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Copyright © by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The Federalist, Paper Number 10
1
The Federalist, Paper Number 10
James Madison
1
OVERVIEW
James Madison,
A
lexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote 85 anonymous articles for the
New York Journal in 1787 and 1788, with the aim of persuading the people of New York to
ratify the proposed Constitution. These articles are known as The Federalist Papers. In this
paper, Madison comments on the checks and balances of competing factions in American
politics and signs it “
Publius
.”
GUIDED READING As you read, consider the following questions:
• What are the differences between a pure democracy and a republic, according to
Madison?
• What does Madison say is the advantage of a republic over a democracy?
mong the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break
and control the violence of faction. . . .
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. . . .
There are . . . two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by
destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to
every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy that it was worse
than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without
which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty,
which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be
to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it
imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As
long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it,
different opinions will be formed. . . .
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see
them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. . . . But the most common and durable
source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct
interests in society. Those who are creditors and those who are debtors fall
A
Copyright © by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The Federalist, Paper Number 10 2
under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of
necessity in civilized nations and divide them into different classes, actuated by
different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit
of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
government. . . .
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good.
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can
such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and
remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest
which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of
the whole.
The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot
be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its
effects.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by
regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it
will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the
public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the
same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then
the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the
great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the
opprobrium under which it has so long labored and be recommended to the
esteem and adoption of mankind. . . .
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens who
assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for
the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every
case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result
from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. . . .
A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place, opens a different prospect and promises the cure for
which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure
democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the
efficacy which it must derive from the Union.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are:
first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of
Copyright © by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The Federalist, Paper Number 10 3
citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and
greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge
the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and
whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. . . . The question resulting is, whether
small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper
guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by
two obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may
be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard
against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be
limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a
multitude. . . .
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number
of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for
unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which
elections are too often carried and, the suffrages of the people being more free,
will be more likely to center in men who possess the most attractive merit and
the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on
both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too
much the number of electors, you render the representative too little
acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these and too little
fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and
aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local, and particular to
the state legislatures.
The other point of difference is the greater number of citizens and extent
of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of
democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders
factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The
smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests
composing it. . . . Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength and to act in unison with each other. . . .
Hence, it clearly appears that the same advantage which a republic has over
a democracy, in controlling the effects of factions, is enjoyed by a large over a
small republic—is enjoyed by the Union over the states composing it. . . .
Copyright © by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. The Federalist, Paper Number 10 4
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans,
ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of
Federalists.
Publius
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Chronological Periods
Prehistory to 1492
Magna Carta
From The Travels of Marco Polo
Examining the Past
Exploring the Americas 1000-1535
Why Explore?
Letter from Christopher Columbus
European Empires in the Americas 1500-1700
The Founding of the Iroquois League
Montezuma’s Greeting to Hernán Cortés
The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico
Search for Gold
Voyages
Letter from Don Pedro de Zuniga
An Advocate of English Colonization
English Bill of Rights
Habeas Corpus Act 1679
Petition of Right
Colonial America 1607-1753
In Jamestown
The Mayflower Compact
Anne Hutchinson’s Trial
Views on Liberty
The Poems of Sor Juana
German Settlements in Pennsylvania
Fundamental Orders of Connecticut
The Massachusetts Body of Liberties
New England Confederation
Nation Building 1754-1791
Virginia in 1759
Exploring Kentucky
About Slavery
Chief Logan’s Speech
Chief Pontiac—Orator and Warrior
Slavery at the End of the Colonial Period
On Liberty
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania
Burning the Gaspée
The Slaves’ Appeal
The Paris Peace Treaty of 1783
Declaration of the First Continental Congress
Lexington and Concord
Patrick Henry Speaks to the Second Virginia Convention
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms
Battle of Bunker Hill
Common Sense
“Remember the Ladies”
The Declaration of Independence
Resolutions of the Stamp Act
Washington Crosses the Delaware
Valley Forge
Surrender at Yorktown
Articles of Confederation
Northwest Ordinance
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
On Slavery
The Federalist, Paper Number 10
Objections to the Constitution
The Albany Plan of Union
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
The Federalist, Paper Number 51
The Federalist, Paper Number 39
The Federalist, Paper Number 78
A New Nation 1789-1825
The Constitution of the United States
Spelling Reform
Report on the Public Credit
Virginia Resolutions on State Debts
On the Constitutionality of the Bank
Farewell Address
Alien and Sedition Acts
Mrs. Adams Moves into the White House
First Inaugural Address
Log Cabins
Marbury v. Madison
On the Lewis and Clark Expedition
Burr-Hamilton Duel
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans
Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves
Embargo Act
Tecumseh Protests
The Burning of Washington
Public Land for Sale
Latin American Policy
McCulloch v. Maryland
The Growing Nation 1820-1860
The Monroe Doctrine
Tariff Speech
Gibbons v. Ogden
Song of the Erie Canal
A Trip on the Erie Canal
National Development
Against Extending Slavery
Against Restricting Slavery
On the Missouri Compromise
Slavery and the Constitution
Manufacturing in the South
Attack on Nullification
Memories of a Factory Girl
The Inauguration of Andrew Jackson
Workers Demand a 10-Hour Day
Indian Removal
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia
The Benefits of the Factory System
The Yellowstone River
Picking Cotton
Public Education Law
The Liberator
On Equality for Women
Seneca Falls Declaration
Women’s Rights
Chief Seattle’s Message
Traveling the Oregon Trail
The Alamo
Mountain Men in Rendezvous
A View of Manifest Destiny
Mormon Pioneers Prepare to Move West
The Mormon Exodus from Nauvoo
Mormons on the Trail
Mormon Pioneers Face Hardship
Declaration of the Mexican War
Critic of the Mexican War
The Discovery of Gold
American Slavery As It Is
Civil War and Reconstruction 1846-1877
Independence Day Speech
Uncle Tom’s Cabin
Dred Scott v. Sanford
Lincoln and Douglas Debates
The Underground Railroad
John Brown at the Gallows
Letter from a Supporter of John Brown
Underground Railroad Spirituals
Slaves Behind Union Lines
Letters from a Union Soldier
An Unusual Telegraph
The Emancipation Proclamation
Gettysburg Address
Union Troops Cause Destruction
Second Inaugural Address
General Lee Says Farewell
Mourning President Lincoln
Amnesty Proclamation
Black Code Laws
On the South
Veto of the First Reconstruction Act
Scenes from the Freedmen’s Bureau Courts
A Report on the Ku Klux Klan
“Meet Brute Force with Brute Force”
The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
Arguments for Impeachment
Plantation Life After the Civil War
Blanche K. Bruce Speaks
Building a Sod House
Reshaping the Nation 1876-1914
On Native American Warfare
Native Americans Chase Buffalo Bill
Driving the Golden Spike
Violence Against Chinese Immigrants
Geronimo’s Plea
A Century of Dishonor
On the Cattle Trails
The Land Rush in Oklahoma
O Pioneers!
Rural Life on the Great Plains
Chinese Exclusion Act
Nineteenth-Century Immigration
On Wealth
Against the Convict-Labor System
A View of the Pullman Strike
Plessy v. Ferguson
Advertising
On the Standard Oil Company
The Need for Public Parks
Children of Poverty in New York
Toward a National Style of Architecture
Child Labor Law in Colorado
Transportation and Leisure Time in New York
Ethnic Groups in Tenements
Chicago Sweatshops
“The Curious Republic of Gondour”
The Arrival of the Country Club
The Lives of “The Four Hundred”
The Corbett-Sullivan Fight
“Plutocracy or Paternalism”
Vaudeville Theater
The National Grange Movement
The Idea of Pan-American Cooperation
Wealth vs. Poverty
“Lords of Industry”
“Eight Hours and Nothing Less”
“The Cross of Gold”
Woman Suffrage
How the Spanish Saw the Battle of Manila Bay
The Rough Riders in Action
A Soldier Reflects on the Spanish-American War
The United States Annexes Hawaii
“Hawaii Under Annexation”
Some Anti-Imperialist Sentiments
Annexing the Philippines
Filipinos Fight for Independence
Becoming a Socialist
Meatpacking in Chicago
Child Labor Laws
The Founding of the NAACP
The Beginnings of Hull House
Treatment of the IWW
Veto Message on the Literacy Test
Theodore Roosevelt and the “Square Deal”
Gentlemen’s Agreement
On Conservation of Natural Resources
The Nomination of Woodrow Wilson
Taft’s Foreign Policy
The Clayton Antitrust Act
African Americans Protest
Munn v. The People of the State of Illinois
Expansion and World War I 1914-1920
A Declaration of War
General Pershing Arrives in Paris
“Over There”
All Quiet on the Western Front
America and World War I
The American Soldier
Democrats in World War I
The Fourteen Points Speech
On the League of Nations
Safeguard America!
Americanism
On Theodore Roosevelt
How a Red is Made
Race Riots, 1919
The Ku Klux Klan Meets Defiance in Kansas
Schenck v. United States
The Roaring Twenties 1920-1929
Nationalism and Americanism
The Radio Catches On
A Friend Remembers Warren G. Harding
Against the National Origins Act of 1924
“The Big Normal Majority”
Gitlow v. New York
Vanzetti’s Last Statement
A View of Prohibition
The Movies
Ford and the Model T
Harlem in the 1920s
“Minstrel Man”
Big City Crime
Economic Crisis and the New Deal 1929-1939
Stock Market Crash, 1929
During the Depression
The Bonus Army
The Grapes of Wrath
“Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?”
First Inaugural Address
Social Security
Eleanor Roosevelt in the White House
Near v. The State of Minnesota
World War II Era 1933-1945
The Four Freedoms
A Declaration of War
“A Day Which Will Live in Infamy”
Bataan and Corregidor
Japanese Internment in the United States
On the Normandy Beaches After D-Day
Radio Address on German Surrender
Hiroshima
The Holocaust
The Postwar World 1945-1963
The “Iron Curtain” Speech
Jackie Robinson Joins the Big Leagues
The Truman Doctrine
Containment or Liberation?
The Korean War
Farewell Address to Congress
Atoms for Peace
Senator McCarthy Speaks Out
Sputnik I
Organized Crime
Against the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act
Peaceful Coexistence
The Senate Condemns Joseph McCarthy
Labor and Organizing
On Television
“The Military-Industrial Complex”
First Voice From Space
Inaugural Address
The Cuban Missile Crisis
On the Cuban Missile Crisis
Engel v. Vitale
Gideon v. Wainwright
Struggle for Civil Rights 1954-1976
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education
Reynolds v. Simms
Miranda v. Arizona
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
Crisis in Little Rock
The Southern Manifesto
Silent Spring
“I Have a Dream”
Malcolm X Remembers
“To Fulfill These Rights”
On Black Power
Delano Grape Workers, A Proclamation
Speech at the Academy Awards
Prayer in the Schools
The “Other” Americans
Roe v. Wade
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
Vietnam Era 1960-1976
Inside the Vietnam War
The Reality of Vietnam
Landing on the Moon
The Moon Landing
Radical Bombings
Eulogy for Robert F. Kennedy
The Invasion of Cambodia
Death at Kent State
The Port Huron Statement
The Impeachment of Richard Nixon
Nixon Resigns
Furman v. Georgia
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
Modern America 1976-Present
Illegal Aliens Receive Amnesty
Working Longer
The Camp David Accords
The Case for Controlling Handguns
The Challenger Disaster
The Challenger Speech
The Iran-Contra Affair
“Common Ground”
For Affirmative Action
Toni Morrison Wins the Nobel Prize in Literature
After the Cold War
Address to Congress on the Gulf War
The Impeachment of Bill Clinton
Tobacco Companies Settle Suits
United States Leaders Speak to Serbian People
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Concepts
Civil Rights
Magna Carta
Virginia in 1759
About Slavery
Chief Logan’s Speech
Slavery at the End of the Colonial Period
The Slaves’ Appeal
“Remember the Ladies”
Northwest Ordinance
On Slavery
Objections to the Constitution
Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves
Tecumseh Protests
Against Extending Slavery
Against Restricting Slavery
Slavery and the Constitution
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia
Picking Cotton
The Liberator
On Equality for Women
Seneca Falls Declaration
Women’s Rights
Independence Day Speech
Chief Seattle’s Message
American Slavery As It Is
Uncle Tom’s Cabin
Dred Scott v. Sanford
Lincoln and Douglas Debates
The Underground Railroad
John Brown at the Gallows
Letter from a Supporter of John Brown
Underground Railroad Spirituals
Slaves Behind Union Lines
The Emancipation Proclamation
Mourning President Lincoln
Amnesty Proclamation
Black Code Laws
Veto of the First Reconstruction Act
Scenes from the Freedmen’s Bureau Courts
A Report on the Ku Klux Klan
“Meet Brute Force with Brute Force”
Plantation Life After the Civil War
Blanche K. Bruce Speaks
On Native American Warfare
Native Americans Chase Buffalo Bill
Violence Against Chinese Immigrants
A Century of Dishonor
Plessy v. Ferguson
Woman Suffrage
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
The Founding of the NAACP
African Americans Protest
How a Red is Made
Race Riots, 1919
The Ku Klux Klan Meets Defiance in Kansas
Vanzetti’s Last Statement
“Minstrel Man”
Eleanor Roosevelt in the White House
The Four Freedoms
Japanese Internment in the United States
Jackie Robinson Joins the Big Leagues
Senator McCarthy Speaks Out
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education
Crisis in Little Rock
The Southern Manifesto
“I Have a Dream”
Malcolm X Remembers
Eulogy for Robert F. Kennedy
“To Fulfill These Rights”
On Black Power
Delano Grape Workers, A Proclamation
Speech at the Academy Awards
The Port Huron Statement
Prayer in the Schools
The “Other” Americans
Roe v. Wade
Working Longer
The Case for Controlling Handguns
“Common Ground”
For Affirmative Action
Habeas Corpus Act 1679
Court Cases
Marbury v. Madison
Gibbons v. Ogden
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia
McCulloch v. Maryland
Dred Scott v. Sanford
Plessy v. Ferguson
Gitlow v. New York
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education
Reynolds v. Simms
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education
Prayer in the Schools
Roe v. Wade
Engel v. Vitale
Gideon v. Wainwright
Furman v. Georgia
Munn v. The People of the State of Illinois
Near v. The State of Minnesota
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
Schenck v. United States
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
Miranda v. Arizona
Reynolds v. Simms
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
Economics and Trade
Why Explore?
Letter from Christopher Columbus
An Advocate of English Colonization
In Jamestown
German Settlements in Pennsylvania
Slavery at the End of the Colonial Period
On Liberty
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania
Burning the Gaspée
Articles of Confederation
Report on the Public Credit
Virginia Resolutions on State Debts
On the Constitutionality of the Bank
Embargo Act
Public Land for Sale
Tariff Speech
Gibbons v. Ogden
Song of the Erie Canal
National Development
Manufacturing in the South
Attack on Nullification
Mountain Men in Rendezvous
The Discovery of Gold
Violence Against Chinese Immigrants
Chinese Exclusion Act
On Wealth
Against the Convict-Labor System
A View of the Pullman Strike
Advertising
On the Standard Oil Company
Chicago Sweatshops
“Plutocracy or Paternalism”
The National Grange Movement
The Idea of Pan-American Cooperation
Wealth vs. Poverty
“Lords of Industry”
“The Cross of Gold”
“Hawaii Under Annexation”
Meatpacking in Chicago
Child Labor Laws
Taft’s Foreign Policy
The Clayton Antitrust Act
Race Riots, 1919
Ford and the Model T
Stock Market Crash, 1929
During the Depression
The Bonus Army
The Grapes of Wrath
“Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?”
First Inaugural Address
Social Security
The Truman Doctrine
Organized Crime
Labor and Organizing
Delano Grape Workers, A Proclamation
The Port Huron Statement
After the Cold War
Address to Congress on the Gulf War
Tobacco Companies Settle Suits
Exploration and Expansion
From The Travels of Marco Polo
Why Explore?
Letter from Christopher Columbus
Montezuma’s Greeting to Hernán Cortés
The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico
Search for Gold
Voyages
Letter from Don Pedro de Zuniga
An Advocate of English Colonization
In Jamestown
The Mayflower Compact
Virginia in 1759
Exploring Kentucky
Chief Logan’s Speech
On the Lewis and Clark Expedition
Tecumseh Protests
Against Extending Slavery
Against Restricting Slavery
Indian Removal
The Yellowstone River
Traveling the Oregon Trail
The Alamo
Mountain Men in Rendezvous
A View of Manifest Destiny
Mormon Pioneers Prepare to Move West
The Mormon Exodus from Nauvoo
Mormons on the Trail
Mormon Pioneers Face Hardship
Declaration of the Mexican War
Critic of the Mexican War
The Discovery of Gold
On Native American Warfare
Native Americans Chase Buffalo Bill
The Land Rush in Oklahoma
The United States Annexes Hawaii
“Hawaii Under Annexation”
Some Anti-Imperialist Sentiments
Annexing the Philippines
Filipinos Fight for Independence
Landing on the Moon
The Moon Landing
The Challenger Disaster
The Challenger Speech
Foreign Relations
Letter from Don Pedro de Zuniga
Alien and Sedition Acts
Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves
Embargo Act
Latin American Policy
The Monroe Doctrine
The Idea of Pan-American Cooperation
How the Spanish Saw the Battle of Manila Bay
The United States Annexes Hawaii
Taft’s Foreign Policy
A Declaration of War
General Pershing Arrives in Paris
The Fourteen Points Speech
Against the National Origins Act of 1924
The Four Freedoms
The “Iron Curtain” Speech
The Truman Doctrine
Containment or Liberation?
The Korean War
Atoms for Peace
Sputnik I
Peaceful Coexistence
The Reality of Vietnam
The Cuban Missile Crisis
On the Cuban Missile Crisis
The Camp David Accords
The Iran-Contra Affair
After the Cold War
Address to Congress on the Gulf War
United States Leaders Speak to Serbian People
Geography and History
Magna Carta
From The Travels of Marco Polo
Examining the Past
Why Explore?
The Founding of the Iroquois League
Letter from Christopher Columbus
Montezuma’s Greeting to Hernán Cortés
The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico
Voyages
Letter from Don Pedro de Zuniga
An Advocate of English Colonization
Chief Pontiac—Orator and Warrior
Northwest Ordinance
Log Cabins
On the Lewis and Clark Expedition
Tecumseh Protests
Song of the Erie Canal
A Trip on the Erie Canal
Indian Removal
Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia
Traveling the Oregon Trail
The Alamo
Mountain Men in Rendezvous
A View of Manifest Destiny
Mormon Pioneers Prepare to Move West
The Mormon Exodus from Nauvoo
Mormons on the Trail
Mormon Pioneers Face Hardship
Declaration of the Mexican War
Critic of the Mexican War
Driving the Golden Spike
On the Cattle Trails
The Land Rush in Oklahoma
Ethnic Groups in Tenements
Against the National Origins Act of 1924
A View of Prohibition
The Truman Doctrine
Containment or Liberation?
The Reality of Vietnam
Immigration
Driving the Golden Spike
Violence Against Chinese Immigrants
Chinese Exclusion Act
Nineteenth-Century Immigration
Ethnic Groups in Tenements
The Beginnings of Hull House
Veto Message on the Literacy Test
Gentlemen’s Agreement
Against the National Origins Act of 1924
Vanzetti’s Last Statement
Against the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act
Illegal Aliens Receive Amnesty
Industrial Growth and Technology
Song of the Erie Canal
A Trip on The Erie Canal
Manufacturing in the South
Memories of a Factory Girl
Workers Demand a 10-Hour Day
The Benefits of the Factory System
Driving the Golden Spike
A View of the Pullman Strike
Advertising
On the Standard Oil Company
The Need for Public Parks
Child Labor Law in Colorado
Transportation and Leisure Time in New York
Chicago Sweatshops
The National Grange Movement
“Lords of Industry”
Meatpacking in Chicago
Child Labor Laws
Treatment of the IWW
The Radio Catches On
The Movies
Ford and the Model T
Hiroshima
Atoms for Peace
Sputnik I
First Voice from Space
Labor and Organizing
On Television
“The Military-Industrial Complex”
Silent Spring
Landing on the Moon
The Moon Landing
Working Longer
The Challenger Disaster
The Challenger Speech
Literature, Art, and Music
The Poems of Sor Juana
About Slavery
Spelling Reform
Song of the Erie Canal
The Yellowstone River
Uncle Tom’s Cabin
Underground Railroad Spirituals
O Pioneers!
Rural Life on the Great Plains
Toward a National Style of Architecture
“The Curious Republic of Gondour”
Vaudeville Theater
Becoming a Socialist
Meatpacking in Chicago
“Over There”
All Quiet on the Western Front
“The Big Normal Majority”
The Movies
Harlem in the 1920s
“Minstrel Man”
Big City Crime
The Grapes of Wrath
“Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?”
Silent Spring
Speech at the Academy Awards
Toni Morrison Wins the Nobel Prize in Literature
National Politics
Farewell Address
Mrs. Adams Moves into the White House
First Inaugural Address
Burr-Hamilton Duel
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans
Against Extending Slavery
Against Restricting Slavery
On the Missouri Compromise
Slavery and the Constitution
The Inauguration of Andrew Jackson
Indian Removal
Dred Scott v. Sanford
Lincoln and Douglas Debates
Amnesty Proclamation
On the South
Veto of the First Reconstruction Act
“Meet Brute Force with Brute Force”
The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson
Arguments for Impeachment
Blanche K. Bruce Speaks
“The Curious Republic of Gondour”
“Plutocracy or Paternalism”
“The Cross of Gold”
Theodore Roosevelt and the “Square Deal”
The Nomination of Woodrow Wilson
Nationalism and Americanism
Democrats in World War I
A Friend Remembers Warren G. Harding
On the League of Nations
Safeguard America!
Americanism
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The Senate Condemns Joseph McCarthy
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Nixon Resigns
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Attack on Nullification
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A View of Manifest Destiny
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John Brown at the Gallows
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Gettysburg Address
Union Troops Cause Destruction
Second Inaugural Address
Amnesty Proclamation
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Veto of the First Reconstruction Act
Scenes from the Freedmen’s Bureau Courts
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Seneca Falls Declaration
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Independence Day Speech
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A View of the Pullman Strike
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Chicago Sweatshops
The National Grange Movement
Wealth vs. Poverty
“Lords of Industry”
“Eight Hours and Nothing Less”
Woman Suffrage
Becoming a Socialist
Meatpacking in Chicago
Child Labor Laws
The Founding of the NAACP
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Theodore Roosevelt and the “Square Deal”
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African Americans Protest
How a Red is Made
A View of Prohibition
First Inaugural Address
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The Port Huron Statement
Eulogy for Robert F. Kennedy
The “Other” Americans
Illegal Aliens Receive Amnesty
Working Longer
The Case for Controlling Handguns
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Why Explore?
Anne Hutchinson’s Trial
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German Settlements in Pennsylvania
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
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Traveling the Oregon Trail
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Mormon Pioneers Face Hardship
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Representative Government
The Founding of the Iroquois League
On Liberty
“Remember the Ladies”
Articles of Confederation
Northwest Ordinance
The Constitution of the United States
The Federalist, Paper Number 10
Objections to the Constitution
On the South
“Plutocracy or Paternalism”
Woman Suffrage
The Southern Manifesto
“To Fulfill These Rights”
The Fundemental Orders of Connecticut
Petition of Right
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Federalist No. 39
Federalist No. 78
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Anne Hutchinson’s Trial
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Declaration of the First Continental Congress
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Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
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Native Americans Chase Buffalo Bill
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O Pioneers!
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Transportation and Leisure Time in New York
Ethnic Groups in Tenements
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The Arrival of the Country Club
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The Corbett-Sullivan Fight
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Montezuma’s Greeting to Hernán Cortés
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Chief Logan’s Speech
Chief Pontiac—Orator and Warrior
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Lexington and Concord
Patrick Henry Speaks to the Second Virginia Convention
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms
Battle of Bunker Hill
Common Sense
The Declaration of Independence
Washington Crosses the Delaware
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Surrender at Yorktown
The Burning of Washington
The Alamo
Declaration of the Mexican War
Critic of the Mexican War
Slaves Behind Union Lines
Letters from a Union Soldier
An Unusual Telegraph
The Emancipation Proclamation
Gettysburg Address
Union Troops Cause Destruction
Second Inaugural Address
General Lee Says Farewell
Geronimo’s Plea
How the Spanish Saw the Battle of Manila Bay
The Rough Riders in Action
A Soldier Reflects on the Spanish-American War
Some Anti-Imperialist Sentiments
Annexing the Philippines
Filipinos Fight for Independence
A Declaration of War
General Pershing Arrives in Paris
“Over There”
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The Fourteen Points Speech
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The American Soldier
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Americanism
How a Red is Made
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“A Day Which Will Live in Infamy”
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User’s Guide and Teaching Strategies
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To the Teacher
What are Primary Source Documents?
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Primary Source Document Correlations to Glencoe/McGraw-Hill Texts
American History: The Early Years to 1877
American History: The Modern Era Since 1865
America Is
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THE
CONSTITUTION
oftheUnitedStates
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.
Article.I.
SECTION.
1
.
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Sen-
ate and House of Representatives.
SECTION.
2
.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Mem-
bers chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifi –
cations requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty fi ve Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he
shall be chosen.
[Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term
of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fi fths of
all other Persons.]* The actual Enumeration shall be made
within three Years after the fi rst Meeting of the Congress
of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The
Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every
thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one
Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made,
the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse
three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence
Plantations one, Connecticut fi ve, New-York six, New
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland
six, Virginia ten, North Carolina fi ve, South Carolina fi ve,
and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of
Election to fi ll such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Offi cers; and shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.
SECTION.
3
.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, [chosen by the Legislature there-
of,]* for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence
of the fi rst Election, they shall be divided as equally as may
be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the fi rst
Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year,
of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and
of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that
one third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacan-
cies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess
of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may
make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of
the Legislature, which shall then fi ll such Vacancies.]*
1
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless
they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Offi cers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice
President, or when he shall exercise the Offi ce of
President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on
Oath or Affi rmation. When the President of the United
States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Offi ce, and disqualifi cation to
hold and enjoy any Offi ce of honor, Trust or Profi t under
the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.
SECTION.
4
.
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and
such Meeting shall be [on the fi rst Monday in December,]*
unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
SECTION.
5
.
Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and Qualifi cations of its own Members, and a Majority
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a
smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members,
in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House
may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts
as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question
shall, at the Desire of one fi fth of those Present, be entered
on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, with-
out the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
SECTION.
6
.
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compen-
sation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid
out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Ses-
sion of their respective Houses, and in going to and return-
ing from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either
House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Offi ce
under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased during such time; and no Person holding any
Offi ce under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Offi ce.
2
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
SECTION.
7
.
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
prove he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated,
who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall
be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House,
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in
all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined
by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for
and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each
House respectively, If any Bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
their Adjournament prevent its Return, in which Case it
shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur-
rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or be-
ing disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of
the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the
Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
SECTION.
8
.
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
Coin, and fi x the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securi-
ties and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offi ces and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To defi ne and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to
the States respectively, the Appointment of the Offi cers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress;
3
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,
over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance
of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Maga-
zines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;
-And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Offi cer thereof.
SECTION.
9
.
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand
eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed
on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
[No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken.]*
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be
obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Con-
sequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of
all public Money shall be published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
And no Person holding any Offi ce of Profi t or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept
of any present, Emolument, Offi ce, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
SECTION.
10
.
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money;
emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver
Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of At-
tainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay
any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what
may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid
by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be
subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of
Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay.
4
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.II.
SECTION. 1.
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America. He shall hold his Offi ce during
the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice Presi-
dent, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Offi ce of Trust or Prof-
it under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not
be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And
they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of
the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign
and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States, directed to the President of the
Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
Certifi cates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The
Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the
President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole
Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than
one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of
Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person
have a Majority, then from the fi ve highest on the List
the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President.
But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote;
A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or
Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of
all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case,
after the Choice of the President, the Person having the
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice
President. But if there should remain two or more who
have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Bal-
lot the Vice President.]*
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the
Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Offi ce of President;
neither shall any person be eligible to that Offi ce who shall
not have attained to the Age of thirty fi ve Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
[In Case of the Removal of the President from Offi ce, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Offi ce, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both
of the President and Vice President, declaring what Offi cer
shall then act as President, and such Offi cer shall act ac-
cordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.]*
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,
a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Offi ce, he shall
take the following Oath or Affi rmation:- “I do solemnly
swear (or affi rm) that I will faithfully execute the Offi ce of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my
Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States.”
5
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
SECTION. 2.
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of
the principal Offi cer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offi ces, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Offi cers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such in-
ferior Offi cers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fi ll up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of
their next Session.
SECTION. 3.
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Informa-
tion of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge neces-
sary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions,
convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of
Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he
shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed, and shall Commission all the Offi cers of the
United States.
SECTION. 4.
The President, Vice President and all civil Offi cers of the
United States, shall be removed from Offi ce on Impeach-
ment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
6
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.III.
SECTION. 1.
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offi ces during good Behaviour, and shall at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Offi ce.
SECTION. 2.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority; – to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls; – to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; – to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; – to Controversies
between two or more States; – [between a State and Citizens
of another State;-]* between Citizens of different States,
– between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, [and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof;- and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.]*
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Con-
gress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment;
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
SECTION. 3.
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levy-
ing War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giv-
ing them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted
of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corrup-
tion of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted.
7
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.IV.
SECTION. 1.
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every oth-
er State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
SECTION. 2.
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall fl ee from Justice, and be found in
another State, shall on Demand of the executive Author-
ity of the State from which he fl ed, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
[No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Conse-
quence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.]*
SECTION. 3.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States con-
cerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing
in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
SECTION. 4.
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.
Article.V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Con-
stitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for pro-
posing Amendments, which in either Case, shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratifi ed by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratifi cation may be proposed by
the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and
eight shall in any Manner affect the fi rst and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth Section of the fi rst Article; and that no State,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate.
8
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Article.VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against
the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all execu-
tive and judicial Offi cers, both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affi rmation,
to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever
be required as a Qualifi cation to any Offi ce or public Trust
under the United States.
Article.VII.
The Ratifi cation of the Conventions of nine States, shall
be suffi cient for the Establishment of this Constitution
between the States so ratifying the Same.
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty
seven and of the Independence of the United States of
America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto
subscribed our Names,
Go. Washington–Presidt:
and deputy from Virginia
NEW HAMPSHIRE
John Langdon
Nicholas Gilman
MASSACHUSETTS
Nathaniel Gorham
Rufus King
CONNECTICUT
Wm. Saml. Johnson
Roger Sherman
NEW YORK
Alexander Hamilton
NEW JERSEY
Wil: Livingston
David Brearley
Wm. Paterson
Jona: Dayton
PENNSYLVANIA
B Franklin
Thomas Miffl in
Robt Morris
Geo. Clymer
Thos. FitzSimons
Jared Ingersoll
James Wilson
Gouv Morris
9
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
DELAWARE
Geo: Read
Gunning Bedford jun
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jaco: Broom
MARYLAND
James McHenry
Dan of St. Thos. Jenifer
Danl Carroll
VIRGINIA
John Blair-
James Madison Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA
Wm. Blount
Richd. Dobbs Spaight
Hu Williamson
SOUTH CAROLINA
J. Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
Charles Pinckney
Pierce Butler
GEORGIA
William Few
Abr Baldwin
Attest William Jackson Secretary
In Convention Monday
September 17th, 1787.
Present
The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Ham-
ilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion
of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted
to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the
People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-
ture, for their Assent and Ratifi cation; and that each Con-
vention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give
Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that
as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratifi ed
this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled
should fi x a Day on which Electors should be appointed by
the States which shall have ratifi ed the same, and a Day on
which the Electors should assemble to vote for the Presi-
dent, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings
under this Constitution.
That after such Publication the Electors should be ap-
pointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That
the Electors should meet on the Day fi xed for the Election
of the President, and should transmit their Votes certifi ed,
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to
the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled,
that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the
Time and Place assigned; that the Senators should appoint
a President of the Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving,
opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that
after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the
President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this
Constitution.
By the unanimous Order of the Convention
Go. Washington-Presidt:
W. JACKSON Secretary.
* Language in brackets has been changed by amendment.
10
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
Preambletothe
BillofRights
Congress of the United States
begun and held at the City of New-York, on
Wednesday the fourth of March,
one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at
the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed
a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse
of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added: And as extending the ground
of public confi dence in the Government, will best
ensure the benefi cent ends of its institution.
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America,
in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses
concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to
the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, all, or any of
which Articles, when ratifi ed by three fourths of the said
Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of the said Constitution; viz.
ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States of America, proposed
by Congress, and ratifi ed by the Legislatures of the
several States, pursuant to the fi fth Article of the
original Constitution.
(Note: The fi rst 10 amendments to the Constitution were
ratifi ed December
15
, 1791, and form what is known as
the “Bill of Rights.”)
AmendmentI.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.
AmendmentII.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.
AmendmentIII.
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
AmendmentIV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affi rma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
AmendmentV.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES AS RATIFIED BY THE STATES
11
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentVI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
AmendmentVII.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
AmendmentVIII.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fi nes
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments infl icted.
AmendmentIX.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.
AmendmentX.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENTS 11-27
AmendmentXI.
Passed by Congress March 4, 1794. Ratifi ed February 7, 1795.
(Note: A portion of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution was
modifi ed by the 11th Amendment.) th Amendment.) th
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or pros-
ecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AmendmentXII.
Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratifi ed June 15, 1804.
(Note: A portion of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution was
changed by the
12
th Amendment.)
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom,
at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted
for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of
all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted
for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed
to the seat of the government of the United States, directed
to the President of the Senate;-the President of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives, open all the certifi cates and the votes shall then be
counted;-The person having the greatest number of votes
for President, shall be the President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if
no person have such majority, then from the persons having
the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall
choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choos-
ing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum
for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall
be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representa-
tives shall not choose a President whenever the right of
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of
March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as
President, as in case of the death or other constitutional
disability of the President.-]* The person having the greatest
number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number
of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority,
then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate
shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose
shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators,
and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to
a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the
offi ce of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President
of the United States.
*Superseded by Section 3 of the 20th Amendment.
12
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXIII.
Passed by Congress January 31, 1865. Ratifi ed December 6,
1865.
(Note: A portion of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
was changed by the
13
th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXIV.
Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratifi ed July 9, 1868.
(Note: Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
Section 2 of the
14
th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for
the choice of electors for President and Vice President of
the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Execu-
tive and Judicial offi cers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, [being twenty-one years of age,]* and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
SECTION 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any offi ce, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an offi cer of the United States,
or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial offi cer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
SECTION 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, au-
thorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrec-
tion or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or eman-
cipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and
claims shall be held illegal and void.
SECTION 5.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.
*Changed by Section 1 of the 26th Amendment.
13
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXV.
Passed by Congress February 26, 1869. Ratifi ed February 3, 1870.
SECTION 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXVI.
Passed by Congress July 2, 1909. Ratifi ed February 3, 1913.
(Note: Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
the
16
ththe 16ththe 16 Amendment.) th Amendment.) th
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AmendmentXVII.
Passed by Congress May 13, 1912. Ratifi ed April 8, 1913.
(Note: Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
the 17th Amendment.)
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for
six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors
in each State shall have the qualifi cations requisite for elec-
tors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall
issue writs of election to fi ll such vacancies: Provided, That
the legislature of any State may empower the executive
thereof to make temporary appointments until the people
fi ll the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes
valid as part of the Constitution.
AmendmentXVIII.
Passed by Congress December 18, 1917. Ratifi ed January 16,
1919. Repealed by the 21st Amendment, December 5,
1933.
SECTION 1.
After one year from the ratifi cation of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation
thereof from the United States and all territory subject to
the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited.
SECTION 2.
The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
SECTION 3.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by the legisla-
tures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution,
within seven years from the date of the submission hereof
to the States by the Congress.
AmendmentXIX.
Passed by Congress June 4, 1919. Ratifi ed August 18, 1920.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
14
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXX.
Passed by Congress March 2, 1932. Ratifi ed January 23, 1933.
(Note: Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution was modifi ed
by Section 2 of this Amendment. In addition, a portion of the
12th Amendment was superseded by Section 3.)
SECTION 1.
The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end
at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Sena-
tors and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January,
of the years in which such terms would have ended if this
article had not been ratifi ed; and the terms of their succes-
sors shall then begin.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and
such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January,
unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
SECTION 3.
If, at the time fi xed for the beginning of the term of the
President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice Presi-
dent elect shall become President. If a President shall not
have been chosen before the time fi xed for the beginning of
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify,
then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a
President shall have qualifi ed; and the Congress may by law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a
Vice President shall have qualifi ed, declaring who shall then
act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act
shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until
a President or Vice President shall have qualifi ed.
SECTION 4.
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death
of any of the persons from whom the House of Representa-
tives may choose a President whenever the right of choice
shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the
death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may
choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall
have devolved upon them.
SECTION 5.
Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of Octo-
ber following the ratifi cation of this article.
SECTION 6.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by the leg-
islatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission.
AmendmentXXI.
Passed by Congress February 20, 1933. Ratifi ed December 5,
1933.
SECTION 1.
The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution
of the United States is hereby repealed.
SECTION 2.
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.
SECTION 3.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by conven-
tions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution,
within seven years from the date of the submission hereof
to the States by the Congress.
15
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXXII.
Passed by Congress March 21, 1947. Ratifi ed February 27,
1951.
SECTION 1.
No person shall be elected to the offi ce of the President
more than twice, and no person who has held the offi ce of
President, or acted as President, for more than two years of
a term to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the offi ce of President more than once.
But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the
offi ce of President when this Article was proposed by Con-
gress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding
the offi ce of President, or acting as President, during the
term within which this Article becomes operative from
holding the offi ce of President or acting as President during
the remainder of such term.
SECTION 2.
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been
ratifi ed as an amendment to the Constitution by the leg-
islatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission to the States by the
Congress.
AmendmentXXIII.
Passed by Congress June 16, 1960. Ratifi ed March 29, 1961.
SECTION 1.
The District constituting the seat of Government of the
United States shall appoint in such manner as Congress
may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal
to the whole number of Senators and Representatives
in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it
were a State, but in no event more than the least populous
State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the
States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of
the election of President and Vice President, to be electors
appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District
and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article
of amendment.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXXIV.
Passed by Congress August 27, 1962. Ratifi ed January 23, 1964.
SECTION 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any pri-
mary or other election for President or Vice President, for
electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or
Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay
poll tax or other tax.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
16
C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S
AmendmentXXV.
Passed by Congress July 6, 1965. Ratifi ed February 10, 1967.
(Note: Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution was modifi ed by
the 25th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
In case of the removal of the President from offi ce or of
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.
SECTION 2.
Whenever there is a vacancy in the offi ce of the Vice Presi-
dent, the President shall nominate a Vice President who
shall take offi ce upon confi rmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress.
SECTION 3.
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his offi ce, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
SECTION 4.
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal offi cers of the executive departments or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his offi ce, the Vice President shall immediately assume the
powers and duties of the offi ce as Acting President.
17
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability ex-
ists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his offi ce un-
less the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
offi cers of the executive department or of such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days
to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his offi ce. Thereupon Congress shall decide the
issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose
if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days
after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress
is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is
required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his offi ce, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the Presi-
dent shall resume the powers and duties of his offi ce.
AmendmentXXVI.
Passed by Congress March 23, 1971. Ratifi ed July 1, 1971.
(Note: Amendment 14, Section 2 of the Constitution was
modifi ed by Section 1 of the 26th Amendment.)
SECTION 1.
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.
SECTION 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AmendmentXXVII.
Originally proposed Sept. 25, 1789. Ratifi ed May 7, 1992.
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an elec-
tion of representatives shall have intervened.
T
he NCC is an independent,
non-partisan, nonprofi t
organization that was established
in 1988 under the Constitution Heritage
Act. The Center’s mission is to increase
awareness and understanding of the
Constitution, the Constitution’s history
and its relevance to people’s daily lives.
National Constitution Center
525 Arch Street
Independence Mall
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 409-6600
www.constitutioncenter.org
chapter 1
Introduction:
Fundamental Questions
M
Y AIM IN THIS BRIEF BOOK IS NOT TO PROPOSE
changes in the American Constitution but to
suggest changes in the way we think about
our constitution. In that spirit, I’ll begin by posing a
simple question: Why should we Americans uphold
our Constitution?
Well, an American citizen might reply, it has been
our constitution ever since it was written in 1787 by a
group of exceptionally wise men and was then ratified
by conventions in all the states.1 But this answer only
leads to a further question.
To understand what lies behind that next question,
I want to recall how the Constitutional Convention that
met in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 was
made up. Although we tend to assume that all thirteen
01dahl.001_006 11/27/01 4:38 PM Page 1
states sent delegates, in fact Rhode Island refused to
attend, and the delegates from New Hampshire didn’t
arrive until some weeks after the Convention opened.
As a result, several crucial votes in June and July were
taken with only eleven state delegations in attendance.
Moreover, the votes were counted by states, and al-
though most of the time most state delegations agreed
on a single position, on occasion they were too divided
internally to cast a vote.
My question, then, is this: Why should we feel
bound today by a document produced more than two
centuries ago by a group of fifty-five mortal men, actu-
ally signed by only thirty-nine, a fair number of whom
were slaveholders, and adopted in only thirteen states
by the votes of fewer than two thousand men, all of
whom are long since dead and mainly forgotten? 2
Our citizen might respond that we Americans are
free, after all, to alter our constitution by amendment
and have often done so. Therefore our present consti-
tution is ultimately based on the consent of those of us
living today.
But before we accept this reply, let me pose an-
other question: Have we Americans ever had an op-
portunity to express our considered will on our consti-
tutional system? For example, how many readers of
these lines have ever participated in a referendum that
asked them whether they wished to continue to be
governed under the existing constitution? The answer,
of course, is: none.
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01dahl.001_006 11/27/01 4:38 PM Page 2
Our citizen might now fall back on another line of
argument: Why should we change a constitution that
has served and continues to serve us well?
Although this is surely a reasonable line of argu-
ment, it does suggest still another question: By what
standards does our constitution serve us well? In par-
ticular, how well does our constitutional system meet
democratic standards of the present day? I’ll turn to
this question in the next chapter.
And if our constitution is as good as most Ameri-
cans seem to think it is, why haven’t other democratic
countries copied it? As we’ll see in Chapter 3, every
other advanced democratic country has adopted a con-
stitutional system very different from ours. Why?
If our constitutional system turns out to be unique
among the constitutions of other advanced democratic
countries, is it any better for its differences, or is it
worse? Or don’t the differences matter? I’ll explore
this difficult question in the fourth chapter.
Suppose we find little or no evidence to support
the view that our constitutional system is superior to
the systems of other comparable democratic countries,
and that in some respects it may actually perform
rather worse. What should we conclude?
As one part of an answer, I am going to suggest
that we begin to view our American Constitution as
nothing more or less than a set of basic institutions
and practices designed to the best of our abilities for
the purpose of attaining democratic values. But if an
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01dahl.001_006 11/27/01 4:38 PM Page 3
important democratic value is political equality, won’t
political equality threaten the rights and liberties we
prize? In Chapter 5, I’ll argue that this view—fa-
mously defended by Tocqueville, among others—is
based on a misunderstanding of the relationship be-
tween democracy and fundamental rights.
Yet the question remains: if our constitution is in
some important ways defective by democratic stan-
dards, should we change it, and how? As I said, my
aim here is not so much to suggest changes in the ex-
isting constitution as to encourage us to change the
way we think about it, whether it be the existing one,
an amended version of it, or a new and more demo-
cratic constitution. That said, in my final chapter I’ll
comment briefly on some possible changes and on the
obstacles to achieving them.
! ! !
BEFORE TURNING TO THESE QUESTIONS, I NEED TO DIS-
pose of two matters. One is purely terminological. In
discussing the formation of the constitution at the
Convention in 1787, I shall refer to the delegates as
the Framers, not, as is more common, the Founding
Fathers. I do so because many of the men who reason-
ably might be listed among the Founding Fathers—
including such notables as John Adams, Samuel Adams,
Tom Paine, and Thomas Jefferson—were not at the
Convention. (By my count, only eight of the fifty-five
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delegates to the Convention had also signed the Dec-
laration of Independence.)
The second matter is both terminological and sub-
stantive. Some readers may argue that the Founding
Fathers (including the Framers) intended to create a
republic, not a democracy. From this premise, accord-
ing to a not uncommon belief among Americans, it fol-
lows that the United States is not a democracy but a
republic. Although this belief is sometimes supported
on the authority of a principal architect of the Consti-
tution, James Madison, it is, for reasons I explain in
Appendix A, mistaken.
But even more important, the conclusion does not
follow from the premise. Whatever the intentions of the
Framers may have been, we would hardly feel bound
by them today if we believed that they were morally,
politically, and constitutionally wrong. Indeed, more
than two centuries of experience demonstrates that
whenever a sufficiently large and influential number
of Americans conclude that the views of the Framers
were wrong, they will change the constitution. Even if
the Framers did not intend their constitution to abol-
ish slavery, when later generations concluded that slav-
ery could no longer be tolerated and must be abol-
ished, they changed the constitution to conform with
their beliefs.
Even if some of the Framers leaned more toward
the idea of an aristocratic republic than a democratic
republic, they soon discovered that under the leader-
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ship of James Madison, among others, Americans would
rapidly undertake to create a more democratic repub-
lic, and in doing so they would begin almost immedi-
ately to change the constitutional system the Framers
had created.
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chapter 2
What the Framers Couldn’t Know
W
ISE AS THE FRAMERS WERE, THEY WERE
necessarily limited by their profound igno-
rance.
I say this with no disrespect, for like many others I
believe that among the Framers were many men of ex-
ceptional talent and public virtue. Indeed, I regard
James Madison as our greatest political scientist and
his generation of political leaders as perhaps our most
richly endowed with wisdom, public virtue, and devo-
tion to lives of public service. In the months and weeks
before the Constitutional Convention assembled “on
Monday the 14th of May, A.D. 1787. [sic] and in the
eleventh year of the independence of the United States
of America, at the State-House in the city of Philadel-
02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 7
phia,”1 Madison studied the best sources as carefully
as a top student preparing for a major exam.2 But even
James Madison could not foresee the future of the
American republic, nor could he draw on knowledge
that might be gained from later experiences with de-
mocracy in America and elsewhere.
It is no detraction from the genius of Leonardo
da Vinci to say that given the knowledge available in
his time he could not possibly have designed a work-
able airplane—much less the spacecraft that now
bears his name. Nor, given the knowledge available in
1903, could the Wright brothers have built the Boeing
707. Although like many others I greatly admire Ben-
jamin Franklin, I recognize that his knowledge of elec-
tricity was infinitesimal compared with that of a first-
year student in electrical engineering—or, for that
matter, the electrician who takes care of my occasional
wiring problems. In fact, on that famous first experi-
ment with the kite, Franklin was lucky to have escaped
alive. None of us, I expect, would hire an electrician
equipped only with Franklin’s knowledge to do our
wiring, nor would we propose to make a trip from
New York to London in the Wright brothers’ aircraft.
Leonardo, Franklin, the Wright brothers were great
innovators in their time, but they could not draw on
knowledge that was still to be accumulated in the
years and centuries to come.
The knowledge of the Framers—some of them,
certainly—may well have been the best available in
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1787. But reliable knowledge about constitutions
appropriate to a large representative republic was, at
best, meager. History had produced no truly relevant
models of representative government on the scale
the United States had already attained, not to mention
the scale it would reach in the years to come. As
much as many of the delegates admired the British
constitution, it was far from a suitable model. Nor
could the Roman Republic provide much of a guide.
The famous Venetian Republic, illustrious though it
had been, was governed by a hereditary aristocracy of
fewer than two thousand men and was already totter-
ing: a decade after the Convention an upstart Corsican
would knock it over in a featherweight military attack.
Whatever knowledge the delegates could gain from
historical experience was, then, only marginally rele-
vant at best.
Leaping into the Unknown
Among the important aspects of an unforeseeable fu-
ture, four broad historical developments would yield
some potential knowledge that the Framers necessar-
ily lacked and that, had they possessed it, might well
have led them to a different constitutional design.
First, a peaceful democratic revolution was soon to
alter fundamentally the conditions under which their
constitutional system would function.
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Second, partly in response to that continuing revo-
lution, new democratic political institutions would fun-
damentally alter and reconstruct the framework they
had so carefully designed.
Third, when democratization unfolded in Europe
and in other English-speaking countries during the two
centuries to come, constitutional arrangements would
arise that were radically different from the American
system. Within a generation or two, even the British
constitution would bear little resemblance to the one
the Framers knew—or thought they knew—and in
many respects admired and hoped to imitate.
Fourth, ideas and beliefs about what democracy re-
quires, and thus what a democratic republic requires,
would continue to evolve down to the present day and
probably beyond. Both in the way we understand the
meaning of “democracy” and in the practices and insti-
tutions we regard as necessary to it, democracy is not
a static system. Democratic ideas and institutions as
they unfolded in the two centuries after the American
Constitutional Convention would go far beyond the
conceptions of the Framers and would even transcend
the views of such early democrats as Jefferson and
Madison, who helped to initiate moves toward a more
democratic republic.
I shall consider each of these developments in
later chapters. But first I want to indicate some of the
practical limitations on what the Framers could rea-
sonably achieve.
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What the Framers Couldn’t Do
The Framers were not only limited by, so to speak,
their inevitable ignorance. They were also crucially
limited by the opportunities available to them.
We can be profoundly grateful for one crucial re-
striction: the Framers were limited to considering only
a republican form of government. They were con-
strained not only by their own belief in the superiority
of a republican government over all others but also by
their conviction that the high value they placed on re-
publicanism was overwhelmingly shared by American
citizens in all the states. Whatever else the Framers
might be free to do, they well knew that they could not
possibly propose a monarchy or a government ruled by
an aristocracy. As the Massachusetts delegate Elbridge
Gerry put it, “There was not a one-thousand part of our
fellow citizens who were not against every approach to-
ward monarchy.”3 The only delegate who was recorded
by Madison4 as looking with favor on monarchy was
Alexander Hamilton, whose injudicious expression of
support for that heartily unpopular institution may have
greatly reduced his influence at the Convention, as it
was to haunt him later.5 Hardly more acceptable was an
adaptation of aristocratic ideas to an American constitu-
tion. During the deliberations about the Senate, Gou-
verneur Morris of Pennsylvania explored the possibility
of drawing its members from an American equivalent
of the British aristocracy.6 But it soon became obvious
11
02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 11
that the delegates could not agree on just who these
American aristocrats might be, and in any case they
well knew that the overwhelming bulk of American cit-
izens would simply not tolerate such a government.
A second immovable limit was the existence of the
thirteen states, with still more states to come. A consti-
tutional solution that would be available in most of the
countries that were to develop into mature and stable
democracies—a unitary system with exclusive sover-
eignty lodged in the central government, as in Britain
and Sweden, for example—was simply out of the ques-
tion. The need for a federal rather than a unitary re-
public was therefore not justified by a principle ad-
duced from general historical experience, much less
from political theory. It was just a self-evident fact. If
Americans were to be united in a single country, it was
obvious to all that a federal or confederal system was
inescapable. Whether the states would remain as fun-
damental constituents was therefore never a serious
issue at the Convention; the only contested question
was just how much autonomy, if any, they would yield
to the central government.7
The delegates had to confront still another stub-
born limit: the need to engage in fundamental com-
promises in order to secure agreement on any consti-
tution at all. The necessity for compromise and the
opportunities this gave for coalitions and logrolling
meant that the Constitution could not possibly reflect
a coherent, unified theory of government. Compro-
mises were necessary because, like the country at large,
12 w h a t t h e f r a m e r s c o u l d n ’ t k n o w
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members of the convention held different views on
some very basic issues.
Slavery. One, of course, was the future of slav-
ery. Most of the delegates from the five southern states
were adamantly opposed to any constitutional provi-
sion that might endanger the institution. Although the
delegates from the other seven states were hardly of
one mind about slavery, it was perfectly obvious to them
that the only condition on which coexistence would be
acceptable to the delegates from the southern states
would be the preservation of slavery. Consequently, if
these delegates wanted a federal constitution they
would have to yield, no matter what their beliefs about
slavery. And so they did. Although some delegates who
signed the final document abhorred slavery, they nev-
ertheless accepted its continuation as the price of a
stronger federal government.
Representation in the Senate. Another conflict of
views that could not be settled without a one-sided
compromise resulted from the adamant refusal of the
delegates from the small states to accept any constitu-
tion that did not provide for equal representation in
the Senate. The opponents of equal representation in-
cluded two of the most illustrious members of the
Convention, James Madison and James Wilson, who
were also among the chief architects of the Constitu-
tion. Both men bitterly opposed what seemed to them
an arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable limit on
national majorities. As Alexander Hamilton remarked
about this conflict: “As states are a collection of indi-
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02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 13
vidual men which ought we to respect most, the rights
of the people composing them, or the artificial beings
resulting from the composition. Nothing could be more
preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to
the latter. It has been sd. that if the smaller States re-
nounce their equality, they renounce at the same time
their liberty. The truth is it is a contest for power, not
for liberty. Will the men composing the small States be
less free than those composing the larger.”8
Let me give you a flavor of the elevated discussion
that preceded the victory of the small states. Here is
Gunning Bedford of Delaware on June 30:
The large states dare not dissolve the Confederation. If
they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of
more honor and good faith, who will take them by the
hand and do them justice.
To which Rufus King of Massachusetts replied:
I cannot sit down, without taking some notice of the lan-
guage of the honorable gentleman from Delaware. . . .
It was not I who with a vehemence unprecedented in
this House, declared himself ready to turn his hopes
from our common Country, and court the protection of
some foreign hand. . . . I am grieved that such a thought
has entered into his heart. . . . For myself whatever
might be my distress, I would never court relief from a
foreign power.9
Faced with the refusal of the small states to ac-
cept anything less, Madison, Wilson, Hamilton, and
the other opponents of equal representation finally ac-
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02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 14
cepted compromise of principle as the price of a con-
stitution. The solution of equal representation was not,
then, a product of constitutional theory, high prin-
ciple, or grand design. It was nothing more than a
practical outcome of a hard bargain that its opponents
finally agreed to in order to achieve a constitution.10
Incidentally, this conflict illustrates some of the
complexities of voting coalitions at the Constitutional
Convention, for the faction opposed to equal repre-
sentation in the Senate included four strange bed-
fellows: Madison, Wilson, Hamilton, and Gouverneur
Morris. Although all four generally supported moves
to strengthen the federal government, Madison and
Wilson usually endorsed proposals that leaned toward
a more democratic republic, while Hamilton and Mor-
ris tended to support a more aristocratic republic.
Undemocratic Elements in the
Framers’ Constitution
It was within these limits, then, that the Framers con-
structed the Constitution. Not surprisingly, it fell far
short of the requirements that later generations would
find necessary and desirable in a democratic republic.
Judged from later, more democratic perspectives, the
Constitution of the Framers contained at least seven
important shortcomings.
Slavery. First, it neither forbade slavery nor em-
powered Congress to do so. In fact, the compromise
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on slavery not only denied Congress the effective
power to prohibit the importation of slaves before
180811 but it gave constitutional sanction to one of the
most morally objectionable byproducts of a morally re-
pulsive institution: the Fugitive Slave laws, according
to which a slave who managed to escape to a free state
had to be returned to the slaveholder, whose property
the slave remained.12 That it took three-quarters of a
century and a sanguinary civil war before slavery was
abolished should at the least make us doubt whether
the document of the Framers ought to be regarded as
holy writ.
Suffrage. Second, the constitution failed to guar-
antee the right of suffrage, leaving the qualifications
of suffrage to the states.13 It implicitly left in place
the exclusion of half the population—women—as well
as African Americans and Native Americans.14 As we
know, it took a century and a half before women were
constitutionally guaranteed the right to vote, and nearly
two centuries before a president and Congress could
overcome the effective veto of a minority of states in
order to pass legislation intended to guarantee the vot-
ing rights of African Americans.
Election of the president. Third, the executive
power was vested in a president whose selection, ac-
cording to the intentions and design of the Framers,
was to be insulated from both popular majorities and
congressional control. As we’ll see, the Framers’ main
design for achieving that purpose—a body of presi-
dential electors composed of men of exceptional wis-
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02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 16
dom and virtue who would choose the chief executive
unswayed by popular opinion—was almost immedi-
ately cast into the dustbin of history by leaders sympa-
thetic with the growing democratic impulses of the
American people, among them James Madison him-
self. Probably nothing the Framers did illustrates more
sharply their inability to foresee the shape that politics
would assume in a democratic republic. (I shall say
more about the electoral college in a later chapter.)
Choosing senators. Fourth, senators were to be
chosen not by the people but by the state legislatures,
for a term of six years.15 Although this arrangement
fell short of the ambitions of delegates like Gouver-
neur Morris who wanted to construct an aristocratic
upper house, it would help to ensure that senators
would be less responsive to popular majorities and
perhaps more sensitive to the needs of property hold-
ers. Members of the Senate would thus serve as a
check on the Representatives, who were all subject to
popular elections every two years.16
Equal representation in the Senate. The attempt
to create a Senate that would be a republican version
of the aristocratic House of Lords was derailed, as we
have seen, by a prolonged and bitter dispute over an
entirely different question: Should the states be equally
represented in Congress or should members of both
houses be allocated according to population? This ques-
tion not only gave rise to one of the most disruptive is-
sues of the Convention, but it resulted in a fifth unde-
mocratic feature of the constitution. As a consequence
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of the famous—or from a democratic point of view, in-
famous—“Connecticut Compromise” each state was,
as we have seen, awarded the same number of sena-
tors, without respect to population. Although this
arrangement failed to protect the fundamental rights
and interests of the most deprived minorities, some
strategically placed and highly privileged minorities—
slaveholders, for example—gained disproportionate
power over government polices at the expense of less
privileged minorities. (I shall come back to this ele-
ment in the constitution in a later chapter.)
Judicial power. Sixth, the constitution of the
Framers failed to limit the powers of the judiciary to
declare as unconstitutional laws that had been prop-
erly passed by Congress and signed by the president.
What the delegates intended in the way of judicial re-
view will remain forever unclear; probably many dele-
gates were unclear in their own minds, and to the ex-
tent that they discussed the question at all, they were
not in full agreement. But probably a majority ac-
cepted the view that the federal courts should rule on
the constitutionality of state and federal laws in cases
brought before them. Nevertheless, it is likely that
a substantial majority intended that federal judges
should not participate in making government laws and
policies, a responsibility that clearly belonged not to
the judiciary but to the legislative branch. Their oppo-
sition to any policy-making role for the judiciary is
strongly indicated by their response to a proposal in
the Virginia Plan that “the Executive and a convenient
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number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a
council of revision” empowered to veto acts of the Na-
tional Legislature. Though this provision was vigor-
ously defended by Madison and Mason, it was voted
down, 6 states to 3.17
A judicial veto is one thing; judicial legislation is
quite another. Whatever some of the delegates may
have thought about the advisability of justices sharing
with the executive the authority to veto laws passed by
Congress, I am fairly certain that none would have
given the slightest support to a proposal that judges
should themselves have the power to legislate, to
make national policy. However, the upshot of their
work was that in the guise of reviewing the constitu-
tionality of state and congressional actions or inac-
tions, the federal judiciary would later engage in what
in some instances could only be called judicial policy-
making—or, if you like, judicial legislation.18
Congressional power. Finally, the powers of Con-
gress were limited in ways that could, and at times did,
prevent the federal government from regulating or
controlling the economy by means that all modern
democratic governments have adopted. Without the
power to tax incomes, for example, fiscal policy, not to
say measures like Social Security, would be impos-
sible. And regulatory actions—over railroad rates, air
safety, food and drugs, banking, minimum wages, and
many other policies—had no clear constitutional au-
thorization. Although it would be anachronistic to
charge the Framers with lack of foresight in these
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02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 19
matters,19 unless the constitution could be altered by
amendment or by heroic reinterpretation of its provi-
sions—presumably by what I have just called judicial
legislation—it would prevent representatives of later
majorities from adopting the policies they believed
were necessary to achieve efficiency, fairness, and se-
curity in a complex post-agrarian society.
Enlightened as the Framers’ constitution may have
been by the standards of the eighteenth century, fu-
ture generations with more democratic aspirations
would find some of its undemocratic features objec-
tionable—and even unacceptable. The public expres-
sion of these growing democratic aspirations was not
long in coming.
Even Madison did not, and probably could not,
predict the peaceful democratic revolution that was
about to begin. For the American revolution was soon
to enter into a new and unforeseen phase.
The Framers’ Constitution Meets
Emergent Democratic Beliefs
We may tend to think of the American republic and its
constitution as solely the product of leaders inspired
by extraordinary wisdom and virtue. Yet without a citi-
zenry committed to republican principles of govern-
ment and capable of governing themselves in accor-
dance with those principles, the constitution would
soon have been little more than a piece of paper. As
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02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 20
historical experience would reveal, in countries where
democratic beliefs were fragile or absent, constitutions
did indeed become little more than pieces of paper—
soon violated, soon forgotten.
The American democratic republic was not cre-
ated nor could it have been long maintained by lead-
ers alone, gifted as they may have been. It was they, to
be sure, who designed a framework suitable, as they
thought, for a republic. But it was the American people,
and the leaders responsive to them, who ensured that
the new republic would rapidly become a democratic
republic.
The proto-republican phase. The ideas, practices,
and political culture necessary to sustain a republican
government were by no means unfamiliar to Ameri-
cans. Unlike some countries that have moved almost
overnight from dictatorship to democratic forms, and
often soon thereafter to chaos and back to dictator-
ship, by 1787 the Americans had already accumulated
a century and a half of experience in the arts of gov-
ernment.
The long colonial period had provided opportuni-
ties to both leaders and many men of ordinary rank
to become acquainted with the requirements of self-
government, both in the direct form of a town meeting
and through electing representatives to the colonial
legislatures.20 We easily forget that although in its two
famous opening paragraphs the Declaration of Inde-
pendence laid down some new and audacious claims,
in the rest of that document—the part few people
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02dahl.007_040 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 21
bother to read today—the authors mainly protested
against the British king for violating rights that, with
some exaggeration, they had previously enjoyed as
Englishmen.
The republican phase. The next phase, creating a
popular republic, had begun with the astounding dec-
laration on July 4, 1776, “that all Men are created
equal.” The Declaration marks the beginning of a se-
ries of events that went much further than simply
gaining independence from Britain. In what the histo-
rian Gordon Wood has called the “greatest Utopian
movement in American history,”21 the Declaration also
triggered a democratic revolution in beliefs, practices,
and institutions—or better, an evolution—that has con-
tinued ever since. The two decades since independ-
ence had provided still more, and deeper, experience
in the practices of self-government. Nor was this expe-
rience limited to a tiny minority. In some of the thir-
teen states, a fairly high proportion of adult males had
acquired the franchise.22
Toward a democratic republic. The lengthy colo-
nial and post-independence experience provided a
sturdy foundation for the efforts that Americans now
undertook in the next phase of the revolution, when
the new republic was transformed into a more demo-
cratic republic. To be sure, at the end of the eigh-
teenth century few Americans were ready to concede
that the principles of the Declaration, much less dem-
ocratic citizenship, applied to everyone.23 It would take
two more centuries of evolution in democratic beliefs
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before most Americans would be inclined to agree
that the famous claim in the Declaration might be re-
phrased: not just “all men,” but “all persons are cre-
ated equal.”
Yet always keeping in mind the huge and persistent
exceptions, by the standards prevailing elsewhere in
the world the extent of equality among Americans was
extraordinary. Alexis de Tocqueville, who observed
Americans during his year’s visit in 1831– 32, opened
his famous work with these words:
Among the novel objects that attracted my attention
during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me
more forcibly than the general equality of conditions. I
readily discovered the prodigious influence which this
primary fact exercises on the whole course of society, by
giving a certain direction to public opinion, and a cer-
tain tenor to the laws; by imparting new maxims to the
governing powers, and peculiar habits to the governed.
I speedily perceived that the influence of this fact
extends far beyond the political character and the laws
of the country, and that it has no less empire over civil
society than over the Government. . . .
The more I advanced in the study of American so-
ciety, the more I perceived that the equality of condi-
tion is the fundamental fact from which all others seem
to be derived, and the central point at which all my ob-
servations constantly terminated.24
During the three decades before Tocqueville ar-
rived, under the leadership of Jefferson, Madison, and
others, supporters of a more democratic republic had
already made some changes. The seismic shift from
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the views of the Framers and the Federalists is sym-
bolized by the changing name of the party that won
both the presidency and Congress in the election that
Jefferson called—as have later historians—the Revo-
lution of 1800. To defeat the Federalists, win the elec-
tion, and gain control of the new government, Jeffer-
son and Madison had created a political party that
they appropriately named the Democratic-Republican
Party. By 1832, with Andrew Jackson as its winning
candidate, the Democratic-Republican party became
the Democratic Party, plain and simple.25 The name
has stuck ever since.
Conservative delegates among the Framers—later
the core of the Federalist Party—had feared that if or-
dinary people were given ready access to power they
would bring about policies contrary to the views and in-
terests of the more privileged classes, which, as the
conservative delegates viewed their interests, were also
the best interests of the country. These conservative
fears were soon confirmed. Within a decade the emi-
nent Federalist leaders were pushed aside and the Fed-
eral Party became a minority party. A generation later
had seen the demise of both the party and its leaders.
If these changes justified some of the pessimism
about popular majorities of many of the Framers, their
pessimism proved unjustified in another important re-
spect. A substantial number of the Framers believed
that they must erect constitutional barriers to popular
rule because the people would prove to be an unruly
mob, a standing danger to law, to orderly government,
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and to property rights. Contrary to these pessimistic
appraisals, when American citizens were endowed with
the rights and opportunities to support demagogues
and rabble rousers, they chose instead to support law,
orderly government, and property rights. White male
Americans were, after all, mainly farmers who owned
their own land; or, where farm land was not easily
available because most of it had already been occu-
pied, they could count on the ready availability of good
farm land farther west—often obtained, to be sure,
at the expense of its earlier inhabitants, the Native
Americans.
White Americans in vast numbers bought western
land and settled down on their own farms. “Two-thirds
of the landless white men of Virginia moved West in
the 1790s. . . . Between 1800 and 1820, the trans-
Appalachian population grew from a third of a million
to more than two million.”26 In foreseeing a democratic
republic based on a citizen body consisting predomi-
nantly of independent farmers, mainly property owners
cultivating their own lands, Jefferson reflected the re-
ality of his time.27 Outside the South, and even in the
southern piedmont, a predominant number of Ameri-
can citizens were free farmers who stood to benefit
from an orderly government dependent on their votes.
Ordinary citizens also revealed strong beliefs in
democratic values and procedures. Presented with the
opportunity to do so, they would choose leaders who
cultivated democratic values and procedures. Just such
an opportunity was soon presented by four acts passed
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in 1798 by the Federalists, who were alarmed not only
by the seemingly subversive activities of France but
also by the rapidly growing influence of boisterous, ir-
reverent, and sometimes libelous opponents in the
new Republican party. In particular, the Federalists
employed one of these new laws, the Sedition Act, in
an effort to silence Republican critics. Notable among
the fourteen who were prosecuted was a bombastic and
somewhat unsavory Republican congressman, the Irish
immigrant Mathew Lyon, whose only memorable con-
tribution to American history was his conviction for
sedition, which carried a fine of a thousand dollars—a
huge amount in those days—and four months in jail.28
To the Republicans, the Sedition Act was a flagrant vio-
lation of the newly adopted First Amendment. After
they gained the presidency and control of Congress in
the election of 1800, the Sedition Act was allowed to
lapse, despite the vigorous efforts of the Federalists.
Democratic Changes to the
Framers’ Constitution: Amendments
The fate of the Alien and Sedition Acts symbolizes a
larger change at work in the country. The democratic
revolution, fitful and uncertain though it would for-
ever remain, not only helped to democratize the for-
mal constitution itself by amendments, it generated
new democratic political institutions and practices
within which the constitutional system would operate.
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The constitutional system that has emerged is no
longer that of the Framers, nor is it one they had in-
tended to create.
The Bill of Rights. To be sure, the first ten amend-
ments to the Constitution—the Bill of Rights—cannot
be attributed to the democratic revolution that fol-
lowed the Convention. They resulted instead from de-
mands within the Convention itself by delegates who
generally favored a more democratic system than their
colleagues could then accept. Among the most influen-
tial of these was George Mason, who wrote the Virginia
constitution and its Declaration of Rights. Responding
to the insistent demands of Mason and several others,
as well as to similar voices outside the Convention,
Mason’s fellow Virginian, James Madison, drafted ten
amendments that were ratified in 1789 – 90 by eleven
states, more than a sufficient number for their adop-
tion. (Incidentally, the two laggards, Georgia and Con-
necticut, finally did come around—but not until 1939!)
Thus, for all practical purposes the Bill of Rights was
a part of the original constitution. In any case, the
amendments have proved to be a veritable cornucopia
of expanding rights necessary to a democratic order.
29
Other Amendments
As I have mentioned, the most profound violation of
human rights permitted by the original constitution,
slavery, was not corrected until the adoption of the
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Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
between 1865 and 1870. In 1909 the Sixteenth Amend-
ment in 1913 gave Congress the power to enact in-
come taxes. The election of U.S. senators by state legis-
latures finally gave way to direct election with the
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.
Women were finally guaranteed the right of suffrage in
federal and state elections with the passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment in 1919. Although the effort
to add an Equal Rights Amendment failed, the Four-
teenth Amendment was later interpreted to provide
a constitutional basis for eliminating discrimination
against women as well as certain minorities whose
members suffered from discriminatory practices. The
iniquitous poll tax that had continued to bar African
Americans from voting in some southern states was fi-
nally forbidden in 1964 by the Twenty-Fourth Amend-
ment. Finally, in a move toward a more inclusive elec-
torate, in 1971 the Twenty-Sixth Amendment reduced
the voting age to eighteen.
In this halting fashion, the democratic revolution
belatedly worked its way through the Constitution to
overcome the veto power of long-entrenched minorities
and to eliminate some of the most flagrantly undemo-
cratic features of the constitution. As Alan Grimes ob-
served some years ago, of the twenty-six (now twenty-
seven) amendments to the constitution, “Twenty-one
amendments may be said to affirm either the principle
of democratic rights or that of democratic processes.”30
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Democratic Changes in
Political Practices and Institutions
The constitution of the Framers was changed not only
by formal amendments. It was also fundamentally al-
tered by political practices and institutions that the
Framers did not foresee, even though they were un-
avoidable—indeed, highly desirable—in a democratic
republic.
Political parties. Perhaps the most important of
these was the political party. The Framers feared and
detested factions, a view famously expressed by Madison
in Federalist No. 10.31 Probably no statement has been
so often cited to explain and justify the checks against
popular majorities that the Framers attempted to build
into the constitution. It is supremely ironic, therefore,
that more than anyone except Jefferson, it was Madison
who helped to create the Republican Party in order to
defeat the Federalists. Although the system would not
settle down for some years, Jefferson and Madison
helped to inaugurate the competitive two-party system
that has pretty much remained in place ever since.
Which suggests other questions. Despite the claim
of every political party everywhere in the world that it
truly represents the general interest, aren’t political
parties really “factions” in Madison’s sense? So did the
Framers fail after all to prevent government by fac-
tions? And did they succeed only in making it more
difficult for a majority faction to prevail—that is, a
party reflecting the interests of a majority coalition?
29
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Whatever the best answers to these hard ques-
tions, it cannot be denied that partisan politics trans-
formed the constitution. Despite their familiarity with
the role of the Tories and Whigs in Britain and nascent
parties in their own legislatures, the Framers did not
fully foresee that in a democratic republic political
parties are not only possible, they are also inevitable
and desirable. As Jefferson and Madison soon came to
realize, without an organized political party to mobi-
lize their voters in the states and their fellow support-
ers in the Congress, they could not possibly overcome
the entrenched political domination of their political
adversaries, the Federalists. The democratic rights in-
corporated in the Bill of Rights made parties possible;
the need to compete effectively made them inevitable;
the ability to represent citizens who would otherwise
not be adequately represented made them desirable.
Today we take for granted that political parties and
party competition are essential to representative de-
mocracy: we can be pretty sure that a country wholly
without competitive parties is a country without democ-
racy. If the Framers had been aware of the central im-
portance of political parties to a democratic republic,
would they have designed their constitution differently?
They might well have. At the very least they would not
have created the absurdity of an electoral college.
The electoral college. In an outcome the Framers
had made possible by their defective design of the
electoral college, the election of 1800 produced a tie
between Jefferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr.
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From the time the final results were known in late
December 1800, the deadlock in the electoral college
persisted, despite many attempts at persuasion and
compromise, until February 17, 1801, when shifts and
abstentions by a number of state delegations gave Jef-
ferson the presidency.32 Ironically, the very institution
that the Framers hoped would insulate the election of
the president from partisan politics was its first victim.
Although a similar fiasco was prevented in the future
by the Twelfth Amendment in 1804, even with the
amendment the electoral college was converted by par-
tisan politics into nothing more than a rather peculiar
and ritualized way of allocating the votes of the states
for president and vice president. Yet the electoral col-
lege still preserved features that openly violated basic
democratic principles: citizens of different states would
be unequally represented, and a candidate with the
largest number of popular votes might lose the presi-
dency because of a failure to win a majority in the elec-
toral college. That this outcome was more than a theo-
retical possibility had already occurred three times
before it was displayed for all the world to see in the
election of 2000. I’ll come back to the democratic
shortcomings of the electoral college in a later chapter.
The Democratic Revolution:
What Madison Learned—and Taught
James Madison arrived in Philadelphia in 1787, a few
months past his thirty-sixth birthday. He was already
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far from a political neophyte, having been elected at
the age of twenty-five to the Virginia constitutional
convention where, with George Mason, he helped to
draft the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the new
state constitution. He then became successively a mem-
ber of the Virginia legislature (though he failed to be
reelected because, it was said, he refused to treat the
voters to the customary rum punch), a delegate to the
Continental Congress, and again a member of the Vir-
ginia legislature. In the months before the Constitu-
tional Convention opened, he drafted the outline of
the proposal that would be presented in the opening
days of the Convention and that would come to be
known as the Virginia Plan. (We shall see something of
its contents in the next chapter.)
Yet, experienced as he was, like his fellow delegates
Madison brought to the Convention limited knowl-
edge of the institutions and practices that a more fully
democratized republic would require. Before his death
in 1836 at the age of eighty-five, nearly half a century
after the Convention, Madison could have looked back
on a rich body of experience that would have shaped
his constitutional views in many ways.
Following the Convention, he was elected to the
U.S. House of Representatives where he drafted and
introduced the first ten amendments to the Constitu-
tion—the Bill of Rights. With Jefferson he soon be-
came a leader of the opposition to Federalist policies
and ideas. As we have seen, they formed and led the
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opposition party, the Democratic Republicans. After
Jefferson’s election, Madison became secretary of
state. He then succeeded Jefferson in the presidency.
By the time he left that office in 1817, his views about
democratic political institutions were probably as well
informed as those of any person then alive.
However that may be, the Madison of seventy in
1821 was no longer the Madison of thirty-six in 1787.
Among other changes, the Madison of 1821 would
have trusted popular majorities—American popular
majorities, anyway—far more than the Madison of
1787. The mature and experienced Madison of 1821
might therefore have done less to check majority rule
and more to facilitate it. Let me offer several pieces of
evidence, one from a time early in his awakening to
the requirements of a democratic republic, the others
from his reflections in old age.
I have already alluded to the first: the basic alter-
ation in his views about “factions,” or what the two
distinguished historians of Federalism describe as
“Madison Revises The Federalist.”33 Madison’s views in
Federalist No. 10, influenced by his reading of David
Hume, are cited endlessly: the dangers of factions, the
threat from majorities united on principles contrary to
the general interest, political parties as at best a neces-
sary evil. But these were not his more mature views.
In January 1792, less than five years after the close
of the Convention, Madison begins to publish a series
of essays in The Gazette, an opposition newspaper
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published by Philip Freneau. The first is entitled “On
Parties.” In “every political society,” he writes, “parties
are unavoidable.” To combat their dangers, Madison
offers five proposals that might well serve us better in
our own time than the anti-majoritarian biases dis-
played in Federalist No. 10. Whatever dangers politi-
cal parties may pose can be overcome
“By establishing political equality among all.”
“By withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few,
to increase the inequality of property by an immoder-
ate, and especially unmerited, accumulation of riches.”
“By the silent operation of the laws, which, without vio-
lating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth to-
wards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence
toward a state of comfort.”
“By abstaining from measures which operate differently
on different interests, and particularly favor one inter-
est, at the expense of another.”
“By making one party a check on the other, so far as the
existence of parties cannot be prevented, nor their
views accommodated.”34
“If this is not the language of reason,” he went on to
say, “it is that of republicanism.”
Nearly thirty years later (around 1821), when he is
preparing his notes on the constitutional debates for
publication, he records some of his later reflections.
As to the right of suffrage, he remarks that his obser-
vations at the Convention “do not convey the speaker’s
[Madison’s] more full and matured view of the sub-
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ject.” “The right of suffrage,” he now insists, “is a fun-
damental Article in Republican Constitutions.” He
also makes explicit his view of political parties: “No
free Country,” he says, “has ever been without parties,
which are a natural offspring of Freedom.” But politi-
cal parties and a broad suffrage may create a conflict
over property. “An obvious and permanent division of
every people is into the owners of the Soil, and the
other inhabitants.” Consequently, if the suffrage is ex-
tended to citizens who are not freeholders, a majority
might threaten the property rights of the freeholders.
Madison then considers a number of possible solu-
tions to this problem, of which the first would be to re-
strict the suffrage to “freeholders, and to such as hold
an equivalent property.” He rejects this solution with
an observation that might well have been a central
principle of the Second Phase of the American Revo-
lution. “The objection to this regulation,” he writes, “is
obvious. It violates the vital principle of free Govt. that
those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a
voice in making them. And the violation wd. be more
strikingly unjust as the lawmakers became the minor-
ity.” A second option is “confining the right of suffrage
for one branch to the holders of property, and for the
other Branch to those without property.” But to do so
“wd. not in fact be either equal or fair.” Nor prudent:
“The division of the State into the two Classes . . .
might lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to
those between the Patricians and Plebeians at Rome.”
After examining other possibilities, he concludes:
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Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable
that the Mass of Citizens not be without a voice, in
making the laws which they are to obey, & in chusing
the Magistrates, who are to administer them, and if the
only alternative be between an equal & universal right
of suffrage for each branch of the Govt. and a confine-
ment of the entire right to a part of the Citizens, it is
better that those having the greater interest at stake
namely that of property & persons both, should be de-
prived of half their share in the Govt. than, that those
having the lesser interest, that of personal rights only,
should be deprived of the whole.35
The older Madison is also more favorable to ma-
jority rule. Like most of his contemporaries, Madison
believes that “all power in human hands is liable to be
abused.” But taking that assumption as axiomatic to-
gether with the need for government, the relevant
question becomes: what kind of government is best?
His answer remains unchanged:
In Governments independent of the people, the rights
and views of the whole may be sacrificed to the views of
the Government. In Republics, where the people gov-
ern themselves, and where, of course, the majority gov-
ern, a danger to the minority arises from opportunities
tempting a sacrifice of their rights to the interest, real
or supposed, of a majority. No form of government,
therefore, can be a perfect guard against the abuse of
power. The recommendation of the republican form is,
that the danger of abuse is less than any other.36
What has changed is his greater confidence in ma-
jority rule. Compared with its alternatives at least, the
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mature Madison is confident that majority rule, in the
words of Marvin Meyers, promises the “least imper-
fect government.”37
“[E]very friend to Republican Government,” he
writes in 1833, “ought to raise his voice against the
sweeping denunciation of majority Governments as the
most tyrannical and intolerable of all Governments.”
It has been said that all Government is an evil. It would
be more proper to say that the necessity of any govern-
ment is a misfortune. This necessity however exists; and
the problem to be solved is, not what form of govern-
ment is perfect, but which of the forms is least imper-
fect; and here the general question must be between a
republican Government in which the majority rule the
minority, and a government in which a lesser number or
the least number rule the majority.
The result . . . is, that we must refer to the moni-
tory reflection that no government of human device
and human administration can be perfect; that that
which is the least imperfect is therefore the best gov-
ernment; that the abused of all other governments have
led to the preference of republican government as the
best of all governments, because the least imperfect;
that the vital principle of republican government is the
lex majoris parties, the will of the majority.38
! ! !
I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT IF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
tutional Convention had been held in 1820, a very dif-
ferent constitution would have emerged from the de-
liberations—although, I hasten to add, we can never
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know what shape that constitution might have taken.
We can be reasonably sure, however, that the dele-
gates would have attempted to provide more support
for, and fewer barriers to, a democratic republic.
As to the undemocratic features of the constitution
created in 1787, let me suggest four conclusions.
First, the aspects of the constitution that are most
defective from a democratic point of view do not nec-
essarily all reflect the intentions of the Framers, inso-
far as we may surmise them. Though the flaws are
traceable to their handiwork, they are in some cases
flaws resulting from the inability of these superbly tal-
ented craftsmen to foresee how their carefully crafted
instrument of government would work under the chang-
ing conditions that were to follow—and most of all,
under the impact of the democratic revolution in which
Americans were, and I hope still are, engaged.
Second, some of the undemocratic aspects of the
original design also resulted from the logrolling and
compromises that were necessary to achieve agree-
ment. The Framers were not philosophers searching
for a description of an ideal system. Nor—and we may
be forever grateful to them for this—were they
philosopher kings entrusted with the power to rule.
They were practical men, eager to achieve a stronger
national government, and as practical men they made
compromises. Would the country have been better off
if they had refused to do so? I doubt it. But in any
case, they did compromise, and even today the consti-
tution bears the results of some of their concessions.
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I’ll have more to say on that point in my next chapter.
Third, undemocratic aspects that were more or
less deliberately built into the constitution overesti-
mated the dangers of popular majorities—American
popular majorities, at any rate—and underestimated
the strength of the developing democratic commit-
ment among Americans. As a result, in order to adapt
the original framework more closely to the require-
ments of the emerging democratic republic, with the
passage of time some of these aspects of the original
constitution were changed, sometimes by amendment,
sometimes, as with political parties, by new institu-
tions and practices.
Finally, though the defects seem to me serious and
may grow even more serious with time, Americans are
not much predisposed to consider another constitu-
tion, nor is it clear what alternative arrangements
would serve them better.
As a result, the beliefs of Americans in the legiti-
macy of their constitution will remain, I think, in con-
stant tension with their beliefs in the legitimacy of
democracy.
For my part, I believe that the legitimacy of the
constitution ought to derive solely from its utility as an
instrument of democratic government—nothing more,
nothing less. In my last chapter, I’ll reflect further on
the meaning of that judgment.
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chapter 3
The Constitution as a Model:
An American Illusion
M
ANY AMERICANS APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT OUR
constitution has been a model for the rest of
the democratic world.1 Yet among the coun-
tries most comparable to the United States and where
democratic institutions have long existed without break-
down, not one has adopted our American constitutional
system. It would be fair to say that without a single ex-
ception they have all rejected it. Why?
Before I explore that question, I need to clarify two
matters. As you may have noticed, rather than speaking
simply of “the constitution,” I’ve sometimes used the
phrase “the constitutional system.” I do so because I
want to include in a constitutional system an important
set of institutions that may or may not be prescribed in
the formal constitution itself: these are its electoral
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arrangements. As we’ll see, electoral systems can in-
teract in crucial ways with the other political institu-
tions and thereby determine the way they function.
Also, I’ve just referred to the countries where
democracy is oldest and most firmly established. We
could call them the older democracies, the mature
democracies, the stable democratic countries, and so
on, but I’ll settle on “the advanced democratic coun-
tries.” Whatever we choose to call them, in order to
compare the characteristics and performance of the
American constitutional system with the characteris-
tics and performance of the systems in other demo-
cratic countries, we need a set of reasonably compa-
rable democratic countries. In short, we don’t want to
compare apples and oranges—or good apples and rot-
ten apples.
I’ve noticed that we Americans often assure our-
selves of the superiority of our American political sys-
tem by comparing it with political systems in countries
ruled by nondemocratic regimes or in countries that
suffer from violent conflict, chronic corruption, fre-
quent chaos, regime collapse or overthrow, and the
like. On voicing or hearing criticism of political life in
the United States, an American not infrequently adds,
“Yes, but just compare it with X!,” a favorite X being
the Soviet Union during the Cold War and, after its
collapse, Russia. One could easily pick more than a
hundred other countries with political systems that by
almost any standard are unquestionably inferior to our
own. But comparisons like this are absurdly irrelevant.
42 t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l
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To my mind, the most comparable countries are
those in which the basic democratic political institu-
tions have functioned without interruption for a fairly
long time, let’s say at least half a century, that is, since
1950. Including the United States, there are twenty-
two such countries in the world.2 (See Appendix B, Ta-
bles 1 and 2.) Fortunately for our purposes, they are
also comparable in their relevant social and economic
conditions: not a rotten apple in the bunch. Not sur-
prisingly, they are mostly European or English speak-
ing, with a few outliers: Costa Rica, the only Latin
American country; Israel, the only Middle Eastern
country; and Japan, the only Asian country.
When we examine some of the basic elements in
the constitutional structures of the advanced demo-
cratic countries, we can see just how unusual the Amer-
ican system is. Indeed, among the twenty-two older de-
mocracies, our system is unique.3
Federal or Unitary
To begin with, among the other twenty-one countries
we find only six federal systems, in which territorial
units—states, cantons, provinces, regions, Länder—
are endowed by constitutional prescription and prac-
tice with a substantial degree of autonomy and with
significant powers to enact legislation. As in the United
States, in these federal countries the basic territorial
units, whether states, provinces, or cantons, are not
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simply legal creatures of the central government with
boundaries and powers that the central government
could, in principle, modify as it chooses. They are
basic elements in the constitutional design and in the
political life of the country.
As with the United States, so too in these other five
countries federalism was not so much a free choice as
a self-evident necessity imposed by history. In most,
the federal units—states, provinces, cantons—existed
before the national government was fully democra-
tized. In the extreme case, Switzerland, the consti-
tuent units were already in place before the Swiss
Confederation itself was formed from three Alpine
cantons in 1291, five centuries before America was
born. Throughout the following seven centuries the
Swiss cantons, now twenty in number,4 have retained a
robust distinctiveness and autonomy. In the outlier,
Belgium, federalism followed long after a unitary gov-
ernment had been imposed on its diverse regional
groups. As the brilliant period of Flemish painting,
weaving, commerce, and prosperity in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries reminds us, profound terri-
torial, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences be-
tween the predominantly Flemish and Walloon areas
existed long before Belgium itself became an inde-
pendent country in 1830. Despite the persistent cleav-
ages between the Flemish and Walloons, however,
federalism did not arrive until 1993 when the three
regions—Wallonia, Flanders, and Brussels—were fi-
nally given constitutional status. I should point out
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that the deep divisions between Walloons and Flemish
continue to threaten the survival of Belgium as a single
country.
The second and third features follow directly from
the existence of federalism.
Strong Bicameralism
A natural, if not strictly necessary, consequence of fed-
eralism is a second chamber that provides special rep-
resentation for the federal units. To be sure, unitary
systems may also have, and historically all have had, a
second chamber. However, in a democratic country
with a unitary system, the functions of a second cham-
ber are far from obvious. The question that was posed
during the American constitutional convention is bound
to arise: Exactly whom or whose interests is a second
chamber supposed to represent? And just as the Fram-
ers could provide no rationally convincing answer, so
too as democratic beliefs grow stronger in democratic
countries with unitary governments, the standard an-
swers become less persuasive—in fact, so unpersua-
sive to the people of the three Scandinavian countries
that they have all abolished their second chambers.
Like the state of Nebraska, Norway, Sweden, and
Denmark also seem to do quite nicely without them.
Even in Britain, the gradual advance of democratic
beliefs created an inexorable force opposed to the his-
torical powers of the House of Lords. As early as 1911
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the Liberals wiped out the power of the Lords to veto
“money bills” passed by the Commons. The continu-
ing advance of democratic beliefs during the past cen-
tury led in 1999 to the abolition of all but ninety-two
hereditary seats, whose occupants would be elected by
hereditary peers.5 The future of that ancient chamber
remains in considerable doubt.
By the end of the twentieth century, then, a
strongly bicameral legislature continued to exist in
only four of the advanced democratic countries, all of
them federal: in addition to the United States, these
were Australia, Germany, and Switzerland. Their exis-
tence poses a question: What functions can and should
a second chamber perform in a democratic country?
And in order to perform its proper functions, if any,
how should a second chamber be composed? As the
deliberations of the Parliamentary Commission on the
future of the House of Lords indicate, these questions
admit of no easy answer. It would not be surprising,
then, if Britain ends up with no real second chamber at
all, even if a ghostly shade of the upper house persists.
Unequal Representation
A third characteristic of federal systems is significant
unequal representation in the second chamber. By un-
equal representation I mean that the number of mem-
bers of the second chamber coming from a federal
unit such as a state or province is not proportional to
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its population, to the number of adult citizens, or to
the number of eligible voters. The main reason, per-
haps the only real reason, why second chambers exist
in all federal systems is to preserve and protect un-
equal representation. That is, they exist primarily to
ensure that the representatives of small units cannot
be readily outvoted by the representatives of large
units. In a word, they are designed to construct a bar-
rier to majority rule at the national level.
To make this clear, let me extend the range of the
term unequal representation to include any system
where, in contrast to the principle of “one person one
vote,” the votes of different persons are given unequal
weights. Whenever the suffrage is denied to some per-
sons within a system, we might say that their votes are
counted as zero, whereas the votes of the eligible citi-
zens are counted as one. When women were denied
the vote, a man’s vote effectively counted for one, a
woman’s for nothing, zero. When property require-
ments were required for the suffrage, property owners
were represented in the legislature, those below the
property threshold were not: like women their “votes”
counted for zero. Some privileged members of Parlia-
ment, like Edmund Burke, referred to “virtual repre-
sentation,” where the aristocratic minority repre-
sented the best interests of the entire country. But the
bulk of the people who were excluded easily saw
through that convenient fiction, and as soon as they
were able to they rejected these pretensions and
gained the right to vote for their own M.P.s. In nine-
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teenth-century Prussia, voters were divided into three
classes according to the amount of their property
taxes. Because each class of property owners was given
an equal number of votes irrespective of the vast dif-
ference in numbers of persons in each class, a wealthy
Prussian citizen possessed a vote that was effectively
worth almost twenty times that of a Prussian worker.6
To return now to the United States: as the Ameri-
can democratic credo continued episodically to exert
its effects on political life, the most blatant forms of
unequal representation were in due time rejected. Yet,
one monumental though largely unnoticed form of un-
equal representation continues today and may well
continue indefinitely. This results from the famous
Connecticut Compromise that guarantees two sena-
tors from each state.
Imagine a situation in which your vote for your
representative is counted as one while the vote of a
friend in a neighboring town is counted as seventeen.
Suppose that for some reason you and your friend
each change your job and your residence. As a result
of your new job, you move to your friend’s town. For
the same reason, your friend moves to your town.
Presto! To your immense gratification you now dis-
cover that simply by moving, you have acquired six-
teen more votes. Your friend, however, has lost sixteen
votes. Pretty ridiculous, is it not?
Yet that is about what would happen if you lived
on the western shore of Lake Tahoe in California and
moved less than fifty miles east to Carson City, Nevada,
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while a friend in Carson City moved to your commu-
nity on Lake Tahoe. As we all know, both states are
equally represented in the U.S. Senate. With a popula-
tion in 2000 of nearly 34 million, California had two
senators. But so did Nevada, with only 2 million resi-
dents. Because the votes of U.S. senators are counted
equally, in 2000 the vote of a Nevada resident for the
U.S. Senate was, in effect, worth about seventeen times
the vote of a California resident. A Californian who
moved to Alaska might lose some points on climate,
but she would stand to gain a vote worth about fifty-
four times as much as her vote in California.7 Whether
the trade-off would be worth the move is not for me
to say. But surely the inequality in representation it
reveals is a profound violation of the democratic idea
of political equality among all citizens.
Some degree of unequal representation also exists
in the other federal systems. Yet the degree of unequal
representation in the U.S. Senate is by far the most
extreme. In fact, among all federal systems, including
those in more newly democratized countries—a total
of twelve countries—on one measure the degree of
unequal representation in the U.S. Senate is exceeded
only by that in Brazil and Argentina.8
Or suppose we take the ratio of representatives in
the upper chamber to the populations of the federal
units. In the United States, for example, the two sena-
tors from Connecticut represent a population of slightly
above 3.4 million, while the two senators from its neigh-
bor New York represent a population of 19 million:
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a ratio of about 5.6 to 1. In the extreme case, the ratio
of over-representation of the least populated state,
Wyoming, to the most populous state, California, is just
under 70 to 1.9 By comparison, among the advanced
democracies the ratio runs from 1.5 to 1 in Austria to
40 to 1 in Switzerland. In fact, the U.S. disproportion
is exceeded only in Brazil, Argentina, and Russia.10
On what possible grounds can we justify this ex-
traordinary inequality in the worth of the suffrage?
A brief digression: rights and interests. A common
response is to say that people in states with smaller
populations need to be protected from federal laws
passed by congressional majorities that would violate
their basic rights and interests. Because the people in
states like Nevada or Alaska are a geographical minor-
ity, you might argue, they need to be protected from
the harmful actions of national majorities. But this re-
sponse immediately raises a fundamental question. Is
there a principle of general applicability that justifies
an entitlement to extra representation for some indi-
viduals or groups?
In searching for an answer, we need to begin with
an eternal and elementary problem in any governmen-
tal unit:11 whether the unit is a country, state, munici-
pality, or whatever, virtually all of its decisions will in-
volve some conflict of interests among the people of
the relevant political unit. Inevitably, almost any gov-
ernmental decision will favor the interests of some cit-
izens and harm the interests of others. The solution to
this problem, which is inherent in all governmental
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units, is ordinarily provided in a democratic system by
the need to secure a fairly broad consent for its deci-
sions by means, among other things, of some form of
majority rule. Yet if decisions are arrived at by majority
rule, then the possibility exists, as Madison and many
others have observed, that the interests of any minor-
ity will be damaged by a majority. Sometimes, fortu-
nately, mutually beneficial compromises may be found.
But if the interests of a majority clash irreconcilably
with those of a minority, then the interests of that mi-
nority are likely to be harmed.
Some interests, however, may be protected from
the ordinary operation of majority rule. To a greater or
lesser degree, all democratic constitutions do so.
Consider the protections that all Americans enjoy,
not just in principle but substantially in practice as
well. First, the Bill of Rights and subsequent amend-
ments provide a constitutional guarantee that certain
fundamental rights are protected whether a citizen
lives in Nevada or California, Rhode Island or Massa-
chusetts, Delaware or Pennsylvania. Second, an im-
mense body of federal law and judicial interpretation
based on constitutional provisions enormously extends
the domain of protected rights—probably far beyond
anything the Framers could have foreseen. Third, the
constitutional division of powers in our federal system
provides every state with an exclusive or overlapping
domain of authority on which a state may draw in
order to extend even further the protections for the
particular interests of the citizens of that state.
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The basic question. Beyond these fundamental
and protected rights and interests, do people in the
smaller states possess additional rights or interests that
are entitled to protection from policies supported by
national majorities? If so, what are they? And on what
general principle can their special protection be justi-
fied? Surely they do not include a fundamental right
to graze sheep or cattle in national forests or to extract
minerals from public lands on terms that were set
more than a century ago. Why should geographical lo-
cation endow a citizen or group with special rights and
interests, above and beyond those I just indicated, that
should be given additional constitutional protection?
If these questions leave me baffled, I find myself
in good company. “Can we forget for whom we are
forming a government?” James Wilson asked at the
Constitutional Convention. “Is it for men, or for the
imaginary beings called States?” Madison was equally
dubious about the need to protect the interests of
people in the small states. “ Experience,” he said, “sug-
gests no such danger. . . . Experience rather taught a
contrary lesson. . . . The states were divided into dif-
ferent interests not by their differences in size, but by
other circumstances.”12
Two centuries of experience since Madison’s time
have confirmed his judgment. Unequal representation
in the Senate has unquestionably failed to protect the
fundamental interests of the least privileged minorities.
On the contrary, unequal representation has some-
times served to protect the interests of the most privi-
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leged minorities. An obvious case is the protection of
the rights of slaveholders rather than the rights of their
slaves. Unequal representation in the Senate gave ab-
solutely no protection to the interests of slaves. On the
contrary, throughout the entire pre–Civil War period
unequal representation helped to protect the interests
of slave owners. Until the 1850s equal representation
in the Senate, as Barry Weingast has pointed out, gave
the “the South a veto over any policy affecting slavery.”
Between 1800 and 1860 eight anti-slavery measures
passed the House, and all were killed in the Senate.13
Nor did the Southern veto end with the Civil War. After
the Civil War, Senators from elsewhere were compelled
to accommodate to the Southern veto in order to secure
the adoption of their own policies. In this way the
Southern veto not only helped to bring about the end of
Reconstruction; for another century it prevented the
country from enacting federal laws to protect the most
basic human rights of African Americans.
So much for the alleged virtues of unequal repre-
sentation in the Senate.
Suppose for a moment we try to imagine that we
actually wanted the constitution to provide special pro-
tection to otherwise disadvantaged minorities by giv-
ing them extra representation in the Senate. What mi-
norities most need this extra protection? How would
we achieve it? Would we now choose to treat certain
states as minorities in special need of protection sim-
ply because of their smaller populations? Why would
we want to protect these regional minorities and not
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other, far weaker minorities? To rephrase James Wil-
son’s question in 1787: Should a democratic govern-
ment be designed to serve the interests of “the imagi-
nary beings called States,” or should it be designed
instead to serve the interests of all its citizens consid-
ered as political equals?
As I have said, the United States stands out among
twenty-two comparable democratic countries for the
degree of unequal representation in its upper chamber.
Of the half dozen that have federal systems and an
upper house designed to represent the federal units,
none come even close to the United States in the ex-
tent of its unequal representation in its upper house.
We begin to see, then, that our constitutional sys-
tem is unusual. As we continue our exploration we shall
discover that it is not merely unusual. It is one of a kind.
Strong Judicial Review of National Legislation
Not surprisingly, other federal systems among the older
democracies also authorize their highest national courts
to strike down legislation or administrative actions by
the federal units—states, provinces, and the like—
that are contrary to the national constitution. The case
for the power of federal courts to review state actions
in order to maintain a federal system seems to me
straightforward, and I accept it here. But the authority
of a high court to declare unconstitutional legislation
that has been properly enacted by the coordinate con-
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stitutional bodies—the parliament or in our system the
Congress and the president—is far more controversial.
If a law has been properly passed by the law-
making branches of a democratic government, why
should judges have the power to declare it unconstitu-
tional? If you could simply match the intentions and
words of the law against the words of the constitution,
perhaps a stronger case could be made for judicial re-
view. But in all important and highly contested cases,
that is simply impossible. Inevitably, in interpreting the
constitution judges bring their own ideology, biases,
and preferences to bear. American legal scholars have
struggled for generations to provide a satisfactory ra-
tionale for the extensive power of judicial review that
has been wielded by our Supreme Court. But the
contradiction remains between imbuing an unelected
body—or in the American case, five out of nine jus-
tices on the Supreme Court—with the power to make
policy decisions that affect the lives and welfare of
millions of Americans. How, if at all, can judicial re-
view be justified in a democratic order? I’ll discuss
that question in my last chapter.
Meanwhile, let me return to another aberrant as-
pect of the American constitutional system.
Electoral Systems
Earlier I explained that I wanted to use the term con-
stitutional system because some arrangements that are
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not necessarily specified in a country’s constitutional
document interact so strongly with the other institu-
tions that we can usefully regard them as a part of the
country’s constitutional arrangements. In that spirit, we
might want to reflect on the peculiarities of our elec-
toral system, which, natural as it may seem to us, is of a
species rare to the vanishing point among the advanced
democratic countries. Closely allied with it is an equally
rare bird, our much revered two-party system.
To be sure, our electoral system was not the doing
of the Framers, at least directly, for it was shaped less
by them than by British tradition. The Framers simply
left the whole matter to the states and Congress,14
both of which supported the only system they knew,
one that had pretty much prevailed in Britain, in the
colonies, and in the newly independent states.
The subject of electoral systems is fearfully com-
plex and for many people fearfully dull as well. I shall
therefore employ a drastic oversimplification, but one
sufficient for our purposes. Let me simply divide elec-
toral systems into two broad types, each with a variant
or two. In the one we know best, typically you can cast
your vote for only one of the competing candidates,
and the candidate with the most votes wins. In the
usual case, then, a single candidate wins office by gain-
ing at least one more vote than any of his or her oppo-
nents. We Americans tend to call this one-vote margin
a plurality; elsewhere, to distinguish it from an ab-
solute majority it may be called a relative majority.
To describe our system, American political scientists
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sometimes employ the cumbersome expression “single
member district system with plurality elections.” I pre-
fer the British usage: on the analogy of a horse race
where the winner needs only a fraction of a nose-
length to win, the British tend to call it the “first-past-
the-post” system.
If voters were to cast their ballots in the same pro-
portion in every district, the party with the most votes
would win every seat. In practice, as a result of varia-
tions from district to district in support for candidates,
a second party generally manages to gain some seats,
although its percentage of seats will ordinarily be
smaller than its percentage of votes. But the represen-
tation of third parties usually diminishes to the vanish-
ing point. In short, first-past-the-post favors two-party
systems.
The main alternative to first-past-the-post is pro-
portional representation. As the name implies, propor-
tional representation is designed to ensure that voters
in a minority larger than some minimal size—say, 5
percent of all voters—will be represented more or less
in proportion to their numbers. For example, a group
consisting of 20 percent of all voters might win pretty
close to 20 percent of the seats in the parliament.
Consequently, countries with proportional represen-
tation systems are also very likely to have multiparty
systems in which three, four, or more parties are rep-
resented in the legislature. In short, although the rela-
tionship is somewhat imperfect, in general a country
with first-past-the-post is likely to have a two-party
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system and a country with proportional representation
is likely to have a multiparty system.
In the most common system of proportional repre-
sentation, each party presents voters with a list of its
candidates; voters cast their votes for a party’s candi-
dates; each party is then awarded a number of seats
roughly in proportion to its overall share of the vote.
Countries with a list system may also permit voters to
indicate their preferences among the party’s candi-
dates. The party’s seats are then filled by the candi-
dates who are most preferred by the voters. Twelve of
the twenty-two advanced democratic countries employ
the list system of proportional representation, and an-
other six use some variant of it. (See Appendix B,
Table 3.)
Of the four countries without proportional repre-
sentation, France avoids one of the defects of single-
member districts by providing that in parliamentary
districts where no candidate receives an absolute ma-
jority of votes, a second election will be held in which
the two candidates with the highest number of votes
compete. This run-off, two-round, or double-ballot sys-
tem, as it is variously called, thereby ensures that all
the members have been elected by a majority of the
voters in their constituency.
This leaves the three oddballs with first-past-the-
post, a plurality system in single member districts:
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Even in the United Kingdom, the original source on
which the Americans drew, the traditional system was
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replaced by proportional representation in the 1999
elections to the newly created legislative bodies in
Scotland and Wales. Four parties won seats in the
Scottish Parliament, and four too in the Welsh Assem-
bly. What is more, the Independent Commission on
the Voting System set up by the Labor Party in 1997 to
recommend an alternative to first-past-the-post pro-
posed in its report a year later that members of the
House of Commons be elected by means of a propor-
tional representation system—a hybrid, to be sure,
but one that would ensure greater proportionality be-
tween votes and seats in that ancient house.15 It is al-
together possible that one day not far off, Britain will
be added to the list of proportional representation
countries, leaving only Canada and the United States
among the advanced democracies with first-past-the-
post.
Although few Americans know much about experi-
ence in the other advanced democratic countries with
proportional representation and multiparty systems,
they seem to have strong prejudices against both. Un-
willing to conceive of an alternative to first-past-the-
post and under pressure to ensure fairer representa-
tion for minorities in state legislatures and Congress,
our legislatures and federal courts in recent years have
sometimes gerrymandered weirdly shaped districts. . .
well, yes, rather like a salamander. But neither legisla-
tures nor courts seem willing to give serious thought
to some form of proportional representation as quite
possibly a better alternative.
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The extent to which we take first-past-the-post for
granted was clearly revealed in 1993, when it was dis-
covered that a well-qualified candidate to head the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice had
written an article in a law journal suggesting that a
rather sensible system of proportional representation
might be worth considering as a possible solution to the
problem of securing more adequate minority repre-
sentation.16 From the comments the author’s innocent
heresy generated, you might have thought that she had
burned the American flag on the steps of the Supreme
Court. Her candidacy, naturally, was stone dead.
First-past-the-post was the only game in town in
1787 and for some generations thereafter. Like the
locomotive, proportional representation had not yet
been invented. It was not fully conceived until the
mid-nineteenth century when a Dane and two Eng-
lishmen—one of them John Stuart Mill—provided a
systematic formulation. Since then it has become the
system overwhelmingly preferred in the older democ-
racies.
After more than a century of experience with other
alternatives, isn’t it time at last to open our minds to
the possibility that first-past-the-post may be just fine
for horse races but might not be best for elections in a
large and diverse democratic country like ours? Might
we not also want to consider the possible advantages
of a multiparty system?
I do not say that we should necessarily make these
choices. But should we not at least give them serious
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consideration? Shouldn’t we ask ourselves this ques-
tion: What kind of electoral and party systems would
best serve democratic ends?
Party Systems
Nearly a half-century ago, a French political scientist,
Maurice Duverger, proposed what came to be called
Duverger’s Law: first-past-the-post electoral systems
tend to result in two-party systems. Conversely, pro-
portional representation systems are likely to produce
multiparty systems.17 Although the causal relation may
be more complex than my brief statement of Du-
verger’s Law suggests,18 a country with a proportional
representation system is likely to require coalition gov-
ernments consisting of two or more parties. In a coun-
try with a first-past-the-post electoral system, however,
a single party is more likely to control both the execu-
tive and the legislature. Thus in countries with propor-
tional representation–multiparty systems and coalition
governments, minorities tend to be represented more
effectively in governing. By contrast, in countries with
first-past-the-post and two-party systems, the govern-
ment is more likely to be in the hands of a single party
that has gained a majority of seats in the parliament
and the most popular votes, whether by an outright
majority, or more commonly, a plurality. To distinguish
the two major alternatives, I’ll refer to the propor-
tional representation–multiparty countries as “propor-
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tional” and countries with first-past-the-post electoral
systems and only two major parties as “majoritarian.”19
Where does the United States fit in? As usual: in
neither category. It is a mixed system, a hybrid, nei-
ther predominantly proportional nor predominantly
majoritarian. (See Appendix B, Table 4.) I am going to
return to the American hybrid in Chapter 5, but three
brief observations may help to put it in perspective
here. First, the Framers had no way of knowing about
the major alternatives to first-past-the-post, much less
fully understanding them. Second, since the Framers’
time most of the older and highly stable democratic
countries have rejected first-past-the-post and opted
instead for proportional systems. Third, our mixed de-
sign contributes even further to the unusual structure
of our constitutional system.
Our Unique Presidential System
As we make our way through the list of countries that
share some constitutional features with the United
States, the list, short to begin with, diminishes even fur-
ther. By the time we reach the presidency the United
States ceases to be simply unusual. It becomes unique.
Among the twenty-two advanced democracies, the
United States stands almost alone in possessing a single
popularly elected chief executive endowed with im-
portant constitutional powers—a presidential system.
Except for Costa Rica, all the other countries govern
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themselves with some variation of a parliamentary sys-
tem in which the executive, a prime minister, is chosen
by the national legislature. In the mixed systems of
France and Finland, most of the important constitu-
tional powers are assigned to the prime minister, but
an elected president is also provided with certain pow-
ers—chiefly over foreign relations. This arrangement
may lead, as in France, to a president from one major
party and a prime minister from the opposing party, a
situation that with a nice Gallic touch the French call
“cohabitation.” Yet even allowing for the French and
Finnish variations, none of the other advanced demo-
cratic countries has a presidential system like ours.
Why is this? The question breaks down into sev-
eral parts. Why did the Framers choose a presidential
system? Why didn’t they choose a parliamentary sys-
tem? Why have all the other advanced democratic
countries rejected our presidential system? Why have
they adopted some variant of a parliamentary system
instead, or as in France and Finland a system that is
predominantly parliamentary with an added touch of
presidentialism?
To answer these questions in detail would go be-
yond our limits here. But let me sketch a brief answer.
Before I do so, however, I want to admonish you
not to cite the explanation given in the Federalist
Papers. These were very far from critical, objective
analyses of the constitution. If we employ a dictionary
definition of propaganda as “information or ideas me-
thodically spread to promote or injure a cause, nation,
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l 63
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etc.,” then the Federalist Papers were surely propa-
ganda. They were written post hoc by partisans—
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison—
who wanted to persuade doubters of the virtues of the
proposed constitution in order to secure its adoption
in the forthcoming state conventions. Although they
were very fine essays indeed, and for the most part
much worth reading today, they render the work of
the convention more coherent, rational, and compel-
ling than it really was. Ironically, by the way, the task
of explaining and defending the Framers’ design for
the presidency was assigned to Hamilton, who had
somewhat injudiciously remarked in the Convention
that as to the executive, “The English model was the
only good one on this subject,” because “the heredi-
tary interest of the king was so interwoven with that of
the nation. . . and at the same time was both suffi-
ciently independent and sufficiently controuled [sic],
to answer the purpose.” He then proposed that the ex-
ecutive and one branch of the legislature “hold their
places for life, or at least during good behavior.”20 Per-
haps as a result of these remarks, Hamilton seems to
have had only a modest influence in the Convention
on that matter or any other.
How it came about. What is revealed in the most
complete record of the Convention21 is a body floun-
dering in its attempts to answer an impossibly difficult
question: How should the chief executive of a republic
be selected, and what constitutional powers should be
assigned to the executive branch? The question was im-
64 t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l
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possibly difficult because, as I emphasized in the pre-
vious chapter, the Framers had no relevant model of
republican government to give them guidance. Most
of all, they lacked any suitable model for the executive
branch. To be sure, they could draw on the sacred doc-
trine of “separation of powers.” Not surprisingly, the
references to that doctrine recorded in Madison’s notes
were all positive. And up to a point, its implications
were obvious: a republic would need an independent
judiciary, a bicameral legislature consisting of a popular
house and some kind of second chamber to check the
popular house, and an independent executive.
But how was the independent executive to be cho-
sen? How independent of the legislature and of the
people should he be? How long should his term of of-
fice be? (“He” is, of course, the language of Article II
and, like most Americans until recently, the only way
the Framers could conceive of the office.) The British
constitution was a helpful model for the Framers in
some respects. But as a solution to the problem of the
executive, it utterly failed them. Despite the respect of
the delegates for many aspects of the British constitu-
tion, a monarchy was simply out of the question.22
Even so, they might have chosen a democratic ver-
sion of the parliamentary system, as the other evolving
European democracies were to do. Although they were
unaware of it, even in Britain a parliamentary system
was already evolving. Why then didn’t the Framers
come up with a republican version of a parliamentary
system?
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l 65
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 65
Well, they almost did. It has been too little empha-
sized, I think, that the Framers actually came very
close to adopting something like a parliamentary sys-
tem. What is more, it is far from clear, to me at least,
why they rejected it and ended up instead with a pres-
idential system.23 One obvious solution—even more
obvious to us today than it would have been in 1787—
was to allow the national legislature to choose the ex-
ecutive. In fact, throughout most of the Convention
this was their favored solution. Right off the bat on
June 2, only two weeks after the Convention opened,
the Virginia delegation, which contained some of the
best minds and most influential delegates, proposed
that the national executive should be chosen by the na-
tional legislature. In Madison’s notes, the subsequent
course of that proposal and the alternatives to it has
left a fascinating and often mystifying trail.
The meandering trail they pursued, as best I can
reconstruct it, looks something like this.24 On three
occasions—July 17, July 24, and July 26—the dele-
gates vote for the selection of the president by “the na-
tional legislature,” the first time by a unanimous vote,
the last by a vote of 6 – 3. With one exception every
other alternative is defeated by substantial majorities:
in a puzzling detour on July 19, with Massachusetts di-
vided, they vote 6 – 3 for electors appointed by the
state legislatures. On July 26, their favored solution,
election by the national legislature, is forwarded to a
Committee on Detail. On August 6 the committee duly
reports in favor of election by the national legislature.
66 t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l
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On August 24 two other alternatives fail once again. A
new committee to consider the issue reports back on
September 4. By now the delegates are eager to wind
up a convention that has already gone on for three
months. In contradiction to the recommendation of
the previous committee, however, this one recom-
mends that the executive be chosen by electors ap-
pointed by the state legislatures. Two days later, with
nine states in favor and only two opposed, the impa-
tient delegates adopt this solution.
Well, not exactly. What they adopt actually states
that: “Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the
legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors,
equal to the whole number of Senators and representa-
tives to which the State may be entitled in Congress.”
Whatever the Framers intend by these words, they will
offer a huge opportunity for the democratic phase of
the American revolution to democratize the presidency.
Ten days after they agree on this provision, the
constitution is signed and the Convention adjourns.
What this strange record suggests to me is a group
of baffled and confused men who finally settle on a so-
lution more out of desperation than confidence. As
events were soon to show, they had little understand-
ing of how their solution would work out in practice.
So the question remains with no clear answer: Why,
finally, did they fail to adopt the solution they had
seemed to favor, a president elected by the Congress, a
sort of American version of a parliamentary system? The
standard answer no doubt has some validity: they feared
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l 67
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 67
that the president might be too beholden to Congress.
And all the other alternatives seemed to them worse.
Among these alternatives was election by the
people, which had been twice rejected overwhelm-
ingly. Yet it was this twice-rejected solution, election
by the people, that was quickly adopted de facto dur-
ing the democratic phase of the American revolution.
How their solution failed. Perhaps in no part of
their work did the Framers fail more completely to
design a constitution that would prove acceptable to a
democratic people. As I have mentioned, their hope
for a group of electors who might exercise their inde-
pendent judgments about the best candidate to fill the
office came a cropper following the election of 1800.
But as I shall describe in the next chapter, more was
still to come. If the election of 1800 first revealed how
inappropriate the electoral college was in a democratic
order, the presidential election of 2000, two centuries
later, dramatized for all the world to witness the con-
flict between the Framers’ constitution and the demo-
cratic ideal of political equality.
Ironically, had they adopted the Virginia Plan and
placed the choice of the chief executive in the hands of
the legislature, as would become the practice in parlia-
mentary systems, the Framers would have put a bit
more distance between the people and the president
than their solution provided in practice. Here again, in
1787 they could not anticipate a constitutional design
that was yet to evolve fully in Britain and, even later, in
other countries on the path to democracy.
68 t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 68
The continuing democratic revolution would bring
about an even more profound change in the presi-
dency. However deftly Jefferson steered the Congress
as he rode the tide of the democratic revolution, he
never publicly challenged the standard view that the
only legitimate representative of the popular will was
the Congress, not the president. Nor did any of his
successors, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, lay
down such a claim.
Andrew Jackson did just that. In justifying his use
of the veto against Congressional majorities, as the
only national official who had been elected by all the
people and not just by a small fraction, as were Sena-
tors and Representatives, Jackson insisted that he alone
could claim to represent all the people. Thus Jackson
began what I have called the myth of the presidential
mandate: that by winning a majority of popular (and
presumably electoral) votes, the president has gained
a “mandate” to carry out whatever he had proposed
during the campaign.25 Although he was bitterly at-
tacked for this audacious assertion, which not all later
presidents supported, it gained credibility from its re-
assertion by Lincoln, Cleveland, Theodore Roosevelt,
and Wilson and was finally nailed firmly in place by
Franklin Roosevelt.
Whatever we may think of the validity of the
claim—I am inclined to think it is little more than a
myth created to serve the political purposes of ambi-
tious presidents—it is simply one part of a transforma-
tion of the presidency in response to democratic ideas
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l 69
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 69
and beliefs that has produced an office completely dif-
ferent from the office that the Framers thought they
were creating, vague and uncertain as their intentions
may have been.
And a good thing, too, you may say. But if you ap-
prove of the democratization of the presidency—or, as I
would prefer to say, its pseudo-democratization—aren’t
you suggesting in effect that the constitutional system
should be altered to meet democratic requirements?
Why other countries became parliamentary de-
mocracies. There is still one more reason why the
Framers didn’t choose a parliamentary system. They
had no model to inspire them. One hadn’t yet been in-
vented.
The British constitutional system they knew, and in
some respects admired, was already on its way to his-
tory’s attic of abandoned or failed constitutions. Al-
though no one saw it clearly in 1787, even at the time
of the Convention the British constitution was under-
going rapid change. Most important, the monarch was
swiftly losing the power to impose a prime minister on
the parliament. The contrary assumption was gaining
strength: that a prime minister must receive a vote of
confidence from both houses of parliament, and that
he must resign if and whenever he lost their confi-
dence. But this profound change in the British consti-
tution did not become fully manifest until 1832, too
late for the Framers to see its possibilities.
In addition, there was the problem of a monarch.
How could a country have a parliamentary system
70 t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 70
without a symbolic head of state who would perform
ceremonial functions, symbolize the unity of the coun-
try, and help to confer legitimacy on the parliament’s
choice by anointing him as prime minister? After the
evolution of a parliamentary system in Britain, in due
time monarchies also helped the Swedes, the Danes,
and the Norwegians—and much later Japan and
Spain—to move to a parliamentary system that the
monarchy helped to legitimize. But in 1787 the full
development of parliamentary democracy in countries
with a monarchy was still a long way off. For Ameri-
cans, a monarch, even a ceremonial monarch, was com-
pletely out of the question. So why didn’t they split the
two functions, ceremonial and executive, by creating a
titular head of state to serve in the place of a ceremo-
nial monarch, and a chief executive, the equivalent of
a prime minister, to whom executive functions would
be assigned? Although that arrangement may seem
obvious enough to us now, for the Framers in 1787 it
was even more distant than the system that was gradu-
ally evolving in Britain, the country they knew best. It
was not until after 1875 and the installation of the
Third Republic in France that the French evolved a
solution that would later be adopted in many other de-
mocratizing countries: a president elected by the par-
liament, or in some cases by the people, who serves as
formal head of state, and a prime minister chosen by
and responsible to the parliament, who serves as the
actual chief executive. But for the Framers this inven-
tion, which now seems obvious enough to us, was al-
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l 71
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 71
most as far off and about as difficult to imagine, per-
haps, as a transcontinental railroad.
Without intending to do so, then, the Framers cre-
ated a constitutional framework that under the driving
impact of the continuing American Revolution would
develop a presidency radically different from the one
they had in mind. In time American presidents would
gain office by means of popular elections—a solution
the Framers rejected and feared—and by combining
the functions of a head of state with those of a chief
executive the president would be the equivalent of
monarch and prime minister rolled into one.
I can’t help wondering whether the presidency
that has emerged is appropriate for a modern demo-
cratic country like ours.
! ! !
SO: AMONG THE OLDER DEMOCRACIES OUR CONSTITU-
tional system is not just unusual. It is unique.
Well, you might say, being unique isn’t necessarily
bad. Perhaps our constitutional system is better for it.
Better by what standards? Is it more democratic?
Does it perform better in many ways? Or worse?
These questions are by no means easy to answer—
probably impossible to answer with finality. But before
turning to them, we need to take one more look at that
anomalous vestige of the Framers’ work, the electoral
college.
72 t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a s a m o d e l
03dahl.041_072 11/27/01 4:39 PM Page 72
appendix a
On the Terms
“Democracy” and “Republic”
T
HE VIEW THAT THE FRAMERS INTENDED TO
create a republic, not a democracy, probably
has its origins in comments by Madison in
Federalist No. 10. Although there as elsewhere he also
used the expression “popular government” as a kind of
generic term, he distinguished further between “a
pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting
of a small number of persons, who assemble and ad-
minister the government in person,” and a “republic,
by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place.” “The two great points of
difference between a democracy and a republic are:
first, the delegation of the government, in the latter,
to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater
08dahlAppA.159_162 11/27/01 4:41 PM Page 159
sphere of the country, over which the latter may be ex-
tended.”1
Here Madison was making the common distinction
that political scientists and others would later differen-
tiate as “direct democracy” and “representative de-
mocracy.” For it was as evident to the Framers as it is
to us that given the size of a nation composed of the
thirteen existing states, with more to come, “the
people” could not possibly assemble directly to enact
laws, as they did at the time in New England town
meetings and had done two millennia earlier in Greece,
where the term “democracy” was invented. It was per-
fectly obvious to the Framers, then, that in such a
large country, a republican government would have to
be a representative government, where national laws
would be enacted by a representative legislative body
consisting of members chosen directly or indirectly by
the people.
Madison was probably also influenced by a long
tradition of “republicanism” that in both theory and
practice leaned somewhat more toward aristocracy, lim-
ited suffrage, concern for property rights, and fear of
the populace than toward a broadly based popular gov-
ernment more dependent on “the will of the people.”
It is also true, however, that during the eighteenth
century the terms “democracy” and “republic” were
used rather interchangeably in both common and
philosophical usage.2 Madison, in fact, was well aware
of the difficulty of defining “republic.” In Federalist
No. 39, he posed the question “What, then, are the
160 o n t h e t e r m s “ d e m o c r a c y ” a n d “ r e p u b l i c ”
08dahlAppA.159_162 11/27/01 4:41 PM Page 160
distinctive characters (sic) of the republican form?” In
response he pointed to the enormous range of mean-
ings given to the word “republic.” “Were an answer to
this question to be sought . . . in the application of the
term by political writers, to the constitutions of differ-
ent states, no satisfactory one could ever be found.
Holland, in which no particle of the supreme authority
is derived from the people, has passed almost univer-
sally under the denomination of a republic. The same
title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute
power over the great body of the people is exercised,
in the most absolute manner, by a small body of here-
ditary nobles.”
In view of this ambiguity, Madison proposed that
“we may define a republic to be . . . a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people, and is administered by
persons holding their offices during pleasure, or for a
limited period, or during good behavior.”3 By defining
a republic as a government which derives all its pow-
ers “directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people,” Madison now seems to be contradicting the
distinction he had drawn earlier in Federalist No. 10.
We might read his struggle with definitions as a fur-
ther illustration of the prevailing confusion over the
two terms.
If further evidence were needed of the ambiguity
of terminology, we could turn to a highly influential
writer whose work was well known to Madison and
many of his contemporaries. In The Spirit of the Laws
o n t h e t e r m s “ d e m o c r a c y ” a n d “ r e p u b l i c ” 161
08dahlAppA.159_162 11/27/01 4:41 PM Page 161
(1748) Montesquieu had distinguished three kinds of
governments: republican, monarchic, and despotic.
Republican governments were of two kinds: “When, in
a republic, the people as a body have the sovereign
power, it is a Democracy. When the sovereign power is
in the hands of a part of the people, it is called an Aris-
tocracy.”4 But Montesquieu also insisted that “It is in
the nature of a republic that it has only a small terri-
tory: without that it could scarcely exist.”5
Although the Framers differed among themselves
as to how democratic they wanted their republic to be,6
for obvious reasons they were of one mind about the
need for a representative government. But as events
soon showed, they could not fully determine just how
democratic that representative government would be-
come—under the leadership of, among others, James
Madison.
162 o n t h e t e r m s “ d e m o c r a c y ” a n d “ r e p u b l i c ”
08dahlAppA.159_162 11/27/01 4:41 PM Page 162
WAC Workshop #2: Revisions
Political Science 10W
Winter 2022
WAC TA: Margaret Hanson
ticket-ins
• I hope taking the time to go over your TA comments was useful as you plan your revisions!
• Remember that the work you did in your ticket-in might also be useful for your cover letter
• explaining how you incorporated your TAs comments
• asking for feedback on specific areas 🡪what was helpful?
arguments and thesis statements
• As a whole, your paper should make a cohesive, debatable argument that answers the prompt question(s)
• In your introduction, you will set up your argument with a thesis statement, which
• Makes a debatable claim
• Makes an argument in support of that claim
• Can be multiple sentences
• Depends on the evidence you will discuss in the rest of your paper
• Is clearly stated and fully explained
• Your claim should provide a clear answer to the central
question: “Have we failed to achieve our country?”
• In order to create a complete thesis, you also need to make
an argument in support of that claim. To construct your
argument, answer the prompt’s follow up questions: How
has the US achieved/failed its ideals? What has made
success possible/impossible?
• In order to answer these questions, you will have to define
your criteria for success/failure.
• Your thesis should be based on the evidence you
find in the readings
• You might change your thesis to better
reflect the arguments in your body
paragraphs
• read
through the paper
• compare your conclusion and
introduction
• You might change your thesis to
incorporate new evidence
• Does the evidence from the new
readings contradict or complicate your
argument?
• Did you miss important evidence in
your first draft?
• If your evidence is complex, your thesis should
be too.
body paragraphs—key components
• Together, your body paragraphs should provide enough evidence + analysis to fully support your thesis
• Each body paragraph should have a clear focus + point. This should be stated in a topic sentence at the beginning
of the paragraph
• The point made in each paragraph should (1) provide support for your thesis and (2) be supported by
evidence
• Integrating evidence into your body paragraph
• All quotes/examples should be contextualized + introduced using signal phrases
• All examples/details/information should be cited, whether or not you use a direct quote
• All quotes and examples should be analyzed: make sure to explain why your evidence is significant and how
it supports your point/thesis
• Use transitions + refer to earlier paragraphs to show how your evidence fits together and guide your reader
through the paper
body paragraphs—key components
•If it’s useful, you can remember paragraph components using the acronym TAXES
• Topic: a sentence establishing the focus of the paragraph
• Assertion: a statement of the paragraph’s argument/main point
• eXamples: evidence to support the assertion(s)
• Explanation: analysis of how the evidence supports the assertion(s)
• Significance: analysis of how the assertions/evidence support the thesis
• I have posted a short reading explaining the TAXES model on canvas.
body paragraphs—grammar and style
• All quotes should be grammatically integrated into the sentence
• Try to keep quotes under 3 lines, if they are longer, use a block quote
• In general, if a body paragraph should be about half a page. If it gets much longer (over 1 page is too long!), try to
break it up
• It’s okay if two paragraphs provide different evidence to support the same point
• Parenthetical citations should match the beginning of your works cited entries. For most sources in this class, that
will be the author(s)’s name(s).
example: How Democracies Die (60-67)
example: How Democracies Die (60-67)
• Each body paragraph should have a clear focus + point. This
should be stated in a topic sentence at the beginning of the
paragraph
• The point made in each paragraph should (1) provide
support for your thesis and (2) be supported by
evidence
• Integrating evidence into your body paragraph
• All quotes/examples should be contextualized +
introduced using signal phrases
• All examples/details/information should be cited,
whether or not you use a direct quote
• All quotes and examples should be analyzed: make sure
to explain why your evidence is significant and how it
supports your point/thesis
• Use transitions + refer to earlier paragraphs to show how
your evidence fits together and guide your reader through
the paper
example: How Democracies Die (60-67)
• Each body paragraph should have a clear focus + point. This
should be stated in a topic sentence at the beginning of the
paragraph
• The point made in each paragraph should (1) provide
support for your thesis and (2) be supported by
evidence
• Integrating evidence into your body paragraph
• All quotes/evidence should be contextualized +
introduced using signal phrases
• All examples/details/information should be cited,
whether or not you use a direct quote
• All quotes and examples should be analyzed: make sure
to explain why your evidence is significant and how it
supports your point/thesis
• Use transitions + refer to earlier paragraphs to show how
your evidence fits together and guide your reader through
the paper
example: How Democracies Die (60-67)
• Each body paragraph should have a clear focus + point. This
should be stated in a topic sentence at the beginning of the
paragraph
• The point made in each paragraph should (1) provide
support for your thesis and (2) be supported by
evidence
• Integrating evidence into your body paragraph
• All quotes/evidence should be contextualized +
introduced using signal phrases
• All examples/details/information should be cited,
whether or not you use a direct quote
• All quotes and examples should be analyzed: make sure
to explain why your evidence is significant and how it
supports your point/thesis
• Use transitions + refer to earlier paragraphs to show how
your evidence fits together and guide your reader through
the paper
revising body paragraphs
• Together, your body paragraphs should provide enough evidence + analysis to fully support your thesis
• Each body paragraph should have a clear focus + point. This should be stated in a topic sentence at the beginning
of the paragraph 🡪make sure the opening sentences establish the focus & argument in the rest of the paragraph
• The point made in each paragraph should (1) provide support for your thesis and (2) be supported by
evidence
• Integrating evidence into your body paragraph
• All quotes/examples should be contextualized + introduced using signal phrases 🡪would a reader unfamiliar
with the course be able to tell where your quotes were coming from?
• All examples/details/information should be cited, whether or not you use a direct quote 🡪would a reader be
able to find & verify the evidence you’re using?
• All quotes and examples should be analyzed: make sure to explain why your evidence is significant and how
it supports your point/thesis 🡪do you explain how your evidence supports your point? If not, can you explain
it? Do you need better evidence? Do you need to change your topic sentence?
• Use transitions + refer to earlier paragraphs to show how your evidence fits together and guide your reader
through the paper 🡪Do the points in this paragraph connect to, build on, or rely on something you discussed
earlier in the paper? Are these connections clear to the reader?
finding evidence
• Read with questions in mind
• Think about connections between readings
• Consider any evidence that relates to your provisional thesis (even if it contradicts your argument)
During the February 7 Lecture (~42:25 on the recording), Dr. Rohr brought up Anderson’s argument about southern
politicians efforts to make black economic independence impossible and asked about their motivation.
How would Glaude answer Dr. Rohr’s question?
How Democracies Die
intro. & ch. 1-3
2/16/22, 4:00 PM
Writing Assignment #2
https://elearn.ucr.edu/courses/35132/assignments/301852 1/2
Writing Assignment #2
Due Friday by 11:59pm Points 100 Submitting a file upload Attempts 0
Allowed Attempts 2
Start Assignment
Background:
In Federalist Paper no. 10 James Madison presents part of his vision of what America could be because
of the structure of the Constitution—a representative republic free from the oppression of minority or
majority factions. Many of the texts for this course present a similar notion of what America can or
should be (i.e. a democratic, egalitarian society). But, these texts also address the ways in which we
have failed to live up to this ideal or how we have failed to “achieve our country”…
Primary Question:
For this assignment begin writing an argumentative, thesis-driven essay answering the following
questions:
Have we failed to achieve our country? Why or why not?
If so, what has kept the United States from living up to its ideals?
If not, in what ways has the US lived up to its ideals?
And, is it possible to achieve our country with our Constitution in its current state? Why or
why not?
Requirements:
You must have a debatable/argumentative thesis statement.
To address this question you must use Federalist Paper no. 10, The Constitution, How
Democratic is the American Constitution?, How Democracies Die.
You must also use at least 2 of the following sources (Uneasy Alliances, Democracy in Black,
White Rage)
DO NOT incorporate outside research unless you have cleared it with your TA.
DO NOT cite lecture. Go to the sources themselves. Lecture will not count as a valid source.
1750-2000 words (double spaced, Times New Roman, 12 point font, 1” margins)
Use whatever formatting style you prefer unless your TA specifies their preference.
Cover page including your name, TA’s name, class, date, title of paper, and one paragraph (200-300
words [does not count towards your overall word count]) explaining how you incorporated your TA’s
2/16/22, 4:00 PM Writing Assignment #2
https://elearn.ucr.edu/courses/35132/assignments/301852 2/2
comments into your revised draft as well as any particular parts of the paper you would like them to
focus on.
In-text citations as well as a works cited page
Please remember, this is a rough draft. You will likely not have a fully articulated argument in this
assignment. But we want to see that you have engaged with the material and are moving in the
direction of original scholarship. Because this is a rough draft, your grade will largely be
dependent on the existence of an argument (even though it may not be fully articulated), your
understanding of the material, the use of resources, and the quality of writing. Meeting all of the
requirements above will also factor into your grade.
2/16/22, 4:00 PM
Writing Assignment #1
https://elearn.ucr.edu/courses/35132/assignments/290833 1/2
Writing Assignment #1
Due Jan 28 by 11:59pm Points 100 Submitting a file upload Attempts 1
Allowed Attempts 2 Available after Jan 14 at 12pm
New Attempt
Background:
In Federalist Paper no. 10 James Madison presents part of his vision of what America could be because
of the structure of the Constitution—a representative republic free from the oppression of minority or
majority factions. Many of the texts for this course present a similar notion of what America can or
should be (i.e. a democratic, egalitarian society). But, these texts also address the ways in which we
have failed to live up to this ideal or how we have failed to “achieve our country”…
Primary Question:
For this assignment begin writing an argumentative, thesis-driven essay answering the following
questions:
Have we failed to achieve our country? Why or why not?
If so, what has kept the United States from living up to its ideals?
If not, in what ways has the US lived up to its ideals?
And, is it possible to achieve our country with our Constitution in its current state? Why or
why not?
Requirements:
You must have a debatable/argumentative thesis statement.
To address this question you must use Federalist Paper no. 10, The Constitution, How
Democratic is the American Constitution?, and How Democracies Die.
DO NOT incorporate outside research unless you have cleared it with your TA.
DO NOT cite lecture. Go to the sources themselves. Lecture will not count as a valid source.
750-1000 words (double spaced, Times New Roman, 12 point font, 1” margins)
Use whatever formatting style you prefer unless your TA specifies their preference.
Cover page including your name, TA’s name, class, date, title of paper, and one paragraph (100-200
words [does not count towards your overall word count]) explaining what you feel most confident
about in your paper and what you’re most concerned about.
In-text citations as well as a works cited page
2/16/22, 4:00 PM Writing Assignment #1
https://elearn.ucr.edu/courses/35132/assignments/290833 2/2
Total Points: 100
Rubric
Criteria Ratings Pts
5 pts
5 pts
20 pts
20 pts
15 pts
20 pts
15 pts
Please remember, this is a rough draft. You will likely not have a fully articulated argument in this
assignment. But we want to see that you have engaged with the material and are moving in the
direction of original scholarship. Because this is a rough draft, your grade will largely be
dependent on the existence of an argument (even though it may not be fully articulated), your
understanding of the material, the use of resources, and the quality of writing. Meeting all of the
requirements above will also factor into your grade.
Cover Page
Does the student have a cover page which includes all of the necessary information (including
your name, TA’s name, class, date, title of paper, and one paragraph (100-200 words
explaining what you feel most confident about in your paper and what you’re most concerned
about)?
Thesis
Does the student have a debatable/argumentative thesis statement that adequately answers
the prompt?
Argument
Does the student translate the argument in their thesis to the paper itself, and do they do so
convincingly?
Prose
Is the paper well written?
Organization
Is the paper as a whole well organized? And, is there good organization of the argument within
the paragraphs themselves?
Material
Does the student show a good understanding of the course material?
Evidence
Is evidence well-used throughout the paper and is it cited correctly? Are all necessary sources
used?
Name: Sihua Lin
TA’s name: Zachary Larsen
Class: POSC 010W 001
Date: 1/28/2022
The factors that made the U.S. fail to achieve its country
I am relatively confident that the arguments I make and the evidence I find fit
together, but I am not sure if they are accurate. I have some concerns about whether
my in-depth thinking about my argument is consistent with what I want to say in the
evidence. And I also have concerns about the adequacy of the analysis after listing the
evidence, after combining my arguments and evidence to validate them. I feel that the
content of each of my paragraphs is relatively sparse and not close enough, they are
each paragraph separately looks and feels quite good, but when combined always
feels strange.
If a country wants to be prosperous and stable, then there must be a
government and a ruling party to manage and restrain the country and reach a
consensus on governance with the people living and active in this country to
consolidate the country’s development. The United States has been fulfilling this
concept since the War of Independence and since the founding of the country, and has
also developed steadily and rapidly into a superpower. Nowadays, the internal
contradictions in the United States are becoming more and more obvious, and the
proud concept of democracy is slightly crumbling and stubborn. The United States
has not yet achieved its country, or to some extent does not fulfill and realize the ideal.
While the United States has demonstrated a great power internationally and set an
example in every way, irreversible racial tensions and pernicious social attitudes have
emerged within the country.
Through these years of observation, I found that the presidential election with
democratic common consultation as the primary concept does not seem to be so
strong, or rather the people are the people and the electors are separated from each
other. In “How Democratic is the American Constitution?” Dahl also has questions
about this: “how many readers of these lines have ever participated in a referendum
that asked them whether they wished to continue to be governed under the existing
constitution? The answer, of course, is: none.”(Page 2). I know that the U.S.
Constitution is very intertwined and complex, which makes it difficult for a lot of
popular analysis and thoughtfulness to get into the process, but it has to at least show
us some sort of sign of review and presentation of the various critiques of the people,
right? And during this Covid 19, we and the world saw a more “remarkable” side of
the United States. And does this phenomenon confirm that there is some kind of hole
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
“In recent times, polarization has once again become a major issue in American politics” works here too
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Stubborn in what regard?
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
This is a good start – I would potentially make this one sentence and take out the “or to some extent” section
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
I’m confused by your phrasing here. Are you talking about the process of the electoral college not being inherently democratic?
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
I would shorten this quote and consider being more specific with your usage of quotation here. This quote doesn’t serve your argument
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Again, not sure what you mean here. The constitution being complicated should not in of itself be a criteria for whether or not it’s democratic. Most democracies have complex systems of rules and norms that govern how they function
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
In what regard? Again, be specific
or missing part in the present century-old iteration of the Constitution? The answer is
yes.
Is there a problem with the electoral rigor of the country’s presidency that
leads to electoral irrationality? This means that as the election system has been
improved and added to over the course of history, the system that was relatively stable
at one point in time has become less solid and less reasonable. Or perhaps the
inclusion of various election conditions makes the election system too saturated and
cracks a hole, thus allowing those who wish to exploit it. The best expression of this
view is the Trump administration. In “How Democracies Die,” it claims that “And in
2016, for the first time in U.S. history, a man with no experience in public office, little
observable commitment to constitutional rights, and clear authoritarian tendencies
was elected president.”(page 2). A person with no prior military or government
service has been the president. This presents an essential problem in the election
process. I think it was the Covid 19 that indirectly affected the smooth
implementation of “the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the
Journal.”(“The US Constitution” section 5) part of the constitution. This is like the
relationship between fans and stars, which star has more fans then the star will be able
to gain the right to speak. This is also extremely contrary to and impedes the idea of a
democratic state.
The United States is a multiracial country and its social components are very
diverse. This means that the interactions and intermingling of the various ethnic
groups will gradually form new social groups. It also creates all sorts of disorganized
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Why though? In a democracy the more popular candidate *should* be the won winning the most votes. That’s why it’s called the “popular vote”
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
What are you trying to say here?
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
What is the deficiency here?
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Your paper overall is way too general. I need more context as to what you’re referring to here. Are you talking about the inclusion of minority groups in the electorate?
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Why does it present an issue? Explain your argument
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
What does popularity have to do with the overall vote percentage? This is both a confusing and surface-level analysis of popular sovereignty
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Your quote usage and integration is lacking. Again, what does adding this quote here add to your argument?
small groups that can influence and intrude into larger groups. And this phenomenon,
of course, has a direct impact on the purity of the faction and these small groups will
be pulled in by the Republic. In “Federalist Paper no. 10,” James states “the greater
number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass
of republican than of democratic government.”(Page 3). It seems that the Republic is
better at uniting small groups and using more combined minds and intelligence to
confront the enemy. This is also a kind of provocation and vigilance against
democracy. After all, the number of people is strong, and whoever has a large group
with the ability to think can take the initiative to grasp the overall situation.
The above-mentioned reasons are only the tip of the iceberg of American
society. After all, the American group and society are too complicated because of
immigration from many regions and countries. And this long-term accumulation of
factors is very difficult to control and integrate, which also requires the United States
to improve and spread the concept of democracy and accept some analysis and
criticism from more voters and audiences to reach a new consensus. In addition, I also
believe that with the mature constitution-making process of the United States, it is
possible to find a way to break the situation.
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Your paper needs a lot of work. Please review my comments and see a writing tutor or go to the ARC center for your next draft.
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
James Madison. Full names for authors
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
What do you mean “it seems”? You need to be authoritative with your argument if you want it to be convincing. Your argument needs more evidence here
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Why? Be specific
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Need a works cited page
Zachary Larsen
144930000000023314
Is your argument that the fact that America is multicultural is its weakness?
Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America
by Paul Frymer
1. TA’s comment is only under assignment #1 / Submission Details / View Feedback.
2. The most helpful is the comment in the first body paragraph of my writing. The TA
reminded me that I had to speak about a specific event rather than the general problem.
3. I think the assistant coach said the comments he gave were very sharp and pointed
out my problems directly, he gave impeccable comments.
4. TA’s comment: “Your paper overall is way too general. I need more context as to
what you’re referring to here. Are you talking about the inclusion of minority groups
in the electorate?” He said what I wrote is the way too general and it is. Not only this
comment, but also in the comments that follow this question. The arguments I listed
are not detailed and in-depth enough, and the evidence I gave does not strongly
support my arguments. This is what I need to pay attention to in my next writing.
5. I think I need to revise and improve too much, maybe I still need to redefine my
thesis statement and writing style. But the most important things are the evidence and
analysis.
6. When I was halfway through reading the TA’s comments, I was thinking that the
main problem was the evidence I gave didn’t quite fit the thesis statement. Both of
these are areas that I need to improve.
7. I need to re-read Federalist Paper no. 10, The Constitution, How Democratic is the
American Constitution?, How Democracies Die and look for evidence that fits my
argument, and this time I have to focus more on a specific of evidence.
Name: Sihua Lin
TA’s name: Zachary Larsen
Class: POSC 010W 001
Date: 1/28/2022
The factors that made the U.S. fail to achieve its country
I am relatively confident that the arguments I make and the evidence I find fit together, but I am not sure if they are accurate. I have some concerns about whether my in-depth thinking about my argument is consistent with what I want to say in the evidence. And I also have concerns about the adequacy of the analysis after listing the evidence, after combining my arguments and evidence to validate them. I feel that the content of each of my paragraphs is relatively sparse and not close enough, they are each paragraph separately looks and feels quite good, but when combined always feels strange.
If a country wants to be prosperous and stable, then there must be a government and a ruling party to manage and restrain the country and reach a consensus on governance with the people living and active in this country to consolidate the country’s development. The United States has been fulfilling this concept since the War of Independence and since the founding of the country, and has also developed steadily and rapidly into a superpower. Nowadays, the internal contradictions in the United States are becoming more and more obvious, and the proud concept of democracy is slightly crumbling and stubborn. The United States has not yet achieved its country, or to some extent does not fulfill and realize the ideal. While the United States has demonstrated a great power internationally and set an example in every way, irreversible racial tensions and pernicious social attitudes have emerged within the country.
Through these years of observation, I found that the presidential election with democratic common consultation as the primary concept does not seem to be so strong, or rather the people are the people and the electors are separated from each other. In “How Democratic is the American Constitution?” Dahl also has questions about this: “how many readers of these lines have ever participated in a referendum that asked them whether they wished to continue to be governed under the existing constitution? The answer, of course, is: none.”(Page 2). I know that the U.S. Constitution is very intertwined and complex, which makes it difficult for a lot of popular analysis and thoughtfulness to get into the process, but it has to at least show us some sort of sign of review and presentation of the various critiques of the people, right? And during this Covid 19, we and the world saw a more “remarkable” side of the United States. And does this phenomenon confirm that there is some kind of hole or missing part in the present century-old iteration of the Constitution? The answer is yes.
Is there a problem with the electoral rigor of the country’s presidency that leads to electoral irrationality? This means that as the election system has been improved and added to over the course of history, the system that was relatively stable at one point in time has become less solid and less reasonable. Or perhaps the inclusion of various election conditions makes the election system too saturated and cracks a hole, thus allowing those who wish to exploit it. The best expression of this view is the Trump administration. In “How Democracies Die,” it claims that “And in 2016, for the first time in U.S. history, a man with no experience in public office, little observable commitment to constitutional rights, and clear authoritarian tendencies was elected president.”(page 2). A person with no prior military or government service has been the president. This presents an essential problem in the election process. I think it was the Covid 19 that indirectly affected the smooth implementation of “the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal.”(“The US Constitution” section 5) part of the constitution. This is like the relationship between fans and stars, which star has more fans then the star will be able to gain the right to speak. This is also extremely contrary to and impedes the idea of a democratic state.
The United States is a multiracial country and its social components are very diverse. This means that the interactions and intermingling of the various ethnic groups will gradually form new social groups. It also creates all sorts of disorganized small groups that can influence and intrude into larger groups. And this phenomenon, of course, has a direct impact on the purity of the faction and these small groups will be pulled in by the Republic. In “Federalist Paper no. 10,” James states “the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government.”(Page 3). It seems that the Republic is better at uniting small groups and using more combined minds and intelligence to confront the enemy. This is also a kind of provocation and vigilance against democracy. After all, the number of people is strong, and whoever has a large group with the ability to think can take the initiative to grasp the overall situation.
The above-mentioned reasons are only the tip of the iceberg of American society. After all, the American group and society are too complicated because of immigration from many regions and countries. And this long-term accumulation of factors is very difficult to control and integrate, which also requires the United States to improve and spread the concept of democracy and accept some analysis and criticism from more voters and audiences to reach a new consensus. In addition, I also believe that with the mature constitution-making process of the United States, it is possible to find a way to break the situation.