary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates.
At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about con-
tracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges
of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates. A simi-
lar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all
causes. We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to
include these states. In them it is the holder of a definite, not of an
indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such
holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging
about some things or about all things. The conception of the citizen now
begins to clear up.
He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial
administration of any state is said by us to be a citizens of that state;
and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the
purposes of life.
Part II
But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents
are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or
more ancestors. This is a short and practical definition but there are
some who raise the further question: How this third or fourth ancestor
came to be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a
difficulty, partly in irony, said—‘Mortars are what is made by the mor-
tar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are those who are made by the
magistrates; for it is their trade to make Larissaeans.’ Yet the question is
really simple, for, if according to the definition just given they shared in
the government, they were citizens. This is a better definition than the
other. For the words, ‘born of a father or mother who is a citizen,’
cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.
There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been
made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the
54/Aristotle
expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes many metics, both
strangers and slaves. The doubt in these cases is, not who is, but whether
he who is ought to be a citizen; and there will still be a furthering the
state, whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for what ought
not to be is what is false. Now, there are some who hold office, and yet
ought not to hold office, whom we describe as ruling, but ruling un-
justly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind
of rule or office—he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfills our
definition of a citizen. It is evident, therefore, that the citizens about
whom the doubt has arisen must be called citizens.
Part III
Whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up with
the previous inquiry. For a parallel question is raised respecting the
state, whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for example, in
the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such
cases persons refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other obligations,
on the ground that the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them; they
argue that some constitutions are established by force, and not for the
sake of the common good. But this would apply equally to democracies,
for they too may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the democ-
racy will be neither more nor less acts of the state in question than those
of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs up into another: on
what principle shall we ever say that the state is the same, or different?
It would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and
the inhabitants (for the soil and the population may be separated, and
some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in another).
This, however, is not a very serious difficulty; we need only remark that
the word ‘state’ is ambiguous.
It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be
regarded as a single city—what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the
city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we
may say, is Babylon, and every city that has the compass of a nation
rather than a city; Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days
before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This dif-
ficulty may, however, with advantage be deferred to another occasion;
the statesman has to consider the size of the state, and whether it should
consist of more than one nation or not.
Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as
Politics/55
their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same, although
the citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and foun-
tains the same, although the water is always flowing away and coming
again Or shall we say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the
same, but that the state changes? For, since the state is a partnership,
and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution, when the form of gov-
ernment changes, and becomes different, then it may be supposed that
the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic
chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And in this
manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different
when the form of their composition alters; for example, a scale contain-
ing the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or
the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the
sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitu-
tion, and it may be called or not called by the same name, whether the
inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another ques-
tion, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements when the
form of government changes.
Part IV
There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a
good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But, before entering on
this discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the
virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a commu-
nity. Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower,
another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by
some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual’s
virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common
definition applicable to them all. For they have all of them a common
object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from
another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of
them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen
must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member.
If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is
not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue. But we
say that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect
virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity
possess the virtue which makes a good man.
The same question may also be approached by another road, from a
56/Aristotle
consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely
composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own
business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all the
citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man
cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen—thus, and
thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a
good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must
be good.
Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the
living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved
are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite,
the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all
these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and,
therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any
more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of
the performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to show why
the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same.
But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen
and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the
good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a states-
man must be a wise man. And some persons say that even the education
of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the children of kings
instructed in riding and military exercises? As Euripides says:
“No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires.”
As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then
the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we
assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue
of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be absolutely
the same, although in some cases they may; for the virtue of a ruler
differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference which
made Jason say that ‘he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant,’ meaning
that he could not endure to live in a private station. But, on the other
hand, it may be argued that men are praised for knowing both how to
rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue
who is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be
that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obey-
ing, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise. Since, then,
Politics/57
it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different
things and not the same, but that the citizen must know and share in
them both, the inference is obvious. There is, indeed, the rule of a mas-
ter, which is concerned with menial offices—the master need not know
how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them:
the other would be degrading; and by the other I mean the power actu-
ally to do menial duties, which vary much in character and are executed
by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who,
as their name signifies, live by the labor of their hands: under these the
mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations,
the working classes had no share in the government—a privilege which
they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good
man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts
of inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually prac-
tice them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave.
This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of
another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth—a
constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would
learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a
general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under
the orders of a general of infantry, and by having had the command of a
regiment and of a company. It has been well said that ‘he who has never
learned to obey cannot be a good commander.’ The two are not the
same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know
how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these
are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of
a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will
include both; for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a
subject, e.g., his justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds,
the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the
temperance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be
thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman,
and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more re-
straint on her conversation than the good man; and indeed their part in
the management of the household is different, for the duty of the one is
to acquire, and of the other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is char-
acteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally
belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not
wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the
58/Aristotle
flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.
From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the ques-
tion, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good
citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different.
Part V
There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he only a true
citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be included? If
they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen can
have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this man is a citizen And if
none of the lower class are citizens, in which part of the state are they to
be placed? For they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners.
May we not reply, that as far as this objection goes there is no more
absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves and freedmen from
any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted that we cannot
consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the
state; for example, children are not citizen equally with grown-up men,
who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up, are only
citizens on a certain assumption. Nay, in ancient times, and among some
nations the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the
majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them
to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue
of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free man as such,
but only to those who are freed from necessary services. The necessary
people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or
mechanics and laborers who are the servants of the community. These
reflections carried a little further will explain their position; and indeed
what has been said already is of itself, when understood, explanation
enough.
Since there are many forms of government there must be many va-
rieties of citizen and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that
under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens,
but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called govern-
ment of the best (if there be such an one), in which honors are given
according to virtue and merit; for no man can practice virtue who is
living the life of a mechanic or laborer. In oligarchies the qualification
for office is high, and therefore no laborer can ever be a citizen; but a
mechanic may, for an actual majority of them are rich. At Thebes there
was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from busi-
Politics/59
ness for ten years. But in many states the law goes to the length of
admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his
mother only be a citizen; and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate
children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But
when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a
female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens;
and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and
mothers are both citizens.
Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a
citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of the state. Com-
pare Homer’s words, ‘like some dishonored stranger’; he who is ex-
cluded from the honors of the state is no better than an alien. But when
his exclusion is concealed, then the object is that the privileged class
may deceive their fellow inhabitants.
As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as
that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that
in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in
others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a
good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have,
alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.
Part VI
Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether
there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they
are, and how many, and what are the differences between them.
A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, espe-
cially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in
the state, and the constitution is in fact the government. For example, in
democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and,
therefore, we say that these two forms of government also are different:
and so in other cases.
First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many
forms of government there are by which human society is regulated. We
have already said, in the first part of this treatise, when discussing house-
hold management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a
political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one
another’s help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought
together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain
to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of
60/Aristotle
individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which
there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do
not greatly overbalance the good) mankind meet together and maintain
the political community. And we all see that men cling to life even at the
cost of enduring great misfortune, seeming to find in life a natural sweet-
ness and happiness.
There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of author-
ity; they have been often defined already in discussions outside the school.
The rule of a master, although the slave by nature and the master by
nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised pri-
marily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally consid-
ers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes
with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and children and
of a household, which we have called household management, is exer-
cised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the com-
mon good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed,
as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in general,
which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists them-
selves. For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes prac-
tice gymnastics, and the helmsman is always one of the crew. The trainer
or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care. But,
when he is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates
in the advantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer be-
comes one of those in training. And so in politics: when the state is
framed upon the principle of equality and likeness, the citizens think
that they ought to hold office by turns. Formerly, as is natural, every one
would take his turn of service; and then again, somebody else would
look after his interest, just as he, while in office, had looked after theirs.
But nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from
the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office.
One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health
while they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they
would be hunting after places. The conclusion is evident: that govern-
ments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in
accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms;
but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective
and perverted forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a commu-
nity of freemen.
Politics/61
Part VII
Having determined these points, we have next to consider how many
forms of government there are, and what they are; and in the first place
what are the true forms, for when they are determined the perversions of
them will at once be apparent. The words constitution and government
have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme au-
thority in states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many.
The true forms of government, therefore, are those in which the one, or
the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but
governments which rule with a view to the private interest, whether of
the one or of the few, or of the many, are perversions. For the members
of a state, if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in its advan-
tages. Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that which
regards the common interests, kingship or royalty; that in which more
than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is so called, either be-
cause the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best
interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large
administer the state for the common interest, the government is called
by the generic name—a constitution. And there is a reason for this use
of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but as the number
increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every
kind of virtue, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the
masses. Hence in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the
supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.
Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of
royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government,
democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the
interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the
wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of
all.
Part VIII
But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will
therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each
of them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various
sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or
omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as
I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over the politi-
cal society; oligarchy is when men of property have the government in
62/Aristotle
their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the
men of property, are the rulers. And here arises the first of our difficul-
ties, and it relates to the distinction drawn. For democracy is said to be
the government of the many. But what if the many are men of property
and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be
the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich,
and have the power in their hands because they are stronger? In these
cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms
of government would no longer hold good.
Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to
the many, and name the governments accordingly—an oligarchy is said
to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in
which the many and the poor are the rulers—there will still be a diffi-
culty. For, if the only forms of government are the ones already men-
tioned, how shall we describe those other governments also just men-
tioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are
the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?
The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in de-
mocracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater num-
ber, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an
accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor
numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the
difference between them. For the real difference between democracy
and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of
their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and
where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few
and the poor many; for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed
by an, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchi-
cal and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.
Part IX
Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and
democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and democratical. For all
men cling to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect
and they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought
by them to be, and is, equality, not. however, for however, for but only
for equals. And inequality is thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this
for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men
judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judgment on them-
Politics/63
selves, and most people are bad judges in their own case. And whereas
justice implies a relation to persons as well as to things, and a just
distribution, as I have already said in the Ethics, implies the same ratio
between the persons and between the things, they agree about the equal-
ity of the things, but dispute about the equality of the persons, chiefly
for the reason which I have just given—because they are bad judges in
their own affairs; and secondly, because both the parties to the argu-
ment are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine them-
selves to be speaking of absolute justice. For the one party, if they are
unequal in one respect, for example wealth, consider themselves to be
unequal in all; and the other party, if they are equal in one respect, for
example free birth, consider themselves to be equal in all. But they leave
out the capital point. For if men met and associated out of regard to
wealth only, their share in the state would be proportioned to their prop-
erty, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It
would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share
of a hundred minae, whether of the principal or of the profits, as he who
paid the remaining ninety-nine. But a state exists for the sake of a good
life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves
and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no
share in happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state exist for
the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake of
exchange and mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians and the
Carthaginians, and all who have commercial treaties with one another,
would be the citizens of one state. True, they have agreements about
imports, and engagements that they will do no wrong to one another,
and written articles of alliance. But there are no magistrates common to
the contracting parties who will enforce their engagements; different
states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one state take care
that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, nor see that
those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wicked-
ness at an, but only that they do no injustice to one another. Whereas,
those who care for good government take into consideration virtue and
vice in states. Whence it may be further inferred that virtue must be the
care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name:
for without this end the community becomes a mere alliance which dif-
fers only in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and
law is only a convention, ‘a surety to one another of justice,’ as the
sophist Lycophron says, and has no real power to make the citizens
64/Aristotle
This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and
Megara, to be brought together so that their walls touched, still they
would not be one city, not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry,
which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if
men dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so far off as to have
no intercourse, and there were laws among them that they should not
wrong each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a state. Let
us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a husbandman, another
a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: neverthe-
less, if they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, and the
like, that would not constitute a state. Why is this? Surely not because
they are at a distance from one another: for even supposing that such a
community were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of
his own, which was in a manner his state, and that they made alliance
with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker
would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another
was of the same character after as before their union. It is clear then that
a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the
prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange. These are
conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together
do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggrega-
tions of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-suffic-
ing life. Such a community can only be established among those who
live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family con-
nections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw
men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live
together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are
the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages
in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and hon-
orable life.
Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of
noble actions, and not of mere companionship. Hence they who contrib-
ute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have
the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to
them in political virtue; or than those who exceed them in wealth but are
surpassed by them in virtue.
From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans
of different forms of government speak of a part of justice only.
Politics/65
Part X
There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state:
Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man?
Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable
consequences. If the poor, for example, because they are more in num-
ber, divide among themselves the property of the rich—is not this un-
just? No, by heaven (will be the reply), for the supreme authority justly
willed it. But if this is not injustice, pray what is? Again, when in the
first division all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the prop-
erty of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin
the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her, nor
is justice destructive of a state; and therefore this law of confiscation
clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity
be just; for he only coerces other men by superior power, just as the
multitude coerce the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy
should be the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder
the people—is this just? if so, the other case will likewise be just. But
there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.
Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that
case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored.
For the offices of a state are posts of honor; and if one set of men always
holds them, the rest must be deprived of them. Then will it be well that
the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still more oligarchical, for the
number of those who are dishonored is thereby increased. Some one
may say that it is bad in any case for a man, subject as he is to all the
accidents of human passion, to have the supreme power, rather than the
law. But what if the law itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will
that help us out of our difficulties? Not at all; the same consequences
will follow.
Part XI
Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. The prin-
ciple that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is
one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to
contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each individual is
but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be
better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively,
just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided
out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of
66/Aristotle
virtue and prudence, and when they meet together, they become in a
manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a
figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better judges
than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part,
and some another, and among them they understand the whole. There is
a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any
individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who
are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because in them the
scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately, the eye
of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer
than in the picture. Whether this principle can apply to every democ-
racy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some
cases it is impossible of application; for the argument would equally
hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ
from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our statement
is nevertheless true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already
raised, and also another which is akin to it—viz., what power should be
assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have
no personal merit—are both solved. There is still a danger in aflowing
them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into
error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not
letting them share, for a state in which many poor men are excluded
from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way of escape
is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial functions. For this
reason Solon and certain other legislators give them the power of elect-
ing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not
allow them to hold office singly. When they meet together their percep-
tions are quite good enough, and combined with the better class they are
useful to the state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure
sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity
of the pure would be), but each individual, left to himself, forms an
imperfect judgment. On the other hand, the popular form of government
involves certain difficulties. In the first place, it might be objected that
he who can judge of the healing of a sick man would be one who could
himself heal his disease, and make him whole—that is, in other words,
the physician; and so in all professions and arts. As, then, the physician
ought to be called to account by physicians, so ought men in general to
be called to account by their peers. But physicians are of three kinds:
there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is the physician of the higher
Politics/67
class, and thirdly the intelligent man who has studied the art: in all arts
there is such a class; and we attribute the power of judging to them quite
as much as to professors of the art. Secondly, does not the same prin-
ciple apply to elections? For a right election can only be made by those
who have knowledge; those who know geometry, for example, will choose
a geometrician rightly, and those who know how to steer, a pilot; and,
even if there be some occupations and arts in which private persons
share in the ability to choose, they certainly cannot choose better than
those who know. So that, according to this argument, neither the elec-
tion of magistrates, nor the calling of them to account, should be en-
trusted to the many. Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent
met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, al-
though individually they may be worse judges than those who have spe-
cial knowledge—as a body they are as good or better. Moreover, there
are some arts whose products are not judged of solely, or best, by the
artists themselves, namely those arts whose products are recognized
even by those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of
the house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words,
the master, of the house will be even a better judge than the builder, just
as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest
will judge better of a feast than the cook.
This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, but there is
another akin to it. That inferior persons should have authority in greater
matters than the good would appear to be a strange thing, yet the elec-
tion and calling to account of the magistrates is the greatest of all. And
these, as I was saying, are functions which in some states are assigned
to the people, for the assembly is supreme in all such matters. Yet per-
sons of any age, and having but a small property qualification, sit in the
assembly and deliberate and judge, although for the great officers of
state, such as treasurers and generals, a high qualification is required.
This difficulty may be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and
the present practice of democracies may be really defensible. For the
power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, or ecclesiast, but in the
court, and the senate, and the assembly, of which individual senators, or
ecclesiasts, or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this reason
the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few; for the
people, and the senate, and the courts consist of many persons, and their
property collectively is greater than the property of one or of a few
individuals holding great offices. But enough of this.
68/Aristotle
The discussion of the first question shows nothing so clearly as that
laws, when good, should be supreme; and that the magistrate or magis-
trates should regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable
to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle
embracing all particulars. But what are good laws has not yet been
clearly explained; the old difficulty remains. The goodness or badness,
justice or injustice, of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of
states. This, however, is clear, that the laws must be adapted to the
constitutions. But if so, true forms of government will of necessity have
just laws, and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws.
Part XII
In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in
the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all—this is the
political science of which the good is justice, in other words, the com-
mon interest. All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a
certain extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have
been laid down by us about Ethics. For they admit that justice is a thing
and has a relation to persons, and that equals ought to have equality.
But there still remains a question: equality or inequality of what? Here
is a difficulty which calls for political speculation. For very likely some
persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed
according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen,
although there is no other difference between him and the rest of the
community; for that those who differ in any one respect have different
rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of
a man, or any other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a
greater share of political rights. The error here lies upon the surface,
and may be illustrated from the other arts and sciences. When a number
of flute players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those of
them who are better born should have better flutes given to them; for
they will not play any better on the flute, and the superior instrument
should be reserved for him who is the superior artist. If what I am say-
ing is still obscure, it will be made clearer as we proceed. For if there
were a superior flute-player who was far inferior in birth and beauty,
although either of these may be a greater good than the art of flute-
playing, and may excel flute-playing in a greater ratio than he excels the
others in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless
the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute-
Politics/69
playing, which they do not. Moreover, upon this principle any good may
be compared with any other. For if a given height may be measured
wealth and against freedom, height in general may be so measured. Thus
if A excels in height more than B in virtue, even if virtue in general
excels height still more, all goods will be commensurable; for if a cer-
tain amount is better than some other, it is clear that some other will be
equal. But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that there
is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on
every sort of inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be slow,
and others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and the
others much; it is in gymnastics contests that such excellence is rewarded.
Whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on
the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state.
And therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may with good reason
claim office; for holders of offices must be freemen and taxpayers: a
state can be no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of
slaves. But if wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and
valor are equally so; for without the former qualities a state cannot exist
at all, without the latter not well.
Part XIII
If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem
that all, or some at least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into
account a good life, then, as I have already said, education and virtue
have superior claims. As, however, those who are equal in one thing
ought not to have an equal share in all, nor those who are unequal in one
thing to have an unequal share in all, it is certain that all forms of gov-
ernment which rest on either of these principles are perversions. All men
have a claim in a certain sense, as I have already admitted, but all have
not an absolute claim. The rich claim because they have a greater share
in the land, and land is the common element of the state; also they are
generally more trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under the same
tide as the noble; for they are nearly akin. For the noble are citizens in a
truer sense than the ignoble, and good birth is always valued in a man’s
own home and country. Another reason is, that those who are sprung
from better ancestors are likely to be better men, for nobility is excel-
lence of race. Virtue, too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice
has been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it implies all
others. Again, the many may urge their claim against the few; for, when
70/Aristotle
taken collectively, and compared with the few, they are stronger and
richer and better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and the other
classes who make up a state, are all living together in the same city, Will
there, or will there not, be any doubt who shall rule? No doubt at all in
determining who ought to rule in each of the above-mentioned forms of
government. For states are characterized by differences in their govern-
ing bodies-one of them has a government of the rich, another of the
virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements co-
exist. How are we to decide? Suppose the virtuous to be very few in
number: may we consider their numbers in relation to their duties, and
ask whether they are enough to administer the state, or so many as will
make up a state? Objections may be urged against all the aspirants to
political power. For those who found their claims on wealth or family
might be thought to have no basis of justice; on this principle, if any one
person were richer than all the rest, it is clear that he ought to be ruler of
them. In like manner he who is very distinguished by his birth ought to
have the superiority over all those who claim on the ground that they are
freeborn. In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a like difficulty
occurs about virtue; for if one citizen be better than the other members
of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon the same
principle of justice, should rule over them. And if the people are to be
supreme because they are stronger than the few, then if one man, or
more than one, but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought
to rule, and not the many.
All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles
on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to
them are strictly right. To those who claim to be masters of the govern-
ment on the ground of their virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly
answer that they themselves are often better and richer than the few—I
do not say individually, but collectively. And another ingenious objec-
tion which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner.
Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest
laws ought to legislate with a view to the good of the higher classes or of
the many, when the case which we have mentioned occurs. Now what is
just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of ‘what is equal’; and that
which is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with refer-
ence to the advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens.
And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He
differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is
Politics/71
one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to
the life of virtue.
If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, although
not enough to make up the full complement of a state, whose virtue is so
pre-eminent that the virtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit
of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they can be no longer regarded
as part of a state; for justice will not be done to the superior, if he is
reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in
virtue and in political capacity. Such an one may truly be deemed a God
among men. Hence we see that legislation is necessarily concerned only
with those who are equal in birth and in capacity; and that for men of
pre-eminent virtue there is no law—they are themselves a law. Any would
be ridiculous who attempted to make laws for them: they would prob-
ably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions said to the hares,
when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and claim-
ing equality for all. And for this reason democratic states have instituted
ostracism; equality is above all things their aim, and therefore they os-
tracized and banished from the city for a time those who seemed to
predominate too much through their wealth, or the number of their friends,
or through any other political influence. Mythology tells us that the
Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason; the ship Argo would
not take him because she feared that he would have been too much for
the rest of the crew. Wherefore those who denounce tyranny and blame
the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held alto-
gether just in their censure. The story is that Periander, when the herald
was sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off the tallest
ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. The herald did not
know the meaning of the action, but came and reported what he had seen
to Thrasybulus, who understood that he was to cut off the principal men
in the state; and this is a policy not only expedient for tyrants or in
practice confined to them, but equally necessary in oligarchies and de-
mocracies. Ostracism is a measure of the same kind, which acts by
disabling and banishing the most prominent citizens. Great powers do
the same to whole cities and nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians,
Chians, and Lesbians; no sooner had they obtained a firm grasp of the
empire, than they humbled their allies contrary to treaty; and the Per-
sian king has repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babylonians, and other
nations, when their spirit has been stirred by the recollection of their
former greatness.
72/Aristotle
The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns all forms of
government, true as well as false; for, although perverted forms with a
view to their own interests may adopt this policy, those which seek the
common interest do so likewise. The same thing may be observed in the
arts and sciences; for the painter will not allow the figure to have a foot
which, however beautiful, is not in proportion, nor will the shipbuilder
allow the stem or any other part of the vessel to be unduly large, any
more than the chorus-master will allow any one who sings louder or
better than all the rest to sing in the choir. Monarchs, too, may practice
compulsion and still live in harmony with their cities, if their own gov-
ernment is for the interest of the state. Hence where there is an acknowl-
edged superiority the argument in favor of ostracism is based upon a
kind of political justice. It would certainly be better that the legislator
should from the first so order his state as to have no need of such a
remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should
endeavor to correct the evil by this or some similar measure. The prin-
ciple, however, has not been fairly applied in states; for, instead of look-
ing to the good of their own constitution, they have used ostracism for
factious purposes. It is true that under perverted forms of government,
and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedi-
ent, but it is also clear that it is not absolutely just. In the perfect state
there would be great doubts about the use of it, not when applied to
excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but when used against
some one who is pre-eminent in virtue—what is to be done with him?
Mankind will not say that such an one is to be expelled and exiled; on
the other hand, he ought not to be a subject—that would be as if man-
kind should claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his offices among them.
The only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler, accord-
ing to what seems to be the order of nature, and that men like him should
be kings in their state for life.
Part XIV
The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads to the consider-
ation of royalty, which we admit to be one of the true forms of govern-
ment. Let us see whether in order to be well governed a state or country
should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of govern-
ment; and whether monarchy, although good for some, may not be bad
for others. But first we must determine whether there is one species of
royalty or many. It is easy to see that there are many, and that the man-
Politics/73
ner of government is not the same in all of them.
Of royalties according to law, (1) the Lacedaemonian is thought to
answer best to the true pattern; but there the royal power is not absolute,
except when the kings go on an expedition, and then they take the com-
mand. Matters of religion are likewise committed to them. The kingly
office is in truth a kind of generalship, irresponsible and perpetual. The
king has not the power of life and death, except in a specified case, as
for instance, in ancient times, he had it when upon a campaign, by right
of force. This custom is described in Homer. For Agamemnon is patient
when he is attacked in the assembly, but when the army goes out to
battle he has the power even of life and death. Does he not say—‘When
I find a man skulking apart from the battle, nothing shall save him from
the dogs and vultures, for in my hands is death’?
This, then, is one form of royalty—a generalship for life: and of
such royalties some are hereditary and others elective.
(2) There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon among the
barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. But this is both legal and
hereditary. For barbarians, being more servile in character than Hellenes,
and Asiadics than Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic govern-
ment. Such royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people are
by nature slaves; but there is no danger of their being overthrown, for
they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore also their guards are such as a
king and not such as a tyrant would employ, that is to say, they are
composed of citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries.
For kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants
over involuntary; and the one are guarded by their fellow-citizens the
others are guarded against them.
These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a third (3) which
existed in ancient Hellas, called an Aesymnetia or dictatorship. This
may be defined generally as an elective tyranny, which, like the barbar-
ian monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being hereditary. Some-
times the office was held for life, sometimes for a term of years, or until
certain duties had been performed. For example, the Mytilenaeans elected
Pittacus leader against the exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and
Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself shows in one of his banquet odes
that they chose Pittacus tyrant, for he reproaches his fellow-citizens for
‘having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and ill-fated
city, with one voice shouting his praises.’
These forms of government have always had the character of tyran-
74/Aristotle
nies, because they possess despotic power; but inasmuch as they are
elective and acquiesced in by their subjects, they are kingly.
(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule—that of the heroic times—
which was hereditary and legal, and was exercised over willing sub-
jects. For the first chiefs were benefactors of the people in arts or arms;
they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them;
and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was
inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and pre-
sided over the sacrifices, except those which required a priest. They
also decided causes either with or without an oath; and when they swore,
the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient
times their power extended continuously to all things whatsoever, in city
and country, as well as in foreign parts; but at a later date they relin-
quished several of these privileges, and others the people took from
them, until in some states nothing was left to them but the sacrifices;
and where they retained more of the reality they had only the right of
leadership in war beyond the border.
These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the monarchy of the
heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but limited to
certain functions; the king was a general and a judge, and had the con-
trol of religion The second is that of the barbarians, which is a heredi-
tary despotic government in accordance with law. A third is the power
of the so-called Aesynmete or Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The
fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship, hereditary
and perpetual. These four forms differ from one another in the manner
which I have described.
(5) There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal
of all, just as each nation or each state has the disposal of public mat-
ters; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as house-
hold management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the
household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations.
Part XV
Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedaemonian and the
absolute royalty; for most of the others he in a region between them,
having less power than the last, and more than the first. Thus the inquiry
is reduced to two points: first, is it advantageous to the state that there
should be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined to
one family, or open to the citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a
Politics/75
single man should have the supreme power in all things? The first ques-
tion falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions; for per-
petual generalship might equally exist under any form of government,
so that this matter may be dismissed for the present. The other kind of
royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have now to consider, and briefly
to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will begin by inquiring
whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the
best laws.
The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in gen-
eral terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any sci-
ence to abide by written rules is absurd. In Egypt the physician is al-
lowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes
the risk. Hence it is clear that a government acting according to written
laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the
general principle which exists in law; and this is a better ruler which is
free from passion than that in which it is innate. Whereas the law is
passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man. Yes, it may be
replied, but then on the other hand an individual will be better able to
deliberate in particular cases.
The best man, then, must legislate, and laws must be passed, but
these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all
other cases retaining their authority. But when the law cannot determine
a point at all, or not well, should the one best man or should all decide?
According to our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, de-
liberate, and decide, and their judgments an relate to individual cases.
Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior
to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a
feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet fur-
nished by a single man, so a multitude is a better judge of many things
than any individual.
Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like
the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little.
The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other pas-
sion, and then his judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly to
be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion
and go wrong at the same moment. Let us assume that they are the
freemen, and that they never act in violation of the law, but fill up the
gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely
attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are
76/Aristotle
good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more incorrupt-
ible, the one good ruler, or the many who are all good? Will not the
many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the
one man is not divided against himself. To which we may answer that
their character is as good as his. If we call the rule of many men, who
are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then
aristocracy will be better for states than royalty, whether the govern-
ment is supported by force or not, provided only that a number of men
equal in virtue can be found.
The first governments were kingships, probably for this reason,
because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue were few.
Further, they were made kings because they were benefactors, and ben-
efits can only be bestowed by good men. But when many persons equal
in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired
to have a commonwealth, and set up a constitution. The ruling class
soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury;
riches became the path to honor, and so oligarchies naturally grew up.
These passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies; for love of
gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number,
and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their masters
and established democracies. Since cities have increased in size, no other
form of government appears to be any longer even easy to establish.
Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is
the best thing for states, how about the family of the king? Are his
children to succeed him? If they are no better than anybody else, that
will be mischievous. But, says the lover of royalty, the king, though he
might, will not hand on his power to his children. That, however, is
hardly to be expected, and is too much to ask of human nature. There is
also a difficulty about the force which he is to employ; should a king
have guards about him by whose aid he may be able to coerce the re-
fractory? If not, how will he administer his kingdom? Even if he be the
lawful sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, still he
must have some force wherewith to maintain the law. In the case of a
limited monarchy there is not much difficulty in answering this ques-
tion; the king must have such force as will be more than a match for one
or more individuals, but not so great as that of the people. The ancients
observe this principle when they have guards to any one whom they
appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked the Syracusans
to allow him guards, somebody advised that they should give him only
Politics/77
such a number.
Part XVI
At this place in the discussion there impends the inquiry respecting the
king who acts solely according to his own will he has now to be consid-
ered. The so-called limited monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I
have already remarked, is not a distinct form of government, for under
all governments, as, for example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there
may be a general holding office for life, and one person is often made
supreme over the administration of a state. A magistracy of this kind
exists at Epidamnus, and also at Opus, but in the latter city has a more
limited power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sover-
eign over an the citizens, in a city which consists of equals, is thought by
some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued that those who are by
nature equals must have the same natural right and worth, and that for
unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an uneven share,
in the offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to
have the same food and clothing. Wherefore it is thought to be just that
among equals every one be ruled as well as rule, and therefore that an
should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession
implies law. And the rule of the law, it is argued, is preferable to that of
any individual. On the same principle, even if it be better for certain
individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and minis-
ters of the law. For magistrates there must be—this is admitted; but then
men say that to give authority to any one man when all are equal is
unjust. Nay, there may indeed be cases which the law seems unable to
determine, but in such cases can a man? Nay, it will be replied, the law
trains officers for this express purpose, and appoints them to determine
matters which are left undecided by it, to the best of their judgment.
Further, it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws
which experience suggests. Therefore he who bids the law rule may be
deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule
adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion
perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The
law is reason unaffected by desire. We are told that a patient should call
in a physician; he will not get better if he is doctored out of a book. But
the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point; for the physician does
nothing contrary to rule from motives of friendship; he only cures a
patient and takes a fee; whereas magistrates do many things from spite
78/Aristotle
and partiality. And, indeed, if a man suspected the physician of being in
league with his enemies to destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have
recourse to the book. But certainly physicians, when they are sick, call
in other physicians, and training-masters, when they are in training,
other training-masters, as if they could not judge judge truly about their
own case and might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is evident
that in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or neutral, for the law
is the mean. Again, customary laws have more weight, and relate to
more important matters, than written laws, and a man may be a safer
ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law.
Again, it is by no means easy for one man to superintend many
things; he will have to appoint a number of subordinates, and what
difference does it make whether these subordinates always existed or
were appointed by him because he needed theme If, as I said before, the
good man has a right to rule because he is better, still two good men are
better than one: this is the old saying, two going together, and the prayer
of Agamemnon,
“Would that I had ten such councillors!”
And at this day there are magistrates, for example judges, who have
authority to decide some matters which the law is unable to determine,
since no one doubts that the law would command and decide in the best
manner whatever it could. But some things can, and other things cannot,
be comprehended under the law, and this is the origin of the nexted
question whether the best law or the best man should rule. For matters
of detail about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation.
Nor does any one deny that the decision of such matters must be left to
man, but it is argued that there should be many judges, and not one only.
For every ruler who has been trained by the law judges well; and it
would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes,
or hear better with two ears, or act better with two hands or feet, than
many with many; indeed, it is already the practice of kings to make to
themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet. For they make col-
leagues of those who are the friends of themselves and their govern-
ments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his government; if
not his friends, they will not do what he wants; but friendship implies
likeness and equality; and, therefore, if he thinks that his friends ought
to rule, he must think that those who are equal to himself and like him-
Politics/79
self ought to rule equally with himself. These are the principal contro-
versies relating to monarchy.
Part XVII
But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? for there is
by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a
master, another to kingly rule, another to constitutional rule; but there is
none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other perverted form of
government; for these come into being contrary to nature. Now, to judge
at least from what has been said, it is manifest that, where men are alike
and equal, it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be lord of
all, whether there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself
is in the place of law. Neither should a good man be lord over good men,
nor a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have
a right to rule, unless in a particular case, at which I have already hinted,
and to which I will once more recur. But first of all, I must determine
what natures are suited for government by a king, and what for an aris-
tocracy, and what for a constitutional government.
A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in
the virtue needed for political rule are fitted for kingly government; and
a people submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue renders
them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy; while
the people who are suited for constitutional freedom are those among
whom there naturally exists a warlike multitude able to rule and to obey
in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their
desert. But when a whole family or some individual, happens to be so
pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all others, then it is just that they
should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen
should be king of the whole nation. For, as I said before, to give them
authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the founders
of all states, whether aristocratical, or oligarchical, or again democrati-
cal, are accustomed to put forward (for these all recognize the claim of
excellence, although not the same excellence), but accords with the prin-
ciple already laid down. For surely it would not be right to kill, or ostra-
cize, or exile such a person, or require that he should take his turn in
being governed. The whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who
has this pre-eminence is in the relation of a whole to a part. But if so, the
only alternative is that he should have the supreme power, and that man-
kind should obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions
80/Aristotle
at which we arrive respecting royalty and its various forms, and this is
the answer to the question, whether it is or is not advantageous to states,
and to which, and how.
Part XVIII
We maintain that the true forms of government are three, and that the
best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there
is one man, or a whole family, or many persons, excelling all the others
together in virtue, and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule,
the others to be ruled, in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life.
We showed at the commencement of our inquiry that the virtue of the
good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the per-
fect state. Clearly then in the same manner, and by the same means
through which a man becomes truly good, he will frame a state that is to
be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king, and the same education and the
same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a
statesman or a king.
Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed to speak of
the perfect state, and describe how it comes into being and is estab-
lished.
BOOK FOUR
Part I
In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject, and do
not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single
art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject. For
example, the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of
different modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is abso-
lutely the best (1); (for the absolutely best must suit that which is by
nature best and best furnished with the means of life), and also what
common form of training is adapted to the great majority of men (4).
And if a man does not desire the best habit of body, or the greatest skill
in gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the
teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of either
(3). The same principle equally holds in medicine and shipbuilding, and
the making of clothes, and in the arts generally.
Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single
science, which has to consider what government is best and of what sort
Politics/81
it must be, to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were
no external impediment, and also what kind of government is adapted to
particular states. For the best is often unattainable, and therefore the
true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with (1)
that which is best in the abstract, but also with (2) that which is best
relatively to circumstances. We should be able further to say how a state
may be constituted under any given conditions (3); both how it is origi-
nally formed and, when formed, how it may be longest preserved; the
supposed state being so far from having the best constitution that it is
unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the best; neither is it
the best under the circumstances, but of an inferior type.
He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of government which is
best suited to states in general; for political writers, although they have
excellent ideas, are often unpractical. We should consider, not only what
form of government is best, but also what is possible and what is easily
attainable by all. There are some who would have none but the most
perfect; for this many natural advantages are required. Others, again,
speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitu-
tion under which they are living, they extol some one in particular, for
example the Lacedaemonian. Any change of government which has to
be introduced should be one which men, starting from their existing
constitutions, will be both willing and able to adopt, since there is quite
as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitution as in the estab-
lishment of a new one, just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn. And
therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesman already men-
tioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing
constitutions, as has been said before. This he cannot do unless he knows
how many forms of government there are. It is often supposed that there
is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. But this is a mis-
take; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what dif-
ferences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways
they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know
which laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions;
for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution, and not the
constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices in a
state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the
end of each community. But laws are not to be confounded with the
principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the
magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders.
82/Aristotle
So that we must know the varieties, and the number of varieties, of each
form of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same
laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all democracies,
since there is certainly more than one form both of democracy and of
oligarchy.
Part II
In our original discussion about governments we divided them into three
true forms: kingly rule, aristocracy, and constitutional government, and
three corresponding perversions—tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.
Of kingly rule and of aristocracy, we have already spoken, for the in-
quiry into the perfect state is the same thing with the discussion of the
two forms thus named, since both imply a principle of virtue provided
with external means. We have already determined in what aristocracy
and kingly rule differ from one another, and when the latter should be
established. In what follows we have to describe the so-called constitu-
tional government, which bears the common name of all constitutions,
and the other forms, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy.
It is obvious which of the three perversions is the worst, and which
is the next in badness. That which is the perversion of the first and most
divine is necessarily the worst. And just as a royal rule, if not a mere
name, must exist by virtue of some great personal superiority in the
king, so tyranny, which is the worst of governments, is necessarily the
farthest removed from a well-constituted form; oligarchy is little better,
for it is a long way from aristocracy, and democracy is the most toler-
able of the three.
A writer who preceded me has already made these distinctions, but
his point of view is not the same as mine. For he lays down the principle
that when all the constitutions are good (the oligarchy and the rest being
virtuous), democracy is the worst, but the best when all are bad. Whereas
we maintain that they are in any case defective, and that one oligarchy is
not to be accounted better than another, but only less bad.
Not to pursue this question further at present, let us begin by deter-
mining (1) how many varieties of constitution there are (since of democ-
racy and oligarchy there are several): (2) what constitution is the most
generally acceptable, and what is eligible in the next degree after the
perfect state; and besides this what other there is which is aristocratical
and well-constituted, and at the same time adapted to states in general;
(3) of the other forms of government to whom each is suited. For de-
Politics/83
mocracy may meet the needs of some better than oligarchy, and con-
versely. In the next place (4) we have to consider in what manner a man
ought to proceed who desires to establish some one among these various
forms, whether of democracy or of oligarchy; and lastly, (5) having
briefly discussed these subjects to the best of our power, we will en-
deavor to ascertain the modes of ruin and preservation both of constitu-
tions generally and of each separately, and to what causes they are to be
attributed.
Part III
The reason why there are many forms of government is that every state
contains many elements. In the first place we see that all states are made
up of families, and in the multitude of citizen there must be some rich
and some poor, and some in a middle condition; the rich are heavy-
armed, and the poor not. Of the common people, some are husbandmen,
and some traders, and some artisans. There are also among the notables
differences of wealth and property—for example, in the number of horses
which they keep, for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are
rich. And therefore in old times the cities whose strength lay in their
cavalry were oligarchies, and they used cavalry in wars against their
neighbors; as was the practice of the Eretrians and Chalcidians, and
also of the Magnesians on the river Maeander, and of other peoples in
Asia. Besides differences of wealth there are differences of rank and
merit, and there are some other elements which were mentioned by us
when in treating of aristocracy we enumerated the essentials of a state.
Of these elements, sometimes all, sometimes the lesser and sometimes
the greater number, have a share in the government. It is evident then
that there must be many forms of government, differing in kind, since
the parts of which they are composed differ from each other in kind. For
a constitution is an organization of offices, which all the citizens distrib-
ute among themselves, according to the power which different classes
possess, for example the rich or the poor, or according to some principle
of equality which includes both. There must therefore be as many forms
of government as there are modes of arranging the offices, according to
the superiorities and differences of the parts of the state.
There are generally thought to be two principal forms: as men say
of the winds that there are but two—north and south, and that the rest of
them are only variations of these, so of governments there are said to be
only two forms—democracy and oligarchy. For aristocracy is consid-
84/Aristotle
ered to be a kind of oligarchy, as being the rule of a few, and the so-
called constitutional government to be really a democracy, just as among
the winds we make the west a variation of the north, and the east of the
south wind. Similarly of musical modes there are said to be two kinds,
the Dorian and the Phrygian; the other arrangements of the scale are
comprehended under one or other of these two. About forms of govern-
ment this is a very favorite notion. But in either case the better and more
exact way is to distinguish, as I have done, the one or two which are true
forms, and to regard the others as perversions, whether of the most
perfectly attempered mode or of the best form of government: we may
compare the severer and more overpowering modes to the oligarchical
forms, and the more relaxed and gentler ones to the democratic.
Part IV
It must not be assumed, as some are fond of saying, that democracy is
simply that form of government in which the greater number are sover-
eign, for in oligarchies, and indeed in every government, the majority
rules; nor again is oligarchy that form of government in which a few are
sovereign. Suppose the whole population of a city to be 1300, and that
of these 1000 are rich, and do not allow the remaining 300 who are
poor, but free, and in an other respects their equals, a share of the gov-
ernment—no one will say that this is a democracy. In like manner, if the
poor were few and the masters of the rich who outnumber them, no one
would ever call such a government, in which the rich majority have no
share of office, an oligarchy. Therefore we should rather say that de-
mocracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and
oligarchy in which the rich; it is only an accident that the free are the
many and the rich are the few. Otherwise a government in which the
offices were given according to stature, as is said to be the case in Ethio-
pia, or according to beauty, would be an oligarchy; for the number of
tall or good-looking men is small. And yet oligarchy and democracy are
not sufficiently distinguished merely by these two characteristics of wealth
and freedom. Both of them contain many other elements, and therefore
we must carry our analysis further, and say that the government is not a
democracy in which the freemen, being few in number, rule over the
many who are not free, as at Apollonia, on the Ionian Gulf, and at
Thera; (for in each of these states the nobles, who were also the earliest
settlers, were held in chief honor, although they were but a few out of
many). Neither is it a democracy when the rich have the government
Politics/85
because they exceed in number; as was the case formerly at Colophon,
where the bulk of the inhabitants were possessed of large property be-
fore the Lydian War. But the form of government is a democracy when
the free, who are also poor and the majority, govern, and an oligarchy
when the rich and the noble govern, they being at the same time few in
number.
I have said that there are many forms of government, and have ex-
plained to what causes the variety is due. Why there are more than those
already mentioned, and what they are, and whence they arise, I will now
proceed to consider, starting from the principle already admitted, which
is that every state consists, not of one, but of many parts. If we were
going to speak of the different species of animals, we should first of all
determine the organs which are indispensable to every animal, as for
example some organs of sense and the instruments of receiving and di-
gesting food, such as the mouth and the stomach, besides organs of
locomotion. Assuming now that there are only so many kinds of organs,
but that there may be differences in them—I mean different kinds of
mouths, and stomachs, and perceptive and locomotive organs—the pos-
sible combinations of these differences will necessarily furnish many
variedes of animals. (For animals cannot be the same which have differ-
ent kinds of mouths or of ears.) And when all the combinations are
exhausted, there will be as many sorts of animals as there are combina-
tions of the necessary organs. The same, then, is true of the forms of
government which have been described; states, as I have repeatedly said,
are composed, not of one, but of many elements. One element is the
food-producing class, who are called husbandmen; a second, the class
of mechanics who practice the arts without which a city cannot exist; of
these arts some are absolutely necessary, others contribute to luxury or
to the grace of life. The third class is that of traders, and by traders I
mean those who are engaged in buying and selling, whether in com-
merce or in retail trade. A fourth class is that of the serfs or laborers.
The warriors make up the fifth class, and they are as necessary as any
of the others, if the country is not to be the slave of every invader. For
how can a state which has any title to the name be of a slavish nature?
The state is independent and self-sufficing, but a slave is the reverse of
independent. Hence we see that this subject, though ingeniously, has not
been satisfactorily treated in the Republic. Socrates says that a state is
made up of four sorts of people who are absolutely necessary; these are
a weaver, a husbandman, a shoemaker, and a builder; afterwards, find-
86/Aristotle
ing that they are not enough, he adds a smith, and again a herdsman, to
look after the necessary animals; then a merchant, and then a retail
trader. All these together form the complement of the first state, as if a
state were established merely to supply the necessaries of life, rather
than for the sake of the good, or stood equally in need of shoemakers
and of husbandmen. But he does not admit into the state a military class
until the country has increased in size, and is beginning to encroach on
its neighbor’s land, whereupon they go to war. Yet even amongst his
four original citizens, or whatever be the number of those whom he
associates in the state, there must be some one who will dispense justice
and determine what is just. And as the soul may be said to be more truly
part of an animal than the body, so the higher parts of states, that is to
say, the warrior class, the class engaged in the administration of justice,
and that engaged in deliberation, which is the special business of politi-
cal common sense-these are more essential to the state than the parts
which minister to the necessaries of life. Whether their several functions
are the functions of different citizens, or of the same—for it may often
happen that the same persons are both warriors and husbandmen—is
immaterial to the argument. The higher as well as the lower elements
are to be equally considered parts of the state, and if so, the military
element at any rate must be included. There are also the wealthy who
minister to the state with their property; these form the seventh class.
The eighth class is that of magistrates and of officers; for the state can-
not exist without rulers. And therefore some must be able to take office
and to serve the state, either always or in turn. There only remains the
class of those who deliberate and who judge between disputants; we
were just now distinguishing them. If presence of all these elements, and
their fair and equitable organization, is necessary to states, then there
must also be persons who have the ability of statesmen. Different func-
tions appear to be often combined in the same individual; for example,
the warrior may also be a husbandman, or an artisan; or, again, the
councillor a judge. And all claim to possess political ability, and think
that they are quite competent to fill most offices. But the same persons
cannot be rich and poor at the same time. For this reason the rich and
the poor are regarded in an especial sense as parts of a state. Again,
because the rich are generally few in number, while the poor are many,
they appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they
form the government. Hence arises the common opinion that there are
two kinds of government—democracy and oligarchy.
Politics/87
I have already explained that there are many forms of constitution,
and to what causes the variety is due. Let me now show that there are
different forms both of democracy and oligarchy, as will indeed be evi-
dent from what has preceded. For both in the common people and in the
notables various classes are included; of the common people, one class
are husbandmen, another artisans; another traders, who are employed
in buying and selling; another are the seafaring class, whether engaged
in war or in trade, as ferrymen or as fishermen. (In many places any one
of these classes forms quite a large population; for example, fishermen
at Tarentum and Byzantium, crews of triremes at Athens, merchant sea-
men at Aegina and Chios, ferrymen at Tenedos.) To the classes already
mentioned may be added day-laborers, and those who, owing to their
needy circumstances, have no leisure, or those who are not of free birth
on both sides; and there may be other classes as well. The notables
again may be divided according to their wealth, birth, virtue, education,
and similar differences.
Of forms of democracy first comes that which is said to be based
strictly on equality. In such a democracy the law says that it is just for
the poor to have no more advantage than the rich; and that neither should
be masters, but both equal. For if liberty and equality, as is thought by
some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained
when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. And since
the people are the majority, and the opinion of the majority is decisive,
such a government must necessarily be a democracy. Here then is one
sort of democracy. There is another, in which the magistrates are elected
according to a certain property qualification, but a low one; he who has
the required amount of property has a share in the government, but he
who loses his property loses his rights. Another kind is that in which all
the citizens who are under no disqualification share in the government,
but still the law is supreme. In another, everybody, if he be only a citi-
zen, is admitted to the government, but the law is supreme as before. A
fifth form of democracy, in other respects the same, is that in which, not
the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and supersede the
law by their decrees. This is a state of affairs brought about by the
demagogues. For in democracies which are subject to the law the best
citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the
laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people be-
comes a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power in
their hands, not as individuals, but collectively. Homer says that ‘it is
88/Aristotle
not good to have a rule of many,’ but whether he means this corporate
rule, or the rule of many individuals, is uncertain. At all events this sort
of democracy, which is now a monarch, and no longer under the control
of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot; the
flatterer is held in honor; this sort of democracy being relatively to other
democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of
both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better
citizens. The decrees of the demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant;
and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. Both
have great power; the flatterer with the tyrant, the demagogue with de-
mocracies of the kind which we are describing. The demagogues make
the decrees of the people override the laws, by referring all things to the
popular assembly. And therefore they grow great, because the people
have an things in their hands, and they hold in their hands the votes of
the people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, those who have
any complaint to bring against the magistrates say, ‘Let the people be
judges’; the people are too happy to accept the invitation; and so the
authority of every office is undermined. Such a democracy is fairly open
to the objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws
have no authority, there is no constitution. The law ought to be supreme
over all, and the magistracies should judge of particulars, and only this
should be considered a constitution. So that if democracy be a real form
of government, the sort of system in which all things are regulated by
decrees is clearly not even a democracy in the true sense of the word, for
decrees relate only to particulars.
These then are the different kinds of democracy.
Part V
Of oligarchies, too, there are different kinds: one where the property
qualification for office is such that the poor, although they form the
majority, have no share in the government, yet he who acquires a quali-
fication may obtain a share. Another sort is when there is a qualification
for office, but a high one, and the vacancies in the governing body are
fired by co-optation. If the election is made out of all the qualified per-
sons, a constitution of this kind inclines to an aristocracy, if out of a
privileged class, to an oligarchy. Another sort of oligarchy is when the
son succeeds the father. There is a fourth form, likewise hereditary, in
which the magistrates are supreme and not the law. Among oligarchies
this is what tyranny is among monarchies, and the last-mentioned form
Politics/89
of democracy among democracies; and in fact this sort of oligarchy
receives the name of a dynasty (or rule of powerful families).
These are the different sorts of oligarchies and democracies. It should,
however, be remembered that in many states the constitution which is
established by law, although not democratic, owing to the education and
habits of the people may be administered democratically, and conversely
in other states the established constitution may incline to democracy,
but may be administered in an oligarchical spirit. This most often hap-
pens after a revolution: for governments do not change at once; at first
the dominant party are content with encroaching a little upon their op-
ponents. The laws which existed previously continue in force, but the
authors of the revolution have the power in their hands.
Part VI
From what has been already said we may safely infer that there are so
many different kinds of democracies and of oligarchies. For it is evident
that either all the classes whom we mentioned must share in the govern-
ment, or some only and not others. When the class of husbandmen and
of those who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, the
government is administered according to law. For the citizens being com-
pelled to live by their labor have no leisure; and so they set up the au-
thority of the law, and attend assemblies only when necessary. They all
obtain a share in the government when they have acquired the qualifica-
tion which is fixed by the law—the absolute exclusion of any class
would be a step towards oligarchy; hence all who have acquired the
property qualification are admitted to a share in the constitution. But
leisure cannot be provided for them unless there are revenues to support
them. This is one sort of democracy, and these are the causes which give
birth to it. Another kind is based on the distinction which naturally comes
next in order; in this, every one to whose birth there is no objection is
eligible, but actually shares in the government only if he can find lei-
sure. Hence in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the
laws, because the state has no means of paying the citizens. A third kind
is when all freemen have a right to share in the government, but do not
actually share, for the reason which has been already given; so that in
this form again the law must rule. A fourth kind of democracy is that
which comes latest in the history of states. In our own day, when cities
have far outgrown their original size, and their revenues have increased,
all the citizens have a place in the government, through the great pre-
90/Aristotle
ponderance of the multitude; and they all, including the poor who re-
ceive pay, and therefore have leisure to exercise their rights, share in the
administration. Indeed, when they are paid, the common people have the
most leisure, for they are not hindered by the care of their property,
which often fetters the rich, who are thereby prevented from taking part
in the assembly or in the courts, and so the state is governed by the poor,
who are a majority, and not by the laws.
So many kinds of democracies there are, and they grow out of these
necessary causes.
Of oligarchies, one form is that in which the majority of the citizens
have some property, but not very much; and this is the first form, which
allows to any one who obtains the required amount the right of sharing
in the government. The sharers in the government being a numerous
body, it follows that the law must govern, and not individuals. For in
proportion as they are further removed from a monarchical form of
government, and in respect of property have neither so much as to be
able to live without attending to business, nor so little as to need state
support, they must admit the rule of law and not claim to rule them-
selves. But if the men of property in the state are fewer than in the
former case, and own more property, there arises a second form of oli-
garchy. For the stronger they are, the more power they claim, and hav-
ing this object in view, they themselves select those of the other classes
who are to be admitted to the government; but, not being as yet strong
enough to rule without the law, they make the law represent their wishes.
When this power is intensified by a further diminution of their numbers
and increase of their property, there arises a third and further stage of
oligarchy, in which the governing class keep the offices in their own
hands, and the law ordains that the son shall succeed the father. When,
again, the rulers have great wealth and numerous friends, this sort of
family despotism approaches a monarchy; individuals rule and not the
law. This is the fourth sort of oligarchy, and is analogous to the last sort
of democracy.
Part VII
There are still two forms besides democracy and oligarchy; one of them
is universally recognized and included among the four principal forms
of government, which are said to be (1) monarchy, (2) oligarchy, (3)
democracy, and (4) the so-called aristocracy or government of the best.
But there is also a fifth, which retains the generic name of polity or
Politics/91
constitutional government; this is not common, and therefore has not
been noticed by writers who attempt to enumerate the different kinds of
government; like Plato, in their books about the state, they recognize
four only. The term ‘aristocracy’ is rightly applied to the form of gov-
ernment which is described in the first part of our treatise; for that only
can be rightly called aristocracy which is a government formed of the
best men absolutely, and not merely of men who are good when tried by
any given standard. In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the
same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only
good relatively to his own form of government. But there are some states
differing from oligarchies and also differing from the so-called polity or
constitutional government; these are termed aristocracies, and in them
the magistrates are certainly chosen, both according to their wealth and
according to their merit. Such a form of government differs from each
of the two just now mentioned, and is termed an aristocracy. For indeed
in states which do not make virtue the aim of the community, men of
merit and reputation for virtue may be found. And so where a govern-
ment has regard to wealth, virtue, and numbers, as at Carthage, that is
aristocracy; and also where it has regard only to two out of the three, as
at Lacedaemon, to virtue and numbers, and the two principles of de-
mocracy and virtue temper each other. There are these two forms of
aristocracy in addition to the first and perfect state, and there is a third
form, viz., the constitutions which incline more than the so-called polity
towards oligarchy.
Part VIII
I have yet to speak of the so-called polity and of tyranny. I put them in
this order, not because a polity or constitutional government is to be
regarded as a perversion any more than the above mentioned aristocra-
cies. The truth is, that they an fall short of the most perfect form of
government, and so they are reckoned among perversions, and the really
perverted forms are perversions of these, as I said in the original discus-
sion. Last of all I will speak of tyranny, which I place last in the series
because I am inquiring into the constitutions of states, and this is the
very reverse of a constitution
Having explained why I have adopted this order, I will proceed to
consider constitutional government; of which the nature will be clearer
now that oligarchy and democracy have been defined. For polity or con-
stitutional government may be described generally as a fusion of oligar-
92/Aristotle
chy and democracy; but the term is usually applied to those forms of
government which incline towards democracy, and the term aristocracy
to those which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education
are commonly the accompaniments of wealth. Moreover, the rich al-
ready possess the external advantages the want of which is a temptation
to crime, and hence they are called noblemen and gentlemen. And inas-
much as aristocracy seeks to give predominance to the best of the citi-
zens, people say also of oligarchies that they are composed of noblemen
and gentlemen. Now it appears to be an impossible thing that the state
which is governed not by the best citizens but by the worst should be
well-governed, and equally impossible that the state which is ill-gov-
erned should be governed by the best. But we must remember that good
laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government. Hence
there are two parts of good government; one is the actual obedience of
citizens to the laws, the other part is the goodness of the laws which they
obey; they may obey bad laws as well as good. And there may be a
further subdivision; they may obey either the best laws which are attain-
able to them, or the best absolutely.
The distribution of offices according to merit is a special character-
istic of aristocracy, for the principle of an aristocracy is virtue, as wealth
is of an oligarchy, and freedom of a democracy. In all of them there of
course exists the right of the majority, and whatever seems good to the
majority of those who share in the government has authority. Now in
most states the form called polity exists, for the fusion goes no further
than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the
rich, who commonly take the place of the noble. But as there are three
grounds on which men claim an equal share in the government, free-
dom, wealth, and virtue (for the fourth or good birth is the result of the
two last, being only ancient wealth and virtue), it is clear that the admix-
ture of the two elements, that is to say, of the rich and poor, is to be
called a polity or constitutional government; and the union of the three
is to be called aristocracy or the government of the best, and more than
any other form of government, except the true and ideal, has a right to
this name.
Thus far I have shown the existence of forms of states other than
monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, and what they are, and in what
aristocracies differ from one another, and polities from aristocracies—
that the two latter are not very unlike is obvious.
Politics/93
Part IX
Next we have to consider how by the side of oligarchy and democracy
the so-called polity or constitutional government springs up, and how it
should be organized. The nature of it will be at once understood from a
comparison of oligarchy and democracy; we must ascertain their differ-
ent characteristics, and taking a portion from each, put the two together,
like the parts of an indenture. Now there are three modes in which fu-
sions of government may be affected. In the first mode we must combine
the laws made by both governments, say concerning the administration
of justice. In oligarchies they impose a fine on the rich if they do not
serve as judges, and to the poor they give no pay; but in democracies
they give pay to the poor and do not fine the rich. Now (1) the union of
these two modes is a common or middle term between them, and is
therefore characteristic of a constitutional government, for it is a com-
bination of both. This is one mode of uniting the two elements. Or (2) a
mean may be taken between the enactments of the two: thus democra-
cies require no property qualification, or only a small one, from mem-
bers of the assembly, oligarchies a high one; here neither of these is the
common term, but a mean between them. (3) There is a third mode, in
which something is borrowed from the oligarchical and something from
the democratical principle. For example, the appointment of magistrates
by lot is thought to be democratical, and the election of them oligarchi-
cal; democratical again when there is no property qualification, oligar-
chical when there is. In the aristocratical or constitutional state, one
element will be taken from each—from oligarchy the principle of elect-
ing to offices, from democracy the disregard of qualification. Such are
the various modes of combination.
There is a true union of oligarchy and democracy when the same
state may be termed either a democracy or an oligarchy; those who use
both names evidently feel that the fusion is complete. Such a fusion
there is also in the mean; for both extremes appear in it. The
Lacedaemonian constitution, for example, is often described as a de-
mocracy, because it has many democratical features. In the first place
the youth receive a democratical education. For the sons of the poor are
brought up with with the sons of the rich, who are educated in such a
manner as to make it possible for the sons of the poor to be educated by
them. A similar equality prevails in the following period of life, and
when the citizens are grown up to manhood the same rule is observed;
there is no distinction between the rich and poor. In like manner they all
94/Aristotle
have the same food at their public tables, and the rich wear only such
clothing as any poor man can afford. Again, the people elect to one of
the two greatest offices of state, and in the other they share; for they
elect the Senators and share in the Ephoralty. By others the Spartan
constitution is said to be an oligarchy, because it has many oligarchical
elements. That all offices are filled by election and none by lot, is one of
these oligarchical characteristics; that the power of inflicting death or
banishment rests with a few persons is another; and there are others. In
a well attempted polity there should appear to be both elements and yet
neither; also the government should rely on itself, and not on foreign
aid, and on itself not through the good will of a majority—they might be
equally well-disposed when there is a vicious form of government—but
through the general willingness of all classes in the state to maintain the
constitution.
Enough of the manner in which a constitutional government, and in
which the so-called aristocracies ought to be framed.
Part X
Of the nature of tyranny I have still to speak, in order that it may have
its place in our inquiry (since even tyranny is reckoned by us to be a
form of government), although there is not much to be said about it. I
have already in the former part of this treatise discussed royalty or king-
ship according to the most usual meaning of the term, and considered
whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and what kind of royalty
should be established, and from what source, and how.
When speaking of royalty we also spoke of two forms of tyranny,
which are both according to law, and therefore easily pass into royalty.
Among barbarians there are elected monarchs who exercise a despotic
power; despotic rulers were also elected in ancient Hellas, called
Aesymnetes or Dictators. These monarchies, when compared with one
another, exhibit certain differences. And they are, as I said before, royal,
in so far as the monarch rules according to law over willing subjects;
but they are tyrannical in so far as he is despotic and rules according to
his own fancy. There is also a third kind of tyranny, which is the most
typical form, and is the counterpart of the perfect monarchy. This tyr-
anny is just that arbitrary power of an individual which is responsible to
no one, and governs all alike, whether equals or better, with a view to its
own advantage, not to that of its subjects, and therefore against their
will. No freeman, if he can escape from it, will endure such a govern-
Politics/95
ment.
The kinds of tyranny are such and so many, and for the reasons
which I have given.
Part XI
We have now to inquire what is the best constitution for most states, and
the best life for most men, neither assuming a standard of virtue which
is above ordinary persons, nor an education which is exceptionally fa-
vored by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an
aspiration only, but having regard to the life in which the majority are
able to share, and to the form of government which states in general can
attain. As to those aristocracies, as they are called, of which we were
just now speaking, they either lie beyond the possibilities of the greater
number of states, or they approximate to the so-called constitutional
government, and therefore need no separate discussion. And in fact the
conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these forms rests upon the
same grounds. For if what was said in the Ethics is true, that the happy
life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment, and that
virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attain-
able by every one, must be the best. And the same the same principles of
virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions; for the
constitution is in a figure the life of the city.
Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich,
another very poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted that moderation
and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the
gifts of fortune in moderation; for in that condition of life men are most
ready to follow rational principle. But he who greatly excels in beauty,
strength, birth, or wealth, or on the other hand who is very poor, or very
weak, or very much disgraced, finds it difficult to follow rational prin-
ciple. Of these two the one sort grow into violent and great criminals,
the others into rogues and petty rascals. And two sorts of offenses cor-
respond to them, the one committed from violence, the other from rogu-
ery. Again, the middle class is least likely to shrink from rule, or to be
over-ambitious for it; both of which are injuries to the state. Again,
those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength, wealth, friends,
and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil
begins at home; for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in
which they are brought up, they never learn, even at school, the habit of
obedience. On the other hand, the very poor, who are in the opposite
96/Aristotle
extreme, are too degraded. So that the one class cannot obey, and can
only rule despotically; the other knows not how to command and must
be ruled like slaves. Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters
and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be
more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this: for good
fellowship springs from friendship; when men are at enmity with one
another, they would rather not even share the same path. But a city
ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and
these are generally the middle classes. Wherefore the city which is com-
posed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best constituted in respect
of the elements of which we say the fabric of the state naturally consists.
And this is the class of citizens which is most secure in a state, for they
do not, like the poor, covet their neighbors’ goods; nor do others covet
theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich; and as they neither plot
against others, nor are themselves plotted against, they pass through life
safely. Wisely then did Phocylides pray—‘Many things are best in the
mean; I desire to be of a middle condition in my city.’
Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by
citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-
administered in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible
than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the
addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the
extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good fortune of a state
in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where
some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme
democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either
extreme—either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oli-
garchy; but it is not so likely to arise out of the middle constitutions and
those akin to them. I will explain the reason of this hereafter, when I
speak of the revolutions of states. The mean condition of states is clearly
best, for no other is free from faction; and where the middle class is
large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar
reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones, because in
them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide
all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave
nothing in the middle. And democracies are safer and more permanent
than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more nu-
merous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no
middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and
Politics/97
the state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superiority of the middle
dass is that the best legislators have been of a middle condition; for
example, Solon, as his own verses testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not
a king; and Charondas, and almost all legislators.
These considerations will help us to understand why most govern-
ments are either democratical or oligarchical. The reason is that the
middle class is seldom numerous in them, and whichever party, whether
the rich or the common people, transgresses the mean and predomi-
nates, draws the constitution its own way, and thus arises either oligar-
chy or democracy. There is another reason—the poor and the rich quar-
rel with one another, and whichever side gets the better, instead of estab-
lishing a just or popular government, regards political supremacy as the
prize of victory, and the one party sets up a democracy and the other an
oligarchy. Further, both the parties which had the supremacy in Hellas
looked only to the interest of their own form of government, and estab-
lished in states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies; they
thought of their own advantage, of the public not at all. For these rea-
sons the middle form of government has rarely, if ever, existed, and
among a very few only. One man alone of all who ever ruled in Hellas
was induced to give this middle constitution to states. But it has now
become a habit among the citizens of states, not even to care about
equality; all men are seeking for dominion, or, if conquered, are willing
to submit.
What then is the best form of government, and what makes it the
best, is evident; and of other constitutions, since we say that there are
many kinds of democracy and many of oligarchy, it is not difficult to see
which has the first and which the second or any other place in the order
of excellence, now that we have determined which is the best. For that
which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is
furthest from it worse, if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to
given conditions: I say ‘relatively to given conditions,’ since a particu-
lar government may be preferable, but another form may be better for
some people.
Part XII
We have now to consider what and what kind of government is suitable
to what and what kind of men. I may begin by assuming, as a general
principle common to all governments, that the portion of the state which
desires the permanence of the constitution ought to be stronger than that
98/Aristotle
which desires the reverse. Now every city is composed of quality and
quantity. By quality I mean freedom, wealth, education, good birth, and
by quantity, superiority of numbers. Quality may exist in one of the
classes which make up the state, and quantity in the other. For example,
the meanly-born may be more in number than the well-born, or the poor
than the rich, yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as they fall
short in quality; and therefore there must be a comparison of quantity
and quality. Where the number of the poor is more than proportioned to
the wealth of the rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in
form with the sort of people who compose it in each case. If, for ex-
ample, the husbandmen exceed in number, the first form of democracy
will then arise; if the artisans and laboring class, the last; and so with
the intermediate forms. But where the rich and the notables exceed in
quality more than they fall short in quantity, there oligarchy arises, simi-
larly assuming various forms according to the kind of superiority pos-
sessed by the oligarchs.
The legislator should always include the middle class in his govern-
ment; if he makes his laws oligarchical, to the middle class let him look;
if he makes them democratical, he should equally by his laws try to
attach this class to the state. There only can the government ever be
stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of the others, and in
that case there will be no fear that the rich will unite with the poor
against the rulers. For neither of them will ever be willing to serve the
other, and if they look for some form of government more suitable to
both, they will find none better than this, for the rich and the poor will
never consent to rule in turn, because they mistrust one another. The
arbiter is always the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an
arbiter. The more perfect the admixture of the political elements, the
more lasting will be the constitution. Many even of those who desire to
form aristocratical governments make a mistake, not only in giving too
much power to the rich, but in attempting to overreach the people. There
comes a time when out of a false good there arises a true evil, since the
encroachments of the rich are more destructive to the constitution than
those of the people.
Part XIII
The devices by which oligarchies deceive the people are five in number;
they relate to (1) the assembly; (2) the magistracies; (3) the courts of
law; (4) the use of arms; (5) gymnastic exercises. (1) The assemblies
Politics/99
are thrown open to all, but either the rich only are fined for non-atten-
dance, or a much larger fine is inflicted upon them. (2) to the magistra-
cies, those who are qualified by property cannot decline office upon
oath, but the poor may. (3) In the law courts the rich, and the rich only,
are fined if they do not serve, the poor are let off with impunity, or, as in
the laws of Charondas, a larger fine is inflicted on the rich, and a smaller
one on the poor. In some states all citizen who have registered them-
selves are allowed to attend the assembly and to try causes; but if after
registration they do not attend either in the assembly or at the courts,
heavy fines are imposed upon them. The intention is that through fear of
the fines they may avoid registering themselves, and then they cannot sit
in the law-courts or in the assembly. concerning (4) the possession of
arms, and (5) gymnastic exercises, they legislate in a similar spirit. For
the poor are not obliged to have arms, but the rich are fined for not
having them; and in like manner no penalty is inflicted on the poor for
non-attendance at the gymnasium, and consequently, having nothing to
fear, they do not attend, whereas the rich are liable to a fine, and there-
fore they take care to attend.
These are the devices of oligarchical legislators, and in democracies
they have counter devices. They pay the poor for attending the assem-
blies and the law-courts, and they inflict no penalty on the rich for non-
attendance. It is obvious that he who would duly mix the two principles
should combine the practice of both, and provide that the poor should be
paid to attend, and the rich fined if they do not attend, for then all will
take part; if there is no such combination, power will be in the hands of
one party only. The government should be confined to those who carry
arms. As to the property qualification, no absolute rule can be laid down,
but we must see what is the highest qualification sufficiently compre-
hensive to secure that the number of those who have the rights of citi-
zens exceeds the number of those excluded. Even if they have no share
in office, the poor, provided only that they are not outraged or deprived
of their property, will be quiet enough.
But to secure gentle treatment for the poor is not an easy thing,
since a ruling class is not always humane. And in time of war the poor
are apt to hesitate unless they are fed; when fed, they are willing enough
to fight. In some states the government is vested, not only in those who
are actually serving, but also in those who have served; among the
Malians, for example, the governing body consisted of the latter, while
the magistrates were chosen from those actually on service. And the
100/Aristotle
earliest government which existed among the Hellenes, after the over-
throw of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was
originally taken from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at
that time depended on cavalry; indeed, without discipline, infantry are
useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics,
and therefore the strength of armies lay in their cavalry). But when
cities increased and the heavy armed grew in strength, more had a share
in the government; and this is the reason why the states which we call
constitutional governments have been hitherto called democracies. An-
cient constitutions, as might be expected, were oligarchical and royal;
their population being small they had no considerable middle class; the
people were weak in numbers and organization, and were therefore more
contented to be governed.
I have explained why there are various forms of government, and
why there are more than is generally supposed; for democracy, as well
as other constitutions, has more than one form: also what their differ-
ences are, and whence they arise, and what is the best form of govern-
ment, speaking generally and to whom the various forms of government
are best suited; all this has now been explained.
Part XIV
Having thus gained an appropriate basis of discussion, we will proceed
to speak of the points which follow next in order. We will consider the
subject not only in general but with reference to particular constitu-
tions. All constitutions have three elements, concerning which the good
lawgiver has to regard what is expedient for each constitution. When
they are well-ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they differ
from one another, constitutions differ. There is (1) one element which
deliberates about public affairs; secondly (2) that concerned with the
magistrates—the question being, what they should be, over what they
should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of electing to
them; and thirdly (3) that which has judicial power.
The deliberative element has authority in matters of war and peace,
in making and unmaking alliances; it passes laws, inflicts death, exile,
confiscation, elects magistrates and audits their accounts. These powers
must be assigned either all to all the citizens or an to some of them (for
example, to one or more magistracies, or different causes to different
magistracies), or some of them to all, and others of them only to some.
That all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy;
Politics/101
this is the sort of equality which the people desire. But there are various
ways in which all may share in the government; they may deliberate, not
all in one body, but by turns, as in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian.
There are other constitutions in which the boards of magistrates meet
and deliberate, but come into office by turns, and are elected out of the
tribes and the very smallest divisions of the state, until every one has
obtained office in his turn. The citizens, on the other hand, are assembled
only for the purposes of legislation, and to consult about the constitu-
tion, and to hear the edicts of the magistrates. In another variety of
democracy the citizen form one assembly, but meet only to elect magis-
trates, to pass laws, to advise about war and peace, and to make scruti-
nies. Other matters are referred severally to special magistrates, who
are elected by vote or by lot out of all the citizens Or again, the citizens
meet about election to offices and about scrutinies, and deliberate con-
cerning war or alliances while other matters are administered by the
magistrates, who, as far as is possible, are elected by vote. I am speak-
ing of those magistracies in which special knowledge is required. A
fourth form of democracy is when all the citizens meet to deliberate
about everything, and the magistrates decide nothing, but only make the
preliminary inquiries; and that is the way in which the last and worst
form of democracy, corresponding, as we maintain, to the close family
oligarchy and to tyranny, is at present administered. All these modes are
democratical.
On the other hand, that some should deliberate about all is oligar-
chical. This again is a mode which, like the democratical has many
forms. When the deliberative class being elected out of those who have
a moderate qualification are numerous and they respect and obey the
prohibitions of the law without altering it, and any one who has the
required qualification shares in the government, then, just because of
this moderation, the oligarchy inclines towards polity. But when only
selected individuals and not the whole people share in the deliberations
of the state, then, although, as in the former case, they observe the law,
the government is a pure oligarchy. Or, again, when those who have the
power of deliberation are self-elected, and son succeeds father, and they
and not the laws are supreme—the government is of necessity oligarchi-
cal. Where, again, particular persons have authority in particular mat-
ters—for example, when the whole people decide about peace and war
and hold scrutinies, but the magistrates regulate everything else, and
they are elected by vote—there the government is an aristocracy. And if
102/Aristotle
some questions are decided by magistrates elected by vote, and others
by magistrates elected by lot, either absolutely or out of select candi-
dates, or elected partly by vote, partly by lot—these practices are partly
characteristic of an aristocratical government, and party of a pure con-
stitutional government.
These are the various forms of the deliberative body; they corre-
spond to the various forms of government. And the government of each
state is administered according to one or other of the principles which
have been laid down. Now it is for the interest of democracy, according
to the most prevalent notion of it (I am speaking of that extreme form of
democracy in which the people are supreme even over the laws), with a
view to better deliberation to adopt the custom of oligarchies respecting
courts of law. For in oligarchies the rich who are wanted to be judges
are compelled to attend under pain of a fine, whereas in deinocracies the
poor are paid to attend. And this practice of oligarchies should be adopted
by democracies in their public assemblies, for they will advise better if
they all deliberate together—the people with the notables and the no-
tables with the people. It is also a good plan that those who deliberate
should be elected by vote or by lot in equal numbers out of the different
classes; and that if the people greatly exceed in number those who have
political training, pay should not be given to all, but only to as many as
would balance the number of the notables, or that the number in excess
should be eliminated by lot. But in oligarchies either certain persons
should be co-opted from the mass, or a class of officers should be ap-
pointed such as exist in some states who are termed probuli and guard-
ians of the law; and the citizens should occupy themselves exclusively
with matters on which these have previously deliberated; for so the people
will have a share in the deliberations of the state, but will not be able to
disturb the principles of the constitution. Again, in oligarchies either the
people ought to accept the measures of the government, or not to pass
anything contrary to them; or, if all are allowed to share in counsel, the
decision should rest with the magistrates. The opposite of what is done
in constitutional governments should be the rule in oligarchies; the veto
of the majority should be final, their assent not final, but the proposal
should be referred back to the magistrates. Whereas in constitutional
governments they take the contrary course; the few have the negative,
not the affirmative power; the affirmation of everything rests with the
multitude.
These, then, are our conclusions respecting the deliberative, that is,
Politics/103
the supreme element in states.
Part XV
Next we will proceed to consider the distribution of offices; this too,
being a part of politics concerning which many questions arise: What
shall their number be? Over what shall they preside, and what shall be
their duration? Sometimes they last for six months, sometimes for less;
sometimes they are annual, while in other cases offices are held for still
longer periods. Shall they be for life or for a long term of years; or, if for
a short term only, shall the same persons hold them over and over again,
or once only? Also about the appointment to them—from whom are
they to be chosen, by whom, and how? We should first be in a position
to say what are the possible varieties of them, and then we may proceed
to determine which are suited to different forms of government. But
what are to be included under the term ‘offices’? That is a question not
quite so easily answered. For a political community requires many of-
ficers; and not every one who is chosen by vote or by lot is to be re-
garded as a ruler. In the first place there are the priests, who must be
distinguished from political officers; masters of choruses and heralds,
even ambassadors, are elected by vote. Some duties of superintendence
again are political, extending either to all the citizens in a single sphere
of action, like the office of the general who superintends them when they
are in the field, or to a section of them only, like the inspectorships of
women or of youth. Other offices are concerned with household man-
agement, like that of the corn measurers who exist in many states and
are elected officers. There are also menial offices which the rich have
executed by their slaves. Speaking generally, those are to be called of-
fices to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain mea-
sures and ofjudging and commanding, especially the last; for to com-
mand is the especial duty of a magistrate. But the question is not of any
importance in practice; no one has ever brought into court the meaning
of the word, although such problems have a speculative interest.
What kinds of offices, and how many, are necessary to the existence
of a state, and which, if not necessary, yet conduce to its well being are
much more important considerations, affecting all constitutions, but more
especially small states. For in great states it is possible, and indeed nec-
essary, that every office should have a special function; where the citi-
zens are numerous, many may hold office. And so it happens that some
offices a man holds a second time only after a long interval, and others
104/Aristotle
he holds once only; and certainly every work is better done which re-
ceives the sole, and not the divided attention of the worker. But in small
states it is necessary to combine many offices in a few hands, since the
small number of citizens does not admit of many holding office: for who
will there be to succeed them? And yet small states at times require the
same offices and laws as large ones; the difference is that the one want
them often, the others only after long intervals. Hence there is no reason
why the care of many offices should not be imposed on the same person,
for they will not interfere with each other. When the population is small,
offices should be like the spits which also serve to hold a lamp. We must
first ascertain how many magistrates are necessary in every state, and
also how many are not exactly necessary, but are nevertheless useful,
and then there will be no difficulty in seeing what offices can be com-
bined in one. We should also know over which matters several local
tribunals are to have jurisdiction, and in which authority should be cen-
tralized: for example, should one person keep order in the market and
another in some other place, or should the same person be responsible
everywhere? Again, should offices be divided according to the subjects
with which they deal, or according to the persons with whom they deal:
I mean to say, should one person see to good order in general, or one
look after the boys, another after the women, and so on? Further, under
different constitutions, should the magistrates be the same or different?
For example, in democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, should
there be the same magistrates, although they are elected, not out of equal
or similar classes of citizen but differently under different constitutions—
in aristocracies, for example, they are chosen from the educated, in oli-
garchies from the wealthy, and in democracies from the free—or are
there certain differences in the offices answering to them as well, and
may the same be suitable to some, but different offices to others? For in
some states it may be convenient that the same office should have a
more extensive, in other states a narrower sphere. Special offices are
peculiar to certain forms of government: for example that of probuli,
which is not a democratic office, although a bule or council is. There
must be some body of men whose duty is to prepare measures for the
people in order that they may not be diverted from their business; when
these are few in number, the state inclines to an oligarchy: or rather the
probuli must always be few, and are therefore an oligarchical element.
But when both institutions exist in a state, the probuli are a check on the
council; for the counselors is a democratic element, but the probuli are
Politics/105
oligarchical. Even the power of the council disappears when democracy
has taken that extreme form in which the people themselves are always
meeting and deliberating about everything. This is the case when the
members of the assembly receive abundant pay; for they have nothing
to do and are always holding assemblies and deciding everything for
themselves. A magistracy which controls the boys or the women, or any
similar office, is suited to an aristocracy rather than to a democracy; for
how can the magistrates prevent the wives of the poor from going out of
doors? Neither is it an oligarchical office; for the wives of the oligarchs
are too fine to be controlled.
Enough of these matters. I will now inquire into appointments to
offices. The varieties depend on three terms, and the combinations of
these give all possible modes: first, who appoints? secondly, from whom?
and thirdly, how? Each of these three admits of three varieties: (A) All
the citizens, or (B) only some, appoint. Either (1) the magistrates are
chosen out of all or (2) out of some who are distinguished either by a
property qualification, or by birth, or merit, or for some special reason,
as at Megara only those were eligible who had returned from exile and
fought together against the democracy. They may be appointed either
(a) by vote or (b) by lot. Again, these several varieties may be coupled,
I mean that (C) some officers may be elected by some, others by all, and
(3) some again out of some, and others out of all, and (c) some by vote
and others by lot. Each variety of these terms admits of four modes.
For either (A 1 a) all may appoint from all by vote, or (A 1 b) all
from all by lot, or (A 2 a) all from some by vote, or (A 2 b) all from
some by lot (and from all, either by sections, as, for example, by tribes,
and wards, and phratries, until all the citizens have been gone through;
or the citizens may be in all cases eligible indiscriminately); or again (A
1 c, A 2 c) to some offices in the one way, to some in the other. Again, if
it is only some that appoint, they may do so either (B 1 a) from all by
vote, or (B 1 b) from all by lot, or (B 2 a) from some by vote, or (B 2 b)
from some by lot, or to some offices in the one way, to others in the
other, i.e., (B 1 c) from all, to some offices by vote, to some by lot, and
(B 2 C) from some, to some offices by vote, to some by lot. Thus the
modes that arise, apart from two (C, 3) out of the three couplings, num-
ber twelve. Of these systems two are popular, that all should appoint
from all (A 1 a) by vote or (A 1 b) by lot—or (A 1 c) by both. That all
should not appoint at once, but should appoint from all or from some
either by lot or by vote or by both, or appoint to some offices from all
106/Aristotle
and to others from some (‘by both’ meaning to some offices by lot, to
others by vote), is characteristic of a polity. And (B 1 c) that some
should appoint from all, to some offices by vote, to others by lot, is also
characteristic of a polity, but more oligarchical than the former method.
And (A 3 a, b, c, B 3 a, b, c) to appoint from both, to some offices from
all, to others from some, is characteristic of a polity with a leaning
towards aristocracy. That (B 2) some should appoint from some is oli-
garchical—even (B 2 b) that some should appoint from some by lot
(and if this does not actually occur, it is none the less oligarchical in
character), or (B 2 C) that some should appoint from some by both. (B
1 a) that some should appoint from all, and (A 2 a) that all should
appoint from some, by vote, is aristocratic.
These are the different modes of constituting magistrates, and these
correspond to different forms of government: which are proper to which,
or how they ought to be established, will be evident when we determine
the nature of their powers. By powers I mean such powers as a magis-
trate exercises over the revenue or in defense of the country; for there
are various kinds of power: the power of the general, for example, is not
the same with that which regulates contracts in the market.
Part XVI
Of the three parts of government, the judicial remains to be considered,
and this we shall divide on the same principle. There are three points on
which the variedes of law-courts depend: The persons from whom they
are appointed, the matters with which they are concerned, and the man-
ner of their appointment. I mean, (1) are the judges taken from all, or
from some only? (2) how many kinds of law-courts are there? (3) are
the judges chosen by vote or by lot?
First, let me determine how many kinds of law-courts there are.
There are eight in number: One is the court of audits or scrutinies; a
second takes cognizance of ordinary offenses against the state; a third is
concerned with treason against the constitution; the fourth determines
disputes respecting penalties, whether raised by magistrates or by pri-
vate persons; the fifth decides the more important civil cases; the sixth
tries cases of homicide, which are of various kinds, (a) premeditated,
(b) involuntary, (c) cases in which the guilt is confessed but the justice is
disputed; and there may be a fourth court (d) in which murderers who
have fled from justice are tried after their return; such as the Court of
Phreatto is said to be at Athens. But cases of this sort rarely happen at
Politics/107
all even in large cities. The different kinds of homicide may be tried
either by the same or by different courts. (7) There are courts for strang-
ers: of these there are two subdivisions, (a) for the settlement of their
disputes with one another, (b) for the settlement of disputes between
them and the citizens. And besides all these there must be (8) courts for
small suits about sums of a drachma up to five drachmas, or a little
more, which have to be determined, but they do not require many judges.
Nothing more need be said of these small suits, nor of the courts for
homicide and for strangers: I would rather speak of political cases, which,
when mismanaged, create division and disturbances in constitutions.
Now if all the citizens judge, in all the different cases which I have
distinguished, they may be appointed by vote or by lot, or sometimes by
lot and sometimes by vote. Or when a single class of causes are tried,
the judges who decide them may be appointed, some by vote, and some
by lot. These then are the four modes of appointing judges from the
whole people, and there will be likewise four modes, if they are elected
from a part only; for they may be appointed from some by vote and
judge in all causes; or they may be appointed from some by lot and
judge in all causes; or they may be elected in some cases by vote, and in
some cases taken by lot, or some courts, even when judging the same
causes, may be composed of members some appointed by vote and some
by lot. These modes, then, as was said, answer to those previously men-
tioned.
Once more, the modes of appointment may be combined; I mean,
that some may be chosen out of the whole people, others out of some,
some out of both; for example, the same tribunal may be composed of
some who were elected out of all, and of others who were elected out of
some, either by vote or by lot or by both.
In how many forms law-courts can be established has now been
considered. The first form, viz., that in which the judges are taken from
all the citizens, and in which all causes are tried, is democratical; the
second, which is composed of a few only who try all causes, oligarchi-
cal; the third, in which some courts are taken from all classes, and some
from certain classes only, aristocratical and constitutional.
108/Aristotle
BOOK FIVE
Part I
The design which we proposed to ourselves is now nearly completed.
Next in order follow the causes of revolution in states, how many, and
of what nature they are; what modes of destruction apply to particular
states, and out of what, and into what they mostly change; also what are
the modes of preservation in states generally, or in a particular state,
and by what means each state may be best preserved: these questions
remain to be considered.
In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the
many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been
an acknowledgment of justice and proportionate equality, although man-
kind fail attaining them, as I have already explained. Democracy, for
example, arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect
are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be
absolutely equal. Oligarchy is based on the notion that those who are
unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal; being unequal, that is,
in property, they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely. The demo-
crats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things;
while the oligarchs, under the idea that they are unequal, claim too much,
which is one form of inequality. All these forms of government have a
kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and,
therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not
accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who ex-
cel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone can with
reason be deemed absolutely unequal), but then they are of all men the
least inclined to do so. There is also a superiority which is claimed by
men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from wealthy
and virtuous ancestors. Here then, so to speak, are opened the very
springs and fountains of revolution; and hence arise two sorts of changes
in governments; the one affecting the constitution, when men seek to
change from an existing form into some other, for example, from de-
mocracy into oligarchy, and from oligarchy into democracy, or from
either of them into constitutional government or aristocracy, and con-
versely; the other not affecting the constitution, when, without disturb-
ing the form of government, whether oligarchy, or monarchy, or any
other, they try to get the administration into their own hands. Further,
there is a question of degree; an oligarchy, for example, may become
more or less oligarchical, and a democracy more or less democratical;
Politics/109
and in like manner the characteristics of the other forms of government
may be more or less strictly maintained. Or the revolution may be di-
rected against a portion of the constitution only, e.g., the establishment
or overthrow of a particular office: as at Sparta it is said that Lysander
attempted to overthrow the monarchy, and King Pausanias, the Ephoralty.
At Epidamnus, too, the change was partial. For instead of phylarchs or
heads of tribes, a council was appointed; but to this day the magistrates
are the only members of the ruling class who are compelled to go to the
Heliaea when an election takes place, and the office of the single archon
was another oligarchical feature. Everywhere inequality is a cause of
revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion—for in-
stance, a perpetual monarchy among equals; and always it is the desire
of equality which rises in rebellion.
Now equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional; by the
first I mean sameness or equality in number or size; by the second,
equality of ratios. For example, the excess of three over two is numeri-
cally equal to the excess of two over one; whereas four exceeds two in
the same ratio in which two exceeds one, for two is the same part of four
that one is of two, namely, the half. As I was saying before, men agree
that justice in the abstract is proportion, but they differ in that some
think that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely,
others that if they are unequal in any respect they should be unequal in
all. Hence there are two principal forms of government, democracy and
oligarchy; for good birth and virtue are rare, but wealth and numbers
are more common. In what city shall we find a hundred persons of good
birth and of virtue? whereas the rich everywhere abound. That a state
should be ordered, simply and wholly, according to either kind of equal-
ity, is not a good thing; the proof is the fact that such forms of govern-
ment never last. They are originally based on a mistake, and, as they
begin badly, cannot fall to end badly. The inference is that both kinds of
equality should be employed; numerical in some cases, and proportion-
ate in others.
Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution
than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oli-
garchs falling out among themselves and also with the people; but in
democracies there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs. No
dissension worth mentioning arises among the people themselves. And
we may further remark that a government which is composed of the
middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy,
110/Aristotle
and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.
Part II
In considering how dissensions and poltical revolutions arise, we must
first of all ascertain the beginnings and causes of them which affect
constitutions generally. They may be said to be three in number; and we
have now to give an outline of each. We want to know (1) what is the
feeling? (2) what are the motives of those who make them? (3) whence
arise political disturbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause
of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned; viz., the desire
of equality, when men think that they are equal to others who have more
than themselves; or, again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when
conceiving themselves to be superior they think that they have not more
but the same or less than their inferiors; pretensions which may and may
not be just. Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals
that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revo-
lutions. The motives for making them are the desire of gain and honor,
or the fear of dishonor and loss; the authors of them want to divert
punishment or dishonor from themselves or their friends. The causes
and reasons of revolutions, whereby men are themselves affected in the
way described, and about the things which I have mentioned, viewed in
one way may be regarded as seven, and in another as more than seven.
Two of them have been already noticed; but they act in a different man-
ner, for men are excited against one another by the love of gain and
honor—not, as in the case which I have just supposed, in order to obtain
them for themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, engrossing
them. Other causes are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, con-
tempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state; causes of
another sort are election intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles,
dissimilarity of elements.
Part III
What share insolence and avarice have in creating revolutions, and how
they work, is plain enough. When the magistrates are insolent and grasp-
ing they conspire against one another and also against the constitution
from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the
expense of individuals or of the public. It is evident, again, what an
influence honor exerts and how it is a cause of revolution. Men who are
themselves dishonored and who see others obtaining honors rise in re-
Politics/111
bellion; the honor or dishonor when undeserved is unjust; and just when
awarded according to merit.
Again, superiority is a cause of revolution when one or more per-
sons have a power which is too much for the state and the power of the
government; this is a condition of affairs out of which there arises a
monarchy, or a family oligarchy. And therefore, in some places, as at
Athens and Argos, they have recourse to ostracism. But how much bet-
ter to provide from the first that there should be no such pre-eminent
individuals instead of letting them come into existence and then finding
a remedy.
Another cause of revolution is fear. Either men have committed
wrong, and are afraid of punishment, or they are expecting to suffer
wrong and are desirous of anticipating their enemy. Thus at Rhodes the
notables conspired against the people through fear of the suits that were
brought against them. Contempt is also a cause of insurrection and revo-
lution; for example, in oligarchies—when those who have no share in
the state are the majority, they revolt, because they think that they are
the stronger. Or, again, in democracies, the rich despise the disorder and
anarchy of the state; at Thebes, for example, where, after the battle of
Oenophyta, the bad administration of the democracy led to its ruin. At
Megara the fall of the democracy was due to a defeat occasioned by
disorder and anarchy. And at Syracuse the democracy aroused contempt
before the tyranny of Gelo arose; at Rhodes, before the insurrection.
Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in
any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many members, and
every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be pre-
served; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of
the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality
as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal: even
so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow impercep-
tibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitu-
tional states. And this disproportion may sometimes happen by an acci-
dent, as at Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables were
slain in a battle with the Iapygians just after the Persian War, the consti-
tutional government in consequence becoming a democracy; or as was
the case at Argos, where the Argives, after their army had been cut to
pieces on the seventh day of the month by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian,
were compelled to admit to citizen some of their Perioeci; and at Ath-
ens, when, after frequent defeats of their infantry at the time of the
112/Aristotle
Peloponnesian War, the notables were reduced in number, because the
soldiers had to be taken from the roll of citizens. Revolutions arise from
this cause as well, in democracies as in other forms of government, but
not to so great an extent. When the rich grow numerous or properties
increase, the form of government changes into an oligarchy or a govern-
ment of families. Forms of government also change—sometimes even
without revolution, owing to election contests, as at Heraea (where, in-
stead of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, because the
electors were in the habit of choosing their own partisans); or owing to
carelessness, when disloyal persons are allowed to find their way into
the highest offices, as at Oreum, where, upon the accession of
Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown, and changed by
him into a constitutional and democratical government.
Again, the revolution may be facilitated by the slightness of the
change; I mean that a great change may sometimes slip into the consti-
tution through neglect of a small matter; at Ambracia, for instance, the
qualification for office, small at first, was eventually reduced to noth-
ing. For the Ambraciots thought that a small qualification was much the
same as none at all.
Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at
once acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, any
more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident.
Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their
foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution; for ex-
ample, the Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of
Sybaris, becoming later the more numerous, expelled them; hence the
curse fell upon Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their
fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted
too much of it and were driven out. At Byzantium the new colonists
were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the
people of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought with them,
and drove them out; and the Zancleans, after having received the Samians,
were driven by them out of their own city. The citizens of Apollonia on
the Euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a
revolution; the Syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having
admitted strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quar-
relled and came to blows; the people of Amphipolis, having received
Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them.
Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under the idea that
Politics/113
they are unjustly treated, because, as I said before, they are equals, and
have not an equal share, and in democracies the notables revolt, because
they are not equals, and yet have only an equal share.
Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution when the coun-
try is not naturally adapted to preserve the unity of the state. For ex-
ample, the Chytians at Clazomenae did not agree with the people of the
island; and the people of Colophon quarrelled with the Notians; at Ath-
ens too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more democratic than those
who live in the city. For just as in war the impediment of a ditch, though
ever so small, may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, how-
ever slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest opposition is confess-
edly that of virtue and vice; next comes that of wealth and poverty; and
there are other antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is
this difference of place.
Part IV
In revolutions the occasions may be trifling, but great interests are at
stake. Even trifles are most important when they concern the rulers, as
was the case of old at Syracuse; for the Syracusan constitution was
once changed by a love-quarrel of two young men, who were in the
government. The story is that while one of them was away from home
his beloved was gained over by his companion, and he to revenge him-
self seduced the other’s wife. They then drew the members of the ruling
class into their quarrel and so split all the people into portions. We learn
from this story that we should be on our guard against the beginnings of
such evils, and should put an end to the quarrels of chiefs and mighty
men. The mistake lies in the beginning—as the proverb says—‘Well
begun is half done’; so an error at the beginning, though quite small,
bears the same ratio to the errors in the other parts. In general, when the
notables quarrel, the whole city is involved, as happened in Hesdaea
after the Persian War. The occasion was the division of an inheritance;
one of two brothers refused to give an account of their father’s property
and the treasure which he had found: so the poorer of the two quarrelled
with him and enlisted in his cause the popular party, the other, who was
very rich, the wealthy classes.
At Delphi, again, a quarrel about a marriage was the beginning of
all the troubles which followed. In this case the bridegroom, fancying
some occurrence to be of evil omen, came to the bride, and went away
without taking her. Whereupon her relations, thinking that they were
114/Aristotle
insulted by him, put some of the sacred treasure among his offerings
while he was sacrificing, and then slew him, pretending that he had been
robbing the temple. At Mytilene, too, a dispute about heiresses was the
beginning of many misfortunes, and led to the war with the Athenians in
which Paches took their city. A wealthy citizen, named Timophanes, left
two daughters; Dexander, another citizen, wanted to obtain them for his
sons; but he was rejected in his suit, whereupon he stirred up a revolu-
tion, and instigated the Athenians (of whom he was proxenus) to inter-
fere. A similar quarrel about an heiress arose at Phocis between Mnaseas
the father of Mnason, and Euthycrates the father of Onomarchus; this
was the beginning of the Sacred War. A marriage-quarrel was also the
cause of a change in the government of Epidamnus. A certain man be-
trothed his daughter to a person whose father, having been made a mag-
istrate, fined the father of the girl, and the latter, stung by the insult,
conspired with the unenfranchised classes to overthrow the state.
Governments also change into oligarchy or into democracy or into a
constitutional government because the magistrates, or some other sec-
tion of the state, increase in power or renown. Thus at Athens the repu-
tation gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian War, seemed
to tighten the reins of government. On the other hand, the victory of
Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in the
fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to command of the sea,
strengthened the democracy. At Argos, the notables, having distinguished
themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, at-
tempted to put down the democracy. At Syracuse, the people, having
been the chief authors of the victory in the war with the Athenians,
changed the constitutional government into democracy. At Chalcis, the
people, uniting with the notables, killed Phoxus the tyrant, and then
seized the government. At Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having
joined with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander, trans-
ferred the government to themselves. And generally it should be remem-
bered that those who have secured power to the state, whether private
citizens, or magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the
state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of their greatness
draws others into rebellion, or they themselves, in their pride of superi-
ority, are unwilling to remain on a level with others.
Revolutions also break out when opposite parties, e.g., the rich and
the people, are equally balanced, and there is little or no middle class;
for, if either party were manifestly superior, the other would not risk an
Politics/115
attack upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent in virtue
usually do not stir up insurrections, always being a minority. Such are
the beginnings and causes of the disturbances and revolutions to which
every form of government is liable.
Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. Force
may be applied either at the time of making the revolution or after-
wards. Fraud, again, is of two kinds; for (1) sometimes the citizens are
deceived into acquiescing in a change of government, and afterwards
they are held in subjection against their will. This was what happened in
the case of the Four Hundred, who deceived the people by telling them
that the king would provide money for the war against the
Lacedaemonians, and, having cheated the people, still endeavored to
retain the government. (2) In other cases the people are persuaded at
first, and afterwards, by a repetition of the persuasion, their goodwill
and allegiance are retained. The revolutions which effect constitutions
generally spring from the above-mentioned causes.
Part V
And now, taking each constitution separately, we must see what follows
from the principles already laid down.
Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemper-
ance of demagogues, who either in their private capacity lay informa-
tion against rich men until they compel them to combine (for a common
danger unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in public
stir up the people against them. The truth of this remark is proved by a
variety of examples. At Cos the democracy was overthrown because
wicked demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At Rhodes the
demagogues not only provided pay for the multitude, but prevented them
from making good to the trierarchs the sums which had been expended
by them; and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought against
them, were compelled to combine and put down the democracy. The
democracy at Heraclea was overthrown shortly after the foundation of
the colony by the injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the no-
tables, who came back in a body and put an end to the democracy. Much
in the same manner the democracy at Megara was overturned; there the
demagogues drove out many of the notables in order that they might be
able to confiscate their property. At length the exiles, becoming numer-
ous, returned, and, engaging and defeating the people, established the
oligarchy. The same thing happened with the democracy of Cyme, which
116/Aristotle
was overthrown by Thrasymachus. And we may observe that in most
states the changes have been of this character. For sometimes the dema-
gogues, in order to curry favor with the people, wrong the notables and
so force them to combine; either they make a division of their property,
or diminish their incomes by the imposition of public services, and some-
times they bring accusations against the rich that they may have their
wealth to confiscate.
Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies
changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally dema-
gogues. They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that
they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into
fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art of rhetoric has made such
progress, the orators lead the people, but their ignorance of military
matters prevents them from usurping power; at any rate instances to the
contrary are few and slight. Tyrannies were more common formerly
than now, for this reason also, that great power was placed in the hands
of individuals; thus a tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the
Prytanis, who had supreme authority in many important matters. More-
over, in those days, when cities were not large, the people dwelt in the
fields, busy at their work; and their chiefs, if they possessed any mili-
tary talent, seized the opportunity, and winning the confidence of the
masses by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded in ob-
taining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus led a faction against the
men of the plain, and Theagenes at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the
wealthy, which he found by the river side, where they had put them to
graze in land not their own. Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of
the tyranny because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich; his enmity
to the notables won for him the confidence of the people. Changes also
take place from the ancient to the latest form of democracy; for where
there is a popular election of the magistrates and no property qualifica-
tion, the aspirants for office get hold of the people, and contrive at last
even to set them above the laws. A more or less complete cure for this
state of things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people, to
elect the magistrates.
These are the principal causes of revolutions in democracies.
Politics/117
Part VI
There are two patent causes of revolutions in oligarchies: (1) First, when
the oligarchs oppress the people, for then anybody is good enough to be
their champion, especially if he be himself a member of the oligarchy, as
Lygdamis at Naxos, who afterwards came to be tyrant. But revolutions
which commence outside the governing class may be further subdivided.
Sometimes, when the government is very exclusive, the revolution is
brought about by persons of the wealthy class who are excluded, as
happened at Massalia and Istros and Heraclea, and other cities. Those
who had no share in the government created a disturbance, until first the
elder brothers, and then the younger, were admitted; for in some places
father and son, in others elder and younger brothers, do not hold office
together. At Massalia the oligarchy became more like a constitutional
government, but at Istros ended in a democracy, and at Heraclea was
enlarged to 600. At Cnidos, again, the oligarchy underwent a consider-
able change. For the notables fell out among themselves, because only a
few shared in the government; there existed among them the rule al-
ready mentioned, that father and son not hold office together, and, if
there were several brothers, only the eldest was admitted. The people
took advantage of the quarrel, and choosing one of the notables to be
their leader, attacked and conquered the oligarchs, who were divided,
and division is always a source of weakness. The city of Erythrae, too,
in old times was ruled, and ruled well, by the Basilidae, but the people
took offense at the narrowness of the oligarchy and changed the consti-
tution.
(2) Of internal causes of revolutions in oligarchies one is the per-
sonal rivalry of the oligarchs, which leads them to play the demagogue.
Now, the oligarchical demagogue is of two sorts: either (a) he practices
upon the oligarchs themselves (for, although the oligarchy are quite a
small number, there may be a demagogue among them, as at Athens
Charicles’ party won power by courting the Thirty, that of Phrynichus
by courting the Four Hundred); or (b) the oligarchs may play the dema-
gogue with the people. This was the case at Larissa, where the guard-
ians of the citizens endeavored to gain over the people because they
were elected by them; and such is the fate of all oligarchies in which the
magistrates are elected, as at Abydos, not by the class to which they
belong, but by the heavy-armed or by the people, although they may be
required to have a high qualification, or to be members of a political
club; or, again, where the law-courts are composed of persons outside
118/Aristotle
the government, the oligarchs flatter the people in order to obtain a
decision in their own favor, and so they change the constitution; this
happened at Heraclea in Pontus. Again, oligarchies change whenever
any attempt is made to narrow them; for then those who desire equal
rights are compelled to call in the people. Changes in the oligarchy also
occur when the oligarchs waste their private property by extravagant
living; for then they want to innovate, and either try to make themselves
tyrants, or install some one else in the tyranny, as Hipparinus did
Dionysius at Syracuse, and as at Amphipolis a man named Cleotimus
introduced Chalcidian colonists, and when they arrived, stirred them up
against the rich. For a like reason in Aegina the person who carried on
the negotiation with Chares endeavored to revolutionize the state. Some-
times a party among the oligarchs try directly to create a political change;
sometimes they rob the treasury, and then either the thieves or, as hap-
pened at Apollonia in Pontus, those who resist them in their thieving
quarrel with the rulers. But an oligarchy which is at unity with itself is
not easily destroyed from within; of this we may see an example at
Pharsalus, for there, although the rulers are few in number, they govern
a large city, because they have a good understanding among themselves.
Oligarchies, again, are overthrown when another oligarchy is cre-
ated within the original one, that is to say, when the whole governing
body is small and yet they do not all share in the highest offices. Thus at
Elis the governing body was a small senate; and very few ever found
their way into it, because the senators were only ninety in number, and
were elected for life and out of certain families in a manner similar to
the Lacedaemonian elders. Oligarchy is liable to revolutions alike in
war and in peace; in war because, not being able to trust the people, the
oligarchs are compelled to hire mercenaries, and the general who is in
command of them often ends in becoming a tyrant, as Timophanes did
at Corinth; or if there are more generals than one they make themselves
into a company of tyrants. Sometimes the oligarchs, fearing this danger,
give the people a share in the government because their services are
necessary to them. And in time of peace, from mutual distrust, the two
parties hand over the defense of the state to the army and to an arbiter
between the two factions, who often ends the master of both. This hap-
pened at Larissa when Simos the Aleuad had the government, and at
Abydos in the days of Iphiades and the political clubs. Revolutions also
arise out of marriages or lawsuits which lead to the overthrow of one
party among the oligarchs by another. Of quarrels about marriages I
Politics/119
have already mentioned some instances; another occurred at Eretria,
where Diagoras overturned the oligarchy of the knights because he had
been wronged about a marriage. A revolution at Heraclea, and another
at Thebes, both arose out of decisions of law-courts upon a charge of
adultery; in both cases the punishment was just, but executed in the
spirit of party, at Heraclea upon Eurytion, and at Thebes upon Archias;
for their enemies were jealous of them and so had them pilloried in the
agora. Many oligarchies have been destroyed by some members of the
ruling class taking offense at their excessive despotism; for example,
the oligarchy at Cnidus and at Chios.
Changes of constitutional governments, and also of oligarchies which
limit the office of counselor, judge, or other magistrate to persons hav-
ing a certain money qualification, often occur by accident. The qualifi-
cation may have been originally fixed according to the circumstances of
the time, in such a manner as to include in an oligarchy a few only, or in
a constitutional government the middle class. But after a time of pros-
perity, whether arising from peace or some other good fortune, the same
property becomes many times as valuable, and then everybody partici-
pates in every office; this happens sometimes gradually and insensibly,
and sometimes quickly. These are the causes of changes and revolutions
in oligarchies.
We must remark generally both of democracies and oligarchies, that
they sometimes change, not into the opposite forms of government, but
only into another variety of the same class; I mean to say, from those
forms of democracy and oligarchy which are regulated by law into those
which are arbitrary, and conversely.
Part VII
In aristocracies revolutions are stirred up when a few only share in the
honors of the state; a cause which has been already shown to affect
oligarchies; for an aristocracy is a sort of oligarchy, and, like an oligar-
chy, is the government of a few, although few not for the same reason;
hence the two are often confounded. And revolutions will be most likely
to happen, and must happen, when the mass of the people are of the
high-spirited kind, and have a notion that they are as good as their rul-
ers. Thus at Lacedaemon the so-called Partheniae, who were the [ille-
gitimate] sons of the Spartan peers, attempted a revolution, and, being
detected, were sent away to colonize Tarentum. Again, revolutions oc-
cur when great men who are at least of equal merit are dishonored by
120/Aristotle
those higher in office, as Lysander was by the kings of Sparta; or, when
a brave man is excluded from the honors of the state, like Cinadon, who
conspired against the Spartans in the reign of Agesilaus; or, again, when
some are very poor and others very rich, a state of society which is most
often the result of war, as at Lacedaemon in the days of the Messenian
War; this is proved from the poem of Tyrtaeus, entitled ‘Good Order’;
for he speaks of certain citizens who were ruined by the war and wanted
to have a redistribution of the land. Again, revolutions arise when an
individual who is great, and might be greater, wants to rule alone, as, at
Lacedaemon, Pausanias, who was general in the Persian War, or like
Hanno at Carthage.
Constitutional governments and aristocracies are commonly over-
thrown owing to some deviation from justice in the constitution itself;
the cause of the downfall is, in the former, the ill-mingling of the two
elements, democracy and oligarchy; in the latter, of the three elements,
democracy, oligarchy, and virtue, but especially democracy and oligar-
chy. For to combine these is the endeavor of constitutional governments;
and most of the so-called aristocracies have a like aim, but differ from
polities in the mode of combination; hence some of them are more and
some less permanent. Those which incline more to oligarchy are called
aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy constitutional gov-
ernments. And therefore the latter are the safer of the two; for the greater
the number, the greater the strength, and when men are equal they are
contented. But the rich, if the constitution gives them power, are apt to
be insolent and avaricious; and, in general, whichever way the constitu-
tion inclines, in that direction it changes as either party gains strength, a
constitutional government becoming a democracy, an aristocracy an
oligarchy. But the process may be reversed, and aristocracy may change
into democracy. This happens when the poor, under the idea that they
are being wronged, force the constitution to take an opposite form. In
like manner constitutional governments change into oligarchies. The only
stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and
for every man to enjoy his own.
What I have just mentioned actually happened at Thurii, where the
qualification for office, at first high, was therefore reduced, and the
magistrates increased in number. The notables had previously acquired
the whole of the land contrary to law; for the government tended to
oligarchy, and they were able to encroach…. But the people, who had
been trained by war, soon got the better of the guards kept by the oli-
Politics/121
garchs, until those who had too much gave up their land.
Again, since all aristocratical governments incline to oligarchy, the
notables are apt to be grasping; thus at Lacedaemon, where property
tends to pass into few hands, the notables can do too much as they like,
and are allowed to marry whom they please. The city of Locri was
ruined by a marriage connection with Dionysius, but such a thing could
never have happened in a democracy, or in a wellbalanced aristocracy.
I have already remarked that in all states revolutions are occasioned
by trifles. In aristocracies, above all, they are of a gradual and imper-
ceptible nature. The citizens begin by giving up some part of the consti-
tution, and so with greater ease the government change something else
which is a little more important, until they have undermined the whole
fabric of the state. At Thurii there was a law that generals should only
be re-elected after an interval of five years, and some young men who
were popular with the soldiers of the guard for their military prowess,
despising the magistrates and thinking that they would easily gain their
purpose, wanted to abolish this law and allow their generals to hold
perpetual commands; for they well knew that the people would be glad
enough to elect them. Whereupon the magistrates who had charge of
these matters, and who are called councillors, at first determined to re-
sist, but they afterwards consented, thinking that, if only this one law
was changed, no further inroad would be made on the constitution. But
other changes soon followed which they in vain attempted to oppose;
and the state passed into the hands of the revolutionists, who established
a dynastic oligarchy.
All constitutions are overthrown either from within or from with-
out; the latter, when there is some government close at hand having an
opposite interest, or at a distance, but powerful. This was exemplified
in the old times of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; the Athe-
nians everywhere put down the oligarchies, and the Lacedaemonians
the democracies.
I have now explained what are the chief causes of revolutions and
dissensions in states.
Part VIII
We have next to consider what means there are of preserving constitu-
tions in general, and in particular cases. In the first place it is evident
that if we know the causes which destroy constitutions, we also know
the causes which preserve them; for opposites produce opposites, and
122/Aristotle
destruction is the opposite of preservation.
In all well-attempered governments there is nothing which should
be more jealously maintained than the spirit of obedience to law, more
especially in small matters; for transgression creeps in unperceived and
at last ruins the state, just as the constant recurrence of small expenses
in time eats up a fortune. The expense does not take place at once, and
therefore is not observed; the mind is deceived, as in the fallacy which
says that ‘if each part is little, then the whole is little.’ this is true in one
way, but not in another, for the whole and the all are not little, although
they are made up of littles.
In the first place, then, men should guard against the beginning of
change, and in the second place they should not rely upon the political
devices of which I have already spoken invented only to deceive the
people, for they are proved by experience to be useless. Further, we note
that oligarchies as well as aristocracies may last, not from any inherent
stability in such forms of government, but because the rulers are on
good terms both with the unenfranchised and with the governing classes,
not maltreating any who are excluded from the government, but intro-
ducing into it the leading spirits among them. They should never wrong
the ambitious in a matter of honor, or the common people in a matter of
money; and they should treat one another and their fellow citizen in a
spirit of equality. The equality which the friends of democracy seek to
establish for the multitude is not only just but likewise expedient among
equals. Hence, if the governing class are numerous, many democratic
institutions are useful; for example, the restriction of the tenure of of-
fices to six months, that all those who are of equal rank may share in
them. Indeed, equals or peers when they are numerous become a kind of
democracy, and therefore demagogues are very likely to arise among
them, as I have already remarked. The short tenure of office prevents
oligarchies and aristocracies from falling into the hands of families; it is
not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is
short, whereas long possession begets tyranny in oligarchies and de-
mocracies. For the aspirants to tyranny are either the principal men of
the state, who in democracies are demagogues and in oligarchies mem-
bers of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and have a long
tenure of them.
Constitutions are preserved when their destroyers are at a distance,
and sometimes also because they are near, for the fear of them makes
the government keep in hand the constitution. Wherefore the ruler who
Politics/123
has a care of the constitution should invent terrors, and bring distant
dangers near, in order that the citizens may be on their guard, and, like
sentinels in a night watch, never relax their attention. He should en-
deavor too by help of the laws to control the contentions and quarrels of
the notables, and to prevent those who have not hitherto taken part in
them from catching the spirit of contention. No ordinary man can dis-
cern the beginning of evil, but only the true statesman.
As to the change produced in oligarchies and constitutional govern-
ments by the alteration of the qualification, when this arises, not out of
any variation in the qualification but only out of the increase of money,
it is well to compare the general valuation of property with that of past
years, annually in those cities in which the census is taken annually and
in larger cities every third or fifth year. If the whole is many times greater
or many times less than when the ratings recognized by the constitution
were fixed, there should be power given by law to raise or lower the
qualification as the amount is greater or less. Where this is not done a
constitutional government passes into an oligarchy, and an oligarchy is
narrowed to a rule of families; or in the opposite case constitutional
government becomes democracy, and oligarchy either constitutional
government or democracy.
It is a principle common to democracy, oligarchy, and every other
form of government not to allow the disproportionate increase of any
citizen but to give moderate honor for a long time rather than great
honor for a short time. For men are easily spoilt; not every one can bear
prosperity. But if this rule is not observed, at any rate the honors which
are given all at once should be taken away by degrees and not all at
once. Especially should the laws provide against any one having too
much power, whether derived from friends or money; if he has, he should
be sent clean out of the country. And since innovations creep in through
the private life of individuals also, there ought to be a magistracy which
will have an eye to those whose life is not in harmony with the govern-
ment, whether oligarchy or democracy or any other. And for a like rea-
son an increase of prosperity in any part of the state should be carefully
watched. The proper remedy for this evil is always to give the manage-
ment of affairs and offices of state to opposite elements; such opposites
are the virtuous and the many, or the rich and the poor. Another way is
to combine the poor and the rich in one body, or to increase the middle
class: thus an end will be put to the revolutions which arise from in-
equality.
124/Aristotle
But above all every state should be so administered and so regu-
lated by law that its magistrates cannot possibly make money. In oligar-
chies special precautions should be used against this evil. For the people
do not take any great offense at being kept out of the government—
indeed they are rather pleased than otherwise at having leisure for their
private business—but what irritates them is to think that their rulers are
stealing the public money; then they are doubly annoyed; for they lose
both honor and profit. If office brought no profit, then and then only
could democracy and aristocracy be combined; for both notables and
people might have their wishes gratified. All would be able to hold of-
fice, which is the aim of democracy, and the notables would be magis-
trates, which is the aim of aristocracy. And this result may be accom-
plished when there is no possibility of making money out of the offices;
for the poor will not want to have them when there is nothing to be
gained from them—they would rather be attending to their own con-
cerns; and the rich, who do not want money from the public treasury,
will be able to take them; and so the poor will keep to their work and
grow rich, and the notables will not be governed by the lower class. In
order to avoid peculation of the public money, the transfer of the rev-
enue should be made at a general assembly of the citizens, and dupli-
cates of the accounts deposited with the different brotherhoods, compa-
nies, and tribes. And honors should be given by law to magistrates who
have the reputation of being incorruptible. In democracies the rich should
be spared; not only should their property not be divided, but their in-
comes also, which in some states are taken from them imperceptibly,
should be protected. It is a good thing to prevent the wealthy citizens,
even if they are willing from undertaking expensive and useless public
services, such as the giving of choruses, torch-races, and the like. In an
oligarchy, on the other hand, great care should be taken of the poor, and
lucrative offices should go to them; if any of the wealthy classes insult
them, the offender should be punished more severely than if he had
wronged one of his own class. Provision should be made that estates
pass by inheritance and not by gift, and no person should have more
than one inheritance; for in this way properties will be equalized, and
more of the poor rise to competency. It is also expedient both in a de-
mocracy and in an oligarchy to assign to those who have less share in
the government (i.e., to the rich in a democracy and to the poor in an
oligarchy) an equality or preference in all but the principal offices of
state. The latter should be entrusted chiefly or only to members of the
Politics/125
governing class.
Part IX
There are three qualifications required in those who have to fill the high-
est offices—(1) first of all, loyalty to the established constitution; (2)
the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice of the kind
proper to each form of government; for, if what is just is not the same in
all governments, the quality of justice must also differ. There may be a
doubt, however, when all these qualities do not meet in the same person,
how the selection is to be made; suppose, for example, a good general is
a bad man and not a friend to the constitution, and another man is loyal
and just, which should we choose? In making the election ought we not
to consider two points? what qualities are common, and what are rare.
Thus in the choice of a general, we should regard his skill rather than his
virtue; for few have military skill, but many have virtue. In any office of
trust or stewardship, on the other hand, the opposite rule should be ob-
served; for more virtue than ordinary is required in the holder of such an
office, but the necessary knowledge is of a sort which all men possess.
It may, however, be asked what a man wants with virtue if he have
political ability and is loyal, since these two qualities alone will make
him do what is for the public interest. But may not men have both of
them and yet be deficient in self-control? If, knowing and loving their
own interests, they do not always attend to them, may they not be equally
negligent of the interests of the public?
Speaking generally, we may say that whatever legal enactments are
held to be for the interest of various constitutions, all these preserve
them. And the great preserving principle is the one which has been re-
peatedly mentioned—to have a care that the loyal citizen should be stron-
ger than the disloyal. Neither should we forget the mean, which at the
present day is lost sight of in perverted forms of government; for many
practices which appear to be democratical are the ruin of democracies,
and many which appear to be oligarchical are the ruin of oligarchies.
Those who think that all virtue is to be found in their own party prin-
ciples push matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion
destroys a state. A nose which varies from the ideal of straightness to a
hook or snub may still be of good shape and agreeable to the eye; but if
the excess be very great, all symmetry is lost, and the nose at last ceases
to be a nose at all on account of some excess in one direction or defect in
the other; and this is true of every other part of the human body. The
126/Aristotle
same law of proportion equally holds in states. Oligarchy or democracy,
although a departure from the most perfect form, may yet be a good
enough government, but if any one attempts to push the principles of
either to an extreme, he will begin by spoiling the government and end
by having none at all. Wherefore the legislator and the statesman ought
to know what democratical measures save and what destroy a democ-
racy, and what oligarchical measures save or destroy an oligarchy. For
neither the one nor the other can exist or continue to exist unless both
rich and poor are included in it. If equality of property is introduced, the
state must of necessity take another form; for when by laws carried to
excess one or other element in the state is ruined, the constitution is
ruined.
There is an error common both to oligarchies and to democracies:
in the latter the demagogues, when the multitude are above the law, are
always cutting the city in two by quarrels with the rich, whereas they
should always profess to be maintaining their cause; just as in oligar-
chies the oligarchs should profess to maintaining the cause of the people,
and should take oaths the opposite of those which they now take. For
there are cities in which they swear—‘I will be an enemy to the people,
and will devise all the harm against them which I can’; but they ought to
exhibit and to entertain the very opposite feeling; in the form of their
oath there should be an express declaration—‘I will do no wrong to the
people.’
But of all the things which I have mentioned that which most con-
tributes to the permanence of constitutions is the adaptation of educa-
tion to the form of government, and yet in our own day this principle is
universally neglected. The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen
of the state, will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and
education in the spirit of the constitution, if the laws are democratical,
democratically or oligarchically, if the laws are oligarchical. For there
may be a want of self-discipline in states as well as in individuals. Now,
to have been educated in the spirit of the constitution is not to perform
the actions in which oligarchs or democrats delight, but those by which
the existence of an oligarchy or of a democracy is made possible. Whereas
among ourselves the sons of the ruling class in an oligarchy live in
luxury, but the sons of the poor are hardened by exercise and toil, and
hence they are both more inclined and better able to make a revolution.
And in democracies of the more extreme type there has arisen a false
idea of freedom which is contradictory to the true interests of the state.
Politics/127
For two principles are characteristic of democracy, the government of
the majority and freedom. Men think that what is just is equal; and that
equality is the supremacy of the popular will; and that freedom means
the doing what a man likes. In such democracies every one lives as he
pleases, or in the words of Euripides, ‘according to his fancy.’ But this
is all wrong; men should not think it slavery to live according to the rule
of the constitution; for it is their salvation.
I have now discussed generally the causes of the revolution and
destruction of states, and the means of their preservation and continu-
ance.
Part X
I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes of its destruction and
preservation. What I have said already respecting forms of constitu-
tional government applies almost equally to royal and to tyrannical rule.
For royal rule is of the nature of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a
compound of oligarchy and democracy in their most extreme forms; it is
therefore most injurious to its subjects, being made up of two evil forms
of government, and having the perversions and errors of both. These
two forms of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. The appoint-
ment of a king is the resource of the better classes against the people,
and he is elected by them out of their own number, because either he
himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions; whereas a
tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector against the no-
tables, and in order to prevent them from being injured. History shows
that almost all tyrants have been demagogues who gained the favor of
the people by their accusation of the notables. At any rate this was the
manner in which the tyrannies arose in the days when cities had in-
creased in power. Others which were older originated in the ambition of
kings wanting to overstep the limits of their hereditary power and be-
come despots. Others again grew out of the class which were chosen to
be chief magistrates; for in ancient times the people who elected them
gave the magistrates, whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others
arose out of the custom which oligarchies had of making some indi-
vidual supreme over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambi-
tious man had no difficulty, if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since he
had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one of the offic-
ers of state. Thus Pheidon at Argos and several others were originally
kings, and ended by becoming tyrants; Phalaris, on the other hand, and
128/Aristotle
the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny by holding great offices. Whereas
Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus at Corinth, Peisistratus at Athens,
Dionysius at Syracuse, and several others who afterwards became ty-
rants, were at first demagogues.
And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is
based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on ben-
efits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. For all
who have obtained this honor have benefited, or had in their power to
benefit, states and nations; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state
from being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country
freedom, or have settled or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian,
Macedonian, and Molossian kings. The idea of a king is to be a protec-
tor of the rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and
oppression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has no regard
to any public interest, except as conducive to his private ends; his aim is
pleasure, the aim of a king, honor. Wherefore also in their desires they
differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches, the king, of what brings honor.
And the guards of a king are citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries.
That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy and oligarchy is
evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end is wealth; (for by wealth
only can the tyrant maintain either his guard or his luxury). Both mis-
trust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. Both agree
too in injuring the people and driving them out of the city and dispersing
them. From democracy tyrants have borrowed the art of making war
upon the notables and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling
them because they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and
also because plots against them are contrived by men of this dass, who
either want to rule or to escape subjection. Hence Periander advised
Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears of corn, meaning
that he must always put out of the way the citizens who overtop the rest.
And so, as I have already intimated, the beginnings of change are the
same in monarchies as in forms of constitutional government; subjects
attack their sovereigns out of fear or contempt, or because they have
been unjustly treated by them. And of injustice, the most common form
is insult, another is confiscation of property.
The ends sought by conspiracies against monarchies, whether tyr-
annies or royalties, are the same as the ends sought by conspiracies
against other forms of government. Monarchs have great wealth and
honor, which are objects of desire to all mankind. The attacks are made
Politics/129
sometimes against their lives, sometimes against the office; where the
sense of insult is the motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult (and
there are many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they com-
monly act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For example, the at-
tempt made upon the Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonor
offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself. He attacked
the tyrant for his sister’s sake, and Aristogeiton joined in the attack for
the sake of Harmodius. A conspiracy was also formed against Periander,
the tyrant of Ambracia, because, when drinking with a favorite youth,
he asked him whether by this time he was not with child by him. Philip,
too, was attacked by Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted
by Attalus and his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because
he boasted of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was
slain by the eunuch to revenge an insult; for his wife had been carried
off by Evagoras’s son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful
attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects. Such was
the attack of Crataeas upon Archelaus; he had always hated the connec-
tion with him, and so, when Archelaus, having promised him one of his
two daughters in marriage, did not give him either of them, but broke his
word and married the elder to the king of Elymeia, when he was hard
pressed in a war against Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, and the younger to his
own son Amyntas, under the idea that Amyntas would then be less likely
to quarrel with his son by Cleopatra—Crataeas made this slight a pre-
text for attacking Archelaus, though even a less reason would have suf-
ficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust which he
felt at his connection with the king. And from a like motive Hellonocrates
of Larissa conspired with him; for when Archelaus, who was his lover,
did not fulfill his promise of restoring him to his country, he thought that
the connection between them had originated, not in affection, but in the
wantonness of power. Pytho, too, and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys
in order to avenge their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in re-
venge for the wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him
when a child.
Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person which they
deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to kill officers of state
and royal princes by whom they have been injured. Thus, at Mytilene,
Megacles and his friends attacked and slew the Penthilidae, as they were
going about and striking people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who
had been beaten and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In
130/Aristotle
the conspiracy against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of
the assassins and led the attack; he was enraged because Archelaus had
delivered him to Euripides to be scourged; for the poet had been irritated
at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath.
Many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies which
have arisen from similar causes.
Fear is another motive which, as we have said, has caused con-
spiracies as well in monarchies as in more popular forms of govern-
ment. Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew him, fearing
that he would be accused of hanging Darius against his orders-he hav-
ing been under the impression that Xerxes would forget what he had
said in the middle of a meal, and that the offense would be forgiven.
Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sardanapalus, whom
some one saw carding wool with his women, if the storytellers say truly;
and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one else. Dion attacked
the younger Dionysius because he despised him, and saw that he was
equally despised by his own subjects, and that he was always drunk.
Even the friends of a tyrant will sometimes attack him out of contempt;
for the confidence which he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they
think that they will not be found out. The expectation of success is like-
wise a sort of contempt; the assailants are ready to strike, and think
nothing of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their
hands. Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example, Cyrus
attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life, and believing
that his power was worn out. Thus again, Seuthes the Thracian con-
spired against Amadocus, whose general he was.
And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive, like
Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out of con-
tempt and partly from the love of gain.
Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high military position,
are most likely to make the attempt in the expectation of success; for
courage is emboldened by power, and the union of the two inspires them
with the hope of an easy victory.
Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way as
well as in those already mentioned. There are men who will not risk
their lives in the hope of gains and honors however great, but who nev-
ertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action
which will make them famous and honorable in the world; they wish to
acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such
Politics/131
men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he
fail. He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon
Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying ‘that whatever mea-
sure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were
to die the moment he landed; such a death would be welcome to him.’
this is a temper to which few can attain.
Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments, are destroyed from
without by some opposite and more powerful form of government. That
such a government will have the will to attack them is clear; for the two
are opposed in principle; and all men, if they can, do what they will.
Democracy is antagonistic to tyranny, on the principle of Hesiod, ‘Pot-
ter hates Potter,’ because they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of
democracy is tyranny; and royalty and aristocracy are both alike op-
posed to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type. And
therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies, and so
did the Syracusans during the time when they were well governed.
Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when the reigning fam-
ily are divided among themselves, as that of Gelo was, and more re-
cently that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo because Thrasybulus, the
brother of Hiero, flattered the son of Gelo and led him into excesses in
order that he might rule in his name. Whereupon the family got together
a party to get rid of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny; but those of the
people who conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them
all out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked and
expelled him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards perished
himself.
There are two chief motives which induce men to attack tyrannies—
hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable, and contempt is
also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus we see that most of
those who have acquired, have retained their power, but those who have
inherited, have lost it, almost at once; for, living in luxurious ease, they
have become contemptible, and offer many opportunities to their assail-
ants. Anger, too, must be included under hatred, and produces the same
effects. It is often times even more ready to strike—the angry are more
impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational principle.
And men are very apt to give way to their passions when they are in-
sulted. To this cause is to be attributed the fall of the Peisistratidae and
of many others. Hatred is more reasonable, for anger is accompanied by
pain, which is an impediment to reason, whereas hatred is painless.
132/Aristotle
In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned as destroying the
last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and the extreme form of de-
mocracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny; indeed the extreme forms
of both are only tyrannies distributed among several persons. Kingly
rule is little affected by external causes, and is therefore lasting; it is
generally destroyed from within. And there are two ways in which the
destruction may come about; (1) when the members of the royal family
quarrel among themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer
the state too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their
authority contrary to the law. Royalties do not now come into existence;
where such forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies or
tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects, and he is
supreme in all important matters; but in our own day men are more
upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to
represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office. Hence man-
kind will not, if they can help, endure it, and any one who obtains power
by force or fraud is at once thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monar-
chies a further cause of destruction is the fact that kings often fall into
contempt, and, although possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal
dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readily ef-
fected; for there is an end to the king when his subjects do not want to
have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like him or not.
The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed to these and the
like causes.
Part XI
And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the opposite causes; or, if
we consider them separately, (1) royalty is preserved by the limitation
of its powers. The more restricted the functions of kings, the longer their
power will last unimpaired; for then they are more moderate and not so
despotic in their ways; and they are less envied by their subjects. This is
the reason why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Molossians.
And for a similar reason it has continued among the Lacedaemonians,
because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards fur-
ther limited by Theopompus in various respects, more particularly by
the establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the power of the kings,
but established on a more lasting basis the kingly office, which was thus
made in a certain sense not less, but greater. There is a story that when
his wife once asked him whether he was not ashamed to leave to his sons
Politics/133
a royal power which was less than he had inherited from his father, ‘No
indeed,’ he replied, ‘for the power which I leave to them will be more
lasting.’
As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most opposite ways.
One of them is the old traditional method in which most tyrants admin-
ister their government. Of such arts Periander of Corinth is said to have
been the great master, and many similar devices may be gathered from
the Persians in the administration of their government. There are firstly
the prescriptions mentioned some distance back, for the preservation of
a tyranny, in so far as this is possible; viz., that the tyrant should lop off
those who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must not
allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like; he must be upon
his guard against anything which is likely to inspire either courage or
confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit literary assemblies or
other meetings for discussion, and he must take every means to prevent
people from knowing one another (for acquaintance begets mutual con-
fidence). Further, he must compel all persons staying in the city to ap-
pear in public and live at his gates; then he will know what they are
doing: if they are always kept under, they will learn to be humble. In
short, he should practice these and the like Persian and barbaric arts,
which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavor to know
what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ spies, like the
‘female detectives’ at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers whom Hiero was
in the habit of sending to any place of resort or meeting; for the fear of
informers prevents people from speaking their minds, and if they do,
they are more easily found out. Another art of the tyrant is to sow quar-
rels among the citizens; friends should be embroiled with friends, the
people with the notables, and the rich with one another. Also he should
impoverish his subjects; he thus provides against the maintenance of a
guard by the citizen and the people, having to keep hard at work, are
prevented from conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an example
of this policy; also the offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the building
of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the great
Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works were alike intended
to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice of tyrants is
to multiply taxes, after the manner of Dionysius at Syracuse, who con-
trived that within five years his subjects should bring into the treasury
their whole property. The tyrant is also fond of making war in order that
his subjects may have something to do and be always in want of a leader.
134/Aristotle
And whereas the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the charac-
teristic of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that all
men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.
Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form of democracy
are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given to women in their
families in the hope that they will inform against their husbands, and the
license which is allowed to slaves in order that they may betray their
masters; for slaves and women do not conspire against tyrants; and they
are of course friendly to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under
them they have a good time. For the people too would fain be a mon-
arch, and therefore by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held
in honor; in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has
those who associate with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of
flattery.
Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because they love to be
flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a freeman in him will lower
himself by flattery; good men love others, or at any rate do not flatter
them. Moreover, the bad are useful for bad purposes; ‘nail knocks out
nail,’ as the proverb says. It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every
one who has dignity or independence; he wants to be alone in his glory,
but any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence en-
croaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy to his
power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners better than
citizens, and lives with them and invites them to his table; for the one are
enemies, but the Others enter into no rivalry with him.
Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by which he preserves
his power; there is no wickedness too great for him. All that we have
said may be summed up under three heads, which answer to the three
aims of the tyrant. These are, (1) the humiliation of his subjects; he
knows that a mean-spirited man will not conspire against anybody; (2)
the creation of mistrust among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until
men begin to have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why
tyrants are at war with the good; they are under the idea that their power
is endangered by them, not only because they would not be ruled des-
potically but also because they are loyal to one another, and to other
men, and do not inform against one another or against other men; (3) the
tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable of action, for no one
attempts what is impossible, and they will not attempt to overthrow a
tyranny, if they are powerless. Under these three heads the whole policy
Politics/135
of a tyrant may be summed up, and to one or other of them all his ideas
may be referred: (1) he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he takes
away their power; (3) he humbles them.
This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are pre-
served; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite
principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be gathered
from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for as one
mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king more
tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like the rule
of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he must keep
power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like him or not, for
if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must
be retained as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear
to act in the character of a king. In the first place he should pretend a
care of the public revenues, and not waste money in making presents of
a sort at which the common people get excited when they see their hard-
won earnings snatched from them and lavished on courtesans and strang-
ers and artists. He should give an account of what he receives and of
what he spends (a practice which has been adopted by some tyrants);
for then he will seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant;
nor need he fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in
want of money. Such a policy is at all events much more advantageous
for the tyrant when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a
hoard, for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to
attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has more
reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens, for the one
accompany him, but the others remain behind. In the second place, he
should be seen to collect taxes and to require public services only for
state purposes, and that he may form a fund in case of war, and gener-
ally he ought to make himself the guardian and treasurer of them, as if
they belonged, not to him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh,
but dignified, and when men meet him they should look upon him with
reverence, and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he
inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect, at
least he should maintain the character of a great soldier, and produce the
impression that he is one. Neither he nor any of his associates should
ever be guilty of the least offense against modesty towards the young of
either sex who are his subjects, and the women of his family should
observe a like self-control towards other women; the insolence of women
136/Aristotle
has ruined many tyrannies. In the indulgence of pleasures he should be
the opposite of our modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and
pass whole days in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they
may admire their happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should
if possible be moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices to the
world; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised and attacked;
not so he who is temperate and wide awake. His conduct should be the
very reverse of nearly everything which has been said before about ty-
rants. He ought to adorn and improve his city, as though he were not a
tyrant, but the guardian of the state. Also he should appear to be par-
ticularly earnest in the service of the Gods; for if men think that a ruler
is religious and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of
suffering injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire
against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting on
his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought foolish. And
he should honor men of merit, and make them think that they would not
be held in more honor by the citizens if they had a free government. The
honor he should distribute himself, but the punishment should be in-
flicted by officers and courts of law. It is a precaution which is taken by
all monarchs not to make one person great; but if one, then two or more
should be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. If after
all some one has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold spirit;
for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike. And if any one is
to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished gradually, not taken
from him all at once. The tyrant should abstain from all outrage; in
particular from personal violence and from wanton conduct towards the
young. He should be especially careful of his behavior to men who are
lovers of honor; for as the lovers of money are offended when their
property is touched, so are the lovers of honor and the virtuous when
their honor is affected. Therefore a tyrant ought either not to commit
such acts at all; or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correc-
tion, and not to trample upon others—and his acquaintance with youth
should be supposed to arise from affection, and not from the insolence
of power, and in general he should compensate the appearance of dis-
honor by the increase of honor.
Of those who attempt assassination they are the most dangerous,
and require to be most carefully watched, who do not care to survive, if
they effect their purpose. Therefore special precaution should be taken
about any who think that either they or those for whom they care have
Politics/137
been insulted; for when men are led away by passion to assault others
they are regardless of themselves. As Heracleitus says, ‘It is difficult to
fight against anger; for a man will buy revenge with his soul.’
And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor men and of rich,
the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they are preserved and pre-
vented from harming one another by his rule, and whichever of the two
is stronger he should attach to his government; for, having this advan-
tage, he has no need either to emancipate slaves or to disarm the citi-
zens; either party added to the force which he already has, will make
him stronger than his assailants.
But enough of these details; what should be the general policy of the
tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to his subjects in the light,
not of a tyrant, but of a steward and a king. He should not appropriate
what is theirs, but should be their guardian; he should be moderate, not
extravagant in his way of life; he should win the notables by compan-
ionship, and the multitude by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity
be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose spir-
its are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an object of
hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His power too will be more last-
ing. His disposition will be virtuous, or at least half virtuous; and he
will not be wicked, but half wicked only.
Part XII
Yet no forms of government are so short-lived as oligarchy and tyranny.
The tyranny which lasted longest was that of Orthagoras and his sons at
Sicyon; this continued for a hundred years. The reason was that they
treated their subjects with moderation, and to a great extent observed
the laws; and in various ways gained the favor of the people by the care
which they took of them. Cleisthenes, in particular, was respected for
his military ability. If report may be believed, he crowned the judge who
decided against him in the games; and, as some say, the sitting statue in
the Agora of Sicyon is the likeness of this person. (A similar story is
told of Peisistratus, who is said on one occasion to have allowed himself
to be summoned and tried before the Areopagus.)
Next in duration to the tyranny of Orthagoras was that of the
Cypselidae at Corinth, which lasted seventy-three years and six months:
Cypselus reigned thirty years, Periander forty and a half, and
Psammetichus the son of Gorgus three. Their continuance was due to
similar causes: Cypselus was a popular man, who during the whole time
138/Aristotle
of his rule never had a bodyguard; and Periander, although he was a
tyrant, was a great soldier. Third in duration was the rule of the
Peisistratidae at Athens, but it was interrupted; for Peisistratus was
twice driven out, so that during three and thirty years he reigned only
seventeen; and his sons reigned eighteen-altogether thirty-five years. Of
other tyrannies, that of Hiero and Gelo at Syracuse was the most last-
ing. Even this, however, was short, not more than eighteen years in all;
for Gelo continued tyrant for seven years, and died in the eighth; Hiero
reigned for ten years, and Thrasybulus was driven out in the eleventh
month. In fact, tyrannies generally have been of quite short duration.
I have now gone through almost all the causes by which constitu-
tional governments and monarchies are either destroyed or preserved.
In the Republic of Plato, Socrates treats of revolutions, but not well,
for he mentions no cause of change which peculiarly affects the first, or
perfect state. He only says that the cause is that nothing is abiding, but
all things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of the change
consists in those numbers ‘of which 4 and 3, married with 5, furnish
two harmonies’ (he means when the number of this figure becomes solid);
he conceives that nature at certain times produces bad men who will not
submit to education; in which latter particular he may very likely be not
far wrong, for there may well be some men who cannot be educated and
made virtuous. But why is such a cause of change peculiar to his ideal
state, and not rather common to all states, nay, to everything which
comes into being at all? And is it by the agency of time, which, as he
declares, makes all things change, that things which did not begin to-
gether, change together? For example, if something has come into being
the day before the completion of the cycle, will it change with things
that came into being before? Further, why should the perfect state change
into the Spartan? For governments more often take an opposite form
than one akin to them. The same remark is applicable to the other changes;
he says that the Spartan constitution changes into an oligarchy, and this
into a democracy, and this again into a tyranny. And yet the contrary
happens quite as often; for a democracy is even more likely to change
into an oligarchy than into a monarchy. Further, he never says whether
tyranny is, or is not, liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause
of them, or into what form it changes. And the reason is, that he could
not very well have told: for there is no rule; according to him it should
revert to the first and best, and then there would be a complete cycle.
But in point of fact a tyranny often changes into a tyranny, as that at
Politics/139
Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron into that of Cleisthenes; into
oligarchy, as the tyranny of Antileon did at Chalcis; into democracy, as
that of Gelo’s family did at Syracuse; into aristocracy, as at Carthage,
and the tyranny of Charilaus at Lacedaemon. Often an oligarchy changes
into a tyranny, like most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily; for ex-
ample, the oligarchy at Leontini changed into the tyranny of Panaetius;
that at Gela into the tyranny of Cleander; that at Rhegium into the tyr-
anny of Anaxilaus; the same thing has happened in many other states.
And it is absurd to suppose that the state changes into oligarchy merely
because the ruling class are lovers and makers of money, and not be-
cause the very rich think it unfair that the very poor should have an
equal share in the government with themselves. Moreover, in many oli-
garchies there are laws against making money in trade. But at Carthage,
which is a democracy. there is no such prohibition; and yet to this day
the Carthaginians have never had a revolution. It is absurd too for him
to say that an oligarchy is two cities, one of the rich, and the other of the
poor. Is not this just as much the case in the Spartan constitution, or in
any other in which either all do not possess equal property, or all are not
equally good men? Nobody need be any poorer than he was before, and
yet the oligarchy may change an the same into a democracy, if the poor
form the majority; and a democracy may change into an oligarchy, if the
wealthy class are stronger than the people, and the one are energetic, the
other indifferent. Once more, although the causes of the change are very
numerous, he mentions only one, which is, that the citizens become poor
through dissipation and debt, as though he thought that all, or the ma-
jority of them, were originally rich. This is not true: though it is true that
when any of the leaders lose their property they are ripe for revolution;
but, when anybody else, it is no great matter, and an oligarchy does not
even then more often pass into a democracy than into any other form of
government. Again, if men are deprived of the honors of state, and are
wronged, and insulted, they make revolutions, and change forms of gov-
ernment, even although they have not wasted their substance because
they might do what they liked—of which extravagance he declares ex-
cessive freedom to be the cause.
Finally, although there are many forms of oligarchies and democra-
cies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one
form of either of them.
140/Aristotle
BOOK SIX
Part I
We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme
power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state
offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of govern-
ment. We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of con-
stitutions, how and from what causes they arise.
Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many
kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of orga-
nization which are proper and advantageous to each, adding what re-
mains to be said about them. Moreover, we ought to consider the vari-
ous combinations of these modes themselves; for such combinations
make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an
oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to democ-
racies.
When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered,
and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these: when
the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is
constituted oligarchically, and the law-courts aristocratically, or when
the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the
election to office aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want
of harmony in the composition of a state.
I have shown already what forms of democracy are suited to par-
ticular cities, and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom
each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not
only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also
briefly proceed to consider how these and other forms of government
are to be established.
First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light
the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the
purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and char-
acteristics of democracy, since from the combinations of these the vari-
eties of democratic government arise. There are several of these differ-
ing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (1) has
been already mentioned—differences of population; for the popular el-
ement may consist of husbandmen, or of mechanics, or of laborers, and
if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others,
not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature
is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various
Politics/141
properties and characteristics of democracy, when variously combined,
make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will
have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an
advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some
new form of democracy, or only to remodel an existing one. Founders of
states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas
of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, as I have
already remarked when speaking of the destruction and preservation of
states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of
such states.
Part II
The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the com-
mon opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state; this they affirm
to be the great end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for all
to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the applica-
tion of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the
majority must be supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must
be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and
therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, be-
cause there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme.
This, then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the
principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes.
This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not
to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second charac-
teristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by
none, if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns;
and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.
Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we
start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows the election of
officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, and each in
his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those
which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no prop-
erty qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one;
that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the
case of few except military offices: that the tenure of all offices, or of as
many as possible, should be brief, that all men should sit in judgment, or
that judges selected out of all should judge, in all matters, or in most and
in the greatest and most important—such as the scrutiny of accounts,
142/Aristotle
the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be su-
preme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, and the
magistrates over none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a
council is the most democratic when there is not the means of paying all
the citizens, but when they are paid even this is robbed of its power; for
the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous
discussion. The next characteristic of democracy is payment for ser-
vices; assembly, law courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when
it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the
law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magis-
trates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals
together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, wealth, and
education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these—
low birth, poverty, mean employment. Another note is that no magis-
tracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in
the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should
be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to
all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based
upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, that all should count
equally; for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in
the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that
all should rule equally according to their numbers. And in this way men
think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state.
Part III
Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to
assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hun-
dred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of
the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retain-
ing the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the
control of the elections and of the courts?—Which, according to the
democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution—this or one
based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to which the
majority agree, oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opin-
ion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In
both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is
the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest
of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have
the sole power—but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will of the
Politics/143
majority, as I was before saying, they will unjustly confiscate the prop-
erty of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality which they
both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.
Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority
of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted: but not without some re-
serve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed—the
poor and the rich—that is to be deemed law, on which both or the greater
part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the
greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For
example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some
measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of
the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the
poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a
case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added
up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is
no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the courts
are divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. But,
although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the
practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like,
encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality
and justice, but the stronger care for none of these things.
Part IV
Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the in the previous dis-
cussion, the best is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest of
them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification
of their inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an agricul-
tural population; there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the
mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. Being poor,
they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and
not having the necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not
covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter
than the cares of government or office where no great gains can be made
out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain than of honor. A
proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them,
as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not
deprived of their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the
others are well enough off. Moreover, they have the power of electing
the magistrates and calling them to account; their ambition, if they have
144/Aristotle
any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all
share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected
in turn out of the whole people, as at Mantinea; yet, if they have the
power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of gov-
ernment may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea.
Hence it is both expedient and customary in the aforementioned type of
democracy that all should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and
sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by
election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a
greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for which a qualification
is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be
appointed. Under such a form of government the citizens are sure to be
governed well (for the offices will always be held by the best persons;
the people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the
good). The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not
be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will
rule justly, because others will call them to account. Every man should
be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he
pleases; for where absolute freedom is allowed, there is nothing to re-
strain the evil which is inherent in every man. But the principle of re-
sponsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right
persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have
their due. It is evident that this is the best kind of democracy, and why?
Because the people are drawn from a certain class. Some of the ancient
laws of most states were, all of them, useful with a view to making the
people husbandmen. They provided either that no one should possess
more than a certain quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should
not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. For-
merly in many states there was a law forbidding any one to sell his
original allotment of land. There is a similar law attributed to Oxylus,
which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every
man’s land on which he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to
the evil of which I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans,
who, although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are all
of them husbandmen. For their properties are reckoned in the census;
not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have
more than the amount required.
Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, are a
pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any
Politics/145
for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people of whom other
democracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life is inferior;
there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments,
whether they be mechanics or traders or laborers. Besides, people of
this class can readily come to the assembly, because they are continu-
ally moving about in the city and in the agora; whereas husbandmen are
scattered over the country and do not meet, or equally feel the want of
assembling together. Where the territory also happens to extend to a
distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent de-
mocracy or constitutional government; for the people are compelled to
settle in the country, and even if there is a town population the assembly
ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come.
We have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should
be constituted; it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a
regular order, and the population which is excluded will at each stage be
of a lower kind.
The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one
which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well
regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to
destroy this or other kinds of government have been pretty fully consid-
ered. In order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people,
the leaders have been in the habit including as many as they can, and
making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the
illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent a citizen, whether
father or mother; for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democ-
racy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right
thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the com-
monalty exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class—beyond
this not to go. When in excess of this point, the constitution becomes
disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democ-
racy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little
evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. Measures like those which
Cleisthenes passed when he wanted to increase the power of the democ-
racy at Athens, or such as were taken by the founders of popular gov-
ernment at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh
tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of fami-
lies should be restricted and converted into public ones; in short, every
contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one
another and get rid of old connections. Again, the measures which are
146/Aristotle
taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance,
as the license permitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent
advantageous) and also that of women and children, and the aflowing
everybody to live as he likes. Such a government will have many sup-
porters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a
sober manner.
Part V
The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal
business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, for
any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a
far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should there-
fore endeavor to have a firm foundation according to the principles al-
ready laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states;
he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws,
whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of
states. He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure
to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligar-
chy, but that which will make them last longest. The demagogues of our
own day often get property confiscated in the law-courts in order to
please the people. But those who have the welfare of the state at heart
should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the con-
demned should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred.
Thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the
same, and the people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to
condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as
few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who
bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not mem-
bers of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought
to be all attached to the constitution as well, or at any rate should not
regard their rulers as enemies.
Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are
very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are
paid, and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon
the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property tax and
confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have
before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no
revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts
should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system
Politics/147
has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even al-
though they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and sec-
ondly, causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not
like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a
few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues
should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the
poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, for such
help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the
people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers
the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which
will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all
classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and
distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable
them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade
or husbandry. And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money
should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and
in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the
poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from
useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the
Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from
time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, where
they grow rich. It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to
divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to
work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of
imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor,
they gain their good will. Moreover, they divide all their offices into two
classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter,
that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state
may be better administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the
same offices, so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by
vote, the other by lot.
Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to
be constituted.
Part VI
From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should
be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to reason from oppo-
sites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form
of democracy.
148/Aristotle
The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitu-
tional government. In this there ought to be two standards of qualifica-
tion; the one high, the other low—the lower qualifying for the humbler
yet indispensable offices and the higher for the superior ones. He who
acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizen-
ship. The number of those admitted should be such as will make the
entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the
new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the people.
The principle, narrowed a little, gives another form of oligarchy; until
at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answer-
ing to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigi-
lance in proportion to its badness. For as healthy bodies and ships well
provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them,
whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by
the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the
greatest care. The populousness of democracies generally preserves them
(for e state need not be much increased,since there is no necessity tha
number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion);
whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite
principle, viz., good order.
Part VII
As there are four chief divisions of the common people—husbandmen,
mechanics, retail traders, laborers; so also there are four kinds of mili-
tary forces—the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light armed troops, the
navy. When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy
is likely to be established. For the security of the inhabitants depends
upon a force of this sort, and only rich men can afford to keep horses.
The second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to
heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to the rich than to the
poor. But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic;
and nowadays, where they are numerous, if the two parties quarrel, the
oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. A remedy for this
state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine a
proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed.
And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil
contests; being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cavalry
and heavy being lightly armed, they fight with advantage against cav-
alry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a force out of
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the lower classes raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the
ages of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the
fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the
agile movements of light-armed troops; and these, when they have been
taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become light-armed warriors
in reality. The oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to
the people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property qualifi-
cation, or, as in the case of Thebes, to those who have abstained for a
certain number of years from mean employments, or, as at Massalia, to
men of merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously
citizens or not. The magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be
in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties at-
tached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no
offense at the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a
heavy fine for their dignity. It is fitting also that the magistrates on
entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public
edifice, and then the people who participate in the entertainments, and
see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire
an alteration in the government, and the notables will have memorials of
their munificence. This, however, is anything but the fashion of our
modern oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honor;
oligarchies like theirs may be well described as petty democracies. Enough
of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies should be orga-
nized.
Part VIII
Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number,
their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken. No
state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well
administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and
good order. In small states, as we have already remarked, there must not
be many of them, but in larger there must be a larger number, and we
should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which
separated.
First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the mar-
ket; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to main-
tain order. For in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers
who will supply one another’s wants; this is the readiest way to make a
state self-sufficing and so fulfill the purpose for which men come to-
150/Aristotle
gether into one state. A second office of a similar kind undertakes the
supervision and embellishment of public and private buildings, the main-
taining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes
about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is com-
monly called the office of City Warden, and has various departments,
which, in more populous towns, are shared among different persons,
one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a
third of harbors. There is another equally necessary office, and of a
similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and
in the country—the magistrates who hold this office are called Wardens
of the country, or Inspectors of the woods. Besides these three there is a
fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the rev-
enue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called
Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts,
and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all prelimi-
nary proceedings. This office again is sometimes subdivided, in which
case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called
Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the like.
Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most nec-
essary and also the most difficult, viz., that to which is committed the
execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are
posted up according to the registers; and also the custody of prisoners.
The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to
it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any
one who does is loath to execute the law. Still the office is necessary; for
judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect; and if society cannot
exist without them, neither can it exist without the execution of them. It
is an office which, being so unpopular, should not be entrusted to one
person, but divided among several taken from different courts. In like
manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons
the writing up of those who are on the register of public debtors. Some
sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular
penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the in-
coming ones; and as regards those due to magistrates already in office,
when one court has given judgement, another should exact the penalty;
for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by
the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines im-
posed by them. For penalties are more likely to be exacted when less
odium attaches to the exaction of them; but a double odium is incurred
Politics/151
when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, and if they
are always the executioners, they will be the enemies of all.
In many places, while one magistracy executes the sentence, an-
other has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, ‘the Eleven’ at
Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship also, and try by some
device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as
that of the executioners; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and
worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; for they themselves
require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. There ought not there-
fore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it
should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a
band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge
of it.
These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first;
next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank, and
requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which
are committed the guard of the city, and other military functions. Not
only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls
and gates, and to muster and marshal the citizens. In some states there
are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states
are content with one; these officers are called generals or commanders.
Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or a naval
force, it will sometimes happen that each of these departments has sepa-
rate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of light-
armed troops. And there are subordinate officers called naval captains,
and captains of light-armed troops and of horse; having others under
them: all these are included in the department of war. Thus much of
military command.
But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public
money, there must of necessity be another office which examines and
audits them, and has no other functions. Such officers are called by
various names—Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers. Be-
sides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and
to this is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of
measures, or at all events it presides, in a democracy, over the assembly.
For there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the
state. In some places they are called ‘probuli,’ because they hold previ-
ous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly ‘councillors.’
These are the chief political offices.
152/Aristotle
Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of reli-
gion priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples
of the Gods and to other matters of religion. One office of this sort may
be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many
besides the priesthood; for example, superintendents of public worship,
guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected
with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of
the public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests;
such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth of the city.
They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings, and sometimes
prytanes.
These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as
follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the
revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the har-
bors, with the country; also with the courts of law, with the records of
contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with
audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those
which preside over the public deliberations of the state. There are like-
wise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and pros-
perous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as the
offices of guardians of women, guardians of the law, guardians of chil-
dren, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic
and Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles. Some of these
are clearly not democratic offices; for example, the guardianships of
women and children—the poor, not having any slaves, must employ
both their women and children as servants.
Once more: there are three offices according to whose directions the
highest magistrates are chosen in certain states—guardians of the law,
probuli, councillors—of these, the guardians of the law are an
aristocratical, the probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical
institution. Enough of the different kinds of offices.
BOOK SEVEN
Part I
He who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought first to
determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain
the best form of the state must also be uncertain; for, in the natural order
of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed
in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought there-
Politics/153
fore to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life,
and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for
individuals.
Assuming that enough has been already said in discussions outside
the school concerning the best life, we will now only repeat what is
contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that
partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz., external
goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy
man must have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy
who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or
prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will
commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or
drink, who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half-a-far-
thing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman. These
propositions are almost universally acknowledged as soon as they are
uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or
that good. Some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough,
but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation,
and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily
prove that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of
external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happi-
ness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often
found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in
their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than
among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are
deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter of experience,
but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with rea-
son. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument,
and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of
them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their
possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater
use, if the epithet useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects.
No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to
another corresponds in degree of excellence to the interval between the
natures of which we say that these very states are states: so that, if the
soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely
and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has
a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods
external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought
154/Aristotle
to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of
them.
Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happi-
ness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action.
God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by
reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own
nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference between good fortune
and happiness; for external goods come of themselves, and chance is the
author of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chance. In
like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be
shown to be that which is best and which acts rightly; and rightly it
cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state
can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, jus-
tice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the quali-
ties which give the individual who possesses them the name of just,
wise, or temperate.
Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I could not avoid
touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the argu-
ments affecting them; these are the business of another science.
Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states,
is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the per-
formance of good actions. If there are any who controvert our assertion,
we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their objections
hereafter.
Part II
There remains to be discussed the question whether the happiness of the
individual is the same as that of the state, or different. Here again there
can be no doubt—no one denies that they are the same. For those who
hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also
think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who
value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which
rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual
for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. Two
points here present themselves for consideration: first (1), which is the
more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of
an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is the best form
of constitution or the best condition of a state, either on the supposition
that political privileges are desirable for all, or for a majority only?
Politics/155
Since the good of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject
of political thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political
discussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest
for us, the latter will be the main subject of our inquiry.
Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every
man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily. But even those who
agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a ques-
tion, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible
than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a
contemplative life, which by some is maintained to be the only one wor-
thy of a philosopher. For these two lives—the life of the philosopher and
the life of the statesman—appear to have been preferred by those who
have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in
other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the
wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according
to the best end. There are some who think that while a despotic rule over
others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over
them, even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man’s indi-
vidual wellbeing. Others take an opposite view; they maintain that the
true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue ad-
mits of being practiced, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by
private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary and ty-
rannical rule alone consists with happiness; indeed, in some states the
entire aim both of the laws and of the constitution is to give men des-
potic power over their neighbors. And, therefore, although in most cities
the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim
at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon
and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the of the laws
are framed with a view to war. And in all nations which are able to
gratify their ambition military power is held in esteem, for example
among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts.
In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the warlike
virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honor of
wearing as many armlets as they have served campaigns. There was
once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should
wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his
man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a
certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number of en-
emies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks
156/Aristotle
which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous
practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established
by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear
very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he
can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How
can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the
legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for
there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences
offer no parallel a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his
patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet most men appear to
think that the art of despotic government is statesmanship, and what
men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not
ashamed of practicing towards others; they demand just rule for them-
selves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it.
Such behavior is irrational; unless the one party is, and the other is not,
born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not indeed
all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as
we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only
the animals which may be hunted for food or sacrifice, this is to say,
such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a city happy
in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is quite
possible that a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have
good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to
war or the conquest of enemies—all that sort of thing must be excluded.
Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to
be deemed honorable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only
means. And the good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of
men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happi-
ness which is attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the
same; and where there are neighbors he will have to see what sort of
studies should be practiced in relation to their several characters, or
how the measures appropriate in relation to each are to be adopted. The
end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly
made a matter of future consideration.
Part III
Let us now address those who, while they agree that the life of virtue is
the most eligible, differ about the manner of practicing it. For some
renounce political power, and think that the life of the freeman is differ-
Politics/157
ent from the life of the statesman and the best of all; but others think the
life of the statesman best. The argument of the latter is that he who does
nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with hap-
piness. To both we say: ‘you are partly right and partly wrong.’ first
class are right in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the
life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in having the use of
a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing commands about neces-
sary things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is des-
potic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference
between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is be-
tween slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said
enough at the commencement of this treatise. And it is equally a mistake
to place inactivity above action, for happiness is activity, and the ac-
tions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble.
But perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may still maintain
that supreme power is the best of all things, because the possessors of it
are able to perform the greatest number of noble actions. if so, the man
who is able to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neighbor, ought
rather to take away his power; and the father should make no account of
his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend; they should not
bestow a thought on one another in comparison with this higher object,
for the best is the most eligible and ‘doing eligible’ and ‘doing well’ is
the best. There might be some truth in such a view if we assume that
robbers and plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be; their
hypothesis is false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honorable,
unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or
a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who
violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what
he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals the honorable
and the just consist in sharing alike, as is just and equal. But that the
unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like,
is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. If,
therefore, there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of per-
forming the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must
have the capacity for action as well as virtue.
If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous
activity, the active life will be the best, both for every city collectively,
and for individuals. Not that a life of action must necessarily have rela-
tion to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be
158/Aristotle
regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results,
but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent
and complete in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore a cer-
tain kind of action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the
directing mind is most truly said to act. Neither, again, is it necessary
that states which are cut off from others and choose to live alone should
be inactive; for activity, as well as other things, may take place by sec-
tions; there are many ways in which the sections of a state act upon one
another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were
otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external actions over and
above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection. Hence
it is evident that the same life is best for each individual, and for states
and for mankind collectively
Part IV
Thus far by way of introduction. In what has preceded I have discussed
other forms of government; in what remains the first point to be consid-
ered is what should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state; for the
perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life. And
therefore we must presuppose many purely imaginary conditions, but
nothing impossible. There will be a certain number of citizens, a coun-
try in which to place them, and the like. As the weaver or shipbuilder or
any other artisan must have the material proper for his work (and in
proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be
nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the materials suited
to him.
First among the materials required by the statesman is population:
he will consider what should be the number and character of the citi-
zens, and then what should be the size and character of the country.
Most persons think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large;
but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a
small state. For they judge of the size of the city by the number of the
inhabitants; whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their
power. A city too, like an individual, has a work to do; and that city
which is best adapted to the fulfillment of its work is to be deemed
greatest, in the same sense of the word great in which Hippocrates might
be called greater, not as a man, but as a physician, than some one else
who was taller And even if we reckon greatness by numbers, we ought
not to include everybody, for there must always be in cities a multitude
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of slaves and sojourners and foreigners; but we should include those
only who are members of the state, and who form an essential part of it.
The number of the latter is a proof of the greatness of a city; but a city
which produces numerous artisans and comparatively few soldiers can-
not be great, for a great city is not to be confounded with a populous
one. Moreover, experience shows that a very populous city can rarely, if
ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a reputation for good
government have a limit of population. We may argue on grounds of
reason, and the same result will follow. For law is order, and good law
is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly: to introduce
order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power—of such a power
as holds together the universe. Beauty is realized in number and magni-
tude, and the state which combines magnitude with good order must
necessarily be the most beautiful. To the size of states there is a limit, as
there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for none of these
retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they
either wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled. For example, a ship which
is only a span long will not be a ship at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile
long; yet there may be a ship of a certain size, either too large or too
small, which will still be a ship, but bad for sailing. In like manner a
state when composed of too few is not, as a state ought to be, self-
sufficing; when of too many, though self-sufficing in all mere neces-
saries, as a nation may be, it is not a state, being almost incapable of
constitutional government. For who can be the general of such a vast
multitude, or who the herald, unless he have the voice of a Stentor?
A state, then, only begins to exist when it has attained a population
sufficient for a good life in the political community: it may indeed, if it
somewhat exceed this number, be a greater state. But, as I was saying,
there must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily ascertained
by experience. For both governors and governed have duties to per-
form; the special functions of a governor to command and to judge. But
if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according
to merit, then they must know each other’s characters; where they do
not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision
of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very large they are
manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides,
in an over-populous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the
rights of citizens, for who will find them out? Clearly then the best limit
of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the
160/Aristotle
purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough concern-
ing the size of a state.
Part V
Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the state: every
one would agree in praising the territory which is most entirely self-
sufficing; and that must be the territory which is all-producing, for to
have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it
should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at once temperately
and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. Whether we are right or wrong
in laying down this limit we will inquire more precisely hereafter, when
we have occasion to consider what is the right use of property and wealth:
a matter which is much disputed, because men are inclined to rush into
one of two extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury.
It is not difficult to determine the general character of the territory
which is required (there are, however, some points on which military
authorities should be heard); it should be difficult of access to the en-
emy, and easy of egress to the inhabitants. Further, we require that the
land as well as the inhabitants of whom we were just now speaking
should be taken in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen
can be easily protected. As to the position of the city, if we could have
what we wish, it should be well situated in regard both to sea and land.
This then is one principle, that it should be a convenient center for the
protection of the whole country: the other is, that it should be suitable
for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of timber
and any other products that are easily transported.
Part VI
Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well-ordered
state or not is a question which has often been asked. It is argued that
the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the in-
crease of population, will be adverse to good order; the increase arises
from their using the sea and having a crowd of merchants coming and
going, and is inimical to good government. Apart from these consider-
ations, it would be undoubtedly better, both with a view to safety and to
the provision of necessaries, that the city and territory should be con-
nected with the sea; the defenders of a country, if they are to maintain
themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land and
by sea; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once,
Politics/161
they will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one
element, if they themselves can use both. Moreover, it is necessary that
they should import from abroad what is not found in their own country,
and that they should export what they have in excess; for a city ought to
be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.
Those who make themselves a market for the world only do so for
the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of this kind
it ought not to have such an emporium. Nowadays we often see in coun-
tries and cities dockyards and harbors very conveniently placed outside
the city, but not too far off; and they are kept in dependence by walls and
similar fortifications. Cities thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of
intercourse with their ports; and any harm which is likely to accrue may
be easily guarded against by the laws, which will pronounce and deter-
mine who may hold communication with one another, and who may not.
There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate naval force
is advantageous to a city; the city should be formidable not only to its
own citizens but to some of its neighbors, or, if necessary, able to assist
them by sea as well as by land. The proper number or magnitude of this
naval force is relative to the character of the state; for if her function is
to take a leading part in politics, her naval power should be commensu-
rate with the scale of her enterprises. The population of the state need
not be much increased, since there is no necessity that the sailors should
be citizens: the marines who have the control and command will be
freemen, and belong also to the infantry; and wherever there is a dense
population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will always be sailors
more than enough. Of this we see instances at the present day. The city
of Heraclea, for example, although small in comparison with many oth-
ers, can man a considerable fleet. Such are our conclusions respecting
the territory of the state, its harbors, its towns, its relations to the sea,
and its maritime power.
Part VII
Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to speak
of what should be their character. This is a subject which can be easily
understood by any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states
of Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable
world. Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit,
but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain compara-
tive freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of
162/Aristotle
ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and in-
ventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in
a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated
between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited
and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of
any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to
rule the world. There are also similar differences in the different tribes
of Hellas; for some of them are of a one-sided nature, and are intelligent
or courageous only, while in others there is a happy combination of both
qualities. And clearly those whom the legislator will most easily lead to
virtue may be expected to be both intelligent and courageous. Some say
that the guardians should be friendly towards those whom they know,
fierce towards those whom they do not know. Now, passion is the qual-
ity of the soul which begets friendship and enables us to love; notably
the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances
than against those who are unknown to us, when we think that we are
despised by them; for which reason Archilochus, complaining of his
friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these words:
“For surely thou art plagued on account of friends.”
The power of command and the love of freedom are in all men
based upon this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. Nor
is it right to say that the guardians should be fierce towards those whom
they do not know, for we ought not to be out of temper with any one; and
a lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when excited against evil-
doers. And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men show
most strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a
wrong at their hands: as indeed is reasonable; for, besides the actual
injury, they seem to be deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one.
Hence the saying:
“Cruel is the strife of brethren,”
and again:
“They who love in excess also hate in excess.”
Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the
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citizens of our state, and also the size and nature of their territory. I say
‘nearly,’ for we ought not to require the same minuteness in theory as in
the facts given by perception.
Part VIII
As in other natural compounds the conditions of a composite whole are
not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in any other combina-
tion forming a unity not everything is a part, which is a necessary con-
dition. The members of an association have necessarily some one thing
the same and common to all, in which they share equally or unequally
for example, food or land or any other thing. But where there are two
things of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing
in common except that the one receives what the other produces. Such,
for example, is the relation which workmen and tools stand to their
work; the house and the builder have nothing in common, but the art of
the builder is for the sake of the house. And so states require property,
but property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part of a
state; for a state is not a community of living beings only, but a commu-
nity of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now, whereas happiness
is the highest good, being a realization and perfect practice of virtue,
which some can attain, while others have little or none of it, the various
qualities of men are clearly the reason why there are various kinds of
states and many forms of government; for different men seek after hap-
piness in different ways and by different means, and so make for them-
selves different modes of life and forms of government. We must see
also how many things are indispensable to the existence of a state, for
what we call the parts of a state will be found among the indispensables.
Let us then enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit
what we want:
First, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many in-
struments; thirdly, there must be arms, for the members of a community
have need of them, and in their own hands, too, in order to maintain
authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assail-
ants; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for inter-
nal needs, and for the purposes of war; fifthly, or rather first, there must
be a care of religion which is commonly called worship; sixthly, and
most necessary of all there must be a power of deciding what is for the
public interest, and what is just in men’s dealings with one another.
These are the services which every state may be said to need. For a
164/Aristotle
state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing
for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is as we
maintain impossible that the community can be absolutely self-suffic-
ing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfillment of these
functions. There must be husbandmen to procure food, and artisans,
and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide
what is necessary and expedient.
Part IX
Having determined these points, we have in the next place to consider
whether all ought to share in every sort of occupation. Shall every man
be at once husbandman, artisan, councillor, judge, or shall we suppose
the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons?
or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to individuals and oth-
ers common to all? The same arrangement, however, does not occur in
every constitution; as we were saying, all may be shared by all, or not
all by all, but only by some; and hence arise the differences of constitu-
tions, for in democracies all share in all, in oligarchies the opposite
practice prevails. Now, since we are here speaking of the best form of
government, i.e., that under which the state will be most happy (and
happiness, as has been already said, cannot exist without virtue), it clearly
follows that in the state which is best governed and possesses men who
are just absolutely, and not merely relatively to the principle of the con-
stitution, the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen,
for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be
husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the development of vir-
tue and the performance of political duties.
Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another of council-
lors, who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law, and
these seem in an especial manner parts of a state. Now, should these two
classes be distinguished, or are both functions to be assigned to the
same persons? Here again there is no difficulty in seeing that both func-
tions will in one way belong to the same, in another, to different persons.
To different persons in so far as these i.e., the physical and the employ-
ments are suited to different primes of life, for the one requires mental
wisdom and the other strength. But on the other hand, since it is an
impossible thing that those who are able to use or to resist force should
be willing to remain always in subjection, from this point of view the
persons are the same; for those who carry arms can always determine
Politics/165
the fate of the constitution. It remains therefore that both functions should
be entrusted by the ideal constitution to the same persons, not, however,
at the same time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to
young men strength and to older men wisdom. Such a distribution of
duties will be expedient and also just, and is founded upon a principle of
conformity to merit. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of
property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in
good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class which is not
a producer of virtue have no share in the state. This follows from our
first principle, for happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is
not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in
regard to them all. And clearly property should be in their hands, since
the husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarian Perioeci.
Of the classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and the
manner in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. No husband-
man or mechanic should be appointed to it; for the Gods should receive
honor from the citizens only. Now since the body of the citizen is di-
vided into two classes, the warriors and the councillors and it is beseeming
that the worship of the Gods should be duly performed, and also a rest
provided in their service for those who from age have given up active
life, to the old men of these two classes should be assigned the duties of
the priesthood.
We have shown what are the necessary conditions, and what the
parts of a state: husbandmen, craftsmen, and laborers of an kinds are
necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the
warriors and councillors. And these are distinguished severally from
one another, the distinction being in some cases permanent, in others
not.
Part X
It is not a new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state
ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be sepa-
rated from the husbandmen. The system has continued in Egypt and in
Crete to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a law of
Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Crete. The institution of common
tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as old as the
reign of Minos, and in Italy far older. The Italian historians say that
there was a certain Italus, king of Oenotria, from whom the Oenotrians
were called Italians, and who gave the name of Italy to the promontory
166/Aristotle
of Europe lying within the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are dis-
tant from one another only half a day’s journey. They say that this Italus
converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides
other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their common meals;
even in our day some who are derived from him retain this institution
and certain other laws of his. On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia
dwelt the Opici, who are now, as of old, called Ausones; and on the side
towards Iapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called Siritis, the
Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race. From this part of the world
originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into
castes from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity
than that of Minos. It is true indeed that these and many other things
have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather
times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught
men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were
provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich
life should grow up by degrees. And we may infer that in political insti-
tutions the same rule holds. Egypt witnesses to the antiquity of all these
things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient; and
they have laws and a regular constitution existing from time immemo-
rial. We should therefore make the best use of what has been already
discovered, and try to supply defects.
I have already remarked that the land ought to belong to those who
possess arms and have a share in the government, and that the husband-
men ought to be a class distinct from them; and I have determined what
should be the extent and nature of the territory. Let me proceed to dis-
cuss the distribution of the land, and the character of the agricultural
class; for I do not think that property ought to be common, as some
maintain, but only that by friendly consent there should be a common
use of it; and that no citizen should be in want of subsistence.
As to common meals, there is a general agreement that a well or-
dered city should have them; and we will hereafter explain what are our
own reasons for taking this view. They ought, however, to be open to all
the citizens. And yet it is not easy for the poor to contribute the requisite
sum out of their private means, and to provide also for their household.
The expense of religious worship should likewise be a public charge.
The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public and the
other private, and each part should be subdivided, part of the public
land being appropriated to the service of the Gods, and the other part
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used to defray the cost of the common meals; while of the private land,
part should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that, each
citizen having two lots, they may all of them have land in both places;
there is justice and fairness in such a division, and it tends to inspire
unanimity among the people in their border wars. Where there is not
this arrangement some of them are too ready to come to blows with their
neighbors, while others are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of
honor. Wherefore there is a law in some places which forbids those who
dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars
with neighbors, on the ground that their interests will pervert their judg-
ment. For the reasons already mentioned, then, the land should be di-
vided in the manner described. The very best thing of all would be that
the husbandmen should be slaves taken from among men who are not all
of the same race and not spirited, for if they have no spirit they will be
better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making
a revolution. The next best thing would be that they should be Perioeci
of foreign race, and of a like inferior nature; some of them should be the
slaves of individuals, and employed in the private estates of men of
property, the remainder should be the property of the state and employed
on the common land. I will hereafter explain what is the proper treat-
ment of slaves, and why it is expedient that liberty should be always
held out to them as the reward of their services.
Part XI
We have already said that the city should be open to the land and to the
sea, and to the whole country as far as possible. In respect of the place
itself our wish would be that its situation should be fortunate in four
things. The first, health—this is a necessity: cities which lie towards the
east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, are the healthi-
est; next in healthfulness are those which are sheltered from the north
wind, for they have a milder winter. The site of the city should likewise
be convenient both for political administration and for war. With a view
to the latter it should afford easy egress to the citizens, and at the same
time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to enemies. There should be
a natural abundance of springs and fountains in the town, or, if there is
a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be established for the collec-
tion of rainwater, such as will not fail when the inhabitants are cut off
from the country by by war. Special care should be taken of the health
of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the
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locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly, on
the use of pure water; this latter point is by no means a secondary con-
sideration. For the elements which we use most and oftenest for the
support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are
water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure
water, and the supply is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to
be separated from that which is used for other purposes.
As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of government
varies: thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or a monarchy, but a
plain to a democracy; neither to an aristocracy, but rather a number of
strong places. The arrangement of private houses is considered to be
more agreeable and generally more convenient, if the streets are regu-
larly laid out after the modern fashion which Hippodamus introduced,
but for security in war the antiquated mode of building, which made it
difficult for strangers to get out of a town and for assailants to find their
way in, is preferable. A city should therefore adopt both plans of build-
ing: it is possible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen plant
their vines in what are called ‘clumps.’ The whole town should not be
laid out in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions; thus
security and beauty will be combined.
As to walls, those who say that cities making any pretension to
military virtue should not have them, are quite out of date in their no-
tions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on this fancy
confuted by facts. True, there is little courage shown in seeking for
safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character and not
much superior in number; but the superiority of the besiegers may be
and often is too much both for ordinary human valor and for that which
is found only in a few; and if they are to be saved and to escape defeat
and outrage, the strongest wall will be the truest soldierly precaution,
more especially now that missiles and siege engines have been brought
to such perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish as to choose a
site for a town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or as if an
individual were to leave his house unwalled, lest the inmates should
become cowards. Nor must we forget that those who have their cities
surrounded by walls may either take advantage of them or not, but cities
which are unwalled have no choice.
If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but
care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful for
warlike purposes, and adapted to resist modern inventions. For as the
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assailants of a city do all they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders
should make use of any means of defense which have been already dis-
covered, and should devise and invent others, for when men are well
prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking them.
Part XII
As the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers built at suit-
able intervals, and the body of citizens must be distributed at common
tables, the idea will naturally occur that we should establish some of the
common tables in the guardhouses. These might be arranged as has
been suggested; while the principal common tables of the magistrates
will occupy a suitable place, and there also will be the buildings appro-
priated to religious worship except in the case of those rites which the
law or the Pythian oracle has restricted to a special locality. The site
should be a spot seen far and wide, which gives due elevation to virtue
and towers over the neighborhood. Below this spot should be estab-
lished an agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the ‘freemen’s
agora’; from this all trade should be excluded, and no mechanic, hus-
bandman, or any such person allowed to enter, unless he be summoned
by the magistrates. It would be a charming use of the place, if the gym-
nastic exercises of the elder men were performed there. For in this noble
practice different ages should be separated, and some of the magistrates
should stay with the boys, while the grown-up men remain with the
magistrates; for the presence of the magistrates is the best mode of in-
spiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. There should also be a traders’
agora, distinct and apart from the other, in a situation which is conve-
nient for the reception of goods both by sea and land.
But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another sec-
tion of the citizens, viz., the priests, for whom public tables should like-
wise be provided in their proper place near the temples. The magistrates
who deal with contracts, indictments, summonses, and the like, and those
who have the care of the agora and of the city, respectively, ought to be
established near an agora and some public place of meeting; the neigh-
borhood of the traders’ agora will be a suitable spot; the upper agora we
devote to the life of leisure, the other is intended for the necessities of
trade.
The same order should prevail in the country, for there too the mag-
istrates, called by some ‘Inspectors of Forests’ and by others ‘Wardens
of the Country,’ must have guardhouses and common tables while they
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are on duty; temples should also be scattered throughout the country,
dedicated, some to Gods, and some to heroes.
But it would be a waste of time for us to linger over details like
these. The difficulty is not in imagining but in carrying them out. We
may talk about them as much as we like, but the execution of them will
depend upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no more about these matters
for the present.
Part XIII
Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out of what
and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-gov-
erned should be composed. There are two things in which all which all
well-being consists: one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of
action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are means to-
wards it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. Sometimes
the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to attain it; in
other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to
themselves a bad end; and sometimes they fail in both. Take, for ex-
ample, the art of medicine; physicians do not always understand the
nature of health, and also the means which they use may not effect the
desired end. In all arts and sciences both the end and the means should
be equally within our control.
The happiness and well-being which all men manifestly desire, some
have the power of attaining, but to others, from some accident or defect
of nature, the attainment of them is not granted; for a good life requires
a supply of external goods, in a less degree when men are in a good
state, in a greater degree when they are in a lower state. Others again,
who possess the conditions of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first
in the pursuit of it. But since our object is to discover the best form of
government, that, namely, under which a city will be best governed, and
since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of
obtaining happiness, it is evident that we must clearly ascertain the na-
ture of happiness.
We maintain, and have said in the Ethics, if the arguments there
adduced are of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect
exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. And I used the
term ‘conditional’ to express that which is indispensable, and ‘absolute’
to express that which is good in itself. Take the case of just actions; just
punishments and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle,
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but they are good only because we cannot do without them—it would be
better that neither individuals nor states should need anything of the
sort—but actions which aim at honor and advantage are absolutely the
best. The conditional action is only the choice of a lesser evil; whereas
these are the foundation and creation of good. A good man may make
the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; but he can
only attain happiness under the opposite conditions (for this also has
been determined in accordance with ethical arguments, that the good
man is he for whom, because he is virtuous, the things that are abso-
lutely good are good; it is also plain that his use of these goods must be
virtuous and in the absolute sense good). This makes men fancy that
external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that
a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument
and not to the skill of the performer.
It follows then from what has been said that some things the legisla-
tor must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must provide. And
therefore we can only say: May our state be constituted in such a man-
ner as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we
acknowledge her power): whereas virtue and goodness in the state are
not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose. A city
can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the govern-
ment are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the govern-
ment; let us then inquire how a man becomes virtuous. For even if we
could suppose the citizen body to be virtuous, without each of them
being so, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the
virtue of all is involved.
There are three things which make men good and virtuous; these are
nature, habit, rational principle. In the first place, every one must be
born a man and not some other animal; so, too, he must have a certain
character, both of body and soul. But some qualities there is no use in
having at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some gifts
which by nature are made to be turned by habit to good or bad. Animals
lead for the most part a life of nature, although in lesser particulars
some are influenced by habit as well. Man has rational principle, in
addition, and man only. Wherefore nature, habit, rational principle must
be in harmony with one another; for they do not always agree; men do
many things against habit and nature, if rational principle persuades
them that they ought. We have already determined what natures are
likely to be most easily molded by the hands of the legislator. An else is
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the work of education; we learn some things by habit and some by in-
struction.
Part XIV
Since every political society is composed of rulers and subjects let us
consider whether the relations of one to the other should interchange or
be permanent. For the education of the citizens will necessarily vary
with the answer given to this question. Now, if some men excelled oth-
ers in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel
mankind in general (having in the first place a great advantage even in
their bodies, and secondly in their minds), so that the superiority of the
governors was undisputed and patent to their subjects, it would clearly
be better that once for an the one class should rule and the other serve.
But since this is unattainable, and kings have no marked superiority
over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be found among the Indi-
ans, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike
should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality con-
sists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government can
stand which is not founded upon justice. For if the government be unjust
every one in the country unites with the governed in the desire to have a
revolution, and it is an impossibility that the members of the govern-
ment can be so numerous as to be stronger than all their enemies put
together. Yet that governors should excel their subjects is undeniable.
How all this is to be effected, and in what way they will respectively
share in the government, the legislator has to consider. The subject has
been already mentioned. Nature herself has provided the distinction when
she made a difference between old and young within the same species,
of whom she fitted the one to govern and the other to be governed. No
one takes offense at being governed when he is young, nor does he think
himself better than his governors, especially if he will enjoy the same
privilege when he reaches the required age.
We conclude that from one point of view governors and governed
are identical, and from another different. And therefore their education
must be the same and also different. For he who would learn to com-
mand well must, as men say, first of all learn to obey. As I observed in
the first part of this treatise, there is one rule which is for the sake of the
rulers and another rule which is for the sake of the ruled; the former is a
despotic, the latter a free government. Some commands differ not in the
thing commanded, but in the intention with which they are imposed.
Politics/173
Wherefore, many apparently menial offices are an honor to the free
youth by whom they are performed; for actions do not differ as honor-
able or dishonorable in themselves so much as in the end and intention
of them. But since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the
same as that of the good man, and that the same person must first be a
subject and then a ruler, the legislator has to see that they become good
men, and by what means this may be accomplished, and what is the end
of the perfect life.
Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has a
rational principle in itself, and the other, not having a rational principle
in itself, is able to obey such a principle. And we call a man in any way
good because he has the virtues of these two parts. In which of them the
end is more likely to be found is no matter of doubt to those who adopt
our division; for in the world both of nature and of art the inferior al-
ways exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or supe-
rior is that which has a rational principle. This principle, too, in our
ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two kinds, for there is a prac-
tical and a speculative principle. This part, then, must evidently be simi-
larly divided. And there must be a corresponding division of actions; the
actions of the naturally better part are to be preferred by those who have
it in their power to attain to two out of the three or to all, for that is
always to every one the most eligible which is the highest attainable by
him. The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and
leisure, war and peace, and of actions some aim at what is necessary
and useful, and some at what is honorable. And the preference given to
one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference
given to one or other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there
must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure,
things useful and necessary for the sake of things honorable. All these
points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he
should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all
the better and the end; he should also remember the diversities of human
lives and actions. For men must be able to engage in business and go to
war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary
and indeed what is useful, but what is honorable is better. On such
principles children and persons of every age which requires education
should be trained. Whereas even the Hellenes of the present day who are
reputed to be best governed, and the legislators who gave them their
constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with a
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regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a
view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those
which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many modern writers
have taken a similar view: they commend the Lacedaemonian constitu-
tion, and praise the legislator for making conquest and war his sole aim,
a doctrine which may be refuted by argument and has long ago been
refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumulat-
ing the goods of fortune; and on this ground Thibron and all those who
have written about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised their
legislator, because the Lacedaemonians, by being trained to meet dan-
gers, gained great power. But surely they are not a happy people now
that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator right. How
ridiculous is the result, if, when they are continuing in the observance of
his laws and no one interferes with them, they have lost the better part of
life! These writers further err about the sort of government which the
legislator should approve, for the government of freemen is nobler and
implies more virtue than despotic government. Neither is a city to be
deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he trains his citizens
to conquer and obtain dominion over their neighbors, for there is great
evil in this. On a similar principle any citizen who could, should obvi-
ously try to obtain the power in his own state—the crime which the
Lacedaemonians accuse king Pausanias of attempting, although he had
so great honor already. No such principle and no law having this object
is either statesmanlike or useful or right. For the same things are best
both for individuals and for states, and these are the things which the
legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens.
Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of
those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should
provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain
empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a
general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters
only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as arguments,
prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other mea-
sures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For
most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall
when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they lose their
temper in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never
having taught them how to lead the life of peace.
Politics/175
Part XV
Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best
man and of the best constitution must also be the same; it is therefore
evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure; for
peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil.
But leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues
which are practiced in leisure, but also by some of those which are
useful to business. For many necessaries of life have to be supplied
before we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and
brave, and able to endure: for truly, as the proverb says, ‘There is no
leisure for slaves,’ and those who cannot face danger like men are the
slaves of any invader. Courage and endurance are required for business
and philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice for both, and more
especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just
and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure
which comes with peace tend to make them insolent. Those then who
seem to be the best-off and to be in the possession of every good, have
special need of justice and temperance—for example, those (if such
there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they
above all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the
more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of abundance. There
is no difficulty in seeing why the state that would be happy and good
ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not to be able to
use the goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use
them in time of leisure—to show excellent qualities in action and war,
and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. Where-
fore we should not practice virtue after the manner of the
Lacedaemonians. For they, while agreeing with other men in their con-
ception of the highest goods, differ from the rest of mankind in thinking
that they are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue. And since
they think these goods and the enjoyment of them greater than the enjoy-
ment derived from the virtues … and that it should be practiced for its
own sake, is evident from what has been said; we must now consider
how and by what means it is to be attained.
We have already determined that nature and habit and rational prin-
ciple are required, and, of these, the proper nature of the citizens has
also been defined by us. But we have still to consider whether the train-
ing of early life is to be that of rational principle or habit, for these two
must accord, and when in accord they will then form the best of harmo-
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nies. The rational principle may be mistaken and fail in attaining the
highest ideal of life, and there may be a like evil influence of habit. Thus
much is clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, birth implies
an antecedent beginning, and that there are beginnings whose end is
relative to a further end. Now, in men rational principle and mind are
the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral disci-
pline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them. In the
second place, as the soul and body are two, we see also that there are
two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two corre-
sponding states—reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order
of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. The
proof is that anger and wishing and desire are implanted in children
from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as
they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that
of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow: none
the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of
the body for the sake of the soul.
Part XVI
Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the
children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, his first care
will be about marriage—at what age should his citizens marry, and who
are fit to marry? In legislating on this subject he ought to consider the
persons and the length of their life, that their procreative life may termi-
nate at the same period, and that they may not differ in their bodily
powers, as will be the case if the man is still able to beget children while
the woman is unable to bear them, or the woman able to bear while the
man is unable to beget, for from these causes arise quarrels and differ-
ences between married persons. Secondly, he must consider the time at
which the children will succeed to their parents; there ought not to be
too great an interval of age, for then the parents will be too old to derive
any pleasure from their affection, or to be of any use to them. Nor ought
they to be too nearly of an age; to youthful marriages there are many
objections—the children will be wanting in respect to the parents, who
will seem to be their contemporaries, and disputes will arise in the man-
agement of the household. Thirdly, and this is the point from which we
digressed, the legislator must mold to his will the frames of newly-born
children. Almost all these objects may be secured by attention to one
point. Since the time of generation is commonly limited within the age
Politics/177
of seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the case of a
woman, the commencement of the union should conform to these peri-
ods. The union of male and female when too young is bad for the pro-
creation of children; in all other animals the offspring of the young are
small and in-developed, and with a tendency to produce female chil-
dren, and therefore also in man, as is proved by the fact that in those
cities in which men and women are accustomed to marry young, the
people are small and weak; in childbirth also younger women suffer
more, and more of them die; some persons say that this was the meaning
of the response once given to the Troezenians—the oracle really meant
that many died because they married too young; it had nothing to do
with the ingathering of the harvest. It also conduces to temperance not
to marry too soon; for women who marry early are apt to be wanton;
and in men too the bodily frame is stunted if they marry while the seed is
growing (for there is a time when the growth of the seed, also, ceases, or
continues to but a slight extent). Women should marry when they are
about eighteen years of age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are
in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both will coincide.
Further, the children, if their birth takes place soon, as may reasonably
be expected, will succeed in the beginning of their prime, when the fa-
thers are already in the decline of life, and have nearly reached their
term of three-score years and ten.
Thus much of the age proper for marriage: the season of the year
should also be considered; according to our present custom, people gen-
erally limit marriage to the season of winter, and they are right. The
precepts of physicians and natural philosophers about generation should
also be studied by the parents themselves; the physicians give good ad-
vice about the favorable conditions of the body, and the natural philoso-
phers about the winds; of which they prefer the north to the south.
What constitution in the parent is most advantageous to the off-
spring is a subject which we will consider more carefully when we speak
of the education of children, and we will only make a few general re-
marks at present. The constitution of an athlete is not suited to the life of
a citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children, any more than
the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean
between them. A man’s constitution should be inured to labor, but not to
labor which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is practiced by
athletes; he should be capable of all the actions of a freeman. These
remarks apply equally to both parents.
178/Aristotle
Women who are with child should be careful of themselves; they
should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. The first of these pre-
scriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by requiring that
they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the
gods who preside over birth. Their minds, however, unlike their bodies,
they ought to keep quiet, for the offspring derive their natures from their
mothers as plants do from the earth.
As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no
deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the
number of children, if the established customs of the state forbid this
(for in our state population has a limit), no child is to be exposed, but
when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before
sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in
these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.
And now, having determined at what ages men and women are to
begin their union, let us also determine how long they shall continue to
beget and bear offspring for the state; men who are too old, like men
who are too young, produce children who are defective in body and
mind; the children of very old men are weakly. The limit then, should be
the age which is the prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons,
according to the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of
seven years, is about fifty; at four or five years or later, they should
cease from having families; and from that time forward only cohabit
with one another for the sake of health; or for some similar reason.
As to adultery, let it be held disgraceful, in general, for any man or
woman to be found in any way unfaithful when they are married, and
called husband and wife. If during the time of bearing children anything
of the sort occur, let the guilty person be punished with a loss of privi-
leges in proportion to the offense.
Part XVII
After the children have been born, the manner of rearing them may be
supposed to have a great effect on their bodily strength. It would appear
from the example of animals, and of those nations who desire to create
the military habit, that the food which has most milk in it is best suited
to human beings; but the less wine the better, if they would escape dis-
eases. Also all the motions to which children can be subjected at their
early age are very useful. But in order to preserve their tender limbs
from distortion, some nations have had recourse to mechanical appli-
Politics/179
ances which straighten their bodies. To accustom children to the cold
from their earliest years is also an excellent practice, which greatly
conduces to health, and hardens them for military service. Hence many
barbarians have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold
stream; others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper only. For
human nature should be early habituated to endure all which by habit it
can be made to endure; but the process must be gradual. And children,
from their natural warmth, may be easily trained to bear cold. Such care
should attend them in the first stage of life.
The next period lasts to the age of five; during this no demand should
be made upon the child for study or labor, lest its growth be impeded;
and there should be sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being
inactive. This can be secured, among other ways, by amusement, but
the amusement should not be vulgar or tiring or effeminate. The Direc-
tors of Education, as they are termed, should be careful what tales or
stories the children hear, for all such things are designed to prepare the
way for the business of later life, and should be for the most part imita-
tions of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnest.
Those are wrong who in their laws attempt to check the loud crying and
screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in
a manner, exercise their bodies. Straining the voice has a strengthening
effect similar to that produced by the retention of the breath in violent
exertions. The Directors of Education should have an eye to their bring-
ing up, and in particular should take care that they are left as little as
possible with slaves. For until they are seven years old they must five at
home; and therefore, even at this early age, it is to be expected that they
should acquire a taint of meanness from what they hear and see. Indeed,
there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to drive
away than indecency of speech; for the light utterance of shameful words
leads soon to shameful actions. The young especially should never be
allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. A freeman who is found
saying or doing what is forbidden, if he be too young as yet to have the
privilege of reclining at the public tables, should be disgraced and beaten,
and an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. And since
we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pic-
tures or speeches from the stage which are indecent. Let the rulers take
care that there be no image or picture representing unseemly actions,
except in the temples of those Gods at whose festivals the law permits
even ribaldry, and whom the law also permits to be worshipped by per-
180/Aristotle
sons of mature age on behalf of themselves, their children, and their
wives. But the legislator should not allow youth to be spectators of
iambi or of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and
to drink strong wine; by that time education will have armed them against
the evil influences of such representations.
We have made these remarks in a cursory manner—they are enough
for the present occasion; but hereafter we will return to the subject and
after a fuller discussion determine whether such liberty should or should
not be granted, and in what way granted, if at all. Theodorus, the tragic
actor, was quite right in saying that he would not allow any other actor,
not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, because
the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. And the
same principle applies universally to association with things as well as
with persons, for we always like best whatever comes first. And there-
fore youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially to
things which suggest vice or hate. When the five years have passed
away, during the two following years they must look on at the pursuits
which they are hereafter to learn. There are two periods of life with
reference to which education has to be divided, from seven to the age of
puberty, and onwards to the age of one and twenty. The poets who di-
vide ages by sevens are in the main right: but we should observe the
divisions actually made by nature; for the deficiencies of nature are
what art and education seek to fill up.
Let us then first inquire if any regulations are to be laid down about
children, and secondly, whether the care of them should be the concern
of the state or of private individuals, which latter is in our own day the
common custom, and in the third place, what these regulations should
be.
BOOK EIGHT
Part I
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all
to the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the
constitution The citizen should be molded to suit the form of govern-
ment under which he lives. For each government has a peculiar charac-
ter which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The
character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligar-
chy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the
government.
Politics/181
Again, for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training and
habituation are required; clearly therefore for the practice of virtue. And
since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be
one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private—
not as at present, when every one looks after his own children sepa-
rately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks
best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the
same for all. Neither must we suppose that any one of the citizens be-
longs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a
part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of
the whole. In this particular as in some others the Lacedaemonians are
to be praised, for they take the greatest pains about their children, and
make education the business of the state.
Part II
That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of
state is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this public
education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions
which remain to be considered. As things are, there is disagreement
about the subjects. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things
to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear
whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral
virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows on what prin-
ciple we should proceed—should the useful in life, or should virtue, or
should the higher knowledge, be the aim of our training; all three opin-
ions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agree-
ment; for different persons, starting with different ideas about the na-
ture of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it. There can be
no doubt that children should be taught those useful things which are
really necessary, but not all useful things; for occupations are divided
into liberal and illiberal; and to young children should be imparted only
such kinds of knowledge as will be useful to them without vulgarizing
them. And any occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or
soul or mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue,
is vulgar; wherefore we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the
body, and likewise all paid employments, for they absorb and degrade
the mind. There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to
acquire, but only in a certain degree, and if he attend to them too closely,
in order to attain perfection in them, the same evil effects will follow.
182/Aristotle
The object also which a man sets before him makes a great difference; if
he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends,
or with a view to excellence the action will not appear illiberal; but if
done for the sake of others, the very same action will be thought menial
and servile. The received subjects of instruction, as I have already re-
marked, are partly of a liberal and party of an illiberal character.
Part III
The customary branches of education are in number four; they are—(1)
reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, to which is
sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these, reading and writing and draw-
ing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways,
and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. concerning mu-
sic a doubt may be raised—in our own day most men cultivate it for the
sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because
nature herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able,
not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for, as I must repeat once
again, the first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required, but
leisure is better than occupation and is its end; and therefore the ques-
tion must be asked, what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we
ought not to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the
end of life. But if this is inconceivable, and amusement is needed more
amid serious occupations than at other times (for he who is hard at work
has need of relaxation, and amusement gives relaxation, whereas occu-
pation is always accompanied with exertion and effort), we should in-
troduce amusements only at suitable times, and they should be our medi-
cines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and
from the pleasure we obtain rest. But leisure of itself gives pleasure and
happiness and enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the busy
man, but by those who have leisure. For he who is occupied has in view
some end which he has not attained; but happiness is an end, since all
men deem it to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. This
pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different persons, and var-
ies according to the habit of individuals; the pleasure of the best man is
the best, and springs from the noblest sources. It is clear then that there
are branches of learning and education which we must study merely
with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be
valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are
useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of
Politics/183
other things. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education,
not on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is not necessary,
nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing, which are
useful in money-making, in the management of a household, in the ac-
quisition of knowledge and in political life, nor like drawing, useful for
a more correct judgment of the works of artists, nor again like gymnas-
tic, which gives health and strength; for neither of these is to be gained
from music. There remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoy-
ment in leisure; which is in fact evidently the reason of its introduction,
this being one of the ways in which it is thought that a freeman should
pass his leisure; as Homer says,
“But he who alone should be called to the pleasant feast,”
and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as inviting
“The bard who would delight them all.”
And in another place Odysseus says there is no better way of pass-
ing life than when men’s hearts are merry and
“The banqueters in the hall, sitting in order, hear the voice of the
minstrel.”
It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which parents
should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because it
is liberal or noble. Whether this is of one kind only, or of more than one,
and if so, what they are, and how they are to be imparted, must hereafter
be determined. Thus much we are now in a position to say, that the
ancients witness to us; for their opinion may be gathered from the fact
that music is one of the received and traditional branches of education.
Further, it is clear that children should be instructed in some useful
things—for example, in reading and writing—not only for their useful-
ness, but also because many other sorts of knowledge are acquired
through them. With a like view they may be taught drawing, not to
prevent their making mistakes in their own purchases, or in order that
they may not be imposed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but
perhaps rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human
form. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and
184/Aristotle
exalted souls. Now it is clear that in education practice must be used
before theory, and the body be trained before the mind; and therefore
boys should be handed over to the trainer, who creates in them the roper
habit of body, and to the wrestling-master, who teaches them their exer-
cises.
Part IV
Of those states which in our own day seem to take the greatest care of
children, some aim at producing in them an athletic habit, but they only
injure their forms and stunt their growth. Although the Lacedaemonians
have not fallen into this mistake, yet they brutalize their children by
laborious exercises which they think will make them courageous. But in
truth, as we have often repeated, education should not be exclusively, or
principally, directed to this end. And even if we suppose the
Lacedaemonians to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For among
barbarians and among animals courage is found associated, not with the
greatest ferocity, but with a gentle and lion like temper. There are many
races who are ready enough to kill and eat men, such as the Achaeans
and Heniochi, who both live about the Black Sea; and there are other
mainland tribes, as bad or worse, who all live by plunder, but have no
courage. It is notorious that the Lacedaemonians themselves, while they
alone were assiduous in their laborious drill, were superior to others,
but now they are beaten both in war and gymnastic exercises. For their
ancient superiority did not depend on their mode of training their youth,
but only on the circumstance that they trained them when their only
rivals did not. Hence we may infer that what is noble, not what is brutal,
should have the first place; no wolf or other wild animal will face a
really noble danger; such dangers are for the brave man. And parents
who devote their children to gymnastics while they neglect their neces-
sary education, in reality vulgarize them; for they make them useful to
the art of statesmanship in one quality only, and even in this the argu-
ment proves them to be inferior to others. We should judge the
Lacedaemonians not from what they have been, but from what they are;
for now they have rivals who compete with their education; formerly
they had none.
It is an admitted principle, that gymnastic exercises should be em-
ployed in education, and that for children they should be of a lighter
kind, avoiding severe diet or painful toil, lest the growth of the body be
impaired. The evil of excessive training in early years is strikingly proved
Politics/185
by the example of the Olympic victors; for not more than two or three of
them have gained a prize both as boys and as men; their early training
and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. When
boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other studies; the period
of life which follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict
diet. Men ought not to labor at the same time with their minds and with
their bodies; for the two kinds of labor are opposed to one another; the
labor of the body impedes the mind, and the labor of the mind the body.
Part V
Concerning music there are some questions which we have already raised;
these we may now resume and carry further; and our remarks will serve
as a prelude to this or any other discussion of the subject. It is not easy
to determine the nature of music, or why any one should have a knowl-
edge of it. Shall we say, for the sake of amusement and relaxation, like
sleep or drinking, which are not good in themselves, but are pleasant,
and at the same time ‘care to cease,’ as Euripides says? And for this end
men also appoint music, and make use of all three alike—sleep, drink-
ing, music—to which some add dancing. Or shall we argue that music
conduces to virtue, on the ground that it can form our minds and habitu-
ate us to true pleasures as our bodies are made by gymnastic to be of a
certain character? Or shall we say that it contributes to the enjoyment of
leisure and mental cultivation, which is a third alternative? Now obvi-
ously youths are not to be instructed with a view to their amusement, for
learning is no amusement, but is accompanied with pain. Neither is
intellectual enjoyment suitable to boys of that age, for it is the end, and
that which is imperfect cannot attain the perfect or end. But perhaps it
may be said that boys learn music for the sake of the amusement which
they will have when they are grown up. If so, why should they learn
themselves, and not, like the Persian and Median kings, enjoy the plea-
sure and instruction which is derived from hearing others? (for surely
persons who have made music the business and profession of their lives
will be better performers than those who practice only long enough to
learn). If they must learn music, on the same principle they should learn
cookery, which is absurd. And even granting that music may form the
character, the objection still holds: why should we learn ourselves? Why
cannot we attain true pleasure and form a correct judgment from hear-
ing others, like the Lacedaemonians?—for they, without learning mu-
sic, nevertheless can correctly judge, as they say, of good and bad melo-
186/Aristotle
dies. Or again, if music should be used to promote cheerfulness and
refined intellectual enjoyment, the objection still remains—why should
we learn ourselves instead of enjoying the performances of others? We
may illustrate what we are saying by our conception of the Gods; for in
the poets Zeus does not himself sing or play on the lyre. Nay, we call
professional performers vulgar; no freeman would play or sing unless
he were intoxicated or in jest. But these matters may be left for the
present.
The first question is whether music is or is not to be a part of educa-
tion. Of the three things mentioned in our discussion, which does it pro-
duce?—education or amusement or intellectual enjoyment, for it may
be reckoned under all three, and seems to share in the nature of all of
them. Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation is of ne-
cessity sweet, for it is the remedy of pain caused by toil; and intellectual
enjoyment is universally acknowledged to contain an element not only
of the noble but of the pleasant, for happiness is made up of both. All
men agree that music is one of the pleasantest things, whether with or
without songs; as Musaeus says:
“Song to mortals of all things the sweetest.”
Hence and with good reason it is introduced into social gatherings
and entertainments, because it makes the hearts of men glad: so that on
this ground alone we may assume that the young ought to be trained in
it. For innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with the perfect end
of life, but they also provide relaxation. And whereas men rarely attain
the end, but often rest by the way and amuse themselves, not only with
a view to a further end, but also for the pleasure’s sake, it may be well at
times to let them find a refreshment in music. It sometimes happens that
men make amusement the end, for the end probably contains some ele-
ment of pleasure, though not any ordinary or lower pleasure; but they
mistake the lower for the higher, and in seeking for the one find the
other, since every pleasure has a likeness to the end of action. For the
end is not eligible for the sake of any future good, nor do the pleasures
which we have described exist for the sake of any future good but of the
past, that is to say, they are the alleviation of past toils and pains. And
we may infer this to be the reason why men seek happiness from these
pleasures.
But music is pursued, not only as an alleviation of past toil, but also
Politics/187
as providing recreation. And who can say whether, having this use, it
may not also have a nobler one? In addition to this common pleasure,
felt and shared in by all (for the pleasure given by music is natural, and
therefore adapted to all ages and characters), may it not have also some
influence over the character and the soul? It must have such an influ-
ence if characters are affected by it. And that they are so affected is
proved in many ways, and not least by the power which the songs of
Olympus exercise; for beyond question they inspire enthusiasm, and
enthusiasm is an emotion of the ethical part of the soul. Besides, when
men hear imitations, even apart from the rhythms and tunes themselves,
their feelings move in sympathy. Since then music is a pleasure, and
virtue consists in rejoicing and loving and hating aright, there is clearly
nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and to cultivate as
the power of forming right judgments, and of taking delight in good
dispositions and noble actions. Rhythm and melody supply imitations
of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and of all
the qualities contrary to these, and of the other qualities of character,
which hardly fall short of the actual affections, as we know from our
own experience, for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a
change. The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is
not far removed from the same feeling about realities; for example, if
any one delights in the sight of a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily
follows that the sight of the original will be pleasant to him. The objects
of no other sense, such as taste or touch, have any resemblance to moral
qualities; in visible objects there is only a little, for there are figures
which are of a moral character, but only to a slight extent, and all do not
participate in the feeling about them. Again, figures and colors are not
imitations, but signs, of moral habits, indications which the body gives
of states of feeling. The connection of them with morals is slight, but in
so far as there is any, young men should be taught to look, not at the
works of Pauson, but at those of Polygnotus, or any other painter or
sculptor who expresses moral ideas. On the other hand, even in mere
melodies there is an imitation of character, for the musical modes differ
essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently
affected by each. Some of them make men sad and grave, like the so-
called Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed modes,
another, again, produces a moderate and settled temper, which appears
to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian; the Phrygian inspires enthusi-
asm. The whole subject has been well treated by philosophical writers
188/Aristotle
on this branch of education, and they confirm their arguments by facts.
The same principles apply to rhythms; some have a character of rest,
others of motion, and of these latter again, some have a more vulgar,
others a nobler movement. Enough has been said to show that music has
a power of forming the character, and should therefore be introduced
into the education of the young. The study is suited to the stage of youth,
for young persons will not, if they can help, endure anything which is
not sweetened by pleasure, and music has a natural sweetness. There
seems to be in us a sort of affinity to musical modes and rhythms, which
makes some philosophers say that the soul is a tuning, others, that it
possesses tuning.
Part VI
And now we have to determine the question which has been already
raised, whether children should be themselves taught to sing and play or
not. Clearly there is a considerable difference made in the character by
the actual practice of the art. It is difficult, if not impossible, for those
who do not perform to be good judges of the performance of others.
Besides, children should have something to do, and the rattle of Archytas,
which people give to their children in order to amuse them and prevent
them from breaking anything in the house, was a capital invention, for a
young thing cannot be quiet. The rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind,
and education is a rattle or toy for children of a larger growth. We con-
clude then that they should be taught music in such a way as to become
not only critics but performers.
The question what is or is not suitable for different ages may be
easily answered; nor is there any difficulty in meeting the objection of
those who say that the study of music is vulgar. We reply (1) in the first
place, that they who are to be judges must also be performers, and that
they should begin to practice early, although when they are older they
may be spared the execution; they must have learned to appreciate what
is good and to delight in it, thanks to the knowledge which they acquired
in their youth. As to (2) the vulgarizing effect which music is supposed
to exercise, this is a question which we shall have no difficulty in deter-
mining, when we have considered to what extent freemen who are being
trained to political virtue should pursue the art, what melodies and what
rhythms they should be allowed to use, and what instruments should be
employed in teaching them to play; for even the instrument makes a
difference. The answer to the objection turns upon these distinctions;
Politics/189
for it is quite possible that certain methods of teaching and learning
music do really have a degrading effect. It is evident then that the learn-
ing of music ought not to impede the business of riper years, or to de-
grade the body or render it unfit for civil or military training, whether
for bodily exercises at the time or for later studies.
The right measure will be attained if students of music stop short of
the arts which are practiced in professional contests, and do not seek to
acquire those fantastic marvels of execution which are now the fashion
in such contests, and from these have passed into education. Let the
young practice even such music as we have prescribed, only until they
are able to feel delight in noble melodies and rhythms, and not merely in
that common part of music in which every slave or child and even some
animals find pleasure.
From these principles we may also infer what instruments should be
used. The flute, or any other instrument which requires great skill, as
for example the harp, ought not to be admitted into education, but only
such as will make intelligent students of music or of the other parts of
education. Besides, the flute is not an instrument which is expressive of
moral character; it is too exciting. The proper time for using it is when
the performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief of the passions.
And there is a further objection; the impediment which the flute presents
to the use of the voice detracts from its educational value. The ancients
therefore were right in forbidding the flute to youths and freemen, al-
though they had once allowed it. For when their wealth gave them a
greater inclination to leisure, and they had loftier notions of excellence,
being also elated with their success, both before and after the Persian
War, with more zeal than discernment they pursued every kind of knowl-
edge, and so they introduced the flute into education. At Lacedaemon
there was a choragus who led the chorus with a flute, and at Athens the
instrument became so popular that most freemen could play upon it.
The popularity is shown by the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when
he furnished the chorus to Ecphantides. Later experience enabled men
to judge what was or was not really conducive to virtue, and they re-
jected both the flute and several other old-fashioned instruments, such
as the Lydian harp, the many-stringed lyre, the ‘heptagon,’ ‘triangle,’
‘sambuca,’ the like—which are intended only to give pleasure to the
hearer, and require extraordinary skill of hand. There is a meaning also
in the myth of the ancients, which tells how Athene invented the flute
and then threw it away. It was not a bad idea of theirs, that the Goddess
190/Aristotle
disliked the instrument because it made the face ugly; but with still more
reason may we say that she rejected it because the acquirement of flute-
playing contributes nothing to the mind, since to Athene we ascribe both
knowledge and art.
Thus then we reject the professional instruments and also the pro-
fessional mode of education in music (and by professional we mean that
which is adopted in contests), for in this the performer practices the art,
not for the sake of his own improvement, but in order to give pleasure,
and that of a vulgar sort, to his hearers. For this reason the execution of
such music is not the part of a freeman but of a paid performer, and the
result is that the performers are vulgarized, for the end at which they
aim is bad. The vulgarity of the spectator tends to lower the character of
the music and therefore of the performers; they look to him—he makes
them what they are, and fashions even their bodies by the movements
which he expects them to exhibit.
Part VII
We have also to consider rhythms and modes, and their use in educa-
tion. Shall we use them all or make a distinction? and shall the same
distinction be made for those who practice music with a view to educa-
tion, or shall it be some other? Now we see that music is produced by
melody and rhythm, and we ought to know what influence these have
respectively on education, and whether we should prefer excellence in
melody or excellence in rhythm. But as the subject has been very well
treated by many musicians of the present day, and also by philosophers
who have had considerable experience of musical education, to these we
would refer the more exact student of the subject; we shall only speak of
it now after the manner of the legislator, stating the general principles.
We accept the division of melodies proposed by certain philoso-
phers into ethical melodies, melodies of action, and passionate or inspir-
ing melodies, each having, as they say, a mode corresponding to it. But
we maintain further that music should be studied, not for the sake of
one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with a view to (1) education, (2)
purgation (the word ‘purgation’ we use at present without explanation,
but when hereafter we speak of poetry, we will treat the subject with
more precision); music may also serve (3) for for enjoyment, for relax-
ation, and for recreation after exertion. It is clear, therefore, that all the
modes must be employed by us, but not all of them in the same manner.
In education the most ethical modes are to be preferred, but in listening
Politics/191
to the performances of others we may admit the modes of action and
passion also. For feelings such as pity and fear, or, again, enthusiasm,
exist very strongly in some souls, and have more or less influence over
all. Some persons fall into a religious frenzy, whom we see as a result of
the sacred melodies—when they have used the melodies that excite the
soul to mystic frenzy—restored as though they had found healing and
purgation. Those who are influenced by pity or fear, and every emo-
tional nature, must have a like experience, and others in so far as each is
susceptible to such emotions, and all are in a manner purged and their
souls lightened and delighted. The purgative melodies likewise give an
innocent pleasure to mankind. Such are the modes and the melodies in
which those who perform music at the theater should be invited to com-
pete. But since the spectators are of two kinds—the one free and edu-
cated, and the other a vulgar crowd composed of mechanics, laborers,
and the like—there ought to be contests and exhibitions instituted for
the relaxation of the second class also. And the music will correspond to
their minds; for as their minds are perverted from the natural state, so
there are perverted modes and highly strung and unnaturally colored
melodies. A man receives pleasure from what is natural to him, and
therefore professional musicians may be allowed to practice this lower
sort of music before an audience of a lower type. But, for the purposes
of education, as I have already said, those modes and melodies should
be employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian, as we said before;
though we may include any others which are approved by philosophers
who have had a musical education. The Socrates of the Republic is
wrong in retaining only the Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and
the more so because he rejects the flute; for the Phrygian is to the modes
what the flute is to musical instruments—both of them are exciting and
emotional. Poetry proves this, for Bacchic frenzy and all similar emo-
tions are most suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the
Phrygian than to any other mode. The dithyramb, for example, is ac-
knowledged to be Phrygian, a fact of which the connoisseurs of music
offer many proofs, saying, among other things, that Philoxenus, having
attempted to compose his Mysians as a dithyramb in the Dorian mode,
found it impossible, and fell back by the very nature of things into the
more appropriate Phrygian. All men agree that the Dorian music is the
gravest and manliest. And whereas we say that the extremes should be
avoided and the mean followed, and whereas the Dorian is a mean be-
tween the other modes, it is evident that our youth should be taught the
192/Aristotle
Dorian music.
Two principles have to be kept in view, what is possible, what is
becoming: at these every man ought to aim. But even these are relative
to age; the old, who have lost their powers, cannot very well sing the
high-strung modes, and nature herself seems to suggest that their songs
should be of the more relaxed kind. Wherefore the musicians likewise
blame Socrates, and with justice, for rejecting the relaxed modes in edu-
cation under the idea that they are intoxicating, not in the ordinary sense
of intoxication (for wine rather tends to excite men), but because they
have no strength in them. And so, with a view also to the time of life
when men begin to grow old, they ought to practice the gentler modes
and melodies as well as the others, and, further, any mode, such as the
Lydian above all others appears to be, which is suited to children of
tender age, and possesses the elements both of order and of education.
Thus it is clear that education should be based upon three principles—
the mean, the possible, the becoming, these three.
THE END
Book 1
Book 2
Book 3
Book 4
Book 5
Book 6
Book 7
Book 8
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Title: Second Treatise of Government
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SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
by JOHN LOCKE
Digitized by Dave Gowan (dgowan@tfn.net). John Locke’s “Second Treatise of Government”
was published in 1690. The complete unabridged text has been republished
several times in edited commentaries. This text is recovered entire from
the paperback book, “John Locke Second Treatise of Government”, Edited,
with an Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company,
Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is
included in the Etext below; only the original words contained in the
1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of copyright.
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
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BY IOHN LOCKE
SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO
LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII
REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1. WHISTON AND B.
WHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE
AND COLLINS; W. IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T.
LONGMAN, B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S. BAKER,
T. PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN
MDCCLXIII
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND
FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND
OVERTHROWN. THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL
EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
1764 EDITOR’S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only been collated with the first
three Editions, which were published during the Author’s Life, but also has the Advantage of his last
Corrections and Improvements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter Coste, communicated to
the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge.
CHAPTER: I., II., III., IV., V., VI., VII., VIII., IX., X., XI., XII., XIII., XIV., XV., XVI.,
XVII., XVIII., XIX.
PREFACE
Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has
otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest,
it is not worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our
great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which
being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in
Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural
rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery
and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be found in them, there will be no great
miss of those which are lost, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have
neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the wanting part of my answer, by tracing
Sir Robert again, through all the windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in the several
branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the nation, have since so thoroughly confuted
his Hypothesis, that I suppose no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our
common safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be deceived with
contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains,
himself, in those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of the flourish of
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doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions,
and then compare them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there was never so much glib
nonsense put together in well-sounding English. If he think it not worth while to examine his works all
thro’, let him make an experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try, whether he
can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and consistent with himself, or common sense. I
should not speak so plainly of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late years,
publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of the times. It is necessary those men, who
taking on them to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what
authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may either retract what
upon so ill grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which
they preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an English courtier: for I should
not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of
(what he so much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men
amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his doctrine, save me from the reproach of
writing against a dead adversary. They have been so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any
wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done the truth and the public
wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and allow its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there
cannot be done a greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong notions concerning
government; that so at last all times might not have reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic. If any
one, concerned really for truth, undertake the confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise him either to
recant my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his difficulties. But he must remember two things.
First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little incident of my discourse, is not an
answer to my book.
Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think either of these worth my notice, though
I shall always look on myself as bound to give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be
conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples.
I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations stands for Observations on
Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition
1680.
Book II
CHAPTER. I.
AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT
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Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,
(1). That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by positive donation from God, any
such authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended:
(2). That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:
(3). That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God that determines which is
the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could
not have been certainly determined:
(4). That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam’s
posterity, being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there
remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of
inheritance:
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on
earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be
the fountain of all power, Adam’s private dominion and paternal jurisdiction; so that he that will not give
just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that
men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a
foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers
of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out another rise of government,
another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it,
than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power;
that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over
his children, a MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his slave. All
which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these
different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a family, and a
captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws with penalties of death,
and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the
force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from
foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.
CHAPTER. II.
OF THE STATE OF NATURE.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking
leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.
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A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also
be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them
all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and
beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on
which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of
justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love
others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one
measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man’s hands, as any
man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein
satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men,
being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire,
must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to
suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they
have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as
much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the
like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as
ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no
man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state
have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare
preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one:
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all
the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master,
sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they
are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all
in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may
authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of
creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully,
so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he
can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away,
or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one
another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the
execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, whereby every one has a right
to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature
would, as all other laws that concern men in this world ‘be in vain, if there were no body that in the state
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of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders.
And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so:
for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over
another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute
or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate
heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and
conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for
reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to
another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares
himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set
to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye,
which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a
trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature,
every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it
is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his
example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN
HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF
NATURE.
Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn
it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for
any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from
the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he
bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that
commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in
England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and
therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly
judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of
another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally
may have over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of
reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human
nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some
other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has,
besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from
him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and
assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has
suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing
the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs
only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common
right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the
law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction
due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a
right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of
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appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man
has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving
all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in
the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which
no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and
also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and
measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon
one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those
wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that
great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so
fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother,
he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law.
It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree,
and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to
repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of
nature, may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a
commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of
the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as
intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of
commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies
and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are
a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the
law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power
of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in
their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other
side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing
but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to
restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for
the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in
their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury,
will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to
remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils,
which necessarily follow from men’s being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore
not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the
state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case,
and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or
controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or
passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to
submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he
is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a
state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of
independent governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain the world never was,
nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent
communities, whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an
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end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one
community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with
another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c. between the two
men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss
and an Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of
nature, in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as
members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only oppose the
authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says,
The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men
absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never any
solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are not
by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, needful for such a
life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects
and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally
induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was the cause of men’s uniting
themselves at first in politic societies.
But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own consents
they make themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse,
to make it very clear.
CHAPTER. III.
OF THE STATE OF WAR.
Sect. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore declaring by word or
action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life, puts him in a
state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the
other’s power to be taken away by him, or any one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his
quarrel; it being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with
destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man being to be preserved as much as possible, when
all cannot be preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man who
makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a
wolf or a lion; because such men are not under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule,
but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious
creatures, that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power.
Sect. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power, does
thereby put himself into a state of war with him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design
upon his life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his power without my
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consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a
fancy to it; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force
to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be free from such force is the
only security of my preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my preservation, who
would take away that freedom which is the fence to it; so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me,
thereby puts himself into a state of war with me. He that, in the state of nature, would take away the
freedom that belongs to any one in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take
away every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as he that, in the state of society,
would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed
to design to take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state of war.
Sect. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared
any design upon his life, any farther than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away
his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his
power, let his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my
liberty, would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And therefore it is lawful
for me to treat him as one who has put himself into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that
hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is aggressor in it.
Sect. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of nature and the state of war,
which however some men have confounded, are as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual
assistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual destruction, are one from
another. Men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to
judge between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared design of force, upon the
person of another, where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of
war: and it is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor, tho’ he
be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief, whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for
having stolen all that I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or coat;
because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it cannot interpose to secure my life from
present force, which, if lost, is capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of
war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common
judge, nor the decision of the law, for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of
a common judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without right, upon a man’s
person, makes a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.
Sect. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases between those that are in society,
and are equally on both sides subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies open
the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future harm: but where no such appeal is, as in
the state of nature, for want of positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war
once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the other whenever he can, until the
aggressor offers peace, and desires reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has
already done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the law, and constituted
judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting
of the laws to protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of men, there it is hard
to imagine any thing but a state of war: for wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands
appointed to administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured with the name, pretences,
or forms of law, the end whereof being to protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application
of it, to all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made upon the sufferers, who
having no appeal on earth to right them, they are left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to
heaven.
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Sect. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the
least difference is apt to end, where there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great
reason of men’s putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature: for where there is an
authority, a power on earth, from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state
of war is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been any such court, any
superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had
never come to a state of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge (says
he) be judge this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then
prosecuting, and relying on his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such
controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the
controversy; every one knows what Jephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where
there is no judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then cannot mean, who shall
judge, whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did,
appeal to heaven in it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will answer it, at
the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.
CHAPTER. IV.
OF SLAVERY.
Sect. 22. THE natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be
under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of
man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the
commonwealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall
enact, according to the trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, Observations,
A. 55. a liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws:
but freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all things,
where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will
of another man: as freedom of nature is, to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.
Sect. 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a
man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for
a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to
any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he
pleases. No body can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life,
cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that
deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it,
and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it: for, whenever he finds the
hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master,
to draw on himself the death he desires.
Sect. 24. This is the perfect condition of slavery, which is nothing else, but the state of war continued,
between a lawful conqueror and a captive: for, if once compact enter between them, and make an
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agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery
ceases, as long as the compact endures: for, as has been said, no man can, by agreement, pass over to
another that which he hath not in himself, a power over his own life.
I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is
plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an
absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time,
whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant
was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim
him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.
CHAPTER. V.
OF PROPERTY.
Sect. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right
to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for
their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to
Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given
the earth to the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to
some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing: I will not
content myself to answer, that if it be difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God gave
the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one universal
monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to Adam, and his heirs
in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavour to shew, how men might
come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that
without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sect. 26. God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use
of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for
the support and comfort of their being. And tho’ all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds,
belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body
has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of them, as they are thus in
their natural state: yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate
them some way or other, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The
fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in
common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it,
before it can do him any good for the support of his life.
Sect. 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a
property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath
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placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men:
for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sect. 28. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered
from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but the
nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or
when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first
gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and
common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so
they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus
appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus
to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had
starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by
compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves
it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that
part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit;
the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in
common with others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour
that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.
Sect. 29. By making an explicit consent of every commoner, necessary to any one’s appropriating to
himself any part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat, which their
father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning to every one his peculiar part.
Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his
only who drew it out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common, and
belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to himself.
Sect. 30. Thus this law of reason makes the deer that Indian’s who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his
goods, who hath bestowed his labour upon it, though before it was the common right of every one. And
amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who have made and multiplied positive
laws to determine property, this original law of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before
common, still takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean, that great and
still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one takes up here, is by the labour that
removes it out of that common state nature left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it.
And even amongst us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase:
for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man’s private possession; whoever has
employed so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her
from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth,
&c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he will. To which I answer, Not so.
The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too.
God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how
far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it
spoils, so much he may by his Tabour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share,
and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the
plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a
part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of
others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could
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be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.
Sect. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that
subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain,
that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves,
cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were,
inclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it;
and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot inclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners,
all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour,
and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the
earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his
labour. He that in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby
annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury
take from him.
Sect. 33. Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any other
man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet unprovided could use. So
that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that
leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think
himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of
the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land and water, where there is enough of
both, is perfectly the same.
Sect. 34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the
greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it
should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational,
(and labour was to be his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and
contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not
complain, ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another’s labour: if he did, it is plain
he desired the benefit of another’s pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had
given him in common with others to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already
possessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.
Sect. 35. It is true, in land that is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty of
people under government, who have money and commerce, no one can inclose or appropriate any part,
without the consent of all his fellow-commoners; because this is left common by compact, i.e. by the law
of the land, which is not to be violated. And though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to
all mankind; but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the remainder, after such
enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the commoners, as the whole was when they could all
make use of the whole; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it
was quite otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for appropriating. God commanded, and his
wants forced him to labour. That was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he
had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined
together. The one gave title to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far
to appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on,
necessarily introduces private possessions.
Sect. 36. The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men’s labour and the
conveniencies of life: no man’s labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment
consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench upon the
right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would still have
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room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was
appropriated. This measure did confine every man’s possession to a very moderate proportion, and
such as he might appropriate to himself, without injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when
men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then vast wilderness of
the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And the same measure may be allowed still
without prejudice to any body, as full as the world seems: for supposing a man, or family, in the state
they were at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some inland,
vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could make himself, upon the measures
we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give
them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this man’s incroachment, though the race of
men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do infinitely exceed the small
number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of ground is of so little value, without labour, that I have
heard it affirmed, that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without being
disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of it. But, on the contrary, the
inhabitants think themselves beholden to him, who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste
land, has increased the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no stress on;
this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man should have as much as he
could make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since there is land enough
in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of
men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, and a right to them; which, how it
has done, I shall by and by shew more at large.
Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had
altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had
agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth
a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour,
each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to
the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry.
To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but
increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life,
produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times
more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And
therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than
he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his
labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred
lying in common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one,
when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste
of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the
needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in
Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed,
as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products
of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of his labour
on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their
due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the
common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he had no
right, farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.
Sect. 38. The same measures governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he tilled and reaped,
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laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and
could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure
rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the
earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of
any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much ground as he could till, and make it his own
land, and yet leave enough to Abel’s sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both their
possessions. But as families increased, and industry inlarged their stocks, their possessions inlarged with
the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of,
till they incorporated, settled themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in
time, to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits between them and their
neighbours; and by laws within themselves, settled the properties of those of the same society: for we
see, that in that part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even
as low down as Abraham’s time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds, which was their
substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a country where he was a stranger. Whence it
is plain, that at least a great part of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed
property in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough in the same place,
for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and
inlarged their pasture, where it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his father, and
his brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sect. 39. And thus, without supposing any private dominion, and property in Adam, over all the
world, exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one’s property be made out
from it; but supposing the world given, as it was, to the children of men in common, we see how labour
could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no
doubt of right, no room for quarrel.
Sect. 40. Nor is it so strange, as perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of
labour should be able to over-balance the community of land: for it is labour indeed that puts the
difference of value on every thing; and let any one consider what the difference is between an acre of
land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in
common, without any husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labour makes the far
greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation to say, that of the products of
the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate
things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely
owing to nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are
wholly to be put on the account of labour.
Sect. 41. There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the Americans
are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having furnished as
liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance,
what might serve for food, raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one
hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds,
lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England.
Sect. 42. To make this a little clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life, through
their several progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they receive of their value
from human industry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things of daily use, and great plenty; yet
notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves, or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not
labour furnish us with these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns,
wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly owing to labour and
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industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the
other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in
value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the
value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be
reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left
wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is,
waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.
This shews how much numbers of men are to be preferred to largeness of dominions; and that the
increase of lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that prince, who
shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and encouragement
to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of power and narrowness of party, will quickly
be too hard for his neighbours: but this by the by.
To return to the argument in hand.
Sect. 43. An acre of land, that bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America, which,
with the same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural intrinsic value: but
yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year, is worth 5l. and from the other possibly not
worth a penny, if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I
may truly say, not one thousandth. It is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land,
without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful
products; for all that the straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an
acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all the effect of labour: for it is not barely the plough-man’s
pains, the reaper’s and thresher’s toil, and the baker’s sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the
labour of those who broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and
framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils, which are a vast number,
requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown to its being made bread, must all be charged on the
account of labour, and received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost
worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of things, that industry provided
and made use of, about every loaf of bread, before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron,
wood, leather, bark, timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts, ropes, and
all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the
workmen, to any part of the work; all which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon
up.
Sect. 44. From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man,
by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it, had still in
himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to
the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life, was
perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.
Sect. 45. Thus labour, in the beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to
employ it upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is yet more
than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented themselves with what unassisted
nature offered to their necessities: and though afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the
increase of people and stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the
several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by laws within themselves
regulated the properties of the private men of their society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled
the property which labour and industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several
states and kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in the others
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possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural common right, which
originally they had to those countries, and so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst
themselves, in distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found,
which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of
their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of,
and so still lie in common; tho’ this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented
to the use of money.
Sect. 46. The greatest part of things really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of
subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally
things of short duration; such as, if they are not consumed by use, will decay and perish of themselves:
gold, silver and diamonds, are things that fancy or agreement hath put the value on, more than real use,
and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature hath provided in common,
every one had a right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and property in all that he could
effect with his labour; all that his industry could extend to, to alter from the state nature had put it in, was
his. He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had thereby a property in them, they were
his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look, that he used them before they spoiled, else he took
more than his share, and robbed others. And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard
up more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to any body else, so that it perished not
uselesly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away plums, that would
have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he
wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others, so
long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal,
pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond,
and keep those by him all his life he invaded not the right of others, he might heap up as much of these
durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness
of his possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it.
Sect. 47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling,
and that by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of
life.
Sect. 48. And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different
proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them: for
supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein there were
but an hundred families, but there were sheep, horses and cows, with other useful animals, wholsome
fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in the island, either
because of its commonness, or perishableness, fit to supply the place of money; what reason could any
one have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his family, and a plentiful supply to its
consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable, useful
commodities, with others? Where there is not some thing, both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be
hoarded up, there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land, were it never so rich, never
so free for them to take: for I ask, what would a man value ten thousand, or an hundred thousand acres
of excellent land, ready cultivated, and well stocked too with cattle, in the middle of the inland parts of
America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by
the sale of the product? It would not be worth the enclosing, and we should see him give up again to the
wild common of nature, whatever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life to be had there
for him and his family.
Sect. 49. Thus in the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such
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thing as money was any where known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money
amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.
Sect. 50. But since gold and silver, being little useful to the life of man in proportion to food, raiment,
and carriage, has its value only from the consent of men, whereof labour yet makes, in great part, the
measure, it is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth,
they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out, a way how a man may fairly possess more land
than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the
possessor. This partage of things in an inequality of private possessions, men have made practicable out
of the bounds of society, and without compact, only by putting a value on gold and silver, and tacitly
agreeing in the use of money: for in governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the
possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.
Sect. 51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labour could at first
begin a title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon our uses bounded
it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title, nor any doubt about the largeness of
possession it gave. Right and conveniency went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ
his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of. This left no
room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on the right of others; what portion a man
carved to himself, was easily seen; and it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much,
or take more than he needed.
CHAPTER. VI.
OF PATERNAL POWER.
Sect. 52. IT may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a discourse of this nature, to find
fault with words and names, that have obtained in the world: and yet possibly it may not be amiss to
offer new ones, when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes, as this of paternal power probably has
done, which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father, as if the
mother had no share in it; whereas, if we consult reason or revelation, we shall find, she hath an equal
title. This may give one reason to ask, whether this might not be more properly called parental power?
for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children, it must certainly bind them
equal to both the concurrent causes of it. And accordingly we see the positive law of God every where
joins them together, without distinction, when it commands the obedience of children, Honour thy father
and thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever curseth his father or his mother, Lev. xx. 9. Ye shall fear
every man his mother and his father, Lev. xix. 3. Children, obey your parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1. is the stile
of the Old and New Testament.
Sect. 53. Had but this one thing been well considered, without looking any deeper into the matter, it
might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes, they have made, about this power
of parents; which, however it might, without any great harshness, bear the name of absolute dominion,
and regal authority, when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father, would
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yet have founded but oddly, and in the very name shewn the absurdity, if this supposed absolute power
over children had been called parental; and thereby have discovered, that it belonged to the mother too:
for it will but very ill serve the turn of those men, who contend so much for the absolute power and
authority of the fatherhood, as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it; and it would have
but ill supported the monarchy they contend for, when by the very name it appeared, that that
fundamental authority, from whence they would derive their government of a single person only, was not
placed in one, but two persons jointly. But to let this of names pass.
Sect. 54. Though I have said above, Chap. II. That all men by nature are equal, I cannot be supposed
to understand all sorts of equality: age or virtue may give men a just precedency: excellency of parts and
merit may place others above the common level: birth may subject some, and alliance or benefits others,
to pay an observance to those to whom nature, gratitude, or other respects, may have made it due: and
yet all this consists with the equality, which all men are in, in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over
another; which was the equality I there spoke of, as proper to the business in hand, being that equal
right, that every man hath, to his natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any
other man.
Sect. 55. Children, I confess, are not born in this full state of equality, though they are born to it. Their
parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them, when they come into the world, and for some time
after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they art
wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy: age and reason as they grow up, loosen
them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal.
Sect. 56. Adam was created a perfect man, his body and mind in full possession of their strength and
reason, and so was capable, from the first instant of his being to provide for his own support and
preservation, and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason which God had
implanted in him. From him the world is peopled with his descendants, who are all born infants, weak
and helpless, without knowledge or understanding: but to supply the defects of this imperfect state, till
the improvement of growth and age hath removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all parents
were, by the law of nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the children they had
begotten; not as their own workmanship, but the workmanship of their own maker, the Almighty, to
whom they were to be accountable for them.
Sect. 57. The law, that was to govern Adam, was the same that was to govern all his posterity, the
law of reason. But his offspring having another way of entrance into the world, different from him, by a
natural birth, that produced them ignorant and without the use of reason, they were not presently under
that law; for no body can be under a law, which is not promulgated to him; and this law being
promulgated or made known by reason only, he that is not come to the use of his reason, cannot be said
to be under this law; and Adam’s children, being not presently as soon as born under this law of reason,
were not presently free: for law, in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free
and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those
under that law: could they be happier without it, the law, as an useless thing, would of itself vanish; and
that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices. So that,
however it may be mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge
freedom: for in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no
freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there
is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who could
be free, when every other man’s humour might domineer over him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order
as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws
under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.
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Sect. 58. The power, then, that parents have over their children, arises from that duty which is
incumbent on them, to take care of their off-spring, during the imperfect state of childhood. To inform
the mind, and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place, and ease
them of that trouble, is what the children want, and the parents are bound to: for God having given man
an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will, and liberty of acting, as
properly belonging thereunto, within the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in an estate,
wherein he has not understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his own to
follow: he that understands for him, must will for him too; he must prescribe to his will, and regulate his
actions; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a freeman, the son is a freeman too.
Sect. 59. This holds in all the laws a man is under, whether natural or civil. Is a man under the law of
nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him a free disposing of his property, according to
his own will, within the compass of that law? I answer, a state of maturity wherein he might be supposed
capable to know that law, that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has
acquired that state, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may
make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, some body else must guide him, who is
presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an age of discretion
made him free, the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of England? What made
him free of that law? that is, to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his
own will, within the permission of that law? A capacity of knowing that law; which is supposed by that
law, at the age of one and twenty years, and in some cases sooner. If this made the father free, it shall
make the son free too. Till then we see the law allows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by
the will of his father or guardian, who is to understand for him. And if the father die, and fail to substitute
a deputy in his trust; if he hath not provided a tutor, to govern his son, during his minority, during his
want of understanding, the law takes care to do it; some other must govern him, and be a will to him, till
he hath attained to a state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will.
But after that, the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after nonage; equally
subjects of the same law together, without any dominion left in the father over the life, liberty, or estate
of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of nature, or under the positive laws of an
established government.
Sect. 60. But if, through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature, any one comes
not to such a degree of reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law, and so living
within the rules of it, he is never capable of being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his
own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding, its proper guide) but is continued
under the tuition and government of others, all the time his own understanding is uncapable of that
charge. And so lunatics and ideots are never set free from the government of their parents;
children, who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have; and innocents
which are excluded by a natural defect from ever having; thirdly, madmen, which for the
present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves, have for their guide,
the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them, to seek and procure their good
for them,
says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7. All which seems no more than that duty, which God and nature
has laid on man, as well as other creatures, to preserve their offspring, till they can be able to shift for
themselves, and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority.
Sect. 61. Thus we are born free, as we are born rational; not that we have actually the exercise of
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either: age, that brings one, brings with it the other too. And thus we see how natural freedom and
subjection to parents may consist together, and are both founded on the same principle. A child is free
by his father’s title, by his father’s understanding, which is to govern him till he hath it of his own. The
freedom of a man at years of discretion, and the subjection of a child to his parents, whilst yet short of
that age, are so consistent, and so distinguishable, that the most blinded contenders for monarchy, by
right of fatherhood, cannot miss this difference; the most obstinate cannot but allow their consistency: for
were their doctrine all true, were the right heir of Adam now known, and by that title settled a monarch
in his throne, invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of; if he should die as
soon as his heir were born, must not the child, notwithstanding he were never so free, never so much
sovereign, be in subjection to his mother and nurse, to tutors and governors, till age and education
brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The necessities of his life, the health of his
body, and the information of his mind, would require him to be directed by the will of others, and not his
own; and yet will any one think, that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with, or spoiled him
of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to, or gave away his empire to those who had the
government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it. If
any body should ask me, when my son is of age to be free? I shall answer, just when his monarch is of
age to govern. But at what time, says the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a man may be said to
have attained so far forth the use of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he
is then bound to guide his actions: this is a great deal more easy for sense to discern, than for any one by
skill and learning to determine.
Sect. 62. Common-wealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there is a time when men are to
begin to act like free men, and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty, or allegiance, or other
public owning of, or submission to the government of their countries.
Sect. 63. The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according to his own will, is grounded on his
having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know
how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he
has reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free; but to thrust him out
amongst brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a man, as their’s.
This is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children. God
hath made it their business to employ this care on their offspring, and hath placed in them suitable
inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power, to apply it, as his wisdom designed it, to
the children’s good, as long as they should need to be under it.
Sect. 64. But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their off-spring into an
absolute arbitrary dominion of the father, whose power reaches no farther, than by such a discipline, as
he finds most effectual, to give such strength and health to their bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their
minds, as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to
his condition, to make them work, when they are able, for their own subsistence. But in this power the
mother too has her share with the father.
Sect. 65. Nay, this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of nature, but only as he
is guardian of his children, that when he quits his care of them, he loses his power over them, which goes
along with their nourishment and education, to which it is inseparably annexed; and it belongs as much to
the foster-father of an exposed child, as to the natural father of another. So little power does the bare
act of begetting give a man over his issue; if all his care ends there, and this be all the title he hath to the
name and authority of a father. And what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world,
where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or in those parts of America, where, when
the husband and wife part, which happens frequently, the children are all left to the mother, follow her,
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and are wholly under her care and provision? If the father die whilst the children are young, do they not
naturally every where owe the same obedience to their mother, during their minority, as to their father
were he alive? and will any one say, that the mother hath a legislative power over her children? that she
can make standing rules, which shall be of perpetual obligation, by which they ought to regulate all the
concerns of their property, and bound their liberty all the course of their lives? or can she inforce the
observation of them with capital punishments? for this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which
the father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is but temporary, and
reaches not their life or property: it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their nonage, a
discipline necessary to their education: and though a father may dispose of his own possessions as he
pleases, when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to the lives
or goods, which either their own industry, or another’s bounty has made their’s; nor to their liberty
neither, when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion. The father’s empire
then ceases, and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son, than that of any
other man: and it must be far from an absolute or perpetual jurisdiction, from which a man may
withdraw himself, having license from divine authority to leave father and mother, and cleave to his wife.
Sect. 66. But though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and
command of his father, as the father himself is free from subjection to the will of any body else, and they
are each under no other restraint, but that which is common to them both, whether it be the law of
nature, or municipal law of their country; yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he
ought, by the law of God and nature, to pay his parents. God having made the parents instruments in his
great design of continuing the race of mankind, and the occasions of life to their children; as he hath laid
on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their offspring; so he has laid on the children a
perpetual obligation of honouring their parents, which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to
be shewn by all outward expressions, ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront,
disturb or endanger, the happiness or life of those from whom he received his; and engages him in all
actions of defence, relief, assistance and comfort of those, by whose means he entered into being, and
has been made capable of any enjoyments of life: from this obligation no state, no freedom can absolve
children. But this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an authority
to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe honour, respect,
gratitude and assistance; another to require an absolute obedience and submission. The honour due to
parents, a monarch in his throne owes his mother; and yet this lessens not his authority, nor subjects him
to her government.
Sect. 67. The subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government, which terminates
with the minority of the child: and the honour due from a child, places in the parents a perpetual right to
respect, reverence, support and compliance too, more or less, as the father’s care, cost, and kindness in
his education, has been more or less. This ends not with minority, but holds in all parts and conditions of
a man’s life. The want of distinguishing these two powers, viz. that which the father hath in the right of
tuition, during minority, and the right of honour all his life, may perhaps have caused a great part of the
mistakes about this matter: for to speak properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of
children, and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and education of
their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children’s good, that nothing can absolve
them from taking care of it: and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it,
yet God hath woven into the principles of human nature such a tenderness for their off-spring, that there
is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the severe
side, the strong byass of nature drawing the other way. And therefore God almighty when he would
express his gentle dealing with the Israelites, he tells them, that though he chastened them, he chastened
them as a man chastens his son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e. with tenderness and affection, and kept them under no
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severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness to have
slackened. This is that power to which children are commanded obedience, that the pains and care of
their parents may not be increased, or ill rewarded.
Sect. 68. On the other side, honour and support, all that which gratitude requires to return for the
benefits received by and from them, is the indispensable duty of the child, and the proper privilege of the
parents. This is intended for the parents advantage, as the other is for the child’s; though education, the
parents duty, seems to have most power, because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in
need of restraint and correction; which is a visible exercise of rule, and a kind of dominion. And that
duty which is comprehended in the word honour, requires less obedience, though the obligation be
stronger on grown, than younger children: for who can think the command, Children obey your parents,
requires in a man, that has children of his own, the same submission to his father, as it does in his yet
young children to him; and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father’s commands, if, out
of a conceit of authority, he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy?
Sect. 69. The first part then of paternal power, or rather duty, which is education, belongs so to the
father, that it terminates at a certain season; when the business of education is over, it ceases of itself,
and is also alienable before: for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands; and he that has made
his son an apprentice to another, has discharged him, during that time, of a great part of his obedience
both to himself and to his mother. But all the duty of honour, the other part, remains never the less entire
to them; nothing can cancel that: it is so inseparable from them both, that the father’s authority cannot
dispossess the mother of this right, nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him.
But both these are very far from a power to make laws, and enforcing them with penalties, that may
reach estate, liberty, limbs and life. The power of commanding ends with nonage; and though, after that,
honour and respect, support and defence, and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to, for the highest
benefits he is naturally capable of, be always due from a son to his parents; yet all this puts no scepter
into the father’s hand, no sovereign power of commanding. He has no dominion over his son’s property,
or actions; nor any right, that his will should prescribe to his son’s in all things; however it may become
his son in many things, not very inconvenient to him and his family, to pay a deference to it.
Sect. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or wise man; defence to his child or
friend; relief and support to the distressed; and gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree, that all he
has, all he can do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but all these give no authority, no right to any one, of making
laws over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain, all this is due not only to the bare title of
father; not only because, as has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these obligations to
parents, and the degrees of what is required of children, may be varied by the different care and
kindness, trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more than another.
Sect. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in societies, where they
themselves are subjects, retain a power over their children, and have as much right to their subjection,
as those who are in the state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were only
paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all paternal power being in the
prince, the subject could naturally have none of it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so
perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different ends,
that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has over
his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of
his subjects do to their’s; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion,
which a prince or magistrate has over his subject.
Sect. 72. Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children, and the obligation on children
to honour their parents, contain all the power on the one hand, and submission on the other, which are
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proper to this relation, yet there is another power ordinarily in the father, whereby he has a tie on the
obedience of his children; which tho’ it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of shewing
it, almost consich tho’ it be common to him with other men, yet the occasions of shewing it, almost
constantly happening to fathers in their private families, and the instances of it elsewhere being rare, and
less taken notice of, it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction. And this is the power men
generally have to bestow their estates on those who please them best; the possession of the father being
the expectation and inheritance of the children, ordinarily in certain proportions, according to the law
and custom of each country; yet it is commonly in the father’s power to bestow it with a more sparing or
liberal hand, according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour.
Sect. 73. This is no small tie on the obedience of children: and there being always annexed to the
enjoyment of land, a submission to the government of the country, of which that land is a part; it has
been commonly supposed, that a father could oblige his posterity to that government, of which he
himself was a subject, and that his compact held them; whereas, it being only a necessary condition
annexed to the land, and the inheritance of an estate which is under that government, reaches only those
who will take it on that condition, and so is no natural tie or engagement, but a voluntary submission: for
every man’s children being by nature as free as himself, or any of his ancestors ever were, may, whilst
they are in that freedom, choose what society they will join themselves to, what commonwealth they will
put themselves under. But if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestors, they must take it on the
same terms their ancestors had it, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a possession. By this
power indeed fathers oblige their children to obedience to themselves, even when they are past minority,
and most commonly too subject them to this or that political power: but neither of these by any peculiar
right of fatherhood, but by the reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a
compliance; and is no more power than what a French man has over an English man, who by the hopes
of an estate he will leave him, will certainly have a strong tie on his obedience: and if, when it is left him,
he will enjoy it, he must certainly take it upon the conditions annexed to the possession of land in that
country where it lies, whether it be France or England.
Sect. 74. To conclude then, tho’ the father’s power of commanding extends no farther than the
minority of his children, and to a degree only fit for the discipline and government of that age; and tho’
that honour and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensably owe to their
parents all their life-time, and in all estates, with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the
father no power of governing, i.e. making laws and enacting penalties on his children; though by all this
he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son: yet it is obvious to conceive how easy it
was, in the first ages of the world, and in places still, where the thinness of people gives families leave to
separate into unpossessed quarters, and they have room to remove or plant themselves in yet vacant
habitations, for the father of the family to become the prince of it;* he had been a ruler from the
beginning of the infancy of his children: and since without some government it would be hard for them to
live together, it was likeliest it should, by the express or tacit consent of the children when they were
grown up, be in the father, where it seemed without any change barely to continue; when indeed nothing
more was required to it, than the permitting the father to exercise alone, in his family, that executive
power of the law of nature, which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigning up to
him a monarchical power, whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by any paternal right, but only
by the consent of his children, is evident from hence, that no body doubts, but if a stranger, whom
chance or business had brought to his family, had there killed any of his children, or committed any other
fact, he might condemn and put him to death, or other-wise have punished him, as well as any of his
children; which it was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority over one who was not
his child, but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature, which, as a man, he had a right to:
and he alone could punish him in his family, where the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of
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such a power, to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him, above the
rest of his family.
(*It is no improbable opinion therefore, which the archphilosopher was of, that the chief person in
every houshold was always, as it were, a king: so when numbers of housholds joined themselves in civil
societies together, kings were the first kind of governors amongst them, which is also, as it seemeth, the
reason why the name of fathers continued still in them, who, of fathers, were made rulers; as also the
ancient custom of governors to do as Melchizedec, and being kings, to exercise the office of priests,
which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit, this is not the only kind of
regiment that has been received in the world. The inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others
to be devised; so that in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have
risen from the deliberate advice, consultation and composition between men, judging it convenient and
behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature considered by itself, but that man might have lived
without any public regiment, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 75. Thus it was easy, and almost natural for children, by a tacit, and scarce avoidable consent,
to make way for the father’s authority and government. They had been accustomed in their childhood to
follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him, and when they were men, who fitter to rule
them? Their little properties, and less covetousness, seldom afforded greater controversies; and when
any should arise, where could they have a fitter umpire than he, by whose care they had every one been
sustained and brought up, and who had a tenderness for them all? It is no wonder that they made no
distinction betwixt minority and full age; nor looked after one and twenty, or any other age that might
make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes, when they could have no desire to be out of
their pupilage: the government they had been under, during it, continued still to be more their protection
than restraint; and they could no where find a greater security to their peace, liberties, and fortunes, than
in the rule of a father.
Sect. 76. Thus the natural fathers of families, by an insensible change, became the politic monarchs of
them too: and as they chanced to live long, and leave able and worthy heirs, for several successions, or
otherwise; so they laid the foundations of hereditary, or elective kingdoms, under several constitutions
and mannors, according as chance, contrivance, or occasions happened to mould them. But if princes
have their titles in their fathers right, and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political
authority, because they commonly were those in whose hands we find, de facto, the exercise of
government: I say, if this argument be good, it will as strongly prove, that all princes, nay princes only,
ought to be priests, since it is as certain, that in the beginning, the father of the family was priest, as that
he was ruler in his own houshold.
CHAPTER. VII.
OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.
Sect. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him
to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into
society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society
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was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in
time, that between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did
meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule
proper to a family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we
consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sect. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and tho’ it
consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another’s bodies as is necessary to its chief end,
procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a communion of interests too, as
necessary not only to unite their care and affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring, who
have a right to be nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
Sect. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the
continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last, even after
procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be
sustained even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young
ones, who are to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for
themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find the
inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction
between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam
being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male only begets, but concerns
not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of
prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her
numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living,
than by feeding on grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common
family, which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care of male and
female. The same is to be observed in all birds, (except some domestic ones, where plenty of food
excuses the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the
nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are able to use their wing, and provide for
themselves.
Sect. 80. And herein I think lies the chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind
are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving,
and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the former is
out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the
assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to take care for those he
hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other
creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns again,
the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season
summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great
Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply
the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife should be more lasting, than
of male and female amongst other creatures; that so their industry might be encouraged, and their
interest better united, to make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain
mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.
Sect. 81. But tho’ these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting
in man, than the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this compact,
where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken care for, may not be made
determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain conditions, as well as any other
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voluntary compacts, there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should
always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such
contracts to be perpetual.
Sect. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different
understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the
last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man’s share, as the
abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves
the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no
more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an
absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him, where natural right, or
their contract allows it; whether that contract be made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the
customs or laws of the country they live in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father or
mother’s lot, as such contract does determine.
Sect. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic government, as well as in the
state of nature, the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either naturally necessary to
those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together; but only decides
any controversy that may arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, and that
absolute sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary
to the society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where the
husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in
the husband, the condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that state.
Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends without it; nay, community of goods, and the power
over them, mutual assistance and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be
varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist
with procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing being
necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sect. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging
respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall not here need to
say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politic society.
Sect. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far different condition;
for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain time, the service he
undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into the
family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary
power over him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is
another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just
war, are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters.
These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their estates; and
being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that state be considered as any part
of civil society; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.
Sect. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife,
children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what resemblance
soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a little commonwealth, yet is very far from
it, both in its constitution, power and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the
absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is
plain, by what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently
limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the
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slave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great, whether there be any
slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them, and none too
but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power
over the whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a family, or
any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society, we shall best see, by
considering wherein political society itself consists.
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, or number of
men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and
estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that
law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the
heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist,
without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences
of all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where every one of the members
hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude
him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every
particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules,
indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that
society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed
against the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who
are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a
common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between
them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such common
appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge for
himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong
to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that
society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto
any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for
the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though
every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has
thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private
judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where
he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the commonwealth to employ his force, for the
execution of the judgments of the commonwealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his
own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the original of
the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences
are to be punished, when committed within the commonwealth; and also to determine, by occasional
judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be
vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every
one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a
political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter
into society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any
one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the
society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the
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society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And
this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth, with
authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of
the commonwealth; which judge is the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there
are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they
are still in the state of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only
government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-
government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniencies of the
state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man’s being judge in his own case, by setting up a
known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or
controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;* where-ever any persons
are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there
those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are
under his dominion.
(*The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the principal
use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey,
unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth
enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone,
there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with
authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or
inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled,
Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his
dominion, as he is with therest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule,
and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them,
there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful
difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of
nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now,
whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as
those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures,
is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and
inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet
corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of
nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by
ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto
whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the
rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be
defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were
done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be
withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and
according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards
himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be
endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree
upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or
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judge over another, Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men’s blood, and corrects the baseness of human
nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that
would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in
a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his
subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of
absolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a degree
of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection, he
that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily see.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have
an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen
betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he
deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away.
But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to
another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power,
profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one
another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out
of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked,
what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute
ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to
ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges,
for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such
circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask
how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is
presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into
society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still
retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is
to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-
cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.
Sect. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people’s understandings, it hinders not men from
feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil
society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on earth against any harm, they may receive
from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be
so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it
was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, (as
shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this discourse) some one good and
excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and
virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit
consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness
and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us) sacredness of
customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in
successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government, as
then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of* property) could never be
safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of
men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became
subject, equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative,
had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the law, when once made;
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nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of
any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it: for if any man
may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on earth, for redress or security against any harm he
shall do; I ask, whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member
of that civil society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the same
thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
(*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be that nothing was
then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted unto their wisdom and
discretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the
thing which they had devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured.
They saw, that to live by one man’s will, became the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to
come unto laws, wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of
transgressing them. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
(**Civil law being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore over-rule each several part of the
same body. Hooker, ibid.)
CHAPTER. VIII.
OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES.
Sect. 95. MEN being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put
out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only
way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by
agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable
living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any,
that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they
are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to
make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body
politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.
Sect. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community,
they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by
the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of
the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary
the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority:
or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every
individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be
concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws,
where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act of the majority passes for the
act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the
whole.
Sect. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one
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government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination
of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others
incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no
other ties than he was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any
compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself
thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his
compact, or any one else in the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of
it if he thinks fit.
Sect. 98. For if the consent of the majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole,
and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the
act of the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of
health, and avocations of business, which in a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth,
will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety of opinions,
and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, the coming into society
upon such terms would be only like Cato’s coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a
constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration, than the feeblest creatures,
and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational
creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority cannot
conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved
again.
Sect. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to
give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the
community, unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by
barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between
the individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which begins and actually
constitutes any political society, is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a
majority to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could
give beginning to any lawful government in the world.
Sect. 100. To this I find two objections made. First, That there are no instances to be found in story,
of a company of men independent, and equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way
began and set up a government.
Secondly, It is impossible of right, that men should do so, because all men being born under
government, they are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one.
Sect. 101. To the first there is this to answer, That it is not at all to be wondered, that history gives us
but a very little account of men, that lived together in the state of nature. The inconveniences of that
condition, and the love and want of society, no sooner brought any number of them together, but they
presently united and incorporated, if they designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose
men ever to have been in the state of nature, because we hear not much of them in such a state, we may
as well suppose the armies of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never children, because we hear little of
them, till they were men, and imbodied in armies. Government is every where antecedent to records,
and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society has, by other more
necessary arts, provided for their safety, ease, and plenty: and then they begin to look after the history
of their founders, and search into their original, when they have outlived the memory of it: for it is with
commonwealths as with particular persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own births and
infancies: and if they know any thing of their original, they are beholden for it, to the accidental records
that others have kept of it. And those that we have, of the beginning of any polities in the world,
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excepting that of the Jews, where God himself immediately interposed, and which favours not at all
paternal dominion, are all either plain instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned, or at least have
manifest footsteps of it.
Sect. 102. He must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it agrees not with
his hypothesis, who will not allow, that shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact, when it
agrees not with his hypothesis, who will not allow, that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the
uniting together of several men free and independent one of another, amongst whom there was no
natural superiority or subjection. And if Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he tells us, that in many
parts of America there was no government at all.
There are great and apparent conjectures, says he, that these men, speaking of those of Peru, for a
long time had neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in troops, as they do this day in Florida, the
Cheriquanas, those of Brazil, and many other nations, which have no certain kings, but as occasion is
offered, in peace or war, they choose their captains as they please, 1. i. c. 25.
If it be said, that every man there was born subject to his father, or the head of his family; that the
subjection due from a child to a father took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he
thought fit, has been already proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is evident, were actually free;
and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them, they themselves claimed it
not, but by consent were all equal, till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves. So that their
politic societies all began from a voluntary union, and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the
choice of their governors, and forms of government.
Sect. 103. And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus, mentioned by Justin, 1. iii. c.
4. will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another, and to have set up a government
over themselves, by their own consent. Thus I have given several examples, out of history, of people
free and in the state of nature, that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth. And if
the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not, nor could not be so
begun, I suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural
liberty: for if they can give so many instances, out of history, of governments begun upon paternal right, I
think (though at best an argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force)
one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the case, they
would do well not to search too much into the original of governments, as they have begun de facto, lest
they should find, at the foundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the design they
promote, and such a power as they contend for.
Sect. 104. But to conclude, reason being plain on our side, that men are naturally free, and the
examples of history shewing, that the governments of the world, that were begun in peace, had their
beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people; there can be little room
for doubt, either where the right is, or what has been the opinion, or practice of mankind, about the first
erecting of governments.
Sect. 105. I will not deny, that if we look back as far as history will direct us, towards the original of
commonwealths, we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. And
I am also apt to believe, that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by itself, and continued
entire together, without mixing with others, as it often happens, where there is much land, and few
people, the government commonly began in the father: for the father having, by the law of nature, the
same power with every man else to punish, as he thought fit, any offences against that law, might thereby
punish his transgressing children, even when they were men, and out of their pupilage; and they were
very likely to submit to his punishment, and all join with him against the offender, in their turns, giving him
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thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression, and so in effect make him the law-
maker, and governor over all that remained in conjunction with his family. He was fittest to be trusted;
paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care; and the custom of obeying him, in
their childhood, made it easier to submit to him, rather than to any other. If therefore they must have one
to rule them, as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together; who so likely to be
the man as he that was their common father; unless negligence, cruelty, or any other defect of mind or
body made him unfit for it? But when either the father died, and left his next heir, for want of age,
wisdom, courage, or any other qualities, less fit for rule; or where several families met, and consented to
continue together; there, it is not to be doubted, but they used their natural freedom, to set up him,
whom they judged the ablest, and most likely, to rule well over them. Conformable hereunto we find the
people of America, who (living out of the reach of the conquering swords, and spreading domination of
the two great empires of Peru and Mexico) enjoyed their own natural freedom, though, caeteris paribus,
they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king; yet if they find him any way weak, or uncapable,
they pass him by, and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler.
Sect. 106. Thus, though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world,
and the history of nations, we commonly find the government to be in one hand; yet it destroys not that
which I affirm, viz. that the beginning of politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals, to
join into, and make one society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of
government they thought fit. But this having given occasion to men to mistake, and think, that by nature
government was monarchical, and belonged to the father, it may not be amiss here to consider, why
people in the beginning generally pitched upon this form, which though perhaps the father’s pre-
eminency might, in the first institution of some commonwealths, give a rise to, and place in the beginning,
the power in one hand; yet it is plain that the reason, that continued the form of government in a single
person, was not any regard, or respect to paternal authority; since all petty monarchies, that is, almost
all monarchies, near their original, have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.
Sect. 107. First then, in the beginning of things, the father’s government of the childhood of those
sprung from him, having accustomed them to the rule of one man, and taught them that where it was
exercised with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and
preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should
pitch upon, and naturally run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all
accustomed to; and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe. To which, if we add, that
monarchy being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed in forms of
government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of
prerogative, or the inconveniences of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay
claim to, and bring upon them, it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to
think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those to whom they had given the authority over
them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands. They
had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the fashion of the age, nor their
possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition) give them any
reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a
frame of government, as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their
present state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries,
than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the
narrow bounds of each man’s small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws to
decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look after the execution of justice,
where there were but few trespasses, and few offenders. Since then those, who like one another so well
as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and
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some trust one in another; they could not but have greater apprehensions of others, than of one another:
and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be, how to secure themselves
against foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government which might
best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead
them out against their enemies, and in this chiefly be their ruler.
Sect. 108. Thus we see, that the kings of the Indians in America, which is still a pattern of the first
ages in Asia and Europe, whilst the inhabitants were too few for the country, and want of people and
money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land, or contest for wider extent of
ground, are little more than generals of their armies; and though they command absolutely in war, yet at
home and in time of peace they exercise very little dominion, and have but a very moderate sovereignty,
the resolutions of peace and war being ordinarily either in the people, or in a council. Tho’ the war itself,
which admits not of plurality of governors, naturally devolves the command into the king’s sole authority.
Sect. 109. And thus in Israel itself, the chief business of their judges, and first kings, seems to have
been to be captains in war, and leaders of their armies; which (besides what is signified by going out and
in before the people, which was, to march forth to war, and home again in the heads of their forces)
appears plainly in the story of lephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel, the Gileadites in fear
send to lephtha, a bastard of their family whom they had cast off, and article with him, if he will assist
them against the Ammonites, to make him their ruler; which they do in these words, And the people
made him head and captain over them, Judg. xi, ii. which was, as it seems, all one as to be judge. And
he judged Israel, judg. xii. 7. that is, was their captain-general six years. So when lotham upbraids the
Shechemites with the obligation they had to Gideon, who had been their judge and ruler, he tells them,
He fought for you, and adventured his life far, and delivered you out of the hands of Midian, Judg. ix.
17. Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general: and indeed that is all is found in his history,
or in any of the rest of the judges. And Abimelech particularly is called king, though at most he was but
their general. And when, being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel’s sons, the children of Israel desired a
king, like all the nations to judge them, and to go out before them, and to fight their battles, I. Sam viii.
20. God granting their desire, says to Samuel, I will send thee a man, and thou shalt anoint him to be
captain over my people Israel, that he may save my people out of the hands of the Philistines, ix. 16. As
if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies, and fight in their defence; and
accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him, declares to Saul, that the Lord had
anointed him to be captain over his inheritance, x. 1. And therefore those, who after Saul’s being
solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mispah, were unwilling to have him their king, made
no other objection but this, How shall this man save us? v. 27. as if they should have said, this man is
unfit to be our king, not having skill and conduct enough in war, to be able to defend us. And when God
resolved to transfer the government to David, it is in these words, But now thy kingdom shall not
continue: the Lord hath sought him a man after his own heart, and the Lord hath commanded him to be
captain over his people, xiii. 14. As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their
general: and therefore the tribes who had stuck to Saul’s family, and opposed David’s reign, when they
came to Hebron with terms of submission to him, they tell him, amongst other arguments they had to
submit to him as to their king, that he was in effect their king in Saul’s time, and therefore they had no
reason but to receive him as their king now. Also (say they) in time past, when Saul was king over us,
thou wast he that reddest out and broughtest in Israel, and the Lord said unto thee, Thou shalt feed my
people Israel, and thou shalt be a captain over Israel.
Sect. 110. Thus, whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth, and the fatherly
authority being continued on to the elder son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted
to it, and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to
have confirmed it, and settled a right of succession by prescription: or whether several families, or the
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descendants of several families, whom chance, neighbourhood, or business brought together, uniting into
society, the need of a general, whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war, and the
great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age, (such as are almost all those
which begin governments, that ever come to last in the world) gave men one of another, made the first
beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man’s hand, without any other express
limitation or restraint, but what the nature of the thing, and the end of government required: which ever
of those it was that at first put the rule into the hands of a single person, certain it is no body was
intrusted with it but for the public good and safety, and to those ends, in the infancies of
commonwealths, those who had it commonly used it. And unless they had done so, young societies
could not have subsisted; without such nursing fathers tender and careful of the public weal, all
governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy, and the prince and the
people had soon perished together.
Sect. 111. But though the golden age (before vain ambition, and amor sceleratus habendi, evil
concupiscence, had corrupted men’s minds into a mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue,
and consequently better governors, as well as less vicious subjects, and there was then no stretching
prerogative on the one side, to oppress the people; nor consequently on the other, any dispute about
privilege, to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate, and so no contest betwixt rulers and people
about governors or government: yet, when ambition and luxury in future ages* would retain and increase
the power, without doing the business for which it was given; and aided by flattery, taught princes to
have distinct and separate interests from their people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully
the original and rights of government; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances, and prevent the
abuses of that power, which they having intrusted in another’s hands only for their own good, they found
was made use of to hurt them.
(*At first, when some certain kind of regiment was once approved, it may be nothing was then farther
thought upon for the manner of governing, but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion which were
to rule, till by experience they found this for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had
devised for a remedy, did indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw, that to
live by one man’s will, became the cause of all men’s misery. This constrained them to come unto laws
wherein all men might see their duty before hand, and know the penalties of transgressing them.
Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 112. Thus we may see how probable it is, that people that were naturally free, and by their own
consent either submitted to the government of their father, or united together out of different families to
make a government, should generally put the rule into one man’s hands, and chuse to be under the
conduct of a single person, without so much as by express conditions limiting or regulating his power,
which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence; though they never dreamed of monarchy
being lure Divino, which we never heard of among mankind, till it was revealed to us by the divinity of
this last age; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion, or to be the foundation of all
government. And thus much may suffice to shew, that as far as we have any light from history, we have
reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the
people. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion in another place to speak of conquest, which
some esteem a way of beginning of governments.
The other objection I find urged against the beginning of polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this,
viz.
Sect. 113. That all men being born under government, some or other, it is impossible any of them
should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a
lawful government.
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If this argument be good; I ask, how came so many lawful monarchies into the world? for if any body,
upon this supposition, can shew me any one man in any age of the world free to begin a lawful
monarchy, I will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty, at the same time to unite and begin
a new government under a regal, or any other form; it being demonstration, that if any one, born under
the dominion of another, may be so free as to have a right to command others in a new and distinct
empire, every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too, and may become a
ruler, or subject, of a distinct separate government. And so by this their own principle, either all men,
however born, are free, or else there is but one lawful prince, one lawful government in the world. And
then they have nothing to do, but barely to shew us which that is; which when they have done, I doubt
not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.
Sect. 114. Though it be a sufficient answer to their objection, to shew that it involves them in the same
difficulties that it doth those they use it against; yet I shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this
argument a little farther. All men, say they, are born under government, and therefore they cannot be at
liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his father, or his prince, and is therefore under
the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor considered any such
natural subjection that they were born in, to one or to the other that tied them, without their own
consents, to a subjection to them and their heirs.
Sect. 115. For there are no examples so frequent in history, both sacred and profane, as those of men
withdrawing themselves, and their obedience, from the jurisdiction they were born under, and the family
or community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places; from whence
sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied, as
long as there was room enough, till the stronger, or more fortunate, swallowed the weaker; and those
great ones again breaking to pieces, dissolved into lesser dominions. All which are so many testimonies
against paternal sovereignty, and plainly prove, that it was not the natural right of the father descending
to his heirs, that made governments in the beginning, since it was impossible, upon that ground, there
should have been so many little kingdoms; all must have been but only one universal monarchy, if men
had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families, and the government, be it what it will,
that was set up in it, and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments, as they thought
fit.
Sect. 116. This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day; nor is it now any
more hindrance to the freedom of mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient polities,
that have established laws, and set forms of government, than if they were born in the woods, amongst
the unconfined inhabitants, that run loose in them: for those, who would persuade us, that by being born
under any government, we are naturally subjects to it, and have no more any title or pretence to the
freedom of the state of nature, have no other reason (bating that of paternal power, which we have
already answered) to produce for it, but only, because our fathers or progenitors passed away their
natural liberty, and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the
government, which they themselves submitted to. It is true, that whatever engagements or promises any
one has made for himself, he is under the obligation of them, but cannot, by any compact whatsoever,
bind his children or posterity: for his son, when a man, being altogether as free as the father, any act of
the father can no more give away the liberty of the son, than it can of any body else: he may indeed
annex such conditions to the land, he enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as may oblige his son
to be of that community, if he will enjoy those possessions which were his father’s; because that estate
being his father’s property, he may dispose, or settle it, as he pleases.
Sect. 117. And this has generally given the occasion to mistake in this matter; because
commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by
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any but those of their community, the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father, but under
the same terms his father did, by becoming a member of the society; whereby he puts himself presently
under the government he finds there established, as much as any other subject of that commonwealth.
And thus the consent of freemen, born under government, which only makes them members of it, being
given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of age, and not in a multitude together; people take
no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally subjects as
they are men.
Sect. 118. But, it is plain, governments themselves understand it otherwise; they claim no power over
the son, because of that they had over the father; nor look on children as being their subjects, by their
fathers being so. If a subject of England have a child, by an English woman in France, whose subject is
he? Not the king of England’s; for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it: nor the king
of France’s; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away, and breed him as he pleases? and
who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter, if he left, or warred against a country, for being barely
born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then, by the practice of governments themselves,
as well as by the law of right reason, that a child is born a subject of no country or government. He is
under his father’s tuition and authority, till he comes to age of discretion; and then he is a freeman, at
liberty what government he will put himself under, what body politic he will unite himself to: for if an
Englishman’s son, born in France, be at liberty, and may do so, it is evident there is no tie upon him by
his father’s being a subject of this kingdom; nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors. And
why then hath not his son, by the same reason, the same liberty, though he be born any where else?
Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children, is the same, where-ever they be born, and
the ties of natural obligations, are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.
Sect. 119. Every man being, as has been shewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him
into subjection to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what shall be
understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man’s consent, to make him subject to the laws of any
government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our
present case. No body doubts but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him
a perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be
looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one shall be looked on to have
consented, and thereby submitted to any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all.
And to this I say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions
of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the
laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of
land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely
on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that
government.
Sect. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to consider, that every man, when he at first
incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed also, and
submits to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall acquire, that do not already belong
to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with
others for the securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose property is to be
regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government, to which
he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his
person, which was before free, to any commonwealth, by the same he unites his possessions, which
were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, person and possession, subject to the
government and dominion of that commonwealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from
thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, so annexed
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to, and under the government of that commonwealth, must take it with the condition it is under; that is,
of submitting to the government of the commonwealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any
subject of it.
Sect. 121. But since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the
possessor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells upon, and
enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such enjoyment, to submit to the government,
begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit
consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty
to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one,
in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once,
by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any commonwealth, is
perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be
again in the liberty of the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to
be dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.
Sect. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and
protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society: this is only a local protection and
homage due to and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging
to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a
member of that society, a perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than it would make a man a subject
to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in
it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we
see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and
protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as
any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can
make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and
compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent
which makes any one a member of any commonwealth.
CHAPTER. IX.
OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own
person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his
freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other
power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as
much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the
enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to
quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason,
that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to
unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name,
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property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there
are many things wanting.
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to
be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them:
for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by
their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to
them in the application of it to their particular cases.
Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority
to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge
and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to
carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and
unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men’s.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence
when right, and to give it due execution, They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where
they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill
condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we
seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are
therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and
therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his
single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and
by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this
we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the
governments and societies themselves.
Sect. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two
powers.
The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the
permission of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are
one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the
corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that
men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into
smaller and divided associations.
The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against
that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic
society, and incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from the rest of mankind.
Sect. 129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and
the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the
preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things
confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.
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Sect. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force,
(which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he
thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require: for being now in
a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of
others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as
much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society
shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.
Sect. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive
power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the
legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the
better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change
his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them,
can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one’s
property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so
unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is
bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by
extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws;
and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to
prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to
be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
CHAPTER. X.
OF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men’s first uniting into society, the whole
power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community
from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the
government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few
select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man,
and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but
upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And
so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they
think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for
their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so
reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a
new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power,
which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a
superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is
the form of the commonwealth.
Sect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form
of government, but any independent community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to
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which the word which best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses
such a society of men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinate
communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and
therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense, in which I find
it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I
consent with him to change it for a better.
CHAPTER. XI.
OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Sect. 134. THE great end of men’s entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in
peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society;
the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power;
as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation
of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not
only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the
community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or
by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from
that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that,
which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can
have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and
therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately
terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to
any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the
society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any
obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine
one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme.
(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belonging so properly
unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to
exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received from
God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws,
it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made
so. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.
Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no full and perfect power to
command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort
be at no man’s commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof
we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal
agreement. Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)
Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or
only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth; yet:
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First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it
being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is
legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society,
and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself;
and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or
take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the
arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or
possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself,
and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the
legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds
of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation,
and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.* The
obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have
by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature
stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men’s
actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to
the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation
of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.
(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination, whereby all
men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching
the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal, the
very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in
such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment
amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly
obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless
presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly
provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common
good, for which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker’s Eccl. Pol. l. i.
sect. 10.)
Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule
by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject
by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being unwritten, and
so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or
misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it
serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it,
especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and
he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to
defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder
men’s propperties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength
of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by
which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the
society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think
fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property
will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.
(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, howbeit such
measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are two, the law of
God, and the law of nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature,
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and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill made. Hooker’s Eccl.
Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.
To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Ibid. l. i. sect. 10.)
Sect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them
consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of
nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by
stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should
intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their
persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily
upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they
had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to
maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have
given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed
themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse
condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than
he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will,
who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times stronger.
And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by
declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: for then
mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a
few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and
unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without
having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the
government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so
it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty,
and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not
be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such
measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.
Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his
own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men
enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without
which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they
entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property,
they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their’s, that no body hath a
right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they
have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me,
when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative
power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or
take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative
consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the
assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in
governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in
absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from
the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what
they think fit from the people: for a man’s property is not at all secure, tho’ there be good and equitable
laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects
have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of
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it as he thinks good.
Sect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed, intrusted
with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or
senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects
one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the
subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all.
And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but
is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute,
we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the preservation of the army,
and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior
officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet
we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or
stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of
his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or for not obeying the
most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of
that soldier’s estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for
the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which the
commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to
do with it.
Sect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one
who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of
it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves,
or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the
people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the
fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that,
which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?
Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it
being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The
people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and
appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be
governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make
laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they
have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the
people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no
power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.
Sect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of God
and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.
First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to
have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.
Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the
people.
Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people,
given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the
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legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to
deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.
Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or
place it any where, but where the people have.
CHAPTER. XII.
OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERATIVE POWER OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH.
Sect. 143. THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the
commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. But because
those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in
a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always
business to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power,
for the same persons, who have the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to
execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the
law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a
distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government: therefore
in wellordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered, as it ought, the legislative
power is put into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with
others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves
subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make
them for the public good.
Sect. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and
lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there
should be a power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and
remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated.
Sect. 145. There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call natural, because it is
that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society: for though in a
commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such as
governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which
is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that
the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed
by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it.
So that under this consideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all
other states or persons out of its community.
Sect. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the
transactions, with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called
federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
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Sect. 147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves,
yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are
parts of it; the other the management of the security and interest of the public without, with all those that
it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this federative
power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less
capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so must
necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the
public good: for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may
well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their
actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those,
who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of
the commonwealth.
Sect. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct
in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct
persons: for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to
place the force of the commonwealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and
federative power should be placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public
would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.
CHAPTER. XIII.
OF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 149. THOUGH in a constituted commonwealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting
according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the community, there can be but one
supreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the
legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme
power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in
them: for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end
is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into
the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and
security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the
attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish, or so
wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject: for no man or
society of men, having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to the
absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring them into
such a slavish condition, they will always have a right to preserve, what they have not a power to part
with; and to rid themselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-
preservation, for which they entered into society. And thus the community may be said in this respect to
be always the supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government, because this
power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved.
Sect. 150. In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme power: for what
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can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him; and since the legislative is no otherwise
legislative of the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of
the society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are
transgressed, the legislative must needs be the supreme, and all other powers, in any members or parts
of the society, derived from and subordinate to it.
Sect. 151. In some commonwealths, where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is
vested in a single person, who has also a share in the legislative; there that single person in a very
tolerable sense may also be called supreme: not that he has in himself all the supreme power, which is
that of law-making; but because he has in him the supreme execution, from whom all inferior magistrates
derive all their several subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part of them: having also no legislative
superior to him, there being no law to be made without his consent, which cannot be expected should
ever subject him to the other part of the legislative, he is properly enough in this sense supreme. But yet
it is to be observed, that tho’ oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him, it is not to him as supreme
legislator, but as supreme executor of the law, made by a joint power of him with others; allegiance
being nothing but an obedience according to law, which when he violates, he has no right to obedience,
nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law, and so is to be
considered as the image, phantom, or representative of the commonwealth, acted by the will of the
society, declared in its laws; and thus he has no will, no power, but that of the law. But when he quits
this representation, this public will, and acts by his own private will, he degrades himself, and is but a
single private person without power, and without will, that has any right to obedience; the members
owing no obedience but to the public will of the society.
Sect. 152. The executive power, placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the
legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleasure changed and displaced;
so that it is not the supreme executive power, that is exempt from subordination, but the supreme
executive power vested in one, who having a share in the legislative, has no distinct superior legislative
to be subordinate and accountable to, farther than he himself shall join and consent; so that he is no
more subordinate than he himself shall think fit, which one may certainly conclude will be but very little.
Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth, we need not speak, they being so
multiplied with infinite variety, in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths, that
it is impossible to give a particular account of them all. Only thus much, which is necessary to our
present purpose, we may take notice of concerning them, that they have no manner of authority, any of
them, beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them
accountable to some other power in the commonwealth.
Sect. 153. It is not necessary, no, nor so much as convenient, that the legislative should be always in
being; but absolutely necessary that the executive power should, because there is not always need of
new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the legislative hath
put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands, they have a power still to resume it out of
those hands, when they find cause, and to punish for any maladministration against the laws. The same
holds also in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both ministerial and
subordinate to the legislative, which, as has been shewed, in a constituted commonwealth is the
supreme. The legislative also in this case being supposed to consist of several persons, (for if it be a
single person, it cannot but be always in being, and so will, as supreme, naturally have the supreme
executive power, together with the legislative) may assemble, and exercise their legislature, at the times
that either their original constitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please; if neither
of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them: for the
supreme power being placed in them by the people, it is always in them, and they may exercise it when
they please, unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons, or by an act of their
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supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and when that time comes, they have a right to
assemble and act again.
Sect. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of representatives chosen for that time by
the people, which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects, and have no share in the
legislature but upon a new choice, this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people, either at
certain appointed seasons, or else when they are summoned to it; and in this latter case the power of
convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of these two limitations in
respect of time: that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain
intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing
and assembling, according to due forms; or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections,
when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, or
the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.
Sect. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being possessed of the force of
the commonwealth, shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when
the original constitution, or the public exigencies require it? I say, using force upon the people without
authority, and contrary to the trust put in him that does so, is a state of war with the people, who have a
right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power: for having erected a legislative, with an
intent they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need
of it, when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the
safety and preservation of the people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all states
and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppose force to it. The use of force
without authority, always puts him that uses it into a state of war, as the aggressor, and renders him
liable to be treated accordingly.
Sect. 156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not
the executive a superiority over it, but is a fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people, in a
case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule: for it not
being possible, that the first framers of the government should, by any foresight, be so much masters of
future events, as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the
legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the commonwealth; the
best remedy could be found for this defect, was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to
be present, and whose business it was to watch over the public good. Constant frequent meetings of the
legislative, and long continuations of their assemblies, without necessary occasion, could not but be
burdensome to the people, and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and
yet the quick turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help: any delay of their
convening might endanger the public; and sometimes too their business might be so great, that the limited
time of their sitting might be too short for their work, and rob the public of that benefit which could be
had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be done in this case to prevent the community
from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard, on one side or the other, by fixed intervals
and periods, set to the meeting and acting of the legislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of some,
who being present, and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for
the public good? and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands, who was intrusted with the
execution of the laws for the same end? Thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and
sitting of the legislative, not settled by the original constitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the
executive, not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure, but with this trust always to have it
exercised only for the public weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require.
Whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative, or
perhaps a mixture of both, hath the least inconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to inquire,
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but only to shew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving
such conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby superior to it.
Sect. 157. Things of this world are in so constant a flux, that nothing remains long in the same state.
Thus people, riches, trade, power, change their stations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and
prove in times neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous
countries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changing equally, and private interest
often keeping up customs and privileges, when the reasons of them are ceased, it often comes to pass,
that in governments, where part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people, that
in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at
first established upon. To what gross absurdities the following of custom, when reason has left it, may
lead, we may be satisfied, when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as
the ruins, where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be
found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers, as a whole county
numerous in people, and powerful in riches. This strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess
needs a remedy; tho’ most think it hard to find one, because the constitution of the legislative being the
original and supreme act of the society, antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending wholly on the
people, no inferior power can alter it. And therefore the people, when the legislative is once constituted,
having, in such a government as we have been speaking of, no power to act as long as the government
stands; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy.
Sect. 158. Salus populi suprema lex, is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he, who sincerely
follows it, cannot dangerously err. If therefore the executive, who has the power of convoking the
legislative, observing rather the true proportion, than fashion of representation, regulates, not by old
custom, but true reason, the number of members, in all places that have a right to be distinctly
represented, which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to, but in proportion to the
assistance which it affords to the public, it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative, but to have
restored the old and true one, and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time had
insensibly, as well as inevitably introduced: For it being the interest as well as intention of the people, to
have a fair and equal representative; whoever brings it nearest to that, is an undoubted friend to, and
establisher of the government, and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community;
prerogative being nothing but a power, in the hands of the prince, to provide for the public good, in such
cases, which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could
not safely direct; whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people, and the establishing
the government upon its true foundations, is, and always will be, just prerogative, The power of erecting
new corporations, and therewith new representatives, carries with it a supposition, that in time the
measures of representation might vary, and those places have a just right to be represented which
before had none; and by the same reason, those cease to have a right, and be too inconsiderable for
such a privilege, which before had it. ‘Tis not a change from the present state, which perhaps corruption
or decay has introduced, that makes an inroad upon the government, but the tendency of it to injure or
oppress the people, and to set up one part or party, with a distinction from, and an unequal subjection
of the rest. Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society, and people in
general, upon just and lasting measures, will always, when done, justify itself; and whenever the people
shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures, suitable to the original frame
of the government, it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society, whoever permitted or
caused them so to do.
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CHAPTER. XIV.
OF PREROGATIVE.
Sect. 159. WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, (as they are in all
moderated monarchies, and well-framed governments) there the good of the society requires, that
several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not
being able to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of
the laws having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for the
good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no direction, till the legislative can
conveniently be assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the law can by no means
provide for; and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in
his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: nay, it is fit that the laws
themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of
nature and government, viz. That as much as may be, all the members of the society are to be
preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may
do harm; (as not to pull down an innocent man’s house to stop the fire, when the next to it is burning)
and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law, which makes no distinction of persons, by
an action that may deserve reward and pardon; ’tis fit the ruler should have a power, in many cases, to
mitigate the severity of the law, and pardon some offenders: for the end of government being the
preservation of all, as much as may be, even the guilty are to be spared, where it can prove no prejudice
to the innocent.
Sect. 160. This power to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of
the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called prerogative: for since in some governments
the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the
dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide
for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm,
if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in
their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the
laws do not prescribe.
Sect. 161. This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and suitably to the trust and
ends of the government, is undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned: for the people are very
seldom or never scrupulous or nice in the point; they are far from examining prerogative, whilst it is in
any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant, that is, for the good of the people, and not
manifestly against it: but if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people,
about a thing claimed as a prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative to the good or
hurt of the people, will easily decide that question.
Sect. 162. It is easy to conceive, that in the infancy of governments, when commonwealths differed
little from families in number of people, they differed from them too but little in number of laws: and the
governors, being as the fathers of them, watching over them for their good, the government was almost
all prerogative. A few established laws served the turn, and the discretion and care of the ruler supplied
the rest. But when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes to make use of this power for private
ends of their own, and not for the public good, the people were fain by express laws to get prerogative
determined in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it: and thus declared limitations of
prerogative were by the people found necessary in cases which they and their ancestors had left, in the
utmost latitude, to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it, that is, for the
good of their people.
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Sect. 163. And therefore they have a very wrong notion of government, who say, that the people
have encroached upon the prerogative, when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws:
for in so doing they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belonged to him, but only
declared, that that power which they indefinitely left in his or his ancestors hands, to be exercised for
their good, was not a thing which they intended him when he used it otherwise: for the end of
government being the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end,
cannot be an encroachment upon any body, since no body in government can have a right tending to
any other end: and those only are encroachments which prejudice or hinder the public good. Those who
say otherwise, speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the
community, and was not made for it; the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and
disorders which happen in kingly governments. And indeed, if that be so, the people under his
government are not a society of rational creatures, entered into a community for their mutual good; they
are not such as have set rulers over themselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked
on as an herd of inferior creatures under the dominion of a master, who keeps them and works them for
his own pleasure or profit. If men were so void of reason, and brutish, as to enter into society upon such
terms, prerogative might indeed be, what some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things
hurtful to the people.
Sect. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into subjection
to another, for his own harm; (though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not perhaps think it
either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but
the people’s permitting their rulers to do several things, of their own free choice, where the law was
silent, and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in
it when so done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the
good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do good; so a weak and ill
prince, who would claim that power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of the law,
as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office, which he may exercise at his pleasure, to make
or promote an interest distinct from that of the public, gives the people an occasion to claim their right,
and limit that power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly
allowed.
Sect. 165. And therefore he that will look into the history of England, will find, that prerogative was
always largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes; because the people, observing the whole
tendency of their actions to be the public good, contested not what was done without law to that end:
or, if any human frailty or mistake (for princes are but men, made as others) appeared in some small
declinations from that end; yet ’twas visible, the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of
the public. The people therefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these princes, whenever they acted
without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they did, and, without the least
complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleased, judging rightly, that they did nothing herein
to the prejudice of their laws, since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws, the
public good.
Sect. 166. Such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power by that argument, that
would prove absolute monarchy the best government, as that which God himself governs the universe
by; because such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That the
reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their people: for when their
successors, managing the government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good
rulers into precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what had been done only
for the good of the people was a right in them to do, for the harm of the people, if they so pleased; it has
often occasioned contest, and sometimes public disorders, before the people could recover their original
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right, and get that to be declared not to be prerogative, which truly was never so; since it is impossible
that any body in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm; though it be very possible,
and reasonable, that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings,
or rulers, who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good: for prerogative is nothing but
the power of doing public good without a rule.
Sect. 167. The power of calling parliaments in England, as to precise time, place, and duration, is
certainly a prerogative of the king, but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the
nation, as the exigencies of the times, and variety of occasions, shall require: for it being impossible to
foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in, and what the best season; the
choice of these was left with the executive power, as might be most subservient to the public good, and
best suit the ends of parliaments.
Sect. 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative, But who shall be judge when
this power is made a right use of one answer: between an executive power in being, with such a
prerogative, and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no judge on
earth; as there can be none between the legislative and the people, should either the executive, or the
legislative, when they have got the power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them.
The people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to
appeal to heaven: for the rulers, in such attempts, exercising a power the people never put into their
hands, (who can never be supposed to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm) do
that which they have not a right to do. And where the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived
of their right, or is under the exercise of a power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they
have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. And therefore,
though the people cannot be judge, so as to have, by the constitution of that society, any superior
power, to determine and give effective sentence in the case; yet they have, by a law antecedent and
paramount to all positive laws of men, reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs
to all mankind, where there lies no appeal on earth, viz. to judge, whether they have just cause to make
their appeal to heaven. And this judgment they cannot part with, it being out of a man’s power so to
submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him; God and nature never allowing a man
so to abandon himself, as to neglect his own preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life,
neither can he give another power to take it. Nor let any one think, this lays a perpetual foundation for
disorder; for this operates not, till the inconveniency is so great, that the majority feel it, and are weary
of it, and find a necessity to have it amended. But this the executive power, or wise princes, never need
come in the danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have most need to avoid, as of all others the
most perilous.
CHAPTER. XV.
OF PATERNAL, POLITICAL, AND DESPOTICAL POWER, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.
Sect. 169. THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before, yet the great mistakes
of late about government, having, as I suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with
another, it may not, perhaps, be amiss to consider them here together.
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Sect. 170. First, then, Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their
children, to govern them for the children’s good, till they come to the use of reason, or a state of
knowledge, wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule, whether it be the law of
nature, or the municipal law of their country, they are to govern themselves by: capable, I say, to know
it, as well as several others, who live as freemen under that law. The affection and tenderness which
God hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children, makes it evident, that this is not
intended to be a severe arbitrary government, but only for the help, instruction, and preservation of their
offspring. But happen it as it will, there is, as I have proved, no reason why it should be thought to
extend to life and death, at any time, over their children, more than over any body else; neither can there
be any pretence why this parental power should keep the child, when grown to a man, in subjection to
the will of his parents, any farther than having received life and education from his parents, obliges him to
respect, honour, gratitude, assistance and support, all his life, to both father and mother. And thus, ’tis
true, the paternal is a natural government, but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of
that which is political. The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child, which is
only in his own disposing.
Sect. 171. Secondly, Political power is that power, which every man having in the state of nature, has
given up into the hands of the society, and therein to the governors, whom the society hath set over
itself, with this express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good, and the preservation of
their property: now this power, which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to
the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means, for the preserving of
his own property, as he thinks good, and nature allows him; and to punish the breach of the law of
nature in others, so as (according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of
himself, and the rest of mankind. So that the end and measure of this power, when in every man’s hands
in the state of nature, being the preservation of all of his society, that is, all mankind in general, it can
have no other end or measure, when in the hands of the magistrate, but to preserve the members of that
society in their lives, liberties, and possessions; and so cannot be an absolute, arbitrary power over their
lives and fortunes, which are as much as possible to be preserved; but a power to make laws, and
annex such penalties to them, as may tend to the preservation of the whole, by cutting off those parts,
and those only, which are so corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity
is lawful. And this power has its original only from compact and agreement, and the mutual consent of
those who make up the community.
Sect. 172. Thirdly, Despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power one man has over another, to
take away his life, whenever he pleases. This is a power, which neither nature gives, for it has made no
such distinction between one man and another; nor compact can convey: for man not having such an
arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such a power over it; but it is the effect only
of forfeiture, which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself into the state of war with
another: for having quitted reason, which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man, and the
common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society; and having renounced the
way of peace which that teaches, and made use of the force of war, to compass his unjust ends upon
another, where he has no right; and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts, by making force,
which is their’s, to be his rule of right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person,
and the rest of mankind, that will join with him in the execution of justice, as any other wild beast, or
noxious brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security*. And thus captives, taken in a
just and lawful war, and such only, are subject to a despotical power, which, as it arises not from
compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of war continued: for what compact can be
made with a man that is not master of his own life? what condition can he perform? and if he be once
allowed to be master of his own life, the despotical, arbitrary power of his master ceases. He that is
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master of himself, and his own life, has a right too to the means of preserving it; so that as soon as
compact enters, slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power, and puts an end to the state of
war, who enters into conditions with his captive.
(*Another copy corrected by Mr. Locke, has it thus, Noxious brute that is destructive to their being.)
Sect. 173. Nature gives the first of these, viz. paternal power to parents for the benefit of their
children during their minority, to supply their want of ability, and understanding how to manage their
property. (By property I must be understood here, as in other places, to mean that property which men
have in their persons as well as goods.) Voluntary agreement gives the second, viz. political power to
governors for the benefit of their subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their properties.
And forfeiture gives the third despotical power to lords for their own benefit, over those who are
stripped of all property.
Sect. 174. He, that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the different ends of these several
powers, will plainly see, that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate, as despotical
exceeds it; and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil society,
that it is as inconsistent with it, as slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority makes
the child incapable to manage his property; political, where men have property in their own disposal;
and despotical, over such as have no property at all.
CHAPTER. XVI.
OF CONQUEST.
Sect. 175. THOUGH governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned, nor
polities be founded on any thing but the consent of the people; yet such have been the disorders
ambition has filled the world with, that in the noise of war, which makes so great a part of the history of
mankind, this consent is little taken notice of: and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the
consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far
from setting up any government, as demolishing an house is from building a new one in the place.
Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth, by destroying the former; but, without
the consent of the people, can never erect a new one.
Sect. 176. That the aggressor, who puts himself into the state of war with another, and unjustly
invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust war, never come to have a right over the conquered,
will be easily agreed by all men, who will not think, that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over
whomsoever they have force enough to master; or that men are bound by promises, which unlawful
force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my house, and with a dagger at my throat make me
seal deeds to convey my estate to him, would this give him any title? Just such a title, by his sword, has
an unjust conqueror, who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal, whether
committed by the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain. The title of the offender, and the number of
his followers, make no difference in the offence, unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is, great
robbers punish little ones, to keep them in their obedience; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels
and triumphs, because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world, and have the power
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in their own possession, which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber, that so
broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied, or I am crippled and
cannot stir, robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of seeking
remedy, there is nothing left but patience. But my son, when able, may seek the relief of the law, which I
am denied: he or his son may renew his appeal, till he recover his right. But the conquered, or their
children, have no court, no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal, as lephtha did, to
heaven, and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors, which was, to
have such a legislative over them, as the majority should approve, and freely acquiesce in. If it be
objected, This would cause endless trouble; I answer, no more than justice does, where she lies open to
all that appeal to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cause, is punished for it by the justice of
the court he appeals to: and he that appeals to heaven must be sure he has right on his side; and a right
too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal, as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be
deceived, and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to his
fellow subjects; that is, any part of mankind: from whence it is plain, that he that conquers in an unjust
war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered.
Sect. 177. But supposing victory favours the right side, let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war,
and see what power he gets, and over whom.
First, It is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him. They that
fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest, but must at least be as much freemen as they were
before. And most commonly they serve upon terms, and on condition to share with their leader, and
enjoy a part of the spoil, and other advantages that attend the conquering sword; or at least have a part
of the subdued country bestowed upon them. And the conquering people are not, I hope, to be slaves
by conquest, and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their leaders triumph. They that
found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword, make their heroes, who are the founders of such
monarchies, arrant Draw-can-sirs, and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side
in the battles they won, or assisted them in the subduing, or shared in possessing, the countries they
mastered. We are told by some, that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman conquest, and that
our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as by the history it appears
otherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island; yet his dominion by conquest could
reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans
that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all descended from them, are freemen, and no subjects
by conquest; let that give what dominion it will. And if I, or any body else, shall claim freedom, as
derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no
distinction between the one and the other, intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or
privileges.
Sect. 178. But supposing, which seldom happens, that the conquerors and conquered never
incorporate into one people, under the same laws and freedom; let us see next what power a lawful
conqueror has over the subdued: and that I say is purely despotical. He has an absolute power over the
lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them; but not over the lives or fortunes of those who
engaged not in the war, nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it.
Sect. 179. Secondly, I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually
assisted, concurred, or consented to that unjust force that is used against him: for the people having
given to their governors no power to do an unjust thing, such as is to make an unjust war, (for they
never had such a power in themselves) they ought not to be charged as guilty of the violence and
unjustice that is committed in an unjust war, any farther than they actually abet it; no more than they are
to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governors should use upon the people
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themselves, or any part of their fellow subjects, they having empowered them no more to the one than
to the other. Conquerors, it is true, seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction, but they willingly
permit the confusion of war to sweep all together: but yet this alters not the right; for the conquerors
power over the lives of the conquered, being only because they have used force to do, or maintain an
injustice, he can have that power only over those who have concurred in that force; all the rest are
innocent; and he has no more title over the people of that country, who have done him no injury, and so
have made no forfeiture of their lives, than he has over any other, who, without any injuries or
provocations, have lived upon fair terms with him.
Sect. 180. Thirdly, The power a conqueror gets over those he overcomes in a just war, is perfectly
despotical: he has an absolute power over the lives of those, who, by putting themselves in a state of
war, have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions. This I doubt not,
but at first sight will seem a strange doctrine, it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world; there
being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries, than to say such an one conquered
it; as if conquest, without any more ado, conveyed a right of possession. But when we consider, that the
practice of the strong and powerful, how universal soever it may be, is seldom the rule of right, however
it be one part of the subjection of the conquered, not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by
the conquering sword.
Sect. 181. Though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage, and the aggressor
seldom fails to harm the estate, when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon; yet
it is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war: for whether by force he begins the injury,
or else having quietly, and by fraud, done the injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force
maintains it, (which is the same thing, as at first to have done it by force) it is the unjust use of force that
makes the war: for he that breaks open my house, and violently turns me out of doors; or having
peaceably got in, by force keeps me out, does in effect the same thing; supposing we are in such a state,
that we have no common judge on earth, whom I may appeal to, and to whom we are both obliged to
submit: for of such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of force then, that puts a man into the state of
war with another; and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life: for quitting reason,
which is the rule given between man and man, and using force, the way of beasts, he becomes liable to
be destroyed by him he uses force against, as any savage ravenous beast, that is dangerous to his being.
Sect. 182. But because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children, and they may be
rational and peaceable, notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father; the father, by his
miscarriages and violence, can forfeit but his own life, but involves not his children in his guilt or
destruction. His goods, which nature, that willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible,
hath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing, do still continue to belong to his
children: for supposing them not to have joined in the war, either thro’ infancy, absence, or choice, they
have done nothing to forfeit them: nor has the conqueror any right to take them away, by the bare title of
having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction; though perhaps he may have some right to
them, to repair the damages he has sustained by the war, and the defence of his own right; which how
far it reaches to the possessions of the conquered, we shall see by and by. So that he that by conquest
has a right over a man’s person to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby a right over his estate to
possess and enjoy it: for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used, that gives his adversary a right to
take away his life, and destroy him if he pleases, as a noxious creature; but it is damage sustained that
alone gives him title to another man’s goods: for though I may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway,
yet I may not (which seems less) take away his money, and let him go: this would be robbery on my
side. His force, and the state of war he put himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me no title to his
goods. The right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who joined in the war, not to their
estates, but only in order to make reparation for the damages received, and the charges of the war, and
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that too with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children.
Sect. 183. Let the conqueror have as much justice on his side, as could be supposed, he has no right
to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit: his life is at the victor’s mercy; and his service and goods
he may appropriate, to make himself reparation; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children;
they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed, and their shares in the estate he possessed: for example, I
in the state of nature (and all commonwealths are in the state of nature one with another) have injured
another man, and refusing to give satisfaction, it comes to a state of war, wherein my defending by force
what I had gotten unjustly, makes me the aggressor. I am conquered: my life, it is true, as forfeit, is at
mercy, but not my wife’s and children’s. They made not the war, nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit
their lives; they were not mine to forfeit. My wife had a share in my estate; that neither could I forfeit.
And my children also, being born of me, had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance.
Here then is the case: the conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received, and the children
have a title to their father’s estate for their subsistence: for as to the wife’s share, whether her own
labour, or compact, gave her a title to it, it is plain, her husband could not forfeit what was her’s. What
must be done in the case? I answer; the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as much as may be,
should be preserved, it follows, that if there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the conqueror’s
losses, and children’s maintenance, he that hath, and to spare, must remit something of his full
satisfaction, and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those who are in danger to perish
without it.
Sect. 184. But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conqueror, to
the utmost farthing; and that the children of the vanquished, spoiled of all their father’s goods, are to be
left to starve and perish; yet the satisfying of what shall, on this score, be due to the conqueror, will
scarce give him a title to any country he shall conquer: for the damages of war can scarce amount to the
value of any considerable tract of land, in any part of the world, where all the land is possessed, and
none lies waste. And if I have not taken away the conqueror’s land, which, being vanquished, it is
impossible I should; scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine, supposing
it equally cultivated, and of an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his. The destruction of
a year’s product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done:
for as to money, and such riches and treasure taken away, these are none of nature’s goods, they have
but a fantastical imaginary value: nature has put no such upon them: they are of no more account by her
standard, than the wampompeke of the Americans to an European prince, or the silver money of
Europe would have been formerly to an American. And five years product is not worth the perpetual
inheritance of land, where all is possessed, and none remains waste, to be taken up by him that is
disseized: which will be easily granted, if one do but take away the imaginary value of money, the
disproportion being more than between five and five hundred; though, at the same time, half a year’s
product is more worth than the inheritance, where there being more land than the inhabitants possess
and make use of, any one has liberty to make use of the waste: but there conquerors take little care to
possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished, No damage therefore, that men in the state of nature
(as all princes and governments are in reference to one another) suffer from one another, can give a
conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished, and turn them out of that inheritance,
which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations. The conqueror
indeed will be apt to think himself master: and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to
dispute their right. But if that be all, it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over
the weaker: and, by this reason, he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on.
Sect. 185. Over those then that joined with him in the war, and over those of the subdued country
that opposed him not, and the posterity even of those that did, the conqueror, even in a just war, hath,
by his conquest, no right of dominion: they are free from any subjection to him, and if their former
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government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves.
Sect. 186. The conqueror, it is true, usually, by the force he has over them, compels them, with a
sword at their breasts, to stoop to his conditions, and submit to such a government as he pleases to
afford them; but the enquiry is, what right he has to do so? If it be said, they submit by their own
consent, then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over
them. It remains only to be considered, whether promises extorted by force, without right, can be
thought consent, and how far they bind. To which I shall say, they bind not at all; because whatsoever
another gets from me by force, I still retain the right of, and he is obliged presently to restore. He that
forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, and I have still a right to retake him. By the
same reason, he that forced a promise from me, ought presently to restore it, i.e. quit me of the
obligation of it; or I may resume it myself, i.e. chuse whether I will perform it: for the law of nature laying
an obligation on me only by the rules she prescribes, cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules: such
is the extorting any thing from me by force. Nor does it at all alter the case to say, I gave my promise,
no more than it excuses the force, and passes the right, when I put my hand in my pocket, and deliver
my purse myself to a thief, who demands it with a pistol at my breast.
Sect. 187. From all which it follows, that the government of a conqueror, imposed by force on the
subdued, against whom he had no right of war, or who joined not in the war against him, where he had
right, has no obligation upon them.
Sect. 188. But let us suppose, that all the men of that community, being all members of the same body
politic, may be taken to have joined in that unjust war wherein they are subdued, and so their lives are at
the mercy of the conqueror.
Sect. 189. I say this concerns not their children who are in their minority: for since a father hath not, in
himself, a power over the life or liberty of his child, no act of his can possibly forfeit it. So that the
children, whatever may have happened to the fathers, are freemen, and the absolute power of the
conqueror reaches no farther than the persons of the men that were subdued by him, and dies with
them: and should he govern them as slaves, subjected to his absolute arbitrary power, he has no such
right of dominion over their children. He can have no power over them but by their own consent,
whatever he may drive them to say or do; and he has no lawfull authority, whilst force, and not choice,
compels them to submission.
Sect. 190. Every man is born with a double right: first, a right of freedom to his person, which no
other man has a power over, but the free disposal of it lies in himself. Secondly, a right, before any other
man, to inherit with his brethren his father’s goods.
Sect. 191. By the first of these, a man is naturally free from subjection to any government, tho’ he be
born in a place under its jurisdiction; but if he disclaim the lawful government of the country he was born
in, he must also quit the right that belonged to him by the laws of it, and the possessions there
descending to him from his ancestors, if it were a government made by their consent.
Sect. 192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended, and derive a title to
their estates from those who are subdued, and had a government forced upon them against their free
consents, retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent not freely to the
government, whose hard conditions were by force imposed on the possessors of that country: for the
first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country, the people who are the descendants
of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint, have
always a right to shake it off, and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath
brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of government as they willingly and of
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choice consent to. Who doubts but the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient possessors of
that country, may justly cast off the Turkish yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever
they have an opportunity to do it? For no government can have a right to obedience from a people who
have not freely consented to it; which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full
state of liberty to chuse their government and governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to
which they have by themselves or their representatives given their free consent, and also till they are
allowed their due property, which is so to be proprietors of what they have, that no body can take away
any part of it without their own consent, without which, men under any government are not in the state
of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.
Sect. 193. But granting that the conqueror in a just war has a right to the estates, as well as power
over the persons, of the conquered; which, it is plain, he hath not: nothing of absolute power will follow
from hence, in the continuance of the government; because the descendants of these being all freemen, if
he grants them estates and possessions to inhabit his country, (without which it would be worth nothing)
whatsoever he grants them, they have, so far as it is granted, property in. The nature whereof is, that
without a man’s own consent it cannot be taken from him.
Sect. 194. Their persons are free by a native right, and their properties, be they more or less, are their
own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or else it is no property. Supposing the conqueror gives
to one man a thousand acres, to him and his heirs for ever; to another he lets a thousand acres for his
life, under the rent of 50£. or 500£. per arm. has not the one of these a right to his thousand acres for
ever, and the other, during his life, paying the said rent? and hath not the tenant for life a property in all
that he gets over and above his rent, by his labour and industry during the said term, supposing it be
double the rent? Can any one say, the king, or conqueror, after his grant, may by his power of
conqueror take away all, or part of the land from the heirs of one, or from the other during his life, he
paying the rent? or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land,
at his pleasure? If he can, then all free and voluntary contracts cease, and are void in the world; there
needs nothing to dissolve them at any time, but power enough: and all the grants and promises of men in
power are but mockery and collusion: for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say, I give you
and your’s this for ever, and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised; and
yet it is to be understood, that I have right, if I please, to take it away from you again to morrow?
Sect. 195. I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country; but this I
am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of God and nature. No body, no power, can exempt them
from the obligations of that eternal law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of promises, that
omnipotency itself can be tied by them. Grants, promises, and oaths, are bonds that hold the Almighty:
whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world, who all together, with all their people joined to
them, are, in comparison of the great God, but as a drop of the bucket, or a dust on the balance,
inconsiderable, nothing!
Sect. 196. The short of the case in conquest is this: the conqueror, if he have a just cause, has a
despotical right over the persons of all, that actually aided, and concurred in the war against him, and a
right to make up his damage and cost out of their labour and estates, so he injure not the right of any
other. Over the rest of the people, if there were any that consented not to the war, and over the children
of the captives themselves, or the possessions of either, he has no power; and so can have, by virtue of
conquest, no lawful title himself to dominion over them, or derive it to his posterity; but is an aggressor,
if he attempts upon their properties, and thereby puts himself in a state of war against them, and has no
better a right of principality, he, nor any of his successors, than Hingar, or Hubba, the Danes, had here
in England; or Spartacus, had he conquered Italy, would have had; which is to have their yoke cast off,
as soon as God shall give those under their subjection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus,
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notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted
Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire. And the lord was with Hezekiah, and he
prospered; wherefore he went forth, and he rebelled against the king of Assyria, and served him not, 2
Kings xviii. 7. Whence it is plain, that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over any
one, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offence before God, but is that which he allows and
countenances, though even promises and covenants, when obtained by force, have intervened: for it is
very probable, to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively, that the Assyrians
subdued Ahaz, and deposed him, and made Hezekiah king in his father’s lifetime; and that Hezekiah by
agreement had done him homage, and paid him tribute all this time.
CHAPTER. XVII.
OF USURPATION.
Sect. 197. AS conquest may be called a foreign usurpation, so usurpation is a kind of domestic
conquest, with this difference, that an usurper can never have right on his side, it being no usurpation,
but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to. This, so far as it is usurpation, is a
change only of persons, but not of the forms and rules of the government: for if the usurper extend his
power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes, or governors of the commonwealth, it is
tyranny added to usurpation.
Sect. 198. In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who are to bear rule, is as natural
and necessary a part as the form of the government itself, and is that which had its establishment
originally from the people; the anarchy being much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to
agree, that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power,
and be the monarch. Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government established, have rules
also of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority, and settled methods of
conveying the right to them: for the anarchy is much alike, to have no form of government at all; or to
agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall have
the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways
than what the laws of the community have prescribed, hath no right to be obeyed, though the form of the
commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have appointed, and consequently
not the person the people have consented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever
have a title, till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow, and
confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped.
CHAPTER. XVIII.
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OF TYRANNY.
Sect. 199. AS usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the
exercise of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to. And this is making use of the power
any one has in his hands, not for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate
advantage. When the governor, however intitled, makes not the law, but his will, the rule; and his
commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people, but the
satisfaction of his own ambition, revenge, covetousness, or any other irregular passion.
Sect. 200. If one can doubt this to be truth, or reason, because it comes from the obscure hand of a
subject, I hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him. King James the first, in his speech to
the parliament, 1603, tells them thus,
I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, in making of good
laws and constitutions, to any particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth
and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a
lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and
greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant, is this, that
whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained
for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth by
the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property
of his people.
And again, in his speech to the parliament, 1609, he hath these words:
The king binds himself by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his
kingdom; tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people, as the laws
of his kingdom; and expressly, by his oath at his coronation, so as every just king, in a settled
kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his
government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after
the deluge. Hereafter, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and
day and night, shall not cease while the earth remaineth. And therefore a king governing in a
settled kingdom, leaves to be a king, and degenerates into a tyrant, as soon as he leaves off
to rule according to his laws.
And a little after,
Therefore all kings that are not tyrants, or perjured, will be glad to bound themselves within
the limits of their laws; and they that persuade them the contrary, are vipers, and pests both
against them and the commonwealth.
Thus that learned king, who well understood the notion of things, makes the difference betwixt a king
and a tyrant to consist only in this, that one makes the laws the bounds of his power, and the good of
the public, the end of his government; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite.
Sect. 201. It is a mistake, to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government
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are liable to it, as well as that: for wherever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of the
people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and made use of to
impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it; there it
presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many. Thus we read of the thirty
tyrants at Athens, as well as one at Syracuse; and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at Rome
was nothing better.
Sect. 202. Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and
whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he has
under his command, to compass that upon the subject, which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a
magistrate; and, acting without authority, may be opposed, as any other man, who by force invades the
right of another. This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates. He that hath authority to seize my
person in the street, may be opposed as a thief and a robber, if he endeavours to break into my house
to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant, and such a legal authority, as will
impower him to arrest me abroad. And why this should not hold in the highest, as well as in the most
inferior magistrate, I would gladly be informed. Is it reasonable, that the eldest brother, because he has
the greatest part of his father’s estate, should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger
brothers portions? or that a rich man, who possessed a whole country, should from thence have a right
to seize, when he pleased, the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour? The being rightfully possessed
of great power and riches, exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the sons of Adam, is so far from
being an excuse, much less a reason, for rapine and oppression, which the endamaging another without
authority is, that it is a great aggravation of it: for the exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right
in a great, than in a petty officer; no more justifiable in a king than a constable; but is so much the worse
in him, in that he has more trust put in him, has already a much greater share than the rest of his brethren,
and is supposed, from the advantages of his education, employment, and counsellors, to be more
knowing in the measures of right and wrong.
Sect. 203. May the commands then of a prince be opposed? may he be resisted as often as any one
shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all
polities, and, instead of government and order, leave nothing but anarchy and confusion.
Sect. 204. To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing, but to unjust and unlawful force;
whoever makes any opposition in any other case, draws on himself a just condemnation both from God
and man; and so no such danger or confusion will follow, as is often suggested: for,
Sect. 205. First, As, in some countries, the person of the prince by the law is sacred; and so,
whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all question or violence, not liable to force,
or any judicial censure or condemnation. But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any
inferior officer, or other commissioned by him; unless he will, by actually putting himself into a state of
war with his people, dissolve the government, and leave them to that defence which belongs to every
one in the state of nature: for of such things who can tell what the end will be? and a neighbour kingdom
has shewed the world an odd example. In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him
from all inconveniencies, whereby he is secure, whilst the government stands, from all violence and harm
whatsoever; than which there cannot be a wiser constitution: for the harm he can do in his own person
not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being able by his single strength to subvert
the laws, nor oppress the body of the people, should any prince have so much weakness, and ill nature
as to be willing to do it, the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes,
when a heady prince comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public, and
security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: it
being safer for the body, that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that
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the head of the republic should be easily, and upon slight occasions, exposed.
Sect. 206. Secondly, But this privilege, belonging only to the king’s person, hinders not, but they may
be questioned, opposed, and resisted, who use unjust force, though they pretend a commission from
him, which the law authorizes not; as is plain in the case of him that has the king’s writ to arrest a man,
which is a full commission from the king; and yet he that has it cannot break open a man’s house to do it,
nor execute this command of the king upon certain days, nor in certain places, though this commission
have no such exception in it; but they are the limitations of the law, which if any one transgress, the
king’s commission excuses him not: for the king’s authority being given him only by the law, he cannot
impower any one to act against the law, or justify him, by his commission, in so doing; the commission,
or command of any magistrate, where he has no authority, being as void and insignificant, as that of any
private man; the difference between the one and the other, being that the magistrate has some authority
so far, and to such ends, and the private man has none at all: for it is not the commission, but the
authority, that gives the right of acting; and against the laws there can be no authority. But,
notwithstanding such resistance, the king’s person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger
to governor or government.
Sect. 207. Thirdly, Supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus
sacred; yet this doctrine of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power, will not upon
every slight occasion indanger him, or imbroil the government: for where the injured party may be
relieved, and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is
only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law: for nothing is to be accounted
hostile force, but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal; and it is such force alone, that puts
him that uses it into a state of war, and makes it lawful to resist him. A man with a sword in his hand
demands my purse in the high-way, when perhaps I have not twelve pence in my pocket: this man I may
lawfully kill. To another I deliver 100 pounds to hold only whilst I alight, which he refuses to restore me,
when I am got up again, but draws his sword to defend the possession of it by force, if I endeavour to
retake it. The mischief this man does me is a hundred, or possibly a thousand times more than the other
perhaps intended me (whom I killed before he really did me any); and yet I might lawfully kill the one,
and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully. The reason whereof is plain; because the one using force,
which threatened my life, I could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it: and when it was gone, it
was too late to appeal. The law could not restore life to my dead carcass: the loss was irreparable;
which to prevent, the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him, who had put himself into a state of
war with me, and threatened my destruction. But in the other case, my life not being in danger, I may
have the benefit of appealing to the law, and have reparation for my 100 pounds that way.
Sect. 208. Fourthly, But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be maintained (by the power he
has got), and the remedy which is due by law, be by the same power obstructed; yet the right of
resisting, even in such manifest acts of tyranny, will not suddenly, or on slight occasions, disturb the
government: for if it reach no farther than some private men’s cases, though they have a right to defend
themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them; yet the right to do so
will not easily engage them in a contest, wherein they are sure to perish; it being as impossible for one,
or a few oppressed men to disturb the government, where the body of the people do not think
themselves concerned in it, as for a raving mad-man, or heady malcontent to overturn a well settled
state; the people being as little apt to follow the one, as the other.
Sect. 209. But if either these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people; or if the mischief
and oppression has lighted only on some few, but in such cases, as the precedent, and consequences
seem to threaten all; and they are persuaded in their consciences, that their laws, and with them their
estates, liberties, and lives are in danger, and perhaps their religion too; how they will be hindered from
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resisting illegal force, used against them, I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all
governments whatsoever, when the governors have brought it to this pass, to be generally suspected of
their people; the most dangerous state which they can possibly put themselves in, wherein they are the
less to be pitied, because it is so easy to be avoided; it being as impossible for a governor, if he really
means the good of his people, and the preservation of them, and their laws together, not to make them
see and feel it, as it is for the father of a family, not to let his children see he loves, and takes care of
them.
Sect. 210. But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind, and actions of another; arts used
to elude the law, and the trust of prerogative (which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the
prince’s hand to do good, not harm to the people) employed contrary to the end for which it was given:
if the people shall find the ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen suitable to such ends, and
favoured, or laid by, proportionably as they promote or oppose them: if they see several experiments
made of arbitrary power, and that religion underhand favoured, (tho’ publicly proclaimed against) which
is readiest to introduce it; and the operators in it supported, as much as may be; and when that cannot
be done, yet approved still, and liked the better: if a long train of actions shew the councils all tending
that way; how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded in his own mind, which way
things are going; or from casting about how to save himself, than he could from believing the captain of
the ship he was in, was carrying him, and the rest of the company, to Algiers, when he found him always
steering that course, though cross winds, leaks in his ship, and want of men and provisions did often
force him to turn his course another way for some time, which he steadily returned to again, as soon as
the wind, weather, and other circumstances would let him?
CHAPTER. XIX.
OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 211. HE that will with any clearness speak of the dissolution of government, ought in the first
place to distinguish between the dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government. That
which makes the community, and brings men out of the loose state of nature, into one politic society, is
the agreement which every one has with the rest to incorporate, and act as one body, and so be one
distinct commonwealth. The usual, and almost only way whereby this union is dissolved, is the inroad of
foreign force making a conquest upon them: for in that case, (not being able to maintain and support
themselves, as one intire and independent body) the union belonging to that body which consisted
therein, must necessarily cease, and so every one return to the state he was in before, with a liberty to
shift for himself, and provide for his own safety, as he thinks fit, in some other society. Whenever the
society is dissolved, it is certain the government of that society cannot remain. Thus conquerors swords
often cut up governments by the roots, and mangle societies to pieces, separating the subdued or
scattered multitude from the protection of, and dependence on, that society which ought to have
preserved them from violence. The world is too well instructed in, and too forward to allow of, this way
of dissolving of governments, to need any more to be said of it; and there wants not much argument to
prove, that where the society is dissolved, the government cannot remain; that being as impossible, as
for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and dissipated by a whirl-
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wind, or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.
Sect. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved from within.
First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace, amongst those who are of it,
from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative,
for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, that the
members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body. This is
the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the commonwealth: from hence the several members have
their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is broken, or
dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one
will, the legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of
that will. The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision
is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by
persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man,
or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest.
When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to
do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which
means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as
they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would impose any
thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of
the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have
no such authority or delegation.
Sect. 213. This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth who misuse the power they
have; it is hard to consider it aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the form of
government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three
distinct persons.
(1). A single hereditary person, having the constant, supreme, executive power, and with it the power
of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time.
(2). An assembly of hereditary nobility.
(3). An assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people. Such a form of government
supposed, it is evident,
Sect. 214. First, That when such a single person, or prince, sets up his own arbitrary will in place of
the laws, which are the will of the society, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed: for
that being in effect the legislative, whose rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed;
when other laws are set up, and other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative,
constituted by the society, have enacted, it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces
new laws, not being thereunto authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society, or subverts the
old, disowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and so sets up a new legislative.
Sect. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time, or from
acting freely, pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted, the legislative is altered: for it is not a
certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have also freedom of debating, and leisure of
perfecting, what is for the good of the society, wherein the legislative consists: when these are taken
away or altered, so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly
altered; for it is not names that constitute governments, but the use and exercise of those powers that
were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the
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legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.
Sect. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are
altered, without the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative
is altered: for, if others than those whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another
way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.
Sect. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power, either by
the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so a dissolution of the
government: for the end why people entered into society being to be preserved one intire, free,
independent society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever they are given up into the
power of another.
Sect. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be
imputed to the prince, is evident; because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to
employ, and often persuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate he is
uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward such changes, under
pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as factious,
seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable
by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and visible rebellion, apt enough
to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign
conquest. Besides, the prince in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other
parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can never in opposition to him,
or without his concurrence, alter the legislative by a law, his conse power, neglects and abandons that
charge, so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonstratively to
reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government: for laws not being made for
themselves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the society, to keep every part of the body politic
in its due place and function; when that totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people
become a confused multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no longer the administration
of justice, for the securing of men’s rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the
force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where the laws
cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I suppose, a
mystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconsistent with human society.
Sect. 220. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to
provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of persons,
or form, or both, as they shall find it most for their safety and good: for the society can never, by the
fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itself, which can only be done by a
settled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is
not so miserable that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for any. To tell
people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, when by oppression, artifice, or
being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is gone, is only to tell them, they may expect relief
when it is too late, and the evil is past cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them first be slaves, and
then to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This,
if barely so, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no
means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get
out of it, but to prevent it.
Sect. 221. There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is,
when the legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust.
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First, The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the
property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary
disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.
Sect. 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property; and the end
why they chuse and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and
fences to the properties of all the members of the society, to limit the power, and moderate the
dominion, of every part and member of the society: for since it can never be supposed to be the will of
the society, that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure,
by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own
making; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the property of the people, or to
reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people,
who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God
hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall
transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to
grasp themselves, or put into the hands of any other, an absolute power over the lives, liberties, and
estates of the people; by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands
for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty,
and, by the establishment of a new legislative, (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety
and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the
legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in
him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when
he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust,
when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society, to corrupt the representatives,
and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such,
whom he has, by sollicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs; and employs them to
bring in such, who have promised before-hand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate
candidates and electors, and new-model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by
the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to themselves
the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that
they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the
commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination, and mature debate, be judged to
require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on
all sides, are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this, and endeavour to set up the
declared abettors of his own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers of the
society, is certainly as great a breach of trust, and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the
government, as is possible to be met with. To which, if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly
employed to the same end, and all the arts of perverted law made use of, to take off and destroy all that
stand in the way of such a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their
country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the society, who thus
employ it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one
cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.
Sect. 223. To this perhaps it will be said, that the people being ignorant, and always discontented, to
lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people, is to
expose it to certain ruin; and no government will be able long to subsist, if the people may set up a new
legislative, whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I answer, Quite the contrary. People are
not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with
to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any
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original defects, or adventitious ones introduced by time, or corruption; it is not an easy thing to get them
changed, even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it. This slowness and aversion in the
people to quit their old constitutions, has, in the many revolutions which have been seen in this kingdom,
in this and former ages, still kept us to, or, after some interval of fruitless attempts, still brought us back
again to our old legislative of king, lords and commons: and whatever provocations have made the
crown be taken from some of our princes heads, they never carried the people so far as to place it in
another line.
Sect. 224. But it will be said, this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I answer,
First, No more than any other hypothesis: for when the people are made miserable, and find
themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power, cry up their governors, as much as you will, for
sons of Jupiter; let them be sacred and divine, descended, or authorized from heaven; give them out for
whom or what you please, the same will happen. The people generally ill treated, and contrary to right,
will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will
wish, and seek for the opportunity, which in the change, weakness and accidents of human affairs,
seldom delays long to offer itself. He must have lived but a little while in the world, who has not seen
examples of this in his time; and he must have read very little, who cannot produce examples of it in all
sorts of governments in the world.
Sect. 225. Secondly, I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public
affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human
frailty, will be born by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long train of abuses, prevarications
and artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel
what they lie under, and see whither they are going; it is not to be wondered, that they should then rouze
themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which
government was at first erected; and without which, ancient names, and specious forms, are so far from
being better, that they are much worse, than the state of nature, or pure anarchy; the inconveniencies
being all as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.
Sect. 226. Thirdly, I answer, that this doctrine of a power in the people of providing for their safety a-
new, by a new legislative, when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust, by invading their
property, is the best fence against rebellion, and the probablest means to hinder it: for rebellion being an
opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the
government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their violation of
them, are truly and properly rebels: for when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have
excluded force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity amongst
themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do rebellare, that is, bring back
again the state of war, and are properly rebels: which they who are in power, (by the pretence they have
to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those about them) being
likeliest to do; the properest way to prevent the evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who
are under the greatest temptation to run into it.
Sect. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is changed, or the legislators
act contrary to the end for which they were constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if
any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by them made,
pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a
peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who
remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can have, but by the
appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people did, and no
body else can set up, and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually
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introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the legislative
established by the society, (in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united, as to that of their own
will) they untie the knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by force
take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less
esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people, their
liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting
themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace,
are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.
Sect. 228. But if they, who say it lays a foundation for rebellion, mean that it may occasion civil wars,
or intestine broils, to tell the people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made
upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their
magistrates, when they invade their properties contrary to the trust put in them; and that therefore this
doctrine is not to be allowed, being so destructive to the peace of the world: they may as well say, upon
the same ground, that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirates, because this may occasion
disorder or bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who
defends his own right, but on him that invades his neighbours. If the innocent honest man must quietly
quit all he has, for peace sake, to him who will lay violent hands upon it, I desire it may be considered,
what a kind of peace there will be in the world, which consists only in violence and rapine; and which is
to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would not think it an admirable
peace betwix the mighty and the mean, when the lamb, without resistance, yielded his throat to be torn
by the imperious wolf? Polyphemus’s den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace, and such a
government, wherein Ulysses and his companions had nothing to do, but quietly to suffer themselves to
be devoured. And no doubt Ulysses, who was a prudent man, preached up passive obedience, and
exhorted them to a quiet submission, by representing to them of what concernment peace was to
mankind; and by shewing the inconveniences might happen, if they should offer to resist Polyphemus,
who had now the power over them.
Sect. 229. The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for mankind, that the
people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers should be
sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for
the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people?
Sect. 230. Nor let any one say, that mischief can arise from hence, as often as it shall please a busy
head, or turbulent spirit, to desire the alteration of the government. It is true, such men may stir,
whenever they please; but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition: for till the mischief be
grown general, and the ill designs of the rulers become visible, or their attempts sensible to the greater
part, the people, who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance, are not apt to stir.
The examples of particular injustice, or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man, moves them
not. But if they universally have a persuation, grounded upon manifest evidence, that designs are
carrying on against their liberties, and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them
strong suspicions of the evil intention of their governors, who is to be blamed for it? Who can help it, if
they, who might avoid it, bring themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed, if they have
the sense of rational creatures, and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And
is it not rather their fault, who put things into such a posture, that they would not have them thought to be
as they are? I grant, that the pride, ambition, and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused
great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms. But whether the
mischief hath oftener begun in the peoples wantonness, and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of
their rulers, or in the rulers insolence, and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over their
people; whether oppression, or disobedience, gave the first rise to the disorder, I leave it to impartial
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history to determine. This I am sure, whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the
rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of
any just government, is highly guilty of the greatest crime, I think, a man is capable of, being to answer
for all those mischiefs of blood, rapine, and desolation, which the breaking to pieces of governments
bring on a country. And he who does it, is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of
mankind, and is to be treated accordingly.
Sect. 231. That subjects or foreigners, attempting by force on the properties of any people, may be
resisted with force, is agreed on all hands. But that magistrates, doing the same thing, may be resisted,
hath of late been denied: as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law, had
thereby a power to break those laws, by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren:
whereas their offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by
the law, and breaking also that trust, which is put into their hands by their brethren.
Sect. 232. Whosoever uses force without right, as every one does in society, who does it without
law, puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it; and in that state all former
ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and every one has a right to defend himself, and to resist the
aggressor. This is so evident, that Barclay himself, that great assertor of the power and sacredness of
kings, is forced to confess, That it is lawful for the people, in some cases, to resist their king; and that
too in a chapter, wherein he pretends to shew, that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of
rebellion. Whereby it is evident, even by his own doctrine, that, since they may in some cases resist, all
resisting of princes is not rebellion. His words are these. Quod siquis dicat, Ergone populus tyrannicae
crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit? Ergone multitude civitates suas fame, ferro, & flamma
vastari, seque, conjuges, & liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi, inque omnia vitae pericula
omnesque miserias & molestias a rege deduci patientur? Num illis quod omni animantium generi est a
natura tributum, denegari debet, ut sc. vim vi repellant, seseq; ab injuria, tueantur? Huic breviter
responsum sit, Populo universo negari defensionem, quae juris naturalis est, neque ultionem quae praeter
naturam est adversus regem concedi debere. Quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas
aliquot privatum odium exerceat, sed corpus etiam reipublicae, cujus ipse caput est, i.e. totum populum,
vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intoleranda saevitia seu tyrannide divexet; populo, quidem
hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuria potestas competit, sed tuendi se tantum, non enim in
principem invadendi: & restituendae injuriae illatae, non recedendi a debita reverentia propter acceptam
injuriam. Praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscenti jus habet. Horum
enim alterum a natura est, ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inferior
de superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit, impedire potest, ne
fiat, id postquam factum est, in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc amplius
quam privatus quispiam habet: quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum nisi
in patientia remedium superest. Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet)
resistere cum reverentia possit, Barclay contra Monarchom. 1. iii. c. 8.
In English thus:
Sect. 233. But if any one should ask, Must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty
and rage of tyranny? Must they see their cities pillaged, and laid in ashes, their wives and children
exposed to the tyrant’s lust and fury, and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin, and all
the miseries of want and oppression, and yet sit still? Must men alone be debarred the common privilege
of opposing force with force, which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation
from injury? I answer: Self-defence is a part of the law of nature; nor can it be denied the community,
even against the king himself: but to revenge themselves upon him, must by no means be allowed them; it
being not agreeable to that law. Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred, not only to some particular
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persons, but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth, whereof he is the head, and shall, with
intolerable ill usage, cruelly tyrannize over the whole, or a considerable part of the people, in this case
the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury: but it must be with this caution, that
they only defend themselves, but do not attack their prince: they may repair the damages received, but
must not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect. They may repulse the
present attempt, but must not revenge past violences: for it is natural for us to defend life and limb, but
that an inferior should punish a superior, is against nature. The mischief which is designed them, the
people may prevent before it be done; but when it is done, they must not revenge it on the king, though
author of the villany. This therefore is the privilege of the people in general, above what any private
person hath; that particular men are allowed by our adversaries themselves (Buchanan only excepted) to
have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable
tyranny; for when it is but moderate, they ought to endure it.
Sect. 234. Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance.
Sect. 235. It is true, he has annexed two limitations to it, to no purpose:
First, He says, it must be with reverence.
Secondly, It must be without retribution, or punishment; and the reason he gives is, because an inferior
cannot punish a superior. First, How to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with
reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to
receive the blows, or in any more respectful posture, without a sword in his hand, to abate the
confidence and force of the assailant, will quickly be at an end of his resistance, and will find such a
defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage. This is as ridiculous a way of resisting, as
juvenal thought it of fighting; ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum. And the success of the combat will be
unavoidably the same he there describes it:
——-Libertas pauperis haec est:
Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat,
Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance, where men may not strike again. He
therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike. And then let our author, or any body else, join a
knock on the head, or a cut on the face, with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit. He that
can reconcile blows and reverence, may, for aught I know, desire for his pains, a civil, respectful
cudgeling where-ever he can meet with it.
Secondly, As to his second, An inferior cannot punish a superior; that is true, generally speaking,
whilst he is his superior. But to resist force with force, being the state of war that levels the parties,
cancels all former relation of reverence, respect, and superiority: and then the odds that remains, is, that
he, who opposes the unjust agressor, has this superiority over him, that he has a right, when he prevails,
to punish the offender, both for the breach of the peace, and all the evils that followed upon it. Barclay
therefore, in another place, more coherently to himself, denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case.
But he there assigns two cases, whereby a king may un-king himself. His words are,
Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem impotentius
dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat? Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet.
Semper enim ex divinis id obstat, Regem honorificato; & qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resisit: non
alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat.
Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber: hoc modo populus & superior
efficitur, reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit. At sunt
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paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo
perlustrem, duo tantum invenio, duos, inquam, casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit &
omni honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus.
Horum unus est, Si regnum disperdat, quemadmodum de Nerone fertur, quod is nempe senatum
populumque Romanum, atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere
decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius
fore, inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare, ac
ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur
serio, omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit, ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit, ut dominus
servi pro derelicto habiti dominium.
Sect. 236. Alter casus est, Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit, ac regnum quod liberum a
majoribus & populo traditum accepit, alienae ditioni mancipavit. Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente
id agit populo plane ut incommodet: tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit, ut summus
scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit, & solo Deo inferior, atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel
invitum, cujus libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit, in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem
dedidit; hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit, ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat,
nec in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transferat; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis
populum relinquit, cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant. Barclay contra Monarchom. 1.
iii. c. 16.
Which in English runs thus:
Sect. 237. What then, can there no case happen wherein the people may of right, and by their own
authority, help themselves, take arms, and set upon their king, imperiously domineering over them?
None at all, whilst he remains a king. Honour the king, and he that resists the power, resists the
ordinance of God; are divine oracles that will never permit it, The people therefore can never come by a
power over him, unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king: for then he divests himself
of his crown and dignity, and returns to the state of a private man, and the people become free and
superior, the power which they had in the interregnum, before they crowned him king, devolving to them
again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. After considering it well on
all sides, I can find but two. Two cases there are, I say, whereby a king, ipso facto, becomes no king,
and loses all power and regal authority over his people; which are also taken notice of by Winzerus.
The first is, If he endeavour to overturn the government, that is, if he have a purpose and design to
ruin the kingdom and commonwealth, as it is recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the senate
and people of Rome, lay the city waste with fire and sword, and then remove to some other place. And
of Caligula, that he openly declared, that he would be no longer a head to the people or senate, and that
he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he
wisht that the people had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow, Such designs as these,
when any king harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and
thought of the commonwealth; and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects, as a
master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned.
Sect. 238. The other case is, When a king makes himself the dependent of another, and subjects his
kingdom which his ancestors left him, and the people put free into his hands, to the dominion of another:
for however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people; yet because he has hereby lost
the principal part of regal dignity, viz. to be next and immediately under God, supreme in his kingdom;
and also because he betrayed or forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved,
into the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this, as it were, alienation of his kingdom, he himself
loses the power he had in it before, without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would
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have bestowed it; and so by this act sets the people free, and leaves them at their own disposal. One
example of this is to be found in the Scotch Annals.
Sect. 239. In these cases Barclay, the great champion of absolute monarchy, is forced to allow, that a
king may be resisted, and ceases to be a king. That is, in short, not to multiply cases, in whatsoever he
has no authority, there he is no king, and may be resisted: for wheresoever the authority ceases, the king
ceases too, and becomes like other men who have no authority. And these two cases he instances in,
differ little from those above mentioned, to be destructive to governments, only that he has omitted the
principle from which his doctrine flows: and that is, the breach of trust, in not preserving the form of
government agreed on, and in not intending the end of government itself, which is the public good and
preservation of property. When a king has dethroned himself, and put himself in a state of war with his
people, what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king, as they would any other man, who
has put himself into a state of war with them, Barclay, and those of his opinion, would do well to tell us.
This farther I desire may be taken notice of out of Barclay, that he says, The mischief that is designed
them, the people may prevent before it be clone: whereby he allows resistance when tyranny is but in
design. Such designs as these (says he) when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously promotes,
he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth; so that, according to him, the neglect
of the public good is to be taken as an evidence of such design, or at least for a sufficient cause of
resistance. And the reason of all, he gives in these words, Because he betrayed or forced his people,
whose liberty he ought carefully to have preserved. What he adds, into the power and dominion of a
foreign nation, signifies nothing, the fault and forfeiture lying in the loss of their liberty, which he ought to
have preserved, and not in any distinction of the persons to whose dominion they were subjected. The
peoples right is equally invaded, and their liberty lost, whether they are made slaves to any of their own,
or a foreign nation; and in this lies the injury, and against this only have they the right of defence. And
there are instances to be found in all countries, which shew, that it is not the change of nations in the
persons of their governors, but the change of government, that gives the offence. Bilson, a bishop of our
church, and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes, does, if I mistake not, in his
treatise of Christian subjection, acknowledge, that princes may forfeit their power, and their title to the
obedience of their subjects; and if there needed authority in a case where reason is so plain, I could
send my reader to Bracton, Fortescue, and the author of the Mirrour, and others, writers that cannot be
suspected to be ignorant of our government, or enemies to it. But I thought Hooker alone might be
enough to satisfy those men, who relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity, are by a strange fate
carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it. Whether they are herein made the tools of
cunninger workmen, to pull down their own fabric, they were best look. This I am sure, their civil policy
is so new, so dangerous, and so destructive to both rulers and people, that as former ages never could
bear the broaching of it; so it may be hoped, those to come, redeemed from the impositions of these
Egyptian under-task-masters, will abhor the memory of such servile flatterers, who, whilst it seemed to
serve their turn, resolved all government into absolute tyranny, and would have all men born to, what
their mean souls fitted them for, slavery.
Sect. 240. Here, it is like, the common question will be made, Who shall be judge, whether the prince
or legislative act contrary to their trust? This, perhaps, ill-affected and factious men may spread amongst
the people, when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative. To this I reply, The people shall be
judge; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well, and according to the trust reposed
in him, but he who deputes him, and must, by having deputed him, have still a power to discard him,
when he fails in his trust? If this be reasonable in particular cases of private men, why should it be
otherwise in that of the greatest moment, where the welfare of millions is concerned, and also where the
evil, if not prevented, is greater, and the redress very difficult, dear, and dangerous?
Sect. 241. But farther, this question, (Who shall be judge?) cannot mean, that there is no judge at all:
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for where there is no judicature on earth, to decide controversies amongst men, God in heaven is judge.
He alone, it is true, is judge of the right. But every man is judge for himself, as in all other cases, so in
this, whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him, and whether he should appeal to the
Supreme Judge, as Jeptha did.
Sect. 242. If a controversy arise betwixt a prince and some of the people, in a matter where the law is
silent, or doubtful, and the thing be of great consequence, I should think the proper umpire, in such a
case, should be the body of the people: for in cases where the prince hath a trust reposed in him, and is
dispensed from the common ordinary rules of the law; there, if any men find themselves aggrieved, and
think the prince acts contrary to, or beyond that trust, who so proper to judge as the body of the
people, (who, at first, lodged that trust in him) how far they meant it should extend? But if the prince, or
whoever they be in the administration, decline that way of determination, the appeal then lies no where
but to heaven; force between either persons, who have no known superior on earth, or which permits
no appeal to a judge on earth, being properly a state of war, wherein the appeal lies only to heaven; and
in that state the injured party must judge for himself, when he will think fit to make use of that appeal,
and put himself upon it.
Sect. 243. To conclude, The power that every individual gave the society, when he entered into it,
can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the
community; because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to
the original agreement: so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to
continue in them and their successors, with direction and authority for providing such successors, the
legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts; because having provided a
legislative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the legislative, and
cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative, and made this supreme
power in any person, or assembly, only temporary; or else, when by the miscarriages of those in
authority, it is forfeited; upon the forfeiture, or at the determination of the time set, it reverts to the
society, and the people have a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in themselves; or
erect a new form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think good.
FINIS.
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