Prepare a 15 presentation on the assigned readings based on those two chapter. Instructions 1. Time: 15 minutes in total for presentation on the assigned readings depending on whether you work as a team or individually (see below under Tasks). The impor

20200518220647a_system_of_conflict_dynamics 20200518220701escalation_and_entrapment
 

Prepare a 15 presentation on the assigned readings based on those two chapter.

Instructions

1. Time: 15 minutes in total for presentation on the assigned readings depending on whether you work as a team or individually (see below under Tasks). The important thing to know well is not how much time you need. It is ability (competency) to identify what is most important to know from the readings and to communicate it clearly and concisely. Get straight to the point.

Prepare a 15 presentation on the assigned readings based on those two chapter.

Discussion Leader. Each student will lead discussion of assigned readings for at least one week.

1. Preparation. Read the assigned material. Identify the author’s main argument or overall point, the main question the argument responding to that question, the reasons and evidence in support of the argument, and the aspect of the conflict on which the author focuses.

Address these main elements first. Ask what is the point of this chapter? What the purpose of each section? What does it focus on? What does the author want the reader to know and understand well?

Next is your position (response to the author). What is your response to the author’s argument? Give a good reason. Finally pose one question NOT several! Just one question that came up as you read or after you completed reading and preparing the assignment. Tell us why it is important for us to consider or worth our time discussing.

2. Posing a good question is an important conflict resolution skill. A good question is one that provokes immediate response from the audience, and advances discussion or debate. It gets your audience’s attention. Provokes thought. It helps to pay attention to the question’s scholars pose in their work and the way they do so. Consider them carefully, specifically their “fruitfulness” or potential to advance debate on a phenomenon of concern to a broader community of scholars and practitioners. Not all questions advance debate or open up new avenues of inquiry. For example, rhetorical questions, questioning the obvious, and questions that elicit an automatic NO or Yes. Think carefully about the questions you ask.

i have also attached the 2 chapters 

 

Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis

A System of Conflict Dynamics

Contributors: By: Ho-Won Jeong

Book Title: Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis

Chapter Title: “A System of Conflict Dynamics”

Pub. Date: 2008

Access Date: May 18, 2020

Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd

City: London

Print ISBN: 9781412903097

Online ISBN: 9781446279366

DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n7

Print pages: 135-153

© 2008 SAGE Publications Ltd All Rights Reserved.

This PDF has been generated from SAGE Knowledge. Please note that the pagination of the online

version will vary from the pagination of the print book.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n7

A System of Conflict Dynamics

The dynamics behind conflict progression, comprising emergence, persistence, and transformation, can be
revealed by a general systems theory that illuminates elements geared toward either sustaining or disrupting
a status quo, and their relationship to the internal and external environment. In complex systems theory, a
conflict path is viewed as more than a simple, static, and dyadic process. While some might depend on a
linear system to explain changes, cyclical patterns may better illustrate how seemingly unrelated events and
processes conspire to shape outcomes (Gleick, 1987). Each conflict is considered contextually unique, but its
main features can be explained by shared common foundations (Golden, 2007).

Society is interlaced by orders created at various levels, but segmented in diverse ways. In considering that
conflict systems are not necessarily linear, the course of any event does not always produce controllable and
predictable outcomes. In contrast with a fixed structure, adaptive response systems can generate novel and
creative outcomes in a complex environment (Jones and Hughes, 2003). This chapter sheds light on action-
reaction modes of conflict dynamics, diverse types of behaviour, and contextual variables involved in influ-
encing the patterns of interaction between actors.

System Perspectives

Relationships between conflict components can be explained in terms of system processes and their out-
comes. Persisting trends in mutual interaction and consistent patterns of behaviour characterize each stage
of conflict. The changes in a conflict system move through a cycle of grievance expression-escalation-sup-
pression. An action-reaction process is considered cyclical with a punctuated equilibrium. With the manifes-
tation of escalation, a latent conflict turns into a crisis. Then the crisis eventually has to be turned back to a
latent condition of conflict, for heightened tension is not the normal state of relationships.

A system is imagined as a complex set of interaction patterns, constituting forces beyond the features of indi-
vidual components. By nature, a system is continuously shifting from one stage to another in the process of
adapting to a new situation. Although a dynamic interaction within a given structure changes from moment to
moment, it is not chaotic, representing instead ‘a set of self-organizing forces that keep the system on track’
(Littlejohn and Domenici, 2001: 218). Thus system dynamics are best captured in terms of an equilibrium em-
bodying a succession of identical or similar states.

In general, events activated at an earlier point can come back to affect the original event with a tendency
toward greater intensity. For example, additional pressure from a supervisor results in more resistance from
employees, eliciting greater directive responses from the boss. On the other hand, the interaction can be
‘self-correcting, and perpetuate a steady state’ if the relationships between the boss and employees are self-
regulated without involving patterns of abusive orders and withdrawal (Littlejohn and Domenici, 2001: 219). A
complex set of interactional patterns is, of course, modified as a result of a deviation of the system, subse-
quently restructuring rules that govern relationships.

Changes can, therefore, be elaborated in terms of any action that causes system disturbance. Equilibrium is
a normal state of many dynamic interaction patterns. Some systems are characterized by cyclical repetition
of an indefinite sequence of states. Thus conflict may be seen as a movement away from an orderly normal
state of relationships regulated by existing norms. The main question that remains, however, is how groups
move from harmony and equilibrium to a manifested conflict, and vice versa.

In a system’s model, the dynamic paths may all converge into, or diverge away, from the equilibrium point.
The loss of equilibrium sparks off movement toward the previous balancing point. When system components
lose the ability to interact in equilibrium, parties experience a breakdown in regular interaction patterns. Once
a new system emerges, the laws of the old system are not valid any more.

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The larger picture of US-Soviet history between 1945 and 1979 epitomizes the repetition of a particular se-
quence of events, moving to and from a certain equilibrium point. The Cold War pendulum vacillated between
the opposing poles of containment and détente before the collapse of the Soviet bloc socialist systems. Dé-
tente in the early 1970s was followed by an unstable equilibrium, ascribed to unilateral arms build-up, the
pursuit of military superiority by President Ronald Reagan and his ideological rhetoric in the early 1980s (ri-
valling that of the worst days of the Cold War in the late 1940s). The US plan to install intermediate-range
missiles in Western Europe and the renewed nuclear arms race created anxiety and pressure to recover a

stable equilibrium.1 This pressure eventually brought about renewed arms talks and a superpower summit.
With the demise of the Soviet system, the old patterns of rivalry were replaced by new rules that govern dif-
ferent dynamics in the relationship between post-Soviet Russia and the United States.

Being accompanied by more than 40 years of antagonistic relations, the US-North Korea nuclear weapons
agreement in 1994 created a stable equilibrium point at which to open up the possibility of diplomatic normal-
ization. The pendulum swung in the opposite direction in 2000, however, with the election of President Bush
and his administration’s abandonment of the agreement. A tit-for-tat escalation of conflict between the Ameri-
can and North Korean leadership led to the latter’s testing of nuclear weapons in 2006. Since then, the conflict
has been moderated only by the renewal of bilateral talks and the withdrawal of US financial sanctions, as an
effort to explore a new equilibrium point that restores normalized channels of communication.

These events are denoted by divergence from, and return to, behavioural and normative expectations found
in stable relationships. Incompatible, unregulated patterns of interaction are the hallmark of negative relation-
ships represented by disequilibrium. Whereas intractable conflicts escalate towards a more destructive end,
many normal adversarial relationships can be managed through a relatively stable system, oscillating be-
tween periods of tension and equilibrium. An action-reaction model suggests not only conditions that facilitate
escalation, but also conditions that encourage stability.

Action-Reaction Functions

A system’s perspective reflects action-reaction functions that have been applied to the analysis of arms races,
which create the vulnerability of each side to destruction by the other. The joint functions of two or more in-
teracting countries can be said to form a system with an equilibrium point at which each side feels that its
security interests, protected by military, technological, and economic strengths, are balanced against the oth-
er’s threats. This equilibrium impinges upon the structure of expectations that are derived from the combined
effects of interests, capabilities, and wills.

In understanding changes which affect the maintenance of the equilibrium, we can focus on a self-reinforcing
spiral of actions and reactions that might either instigate the initiation of war or spur conciliation. The ex-
change of the moves and countermoves drives conflict either downwards or upwards. By moving away from
mainly adversarial relationships, associated with an overall increase in a range of hostile behaviour, accom-
modation can be reached at the balancing point.

In an action-reaction process, the behaviour of one party is, in large part, a function of the other’s move. The
concept of interaction functions was originally formulated from an arms race perspective (Richardson, 1967).
This research originates in the classic work by Quincy Wright (1942), which correlates national interests and
respective levels of armaments to the increased likelihood of hostilities.

In the processes of the arms race envisaged by Richardson (1967), one country reacts to increases in an ad-
versary’s armament levels by strengthening its own arms expenditures, pushing, in turn, growth in the initia-
tor’s military spending levels. The threat of the other party, denoted by even higher levels of arms, will cause
one party to boost its military strength again. The perceived threats coming from the rapid arms build-up of
the opponent are a main factor leading to an upsurge in armaments; the level of responsiveness in military

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build-up reflects the intensity of the impact of an adversary’s armament on one’s own perceptions of threats,
fears, and grievances.

In the mutually aggravating process of an arms race, therefore, the rate of change in each party’s military
build-up is a direct result of the combined effect of a rival country’s military strength and an accumulation
of grievances that sharpens a sense of threat. The level of arms production is checked only by the cost of
procuring arms systems, and such internal constraints as limited economic strength, budgetary restrictions,
and other indicators of fatigue.

A desire for balance in the dynamics of arms competition is driven by fear of the other’s superiority in arms
levels. While the perceptions of threat (resulting from feelings of insecurity) are magnified by increasing griev-
ances toward the other party, motivating further arms build-up, each party must be able to afford continuing
armaments. The capability to keep up with the other’s expenditures is bound to preserve a threat-arms accu-
mulation reaction system. Thus mutual parity in arms procurement is an essential condition for safeguarding
equilibrium and deterring all-out war.

The system is regarded as stable if forces tending to recover the equilibrium point effectively counter a distur-
bance. When the differences in arms procurements are relatively small, disturbances move within a certain
range from an equilibrium point. Noticeably, a small deviation does not result in a general war. Gradual and
continuous adjustments to arms levels reproduce stable interactions between perceived threats and costs. In
contrast, equilibrium in the existing interaction would not be sustained if an arms race were to end in either
total disarmament or war.

The failure to attain equal arms development with disparities in economic capabilities produces conditions for
disequilibrium. An unstable equilibrium is created by large disturbances from the system’s present state. The
rising level of threats, following an uncontrolled exchange of hostilities, in tandem with a clear manifestation
of opposing interests, is expected to unleash catastrophic events that are beyond defensive reactions. In this
situation, predomination of the arms build-up is likely to precipitate overt armed conflict.

The accumulated mutual grievances from each other’s threats generate runaway conflict spirals. The ability
of parties to intensify a conflict can be constrained by emotional and physical costs. The strength of disequi-
librium factors needs to be overshadowed by braking factors, such as a fear of a possible war, along with the
accumulation of goodwill.

If equilibrium in the arms race is not stable, instances of hostilities can have a chain effect, leading to a specific
outcome of war. The retention of high levels of arms outweighs goodwill by generating the need to keep pace
with the increasing arms competition and heightened threat levels (Richardson, 1967). Large disturbances in
the system’s state result in a failure to return to the equilibrium point.

Intense overt conflict is irrevocably tied to the destructive capabilities of parties as well as perceptions of
threat and grievances derived from unequal relationships. In order to uphold stable action-reaction dynamics,
the conflict system has to balance threats and arms control. In the end, system transformation is essential to
de-escalation and conflict resolution.

In parallel to an arms race between rival states, ethnic mobilization, accompanied by the collapse of the cen-
tral authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992 to 1995) or militia armaments in Somalia (since 1988) and Liberia
(1989 to 1996), demonstrates competition among antagonistic groups for control of the state. Each group may
want to take advantage of a window of opportunity to expand its power and exploit the vulnerability of others
in an all out competition to capture state legitimacy and material assets (for example, timber and minerals) or
infrastructure such as ports. In enduring ethnic rivalries, one group’s increased strength creates a sense of
insecurity for others, whereas neighbouring groups practice self-help to ensure their own security.

Competitive, especially armed, mobilizations generate ‘a hostility spiral of action and reaction’ (Lobell and

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Mauceri, 2004: 4). Even a seemingly defensive move is seen as an offensive posture by rival groups. Each
hostile action is likely to be reciprocated by an adversary’s counter-offensive operations. In total anarchy, eth-
nic groups seek counterbalance with their opponents’ fighting capabilities, believing that offensive strategies
are the most effective in pursuing their survival. While each group either implicitly or explicitly takes measures
to protect themselves by balancing the rival’s strength, the mobilization dynamics result in further escalation
of hostile actions without increasing one’s own group’s security. This process ultimately ends either with the
emergence of one dominant group or external intervention to bring stability through new institution building.

The Modes of Interaction

Sanctions are often regarded as legitimate and acceptable methods of coercion in the international political
system. The transmission of threats specifies the negative consequences faced by parties who defy the de-
mands of a coercive opponent. Hostilities, war, or other negative forms of social influence are contrasted with
persuasion and incentives (Franck, 2006). While a negative mode of action involves economic or diplomatic
sanctions that are intended to increase costs or to take away benefit, positive measures focus on rewards or
recognition.

The attributes of interaction may consist not only of a mode of behaviour, but also different levels of intensity
in movements (incremental versus sudden) and directions of a particular measure (an increase or decrease
in punitive action). The degree of severity and consistency of sanctions produce diverse interpretation and
reciprocal action over time. The consistently increasing harshness of sanctions is likely to signal the demand
for capitulation rather than a move toward conciliation. The increasing or decreasing pressure is inclined to
be adopted in a manner that bears a direct relationship to the other party’s compliant or defiant acts.

Different degrees of positive inducements, ranging from diplomatic recognition, humanitarian relief and eco-
nomic assistance to military aid, can be employed as an appeasing influence strategy. Economic incentives
such as lower import tariffs and free loans have often been aimed at inducing a favourable response and forti-
fying ally relationships. In its pursuit of the war on terrorism, US economic assistance has, for example, been
granted to Pakistan and strategically important Central Asian countries.

The initiation of a negative mode of behaviour (such as violent acts as well as hostile statements) tends to
be easily reciprocated through retaliatory measures. The transmission of coercive messages may have un-
desirable repercussions with uncontrolled consequences via escalation. To prevent a run-away acceleration
of violence, coercive action needs to be applied gradually, with a greater magnitude, in specific areas. The
effects of threats and punishment as a mode of influence generally focus on the costs originating from non-
compliance. This strategy is contrasted with a promise made to engender trustworthy perceptions and deliver
good intentions.

In most conflict interactions, the imposition of pain is combined with the remuneration of benefits (Mitchell,
1999). Whereas coercion is likely to constitute a dominant form of escalatory action, the mixture of both col-
laborative and coercive strategies is typically associated with conflict diminution. Even with the introduction of
de-escalatory measures, bullying and intimidation tactics may not completely disappear if pressure needs to
be put on adversaries to act. When a conflict is controlled to bring about settlement, the ratio and frequency
of conciliatory behaviour increase vis-à-vis those that are coercive.

Threats and coercion may be accompanied by persuasive efforts made through the promise of rewards. For
example, the USA and its European allies promised limited types of nuclear technology to Iran in return for
Teheran’s freeze on uranium programmes. When Iran declined the proposal, Western powers threatened to
initiate UN-sponsored sanctions. In the post-conflict settings of Mozambique and El Salvador between 1992
and 1994, guerrilla forces temporarily ceased a continuing demobilization process when the governments
were slow to take promised measures such as changes in election rules and land reform, respectively.

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In antagonistic relationships, sanctions may serve as a means of communication to constrain an adversary’s
behaviour. On the other hand, the unmanaged expression of hostile intentions inadvertently instigates the
rival party’s misperceptions. The prevalence of an aggressive mood in one country is likely to invite similar re-
actions from the other. Prior to the Six Day War of 1967, both Arabs and Israelis were reacting to each other’s
intense emotional fever for war.

The same action causes different consequences, depending on the opponents’ perceptions. Provocative be-
haviour by one side generally brings about the other’s harsh response intended to deter continuing provo-
cation. Even if stronger reactions entail a risk of inciting further escalation through a negative spiral, it might
be feared that modest reactions are seen as a lack of will to challenge an aggressor. The breach of normal
expectations, accompanied by extreme violence, sets off a malignant spiral of escalatory acts. Witnessing
atrocities encourages vindictive behaviour against enemies.

High-stakes competition, especially in conjunction with an ability to inflict pain on adversaries, most likely
rouses voices of complaint about excessive concessions. While conciliatory counter-proposals can be made
to meet, at least partially, an adversarial demand, this might not soften the stiff position of the opponent who
feels a sense of victory and seeks total capitulation. The concessions proffered unconditionally by one side
may generate expectations of continued gains from the other, who may not want to believe in, or be convinced
of, a limit on what can be achieved. If the adversary’s goal is confined to low antagonistic interactions, they
can be placated through friendly gestures and symbolic recognition of their claims.

Prior to the abandonment of antagonistic measures, competitive behaviour may increase temporarily in sig-
nalling the possibility of a return to a tough stance, commensurate with an adversary’s future strategies. Ag-
gressive moves for short-term gains can be misinterpreted, however, unintentionally producing retaliatory re-
actions. The hard question becomes how to avoid provoking the other side into an escalatory track while
adopting contentious tactics in a measured manner to strengthen one’s negotiating position.

The other’s intention can be misconstrued due to the multiple functions of communication methods. Whereas
specific actions may have been taken to shape the opponent’s interpretations of the situation, these may also
have to be considered in terms of the morale of one’s own constituents. The efforts to send out both concilia-
tory and harsh messages to multiple types of audience often bring about misunderstandings and unintended
reactions. Ambiguous meanings can be crafted to show intransigence to the domestic audience, while inti-
mating an intention to lower hostilities toward adversaries. Even though the tough messages are constructed
for public consumption and to allay domestic critics, they can proliferate ill feelings and enmity in the enemy
camp.

Specific expectations and standards about acceptable and unacceptable contentious behaviour may differ
among the parties. Words and acts ought to be interpreted in the specific context of past and present events.
Every action does not have the same value. In fact, some can be intentionally ignored or dismissed. For in-
stance, even after the North Koreans detonated nuclear weapons in the autumn of 2006, the USA and Japan
declared, as part of efforts to reverse their adversary’s claim to a nuclear power status, that they do not rec-
ognize the ownership of nuclear bombs by Pyongyang as a factual matter. Even in escalation, implicit or ex-
plicit sets of rules may emerge to inhibit excessive conduct intended for total destruction. In the midst of a
violent struggle, tacit communications can be devised to constrain each other’s attempts at further escalation.
Without official acknowledgement, the Israeli military refrained from bombing Beirut’s main commercial cen-
tre, during the 2006 Lebanese war, in part, due to Hezbollah’s threat of retaliatory rocket attacks on Tel Aviv.

A Threat Mode of Action

Threats can be designed to force the other party to abstain from particular actions or to push them to pursue
new policies that favour the threatening party. Compliance with another’s threats and accompanying demands

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hinges, in part, on the likelihood of the actual implementation of the impending actions in the event of defi-
ance. The threats are seen to be more credible if the imminent attack appears to be well prepared for causing
real harm. Credibility also rests on the actor’s reputation for adhering to their own words with a show of deter-
mination (Patchen, 1988).

The cost of acting on a threat has to incorporate vulnerability to counteraction by the target. Even though the
United States has the military capability to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, the American government is less
inclined to employ force because of their vulnerability to destructive counterattacks. The price of actually car-
rying out the threatened military strikes needs to be compared to the cost of not doing so.

In response to coercive steps, the target party has multiple choices, ranging from unconditional or partial com-
pliance with the demand, ignorance by inaction to defiance with a counter-threat. The recipient of the threats
may choose to placate an adversary with an alternative reward, opt for conditional compliance in return for
the satisfaction of their own demand, or simply counter the other’s threat with their own. When the threatening
side is unlikely to accept any response short of unconditional and outright compliance, threats and counter-
threats can be further escalated as far as to war. Serbian rejection of the Austro-Hungarian empire’s key de-
mands, in the aftermath of the June 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, set a chain
effect into motion. The series of fast-moving events finally spiralled into World War I.

Compliance to demands under intimidation is more likely if the punishment is of high magnitude, if a low cost
for concession making is worthwhile evading the reprisal, and if other means are available by which to achieve
the goals to be abandoned. Power differentials make compliance inevitable in order to end the current pain
and to avert an imminent, even larger one. The target may choose to respond to low-level coercion, instead
of waiting for the infliction of much more severe retribution if the current loss is considered a less costly option
in the long run.

Threats, especially carrying excessive demands, can be a gamble if they push an adversary into a corner.
The target of deterrent threats is less likely to yield if it has to give up its vital needs without any alternative
routes to satisfaction. In particular, the appeal of compliance would not be great without the availability and
attractiveness of alternative options after the desertion of one’s objectives.

Resistance is likely to come from concerns relating to the precedent-setting effect of yielding under coercive
pressure. This anxiety increases if the issues at stake are repetitive in nature and so likely to be brought up
again. In addition, compliance under coercion is likely to be discouraged if what has to be conceded carries
value of a high magnitude.

The intrinsic costs originating from accepting the threat terms take account of a loss of reputation for being
firm as well as damage to status, self-esteem, and pride. The price of complying with a public threat can be
particularly difficult to absorb due to a loss of face. Such harm to one’s standing can result in the encourage-
ment of new demands and threats even from other adversaries fighting on different issues.

Giving in or making a concession might be taken to be evidence of general weakness for opponents who are
inclined to issue further challenges. The outcome of the current conflict can then set expectations about future
resolve. For instance, Germany adopted more assertive strategies and invaded Poland in September 1939,
after the Munich crisis of 1938 that ended with Hitler’s partial annexation of Czechoslovakia.

A target may defy the threat despite possible vengeance, or even send out a counter-threat as an attempt to
discourage the adversary from carrying out the original plan. Furthermore, pre-emptive action can be taken
against the warning party in order to neutralize their coercive capabilities. A high cost of compliance with the
threats and also the perceived illegitimacy of the attached demand are likely to augment a prospect for such
defiance. Since the counter-coercion needs to be backed up by necessary force, not every actor is capable
of forceful resistance or counter-retaliation.

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In general, threats are made under the assumption that the target will react rationally to make an objective
calculation of costs and benefits. The opponent’s response may, however, become unpredictable, with the
involvement of miscalculations, especially under the stress arising from having few options but highly destruc-
tive outcomes except capitulation. In this situation, policy making is more likely to be dictated by emotion than
rational considerations (Gordon and Arian, 2001). Even though a high level threat is successful in creating
fear, it fails to engender an attitude change. The magnitude of threats should, therefore, be adaptable to the
target of influence.

The nature of threats ought to differ according to the target’s strength and the odds of resistance. For exam-
ple, the US threats of trade sanctions against Iran would have a different leverage from those targeted toward
China. The threat of a sanction (for instance, the imposition of high tariffs) would be effective if the positive
incentives (the continuing benefit of trade relationships) exist for compliance with the demand (the protection
of property rights).

Behavioural, Psychological, and Organizational Dimensions

The situation of each conflict stage is configured by particular behavioural and psychological parameters. At
the same time, the perception of structural conditions by parties is likely to mirror changes in the dynamics of
conflict. The situational variables in antagonistic interactions elucidate the definitive effects of confrontational
actions. The mitigation of a conflict is typified by a transition from violent to non-violent strategies.

The patterns of interaction, associated with a particular conflict phase, impinge on certain psychological and
structural conditions. Behaviour is adjusted to various periods of perceptional change in relation to themselves
and the opposition. Adversarial behaviour is unlikely to be moderated in a meaningful manner if each contes-
tant desires to keep up coercive strategies with the goal of domination. Various types of action and strategies
can be accounted for by the intensity of a fight.

The different degrees of coercive power have an impact on choices of actions, thus altering the dynamics of
contest. Besides a value commitment to non-violence, the use of threat or the actual exercise of force be-
comes asymmetrical if there is imbalance in the capacity to reciprocate the other’s aggressive behaviour. In
asymmetrical situations, the stronger party is in a position to dictate its favoured settlement terms. While ex-
treme power inequality is likely to motivate the superior party not to make concessions, the worst escalation
is more likely to happen in the moderately unequal balance of power (Pruitt, 2005).

The imposition of a unilateral solution may be met with fierce resistance under normal circumstances, espe-
cially when the weaker party in possession of their own means of reprisal lacks alternatives for redress. The
more important the issue is, the more difficult it is for the parties to give up their struggle, even in disadvan-
tageous situations. Through persuasion, each party may attempt to convince the other to assent by arguing
that its desired goals can serve the interests and values of the other party. The loss of capacity and will to
continue to fight eventually leads to the contraction of goals.

The degree of power to impose one’s own will differs according to the types of issue in contention. Protag-
onists have diverse levels of ability to control agendas in different issue areas. The extent of asymmetry in
issue salience has an impact on each party’s decision on whether to fight. The achievement of a particular
goal is probably more critical to one side than the other. The other side’s coercion is more likely to be endured
with a greater will of resistance if vital interests are at stake, containing a high magnitude of grievance. The
pertinence of the issues in contention, embedded in a historic struggle, inspires a highly committed fight in
the longer time horizon.

The commitment to the exchange of coercive actions during escalation and stalemate is based on a balance
between a party’s ability to endure the costs and its perceived potential for victory. A weak party’s strong will

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and capacity to resist raise the cost to a more powerful party with the consequence of drawing out a strug-
gle. Dominant parties may refuse to change their positions unless they notice that the conflict cannot be won
without unbearably heavy costs.

Mounting costs test social, psychological, and military resilience in intense conflict situations. Each party has
a different degree of ability to absorb costs. The infliction of pain has a limited effect when the other side has
already anticipated some cost and has been prepared for that. If an adversary perceives pain to be an invest-
ment, the higher price to be paid for the sacrifice only strengthens their resolve. In such situations, therefore,
reversing the other’s decision through heavier coercive tactics is likely to be counterproductive.

Gross asymmetry in psychological and organizational resilience is contrasted with asymmetry in military pow-
er. In the 2006 war in Lebanon, Israel had far superior military power, but, despite a high-tech Israeli military
assault, Hezbollah demonstrated more resilience, in absorbing higher conflict costs than generally expected,
forcing Israel to retreat after its re-entry in southern Lebanon. In the 1991 Slovenian War, local, irregular mili-
tia groups had far superior morale, in contrast with that of their counterparts in the Yugoslav army. Without a
big stake in the fighting, many of the Yugoslav soldiers, composed of diverse ethnic groups, initially mistook
the military operation as an exercise. As a consequence of the lack of a clear direction or goal for the war, the
federal government easily gave up the war in ten days, granting independence to the breakaway republic.

The trajectory of a conflict’s intractability is shaped by the effects of grievances in psychological commitment
and mood as well as the level of incompatibility in the goals and methods adopted to dominate others. Psy-
chological changes at each stage of conflict can be explained in terms of not only perceptual variables but
also emotional intensity. A collective trauma results in the development of shared emotions such as fear and
hate. Indeed, deep feelings of animosity and rage contribute to destructive behaviour. In conflict mitigation, a
reduced level of enmity and hostility is necessary for the control of coercive action.

Not only social and psychological, but also organizational developments generate new conflict dynamics.
New perceptions, thoughts, and feelings of solidarity can emerge along with the development of new orga-
nizational culture. Group activities are adapted to the acquirement of new members, technologies and tasks
(McGrath and Argote, 2001). The strategies of conflict may count on the prevailing cultural and institutional
patterns as well as the capabilities of the adversaries. Organizational ability for a continued struggle is limited
by fatigue, derived from difficulties in the recruitment of new members and internal cleavages. The exhaustion
of organizational will and capacity saps the desire to pursue even a once sacred goal.

Organizational Behaviour

Parties with diverse sizes, membership structures, and goals have different organizational inclinations and
skills in adopting particular methods of struggle (Hogg, 2001). Resistance groups in civil war situations may
rely on economic sabotage, destruction of government installations and attacks on security forces. In con-
trast, many civic organizations are purely committed to strategies of non-violent mobilization with open, hori-
zontal communication structures. Greenpeace and other environmental advocacy groups have rallied a great
number of protesters in an effort to bring public attention to global warming and the loss of species. The Ti-
betan government in exile has remained committed to non-violence even though the Chinese government
killed several thousand peaceful protesters in 1957 and has continued to use highly coercive and repressive
tactics, including torture.

Broad-based non-violent movements can be contrasted with terrorist organizations, characterized by the tight,
cell-like leadership structure which carries out relentless violence against any enemy targets. A relatively
small group is more adapted to upholding violence as a strategy to challenge state authority, even though vi-
olent means do not enhance their cause. It is very difficult to negotiate with terrorist groups that refuse to give
up mostly destructive tactics, especially because their goal is illusive and is not amenable to compromise.

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Some organizations advocate violence as a means of taking a strategic advantage, or due to a lack of peace-
ful means by which to achieve their goals. Nonviolence and violence strategies have even been used by
the same organizations in diverse situations against different adversaries. While Hezbollah preferred guerrilla
warfare tactics against the Israeli troops, they have been restrained from armed tactics against their domestic
opponents. In March 2007, they set up tent towns in central Beirut as part of their sit-in protest to demand the
resignation of a pro-Western government, even controlling the temptation to retaliate against killing of their
members and other provocative actions by adversarial groups. This avoidance of violent tactics by Hezbollah
can be, in part, attributed to efforts to conserve their capabilities to fight with a much more onerous foe.

In principle, non-violent resistance has been used to change a dominant party’s behaviour by generating pub-
lic sympathy and support for the cause of the oppressed. In applying moral pressure on the dominant power
to recognize injustice, non-violent engagement counts on clear communication of intentions for persuasion
(Sharp, 1973). Non-cooperation and civil resistance are juxtaposed against violent, malignant strategies of
government oppression. Violence can be rejected on the grounds of a moral or religious principle.

Non-violence may also be a more practical means by which to overcome a physical power imbalance, in that
it can lower the costs of a struggle for a weaker party that is not adapted to militant strategies. Unfortunately,
however, non-violent struggle against the government’s continuing coercive tactics did not ease the degree
of suppression in Burma and China, though it has helped to inspire international support for the causes of
human rights and self-determination (Kriesberg, 1998). The success of non-armed, persuasion strategies is
contingent on the existence of a viable civil society as well as freedom of the press and reasonably well in-
formed public opinion. Noncoercive strategies can be more easily embraced in societies with relatively little
repression, and less government control over dissent and opposition groups.

Political and normative dimensions such as the quest for justice play an important role in conflict analysis to
the extent that moral opinions provide constraints on a powerful party’s ability for non-discriminatory destruc-
tion. A subordinate group yearning for justice may refuse to accept the status quo and continue to struggle
for the recognition of their moral cause. Escalation via non-violent struggles may take account of a strategy of
transforming asymmetric conflict for subordinate groups. The attitude of a dominant party may fluctuate under
the weight of moral and political costs brought about by sufficient external pressure.

Internal, External, and Contextual Variables

Not only internal but also external dynamics shift with the evolution of adversarial interaction. The overall
characteristics of conflict dynamics can be determined by any combination of 1) internal changes in the con-
tending parties, 2) the predicament in the inter-party relationship, and 3) an overarching context. Various com-
positions in the modification of these three components may either strengthen or weaken negative conflict
dynamics.

Intra-party changes such as the emergence of a new leadership may instigate an adjustment in inter-party dy-
namics. The effects of positive changes within a party can be constrained by a negative external environment.
For instance, efforts to bring stability to the Central African Republic have been hampered by the spill-over of
armed conflicts into neighbouring countries such as Sudan. Therefore, modifications in one component such
as intra-party level decision-making structure (considered favourable to de-escalation) can be negated by an
opposing movement toward escalatory directions made at an external level (Putnam, 1988).

Internal changes might take place in either one of the parties, or both. A negative attitude on one side may
have contagious effects on the other. The hawkish positions of one party resonate in the other’s switch to-
ward hard-line views. This relationship dynamic would, in turn, make it more difficult for conciliatory positions

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to be formed within each party. Moreover, forces external to the party may lay more road blocks across the
path toward settlement. The overall outcome of conflict dynamics hinges on how stabilizing and destabilizing
forces balance each other out.

If one party is ready for change, while the other is not, positive initiatives may be cancelled out or undercut by
adverse actions. If one party’s action toward intensification of conflict is stronger, the other party’s efforts to-
ward de-escalation are likely to be outbalanced. Overall, the nature of interaction between parties is featured
by communication patterns, content of messages, the level of incompatibilities in each other’s activities, and
the number of adversarial groups (Ellis, 2006).

External Influence

Conflict transformation might arise from adaptations in external dimensions as well as internal dynamics. In-
ternal support of escalatory moves can be mitigated by an opposite external effect towards the weakened
military capabilities of adversaries. On the contrary, an external environment, related to military and economic
support for war efforts, can further fuel the underlying force of self-perpetuating conflict spirals.

In a struggle with a dominant party, weaker parties may be empowered by both technical assistance and
moral encouragement. If external intervention on behalf of a weaker party is designed to redress asymmetric
power relations, it can compel a stronger party to cease escalatory tactics. External pressure on the parties
who refuse to negotiate will, however, be more effective if there are organizational or psychological changes
within each party such as a rising level of fatigue combined with deteriorating capabilities to fight.

The regional or international context has an impact on inter-group dynamics, for example, in civil wars. In
the Cold War period, many internal conflicts started off because of, or were aggravated by, the US adminis-
tration’s political and military backing of corrupt authoritarian governments or right-wing military dictatorships
worldwide from Chile and Guatemala to Zaire. In 1954, a CIA-organized covert operation toppled the democ-
ratically elected President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, who was known for being socialist in lean-
ing. The increasingly autocratic rule of the newly installed military government set off an armed insurrection
that turned into 36 years of civil war. In September 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger master-
minded the Chilean coup d’état that overthrew the democratically elected Marxist president of Chile, Salvador
Allende, whom the Nixon Administration feared supported the Soviet Union. The subsequent military dictator-
ship by General Augusto Pinochet instituted a brutal campaign against the leftist political parties, which led to
the execution of around 3,000 people, the incarceration of 27,000, and the torture of a great many others.

As is illustrated in the global war on terrorism, all factors (related to parties, goals, issues, scope, and domains
of conflict) are interrelated. Ethnic conflicts, combined with competition between radical and moderate Islamic
groups, began to draw US attention, because the extremist groups may become potential allies for al Qaeda
or other terrorist networks. The conflict in Somalia, ignored for the last ten years by external powers, now
has a new dimension as a result of US suspicions that the fall of Mogadishu to religiously oriented groups
might provide a breeding ground for terrorists. The Bush administration even militarily supported the Ethiopi-
an government’s invasion of Somalia, in January 2007, to nullify the military victory of the radical Islamists in
an effort to bring moderate groups back to the control of the country.

Many casualties in African civil wars were, in part, attributed to the availability of small arms flowing from
neighbouring countries that experienced internal violence (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004). Funding for internal
violence comes from the existence of international black markets that permit rebel forces to profit from the
illegal sales of timber, diamonds, and other minerals. The system of antagonistic inter-group relations is often
interlinked to external forces that have vested interests in prolonging the conflict rather than undercutting de-
structive dynamics.

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Inter-Group Dynamics

The rivalry between opposing blocs of protagonists has driven decades of conflict in Somalia, Burundi, Sudan,
and Nepal. In these and other divided countries, settlement has been hampered by the necessity to involve
multiple actors who are not necessarily representing broad constituents. In Nepal, the dissolution of the gov-
ernment by King Gyanendra in February 2005 and the imposition of a state of emergency united all of the
established opposition political parties and eventually contributed to his loss of traditional monarchical power
in April 2006. This helped Maoist guerrilla groups reach agreements with the coalition of various political par-
ties that began to run the government.

The fate of many ethnic and political conflicts rests on more than two parties which may form different al-
liances or complementary relationships on a united front against a common enemy. Opposing blocs may try
to take superiority or keep up with a balance in the power struggle by recruiting diverse new allies. In op-
posing one dominant group, all others may build a natural alliance simply for the sake of their survival. Many
opposition organizations may coalesce to develop joint forces in bringing down an authoritarian government.
In a civil protest against an autocratic state, varied political parties often work together with the single aim of
political change.

The rebel movements, composed of disparate, ethnic contingents, may build up a unitary force against the
existing political establishment, dominated by a single elite faction or ethnic group. But once the shared en-
emy is gone, fresh conflicts flourish among former allies. The major ethnic groups joined the Ethiopian Peo-
ple’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to topple the Mengistu regime. Since the government’s fall in
1991, the movements representing the region of Eritrea successfully sought independence in 1993, but the
1999 border clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea evolved into a year-long war. Meanwhile, the EPRDF was
battling with two major opponent blocs, many members of which used to operate under a broad umbrella of
the previous rebel movements. In particular, the opposition groups consisting of the Coalition for Unity and
Democracy and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces protested the denial of victory in the 2005 parlia-
mentary elections ascribed to the ruling party’s fraud.

Intra-Party Dynamics

External conflict either exacerbates or undermines internal dissension, depending on the existing level of
group loyalty among members. The means chosen in pursuing goals are generally adaptable to a group’s in-
ternal structure. In its struggle against the Serbian government, the Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, had
vastly different political ideologies, tactics and relationships with its constituents compared with those political
groups that advocated non-violence.

Internal party divisions often centre on who is genuinely representing the community. In-fighting creates an
obstacle to the negotiated solution of a larger conflict, but at the same time, a protracted intra-group struggle
erodes the will to fight external enemies, contributing to subsiding violence. There are always complicated
relationships between those engaged in armed struggles and those who seek political solutions.

Tamil guerrilla forces removed voices for compromise with the violent eradication of a moderate political lead-
ership (that shares the same ethnic constituent base), further aggravating the Sri Lankan conflict. In contrast,
the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), engaged in a bloody campaign against government institutions
and personnel, has lost wide support among the constituent population due to the success of moderate na-
tionalists in gaining concessions for regional autonomy from the Spanish government. In the Kosovo conflict,
the Albanian community has been politically represented by those who advocated non-military solutions, un-
dercutting the power of armed resistance groups heavily oriented toward intimidation tactics with an ethno-
nationalist ideology.

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The nature of a struggle has an impact on the group’s identity, morale, and self-respect as well as a general
level of material well-being. The degree of commitment to a conflict, and types of strategy and tactic select-
ed for the struggle can have lasting implications for group cohesion and values. The use of violence by op-
pressed groups is often ascribed to self-affirmation of their identity and esteem especially in a situation within
which non-violence is not feasible (Fanon, 2004).

The impact of a conflict on each contending party differs, depending on group structures such as the degree
of membership unity and the extent of centralized control. Each party has unique decision-making procedures

and rules related to power distributions and diverse methods of regulating internal divisions.2 Morale may
decrease, due to an unfavourable trend in the balance of power between parties, accompanied by a loss of
battles or international isolation. Low morale, following economic sanctions or destruction in war, sways the
mood of the rank and file, in tandem with the loss of confidence in the leadership, demanding an adjustment
of goals.

A struggle with outside enemies has unforeseen consequences within each society or group. The need to en-
gage in extreme struggles may effectively justify the expansion of hierarchical control. In addition, further cen-
tralization of decision-making power is frequently rationalized in such instances as a major socio-economic
crisis that has dire implications for survival. A group involved in a political, military battle with a much stronger
adversary calls for stronger membership commitment and blind loyalty. Militant or revolutionary forces en-
gaged in unconventional strategies necessitate a hierarchical, command system based on absolute obedi-
ence (Coser, 1964).

The image of a demonized opponent helps to submerge internal differences, in that group members believe
that internal divisions jeopardize the chances for their survival in the face of a vilified enemy. On the other
hand, an internal discord over strategies, in the absence of a unifying leadership, can be exposed and ag-
gravated in the midst of an uphill battle, eventually serving the demise of the group’s campaign. During the
Algerian civil war, for example, the split between the two main rival Islamist rebel groups, namely, the Islamic
Salvation Army and the Armed Islamic Group, in 1994, undercut their capacity to arrange an efficient cam-
paign against the military-run government, contributing to the struggle’s cessation by 2002.

Contrary to this, however, well coordinated insurgent groups demonstrate an ability to share information, tech-
niques, infrastructure sometimes with reorganization or more centralized management of their relationships.
After experiencing internal divisions with the creation of new splinter groups, in the Second Sudanese War,
13 opposition groups set up the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in June 1989. This was instigated by
the necessity to work out collective agendas and strategies against the newly established regime of Omar
Hassan al-Bashir who seized power in a military coup. In ending the civil war, the NDA successfully negoti-
ated with the government and signed a peace agreement in June 2005. Similarly, after almost two decades
of fighting, four principal left-wing guerrilla forces in the Guatemalan civil war were combined to establish the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982. This group conducted effective negotiations with
the government in 1995.

The ability to fend off the external pressures is reinforced by a strong sense of group loyalty. Identities play
an important role in the translation of grievances into mass sentiment as well as the formulation of goals and
methods. When the commitment to the cause is not strong, for instance, in the US wars in Vietnam and Iraq,
mounting costs, especially accumulated by unlimited war spending and human suffering, are likely to be an
important source of internal discord. In autocratic states, defeat or failure to fight effectively against external
enemies emboldens opposition, raising questions as to the legitimacy of oligarchic control.

Internal discord can be put aside again by revitalizing popularly accepted beliefs or myths. Any overt expres-
sion of dissent is accused of interfering with the pursuit of collective goals, being condemned by group mem-
bers. Pacifist opposition to a total war has been suppressed even in Western democratic societies. World-
renowned philosopher Bertrand Russell, for instance, was imprisoned for his pacifist activities against World

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War I in 1916. If continuing struggles rely on the recruitment of new members and volunteers, tolerance and
inclusiveness might be needed to expand a constituency base.

Besides members’ total conviction of their shared future, unity, discipline and loyalty cannot be insisted upon
or retained without a strong leadership capable of keeping the group together especially during the discour-
aging moments. The costs of maintaining coercive strategies, especially for a large population, are generally
unpopular if the sacrifice is made without the promise of a tangible reward, either psychological or material,
or if it exceeds what people originally estimated. Dissension is subdued by even such means as execution
to artificially craft support under an authoritarian leadership, but universal values or nationalist ideologies are
more emphasized in democratic relationships.

Internal Decision-Making Structure

Decision-making can be protracted with a more diverse input in the development of options. The influence of
individuals and groups in the course of a larger conflict can be undermined by decision-making procedures. In
fact, weak group cohesiveness, internal rivalry, and differences in intra-party belief systems may complicate
the development of official positions. In winding down the El Salvadoran civil war in the early 1990s, the UN
and external mediation yielded a successful result, in part, owing to a united negotiating position of opposition
guerrilla forces and their ability to impose internal discipline. On the other hand, ending a civil war was more
challenging in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, because of a loose coordination of multiple
rebel groups, their different interests, and a lack of self-control needed to abide by the agreements.

Intra-party decision-making structures become more complex in state bureaucratic institutions. State behav-
iour, in part, illustrates an outcome of a complex negotiation of policy-making organizations. The top lead-
ership may also have to consider the levels of economic strength, resource base, and popular support as
well as an appropriate type of fighting. The economic burden and rising casualties are borne disproportion-
ately within a group. Internal bargaining entails difficult balances among disperse factions, subsequently nail-
ing down common denominators in a variety of institutional interests. The existence of perceptive leadership
helps overcome political and personal differences that drive internal factions apart (Gerzon, 2006).

Leaders have a diverse set of relationships within their collective entity during the course of a conflict. The
types of relationship between the elite and constituencies, by and large, determine the extent of leadership
power to formulate group strategies and goals. The capacity to keep up escalation comes from internal sol-
idarity as well as a strong resource base. In addition, the leadership’s flexibility to explore better relations
with adversaries comes from success in the minimization of internal resistance and the preservation of trust
among key constituencies.

The low degree of internal unity and the existence of extreme or militant factions present the leadership with a
challenge to overcome factional divisions. Hawks are more likely to amplify internal divisions with their intim-
idating tactics against even other group members. The necessity for internal negotiations between the elite
and its followers, as well as between different factions, can protract the final settlement. Such crucial deci-
sions on ending or continuing a struggle may have to await not only the shifting balance between hawks and
doves but also the political leadership’s effectiveness in the persuasion of key constituents.

Notes

1 Reflecting on the public fear of nuclear war in November 1982, ten-year-old American Samantha Smith sent
a letter to the Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, pleading with him to work toward peace. Her visit to the Soviet
Union, in 1983, upon the invitation of Mr Andropov, served as one of the prominent incidents which helped
reverse a dangerously low point in US-Soviet relations.

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2 The course of external conflict can be affected by the outcome of internal power struggles. External negotia-
tion becomes more complicated if there is a challenge to the leadership with the ascending demand of radical
factions. The US pursuit of al Qaeda has become more tricky, for example, as related to Pakistani President
Musharraf’s wishes to avoid clashes with tribal group leaders in the lawless region of western Pakistan, where
terrorist suspects are believed to reside.

• arms race
• threats
• grievance
• Hezbollah
• military
• tactics
• dominant parties

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n7
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http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n7

Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis
A System of Conflict Dynamics

Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis

Escalation and

Entrapment

Contributors: By: Ho-Won Jeong

Book Title: Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis

Chapter Title: “Escalation and Entrapment”

Pub. Date: 2008

Access Date: May 18, 2020

Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd

City: London

Print ISBN: 9781412903097

Online ISBN: 9781446279366

DOI:

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n8

Print pages: 154-176

© 2008 SAGE Publications Ltd All Rights Reserved.

This PDF has been generated from SAGE Knowledge. Please note that the pagination of the online

version will vary from the pagination of the print book.

javascript:void(0);

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Escalation and Entrapment

Conflict escalation is noted for its rising levels of hostility, driven by the severity of the tactics. New patterns of
interaction are accompanied not only by the involvement of extra parties in the struggle, but also by changes
within each of the parties. An increase in the intensity of a conflict tends to bring about an expanded scope of
participation that engages more people. At the same time, conflict groups are further divided with de-individ-
ualization, due to adversarial socio-psychological processes and organizational developments in preparation
for an entrenched struggle. Enemy images, stereotypes, and lack of trust result in the destruction or loss of
important links of communication, both formal and informal.

The escalation of a conflict is associated with proliferation and generalization of the initial specific issue, the
polarization of relationships among parties, deep feelings and the personalization of the situation. The con-
tinued escalation reflects efforts to rally allies and the dehumanization of an enemy with hardening attitudes.
The value placed on winning substitutes a more pragmatic goal, along with the rise of hard-line leaders, curb-
ing the possibility of seeking alternatives. In a nutshell, the self-fulfilling expectations of contentious behaviour
are further fuelled by the development of enemy perceptions and decreased contact between the parties as
well as strained communication. This chapter examines the various characteristics and processes that are
related to conflict intensification and entrapment.

Dynamics of Escalation

The emergence of a number of contentious issues pushes the parties to move further apart, accentuating dif-
ferences and submerging similarities between them in order to justify a desire to inflict harm on one another.
The increased mistrust of enemy motives hinders an ability to sympathize with the other party and strength-
ens a tendency toward zero-sum calculations. Fixed assumptions about the conflict result in the distortion of
each party’s positions, even generating a strong sense of threat to a group’s central values. A disputed terri-
tory may have been perfectly divisible, but the fighting and its consequences attach symbolic meaning to the
contested land; denying it to the enemy becomes, in itself, a gratifying goal.

In a highly contentious struggle, issue proliferation produces new flashpoints along with the emergence of
obdurate positions. Narrow, specific complaints become universalized, with the development of antagonism
predicated on the denial of the other’s legitimate rights. The shift from a specific disagreement to general
group hostilities may shed light on hidden agendas that were previously considered taboo. The prohibition on
wearing a headscarf in French schools, for example, provoked a protest against the suppression of Islamic
culture; forced assimilation and intolerance of non-French ethnic traditions has resulted in the resurfacing of
discussion about French government policies, and mainstream society’s attitude toward African and Middle
Eastern minorities.

The enlargement of contentious issues is likely to highlight the competitive positions of opposing groups. A
widening conflict is inexorable in a clash involving multiple types of contestant over a broad set of issues aris-
ing from deep divisions of basic values or interests. When one adversary extends their list of demands, the
other may be willing to enlarge an opposing list of contentious issues. Even technical, mundane matters may
evolve into attacks on personal or group attributes, being framed as integral to collective identities and even
to the party’s own existence. Great symbolic significance can be attached to seemingly separate, minor inci-
dents of collision once there is a rising sense of grievance. Any harm caused by the imposition of sanctions is
attributed to the other’s strong desire for vengeance by the use of any means, even if the sanctions may have
been carefully introduced, with limited objectives, so as not to alienate the entire population of an adversarial
state.

The expansion of a conflict demands heightened personal commitment in conjunction with the devotion of
more resources to the fight with optimism. Conviction in the feasibility of total victory generates increased con-

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fidence about the achievement of desired objectives (Kriesberg, 1998). This is well illustrated by the euphoria
and surge of Arab nationalism, prior to the 1967 Six Day War, along with a call for sacrifice, exhibited in the
capitals of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Middle Eastern states.

Parties are unwilling to make concessions and take positions of non-compromise with high aspirations for
a victory across a wide range of issues. Embracing more assertive patterns of behaviour complicates the
original conflict that became expanded with the growth of issue complexity. Once the solidification of enemy
perceptions is tied to one’s own survival needs, ideologically or morally characterized struggles defy compro-
mise. The war on terrorism was monolithically defined by the US government in terms of a fight against ‘evil’,
leaving very little room for the analysis of the political and social causes that might be related to the US role
in the Middle East. Such positional rigidity is further strengthened if there are no efforts to properly interpret
an adversary’s motives.

A fight over an extended list of issues is more likely to solicit support from a wide spectrum of sympathizers
with the expansion of recruitment bases. Splinter groups might be formed to push their own agendas to the
fore. As people react to calls for outside support, a conflict gains new complexity through an increased num-
ber of partisans, each of whom is likely to have their own understandings of the original issues entrenched in
primary antagonism.

The creation of opposing camps in support of different protagonists enlarges the conflict with the addition of
new ally or patron-client relationships (Maoz, 2006). The tendency toward enlargement exerts pressure on
non-aligned parties in the periphery of the conflict to take sides, pulling more groups farther away from moder-
ate positions. Formerly neutral observers are increasingly more attuned to the polarized centres in a widening
conflict in which vying for external support becomes the latest game of competition.

There are diverse motives for the participation, ranging from shared interests with one of the protagonists and
a search for allies in their own conflicts (through links to other conflicts) to the evasion of future costs incurred
from non-involvement. The Pakistani government revealed that the US threat through informal channels of
‘bombing [its] country back to the Stone Age’ forced its participation in the US fight against the Taliban and al
Qaeda in Afghanistan despite domestic opposition.

A high level of polarization accompanies inadvertent escalation associated with very little trust or miscom-
munication (Anderson, 2004). The bifurcation of groups between ‘us’ and ‘them’ puts up psychological and
physical barriers that reduce interaction with the formation of negative images. Severe forms of violence wipe
out cross-cutting ties that used to link multiple sectors of society and sub-groupings across political, cultural
boundaries. In the aftermath of various terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and its proxies or sympathizers, the num-
ber of Arab professional visits, other travels and students studying in the United States has dramatically de-
clined, deepening social distance. Most significantly, inter-group polarization produces a synergy for in-group
solidarity with less tolerance of favourable or sympathetic views about a common enemy.

Thus polarized attitudes emerge, in part, from conformity to extreme in-group normative positions along with
the derogation of other groups (Cooper et al., 2001). A lack of interest in accommodation is reinforced by
such motives as seeking a sense of ‘justice’ and yearning for revenge as well as the expression of anger.
These sentiments are supported by the adoption of a militant ideology that rationalizes the high cost of fight-
ing adversaries as psychologically redeeming. In the patriotic post-9/11 era, any opposition to US military
campaigns in Afghanistan was ridiculed or was subject to ideological criticism, raising very little doubt about
extravagant government spending on ‘the war against terrorism’ despite the sacrifice of essential domestic,
social and economic necessities.

The projection of fear onto the opponent plays a critical role in rationalizing highly destructive, retaliatory tac-
tics in lieu of persuasive argument. Tenacious enemy images, rooted in the predominant public sentiment, are
exploited in the justification of a win-lose orientation. The contentious strategies prevail in anger and hatred,

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seeking costly, undesirable consequences for opponents and shutting the door for the promise of reasonable
discussion. A stronger party is inclined to bully antagonists into submission when their substantial power su-
periority would easily subdue the aspirations of the other.

The magnitude of value incompatibility is misapprehended in a switch from pursuing narrowly defined objec-
tives to an attempt to annihilate adversaries. The original aspirations are reinterpreted in the overall prefer-
ences of goal hierarchies, supporting agendas seen as integral to the protection of the group’s essential core
identities. The intense pursuit of uncompromising goals, combined with the use of threats and force, is pri-
marily responsible for destructive conflicts.

Psychological and Behavioural Aspects

Escalation is characterized by an increase in quantity, intensity and scope of coercive exchanges among pro-
tagonists. The perpetuation of a violent struggle invokes a ‘upward spiral’, comprising a cycle of attacks and
counter-attacks. The intensification of violence may proceed from a series of actions, ranging from the denial
of rewards to economic threats and boycotts prior to military moves. An increasing employment of deception
and pressure tactics becomes the main means of influencing an adversary in seeking an advantage. Even
greater coercion is advocated as the only way to curtail resistance from the other side.

A high level of escalation is advanced by a variety of socio-psychological processes such as misperception
which stimulates the distortion of the other side’s traits and motives. Fear anchored in the distrust of the oth-
er’s intent might encourage provocative actions that prompt escalatory moves. In general, any conciliatory
conduct by an adversary is inclined to be overlooked or, even if it is acknowledged, regarded as deceptive.
The amplification of negative stereotypes assists in depicting the opposition as menacing, invigorating the
belief that the enemy would completely violate one’s own rights (Abrams, 2005). These rising tensions cause
deformed patterns of communication with every message viewed through an antagonistic lens. Non-existence
of communication at the height of escalation begets dangerous conditions for misjudging the other’s inten-
tions and taking risky behaviour.

Negative emotions attached to a locked-in struggle encompass a subjective, ethical legitimization of violent
acts. An outlet for the mounting hostility depreciates the ability to empathize with the other’s needs. De-in-
dividualization of enemy group members, based on ethnocentric values and attitudes, spawns demeaning
behaviour, along with a display of superiority to outsiders. In particular, a moral disengagement rationalizes
harm to, or exploitation of, certain ‘kinds’ of people deemed to be an obstacle to one’s own prosperity. Harsh
measures are more easily taken with a feeling of contempt for opponents seen as inferior or evil.

In a long-term rivalry, the motivation to inflict physical and psychological injuries is ascribed to a profound
desire to seek revenge for one’s losses. The parties’ ability to envision alternatives is further constricted by a
breakdown of open and direct communication. This interruption of communication, in conjunction with a high
level of distrust, engenders the misrepresentation of factual matters. Damaging propaganda adds yet further
difficulties for blocking fruitful discussion about substantive issues. Most importantly, vicious escalation spirals
are stoked by malicious intentions, castigation and revenge.

Once a total commitment is made on the basis of the justification of previous investments, complete with-
drawal from even a failing course of action is not considered to be an option despite continuously rising costs.
With very little prospect for reaching settlement, an escalatory path of ever increasing commitments is built
over a longer time horizon, perpetuating a tendency to persist in the existing course of action. Independent
of its originating sources, each action represents a momentum of its own, while the original causes become
less relevant. Increasingly hateful confrontations are geared to hurt opponents rather than boosting one’s own
interests.

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A Malignant Interaction

A threat by one group spurs the other side’s counter-threat in a spiral of new coercion and defence. Every
escalation step taken by one party provokes the other’s defensive hostilities in the absence of any willingness
to compromise. Tensions exacerbated by unregulated responses push the upward-spiralling dynamics of a
more damaging conflict. In a malignant social process, retreat becomes more difficult, owing to vulnerability to
an unacceptable loss of pride and self-esteem. Self-amplifying action-reaction dynamics are founded on the
intentional or unintentional instigation of violent acts which become normalized patterns. Brutalized relations,
revealed in terrorism or total warfare, are based on the excessive means and extent of destruction without
any regard for an adversary’s welfare (Eckert and Willems, 2005).

At the initial stage of the second intifada, Palestinians were angered by the killings of a growing number of
children following gun battles between Israeli troops and Palestinians in September 2000. After Ariel Sharon’s
election as Prime Minister, Israelis launched F-16 warplanes against Palestinian targets for the first time in
May 2001. In the ensuing months of June and August, Islamic Jihad began its campaign, with the recruitment
of Palestinian suicide bombers. They blew up a disco in Tel Aviv, leaving more than twenty people dead and
more than sixty others injured. This was followed by another suicide attack on a crowded restaurant in the
heart of Jerusalem, claiming the lives of 15 people and injuries to about ninety others.

In the subsequent years, approximately ten more Palestinian suicide bomb attacks detonated buses in Haifa,
Jerusalem and Beersheba, a hotel event in Netanya, a social club in Rishon Letzion, a Haifa restaurant, and
a popular nightspot in Tel Aviv. The levels of casualties reached their highest between 2002 and 2004. The
Israelis reacted with an incursion into the Rafah refugee camp (causing at least forty Palestinian deaths), a
massive military assault on Jenin and other West Bank towns (even reaching Yasser Arafat’s Ramallah head-
quarters) as well as the assassination of Hamas leaders with missile strikes and aircraft bombs. In spite of
a seven-week truce in the summer of 2003, these attacks had lasted until a ceasefire between Israel and
Palestinian militants in February 2005.

Progressively destructive interactions, represented by strident rhetoric and assertive strategies, push each
side to expect a higher degree of coercive action by their opponents (McAdam et al., 2001). A rise in hostilities
might even be derived from the anticipation of an enemy’s fresh attacks. Higher levels and new types of of-
fence, exemplified by suicide bombs, missile strikes and assaults by F-15 fighters on residential areas, can
be introduced to alter expectations about future actions and outcomes. The permissible amount of force may
go beyond previous boundaries with direct attacks on an enemy’s top leadership (for instance, the Israeli mis-
sile strike against Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi in May 2004 and air strikes on the spiritual leader
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004). The indication of an expanded boundary for one party’s attacks signals
a heightened level of pressure on the other side to concede.

The retaliatory spirals driven by blame, anger, and vengeance intensify the desire of one party to hurt the oth-
er in response to actions that it finds offensive. The growth in negative stereotypes relaxes inhibitions against
the employment of harsh measures. The experiences of each party are justified by hostility originating from
past grievances or feelings of injustice in relation to the other’s atrocious acts. As perceived injustice exacer-
bates rage, the harm suffered becomes a lasting source to seek revenge.

The belligerent actions are reproduced with each round of exchanges in an upward spiralling driven by action-
reaction processes. In a mutually damaging interaction, a growing list of grievances is further expanded, while
each retaliation action stirs a new provocative action. In malign, escalatory spirals, therefore, every exchange
of contentious behaviour aggravates protagonists to step up their pressure. The retaliatory actions of one are
countered by the other’s coercive responses at even a higher level in a ‘tit-for-tat’ logic. The lower end of the
intensity scale, meanwhile, is elevated to an intolerable level with the replication of an enemy’s escalatory
moves.

This higher pressure, along with a growing perception of threat, arouses self-fulfilling expectations in which

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one’s worst suspicion is confirmed by the other’s behaviour via one’s own false beliefs (Bordens and Horowitz,
2002). False expectations and negative perceptions elicit the feared response to become reality as a conse-
quence of inflamed emotions. Once one’s initiatives are based on the anticipation of an antagonistic action,
this, in turn, evokes its actual realization. Thus self-fulfilling prophecies are materialized by the parties’ irra-
tional images of, and behaviour toward, each other, in the context of deadly confrontations.

Even if the intention of the initiator is proactive (for example, the construction of a 640-kilometre West Bank
barrier by the Israelis in 2002), actions may be seen as menacing by the opponent. The attribution of adver-
sarial behaviour to harmful intentions provokes further engagement in a hostile reaction. An excessive reac-
tion to a perceived threat is attributed to growing suspicion and mistrust in conjunction with the miscalculation
of an adversary’s likely move. A mutually destructive spiral is predestined for a highly competitive process
felt simultaneously by adversaries. In the mutually assured destruction (MAD) of competition for nuclear ar-
mament during the Cold War period, an adversary’s move was often regarded as an unacceptable peril with
concerns about humiliating defeat. Stereotyped enemy images and historical analogies further tighten a com-
mitment to absolute victory.

A Mode of Escalatory Spiral

In a linear arrangement, qualitative and quantitative changes occur in each repetitive pattern of interaction.
In an incremental escalation model, a spiral whirls upward in a step-by-step process, with roughly the same,
or similar rates, in each antagonistic response. Tension may rise over time through a chain of incidents, each
provoking a new level of hostility, eventually reaching a point of crisis. The endpoint of mutual escalation is
likely to be an exercise of physical force; a series of events can prompt one or both parties to determine the
outcome of contest by attack.

Research on foreign policy-making behaviour suggests that conflict is more likely to escalate into an intense
crisis level if it entails a threat to basic values, finite time to react, and a high likelihood of military hostilities
(Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000). After the establishment of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s, the
exchange of hostile rhetoric between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union (exhibited by the
‘evil empire’ and ‘a mad man’ respectively) drastically grew into a dangerous psychological warfare and a re-
newed arms race, despite mutual avoidance of military provocations. Fortunately, the psycho-political aspect
of the confrontation was not further escalated beyond the competitive military build-up and antagonistic emo-
tional responses.

The course of challenging and protecting the status quo can be featured by gradual escalation when each
party attempts to test the other’s strength and resolve with a series of increasing provocations. The unstable
competition for advantage, in general, ends up with uncontrollable violence without any steps taken to reverse
it. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and occupied a significant portion of land inhabited by the Greeks as a
final step to break through the continual standoff with which neither side to the conflict felt comfortable. The
invasion was set in the context of Turkish threats of military intervention in the mid-1960s to alter the political
landscape in favour of minority Turks on the island vis-à-vis the original Greek inhabitants.

Prior to the invasion, each clash further escalated the conflict, producing a higher level of political tension.
This coincided with a Turkish weapons shipment and aerial bombing as well as Athens’ support for hard line
Greek nationalists. The Turkish government used a coup orchestrated by Greek militants to depose Cyprus
President Makarios as a pretext to dramatically tip the territorial balance. The Turkish action created about
160,000–200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who comprised 82% of the population in the north.

By taking advantage of Greek inaction to the military provocation, the Turkish government was able to further
escalate the tension and imposed a new status quo desired by them. In the above case, ‘[t]ensions and vul-
nerability build up slowly, until they reach a critical point at which something snaps or some parties decide to

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force a break-through’. In this situation, a long and gradual onset contributes to the unfolding of a pattern of
critical incidents with a relatively abrupt termination after ‘the stage was set psychologically and politically for
a showdown’ (‘tHart and Boin, 2001: 32).

Escalation behaviour is not necessarily restricted to military actions or direct threats of their use (Hewitt,
2003). In the majority of international conflicts, severe political acts encompass antagonistic alliance forma-
tion, severance of communication, violation or abandonment of treaties, territorial claims, denial of political
legitimacy and diplomatic sanctions. One-sided escalation, imposed on an adversary, can be taken more se-
riously by virtue of either stronger verbal or physical acts even if the adversary might not have initially taken
the threat seriously.

A status quo is ultimately disrupted by the escalation of a non-violent, diplomatic mode of exchange to military
action. Even an escalatory ladder of war entails various types of threshold, ranging from demonstration at-
tacks on the interior zone and limited bombing against the infrastructure to increasing assault on the military.
Thus a constrained disarming attack and some other forms of controlled warfare may precede full military
attacks. A series of thresholds may be pushed further up the escalation curve, while each party is eager to
display its own capabilities for and commitment to entrenched battles.

In cautious bullying, adverse statements may escalate to shows of strength, military preparedness, and ma-
noeuvres before an ultimatum being accompanied by the employment of force. Intimidation tactics may not
necessarily be intended to move farther up escalatory steps and might have been prepared as part of a ‘car-
rot-and-stick’ strategy. Pre-threat is devised for probing to get a sense of the other’s strategy prior to the first
signal of threat along with initial steps toward escalation. Escalating threats culminate in the actual application
of destructive force at the end of assertive bullying.

The initial exchange of threats and low-level coercive actions can continue to grow in magnitude and pass
one or more salient points, finally crossing the border line of an all-out war. In fact, adversarial actions impli-
cated in a war might denote the failure of manipulating enemy psychology with a gradual escalation strategy
built initially into diplomatic pressure and warnings as well as a demonstration of strength. In the two US in-
vasions of Iraq in 1991 and 2003, the advance of military actions proceeded from diplomatic efforts to form a
coalition in support of American policy along with the psychological manoeuvres to scare Saddam Hussein.

As opposed to a progressive escalation of hostile exchanges, a spiral for the eruption of sudden hostilities
is embedded in a long-term rivalry. This is well demonstrated by the massive Israeli retaliatory air strikes
in Lebanon following Hezbollah’s abduction of three Israeli soldiers in summer 2006 as well as swift Israeli
bombings on Syrian targets of suspected nuclear laboratory sites in fall 2007. Unrestrained, emotional re-
actions to any provocations may slip into open warfare quickly without a regulation mechanism. In surprise
attacks, intentions of aggressive moves, exemplified by the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands, may not be
so clearly expressed. The Korean War of 1950–53 was also initiated without much of a warning signal. Even
though there were a series of antagonistic political and diplomatic moves, no one predicted the North’s major
military offence in a short time span.

Tensions are easily exacerbated by unregulated responses to surprise attacks. In many crisis situations, quick
military strikes are taken to catch enemies off guard. In a show of dramatic offensive moves, the higher end
of the intensity scale might be reached without much of a spiral process; adversaries may promptly mobilize
the highest destructive forces with great intensity.

A Crisis Mode of Escalation

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An engagement in intense hostile behaviour is often reinforced by a sense of crisis which stems from warn-
ings of acute danger requiring immediate reaction. In many escalation cases, the stakes unintentionally rise
to crisis levels, especially when each party does not fully assess the broader consequences of individual ac-
tions. In the lead-up to World War I, a series of events, escalated by antagonistic diplomatic manoeuvres and
the mobilization of coalition armies within a short time frame, rapidly got out of control.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 originated from the Pakistani troops’ attempt to infiltrate Indian Kashmir and
instigate local armed resistance. Initially it was planned as a quick military campaign to tilt the balance in the
disputed territory of Kashmir. After several skirmishes, India attacked Pakistan on multiple western fronts in
retaliation. This war started with the miscalculation of Pakistan’s leader General Ayub Khan to easily stir a re-
bellion in a region controlled by India. The Pakistani leadership underestimated the Indian military’s strength
after the latter’s loss in the 1962 war with China, and misconceived India’s will to fight.

The exacerbation of a high-stakes struggle into a crisis evolves from negative reactions to each other’s
threats. In a vicious spiral of escalation, each party justifies its action as defensive, while perceiving the other’s
action as offensive. Behaviour involved in such escalation situations as the Cuban Missile Crisis illuminates
the fact that the posturing of one side elicits similar behaviour from the opponent who is reluctant to show
weakness. Neither party is willing to make concessions, given that the mutual reinforcement of hostile expec-
tations involves higher stakes in the outcome of the struggle.

In the absence of caution, competitive risk taking, as part of manoeuvres for advantage, may evolve into a
spin-off escalation. Inflicted pain may have been designed to change the behaviour of the adversaries, but its
effects would be the reverse if the other side were to overreact out of fear. It is also ineffective if an adversary
has anticipated some cost and has been prepared to provide counter-threats.

In a crisis situation, an interaction pattern of contentious behaviour impels high emotional arousal with feelings
of anxiety and surprise (Brecher, 1998; Rosenthal et al., 2001). Intense stress and negative emotions stir a
chaotic interaction process. Quick escalation leaves limited time to act, developing a sense of urgency with
fewer creative, moderate options. In this situation, particular stages are dictated by the leader’s emotional re-
silience and bureaucratic decision-making styles. Urgency is often generated by public announcements of a
deadline or ultimatum. The short time span of conflict alters the quality of decisions by demanding swift action
with dire consequences.

Decision makers are usually uncertain as to the effects of particular actions within the crisis context marked
by a high level of instability. In general, great uncertainty is unavoidable in the absence of information about
the other actors’ intentions. An intense level of stress is produced by the elements of surprise, characteristic
of an unexpected event, in tandem with time constraints which prohibit full investigation of decision-making
choices (Robinson, 1996). Conflict behaviour in crisis conditions is consequently handicapped by fear, panic,
rage and other intense emotions. Being overwhelmed by extreme anxiety, decision makers are subject to re-
acting more erratically and dysfunctionally, being less concerned about the effects of reckless choices.

Irrevocable commitments tend to be made by narrowing options to force the other side to back down. When
one party has an ability to cause damage, aggressive policies serve as a means to subjugate an adversary to
put down resistance. A dangerous situation can be pushed to the verge of disaster after opponents depend
on brinkmanship for obtaining the most advantageous outcome. As a manoeuvre to press the opposing camp
into making concessions, each adversary attempts to fabricate an impression that they are not hesitant to
employ extreme methods. In some escalatory processes, thus, a willingness to risk precipitating a dead-end
battle by means of such acts as the issuance of ultimatum may be intentionally designed for false impression
of invincibility while putting unbearable pressure on an opponent.

Eagerness to back up threats is often displayed by a high level of provocative action. However, such inten-
tional shows of commitment further exacerbate volatile situations with an adversary’s inclination to adopt a

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similar strategy. Thus escalation may be an outcome of inadvertent steps that follow each party’s miscalcu-
lated moves (Lebow and Stein, 1994). Escalation to war is more likely to happen in instances of power parity
combined with mutually exclusive confidence in success. In a coercive interaction, the majority of communi-
cations is presumed to be threatening. As long as an adversary’s intent is not to go to an all-out war, each
party can reduce the potential for escalation by cooling down the other’s provocative actions with a restrained
response.

Escalation and Deterrence

In general, manipulation via threat tends to be a primitive method of controlling contentious social relation-
ships. As a matter of fact, adversarial interaction, especially in an international conflict, is more likely to be
managed by deterrence based on punishment capability and hostile intent. Threats and intimidation have long
comprised a major strategy for deterring others from taking antagonistic actions. The administration of threats
entails committing certain acts construed as detrimental to the adversaries.

In a stable deterrence system of checks and balances, the opponents may be discouraged from resorting to
violence, assuming the availability of information about each other’s objectives and intentions. A recognizable
risk of war can be deliberately created by displays of the will to deploy destructive forces. Being concerned
that an opponent would exploit any sign of weakness, however, protagonists are more earnest to exhibit
toughness to mobilize military force even to the point of risking mutually devastating destruction. A party may
even believe that inflexible, stringent positions are necessary to prohibit another’s aggression.

Escalation is an inescapable outcome of dysfunctional deterrence systems that favour the threat of equal or
superior force as a main tool of controlling the chances for potential aggression. The failure of deterrence
stimulates spiral dynamics, as exemplified by a war resulting from an arms race. A historical collapse in inter-
national deterrence is evident in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and German aggression against Poland
prior to World War II (Choucri, et al., 1992).

So long as the capability to ensure severe damage to the other is a basic premise of deterrence, mutual
threats are actually intensified once each side engages in certain prohibited actions beyond a permissible
boundary. In spite of serious warnings, Hitler believed and hoped that Britain and France would not organize
a military campaign to save Poland (van Evera, 1999). On the other hand, the allies felt that there would be
no limit on Hitler’s demand for endless concessions unless they stood up against Nazi Germany’s military oc-
cupation of Poland in 1939. The disastrous outcome is inexorable, as a mutual deterrence system unleashes,
instead of controlling, a high magnitude of destructive capability.

In a realpolitik approach, a threat to escalation continues to be part and parcel of deterrence mechanisms,
with a belief that the demonstration of a resolve to retaliate would successfully check an aggressor’s behav-
iour. Escalatory exchanges of sanctions are commonly associated with engagement in punitive actions. Neg-
ative intentions and attempts to inject fear in the other’s calculation bring threats and counter-threats to the
forefront of an adversarial relationship. Escalation may even have been designed as a move in strategic bar-
gaining that combines threats with offers to be made later (Schelling, 1960).

Threats intentionally made in crisis situations are, however, likely to produce more antagonistic reactions with
each round of hostile exchanges. Even the verbal expression of extreme acts may ultimately backfire, inviting
pre-emptive strikes when ostensibly well-calculated increases in threats end up provoking unintended desta-
bilizing incidents. In an intense conflict situation, limited escalatory activities are not likely to be interpreted
as a probe designed to seek local advantage. The actual exchange of punishments means the breakdown
of a deterrence system supposed to prevent destructive consequences through the fear of violence. If the
opponent is not discouraged from resorting to violence, deterrence systems are a sure avenue to conflict es-
calation (Morgan, 2005; Reiter, 2003).

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The danger of escalation strategies to deter the other’s action is attributed to psychological decision-making
characteristics. There is a tendency that threat or coercive acts harden the attitudes of an adversary in-
stead of yielding submission (Gordon and Arian, 2001). Regulating the adversaries’ behaviour through military
strength is not successful in inducing changes in the positions of determined adversaries for whom sacrifice
equals investment. The containment of antagonistic behaviour cannot be solely dependent upon creating the
fear of devastating fighting. The attempt to reverse the adversaries’ decision through inflicting pain may even
reinforce the enemy’s resolve. The resentment of an enemy who causes the suffering in the first place further
strengthens the positions of a hawkish leadership.

In more cautious actors’ calculations, escalated commitments must cease to thwart ever more costly out-
comes. It would be preferable to react rather cautiously to an adversary’s provocations (especially limited to
little damage) by avoiding the option of retaliation. In general, past setbacks in the same or similar clashes are
likely to be attributed to the development of a more guarded approach to subsequent escalation decisions.
But a high level of simmering grievances ascribed to earlier loss can lessen the fear of continuing loss. In
1973, the Egyptians and Syrians decided to begin another war with Israel, despite their military inferiority, in
order to regain self-respect and vindicate pride lost in the 1967 War.

Owing to its high price tag, a commitment to escalation as a means for achieving goals is not always based on
a rational calculation of obtaining a desired endpoint with minimal costs. If the other party is willing to display
destructive capabilities without any apprehension, tensions over minor issues may easily erupt into costly,
protracted battles.

Strategies for Controlled Escalation

In international politics, the exhibition of firmness has been advocated as a main strategy to confront a com-
petitive adversary seeking unilateral advantages. However, a clear demonstration of resistance against dom-
ination can be combined with efforts not to invite unintended risks by signalling one’s non-aggressive aims.
Threatening messages could be applied, with diverse degrees of intensity, in an attempt to change the behav-
iour of opponents. A high or low scale of severity in the prospective outcome has a dissimilar psychological
impact on the parties.

A sudden administration of sanctions is contrasted with small increments over an extended time period. Un-
expected escalatory moves leave less control over the development of events in the hands of the initiator as
well as the target, especially when the spiral dynamics are more difficult to manage. Independent of its initi-
ating rationale, each action may produce unpredicted consequences along with misjudgement of the target’s
intentions and probable responses. In the pre-World War I crisis, Austria wanted to punish Serbia without
inviting Russia to a brawl, but its move brought about a chain effect of escalation that led to the catastrophic
war, eventually involving Germany and France as well as Russia.

An escalatory mode of strategies can be adapted either to the higher or lower ends of the intensity scale,
depending on changes in each actor’s calculations and behaviour. One way in which to avoid uncontrolled
escalation is to take gradually punitive steps instead of introducing sudden provocative actions that catch the
other side off guard, making them react in panic with disproportionate means. Temporary tactical escalation
with restricted punitive measures might be waged to elicit the other’s concession without provoking a retalia-
tory spiral despite an element of pressure (Brzoska and Pearson, 1994).

In some instances, a warning shot could be undertaken to deter the other’s shift to aggressive strategies,
while leaving future options open. A lower level threat of punishment at the initial stage of escalation provides
more flexibility, given that it can be used merely to send a signal of further action. The intentions of the mes-
sages ought to be clearly declared, given the possibility that the adversaries may initiate new levels of hostile
moves in a reaction even to cautiously taken measures. The frequency and magnitude of coercive actions

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and counteractions might grow, but the process can be halted, and even be reversed, prior to explosion into
all-out conflict (Patchen, 1988).

The gradual escalation may be stabilized by hostile, yet predictable, patterns of interaction that are governed
by the implicit or explicit rules of the game. A controlled mode of escalation is more easily managed to avert
reaching a threshold for initiating a catastrophic spiral. In US-Cuba relations after the 1962 Missile Crisis,
the American government did not resort to military action, being content with the four decades’ old econom-
ic embargo. Despite its rhetoric and occasional emergence of contentious issues, the Castro government in
Havana largely held back provocative action that might raise any security concerns in Washington.

There are various types of condition that inhibit the increasing level of escalation. In general, stability is likely
to be fostered by the necessity to maintain strong social bonds as well as the fear of a dangerous escala-
tion. The need for contentious tactics is minimized by the existence of conflict management institutions and
forums that cultivate conciliatory norms. Broadly based interdependent relationships serve to buttress stability
instead of uncontrolled enmity. A short-term intensification of conflict is, however, more likely to happen in the
event of a power imbalance that generates perceptions of a quick victory. In addition, a lack of options, com-
bined with high expectations about a successful fight, encourages the parties to go for a more contentious
approach.

While adversaries have different choices about escalating their commitment, non-violent tactics are preferred
as a more viable means of confrontation in more stable relationships. The rules of a struggle can be trans-
formed by accepting institutionalized channels for protest. For tactical reasons, some struggles may transition
from violent fighting to non-violent confrontation and vice versa. During its four decades old campaign for in-
dependence, the Basque separatist movement ETA in Spain has occasionally switched its tactics to declare
the abandonment of terrorist attacks, with the emergence of a more liberal government, only to resume the
armed struggle later.

Entrapment

After a sustained period of escalation, a conflict may end up being trapped in a longer course of action that
is justified by an increased commitment to the pursuit of goals. A malign conflict spiral maintains high cost
struggles with no chance of either party backing away. Once the thresholds have been crossed for the inten-
sification of overt coercion and outright violence, a conflict is more likely to be entrenched. In a stalemate,
perpetually polarized and malignant processes are accepted as a normal and natural reality.

The Sri Lankan government has been locked in armed battles, over the last two decades, with Tamil guerrilla
forces, characterized by repeated territorial gains and losses. The conflict originally started with a protest
against the government’s exclusion of the minority language from an official status, leading to communal up-
risings by the Hindu Tamil minority in the late 1950s. Once the conflict turned into deadly military insurgencies
with the establishment of well-financed Tamil Tiger rebel forces and attacks on government troops in 1983,
the armed struggle has defied any logic of sensible compromise despite various attempts for external media-
tion.

The government is not willing to give into the rebels’ demand for an independent Tamil homeland in the north
and east, being undeterred by the death of more than 60,000 people and damage to the economy in one of
South Asia’s potentially prosperous societies. The exhaustive nature of internal warfare is well characterized
by the government campaign ‘war for peace’, being matched by guerrilla forces’ counter-offensive with the
atrocious killings of civilians and assassination of political and military elites. Even cease-fires and tentative
political agreements reached between the government and rebels in late 2002 easily faded away in an atmos-
phere of deep mistrust, only serving as an interval to re-charge armed strength. The entrapment has been
marked by a periodic switch between low intensity fighting and all-out war.

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Reflecting various characteristics of a war of attrition, a stalemate and impasse are typical conditions of en-
trapment. When increased demand levels by adversaries reach the limit of concessions, heightened resis-
tance to further compromise brings a deadlock (Faure, 2005). Neither side has been neutralized or destroyed
without losing the capability to fight completely. Bailing out of a costly war on baseless commitments is dif-
ficult due to too much investment. However, the main goals may not be obtainable despite all the dedicated
efforts. Frustration is attributed to the recognition of little prospect for a clear-cut victory, following the initial
underestimation of the other party’s capacity and determination to get involved in an entrenched struggle as
well as the inflated estimates of one’s own commitments.

Although it may belong to the end stage of escalation, entrapment is not necessarily part of an escalatory
spiral (Brockner and Rubin, 1985). Whereas each partisan may not be psychologically ready to escalate a
degree of commitment to fight further, adversaries may feel that their past struggle has been in vain if they do
not continue to devote themselves to a chosen course of action. If someone is absorbed in a certain cause,
then they are less likely to be concerned that their decision would increase the duration of being embroiled in
the impasse.

Being stuck in a particular type of hostile exchange, each party does not possess an ability to draw back and
assess the larger picture. Being too close to daily experiences and operations prohibits the development of
awareness about dysfunctional behavioural patterns. It is easy to underestimate an opponent’s will by over-
looking the propensity of one’s attacks to stiffen others’ resolve. In spite of short-term gains, longer conse-
quences can be harmful and damaging. In situations of entrapment, immediate gains are easily reversed by
future losses.

Irrational decisions continue to be made to conduct a violent struggle that has cost more than gains that one
still hopes to obtain (Pillar, 1990). Even though they are no longer winning, it is difficult for adversaries to give
up their original objectives. When the commitment is emotionally binding, each party is willing to tolerate costs
and risks beyond acceptable levels.

Although desires of winning a war may dwindle, a destructive spiral of conflict attains a momentum of its own.
As original causes behind antagonism become irrelevant to the persisting struggle, strategies shift from win-
ning to not losing by sustaining the status quo. Reversing a chosen policy, along with the admission of defi-
ciencies, is also difficult not only politically but also psychologically. The necessity to save face in the eyes of
others and look strong becomes a driving force behind sticking to the existing course of action. Decision mak-
ers are more anxious about leaving an impression of being co-opted with harm to their domestic influence.

Irrational decision making stays rooted, along with a non-revocable commitment to losing causes, even
though withdrawal presents a less perilous future. The benefit that may never be realized rationalizes the
expended costs. Likewise, the visions, fixated on victory, act to undervalue the anticipated expenses, while
exaggerating potential rewards. In addition, at this point, an increasing desire to damage an adversary over-
shadows the necessity to minimize one’s overall losses.

The deception of one’s own group members can be used to underestimate the extent of the sacrifice made
to achieve victory. Unforeseen difficulties arise from desertions by allies and an opponent’s stubbornness, but
defeats are frequently concealed as mere temporary setbacks from public views for the mobilization efforts.
Secrecy about losses hidden by a centralized leadership misleads the population or group members to be-
lieve that victory remains ‘just around the corner’. Information guarded in the absence of transparency assists
in disguising military setbacks occurring in remote areas, as happened to Japanese armies following Pacific
battles during World War II.

The motives of messengers conveying any bad news are often questioned in an internal deception that is
designed to hide weaknesses and boost morale. Ultimately, it can create an obstacle for ending armed hos-
tilities. Even though the Pakistani army absorbed heavier losses and casualties in its 1965 War than its In-

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dian counterpart, government reports had misguidedly glorified their military’s admirable performance. This
misinformation later provoked a backlash against an agreement on cease-fire and an initiative for mediated
settlement since the public did not see the cessation of hostilities as necessary in a winning war.

In the Iran-Iraq war waged in the 1980s, a history of miraculous victories and courageous acts of heroism
functioned as propaganda to distort objective reality and even the leaderships’ own subjective assessments
about the costs of suffering. Inaccurate historical records may shore up myths concerning the party’s own in-
vincibility (Blalock, 1989). Irrational decisions may be legitimized by ideological or some other standards that
are external to the conflict. A nationalist cause’s righteousness rooted in mythology contributes to the rational-
ization of one’s own claims over an adversary’s, fortifying a will to fight. The strength in the myth of invincibility
stems from ideological simplicity. The pursuit of an absolute goal, for example, based on unchallenging val-
ues, is less likely undermined by the perceptions of setbacks.

Self-Perpetuating Decision-Making Rules

A failing course of action in entrapment persists due to the need to justify previously chosen investments
(Brockner and Rubin, 1985). The expended resources are rationalized via the notion of ‘too much invested
to quit’ in conjunction with a strongly felt need to recover past expenditures. Emotional obsession is made to
validate irretrievable expenses, further expanding the gap between perceived and actual costs. It would sure-
ly be unthinkable to accept the accumulated sacrifices for nothing or an unworthy compromise. As is reflected
in the Bush administration’s policy towards the war in Iraq, a natural inertia reins in decision-making during
the entrapment stage, at which point continued obligations may reflect active support for bottomless spending
and troop deployments.

The determinants of entrapment include decision rules in which the degree of allegiance to the previously se-
lected course of action increases automatically without more conscious efforts towards its reversal. Reflecting
on an inevitable choice of a self-sustaining situation, the decision makers’ expectations about the likelihood
of goal attainment no longer influence views about continuing struggles. Future suffering may be considered
relatively bearable and trivial in comparison with past investment in a very costly conflict.

Since an escalated commitment is not ingrained in a calculation of the appropriateness of keeping up the
fight, the higher price becomes even more of a reason for carrying on the struggle. The increasing loss is
able to justify both psychological and political sacrifices only if it yields a bigger reward. Typical entrapment
decision making does not, however, consider the prospects for an optimal outcome. Actions are less moti-
vated by rational reasons with a deepening degree of emotional attachment to the fight. The strength of the
driving forces toward staying in entrapment is, in part, related to the degree of the desire to avoid the costs
associated with having given up one’s past investment.

The limitations on the number of decision choices in conflict entrapment are well illustrated by the ‘dollar auc-
tion’ game (Teger, 1980). The bidder’s calculation is dictated by the rules of the game, indicating that the
second highest bidder is obliged to pay the auctioneer the bidding amount for nothing in return. In the endless
bidding war, the two competitors attempt to outbid each other whenever either of them is put in the subordi-
nate situation. The second highest bidder is always entrapped in the dollar auction, due to the irretrievable
amount invested in the unobtainable goal. This dynamic is continuously escalating the bidding. It is difficult to
quit if the parties believe that the benefits of success and final victory are only garnered at the very end of the
process. The unbearable costs can be transformed into ‘investments’ only if there is a prospect for victory.

Sustainability of Entrapment

If the prolonged acceptance of costs is no longer legitimized or durable, any further devotion of resources

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to the goal, which is not likely to be achieved, can be interpreted as irretrievable. It is impractical to sustain
undesirable struggles indefinitely, under growing pessimism, in the midst of unexpected difficulties. The ne-
cessity of ending a risky game may arise as a result of changes in balance between the subjective value of
goal attainment and additional costs. When a substantial investment may not yield any valuable outcome,
policy makers eventually have to grapple with the evidence of mistakes being made (Iklé, 2005).

The price ultimately reaches a threshold for making continued personnel and material devotion no longer
bearable. The fatigue factor predominates, owing to difficulties in recruiting new members, declining logistical
support, or the increasing vulnerability of a large population to an adversary’s bombing campaign. The uneven
distribution of expense among group members increases a potential for internal divisions, hurting the ability to
fight effectively with enemies. The original belief systems, embedded at the time of conflict initiation, undergo
modification. The decision relating to the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 went through various adjust-
ments in response to political, emotional, and financial costs.

Overall, the resilience of each group’s cost absorption is affected by the level and nature of support that each
garners from its constituents and external allies. Difficulties in ending the struggle come from a refusal to
make concessions following long-term suffering. The continued reassessments of subsequent situations are
essential to acknowledging the initial underestimation of the total costs and the duration of conflict. The Soviet
retreat from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, for example, was seen as inevitable, owing to the invader’s weak-
ened ability and unwillingness to accept further absorption of massive expenses over a prolonged period of
time.

Internal Politics and Group Dynamics

The internal dynamics of a party, as affected by inter-group interaction, have an impact on conflict escalation
and entrapment. The elite has to manage a difficult domestic political landscape while simultaneously re-
sponding to an international crisis. Internal factors of escalation include the selection of militant leaders, the
ascendance of radical subgroups, the supremacy of extremist values or ideologies, and uncompromising or-
ganizational goals. In particular, the failure to effectively challenge a hard line faction is ascribed to intra-fac-
tional polarization among doves as well as the successful mobilization of partisan supporters in favour of
hawkish factions.

Factions that bear an uneven share of the burdens of continuing struggles are inclined to look for ways in
which to resist the prolonging of conflict. The patterns of gains and losses are directly connected to the morale
of different segments of the population. In an enduring conflict, those who carry the greatest costs and receive
the smallest benefits are likely to be the least powerful members.

Engagement in intense struggles with an external enemy becomes a safety valve for dissipating internal ten-
sions. Indeed, aggressive actions are encouraged by the depiction of the enemy as a grave threat. Intra-group
differences are often minimized in the midst of intense hostile inter-group exchanges. The efforts towards in-
ternal unity may focus on appealing to common goals against an external enemy. International conflict escala-
tion distracts attention away from an internal challenge, contributing to rallying support behind the incumbent
leadership.

However, it is difficult to keep unity upon facing an uphill battle which would eventually bring about a major
defeat. By invading the Falklands and entering a war with Britain in 1982, the repressive Argentinean military
junta was initially successful in diverting public attention from a devastating economic crisis and large-scale
civil unrest. When Argentina had to confront a humiliating defeat, public enthusiasm with the war quickly evap-
orated along with a deepened mistrust of the ruling military elite. Despite its attempt to stay on by toying with

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long-standing sentiments towards the islands, the Argentinean military dictatorship lost its grip on power.

While increasing cohesiveness within a group can perpetuate external conflict, threats from outside enemies
strengthen the control of coercive machinery by the authoritarian leadership. External threats are often utilized
as an opportunity to manage internal tensions, even increasing an ideological bond. When the leadership is
threatened or challenged by an immediate crisis, it takes more extreme actions to build a sense of solidarity,
which may, in turn, create a false perception of psychological security within the group. Especially, a con-
tentious interaction with an external enemy rationalizes extreme views within a group.

Relatively little in-group diversity tends to discourage raising any question about severe action especially in
combination with organizational developments that restrict control over extreme factions. The rapid escalation
of conflict can be more easily initiated and sustained by groups that have the strong cohesiveness. A lack
of internal diversity in opinions is ascribed to a demand for conformity to exclusive belief systems. Initiating
escalatory moves may depend on a strong consensus on the collective goals of defeating the enemy as well
as a high level of grievances. Group members are pressured to adopt a hostile out-group image and develop
a perception of an adversary’s destructive motives toward them. The validation of group values reinforces a
heightened commitment to the goal along with a stronger conviction in a victory.

Decision making, based on group solidarity, often promotes extreme choices by not permitting an opportunity
to discuss an alternative course of action. Little internal diversity produces a similar response to events in
drowning out dissident voices. The majority swamps a cautious, reasonable minority voice in seeking the ho-
mogeneity needed to concentrate on a fight with external adversaries. The fear of being labelled a ‘traitor’
also suppresses doubts, questions, and challenges about the legitimacy of contentious tactics. Meanwhile,
the dissemination of information by media arouses negative evaluations of outsiders and institutes hawkish
positions. Therefore, the intolerance of alternative views about the enemies, in part, ascribed to a lack of in-
ternal diversity, provides a basis for escalatory commitment to engage in more confrontational behaviour.

During escalation, changes in conflict orientation are likely to reflect the emergence of the militant leadership
and the replacement of doves by hawks. The nature of partisan support and organizational goals go through
dramatic alterations at different sub-stages of escalation. The new organizational objectives may help hawk-
ish factions surge to implement the goals of defeating enemies. Above all, hawkish factions may feel a threat
to their identity by accepting moderate positions. Mutual hostilities between factions may be directed toward
causing harm to each other. In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, extremist Hutus assaulted and even massacred
a number of moderate Hutus who did not join their violent campaign against the Tutsis.

In the Algerian civil war, two main guerrilla forces quickly emerged after the government intervened to cancel
elections for the purpose of blocking the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Party’s electoral victory in December
1991. The guerrillas initially targeted the army and police, but the insurgent movement began to diverge af-
ter some groups started attacking civilians. Eventually, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), drawing support from
the towns, declared a war on the FIS and its supporters when the imprisoned leadership of the FIS accepted
the government’s offer for negotiations in 1994. At that point, the other insurgent group, the Islamic Armed
Movement (MIA) based in the mountains, was re-aligned with various smaller groups to form the FIS-Loyalist
Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Not only in Algeria, but also in Burundi and other African civil wars, factional
differences often result in the restructuring of existing groups and the formation of new splinter groups that
face the same adversaries, but employ opposing strategies and have different constituent bases.

In leadership struggle, contentious tactics are advocated as if to prove loyalty to group norms. A militant fac-
tion does not want to look weak or submissive, and so may step up coercive activities. The strong hand of mil-
itants, completely devoid of interest in resolution, is visible in inhumane attitudes that ritualize violence without
any remorse. Such methods of brutality as beheadings, designed to impose maximum fear, have been adopt-
ed by radical insurgent groups in Iraq.

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The threat from militant rivals in a leadership struggle forces the moderate to take a harsh position in support
of escalation. The differences in decision making may not necessarily arise from the goals of, but from the
choice of means for, struggle. Maintaining a costly fight is likely to bring about an increase in the number of
hawkish members more committed to violent struggle. This change in the composition of a partisan group, or
a decision-making body, expands a support base for more radical factions.

The Impact of Group Radicalization

Various group membership characteristics re-define an intra-party political terrain in establishing relations with
outside groups. In discussion about different priorities relating to a war, the relative influence of military and
intelligence agencies fluctuates according to the degree of an emphasis on the necessity for coercive induce-
ments. In inner fighting, extremist groups seize upon an external tension as an opportunity to outrival their
moderate opponents with expanded resource bases and control over coercive institutions. In conducting their
campaign of violence against the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil guerrilla leadership rejected and annihilated
moderate Tamil politicians who sought a dialogue with the government via assassinations.

A widening conflict brings about structural changes in relation to group representation as a result of the real-
location of decision-making power and positions. A continuing fight gives more opportunities to those who are
predisposed to intense violence and who express the total dedication to an exclusive group value. In addition,
violent conflict presents militia group members with an opportunity for upward mobility especially in combat
operations and for different kinds of leadership roles that are not available during peacetime.

Consequently, militant subgroups have vested interests in violent conflict that creates a new status and mate-
rial compensation, even helping to develop a sense of new meaning for their lives. The incentives for uphold-
ing violent struggles are reinforced by the personalization of a group conflict that carries not only a new status
but also honour. Members of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Brothers in Solidarity in Egypt
have developed a high level of principle and dedication, even surrendering their personal well-being to group
causes. Especially for the underdogs, the martyr images, associated with suicide bombings and self-punitive
tactics, such as hunger strikes during imprisonment, glorify the group’s cause. At the height of their struggle
against the policies of Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, imprisoned Irish Republican
Army members chose to die from hunger strikes in 1981, further radicalizing their constituent base.

The widening participation of extremists generates rivalry between new and old militant groups over the radi-
calization of tactics adopted for total destruction of enemies with the creation of chaos. Numerous new splin-
ter groups have been created, in Iraq, to radicalize the methods of fighting in a total war against common
enemies, namely, the Iraqi government and US forces. With the formation of more groups, factional rivalry
naturally develops animosities inside the insurgency movement. By directing its attacks toward the general
population beyond Iraqi and US occupational forces, al Qaeda has further factionalized the civil war situation.
The attacks by al Qaeda on other Islamic insurgent groups have even resulted in collaboration between other
Sunni insurgents and the US occupation forces in western Iraq such as the Anja province.

The emergence of new radical groups and the prevalence of those in charge of a more intense means of
violence generate newly aroused will at the height of an escalation phase. Even when moderate groups may
have larger numbers of members, extremist groups can have a significant impact on conflict escalation with
the use of more severe tactics. The entire group’s goals can shift to the defeat and even annihilation of an
opponent, along with the social endorsement of aggression. Escalation is most likely to be sustained by the
rise of militant extremists in competition for leadership and their key decision making roles within a hawkish
organizational setting.

Polarizing attitudes of the extreme leadership, accompanied by a radical shift in the public mood and the
surge of militant groups, can catalyse counter-responses from the other party. The increased influence of a

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hawkish faction in one party gives the upper hand to the position of its counterpart on the adversarial side,
making intransigence become more entrenched. Fluctuation in the management of long-term tensions be-
tween Israel and Palestine is, in part, traced to the difficulties related to controlling radicalized groups such as
settlers, orthodox Jews and Islamic Jihad whose actions have often sparked off direct confrontation between
the two opposing communities.

• entrapment
• enemies
• deterrence
• military
• faction
• threats
• concession

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n8
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http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n8

Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis
Escalation and Entrapment