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How the Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland Settlement in the 1790s
Author(s): Wendy St. Jean
Source: Tennessee Historical Quarterly , SPRING 2009, Vol. 68, No. 1 (SPRING 2009), pp.
2-19
Published by: Tennessee Historical Society
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42628109
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Historian asserted Settlement James that (todays the Henry Cumberland Nashville) Malone
asserted that the Cumberland
Settlement (todays Nashville)
“would have been entirely destroyed and the
pioneers murdered and scalped, but for the
restraining influence of the small Chickasaw
nation.” The Chickasaws proved themselves
to be good friends and allies of the Tennessee
settlers and contributed much to the safety
and survival of the settlement. In their oppo-
sition to the hostile Creek nation, they ulti-
mately helped to pacify the frontier and
assure security for Americans in the tumul-
tuous and formative period of early nine-
teenth United States frontier history. But why
was the Chickasaw nation, which numbered
only 800 warriors and about 2,000 people
altogether, so important to the early settlers of
Tennessee? According to the U.S agent to the
Chickasaws, General James Robertson, Creek
raids on the early Tennessee settlement abated
when the Creeks became preoccupied with
the hostile Chickasaws. In 1795 the governor
of the Southwest Territory, William Blount
praised the Chickasaws in even grander
terms: “What do the United States not owe
to the Chickasaws?” Here he noted their suc-
cessful challenge to an emergent anti-
American Southern Indian Confederacy
headed by Creeks.1
The Chickasaws were the smallest but
also the most cohesive of the agricultural
societies that pre-dated Tennesseans settle-
ment. They were an agricultural people and
had been since about 700 A.D. when maize
cultivation thrived in the Southeast. Like
other Indians in this region, including the
Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks, the
Chickasaws developed a system of beliefs
oriented around the yearly cycle of the
crops, with deities such as the Sun, Moon,
and the Corn Mother. They also developed
an elaborate social system based on hierar-
chical rank, clan membership, and descent
through the female line.2 Although they
shared cultural characteristics with the
Creeks, Cherokees, and Choctaws, the
Chickasaws developed an independent strat-
egy for surviving Euro-American expansion
into their lands in northern Mississippi and
western Tennessee. In direct opposition to
the Creeks effort to unite the Southern
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This content downloaded from “What do the United States not owe the Chickasaws?” The small nation’s location and
competition with the more numerous Creeks led the Chickasaws to be allies of the early
Tennessee settlers. (From The Southern Frontier 1670-1732 , 1929)
Indians into a military alliance funded by
Spain, the Chickasaws chose accommoda-
tion as the best strategy for dealing with the
U.S. and Tennessee governments.
Governor Manuel Lemos de Gayoso of
Spanish Louisiana observed that the
Chickasaws refused to join the Indian
Confederacy, “for the sake of showing that
they are a people by themselves.”3
Membership in the Southern Confederacy
would have subjected them to the will of
the Creeks and put them on the warpath
against their best prospective trading part-
ners. On their own, Chickasaw leaders
steered a course that maximized their mili-
tary and diplomatic strength while fostering
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economic ties to the developing well situated for trade and offered the
Chickasaws “What Supplies of Ammunition
they May Want” to hunt game and ward off
enemies.4
Judging that the U.S. was a stronger
party than the Creeks and other Indian mili-
tants combined, the Chickasaws established
friendships with their white neighbors, espe-
cially their agent Robertson. The Chickasaws
viewed the Creeks as foolhardy for depend-
ing exclusively on the ill-supplied Spanish
whose support was limited, and whose fear
of direct confrontation with Americans was
obvious.5 Whereas the Creeks’ numerical
superiority to the Chickasaws and their
white neighbors gave them a false sense of
their might, the Chickasaws never believed
that they could resist U.S. armies and The Chickasaws would not pick a battle
with the American Republic that they were
sure to lose. They knew it was futile to American settlers. Chickasaw war chief
Piomingo pointed out the southern Indians’
relative weakness before Tennessee militias
and the US army, stating in a speech to the
Creeks: “If you had any prospect of Kiling
and Driving the white people back to where
they come from it mite have answered a
Good End enough . . . but you had no
prospect of any such hopes.”6 He criticized
the Creeks for “Railing at me … for Trying
to live in peace [with the Americans] and
save my land; as we are but few the Only
method we could take to secure it.”7
The roots of Chickasaw-Creek animos-
ity ran deep, but the Chickasaws’ conflict
with Kentucky frontiersmen during the
American Revolution gave no indication
that they would prove fast friends to
Tennesseans. In 1781, the Chickasaws
drove American settlers from Fort Jefferson.
At the war’s end, they explained that they
had not cared about the British-American
quarrel, except to the extent that they
meant to protect their hunting grounds.
Now, as Americans flooded into Tennessee
and Kentucky, the Chickasaws faced a more
formidable foe than any Indian or Euro-
American army of the past. American fron-
tiersmen clamored for their lands, backed
by state governments run by land specula-
tors. Desirous to reestablish peace and
trade, the Chickasaws negotiated separate
treaties with Virginia in 1783, Spain in The Creeks were outraged when a
Chickasaw delegation signed the Hopewell
Treaty (1786) with the U.S. government. Mountain Leader, the Chickasaw chief used
his honorific title “Piomingo” (also spelled
Opoia Minko) when he engaged in formal
negotiations at Hopewell. Most likely,
“Piomingo” was derived from “minko”
(chief) and “hopayi” (medicine man). To
the Chickasaws, religion and warfare were
inseparable categories. War chiefs were
This content downloaded from Chickasaw Chief Piomingo desired peace
and trade with the new United States,
especially Tennessee. His friendship with,
and defense of, the Cumberland Settlement
helped lead to the Creek-Chickasaw War
of 1795-1796. “(Piomingo statue in Fair
Park, Tupelo, Miss.)
expected to enjoy divine favor and to have
dreams and premonitions that foretold the
outcome of battles/ Having spent part of
his youth among the Cherokees, Piomingo
was fluent in Cherokee and counted several
Cherokee leaders among his friends. His
Cherokee affiliation probably accounts for
his nickname Mountain Leader, for
Americans referred to the Cherokees, who
lived among the Blue Ridge Mountains, as At Hopewell, the Chickasaws relin-
quished an area five miles in diameter on
the Tennessee River in exchange for annu-
ities and a trading post. This was a major
commitment in support of the Americans
and the Tennessee settlers. When the
Cherokees and Creeks protested that the
Chickasaws had ceded common hunting
grounds, Piomingo dismissed their claims.
Alexander McGillivray, the Creeks’ leading
war chief, determined to prevent Americans
from gaining a foothold in the southeastern
interior. He warned the Chickasaws “to
take care & not be duped by their promis-
es.”10 Spanish Governor Gayoso attributed
the Chickasaw-Creek dispute to “the inti-
macy of a great part of the [Chickasaw] William Panton, who worked for the
Spanish, expected the Chickasaws to cave
into Creek demands that they break off cials. If the Chickasaws stood by the
Americans, he wrote, they would “be cut to
pieces in one month” by the Creeks and
“become a lost people.”12
Most Chickasaws wanted to avoid war
with the Creeks, if only because, with a
population of more than 20,000 people,
the Creeks greatly outnumbered them. In
1787, the Chickasaws persuaded Governor
George Mathews of North Carolina to
insert “a clause” in his treaty with the
Creeks “that they should forebear to com-
mit hostilities on us as we are too weak to
do anything of consequence against the
Creeks.”13 However, Chief McGillivray and
his confederates, the “Creeks, Cherokees,
& a small tribe of the Delawares then liv-
ing on the Tennessee River” ignored the
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Chickasaws’ peace overtures and sent war
parties to harass them. In addition,
McGillivray’s warriors ambushed nearly
every American trader, messenger, and
packhorseman that tried to enter the
Chickasaws’ towns. McGillivray said the
deaths would serve as a warning to the
Chickasaws not to “concert with any people
against us.”14 After Creek warriors attacked
Major John Doughty of Tennessee’s party
and stole the supplies intended for the
Chickasaws, Doughty survived the raid and
wrote an account of the Chickasaws’ situa-
tion. The Chickasaws sided with the
Americans because they needed ammuni- “Pressed as the Chicasaws & Choctaws are
by the Kickapoos & Wabash Indians on Doughty observed, “it is in their Interest &
Wish to be connected with us.”15
Chief McGillivray threatened to kill
“the friends of the Americans among the
Chickasaws” if they engaged in trade with
U.S. settlers.16 Because Piomingo had per-
sonally promised to protect the trading
route to his country, the Natchez Path,
“from the plundering [Creek] parties,”
McGillivray targeted him for assassination.17
Although McGillivray failed to wipe out
Piomingo, his war parties killed Piomingo’s
closest relatives.18 McGillivray claimed that
“the Chickesaw Nation are Content (what-
ever pio Mingo Can Say to the Contrary) to
put up with the loss of that Chiefs Brother
&C Son as having fallen in Bad Company.”19
Piomingo was anything but content, for
the spirits of his beloved relatives demanded
blood revenge. Still, without provisions and
war supplies, he was too weak to avenge the
white traders and Chickasaw escorts who
McGillivray had killed. He journeyed to
Virginia, Tennessee, and New York to drum
up American military support for an anti-
Creek campaign. Wherever he went, gover-
nors welcomed him and gave him arms to
use in his Creek campaign.20
In 1792, while Piomingo and other warriors stole their horses, and their head-
men refused to restore them. One Spanish
informant thought war imminent, remark-
ing that “the death of Piomingo’s Nephew
for which he has long breathed Vengeance
will now be urged again to involve them in
a War.”21 Indeed, Piomingo brushed aside
Spanish efforts to reconcile the Chickasaws
and Creeks, stating the Creeks “kill all the
white traders in the nation and pillage any-
thing they can lay their hands on. . . we are
going to take revenge.”22
Creek assaults on the Chickasaws were
indiscriminate, and soon the Creeks killed
the nephew of another Chickasaw chief,
the Spanish partisan Wolf’s Friend, better
known to Cumberland settlers as the
Ugly Cub (a play on his Indian name
Ugulayacabe). The Spanish commissary
reported, “He weeps continually,” and now
demanded “complete revenge to which knives . . . asking them to declare war also
on the Creeks.”23 To the Chickasaws like
Piomingo and Ugulayacabe, who had lost
This content downloaded from near relations, the Creeks posed a more
immediate threat than American expansion.
Individual Chickasaws had their own rea-
sons for war, which included blood
vengeance and personal quarrels with the
Creeks over access to trade, land cessions,
hunting grounds, horse theft, and the cus-
tody of runaway slaves.
Without the prospect of American and
Choctaw aid, the Chickasaws could not
have retaliated for Creek injuries. over the Choctaws, who numbered over
twelve thousand persons, the Chickasaws
garnered diplomatic leverage from their
association with the larger tribe.24 Several
Choctaws became Piomingos followers in bounty. A war faction of Choctaws was
reportedly loyal to Piomingo, who
“instructs them in everything that happens
in the Nation.”25 A much larger nation, the
Choctaws preferred neutrality to the
Chickasaws open defiance of the anti- had common interest with them in this war.
As the Chickasaws maintained, the Creeks
kept them poor and would “give nobody
any peace in this Contry.”26 Baron Francisco
Luis Hector De Carondelet XV, Governor
of Spanish Louisiana, feared that the
Chickasaws would “always draw along the
Choctaws with it.”27 His spy and commis-
sary to the Chickasaws and Choctaws, Don
Juan de la Villebreuve, maintained that the
Choctaws were likely to get “mixed up in it”
if Choctaws married to Chickasaw women
were killed.28 In fact, Choctaw chief
Franchimastabe warned Spanish officials
that he was obligated by marriage ties to
assist the Chickasaws.29
The Choctaws never actually sent any
warriors to assist the Chickasaws, who pre-
sumably exaggerated the strength of the
Chickasaw-Choctaw military alliance. In
the resource-dwindling Mississippi Valley,
the Chickasaws and Choctaws regarded
each other alternatively as friends and as
economic rivals.- In one instance, a party of
Chickasaw warriors asked the Spanish not
to permit the Choctaws to trade at their new
post, stating that when “the Choctaws
learned that there was here a trading post
they would run to it and establish their
hunting grounds in this vicinity to their
great prejudice which might be the ruin of
their nation.”30 The Chickasaws were deter-
mined to promote their distinct interests as
they perceived them.
The Chickasaw nation as a whole did
not support a Creek war until the Creeks
challenged them with an atrocity. Governor
Blount gave this account of the 1793 out- Chickasaws were in the hunting grounds
fifteen miles from the towns where a party
of Creeks fired on them, and killed one,
besides scalping him as is usual they were
much hacked and mangled his body, and
threw it into a pond. The Chickasaws
immediately called a national council and .
. . unanimously determined to make war
against the Creeks.” Piomingo stirred up
his people at the Creeks’ insult, relating,
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” [The Creeks] have made very light of us .
. . saying that [as] we were but a handfull of
people, they could lay us desolate in a little
time.” Such contempt demanded a nation-
al response. The Chickasaws fortified their
towns and prepared for the worst.
The Chickasaws took a calculated risk.
They would not be bullied by Creek harass-
ment so long as they had powerful Indian
and white allies. Instead of backing down to
Creek threats, Chickasaw warriors looked to
Americans, their cannons and their rifles, to
strengthen the Chickasaws’ position relative
to the Creeks. The Spanish orchestrated an
uneasy truce between the Creeks and the
Chickasaws. As Governor Blount reported,
“The Creek and Chickasaw war does not go
on with the ferocity and spirit that might be
expected, owing it is said to Mr. [William]
Panton having informed the Creeks, that if
red people went to war with each other that
he would withhold all supplies of arms and
ammunition.”31 Governor Carondelet
feared that a Creek warrior would mistaken-
ly kill a Choctaw, and thereby ignite a mas-
sive Choctaw-Chickasaw-Creek war, and
perhaps draw Spaniards and Americans into
the field. The Chickasaws were content to
wait until they had stronger assurances of
American intervention in a full-scale war
against the Creeks.32
To help the Chickasaw take care of Creek militants in 1 792, General Anthony Wayne sent
the Chickasaws 500 stands of arms and 10,000 pounds of lead, powder, and flint.
(Library of Congress)
In building a Chickasaw-American Americans fears of a pan-Indian confeder-
ation by reminding Americans that if their
concerns were ignored, they would join and Southeast. The U.S. agent to the south-
ern tribes, Joseph Martin, observed in 1788
that the Chickasaws were restive and need-
ed attention: “I am not doubtful [that] the
Chickasaws will be in the same unfriendly
disposition [as northern and southern con-
federates] shortly if neglected.” Indeed,
Piomingo warned the U.S. that without
“supplies, the Chicasaws & Choctaws may
be over-run & forced to join the Creeks.”33
To underline their opposition to militant
Indian resisters, the Chickasaws sent warriors
to fight against the Indians in Northwest
Ohio. Piomingo and other war chiefs
brought warriors to aid Arthur St. Clair, but
they arrived too late to help the defeated
General. President George Washington read
the Chickasaws’ easy recruitment as a sign of
their “constancy” and “devotion;” in reality,
the federal government expended a large
sum of money for the Chickasaws’ minimal
participation. As one observer noted, “The
English and American Commissaries have
spoiled the Indians by giving presents in
great profusion, without which they do not
respond. The most rhetorical and beautiful
talks scarcely cause any attention unless
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adorned with red and blue Blankets. They
promise much and do nothing.”34 From the
Chickasaws’ perspective, with a Creek war
threatening, they could not afford to send
many warriors out of their country for an
extended length of time.
While the service of the Chickasaws to
the United States was somewhat limited, on
the Tennessee borderland the Chickasaws
promised a more active role. Thrilled to
have the Chickasaws taking care of Creek Miamis in the north, General Anthony
Wayne sent the Chickasaws “500 stand of
arms, 4000 pounds led, 2000 pounds pow-
der, 4000 flint, 50 pounds vermillion, 100
gallons whiskey, 100 bushels salt, 1500 tion, President Washington sent three thou-
sand pounds of ammunition, as well as
rapid-firing “swivels” and long rifles to
Piomingo. McGillivray reported that after
the American guns and powder arrived,
Piomingo “ruled the roost” and command-
ed the support of nearly all the Chickasaw
towns and some of the Choctaws.35
Because President Washington saw the
Chickasaws as key to preventing the success
of a broad pan-Indian alliance, he tried to
guarantee their current boundaries and
promised to compensate for future land
cessions. After sending military supplies,
Washington courted Chickasaw leaders at
the capitol in 1794 and gave his assurances
that he would safeguard the Chickasaw
homeland. Ostensibly to reward the
Chickasaws for their military assistance
against the Indians of the Northwest,
Washington hosted a party of Chickasaw
war chiefs in Philadelphia. Following the
peace pipe ceremony and presentation of
gifts, Washington presented the Chickasaw
delegates with a charter that guaranteed
their title to their homeland and remaining
hunting grounds. According to Vice meeting, Washington promised that these boundaries.”36 Although well-intend-
ed, Washington could not back his prom-
ise, which later politicians claimed was feared a united southern and northern
Indian confederacy. The pressure on the of Washington supporters for why the
treaty was not binding.
At the same 1794 meeting, Washington
led the Chickasaws to expect U.S. military
aid against the Creeks. As he did at
Hopewell, the president guaranteed the
Chickasaws “protection” and reaffirmed
Americans’ intention to “erect a post at the
Creeks crossing place on the Tenasee. . . for
the purpose of Indian Trade and defense.”
Then the president appointed Chickasaw
war chief William Colbert a major and
enjoined him to kill the Indian enemies of
the U.S. From this point on, Major Colbert
became an aggressor in the Chickasaw- The Chickasaw-Creek animosity sealed
the Chickasaws’ alliance with Cumberland
settlers. During the 1780s and the early
This content downloaded from friendship. Knox sent silver peace medals,
“rich uniform clothes,” rifles, and other gifts
for Piomingo and the brothers William and
George Colbert in recognition of their serv-
ice in St. Clair’s failed expedition against the
northern Indian confederacy.38
When at the Conference of Nashville
in 1792, Governor Blount met with some
five hundred representatives of the Choctaws, he reaffirmed the Tennesseans’
peace with both nations. Brigadier General
Andrew Pickens vowed, “We will always
look upon it that your enemies are our ene-
mies and ours yours.” To the Chickasaws,
the importance of the meeting was the for-
mation of a Tennessee-U.S. -Chickasaw
military alliance against the Creek
Confederacy. For his part, Piomingo
pledged to protect the Cumberland emi-
grants “from the plundering [Creek] par-
ties.”39 Blount appreciated the fact that the
Chickasaws “were the nearest neighbors of
the Cumberland people,” and a useful
source of intelligence. He fostered their
alliance through personal relationships They were always welcome at his home.
Although the Chickasaws counted on
Tennessee military assistance, Blount never
secured the Chickasaws’ complete trust. In
a speech to the Spanish governor following
the Conference of Nashville, Piomingo
reported that Blount was a “thief, that the
governor has been putting things in his men.”40 Chickasaw chief Wolf s Friend, the
O m ia 2 11
1790s militant Cherokees (the breakaway
Chickamaugans), Creeks, and Shawnees,
supported by Spain, relentlessly attacked
the Nashville settlements. Endangering the
lives of his constituents, Governor Blount
made no secret of his death wish for all
Creeks. He wrote in 1792: “The Creeks
must be scourged and well too and the would give the inhabitants of Tennessee “a
party of pleasure” to “totally destroy both
nations.” In 1794 he wrote another fiery
letter, arguing that the Chickasaws and
Choctaws would “readily aid the Arms of
the United States in chastising and hum-
bling this bloodthirsty nation,” the Creeks.
Tennesseans gave the Chickasaws sever-
al indications of their friendship and the
importance of preserving their alliance.
According to Robertson, the Chickasaws always supplied them with corn and other
provisions. Robertson commended Blount
for his skill in Indian diplomacy, reporting
that the Chickasaws praised the governors
hospitality, for he gave them “10 beaves a
day and what Rum they wanted and tobac-
co to smoak after they get home.”37 But the
Chickasaws were not blind to the
Tennesseans’ machinations. If Blount had
had his way, he would have immediately
grabbed the Chickasaws’ lands and turned
them over to land speculation companies. In
1791 Secretary of War Henry Knox curbed
his ambition, instructing Blount not to and to use U.S. largesse to reaffirm their
This content downloaded from Spanish partisan, related that Blount had
stared at him with “evil eyes” when he
refused the former’s request to establish a
trading post on Chickasaw lands.41
In 1793, when Chickasaw war parties settlements, a full-blown Chickasaw-Creek
war seemed eminent. At that time Piomingo
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This content downloaded from of friendship by all ranks of citizens,” the
Knoxville Gazette reported.44 On July 4,
1795, Cumberland officials toasted
“Opiomingo and our gallant sans cullo te nations/’45 Only occasionally did Americans
mistake individual Chickasaws for enemies
and these isolated incidents were deeply
regretted. For example, in 1793, after a Chickasaw named John Morris, Governor
Blount buried him with military honors,
and his funeral was well-attended by “sor-
rowful” whites.46
The second phase of the Creek-
Chickasaw War of 1795-179 6 began just Philadelphia in 1794, when Blount purport-
edly re-ignited the Chickasaw-Creek war by
secretly offering Chickasaws American dol-
lars for Creek scalps. He met a receptive
audience, for Chickasaw warriors were dis-
gruntled at the Creeks for stealing their hors-
es on their passage home.47 In addition to
financial incentives, General Robertson
assured the Chickasaws that Congress would
“order an army in the course of the ensuing
Spring or summer sufficient to humble if not
destroy the Creek Nation.” Secretary of War
Timothy Pickering observed that the expec-
tation of U.S. military aid “presented a
O m 0) 2 13
James Robertson claimed the Chickasaws were attached to Tennesseans because he sup-
plied them with corn and other provisions. He also sent them swivel guns and militiamen
to operate the artillery. (Tennessee State Museum)
boasted that he would “call in the Americans
from the Cumberland settlement to help
them.”42 General Robertson sent militiamen
and another swivel. Robertson himself
helped the Chickasaws operate the artillery.
Again, the Spanish were shocked to see the
powerful weapons that Americans placed in
Chickasaw hands. Governor Carondelet
protested, stating that the swivel was “an
arm too dangerous in the hands of Indians,”
the use of which should be concealed.
Robertson responded that he may have been
foolhardy, but “that step was merely the
effect of an effusion of friendship for them
in consequence of their faithful adherence to
our interest.”43
Although Chickasaw-Creek hostilities
were contained to only a handful of casual-
ties, the Chickasaws enjoyed great marks of
favor for their antagonism toward the
Creeks. That antagonism provided some
security to the^ Tennesseans. Cumberland
settlers treated the Chickasaws with honors
when they traveled through their communi-
ties. When a party of Chickasaw chiefs
passed through Winchester, Tennessee, in
the summer of 1794, they were met by the
towns cavalry and infantry and paraded to a
tavern, “followed by a numerous train of cit-
izens.” After a light lunch, Piomingo and
the others, accompanied by the Winchester
infantry and cavalry, proceeded on their
journey. They “were treated with every mark
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prospect so gratifying to them [the enemies of the Creeks” that they could hard-
ly resist instigating a war. This false hope as
well as Blount’s other “indirect encourage-
ments” led Major William Colbert and his 1795, when Major Colberts war party killed
five Creeks, who were allegedly on their way
to kill Cumberland settlers, Blount described
Colberts act as “the proofs the Chickasaws
give of their love for the people of the United
States.” The Knoxville Gazette described
Colbert and his warriors’ procession into They said they were the people of the
US, bearing commissions from the themselves bound to retaliate his ene-
mies. They were received with great
applause by the people of Nashville,
who gave a public entertainment in
their honor, escorting them from pany of cavalry in uniform. On their
part, the Chickasaws held a war dance
that night around the scalps of their To Colbert’s request for aid, Blount sent
guns and about fifiy volunteers for the
Chickasaws’ defense, who remained until the
Creeks abandoned their siege of the With the help of the Tennessee militia,
the Chickasaws repelled a massive Creek
attack, killed twenty-six invaders, and took
all their baggage. In addition to militia-
men, Robertson turned the Chickasaw
nation into a formidable stronghold with
the most advanced weaponry of the time.
Captain John Gordon diverted (presum-
ably at Robertson’s request) to the
Chickasaws heavy equipment, among
which were six howitzers, powder and ball,
sent by Henry Knox, and intended for With war in full swing, Piomingo
begged the U.S. government for help: “If
you think anything of your Brothers you
will send one or two hundred of your war-
riors and help your Brothers hold their
Land. I expect they will come [again].” He
promised that he would warn the anything that comes.”50 When Colbert back a Chickasaw-Creek war, he was
enraged and insisted on meeting with the
president himself. Pickering reported, “I
found Major Colbert singularly difficult to
please perhaps because the president could
not gratify his wishes in making open war
against the Creeks.” In addition to clothing
Colbert and his companions and their fam-
ilies, and supplying the Chickasaws with
provisions, Pickering gave Colbert “$400
to buy an elegant Stallion but he seemed to
consider the sum as hardly proficient … it
was not easy tip please him.”51 Even
Washington had a difficult time placating sure of his importance.
This content downloaded from After making peace with the Creeks, Piomingo wrote southern Indian agent Benjamin
Hawkins for blacksmiths, iron plows, and spinning looms to enable the Chicksaws to pros-
per as planters. (Benjamin Hawkins and the Creek Indians, ca. 1 805, Greenville County
Museum of Art, gift of the Museum Association, Inc.)
The Creeks were loath to send an army
against the Chickasaws because they
believed that that the nation was “supported
by the US,” and they were in the process of
negotiating a peace treaty with President
Washington. The Creeks protested the
Tennessee militias engagement in a “red
mans war,” to use their expression, fearing
trouble, should Creek warriors injure or kill
a U.S. citizen.52
The Creeks now wanted peace with the
United States. General Wayne had defeated
the powerful Northern Indian Confederacy,
and the United States could now turn their
full attention and their guns against the
Creeks. They saw that Spain was unwilling
to commit its national resources to a war
against Americans. Spanish governors seemed imminent.53 The Creek-Chickasaw
war never exploded into the large conflict
that Indian haters, like Blount in Tennessee,
desired. Nevertheless, the Chickasaws played
a crucial role in Middle Tennessee’s survival.
Not only did they warn local officials of
impending Creek raids, they patrolled the
borders and frustrated the formation of a
full-fledged Southern Indian Confederacy.
O m (A 2 15
This content downloaded from O) E 1 5 H E Ul U) Z H 16
Although they feared U.S. expansion, the
Chickasaws rejected pan-Indian military
resistance against the white settlers on the
Cumberland River. Instead of resisting
Americans, Piomingo and his followers Piomingo perceived Americans’ growing
power and took full advantage of them. For a
time, he made himself the most powerful
chief in the southeast by virtue of the how-
itzers, swivels, and stands of muskets at his dis-
posal. Piomingos amicable relations with
Americans brought him the military assistance
and manufactured goods on which his influ-
ence rested.54 After making peace with the
Creeks, he retired from war and prepared to
live out his life as a prosperous planter. He had
his daughter educated in reading and writing
and asked southern Indian agent Benjamin
Hawkins for blacksmiths, iron plows, and
spinning looms to enable the Chickasaws to
prosper as planters.55 It is likely that Piomingo
died around 1796, for he disappeared from
the historical record after that date.
Henceforth Major William Colbert became
the Chickasaws official “Piomingo,” although
Tennesseans preferred to call him “Billie,” per-
haps, because in their view, there was only one
Piomingo, the great man who had protected
the frontier settlers from Creek raids.56
The Chickasaws might have combined
with larger tribes against American settlers,
but the price would have been high and victo-
ry unlikely.57 They would have found them-
selves in the unenviable position of the dangerous predicament. As they awaited an
invading force of Kentucky militiamen,
Cherokee headman Little Turkey wrote to a
Creek chief, “It is chiefly your peoples doings
that brings so much trouble on us; the eyes of
all white and red people are looking both on
your nation as well as ours, for our doings.”58
The Chickasaws defended the Tennesseans
against Creek war parties because they desired
manufactured goods and autonomy from
Creek leaders, such as the autocratic
McGillivray. The Chickasaws’ Tennessee
alliance helped them to safeguard their lands
and independence, and enlarged Piomingos
power base. It also provided support and pro-
tection to Tennessee settlers and helped assure
the settlement of the area by Americans.
In 1798 Americans formed the
Mississippi Territory after Spain ceded its
claims to the disputed region, and thousands
of eastern settlers passed through Chickasaw
lands en route to now American Natchez,
Mississippl. Again, a Chickasaw chief took
the lead in urging peaceful relations with
Americans. In 1804, George Colbert, broth-
er to Major Colbert, censured sporadic
Creek violence against American travelers,
asserting, “The road to Cumberland was
freely granted to the United States, and it
should remain a clear and white path.”59 of the Americans’ westward immigration by
setting up stores and accommodations along
the Natchez Trace. The Chickasaws built
accommodations for travelers along the
Natchez Trace and engaged in a flourishing
frontier barter system with American settlers
in Mississippl.60
This content downloaded from Never forgetting their ancient enemies,
in 1813 the Chickasaws later joined
Andrew Jackson in destroying the militant
Creek “Red Stick” faction that revived
attacks on frontier settlements. However,
that story of alliance, war, and the ultimate
American reward of the Chickasaws must
wait for another day.
The author acknowledges the support of a Jesse
Wills Memorial Research Fellowship from the the Tennessee State Library and Archives staff in the 1 . James Henry Malone, The Chickasaw 2. David LaVere, Contrary Neighbors: Southern
Plains and Removed Indians in Indian Territory 3. Gayoso to Ougoulayacabe, 14 March 1795,
in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds., “Papers
from the Spanish Archives,” East Tennessee Historical
Society Publications [ETHSP] 44 (1972): 110. D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 28 (1956): Corbitt), “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” 5. Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things:
Property. ; Power ; and the Transformation of the Creek
Indians , 1733-1816 (Cambridge, 1999).
6. Ougoulayacabe to Gayoso, 1 1 June 1794, in
Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish
Archives,” ETHSP AO (1968): 101. 8. James Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid
People: The Chickasaw Indians to Removal Piomingo was “a postjuvenile title signifying that an
individual had become recognized as an exceptional 9. Bloodyfellow to Carondelet, February 1793,
ETHSP 29: 156; Atkinson, Splendid Landy Splendid
People y 126.
10. Miró to Cruzat, 5 March 1786, Spain in the
Mississippi Valley 2:170; McGillivray to O’Neill, 28
March 1786, in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray
of the Creeks (Norman, Okla., 1938), 106.
11. Gayoso to Carondelet, 8 January 1795, in
Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP M (1970): 103.
12. William Panton to Carondelet, 2 January
1783, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from
the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 23 (1951): 201.
13. M. Thomas Hatley, The Dividing Paths:
Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of
Revolution (New York, 1995), 53; James Robertson to
Governor George Mathews, 3 October 1787, in Doc. TCC289. Digital Library of Georgia Database.
14. McGillivray to Miró 24 June 1789, in
Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks , 238-40.
15. Ed. Colton Storm, “Up the Tennessee in
1790: The Report of Major John Doughty to the
Secretary of War,” ETHSP 17 (1945): 125.
16. McGillivray to O’Neill, 12 May 1786, in
Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives, n ETHSP 10 (1938): 138; McGillivray to Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,”
ETHSP 12 (1940): 115; Kentucky Gazette , 18
August 1787, 15-16.
17. Pennsylvania Packet, 27 October 1785 from
Draper Manuscript 3JJ. Harvard Library Microfilm.
18. Talks of the King, Chiefs, and Warriors of
the Chickasaw Nation to the Governor of Georgia,
[1786?], Southeastern Native American Documents ,
1730-1742, Doc. TCC223. Digital Library of 19. McGillivray to Panton, 10 August 1789, in
Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks , 245-9.
20. McGillivray to Miró, 24 June 1789, ibid., 21. John Forbes, 1792, in Corbitt and Corbitt,
eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” 132.
o m to 2 17
This content downloaded from 0) Ü E (/) i¡ H E X y U) u z U 18 22. Piomingo and Others to Carondelet, 11
February 1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds.,
“Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 29 23.Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 28 April 1793,
in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the
Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 32 (1960): 79; 24. Daniel Usner, American Indians in the Lower
Mississippi Valley (Lincoln, Neb., 2004), Usner s pop-
ulation estimates for 1775: Choctaws 13,400;
Chickasaws 2,300, and Upper Creeks 9,200. Usner
does not include Lower Creeks in his figures.
25. Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary
Age (Lincoln, Neb., 2005), xvi; Villebeuvre to eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 26. Taskihatoka and Others to Villebeuvre, 10
March 1793, ETHSP 30 (1958): 97-98.
27. Carondelet to Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, 28. Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 16 January
1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from
the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 29 (1957): 145; Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 29 (1957): 148.
29. O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 30. Gayoso to Carondelet on Negotiations Roger Clark Papers, no. 15: 159-175.
31. Blount to Knox, 23 May 1793, in Carter,
ed. , Territorial Papers 4:260.
32. Carondelet to Gayoso, 5 March 1793, in
Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 31 (1959): 65.
33. Blount to Andrew Pickens, 1 August 1793,
in Carter, ed., Territorial Papers 4: 292.
34. Villebeuvre to Gayoso, 5 February 1793, in
Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 29 (1957): 149.
35. McGillivray to Panton, 28 November 1792,
in Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks , 348.
36. Thomas Edwin Matthew, General James
Robertson: Father of Tennessee (Nashville, 1934), 47-49.
37. Robertson to Blount, 12 October 1792, in
Carter, ed., Territorial Papers 4: 198.
38. Atkinson, Splendid Land ‘ Splendid People , 39. See also Piomingo to Creek Agent James
Seagrove, 1 September 1793, in Corbitt and ETHSP 35 (1963): 90; Robertson to Sevier, 1
August 1787, Creek Letters, 1: 157.
40. Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 16 January “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 29 41. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People , 42. Carondelet to Casas, 9 March 1793, in
Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,” ETHSP 31 (1959): 67.
43. Albigence W. Putnam, History of Middle
Tennessee: Life and Times of General James Robertson
(Nashville, 1859), 439-440.
44. Knoxville Gazette , 31 July 1794, no. 17,
vol. 3. American Antiquarian Society.
45. Knoxville Gazette , 17 July 1795, no. 140,
vol. 4. American Antiquarian Society.
46. Blount to the Secretary of War, 28 May
1793, in Carter, ed., Territorial Papers, 4: 262.
47. McDonald to White, 28 December 1794,
Spain in the Mississippi Valley 2: 385.
48. Albert V. Goodpasture, “Indian Wars and Historical Magazine 4 (1918): 286.
49. Putnam, History of Middle Tennessee , 52 7.
50. Chickasaw Nation to David Henley, 29
September 1795. David Henley Papers.
51. Pickering to Henley, 26 August 1796, Ayer
MS, folder 16, no. 926, Newberry Library.
52. Upper Creeks to Robertson, 22 April 53. Saunt, A New Order of Things.
54. Carondelet to McGillivray, 14 December
1792, in Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks,
350; R. S. Cotterill, “The Virginia-Chickasaw (1942): 484-85. in Benjamin Hawkins, Letters of Benjamin Hawkins .
This content downloaded from Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, vol. 3,
pt. 1 (1848): 392-294; Atkinson, Splendid Landy
Splendid People y 183.
56. Goodpasture, “Indian Wars and 57. J. Leitch Wright, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in
North America (Athens, Ga., 1971), 67; Jane M.
Berry, “Indian Policy of Spain in the Southwest,
1783-1795,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review , 3
(1917): 465.
58. Little Turkey to Mad Dog, 18 November Antiquarian Society. 59. Letters from Mississippi Officials, 1804.
Papers of the States of the United States. Microfilm,
Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
60. Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers, &
Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower
Mississippi Valley Before 1783 (Chapel Hill, 1992).
O m U) 2 19
This content downloaded from p. 2 Tennessee Historical Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 1 (SPRING 2009) pp. 1-110 Materials created by the National Archives and Records Administration are in the public domain.Materials created by the National Archives and Records Administration are in the public domain.
Analyze a Written Document
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Use it as historical evidence. What other documents or historical evidence are you going to use to help you understand this
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Cumberland region. American settlers in
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obstruct the westward movement of
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the “Mountain Indians.”9
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relations with U.S. and Cumberland offi-
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one side & the Creeks on the other,”
chiefs met with Tennessee officials, Creek
effect he has sent to the Choctaws three red
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order to share in his access to American
American Creeks. However, the Choctaws
break of intertribal warfare: “Four
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militants in the south while he defeated the
bushels corn, armourer and tools.” In addi-
President John Adams, who was at this
Americans “would never bother within
made “under duress” because the U.S.
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Creek conflict.
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Chickasaws, and a lesser number of
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killed a few Creeks near the Cumberland
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allies of the Chickasaw and Choctaw
band of white horse thieves killed a
months after the Chickasaws’ return from
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Chickasaws] as Warriors and the inveterate
Chickasaw warriors to attack Creeks. In
Nashville:
President himself and therefore felt
General Robertson’s house with a com-
Creek victims.48
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Spaniards in West Florida not to “interrupt
learned that the United States would not
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backed off whenever conflict with Americans
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befriended them. An “astute observer,”
Cherokees, who blamed the Creeks for their
Colbert and other Chickasaws made the best
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Tennessee Historical Society and the assistance of
research for this article.
Nation y a Short Sketch of a Noble People…
(Louisville, 1922), 337.
(Norman, Okla., 2000), 8-9.
4. Forbes to Carondelet, 1 November 1792, in
132; Miró to Favrot, 6 July 1786, in D.C. Corbitt
and Roberta Corbitt, eds. (hereafter Corbitt and
ETHSP 10 (1938): 141.
7. Ibid.
(Tuscaloosa, 2003), 125. Atkinson notes that
war leader.”
Southeastern Native American Documents , 1730-1842 ,
Miró,, Dec. 1787, in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta
Georgia.
238-40.
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(1957): 154.
Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 18 April 1793, ibid., 75.
Carondelet, 4 April 1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt,
30 (1958): 107.
18 December 1792.
Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 4 February 1793, in
94.
with Chickasaws (no date), Draper 32, George
155.
Corbitt, eds., “Papers from the Spanish Archives,”
1793, in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds.,
(1957): 145-
150.
Warriors of the Old Southwest,” Tennessee
1795, in Carter, ed., Territorial Papers, 4: 253.
Treaty of 1783,” The Journal of Southern History 8
55. Hawkins to Dearborn, 28 October 1801,
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Warriors,” 109.
1794, in Knoxville Gazette , no. 22, vol. 4. American
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p. 3
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Front Matter
How the Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland Settlement in the 1790s [pp. 2-19]
James Hogan, Jr., and the Conflicts of Antebellum Southern Identity in Williamson County [pp. 20-39]
“Upon the Stage of Disorder:” Legalized Prostitution in Memphis and Nashville, 1863-1865 [pp. 40-65]
Partisan Warfare in Monroe County, Tennessee, During the Civil War: The Murder of Joseph M. Divine [pp. 66-97]
Book Reviews
Review: untitled [pp. 98-99]
Review: untitled [pp. 99-101]
Review: untitled [pp. 101-102]
Review: untitled [pp. 102-104]
Review: untitled [pp. 104-106]
Review: untitled [pp. 106-107]
Contributors [pp. 107-107]
News from the THS: Tennessee Students Compete for Honors at National History Day Contest [pp. 108-109]
Back Matter
Type (check all that apply):
❑ Letter ❑ Speech ❑ Patent ❑ Telegram ❑ Court document
❑ Chart ❑ Newspaper ❑ Advertisement ❑ Press Release ❑ Memorandum
❑ Report ❑ Email ❑ Identification document ❑ Presidential document
❑ Congressional document ❑ Other
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