Management Assignement

Management – Decision Theory 

Euro Disneyland

In the Euro Disneyland case study (Attachment 1 Pdf), many of the issues Disney had from the start related to cultural challenges expanding into France. Using Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions as a point of reference, how would you make the following decisions using the Business Problem Solving Model in the course content?

1. Discover-Identify the problem: What were two of the three main issues described in the case that were problematic? 

2. Investigate-Gather information to define the problem: What were the cultural challenges posed by Disney’s expansion into France? 

3. Brainstorm-Produce Alternatives: In your opinion, how could Disney have resolved these issues? 

4. Implement-Put the best solution into effect: Of your alternatives, which one do you think would work out best? Why? 

5. Review-Assess the effects of the solution: Based on Disney’s experience, what are the lessons the company should have learned about how to deal with cultural issues when expanding? Describe each.

Instructions

· Be 6 pages in length, which does not include the title page, abstract, or required reference page, which is never a part of the content minimum requirements.

· Use APA (7th ed) style guidelines.

· Support your submission with course material concepts, principles, and theories from the textbook and at least two scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles. 

· Provide plagiarism report.

262

Despite the frustrations, Eisner was tirelessly upbeat
about the project. “Instant hits are things that go away
quickly, and things that grow slowly and are part of the
culture are what we look for,” he said. “What we created
in France is the biggest private investment in a foreign
country by an American company ever. And it’s gonna
pay off.”

In the Beginning
Disney’s story is the classic American rags-to-riches
story, which started in a small Kansas City advertising
office where Mickey was a real mouse prowling the
unknown Walt Disney floor. Originally, Mickey was
named Mortimer, until a dissenting Mrs. Disney stepped
in. How close Mickey was to Walt Disney is evidenced
by the fact that when filming, Disney himself dubbed the
mouse’s voice. Only in later films did Mickey get a dif-
ferent voice. Disney made many sacrifices to promote his
hero-mascot, including selling his first car, a beloved
Moon Cabriolet, and humiliating himself in front of Louis
B. Mayer. “Get that mouse off the screen!” was the movie
mogul’s reported response to the cartoon character. Then,
in 1955, Disney had the brainstorm of sending his movie
characters out into the “real” world to mix with their fans,
and he battled skeptics to build the very first Disneyland
in Anaheim, California.

When Disney died in 1966, the company went into
virtual suspended animation. Its last big hit of that era
was 1969’s The Love Bug, about a Volkswagen named
Herbie. Today, Disney executives trace the problem to a
tyrannical CEO named E. Cardon Walker, who ruled the
company from 1976 to 1983, and to his successor, Ronald
W. Miller. Walker was quick to ridicule underlings in pub-
lic and impervious to any point of view but his own. He
made decisions according to what he thought Walt would
have done. Executives clinched arguments by quoting
Walt like the Scriptures or Marx, and the company even-
tually supplied a little book of the founder’s sayings. Mak-
ing the wholesome family movies Walt would have wanted
formed a key article of Walker’s creed. For example, a
poster advertising the unremarkable Condorman featured
actress Barbara Carrera in a slit skirt. Walker had the slit
painted over. With this as the context, studio producers
ground out a thin stream of tired, formulaic movies that
fewer and fewer customers would pay to see. In mid-1983,
a similar low-horsepower approach to television production

On January 18, 1993,

Euro Disneyland

chair Robert
Fitzpatrick announced he would leave that post on April
12 to begin his own consulting company. Quitting his
position exactly one year after the grand opening of Euro
Disneyland, Fitzpatrick with his resignation removed U.S.
management from the helm of the French theme park and
resort.

Fitzpatrick’s position was taken by a Frenchman, Philippe
Bourguignon, who had been Euro Disneyland’s senior vice
president for real estate. Bourguignon, 45 years old, faced
a net loss of FFr 188 million for Euro Disneyland’s fiscal
year, which ended September 1992. Also, between April
and September 1992, only 29 percent of the park’s total
visitors were French. Expectations were that closer to half
of all visitors would be French.

It was hoped that the promotion of Philippe Bourgui-
gnon would have a public relations benefit for Euro
Disneyland—a project that had been a publicist’s night-
mare from the beginning. One of the low points was at a
news conference prior to the park’s opening when protest-
ers pelted Michael Eisner, CEO of the Walt Disney Com-
pany, with rotten eggs. Within the first year of operation,
Disney had to compromise its “squeaky clean” image and
lift the alcohol ban at the park. Wine is now served at all
major restaurants.

Euro Disneyland, 49 percent owned by Walt Disney
Company, Burbank, California, originally forecasted 11
million visitors in the first year of operation. In January
1993 it appeared attendance would be closer to 10 mil-
lion. In response, management temporarily slashed prices
at the park for local residents to FFr 150 ($27.27) from
FFr 225 ($40.91) for adults and to FFr 100 from FFr 150
for children in order to lure more French during the slow,
wet winter months. The company also reduced prices at
its restaurants and hotels, which registered occupancy
rates of just 37 percent.

Bourguignon also faced other problems, such as the
second phase of development at Euro Disneyland, which
was expected to start in September 1993. It was unclear
how the company planned to finance its FFr 8–10 billion
cost. The company had steadily drained its cash reserves
(FFr 1.9 billion in May 1993) while piling up debt (FFr
21 billion in May 1993). Euro Disneyland admitted that
it and the Walt Disney Company were “exploring poten-
tial sources of financing for Euro Disneyland.” The com-
pany was also talking to banks about restructuring its
debts.

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a

Euro Disneyland

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a Euro Disneyland 263

“I knew that would hang a ‘For Sale’ sign over the com-
pany,” said Gold.

By resigning, Roy pushed over the first of a train of
dominoes that ultimately led to the result he most desired.
The company was raided, almost dismantled, greenmailed,
raided again, and sued left and right. But it miraculously
emerged with a skilled new top management with big
plans for a bright future. Roy Disney proposed Michael
Eisner as the CEO, but the board came close to rejecting
Eisner in favor of an older, more buttoned-down candidate.
Gold stepped in and made an impassioned speech to the
directors. “You see guys like Eisner as a little crazy . . .
but every studio in this country has been run by crazies.
What do you think Walt Disney was? The guy was off
the goddamned wall. This is a creative institution. It needs
to be run by crazies again.”

Meanwhile Eisner and Wells staged an all-out lobbying
campaign, calling on every board member except two,
who were abroad, to explain their views about the com-
pany’s future. “What was most important,” said Eisner,
“was that they saw I did not come in a tutu, and that I
was a serious person, and I understood a P&L, and I knew
the investment analysts, and I read Fortune.”

In September 1984, Michael Eisner was appointed
CEO and Frank Wells became president. Jeffrey Katzen-
berg, the 33-year-old, maniacal production chief, followed
Fisher from Paramount Pictures. He took over Disney’s
movie and television studios. “The key,” said Eisner, “is
to start off with a great idea.”

Disneyland in Anaheim, California
For a long time, Walt Disney had been concerned about
the lack of family-type entertainment available for his two
daughters. The amusement parks he saw around him were
mostly filthy traveling carnivals. They were often unsafe
and allowed unruly conduct on the premises. Disney envi-
sioned a place where people from all over the world
would be able to go for clean and safe fun. His dream
came true on July 17, 1955, when the gates first opened
at Disneyland in Anaheim, California.

Disneyland strives to generate the perfect fantasy. But
magic does not simply happen. The place is a marvel of
modern technology. Literally dozens of computers, huge
banks of tape machines, film projectors, and electronic
controls lie behind the walls, beneath the floors, and
above the ceilings of dozens of rides and attractions. The
philosophy is that “Disneyland is the world’s biggest
stage, and the audience is right here on the stage,” said
Dick Hollinger, chief industrial engineer at Disneyland.
“It takes a tremendous amount of work to keep the stage
clean and working properly.”

Cleanliness is a primary concern. Before the park
opens at 8 a.m., the cleaning crew will have mopped,
hosed, and dried every sidewalk, street, floor, and counter.

led to CBS’s cancellation of the hour-long program The
Wonderful World of Disney, leaving the company without
a regular network show for the first time in
29 years. Like a reclusive hermit, the company lost touch
with the contemporary world.

Ron Miller’s brief reign was by contrast a model of
decentralization and delegation. Many attributed Miller’s
ascent to his marrying the boss’s daughter rather than to
any special gift. To shore Miller up, the board installed
Raymond L. Watson, former head of the Irvine Co., as
part-time chair. He quickly became full time.

Miller sensed the studio needed rejuvenation, and he
managed to produce the hit film Splash, featuring an
apparently (but not actually) bare-breasted mermaid,
under the newly devised Touchstone label. However, the
reluctance of freelance Hollywood talent to accommodate
Disney’s narrow range and stingy compensation often
kept his sound instincts from bearing fruit. “Card [Cardon
Walker] would listen but not hear,” said a former executive.
“Ron [Ron Miller] would listen but not act.”

Too many box office bombs contributed to a steady
erosion of profit. Profits of $135 million on revenues of
$915 million in 1980 dwindled to $93 million on revenues
of $1.3 billion in 1983. More alarmingly, revenues from
the company’s theme parks, about three-quarters of the
company’s total revenues, were showing signs of leveling
off. Disney’s stock slid from $84.375 a share to $48.75
between April 1983 and February 1984.

Through these years, Roy Disney Jr. simmered while
he watched the downfall of the national institution that his
uncle, Walt, and his father, Roy Disney Sr., had built. He
had long argued that the company’s constituent parts all
worked together to enhance each other. If movie and tele-
vision production weren’t revitalized, not only would that
source of revenue disappear, but the company and its
activities would also grow dim in the public eye. At the
same time, the stream of new ideas and characters that
kept people pouring into the parks and buying toys, books,
and records would dry up. Now his dire predictions were
coming true. His own personal shareholding had already
dropped from $96 million to $54 million. Walker’s treat-
ment of Ron Miller as the shining heir apparent and Roy
Disney as the idiot nephew helped drive Roy to quit as
Disney vice president in 1977 and to set up Shamrock
Holdings, a broadcasting and investment company.

In 1984, Roy teamed up with Stanley Gold, a tough-
talking lawyer and a brilliant strategist. Gold saw that the
falling stock price was bound to flush out a raider and
afford Roy Disney a chance to restore the company’s for-
tunes. They asked Frank Wells, vice chair of Warner
Bros., if he would take a top job in the company in the
event they offered it. Wells, a lawyer and a Rhodes
scholar, said yes. With that, Roy knew that what he would
hear in Disney’s boardroom would limit his freedom to
trade in its stock, so he quit the board on March 9, 1984.

264 Part 2 The Role of Culture

complexes: Future World, a series of pavilions designed to
show the technological advances of the next 25 years, and
World Showcase, a collection of foreign “villages.”

Tokyo Disneyland
It was Tokyo’s nastiest winter day in four years. Arctic
winds and 8 inches of snow lashed the city. Roads were
clogged and trains slowed down. But the bad weather
didn’t keep 13,200 hardy souls from Tokyo Disneyland.
Mikki Mausu, better known outside Japan as Mickey
Mouse, had taken the country by storm.

Located on a fringe of reclaimed shoreline in Urayasu
City on the outskirts of Tokyo, the park opened to the pub-
lic on April 15, 1983. In less than one year, over 10 million
people had passed through its gates, an attendance figure
that has been bettered every single year. On August 13,
1983, 93,000 people helped set a one-day attendance record
that easily eclipsed the old records established at the two
parent U.S. parks. Four years later, records again toppled
as the turnstiles clicked. The total this time: 111,500. By
1988, approximately 50 million people, or nearly half of
Japan’s population, had visited Tokyo Disneyland since its
opening. The steady cash flow pushed revenues for fiscal
year 1989 to $768 million, up 17 percent from 1988.

The 204-acre Tokyo Disneyland is owned and operated
by Oriental Land under license from the Walt Disney Co.
The 45-year contract gives Disney 10 percent of admis-
sions and 5 percent of food and merchandise sales, plus
licensing fees. Disney opted to take no equity in the proj-
ect and put no money down for construction. “I never had
the slightest doubt about the success of Disneyland in
Japan,” said Masatomo Takahashi, president of Oriental
Land Company. Oriental Land was so confident of the
success of Disney in Japan that it financed the park
entirely with debt, borrowing ¥180 billion ($1.5 billion at
February 1988 exchange rates). Takahashi added, “The
debt means nothing to me,” and with good reason. Accord-
ing to Fusahao Awata, who co-authored a book on Tokyo
Disneyland: “The Japanese yearn for [American culture].”

Soon after Tokyo Disneyland opened in April 1983,
five Shinto priests held a solemn dedication ceremony
near Cinderella’s castle. It is the only overtly Japanese
ritual seen so far in this sprawling theme park. What
visitors see is pure Americana. All signs are in English,
with only small katakana (a phonetic Japanese alphabet)
translations. Most of the food is American style, and the
attractions are cloned from Disney’s U.S. parks. Disney
also held firm on two fundamentals that strike the Japanese
as strange—no alcohol is allowed and no food may be
brought in from outside the park.

However, in Disney’s enthusiasm to make Tokyo a brick-
by-brick copy of Anaheim’s Magic Kingdom, there were a
few glitches. On opening day, the Tokyo park discovered
that almost 100 public telephones were placed too high for
Japanese guests to reach them comfortably. And many

More than 350 of the park’s 7,400 employees come on
duty at 1 a.m. to begin the daily cleanup routine. The
thousands of feet that walk through the park each day and
chewing gum do not mix; gum has always presented
major cleanup problems. The park’s janitors found long
ago that fire hoses with 90 pounds of water pressure
would not do the job. Now they use steam machines, razor
scrapers, and mops towed by Cushman scooters to literally
scour the streets and sidewalks daily.

It takes one person working a full eight-hour shift to
polish the brass on the Fantasyland merry-go-round. The
scrupulously manicured plantings throughout the park are
treated with growth-retarding hormones to keep the trees
and bushes from spreading beyond their assigned spaces
and destroying the carefully maintained five-eighths scale
modeling that is utilized in the park. The maintenance
supervisor of the Matterhorn bobsled ride personally walks
every foot of track and inspects every link of tow chain
every night, thus trusting his or her own eyes more than
the $2 million in safety equipment that is built into the ride.

Eisner himself pays obsessive attention to detail. Walk-
ing through Disneyland one Sunday afternoon, he peered
at the plastic leaves on the Swiss Family Robinson tree
house, noting that they periodically wear out and need to
be replaced leaf by leaf at a cost of $500,000. As his
family strolled through the park, he and his eldest son
Breck stooped to pick up the rare piece of litter that the
cleanup crew had somehow missed. This old-fashioned
dedication has paid off. Since opening day in 1955,
Disneyland has been a consistent moneymaker.

Disney World in Orlando, Florida
By the time Eisner arrived, Disney World in Orlando was
already on its way to becoming what it is today—the most
popular vacation destination in the United States. But the
company had neglected a rich niche in its business: hotels.
Disney’s three existing hotels, probably the most profit-
able in the United States, registered unheard-of occupancy
rates of 92 percent to 96 percent versus 66 percent for the
industry. Eisner promptly embarked on an ambitious
$1 billion hotel expansion plan. Two major hotels, Disney’s
Grand Floridian Beach Resort and Disney’s Caribbean
Beach Resort, were opened during 1987–89. Disney’s
Yacht Club and Beach Resort along with the Dolphin and
Swan Hotels, owned and operated by Tishman Realty &
Construction, Metropolitan Life Insurance, and Aoki Cor-
poration, opened during 1989–90. Adding 3,400 hotel
rooms and 250,000 square feet of convention space made
it the largest convention center east of the Mississippi.

In October 1982, Disney made a new addition to the
theme park—the Experimental Prototype Community of
Tomorrow, or EPCOT Center. E. Cardon Walker, then
president of the company, announced that EPCOT would
be a “permanent showcase, industrial park, and experimen-
tal housing center.” This new park consists of two large

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a Euro Disneyland 265

James B. Cora and his team of some 150 operations
experts did a little calculating and pointed out that it
would take 100,000 pigs to do the job. And then there
would be the smell . . .

The Japanese relented.
The Japanese were also uneasy about a rustic-looking

Westernland, Tokyo’s version of Frontierland. “The Japa-
nese like everything fresh and new when they put it in,”
said Cora. “They kept painting the wood and we kept
saying, ‘No, it’s got to look old.’” Finally the Disney crew
took the Japanese to Anaheim to give them a firsthand
look at the Old West.

Tokyo Disneyland opened just as the yen escalated in
value against the dollar, and the income level of the
Japanese registered a phenomenal improvement. During
this era of affluence, Tokyo Disneyland triggered an inter-
est in leisure. Its great success spurred the construction
of “leisurelands” throughout the country. This created an
increase in the Japanese people’s orientation toward
leisure. But demographics are the real key to Tokyo
Disneyland’s success. Thirty million Japanese live within
30 miles of the park. There are three times more than the
number of people in the same proximity to Anaheim’s
Disneyland. With the park proven such an unqualified hit,
and nearing capacity, Oriental Land and Disney mapped
out plans for a version of the Disney-MGM studio tour
next door. This time, Disney talked about taking a
50 percent stake in the project.

Building Euro Disneyland
On March 24, 1987, Michael Eisner and Jacques Chirac,
the French prime minister, signed a contract for the build-
ing of a Disney theme park at Marne-la-Vallee. Talks
between Disney and the French government had dragged
on for more than a year. At the signing, Robert Fitzpat-
rick, fluent in French, married to the former Sylvie
Blondet, and the recipient of two awards from the French
government, was introduced as the president of Euro
Disneyland. He was expected to be a key player in wooing

hungry customers found countertops above their reach at the
park’s snack stands.

“Everything we imported that worked in the United
States works here,” said Ronald D. Pogue, managing
director of Walt Disney Attractions Japan Ltd. “American
things like McDonald’s hamburgers and Kentucky Fried
Chicken are popular here with young people. We also
wanted visitors from Japan and Southeast Asia to feel they
were getting the real thing,” said Toshiharu Akiba, a staff
member of the Oriental Land publicity department.

Still, local sensibilities dictated a few changes. A Jap-
anese restaurant was added to please older patrons. The
Nautilus submarine is missing. More areas are covered
to protect against rain and snow. Lines for attractions had
to be redesigned so that people walking through the park
did not cross in front of patrons waiting to ride an attrac-
tion. “It’s very discourteous in Japan to have people cross
in front of somebody else,” explained James B. Cora,
managing director of operations for the Tokyo project.
The biggest differences between Japan and America have
come in slogans and ad copy. Although English is often
used, it’s “Japanized” English—the sort that would have
native speakers shaking their heads while the Japanese
nod happily in recognition. “Let’s Spring” was the motto
for one of their highly successful ad campaigns.

Pogue, visiting frequently from his base in California,
supervised seven resident American Disney managers
who work side by side with Japanese counterparts from
Oriental Land Co. to keep the park in tune with the Dis-
ney doctrine. American it may be, but Tokyo Disneyland
appeals to such deep-seated Japanese passions as cleanli-
ness, order, outstanding service, and technological wiz-
ardry. Japanese executives are impressed by Disney’s
detailed training manuals, which teach employees how to
make visitors feel like VIPs. Most worth emulating, say
the Japanese, is Disney’s ability to make even the lowliest
job seem glamorous. “They have changed the image of
dirty work,” said Hakuhodo Institute’s Sekizawa.

Disney Company did encounter a few unique cultural
problems when developing Tokyo Disneyland:

The problem: how to dispose of some 250 tons of trash that
would be generated weekly by Tokyo Disneyland visitors?
The standard Disney solution: trash compactors.
The Japanese proposal: pigs to eat the trash and be
slaughtered and sold at a profit.

Exhibit 1 How the Theme Parks Grew
1955 Disneyland
1966 Walt Disney’s death
1971 Walt Disney World in Orlando
1982 Epcot Center
1983 Tokyo Disneyland
1992 Euro Disneyland

Source: Stephen Koepp, “Do You Believe in Magic?” Time, April 25, 1988, pp. 66–73.

Exhibit 2 Investor’s Snapshot: The Walt Disney Company
(December 1989)

Sales (latest four quarters) $4.6 billion
Change from year earlier Up 33.6%
Net profit $703.3 million
Change Up 34.7%
Return on common stockholders’ equity 23.4%
Five-year average 20.3%
Stock price average (last 12 months) $60.50–$136.25
Recent share price $122.75
Price/Earnings Multiple 27
Total return to investor
(12 months to 11/3/89) 90.6%

Source: Fortune, December 4, 1989.

266 Part 2 The Role of Culture

40 percent foreign, with Disney taking 16.67 percent.
Euro Disneyland was expected to bring $600 million in
foreign investment into France each year.

As soon as the contract had been signed, individuals
and businesses began scurrying to somehow plug into the
Mickey Mouse money machine—all were hoping to ben-
efit from the American dream without leaving France. In
fact, one Paris daily, Liberation, actually sprouted mouse
ears over its front-page flag.

The $1.5 to $2 billion first-phase investment would
involve an amusement complex including hotels and res-
taurants, golf courses, and an aquatic park in addition to
a European version of the Magic Kingdom. The second
phase, scheduled to start after the gates opened in 1992,
called for the construction of a community around the
park, including a sports complex, technology park, confer-
ence center, theater, shopping mall, university campus,
villas, and condominiums. No price tag had been put on
the second phase, although it was expected to rival, if not
surpass, the first-phase investment. In November 1989,
Fitzpatrick announced that the Disney–MGM Studios,
Europe, would also open at Euro Disneyland in 1996,
resembling the enormously successful Disney–MGM Stu-
dios theme park at Disney World in Orlando. The new
studios would greatly enhance the Walt Disney Compa-
ny’s strategy of increasing its production of live action
and animated filmed entertainment in Europe for both the
European and world markets.

“The phone’s been ringing here ever since the
announcement,” said Marc Berthod of EpaMarne, the
government body that oversees the Marne-la-Vallee
region. “We’ve gotten calls from big companies as well
as small—everything from hotel chains to language inter-
preters all asking for details on Euro Disneyland. And the
individual mayors of the villages around here have been
swamped with calls from people looking for jobs,” he
added.

Euro Disneyland was expected to generate up to 28,000
jobs, providing a measure of relief for an area that had
suffered a 10 percent–plus unemployment rate for the pre-
vious year. It was also expected to light a fire under
France’s construction industry, which had been particularly
hard hit by France’s economic problems over the previous
year. Moreover, Euro Disneyland was expected to attract
many other investors to the depressed outskirts of Paris.
International Business Machines (IBM) and Banque
National de Paris were among those already building in
the area. In addition one of the new buildings going up
was a factory that would employ 400 outside workers to
wash the 50 tons of laundry expected to be generated per
day by Euro Disneyland’s 14,000 employees.

The impact of Euro Disneyland was also felt in the
real estate market. “Everyone who owns land around here
is holding on to it for the time being, at least until they
know what’s going to happen,” said Danny Theveno, a

support from the French establishment for the theme park.
As one analyst put it, Disney selected him to set up the
park because he is “more French than the French.”

Disney had been courted extensively by Spain and
France. The prime ministers of both countries ordered
their governments to lend Disney a hand in its quest for
a site. France set up a five-person team headed by Special
Advisor to Foreign Trade and Tourism Minister Edith
Cresson, and Spain’s negotiators included Ignacio Vasallo,
Director-General for the Promotion of Tourism. Disney
pummeled both governments with requests for detailed
information. “The only thing they haven’t asked us for is
the color of the tourists’ eyes,” moaned Vasallo.

The governments tried other enticements too. Spain
offered tax and labor incentives and possibly as much as
20,000 acres of land. The French package, although less
generous, included spending of $53 million to improve
highway access to the proposed site and perhaps speeding
up a $75 million subway project. For a long time, all that
smiling Disney officials would say was that Spain had
better weather while France had a better population base.

Officials explained that they picked France over Spain
because Marne-la-Vallee is advantageously close to one
of the world’s tourism capitals, while also being situated
within a day’s drive or train ride of some 30 million peo-
ple in France, Belgium, England, and Germany. Another
advantage mentioned was the availability of good trans-
portation. A train line that serves as part of the Paris
Metro subway system ran to Torcy, in the center of
Marne-la-Vallee, and the French government promised to
extend the line to the actual site of the park. The park
would also be served by A-4, a modern highway that runs
from Paris to the German border, as well as a freeway
that runs to Charles de Gaulle airport.

Once a letter of intent had been signed, sensing that
the French government was keen to not let the plan fail,
Disney held out for one concession after another. For
example, Disney negotiated for VAT (value-added tax) on
ticket sales to be cut from a normal 18.6 percent to
7 percent. A quarter of the investment in building the park
would come from subsidized loans. Additionally, any dis-
putes arising from the contract would be settled not in
French courts but by a special international panel of arbi-
trators. But Disney did have to agree to a clause in the
contract that would require it to respect and utilize French
culture in its themes.

The park was built on 4,460 acres of farmland in
Marne-la-Vallee, a rural corner of France 20 miles east of
Paris known mostly for sugar beets and Brie cheese.
Opening was planned for early 1992, and planners hoped
to attract some 10 million visitors a year. Approximately
$2.5 billion was needed to build the park, making it the
largest single foreign investment ever in France. A French
“pivot” company was formed to build the park with start-
ing capital of FFr 3 billion, split 60 percent French and

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a Euro Disneyland 267

problems to their countryside. Such a public relations pro-
gram was a rarity in France, where businesses make little
effort to establish good relations with local residents. Dis-
ney invited 400 local children to a birthday party for
Mickey Mouse, sent Mickey to area hospitals, and hosted
free trips to Disney World in Florida for dozens of local
officials and children.

“They’re experts at seduction, and they don’t hide the
fact that they’re trying to seduce you,” said Vincent Guar-
diola, an official with Banque Indosuez, one of the 17
banks wined and dined at Orlando and subsequently one
of the venture’s financial participants. “The French aren’t
used to this kind of public relations—it was unbeliev-
able.” Observers said that the goodwill efforts helped dis-
sipate initial objections to the project.

Financial Structuring at Euro Disneyland
Eisner was so keen on Euro Disneyland that Disney kept
a 49 percent stake in the project, while the remaining
51 percent of stock was distributed through the London,
Paris, and Brussels stock exchanges. Half the stock under
the offer was going to the French, 25 percent to the Eng-
lish, and the remainder distributed in the rest of the Euro-
pean community. The initial offer price of FFr 72 was
considerably higher than the pathfinder prospectus esti-
mate because the capacity of the park had been slightly
extended. Scarcity of stock was likely to push up the price,
which was expected to reach FFr 166 by opening day in
1992. This would give a compound return of 21 percent.

Walt Disney Company maintained management control
of the company. The U.S. company put up $160 million of
its own capital to fund the project, an investment that soared
in value to $2.4 billion after the popular stock offering in
Europe. French national and local authorities, by compari-
son, were providing about $800 million in low-interest loans
and poured at least that much again into infrastructure.

Other sources of funding were the park’s 12 corporate
sponsors, and Disney would pay them back in kind. The
“autopolis” ride, where kids ride cars, features coupes
emblazoned with the “Hot Wheels” logo. Mattel Inc.,
sponsor of the ride, was grateful for the boost to one of
its biggest toy lines.

The real payoff would begin once the park opened. The
Walt Disney Company would receive 10 percent of admis-
sion fees and 5 percent of food and merchandise revenue,
the same arrangement as in Japan. But in France, it would
also receive management fees, incentive fees, and 49 per-
cent of the profits.

A Saloman Brothers analyst estimated that the park
would pull in 3 to 4 million more visitors than the 11 mil-
lion the company expected in the first year. Other Wall
Street analysts cautioned that stock prices of both Walt
Disney Company and Euro Disney already contained all
the Euro optimism they could absorb. “Europeans visit

spokesperson for the town of Villiers on the western edge
of Marne-la-Vallee. Disney expected 11 million visitors
in the first year. The break-even point was estimated to
be between 7 and 8 million. One worry was that Euro
Disneyland would cannibalize the flow of European vis-
itors to Walt Disney World in Florida, but European
travel agents said that their customers were still eagerly
signing up for Florida, lured by the cheap dollar and the
promise of sunshine.

Protests of Cultural Imperialism
Disney faced French communists and intellectuals who
protested the building of Euro Disneyland. Ariane
Mnouchkine, a theater director, described it as a “cultural
Chernobyl.” “I wish with all my heart that the rebels
would set fire to Disneyland,” thundered a French intel-
lectual in the newspaper La Figaro. “Mickey Mouse,”
sniffed another, “is stifling individualism and transform-
ing children into consumers.” The theme park was damned
as an example of American “neoprovincialism.”

Farmers in the Marne-la-Vallee region posted protest
signs along the roadside featuring a mean-looking Mickey
Mouse and touting sentiments such as “Disney go home,”
“Stop the massacre,” and “Don’t gnaw away our national
wealth.” Farmers were upset partly because under the
terms of the contract, the French government would
expropriate the necessary land and sell it without profit
to the Euro Disneyland development company.

While local officials were sympathetic to the farmers’
position, they were unwilling to let their predicament inter-
fere with what some called “the deal of the century.” “For
many years these farmers have had the fortune to cultivate
what is considered some of the richest land in France,” said
Berthod. “Now they’ll have to find another occupation.”

Also less than enchanted about the prospect of a magic
kingdom rising among its midst was the communist-
dominated labor federation, the Confédération Générale du
Travail (CGT). Despite the job-creating potential of Euro
Disney, the CGT doubted its members would benefit. The
union had been fighting hard to stop the passage of a bill
that would give managers the right to establish flexible
hours for their workers. Flexible hours were believed to be
a prerequisite to the profitable operation of Euro
Disneyland, especially considering seasonal variations.

However, Disney proved to be relatively immune to the
anti-U.S. virus. In early 1985, one of the three state-
owned television networks signed a contract to broadcast
two hours of dubbed Disney programming every Saturday
evening. Soon after, Disney Channel became one of the
top-rated programs in France.

In 1987, the company launched an aggressive com-
munity relations program to calm the fears of politicians,
farmers, villagers, and even bankers that the project would
bring traffic congestion, noise, pollution, and other

268 Part 2 The Role of Culture

In Fantasyland, designers strived to avoid competing
with the nearby European reality of actual medieval towns,
cathedrals, and chateaux. While Disneyland’s castle is based
on Germany’s Neuschwanstein and Disney World’s is based
on a Loire Valley chateau, Euro Disney’s Le Château de la
Belle au Bois Dormant, as the French insisted Sleeping
Beauty be called, is more cartoonlike with stained glass
windows built by English craftspeople and depicting Disney
characters. Fanciful trees grow inside as well as a beanstalk.

The park is criss-crossed with covered walkways.
Eisner personally ordered the installation of 35 fireplaces
in hotels and restaurants. “People walk around Disney
World in Florida with humidity and temperatures in the
90s and they walk into an air-conditioned ride and say,
‘This is the greatest,’” said Eisner. “When it’s raining and
miserable, I hope they will walk into one of these lobbies
with the fireplace going and say the same thing.”

Children all over Europe were primed to consume.
Even one of the intellectuals who contributed to Le
Figaro’s Disney-bashing broadsheet was forced to admit
with resignation that his 10-year-old son “swears by
Michael Jackson.” At Euro Disneyland, under the name
“Captain EO,” Disney just so happened to have a Michael
Jackson attraction awaiting him.

Food Service and Accommodations
at Euro Disneyland
Disney expected to serve 15,000 to 17,000 meals per hour,
excluding snacks. Menus and service systems were devel-
oped so that they varied in both style and price. There is a
400-seat buffeteria, 6 table service restaurants, 12 counter
service units, 10 snack bars, 1 Discovery food court seating
850, 9 popcorn wagons, 15 ice-cream carts, 14 specialty
food carts, and 2 employee cafeterias. Restaurants were, in
fact, to be a showcase for American foods. The only excep-
tion to this is Fantasyland, which recreates European fables.
Here, food service will reflect the fable’s country of origin:
Pinocchio’s facility having German food; Cinderella’s,
French; Bella Notte’s, Italian; and so on.

Of course recipes were adapted for European tastes.
Because many Europeans don’t care much for very spicy
food, Tex-Mex recipes were toned down. A special coffee
blend had to be developed that would have universal
appeal. Hot dog carts would reflect the regionalism of
American tastes. There would be a ball park hot dog
(mild, steamed, a mixture of beef and pork), a New York
hot dog (all beef, and spicy), and a Chicago hot dog
(Vienna-style, similar to bratwurst).

Euro Disneyland has six theme hotels, which would offer
nearly 5,200 rooms on opening day; a campground (444
rental trailers and 181 camping sites); and single-family
homes on the periphery of the 27-hole golf course. Exhibit 4
provides an overview of the size, and main features of Euro
Disneyland. Exhibit 5 compares daily pass and accommoda-
tion prices of Euro Disneyland with Disney World Orlando.

Disney World in Florida as part of an ‘American experi-
ence,’” said Patrick P. Roper, marketing director of Alton
Towers, a successful British theme park near Manchester.
He doubted they would seek the suburbs of Paris as eagerly
as America and predicted attendance would trail Disney
projections. Exhibit 3 summarizes the history and major
milestones of Euro Disneyland.

The Layout of Euro Disneyland
Euro Disneyland is determinedly American in its theme.
There was an alcohol ban in the park despite the attitude
among the French that wine with a meal is a God-given
right. Designers presented a plan for a Main Street USA
based on scenes of America in the 1920s because research
indicated that Europeans loved the Prohibition era. Eisner
decreed that images of gangsters and speakeasies were too
negative. Though made more ornate and Victorian than Walt
Disney’s idealized Midwestern small town, Main Street
remained Main Street. Steamships leave from Main Street
through the Grand Canyon Diorama en route to Frontierland.

The familiar Disney Tomorrowland, with its dated
images of the space age, was jettisoned entirely. It was
replaced by a gleaming brass and wood complex called
Discoverland, which was based on themes of Jules Verne
and Leonardo da Vinci. Eisner ordered $8 or $10 million
in extras to the “Visionarium” exhibit, a 360-degree movie
about French culture that was required by the French in
their original contract. French and English are the official
languages at the park, and multilingual guides are available
to help Dutch, German, Spanish, and Italian visitors.

With the American Wild West being so frequently cap-
tured on film, Europeans have their own idea of what life
was like back then. Frontierland reinforces those images.
A runaway mine train takes guests through the canyons
and mines of Gold Rush country. There is a paddle-wheel
steamboat reminiscent of Mark Twain, Indian explorer
canoes, and a phantom manor from the Gold Rush days.

Exhibit 3 Chronology of the Euro Disneyland Deal
1984–85 Disney negotiates with Spain and France to cre-

ate a European theme park. Chooses France as
the site.

1987 Disney signs letter of intent with the French
government.

1988 Selects lead commercial bank lenders for the
senior portion of the project. Forms the Société
en Nom Collectif (SNC). Begins planning for the
equity offering of 51% of Euro Disneyland as
required in the letter of intent.

1989 European press and stock analysts visit Walt
Disney World in Orlando. Begin extensive news
and television campaign. Stock starts trading at
20–25 percent premium from the issue price.

Source: Geraldine E. Willigan, “The Value-Adding CFO: An Interview with Disney’s Gary
Wilson,” Harvard Business Review, January–February 1990, pp. 85–93.

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a Euro Disneyland 269

with the earring’s diameter no more than three-quarters of
an inch. Neither men nor women can wear more than one
ring on each hand. Further, women were required to wear
appropriate undergarments and only transparent panty
hose, not black or anything with fancy designs. Though a
daily bath was not specified in the rules, the applicant’s
video depicted a shower scene and informed applicants
that they were expected to show up for work “fresh and
clean each day.” Similar rules are in force at Disney’s three
other theme parks in the United States and Japan.

In the United States, some labor unions representing Dis-
ney employees have occasionally protested the company’s
strict appearance code, but with little success. French labor
unions began protesting when Disneyland opened its “casting
center” and invited applicants to “play the role of [their lives]”
and to take a “unique opportunity to marry work and magic.”
The CGT handed out leaflets in front of the center to warn
applicants of the appearance code, which they believed rep-
resented “an attack on individual liberty.” A more mainstream
union, the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail
(CFDT), appealed to the Labor Ministry to halt Disney’s vio-
lation of “human dignity.” French law prohibits employers
from restricting individual and collective liberties unless the
restrictions can be justified by the nature of the task to be
accomplished and are proportional to that end.

Degelmann, however, said that the company was “well
aware of the cultural differences” between the United
States and France and as a result had “toned down” the
wording in the original American version of the guidebook.
He pointed out that many companies, particularly airlines,
maintained appearance codes just as strict. “We happened
to put ours in writing,” he added. In any case, he said that
he knew of no one who had refused to take the job
because of the rules and that no more than
5 percent of the people showing up for interviews had
decided not to proceed after watching the video, which
also detailed transportation and salary.

Fitzpatrick also defended the dress code, although he
conceded that Disney might have been a little naive in
presenting things so directly. He added, “Only in France
is there still a communist party. There is not even one in
Russia any more. The ironic thing is that I could fill the
park with CGT requests for tickets.”

Another big challenge lay in getting the mostly French
“cast members,” as Disney calls its employees, to break
their ancient cultural aversions to smiling and being
consistently polite to park guests. The individualistic
French had to be molded into the squeaky-clean Disney
image. Rival theme parks in the area, loosely modeled on
the Disney system, had already encountered trouble keep-
ing smiles on the faces of the staff, who sometimes took
on the demeanor of subway ticket clerks.

The delicate matter of hiring French citizens as opposed
to other nationals was examined in the more than two-year-
long preagreement negotiations between the French govern-

Disney’s Strict Appearance Code
Antoine Guervil stood at his post in front of the l,000-
room Cheyenne Hotel at Euro Disneyland, practicing his
“Howdy!” When Guervil, a political refugee from Haiti,
said the word, it sounded more like “Audi.” Native French
speakers have trouble with the aspirated “h” sound in
words like “hay” and “Hank” and “howdy.” Guervil had
been given the job of wearing a cowboy costume and
booming a happy, welcoming howdy to guests as they
entered the Cheyenne, styled after a Western movie set.

“Audi,” said Guervil, the strain of linguistic effort
showing on his face. This was clearly a struggle. Unless
things got better, it was not hard to imagine objections
from Renault, the French car company that was one of the
corporate sponsors of the park. Picture the rage of a
French auto executive arriving with his or her family at
the Renault-sponsored Euro Disneyland, only to hear the
doorman of a Disney hotel advertising a German car.

Such were the problems Disney faced while hiring some
12,000 people to maintain and populate its Euro Disney-
land theme park. A handbook of detailed rules on accept-
able clothing, hairstyles, and jewelry, among other things,
embroiled the company in a legal and cultural dispute. Crit-
ics asked how the brash Americans could be so insensitive
to French culture, individualism, and privacy. Disney offi-
cials insisted that a ruling that barred them from imposing
a squeaky-clean employment standard could threaten the
image and long-term success of the park.

“For us, the appearance code has a real effect from a
product identification standpoint,” said Thor Degelmann,
vice president for human resources for Euro Disneyland.
“Without it we wouldn’t be presenting the Disney product
that people would be expecting.”

The rules, spelled out in a video presentation and
detailed in a guide handbook, went beyond height and
weight standards. They required men’s hair to be cut above
the collar and ears with no beards or mustaches. Any tat-
toos must be covered. Women must keep their hair in one
“natural color” with no frosting or streaking, and they may
make only limited use of makeup like mascara. False eye-
lashes, eyeliners, and eye pencil were completely off lim-
its. Fingernails can’t pass the end of the fingers. As for
jewelry, women can wear only one earring in each ear,

Exhibit 4 The Euro Disneyland Resort
5,000 acres in size
30 attractions
12,000 employees
6 hotels (with 5,184 rooms)
10 theme restaurants
414 cabins
181 camping sites

Source: Roger Cohen, “Threat of Strikes in Euro Disney Debut,” New York Times, April
10, 1992, p. 20.

270 Part 2 The Role of Culture

below 25,000, less than half the park’s capacity and way
below expectations. Many people may have heeded the
advice to stay home or, more likely, were deterred by a
one-day strike that cut the direct rail link to Euro Disney-
land from the center of Paris. Queues for the main rides,
such as Pirates of the Caribbean and Big Thunder Moun-
tain railroad, were averaging around 15 minutes less than
on an ordinary day at Disney World, Florida.

Disney executives put on a brave face, claiming that
attendance was better than at first days for other Disney
theme parks in Florida, California, and Japan. However,
there was no disguising the fact that after spending thou-
sands of dollars on the preopening celebrations, Euro Dis-
ney would have appreciated some impressively long
traffic jams on the auto route.

Other Operating Problems
When the French government changed hands in 1986, work
ground to a halt, as the negotiator appointed by the Conser-
vative government threw out much of the groundwork pre-
pared by his Socialist predecessor. The legalistic approach
taken by the Americans also bogged down talks, as it meant
planning ahead for every conceivable contingency. At the
same time, right-wing groups who saw the park as an inva-
sion of “chewing-gum jobs” and U.S. pop culture also
fought hard for a greater “local cultural context.”

On opening day, English visitors found the French
reluctant to play the game of queuing. “The French seem
to think that if God had meant them to queue, He wouldn’t
have given them elbows,” they commented. Different cul-
tures have different definitions of personal space, and
Disney guests faced problems of people getting too close
or pressing around those who left too much space between
themselves and the person in front.

Disney placed its first ads for work bids in English,
leaving small- and medium-sized French firms feeling like
foreigners in their own land. Eventually, Disney set up a
data bank with information on over 20,000 French and
European firms looking for work, and the local Chamber
of Commerce developed a video text information bank
with Disney that small- and medium-sized companies

ment and Disney. The final agreement called for Disney to
make a maximum effort to tap into the local labor market.
At the same time, it was understood that for Euro Disneyland
to work, its staff must mirror the multicountry makeup of
its guests. “Casting centers” were set up in Paris, London,
Amsterdam, and Frankfurt. “We are concentrating on the
local labor market, but we are also looking for workers who
are German, English, Italian, Spanish, or other nationalities
and who have good communication skills, are outgoing,
speak two European languages—French plus one other—
and like being around people,” said Degelmann.

Stephane Baudet, a 28-year-old trumpet player from
Paris, refused to audition for a job in a Disney brass band
when he learned he would have to cut his ponytail. “Some
people will turn themselves into a pumpkin to work at
Euro Disneyland,” he said. “But not me.”

Opening Day at Euro Disneyland
A few days before the grand opening of Euro Disneyland,
hundreds of French visitors were invited to a preopening
party. They gazed perplexed at what was placed before
them. It was a heaping plate of spare ribs. The visitors
were at the Buffalo Bill Wild West Show, a cavernous
theater featuring a panoply of “Le Far West,” including 20
imported buffaloes. And Disney deliberately didn’t provide
silverware. “There was a moment of consternation,” recalls
Fitzpatrick. “Then they just kind of said, ‘The hell with
it,’ and dug in.” There was one problem. The guests
couldn’t master the art of gnawing ribs and applauding at
the same time. So Disney planned to provide more napkins
and teach visitors to stamp with their feet.

On April 12, 1992, the opening day of Euro Disney-
land, France-Soir enthusiastically predicted Disney
dementia. “Mickey! It’s Madness” read its front-page
headline, warning of chaos on the roads and suggesting
that people might have to be turned away. A French gov-
ernment survey indicated that half a million might turn
up with 90,000 cars trying to get in. French radio warned
traffic to avoid the area.

By lunchtime on opening day, the Euro Disneyland car
park was less than half full, suggesting an attendance of

Exhibit 5 What Price Mickey?
Euro Disneyland Disney World, Orlando

Peak Season Hotel Rates

4-person room $97–$345 $104–$455

Campground Space

$48 $30–$49
One-Day Pass

Children $26 $26

Adults $40 33

Source: BusinessWeek, March 30, 1992.

In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a Euro Disneyland 271

thought about these and other problems, the previous
year’s losses and the prospect of losses again in the cur-
rent year, with their negative impact on the company’s
stock price, weighed heavily on his mind.

Questions for Review
1. Using Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions as a

point of reference, what are some of the main cul-
tural differences between the United States and
France?

2. In what way has Trompenaars’s research helped
explain cultural differences between the United
States and France?

3. In managing its Euro Disneyland operations, what
are three mistakes that the company made? Explain.

4. Based on its experience, what are three lessons the
company should have learned about how to deal
with diversity? Describe each.

Source: This case was prepared by Research Assistant Sonali Krishna under the direc-
tion of Professors J. Stewart Black and Hal B. Gregersen as the basis for class discus-
sion. It is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective managerial capability
or administrative responsibility. J. S. Black, and H. B. Gregersen, “EuroDisneyland,” in
Cases in International Organizational Behavior, ed. G. Oddou and M. Mendenhall
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). Copyright © 1998 by J. Stewart Black and
Hal B. Gregersen. All rights reserved. Used with permission.

through France and Europe would be able to tap into. “The
work will come, but many local companies have got to
learn that they don’t simply have the right to a chunk of
work without competing,” said a chamber official.

Efforts were made to ensure that sooner, rather than
later, European nationals take over the day-to-day running
of the park. Although there were only 23 U.S. expatriates
among the employees, they controlled the show and held
most of the top jobs. Each senior manager had the task
of choosing his or her European successor.

Disney was also forced to bail out 40 subcontractors
who were working for the Gabot-Eremco construction
contracting group, which had been unable to honor all of
its commitments. Some of the subcontractors said they
faced bankruptcy if they were not paid for their work on
Euro Disneyland. A Disney spokesperson said that the
payments would be less than $20.3 million and the com-
pany had already paid Gabot-Eremco for work on the
park. Gabot-Eremco and 15 other main contractors
demanded $157 million in additional fees from Disney for
work that they said was added to the project after the
initial contracts were signed. Disney rejected the claim
and sought government intervention. Disney said that
under no circumstances would it pay Gabot-Eremco and
accused its officers of incompetence. As Bourguignon

A Further Look at Euro Disneyland in
Recent Years:
As discussed in In-Depth Integrative Case 2.1a, Euro
Disneyland faced major hurdles in its early years. In
May 1992, roughly 25 percent of Euro Disney’s work-
force (approximately 3,000 people) resigned from their
jobs citing unacceptable working conditions. As a
result, the Euro Disney Company stock price declined
and Euro Disney announced an expected net loss in its
first year of operation of approximately 300 million
French francs in July of 1992.1 Since then, Euro Dis-
neyland has enacted some major changes—many with
great success.
In an effort to improve attendance, Disney began
serving alcoholic beverages with meals inside the Euro
Disneyland Park in June of 1993.2 In March of 1994,
Disney offered the banks a deal: Disney would provide
additional capital to ensure that it continues to operate
if the banks agreed to restructure the US$1 billion of
debt. If the banks did not agree, Disney was prepared
to close the park and default on the loans. Disney put
additional pressure on the banks by publicly announc-
ing the possible closure of the park unless the debt was
restructured. The banks agreed to Disney’s demands
and wrote off the next two years of interest payments
along with a three-year period where loan repayments

would be postponed. In return, The Walt Disney Com-
pany agreed to restructure its own loan arrangements
at the new park valued at US$210 million.3

A turnaround began to blossom shortly after restruc-
turing. In 1995, Disney reported that attendance had
increased 21 percent from 8.8 million to 10.7 million
year over year with hotel occupancy also increasing
from 60 percent to 68.5 percent.4 The Euro Disney
Resort was renamed to Disneyland Paris in 1994 and,
in July of 1995, the company reported its first quarterly
profit of US$35.3 million. Disneyland Paris ended 1995
with a profit of US$22.8 million. Disney opened a sec-
ond theme park in France, Walt Disney Studios Park, in
March of 2002.5 The two combined parks had a total
attendance in 2015 of over 14.8 million, making it
Europe’s most visited themed attraction.6

In January 2015, Euro Disney S.C.A. shareholders
approved a one billion euro recapitalization plan.
Funded by the Walt Disney Company, the plan aims to
improve the long-term cash position of Disneyland Paris,
putting an end to the reoccurring debt crises that have
plagued Euro Disney S.C.A. over its two-decade history.
Per the terms of the deal, the existing debt held by Walt
Disney Company will be converted to equity, further
increasing the American company’s investment in the
European operations.7

272 Part 2 The Role of Culture

1. Anna Willard, James Mackenzie, James Grubel,
Wayne Cole, Tova Cohen, Alan Raybould, and Jon-
athan Thatcher. “FACTBOX: Who’s Next? Coun-
tries at Risk of Recession,”  Reuters,  March 3,
2009,  www.reuters.com/article/financial-recession-
risk-idUSSP40009620090304.

2. “Euro Disney Adding Alcohol,”  New York Times,
June 12, 1993,  www.nytimes.com/1993/06/12/
business/euro-disney-adding-alcohol.html.

3. “The History of DisneyLand Paris,”  Solarius, July 4,
2006.  www.solarius.com/dvp/dlp/dlp-history.htm.

4. Christian Sylt, “Magic Results: Euro Disney Plans
New Hotels,” August 17, 2008,  www.independent.
co.uk/news/business/news/magic-results-euro-disney-
plans-new-hotels-899529.html.

5. Euro Disney S.C.A., “Euro Disney S.C.A. Reports
Fiscal Year 2011 Results,” November 9,
2011,  http://corporate.disneylandparis.com/CORP/
EN/Neutral/Images/uk-2011-11-09-euro-disney-sca-
reports-annual-results-for-fiscal-year-2011 .

6. “Disneyland Paris Visitor Numbers Down Since
Attacks,”  RFI,  February 10, 2016,  http://en.rfi.fr/
france/20160210-disneyland-paris-visitor-numbers-
down-attacks.

7. Euro Disney S.C.A.,  First Quarter Announcement,
January 16, 2015,  http://disneylandparis-news.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/01/uk-2015-01-16-cp-Q1-
revenues .

ENDNOTES

Collaborative Technologies and the Internet of Things (IoT) (105 points)

The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming increasingly popular in both business and everyday life.

· Explain what the Internet of Things (IoT) is and provide a brief history, in your own words, of the IoT.

· Discuss the potential impact that IoT can have on how people live.

· Select a company and explain how the organization has benefited from the IoT. Detail specific examples of how the company benefited.

· How has the IoT been impacted by the pandemic? Explain specific examples.

Instructions:

· Your well-written report should be 6 pages in length, not including the title and reference pages.

· To make it easier to read and therefore grade, make sure you clearly delineate each section of your answer so it can be matched with the relevant question.

· Use APA style guidelines, citing at least two references as appropriate.

· Provide Plagiarism report.