Write a coherent, well-crafted essay that does the following things:
(a) Describe J. S. Mill’s principle of utility. (b) Explain what Mill means when he says that the principle of utility is the “First Principle” of morality and explain Mill’s reasons for thinking that morality must have a first principle. (c) Distinguish direct utilitarianism from indirect utilitarianism. (d) Describe Bernard Williams’ hypothetical case in which “George the chemist” faces a moral dilemma. (e) Does the case of George the chemist show that some forms of utilitarianism are false, mistaken, or that they provide us with a poor guide to action? (fi) If you think the example undermines some forms of utilitarianism, describe which and explain why you think the example undermines these forms of utilitarianism. (fii) On the other hand, if you think the example fails to undermine any form of utilitarianism explain why you think this is so. (g) How might an indirect utilitarian who still thinks that promoting happiness is the point of morality justify acting in accordance with a rule (on a particular occasion) when he knows that if he made an exception to that rule on that particular occasion alone this would lead to more happiness than would result if he did not make an exception on that occasion?
The paper must be 5 pages long, double-spaced text in normal font (e.g. Times New Roman 12 pt.), with normal tabs and margins (e.g. Microsoft Word’s default settings).
Utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill
Copyright © Jonathan Bennett
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. All rights reserved
[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as
though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,
are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the
omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth.
First launched: September
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Last amended: April 200
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Contents
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4
·Higher and Lower Pleasures· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
·Happiness as an Aim· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
·Self-Sacrifice· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
·Setting the Standard too High?· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
·Is Utilitarianism Chilly?· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
3
·Utilitarianism as ‘Godless’· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
·Expediency· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
·Time to Calculate?· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
6
·Bad Faith· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill
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·Punishment· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
·Wages· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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·Taxation· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
ii
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 1: General remarks
Chapter 1: General Remarks
Little progress has been made towards deciding the contro-
versy concerning the criterion of right and wrong. Among all
the facts about the present condition of human knowledge,
the state of this controversy is •most unlike what might
have been expected and •most indicative significant of the
backward state in which theorizing on the most important
subjects still lingers. That is how little progress has been
made! From the dawn of philosophy the question concerning
the summum bonum [Latin, = ‘the greatest good’] or, what is the
same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has
•been regarded as the main problem in speculative
thought,
•occupied the most gifted intellects, and
•divided them into sects and schools, vigorously war-
ring against one another.
And after more than two thousand years the same discus-
sions continue! Philosophers still line up under the same
opposing battle-flags, and neither thinkers nor people in
general seem to be any nearer to being unanimous on the
subject than when young Socrates listened to old Protagoras
and asserted the theory of utilitarianism against the popular
morality of the so-called ‘sophist’ (I’m assuming here that
Plato’s dialogue is based on a real conversation). [Except on
page
14
, ‘popular’ is used in this work only to mean ‘of the people’, with
no implication about being liked.]
It is true that similar confusion and uncertainty, and
in some cases similar disagreements, exist concerning the
basic principles of all the sciences—even including the one
that is thought to be the most certain of them, namely
mathematics—without doing much harm, and usually with-
out doing any harm, to the trustworthiness of the conclu-
sions of those sciences. This seems odd, but it can be
explained: the detailed doctrines of a science usually •are
not deduced from what are called its first principles and
•don’t need those principles to make them evident. If this
weren’t so, there would be no science more precarious, and
none whose conclusions were more weakly based, than
algebra. This doesn’t get any of its certainty from what
are commonly taught to learners as its •elements ·or first
principles·, because •these, as laid down by some of its most
eminent teachers, are as full of fictions as English law and as
full of mysteries as theology. The truths that are ultimately
accepted as the first principles of a science are really the last
results of metaphysical analysis of the basic notions that
are involve in the science in question. Their relation to the
science is not that of •foundations to a building but of •roots
to a tree, which can do their job equally well if they are never
dug down to and exposed to light. But though in science the
particular truths precede the general theory, the reverse of
that might be expected with a practical art such as morals
or legislation. [Here an ‘art’ is any activity requiring a set of rules or
techniques, and ‘practical’ means ‘having to do with human conduct’.]
All action is for the sake of some end; and it seems natural to
suppose that rules of action must take their whole character
and colour from the end at which actions aim. When we are
pursuing something, a clear and precise conception of what
we are pursuing would seem to be the first thing we need,
rather than being the last we are to look forward to. One
would think that a test ·or criterion· of right and wrong must
be •the means of discovering what is right or wrong, and not
•a consequence of having already discovered this.
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 1: General remarks
The difficulty can’t be avoided by bringing in the popu-
lar theory of a natural ·moral· faculty, a sense or instinct
informing us of right and wrong. For one thing, the ‘criterion’
dispute includes a dispute about whether there is any such
moral instinct. And, anyway, believers in it who have
any philosophical ability have been obliged to abandon the
idea that it—·the moral faculty or ‘moral sense’ or moral
intuition·—picks out what is right or wrong in this or that
•particular case in the way that our other senses pick up
the sight or sound that is actually present ·in the •particular
concrete situation·. Our moral faculty, according to all those
of its friends who are entitled to count as thinkers, supplies
us only with the •general principles of moral judgments; it
belongs with reason and not with sense-perception; what we
can expect from it are the abstract doctrines of morality,
and not the perception of morality in particular concrete
situations. The intuitionist school of ethics insists on the
necessity of general laws just as much as does the inductive
school (as we might label it). They both agree that ·knowing·
the morality of an individual action is not a matter of •direct
perception but of the •application of a law to an individual
case. The two schools mostly agree also in what moral laws
they recognize; but they differ on
•what makes those moral laws evident, and
•what give them their authority.
According to the intuitionists, the principles of morals are
evident a priori: if you know the meanings of the terms in
which they are expressed, you’ll have to assent to them.
According to the inductivists, •right and wrong are questions
of observation and experience just as •truth and falsehood
are. But both schools hold equally that morality must be
deduced from principles; and the intuitive school affirm
as strongly as the inductive does that there is a science of
morals—·i.e. an organized system containing basic axioms
from which the rest can be rigorously deduced·. Yet they
seldom attempt to provide a list of the a priori principles that
are to serve as the premises of the science; and they almost
never make any effort to reduce those various principles to
one first principle, one first all-purpose ground of obligation.
Instead, they either •treat the ordinary precepts of morals
as though they had a priori authority or •lay down as the
all-purpose groundwork of those maxims some general moral
principle that is much less obviously authoritative than the
maxims themselves and hasn’t ever been widely accepted.
Yet to support their claims there ought to be one fundamental
principle or law at the root of all morality; or if there are sev-
eral of them, •they should be clearly rank-ordered in relation
to one another, and •there should be a self-evident principle
or rule for deciding amongst them when they conflict ·in a
particular case·.
The lack of any clear recognition of an ultimate standard
may have •corrupted the moral beliefs of mankind or made
them uncertain; on the other hand, the bad effects of this de-
ficiency may have •been moderated in practice. To determine
how far things have gone in the •former way and how far in
the •latter would require a complete critical survey of past
and present ethical doctrine. But it wouldn’t be hard to show
that whatever steadiness or consistency mankind’s moral
beliefs have achieved has been mainly due to the silent influ-
ence of a standard that hasn’t been ·consciously· recognised.
In the absence of an acknowledged first principle, ethics has
been not so much a •guide to men in forming their moral
views as a •consecration of the views they actually have; but
men’s views—both for and against—are greatly influenced by
what effects on their happiness they suppose things to have;
and so the principle of utility—or, as Bentham eventually
called it, ‘the greatest happiness principle’—has had a large
share in forming the moral doctrines even of those who
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 1: General remarks
most scornfully reject its authority. And every school of
thought admits that the influence of actions on happiness
is a very significant and even predominant consideration in
many of the details of morals, however unwilling they may
be to allow the production of happiness as the fundamental
principle of morality and the source of moral obligation. I
might go much further and say that a priori moralists can’t
do without utilitarian arguments (I am not talking about the
ones who don’t think they need to argue at all!). It is not my
present purpose to criticise these thinkers; but I can’t refrain
from bringing in as an illustration a systematic treatise by
one of the most illustrious of the a priori moralists, the
Metaphysics of Ethics by Kant. This remarkable man, whose
system of thought will long remain one of the landmarks
in the history of philosophical thought, lays down in that
treatise a universal first principle as the origin and ground
of moral obligation:
Act in such a way that the rule on which you act
could be adopted as a law by all rational beings.
But when he begins to derive any of the actual duties of
morality from this principle he fails, almost grotesquely, to
show that there would be any contradiction—any logical
impossibility, or even any physical impossibility—in the
adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously
immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the universal
adoption of such rules would have consequences that no-one
would choose to bring about.
In the present work I shall, without further discussion
of the other theories, try to contribute something towards
the understanding and appreciation of the Utilitarian or
Happiness theory, and towards such proof as it can be given.
Obviously this can’t be ‘proof’ in the ordinary and popular
meaning of that word. Questions about ultimate ends can’t
be settled by direct proof. You can prove something to be
good only by showing that it is a means to something that
is admitted without proof to be good. The art of medicine is
proved to be good by its conducing to health, but how is it
possible to prove that health is good? The art of music is
good because (among other reasons) it produces pleasure,
but what proof could be given that pleasure is good? So if it
is claimed that
•there is a comprehensive formula that covers every-
thing that is good in itself, and
•whatever else is good is not good as an end but as a
means ·to something that is covered by the formula·,
the formula may be accepted or rejected but it can’t be
given what is commonly called a ‘proof’. But we shouldn’t
infer that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind
impulse or arbitrary choice. There is a broader meaning of
the word ‘proof’ in which this question is as capable of ·being
settled by· ‘proof’ as any other of the disputed questions in
philosophy. The subject is within reach of the faculty of
reason, which doesn’t deal with it solely by ·moral· intuitions
·such as the intuitionists believe in·. Considerations can
be presented that are capable of determining the intellect
either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this
is equivalent to proof.
We shall examine presently what sort of thing these con-
siderations are and how they apply to the question at hand.
In doing this we shall be examining what rational grounds
can be given for accepting or rejecting the utilitarian formula.
But if there is to be rational acceptance or rejection, the
formula should first be correctly understood. I believe that
•the chief obstacle to acceptance of the utilitarian principle
has been people’s very imperfect grasp of its meaning, and
that if the misunderstandings of it—or even just the very
gross ones—could be cleared up, the question would be
greatly simplified and a large proportion of its difficulties
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
removed. So before I embark on the philosophical grounds
that can be given for assenting to the utilitarian standard, I
shall offer some illustrations of the doctrine itself; aiming to
•show more clearly what it is,
•distinguish it from what it is not, and
•dispose of such of the practical objections to it as
come from or are closely connected with mistaken
interpretations of its meaning.
Having thus prepared the ground, I shall afterwards try to
throw as much light as I can on the question, considered as
one of philosophical theory.
Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is
Some people have supposed that those who stand up for
‘utility’ as the test of right and wrong use that term in the
restricted and merely colloquial sense in which ‘utility’ is
opposed to pleasure. A passing remark is all that needs to
be given to that ignorant blunder. [This is probably a protest
against, among other things, a school-master in Dickens’s fine novel
Hard Times, whose approach to education insisted on what is ‘useful’
and flatly opposed any kind of pleasure.] I owe an apology to the
philosophical opponents of utilitarianism for even briefly
seeming to regard them as capable of so absurd a misunder-
standing. The blunder is all the more extraordinary given
that another of the common charges against utilitarianism is
the opposite accusation that it bases everything on pleasure
(understood very crudely). One able writer has pointedly
remarked that the same sort of persons, and often the very
same persons, denounce the theory ‘as impracticably dry
when the word “utility” precedes the word “pleasure”, and
as too practicably voluptuous when the word “pleasure”
precedes the word “utility” ’! Those who know anything
about the matter are aware that every writer from Epicurus
to Bentham who maintained the theory of ‘utility’ meant
by it not •something to be contrasted with pleasure but
•pleasure itself together with freedom from pain; and instead
of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental,
they have always declared that ‘useful’ includes these among
other things. Yet the common herd, including the herd
of writers—not only in newspapers and magazines but in
intellectually ambitious books—are perpetually falling into
this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word ‘utilitarian’,
while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they
habitually express by it keeping out or neglecting pleasure in
some of its forms, such as beauty, ornament and amusement.
And when the term ‘utility’ is ignorantly misused in this way,
it isn’t always in criticism of utilitarianism; occasionally it
occurs when utilitarianism is being complimented, the idea
being that utility is something •superior to frivolity and the
mere pleasures of the moment, ·whereas really it •includes
them·. This perverted use is the only one in which the
word ‘utility’ is popularly known, and the one from which
the young are now getting their sole notion of its meaning.
Those who introduced the word, but who had for many
years stopped using it as a doctrinal label, may well feel
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
themselves called upon to resume it, if by doing so they can
hope to contribute anything towards rescuing it from this
utter degradation.1
The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the
greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right
in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in
proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
By ‘happiness’ is meant pleasure and the absence of pain;
by ‘unhappiness’ is meant pain and the lack of pleasure. To
give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory,
much more needs to be said, especially about what things
the doctrine includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure, and
to what extent it leaves this as an open question. But these
supplementary explanations don’t affect the theory of life on
which this theory of morality is based—namely the thesis
that
pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things that
are desirable as ends, and that
everything that is desirable at all is so either •for the
pleasure inherent in it or •as means to the promotion
of pleasure and the prevention of pain.
(The utilitarian system has as many things that are desirable,
in one way or the other, as any other theory of morality.)
Now, such a theory of life arouses utter dislike in many
minds, including some that are among the most admirable in
feeling and purpose. The view that life has (as they express
it) no higher end —no better and nobler object of desire and
pursuit—than pleasure they describe as utterly mean and
grovelling, a doctrine worthy only of pigs. The followers of
Epicurus were contemptuously compared with pigs, very
early on, and modern holders of the utilitarian doctrine are
occasionally subjected to equally polite comparisons by its
German, French, and English opponents.
·Higher and Lower Pleasures·
When attacked in this way, the Epicureans have always
answered that it is not they but their accusers who represent
human nature in a degrading light, because the accusation
implies that human beings are capable only of pleasures
that pigs are also capable of. If this were true, there’d
be no defence against the charge, but then it wouldn’t
be a charge; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely
the same for humans as for pigs, the rule of life that is
good enough for them would be good enough for us. The
comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt
as degrading precisely because a beast’s pleasures do not
satisfy a human’s conceptions of happiness. Human beings
have •higher faculties than the animal appetites, and once
they become conscious of •them they don’t regard anything
as happiness that doesn’t include •their gratification. Admit-
tedly the Epicureans were far from faultless in drawing out
the consequences of the utilitarian principle; to do this at
all adequately one must include—·which they didn’t·—many
Stoic and some Christian elements. But every Epicurean
theory of life that we know of assigns to the •pleasures
of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination and of the
moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than
1 I have reason to believe that I am the first person who brought the word ‘utilitarian’ into ·general· use. I didn’t invent it, but adopted it from a
passing expression in Mr. Galt’s Annals of the Parish. After using it as a label for several years, he and others abandoned it because of their growing
dislike for anything resembling a badge or slogan marking out a sect. But as a name for •one single opinion, not •a set of opinions—to stand for the
recognition of utility as a standard, not any particular way of applying the standard—the term fills a gap in the language, and offers in many cases a
convenient way of avoiding tiresome long-windedness.
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
to •those of mere sensation. But it must be admitted that
when utilitarian writers have said that mental pleasures
are better than bodily ones they have mainly based this on
mental pleasures being more permanent, safer, less costly
and so on—i.e. from their circumstantial advantages rather
than from their intrinsic nature. And on all these points
utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they could, quite
consistently with their basic principle, have taken the other
route—occupying the higher ground, as we might say. It
is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise
that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more
valuable than others. In estimating ·the value of· anything
else, we take into account •quality as well as •quantity; it
would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to
depend on •quantity alone.
‘What do you mean by “difference of quality in pleasures”?
What, according to you, makes one pleasure •more valuable
than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being •greater
in amount?’ There is only one possible answer to this.
Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all
or almost all people who have had experience of both
give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any
feeling that they ought to prefer it.
If those who are competently acquainted with both these
pleasures place P1 so far above P2 that •they prefer it even
when they know that a greater amount of discontent will
come with it, and •wouldn’t give it up in exchange for
any quantity of P2 that they are capable of having, we are
justified in ascribing to P1 a superiority in quality that so
greatly outweighs quantity as to make quantity comparatively
negligible.
Now, it is an unquestionable fact that the way of life
that employs the higher faculties is strongly preferred ·to
the way of life that caters only to the lower ones· by people
who are equally acquainted with both and equally capable of
appreciating and enjoying both. Few human creatures would
agree to be changed into any of the lower animals in return
for a promise of the fullest allowance of animal pleasures;
•no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool,
•no educated person would prefer to be an ignoramus,
•no person of feeling and conscience would rather be
selfish and base,
even if they were convinced that the fool, the dunce or the
rascal is better satisfied with his life than they are with
theirs. . . . If they ever think they would, it is only in cases of
unhappiness so extreme that to escape from it they would
exchange their situation for almost any other, however unde-
sirable they may think the other to be. Someone with higher
faculties •requires more to make him happy, •is probably
capable of more acute suffering, and •is certainly vulnerable
to suffering at more points, than someone of an inferior type;
but in spite of these drawbacks he can’t ever really wish
to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence.
Explain this unwillingness how you please! We may attribute
it to
•pride, a name that is given indiscriminately to some of
the most and to some of the least admirable feelings
of which human beings are capable;
•the love of liberty and personal independence (for the
Stoics, that was one of the most effective means for
getting people to value the higher pleasures); or
•the love of power, or the love of excitement, both of
which really do play a part in it.
But the most appropriate label is a sense of dignity. All
human beings have this sense in one form or another, and
how strongly a person has it is roughly proportional to how
well endowed he is with the higher faculties. In those who
have a strong sense of dignity, their dignity is so essential
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
to their happiness that they couldn’t want, for more than a
moment, anything that conflicts with it.
Anyone who thinks that this preference takes place at a
sacrifice of happiness—anyone who denies that the superior
being is, other things being anywhere near equal, happier
than the inferior one—is confusing two very different ideas,
those of happiness and of contentment. It is true of course
that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low has the
greatest chance of having them fully satisfied ·and thus of
being contented·; and a highly endowed being will always feel
that any happiness that he can look for, given how the world
is, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections,
if they are at all bearable; and they won’t make him envy
the person who isn’t conscious of the imperfections only
because he has no sense of the good that those imperfections
are imperfections of —·for example, the person who isn’t
bothered by the poor quality of the conducting because he
doesn’t enjoy music anyway·. It is better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig
think otherwise, that is because they know only their own
side of the question. The other party to the comparison
knows both sides.
‘But many people who are capable of the higher pleasures
do sometimes, under the influence of temptation, give prefer-
ence to the lower ones.’ Yes, but this is quite compatible with
their fully appreciating the intrinsic superiority of the higher.
Men’s infirmity of character often leads them to choose the
nearer good over the more valuable one; and they do this just
as much when •it’s a choice between two bodily pleasures
as when •it is between a bodily pleasure and a mental one.
They pursue sensual pleasures at the expense of their health,
though they are perfectly aware that health is the greater
good, ·doing this because the sensual pleasures are nearer·.
‘Many people who begin with youthful enthusiasm for
everything noble, as they grow old sink into laziness and
selfishness.’ Yes, this is a very common change; but I
don’t think that those who undergo it voluntarily choose
the lower kinds of pleasures in preference to the higher.
I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to
the lower pleasures they have already become incapable of
the higher ones. In most people a capacity for the nobler
feelings is a very tender plant that is easily killed, not only
by hostile influences but by mere lack of nourishment; and
in the majority of young persons it quickly dies away if their
jobs and their social lives aren’t favourable to keeping that
higher capacity in use. Men lose their high aspirations as
they lose their intellectual tastes, because they don’t have
time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict
themselves to lower pleasures not because they deliberately
prefer them but because they are either •the only pleasures
they can get or •the only pleasures they can still enjoy. It may
be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally
capable of both kinds of pleasure has ever knowingly and
calmly preferred the lower kind; though throughout the
centuries many people have broken down in an ineffectual
attempt to have both at once.
I don’t see that there can be any appeal against this
verdict of the only competent judges! On a question as to
which is the better worth having of two pleasures, or which
of two ways of life is the more agreeable to the feelings
(apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences),
the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of
both must be admitted as final—or, if they differ among
themselves, the judgment of the majority among them. And
we can be encouraged to accept this judgment concerning the
quality of pleasures by the fact that there is no other tribunal
to appeal to even on the question of quantity. What means
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
do we have for deciding which is the more acute of two pains,
or the more intense of two pleasurable sensations, other
than the collective opinion of those who are familiar with
both? ·Moving back now from quantity to quality·: there are
different kinds of pain and different kinds of pleasure, and
every pain is different from every pleasure. What can decide
whether a particular ·kind of· pleasure is worth purchasing
at the cost of a particular ·kind of· pain, if not the feelings
and judgment of those who are experienced ·in both kinds·?
When, therefore, those feelings and judgments declare the
pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in
kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those that can
be enjoyed by animals that don’t have the higher faculties,
their opinion on this subject too should be respected.
I have dwelt on this point because you need to understand
it if you are to have a perfectly sound conception of utility
or happiness, considered as the governing rule of human
conduct. But you could rationally accept the utilitarian
standard without having grasped ·that people who enjoy the
higher pleasures are happier than those who don’t·. That’s
because the utilitarian standard is not •the agent’s own
greatest happiness but •the greatest amount of happiness
altogether; and even if it can be doubted whether a noble
character is always happier because of its nobleness, such
a character certainly makes other people happier, and the
world in general gains immensely from its existence. So
utilitarianism would achieve its end only through the general
cultivation of nobleness of character, even if
each individual got benefit only from the nobleness of
others, with his own nobleness serving to reduce his
own happiness.
But mere statement of this last supposition [the indented one
just above] brings out its absurdity so clearly that there is no
need for me to argue against it.
·Happiness as an Aim·
According to the greatest happiness principle as I have
explained it, the ultimate end. . . ., for the sake of which
all other things are desirable (whether we are considering
our own good or that of other people) is an existence as free
as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments.
This means rich in •quantity and in •quality; the test of
•quality, and the rule for measuring it against •quantity,
being the preferences of those who are best equipped to
make the comparison—equipped, that is, by the range of
their experience and by their habits of self-consciousness
and self-observation. If the greatest happiness of all is (as
the utilitarian opinion says it is) •the end of human action, is
must also be •the standard of morality; which can therefore
be defined as:
the rules and precepts for human conduct such that:
the observance of them would provide the best pos-
sible guarantee of an existence such as has been
described—for all mankind and, so far as the nature
of things allows, for the whole sentient creation.
Against this doctrine, however, another class of objectors
rise up, saying that the rational purpose of human life and
action cannot be happiness in any form. For one thing, it is
unattainable, they say; and they contemptuously ask ‘What
right do you have to be happy?’, a question that Mr. Carlyle
drives home by adding ‘What right, a short time ago, did you
have even to exist?’. They also say that men can do without
happiness; that all noble human beings have felt this, and
couldn’t have become noble except by learning the lesson
of . . . .renunciation. They say that thoroughly learning and
submitting to that lesson is the beginning and necessary
condition of all virtue.
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
If the first of these objections were right, it would go to
the root of the matter; for if human beings can’t have any
happiness, the achieving of happiness can’t be the end of
morality or of any rational conduct. Still, even if human
beings couldn’t be happy there might still be something to
be said for the utilitarian theory, because utility includes not
solely •the pursuit of happiness but also •the prevention or
lessening of unhappiness; and if the •former aim is illusory
there will be all the more scope for —and need of —the •latter.
At any rate, that will be true so long as mankind choose to
go on living, and don’t take refuge in the simultaneous act
of suicide recommended under certain conditions by ·the
German poet· Novalis. But when someone positively asserts
that ‘It is impossible for human life to be happy’, if this isn’t
something like a verbal quibble it is at least an exaggeration.
If ‘happiness’ is taken to mean a continuous state of highly
pleasurable excitement, it is obvious enough that this is
impossible. A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments,
or—in some cases and with some interruptions—hours or
days. Such an experience is the occasional •brilliant flash
of enjoyment, not its •permanent and steady flame. The
philosophers who have taught that happiness is the end of
life were as fully aware of this as those who taunt them. The
‘happiness’ that they meant was not a life of rapture; but
a life containing some moments of rapture, a few brief
pains, and many and various pleasures; a life that is
much more active than passive; a life based on not
expecting more from life than it is capable of providing.
A life made up of those components has always appeared
worthy of the name of ‘happiness’ to those who have been
fortunate enough to obtain it. And even now many people
have such an existence during a considerable part of their
lives. The present wretched education and wretched social
arrangements are the only real hindrance to its being attain-
able by almost everyone. [In Mill’s day ‘education’ tended to have a
broader meaning than it does today, and to cover every aspect of a young
person’s upbringing.]
‘If human beings are taught to consider happiness as
the end of life, they aren’t likely to be satisfied with such a
moderate share of it.’ On the contrary, very many people
have been satisfied with much less! There seem to be two
main constituents of a satisfied life, and each of them has
often been found to be, on its own, sufficient for the purpose.
They are tranquillity and excitement. Many people find that
when they have much tranquillity they can be content with
very little pleasure; and many find that when they have much
excitement they can put up with a considerable quantity of
pain. It is certainly possible that a man—and even the mass
of mankind—should have both tranquillity and excitement.
So far from being incompatible with one another, they are
natural allies: prolonging either of them is a preparation
for the other, and creates a wish for it. The only people
who don’t desire excitement after a restful period are those
in whom laziness amounts to a vice; and the only ones
who dislike the tranquillity that follows excitement—finding
it •dull and bland rather than •pleasurable in proportion
to the excitement that preceded it—are those whose need
for excitement is a disease. When people who are fairly
fortunate in their material circumstances don’t find sufficient
enjoyment to make life valuable to them, this is usually
because they care for nobody but themselves. If someone
has neither public nor private affections, that will greatly
reduce the amount of excitement his life can contain, and
any excitements that he does have will sink in value as the
time approaches when all selfish interests must be cut off
by death. On the other hand, someone who leaves after him
objects of personal affection, especially if he has developed a
fellow-feeling with the interests of mankind as a whole, will
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of his death as
he had in the vigour of youth and health. Next to selfishness,
the principal cause that makes life unsatisfactory is lack of
mental cultivation [= ‘mental development’]. I am talking here
not about minds that are cultivated as a philosopher’s is,
but simply minds that have been open to the fountains
of knowledge and have been given a reasonable amount
of help in using their faculties. A mind that is cultivated
in that sense will find inexhaustible sources of interest in
everything that surrounds it—in the objects of nature, the
achievements of art, the imaginations of poetry, the incidents
of history, human events in the past and present as well
as their prospects in the future. It is possible to become
indifferent to all this, even when one hasn’t yet exhausted a
thousandth part of it; but that can happen only to someone
who from the beginning has had no •moral or human interest
in these things, and has looked to them only to •satisfy his
curiosity.
·These two prime requirements of happiness—•mental
cultivation and •unselfishness—shouldn’t be thought of as
possible only for a lucky few·. There is absolutely no reason
in the nature of things why an amount of •mental culture
sufficient to give an intelligent interest in science, poetry, art,
history etc. should not be the inheritance of everyone born
in a civilised country; any more than there’s any inherent
necessity that any human being should be a •selfish egotist
whose only feelings and cares are ones that centre on his
own miserable individuality. Something far superior to this
is, even now, common enough to give plenty of indication
of what the human species may become. Genuine private
affections and a sincere interest in the public good are possi-
ble, though to different extents, for every rightly brought up
human being. In a world containing so much to interest us,
so much for us to enjoy, and so much needing to be corrected
and improved, everyone who has a moderate amount of
these moral and intellectual requirements—·unselfishness
and cultivation·—is •capable of an existence that may be
called enviable; and such a person will certainly •have this
enviable existence as long as
•he isn’t, because of bad laws or conditions of servitude,
prevented from using the sources of happiness that
are within his reach; and
•he escapes the positive evils of life—the great sources
of physical and mental suffering—such as poverty,
disease, and bad luck with friends and lovers (turning
against him, proving to be worthless, or dying young).
So the main thrust of the problem lies in the battle against
these calamities. In the present state of things, poverty
and disease etc. can’t be eliminated, and often can’t even
be lessened much; and it is a rare good fortune to escape
such troubles entirely. Yet no-one whose opinion deserves
a moment’s consideration can doubt that most of the great
positive evils of the world are in themselves removable, and
will (if human affairs continue to improve) eventually be
reduced to something quite small. Poverty, in any sense
implying suffering, could be completely extinguished by the
wisdom of society combined with the good sense and gen-
erosity of individuals. Even that most stubborn of enemies,
•disease, could be indefinitely reduced in scope by good
physical and moral education and proper control of noxious
influences [= ‘air- and water-pollution’]; while the progress of
science holds out a promise of still more direct conquests
over •this detestable foe. And every advance in that direction
reduces the probability of events that would cut short our
own lives or —more important to us—the lives of others
in whom our happiness is wrapped up. As for ups and
downs of fortune, and other disappointments connected with
worldly circumstances, these are principally the effect of
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
gross foolishness, of desires that got out of control, or of bad
or imperfect social institutions.
In short, all the large sources of human suffering are
to a large extent —and many of them almost entirely—
conquerable by human care and effort. Their removal is
grievously slow, and a long succession of generations will
perish in the battle before the conquest is completed and
this world becomes what it easily could be if we had the will
and the knowledge to make it so. Yet despite this, every mind
that is sufficiently intelligent and generous to play some part
(however small and inconspicuous) in the effort will draw a
noble enjoyment from the contest itself—an enjoyment that
he couldn’t be induced to give up by any bribe in the form of
selfish indulgence.
And this leads to the right response to the objectors
who say that we can, and that we should, do without
happiness. It is certainly possible to do without happiness;
nineteen-twentieths of mankind are compelled to do without
it, even in those parts of our present world that are least deep
in barbarism. And it often happens that a hero or martyr
forgoes it for the sake of something that he values more than
his individual happiness. But what is this ‘something’ if
it isn’t the happiness of others or something required for
·their· happiness? It is noble to be capable of resigning
entirely one’s own share of happiness, or the chances of it;
but no-one engages in self-sacrifice just so as to engage in
self-sacrifice! He must have some end or purpose. You may
say: ‘The end he aims at in his self-sacrifice is not ·anyone’s·
happiness; it is virtue, which is better than happiness.’ In
response to this I ask: Would the sacrifice be made if the hero
or martyr didn’t think it would spare others from having to
make similar sacrifices? Would it be made if he thought that
his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce
no result for any of his fellow creatures except to make
their situation like his, putting them in also in the position of
persons who have renounced happiness? All honour to those
who can give up for themselves the personal enjoyment of life,
when by doing this they contribute worthily to increasing the
amount of happiness in the world; but someone who does
it, or claims to do it, for any other purpose doesn’t deserve
admiration any more than does the ascetic living on top of
his pillar. He may be a rousing proof of what men can do,
but surely not an example of what they should do.
·Self-Sacrifice·
Only while the world is in a very imperfect state can it
happen that anyone’s best chance of serving the happiness of
others is through the absolute sacrifice of his own happiness;
but while the world is in that imperfect state, I fully admit
that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest
virtue that can be found in man. I would add something
that may seem paradoxical: namely that in this ·present
imperfect· condition of the world •the conscious ability to do
without happiness gives the best prospect of bringing about
such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that
•consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life
by making him feel that fate and fortune—let them do their
worst!—have no power to subdue him. Once he feels that, it
frees him from excessive anxiety about the evils of life and
lets him (like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman
Empire) calmly develop the sources of satisfaction that are
available to him, not concerning himself with the uncertainty
regarding how long they will last or the certainty that they
will end.
Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim that they
have as much right as the Stoic or the Transcendentalist to
maintain the morality of devotion to a cause as something
11
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
that belongs to them. The utilitarian morality does recognise
that human beings can sacrifice their own greatest good
for the good of others; it merely refuses to admit that the
sacrifice is itself a good. It regards as wasted any sacrifice
that doesn’t increase, or tend to increase, the sum total
of happiness. The only self-renunciation that it applauds
is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means to
happiness, of others. . . .
I must again repeat something that the opponents of
utilitarianism are seldom fair enough to admit, namely that
the happiness that forms the utilitarian standard of what
is right in conduct is not •the agent’s own happiness but
•that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and
that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. [Here
and everywhere Mill uses ‘disinterested’ in its still-correct meaning = ‘not
self -interested’ = ‘not swayed by any consideration of how the outcome
might affect one’s own welfare’.] In the golden rule of Jesus of
Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility.
To
do as you would be done by, and to
love your neighbour as yourself
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As
the ·practical· way to get as close as possible to this ideal,
·the ethics of· utility would command two things. (1) First,
laws and social arrangements should place the happiness
(or what for practical purposes we may call the interest) of
every individual as much as possible in harmony with the
interest of the whole. (2) Education and opinion, which
have such a vast power over human character, should use
that power to establish in the mind of every individual an
unbreakable link between •his own happiness and •the good
of the whole; especially between •his own happiness and
•the kinds of conduct (whether doing or allowing) that are
conducive to universal happiness. If (2) is done properly,
it will tend to have two results: (2a) The individual won’t
be able to conceive the possibility of being personally happy
while acting in ways opposed to the general good. (2b) In
each individual a direct impulse to promote the general good
will be one of the habitual motives of action, and the feelings
connected with it will fill a large and prominent place in
his sentient existence. This is the true character of the
utilitarian morality. If those who attack utilitarianism see it
as being like this, I don’t know •what good features of some
other moralities they could possibly say that utilitarianism
lacks, •what more beautiful or more elevated developments
of human nature any other ethical systems can be supposed
to encourage, or •what motivations for action that aren’t
available to the utilitarian those other systems rely on for
giving effect to their mandates.
·Setting the Standard too High?·
The objectors to utilitarianism can’t be accused of always
representing it in a •discreditable light. On the contrary,
objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its disin-
terested character sometimes find fault with utilitarianism’s
standard as being •too high for humanity. To require people
always to act from the •motive of promoting the general
interests of society—that is demanding too much, they say.
But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of
morals, and confuse the •rule of action with the •motive for
acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our
duties, or by what test we can know them; but no system of
ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall
be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths
of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
so if the •rule of duty doesn’t condemn them. It is especially
unfair to utilitarianism to object to it on the basis of this
particular misunderstanding, because utilitarian moralists
have gone beyond almost everyone in asserting that the
motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action
though it has much to do with the worth of the agent. He
who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is
morally right, whether his motive is duty or the hope of being
paid for his trouble; he who betrays a friend who trusts him
is guilty of a crime, even if his aim is to serve another friend
to whom he is under greater obligations.
Let us now look at actions that are done from the motive
of duty, in direct obedience to ·the utilitarian· principle: it
is a misunderstanding of the utilitarian way of thinking to
conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds on
anything as wide as the world or society in general. The great
majority of good actions are intended not for •the benefit of
the world but for parts of the good of the world, namely •the
benefit of individuals. And on these occasions the thoughts
of the most virtuous man need not go beyond the particular
persons concerned, except to the extent that he has to assure
himself that in benefiting those individuals he isn’t violating
the rights (i.e. the legitimate and authorised expectations)
of anyone else. According to the utilitarian ethics the object
of virtue is to multiply happiness; for any person (except
one in a thousand) it is only on exceptional occasions that
he has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, i.e.
to be a public benefactor; and it is only on these occasions
that he is called upon to consider public utility; in every
other case he needs to attend only to private utility, the
interest or happiness of some few persons. The only people
who need to concern themselves regularly about so large
an object as society in general are those ·few· whose actions
have an influence that extends that far. ·Thoughts about the
general welfare do have a place in everyone’s moral thinking·
in the case of refrainings—things that people hold off from
doing, for moral reasons, though the consequences in the
particular case might be beneficial. The thought in these
cases is like this: ‘If I acted in that way, my action would
belong to a class of actions which, if practised generally,
would be generally harmful, and for that reason I ought not
to perform it.’ It would be unworthy of an intelligent agent
not to be consciously aware of such considerations. But the
amount of regard for the public interest implied in this kind
of thought is no greater than is demanded by every system of
morals, for they all demand that one refrain from anything
that would obviously be pernicious to society; ·so there is no
basis here for a criticism of utilitarianism in particular·.
·Is Utilitarianism Chilly?·
The same considerations dispose of another reproach against
the doctrine of utility, based on a still grosser misunderstand-
ing of the purpose of a standard of morality and of the very
meanings of the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. It is often said
that utilitarianism •makes men cold and unsympathising;
that it •chills their moral feelings towards individuals; that it
•makes them attend only to
•the dry and hard consideration of the consequences
of actions,
leaving out of their moral estimate
•the ·personal· qualities from which those actions
emanate.
If this means that they don’t allow their judgment about the
rightness or wrongness of an action to be influenced by their
opinion of the qualities of the person who does it, this is
a complaint not against •utilitarianism but against •having
any standard of morality at all; for certainly no known ethical
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
standard declares that an action is good or bad because it
is done by a good or a bad man, still less because it is done
by a lovable, brave or benevolent man, or by an unfriendly,
cowardly or unsympathetic one. These considerations ·of
personal virtue· are relevant to how we estimate persons,
not actions; and the utilitarian theory in no way conflicts
with the fact that there are other things that interest us
in persons besides the rightness and wrongness of their
actions. The Stoics, indeed, with the paradoxical misuse
of language which was part of their system and by which
they tried to raise themselves to a level at which their only
concern was with virtue, were fond of saying that he who
has virtue has everything; that it is the virtuous man, and
only the virtuous man, who is rich, is beautiful, is a king.
But the utilitarian doctrine doesn’t make any such claim on
behalf of the virtuous man. Utilitarians are well aware that
there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides
virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow to all of them their
full worth. They are also aware that •a right action doesn’t
necessarily indicate a virtuous character, and that •actions
that are blamable often come from ·personal· qualities that
deserve praise. When this shows up in any particular case,
it modifies utilitarian’s estimation not of the act but of the
agent. They do hold that in the long run the best proof of
a good character is good actions; and they firmly refuse to
consider any mental disposition as good if its predominant
tendency is to produce bad conduct. This, which I freely
grant, makes utilitarians unpopular with many people; but
this is an unpopularity that they must share with everyone
who takes seriously the distinction between right and wrong;
and the criticism is not one that a conscientious utilitarian
need be anxious to fend off.
If the objection means only this:
Many utilitarians look on the morality of actions, as
measured by the utilitarian standard, in too exclusive
a manner, and don’t put enough emphasis on the
other beauties of character that go towards making a
human being lovable or admirable,
this may be admitted. Utilitarians who have cultivated their
moral feelings but not their sympathies or their artistic
perceptions do fall into this mistake; and so do all other
moralists under the same conditions. What can be said in
excuse of other moralists is equally available for utilitarians,
namely that if one is to go wrong about this, it is better to
go wrong on that side, ·rather than caring about lovability
etc. and ignoring the morality of actions·. As a matter of fact,
utilitarians are in this respect like the adherents of other
systems: there is every imaginable degree of rigidity and of
laxity in how they apply their standard ·of right and wrong·:
some are puritanically rigorous, while others are as forgiving
as any sinner or sentimentalist could wish! But on the whole,
a doctrine that highlights the interest that mankind have
in the repression and prevention of conduct that violates
the moral law is likely to do as good a job as any other in
turning the force of public opinion again such violations. It
is true that the question ‘What does violate the moral law?’
is one on which those who recognise different standards
of morality are likely now and then to differ. But ·that
isn’t a point against utilitarianism·; difference of opinion
on moral questions wasn’t first introduced into the world by
utilitarianism! And that doctrine does supply a tangible and
intelligible way—if not always an easy one—of deciding such
differences.
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
·Utilitarianism as ‘Godless’·
It may be worthwhile to comment on a few more of the
common misunderstandings of utilitarian ethics, even those
that are so obvious and gross that it might appear impossible
for any fair and intelligent person to fall into them. ·It might
appear impossible but unfortunately it isn’t·: the crudest
misunderstandings of ethical doctrines are continually met
with in the deliberate writings of persons with the greatest
claims both to high principle and to philosophy. That
is because people—even very able ones—often take little
trouble to understand the likely influence of any opinion
against which they have a prejudice, and are unaware of
this deliberate ignorance as a defect. We quite often hear the
doctrine of utility denounced as a godless doctrine. If this
mere assumption needs to be replied to at all, we may say
that the question depends on what idea we have formed of
the moral character of the Deity. If it is true that God desires
the happiness of his creatures above all else, and that this
was his purpose in creating them, then utilitarianism, far
from being a godless doctrine, is the most deeply religious
of them all. If the accusation is that utilitarianism doesn’t
recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of
morals, I answer that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect
goodness and wisdom of God has to believe that whatever
God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals must
fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. Others
besides utilitarians have held this:
The Christian revelation was intended (and is fitted)
to bring into the hearts and minds of mankind a spirit
that will enable them to find for themselves what is
right, and incline them to do right when they have
found it; rather than to tell them —except in a very
general way—what it is. And we need a doctrine of
ethics, carefully followed out, to know what the will of
God is.
We needn’t discuss here whether this is right; because what-
ever aid religion—either natural or revealed—can provide to
ethical investigation is as open to the utilitarian moralist as
to any other. He is as entitled to cite it as God’s testimony to
the usefulness or hurtfulness of a course of action as others
are to cite it as pointing to a transcendental law that has no
connection with usefulness or happiness.
·Expediency·
Again, utilitarianism is often slapped down as an immoral
doctrine by giving it the name ‘Expediency’, and taking
advantage of the common use of that term to contrast it
with ‘Principle’. But when ‘expedient’ is opposed to ‘right’,
it usually means what is expedient for the particular interest
of the agent himself, as when a high official sacrifices the
interests of his country in order to keep himself in place.
When it means anything better than this, it means what is
expedient for some immediate temporary purpose, while vio-
lating a rule whose observance is much more expedient. The
‘expedient’ in this sense, instead of being the same thing as
the •useful, is a branch of the •hurtful. For example, telling
a lie would often be expedient for escaping some temporary
difficulty or getting something that would be immediately
useful to ourselves or others. But (1) the principal support
of all present social well-being is people’s ability to trust
one another’s assertions, and the lack of that trust does
more than anything else to keep back civilisation, virtue,
everything on which human happiness on the largest scale
depends. Therefore (2) the development in ourselves of a
sensitive feeling about truthfulness is one of the most useful
things that our conduct can encourage, and the weakening of
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
that feeling is one of the most harmful. Finally, (3) any devia-
tion from truth—even an unintentional one—does something
towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion.
For these reasons we feel that (4) to obtain an immediate
advantage by violating such an overwhelmingly expedient
rule is not expedient, and that someone who acts in that
way does his bit towards depriving mankind of the good,
and inflicting on them the harm, involved in the greater or
less reliance that they can place in each other’s word, thus
acting as though he were one of mankind’s worst enemies.
Yet all moralists agree that even this rule ·about telling the
truth·, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions. The
chief one is the case where the withholding of some fact
from someone would save an individual (especially someone
other than oneself) from great and undeserved harm, and
the only way of withholding it is to lie about it. (Examples:
keeping information ·about the whereabouts of a weapon·
from a malefactor, keeping bad news from a person who
is dangerously ill.) But in order that this exception ·to the
truth-telling rule· doesn’t extend itself beyond the need for
it, and has the least possible effect of weakening reliance
on truth-telling, it ought to be recognised, and if possible its
limits should be defined; and if the principle of utility is good
for anything, it must be good for weighing these conflicting
utilities against one another, and marking out the region
within which one or the other dominates.
·Time to Calculate?·
Again, defenders of utility often find themselves challenged
to reply to such objections as this: ‘Before acting, one doesn’t
have time to calculate and weigh the effects on the general
happiness of any line of conduct.’ This is just like saying:
‘Before acting, one doesn’t have time on each occasion to read
through the Old and New Testaments; so it is impossible
for us to guide our conduct by Christianity.’ The answer to
the objection is that there has been plenty of time, namely,
the whole past duration of the human species. During all
that time, mankind have been learning by •experience what
sorts of consequences actions are apt to have, this being
something on which all the morality of life depends, as well
as all the prudence [= ‘decisions about what will further one’s own
interests’]. The objectors talk as if the start of this course of
•experience had been put off until now, so that when some
man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of
someone else he has to start at that moment considering
for the first time whether murder and theft are harmful to
human happiness! Even if that were how things stand, I
don’t think he would find the question very puzzling. . . .
If mankind were agreed in considering utility to be the
test of morality, they would of course—it would be merely
fanciful to deny it—reach some agreement about what is
useful, and would arrange for their notions about this to
be taught to the young and enforced by law and opinion.
Any ethical standard whatever can easily be ‘shown’ to work
badly if we suppose •universal idiocy to be conjoined with
it! But on any hypothesis short of •that, mankind must by
this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of
some actions on their happiness; and the beliefs that have
thus come down ·to us from the experience of mankind· are
the rules of morality for the people in general—and for the
philosopher until he succeeds in finding something better. I
admit, or rather I strongly assert, that
•philosophers might easily find something better, even
now, on many subjects; that
•the accepted code of ethics is not God-given; and that
•mankind have still much to learn about how various
kinds of action affect the general happiness.
16
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 2: What utilitarianism is
The corollaries from the principle of utility, like the rules
of every practical art, can be improved indefinitely, and
while the human mind is progressing they are constantly
improving.
But to consider the intermediate rules of morality as
unprovable is one thing; to pass over them entirely, trying to
test each individual action directly by the first principle, is
another. It is a strange notion that having a •first principle is
inconsistent with having •secondary ones as well. When you
tell a traveller the location of the place he wants to get to, you
aren’t forbidding him to use landmarks and direction-posts
along the way! The proposition that happiness is the end
and aim of morality doesn’t mean that no road ought to be
laid down to that goal, or that people going to it shouldn’t be
advised to take one direction rather than another. Men
really ought to stop talking a kind of nonsense on this
subject –nonsense that they wouldn’t utter or listen to with
regard to any other practically important matter. Nobody
argues that the art of navigation is not based on astronomy
because sailors can’t wait to calculate the Nautical Almanack.
Because they are rational creatures, sailors go to sea with
the calculations already done; and all rational creatures
go out on the sea of life with their minds made up on the
common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of
the much harder questions of wise and foolish. And we can
presume that they will continue to do so long as foresight
continues to be a human quality. Whatever we adopt as
the fundamental principle of morality, we need subordinate
principles through which to apply it; the absolute need for
them is a feature of all ·moral· systems, so it doesn’t support
any argument against any one system in particular. To argue
solemnly in a manner that presupposes this:
No such secondary principles can be had; and
mankind never did and never will draw any general
conclusions from the experience of human life
is as totally absurd, I think, as anything that has been
advanced in philosophical controversy.
·Bad Faith·
The remainder of the standard arguments against utilitarian-
ism mostly consist in blaming it for •the common infirmities
of human nature and •the general difficulties that trouble
conscientious persons when they are shaping their course
through life. We are told that a utilitarian will be apt to make
his own particular case an exception to moral rules; and
that when he is tempted ·to do something wrong· he will see
more utility in doing it than in not doing it. But is utility the
only morality that can provide us with excuses for evil doing,
and means of cheating our own conscience? ·Of course not·!
Such excuses are provided in abundance by •all doctrines
that recognise the existence of conflicting considerations as
a fact in morals; and this is recognized by every doctrine
that any sane person has believed. It is the fault not •of any
creed but •of the complicated nature of human affairs that
rules of conduct can’t be formulated so that they require
no exceptions, and hardly any kind of action can safely be
stated to be either always obligatory or always condemnable.
Every ethical creed softens the rigidity of its laws by
giving the morally responsible agent some •freedom to adapt
his behaviour to special features of his circumstances; and
under every creed, at the •opening thus made, self-deception
and dishonest reasoning get in. Every moral system allows
for clear cases of conflicting obligation. These are real
difficulties, knotty points both in the •theory of ethics and
in the •practical personal matter of living conscientiously.
In practice they are overcome, more or less successfully,
according to the person’s intellect and virtue; but it can’t
17
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 3: What will motivate us?
be claimed that having an ultimate standard to which con-
flicting rights and duties can be referred will make one less
qualified to deal with them! If utility is the basic source of
moral obligations, utility can be invoked to decide between
obligations whose demands are incompatible. The ·utility·
standard may be hard to apply, but it is better than having
no standard. In other systems, the moral laws all claim
independent authority, so that there’s no common umpire
entitled to settle conflicts between them; when one of them is
claimed to have precedence over another, the basis for this is
little better than sophistry, allowing free scope for personal
desires and preferences (unless the conflict is resolved by the
unadmitted influence of considerations of utility). It is only
in these cases of conflict between secondary principles that
there is any need to appeal to first principles. In every case
of moral obligation some secondary principle is involved; and
if there is only one, someone who recognizes that principle
can seldom be in any real doubt as to which one it is.
Chapter 3: What will motivate us to obey the principle of utility?
The question is often asked, and it is a proper question in
relation to any supposed moral standard,
What is its sanction? [= ‘What is the reward for conforming
to it and/or the punishment for not doing so?’]
What are the motives to obey it?
or more specifically,
What is the source of its obligation? Where does it get
its binding force from?
It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the
answer to this question. It often takes the shape of an
objection to the utilitarian morality in particular, as though
it were specially applicable to that; but really it arises in
regard to all standards. It arises, in fact, whenever someone
is called on to adopt a standard ·that is new to him·, or
to put morality on some basis on which he hasn’t been
accustomed to rest it. The only morality that presents itself
to the mind with the feeling of being in itself obligatory is the
customary morality, the one that education and opinion have
•consecrated; and when a person is asked to believe that this
morality derives its obligation from some general principle
around which custom has not thrown the same •halo, he
finds the demand paradoxical; the supposed corollaries seem
to have a more binding force than the original theorem; the
superstructure seems to stand better without its supposed
foundation than with it. He says to himself, ‘I feel that I
am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why
am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own
happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the
preference?’
If the utilitarian philosophy’s view of the nature of the
moral sense is correct, this difficulty will always present
itself, until the influences that form moral character have
taken the same hold of the •principle that they have taken
of some of its •consequences. That will be the time when
the improvement of education brings about something that
Christ certainly intended should come about, namely that
18
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 3: What will motivate us?
the •feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures should be
as deeply rooted in our character, and feel to us to be as
completely a part of our nature as the •horror of crime is in
an ordinarily well brought up young person. While we are
waiting for that day to come, the difficulty has no special
application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every
attempt to analyse morality and organize it under principles.
Unless the first principle already has in men’s minds as
much sacredness as any of its applications, this process
always seems to deprive the applications of a part of their
sanctity.
The principle of utility either has, or perfectly well could
have, all the sanctions that belong to any other system of
morals. Those sanctions are either external or internal. I
needn’t spend long on the external sanctions. They are
the hope of favour and the fear of displeasure from
•our fellow creatures or from •the ruler of the universe,
and also
whatever sympathy or affection we may have for •them,
or whatever love and awe we may have towards •Him,
inclining us to do ·what they want or· what He wants,
independently of selfish consequences.
Obviously there is no reason why all these motives for
conforming to moral principles shouldn’t attach themselves
to the utilitarian morality as completely and as powerfully
as to any other. Indeed, the motives that refer to our fellow
creatures are sure to do so, insofar as people are intelligent
enough ·to make the connection·. Here is why. Whether
or not there is any basis of moral obligation other than the
general happiness, men do want happiness; and however
imperfect a particular person’s conduct may be, he does
desire and commend all conduct by others that promotes his
happiness. With regard to the religious motive: if men believe
in the goodness of God (as most of them say they do), those
who think that conduciveness to the general happiness is
the essence of good, or even just the criterion of good, must
believe that general happiness is also what God approves.
So
•the whole force of external reward and punishment,
whether physical or moral and whether coming from
God or from our fellow men,
together with
•everything that human nature is capable of in the way
of disinterested devotion to God or to man,
become available ·as sanctions· to enforce ·obedience to·
the utilitarian morality, in proportion as that morality is
recognised. And the more the techniques of education and
general cultivation are put to work on this, the stronger the
sanctions will be.
That’s enough about external sanctions. The internal
sanction of duty is one and the same, whatever our standard
of duty may be. It is a feeling in our own mind, a more
or less intense pain that comes with violations of duty;
and in properly cultivated moral natures it rises in the
more serious cases into shrinking from the violation as
an impossibility. When this feeling is disinterested, and
connected with the pure idea of duty and not with some
particular form of it or with any of the merely accessory
circumstances, it is the essence of •conscience; though in
•that complex phenomenon as it actually exists the simple
fact ·of pure conscience· is usually all encrusted over with
associated feelings derived
from sympathy,
from love and even more from fear;
from all the forms of religious feeling;
from memories of childhood and of all our past life;
from self-esteem, desire for the esteem of others, and
occasionally even self-abasement.
19
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 3: What will motivate us?
It seems to me that this extreme complicatedness is the
origin of the sort of mystical character which is apt to be
attributed to the idea of moral obligation and which leads
people to think that the idea ·of moral obligation· can’t
possibly attach itself to any objects except the ones that,
by a supposed mysterious law, are found in our present
experience to arouse it. Its binding force, however, consists
in the existence of a mass of feeling that must be broken
through in order to do what violates our standard of right;
and if we do nevertheless violate that standard, the feelings
will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form
of remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin
of conscience, this is what it essentially consists of.
Since the ultimate sanction of all morality (external mo-
tives apart) is a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see
nothing awkward for the utilitarian in the question ‘What
is the sanction of the utilitarian standard?’ We can answer,
‘It is the same as of all other moral standards—namely
the conscientious feelings of mankind.’ Undoubtedly this
sanction has no binding force for those who don’t have
the feelings it appeals to; but these people won’t be more
obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian
one. No morality of any kind has any hold on them except
through external sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings do exist,
a fact in human nature; and experience shows that they are
real and that they can act with great power on people in
whom they have been duly developed. No reason has ever
been shown why they can’t be developed to as great intensity
in connection with the utilitarian rule of morals as with any
other.
I realize that some people are inclined to believe that a
person who sees in moral obligation
a transcendental fact, an objective reality belonging
to the province of ‘things in themselves’
is likely to be more obedient to moral obligation than one
who believes it to be
entirely subjective, being rooted purely in human
consciousness.
But whatever a person’s opinion may be on this metaphysical
point, the force he is really urged by is his own subjective
feeling, and the •power of the force is exactly measured by
the •strength of the feeling. No-one’s belief that
duty is an objective reality
is stronger than the belief that
God is an objective reality;
yet the belief in God, apart from the expectation of actual re-
ward and punishment, operates on conduct only through the
subjective religious feeling, and the power of the operation is
proportional to the strength of the feeling. The sanction, so
far as it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself; so the
thought of the transcendental moralists ·I am discussing·
must be this:
This sanction won’t exist in the mind unless it is
believed to have its root outside the mind. If a person
can say to himself ‘What is now restraining me—what
is called my conscience—is only a feeling in my own
mind’, he may draw the conclusion that when the
feeling ceases the obligation also ceases, and that if
he finds the feeling inconvenient he may disregard it
and try to get rid of it.
But is this danger confined to the utilitarian morality? Does
the belief that moral obligation has its seat outside the mind
make the feeling of it too strong for you to get rid of it? The
facts are otherwise—so much so that all moralists admit
and lament how easy it is for conscience to be silenced or
stifled in most people’s minds. People who never heard
of the principle of utility ask themselves ‘Need I obey my
conscience?’ just as often as do utilitarians. Those whose
20
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 3: What will motivate us?
conscientious feelings are so weak as to allow them to ask
this question, if they answer ‘Yes’ they will do so not because
•they believe in the transcendental theory but because of
•the external sanctions.
It isn’t necessary for present purposes to decide whether
the feeling of duty is innate or implanted [i.e. whether it is part
of our natural birthright or is acquired along the way through education
or whatever]. Assuming it to be innate, the question remains
as to what duties the feeling naturally attaches itself to;
for the philosophic supporters of the innateness theory are
now agreed that ·what is given to us innately·—what we
have an intuitive perception of—is the •principles of morality
and not its •details. If there is anything innate in all this,
I don’t see why the feeling that is innate shouldn’t be the
feeling of •concern for the pleasures and pains of others. If
any principle of morals is intuitively obligatory, I should say
it must be •that one. If so, intuitive ·innatist· ethics would
coincide with utilitarian ethics, and there would be no further
quarrel between them. Even as things stand, although the
intuitive moralists believe that there are other intuitive moral
obligations, they do already believe that this —·the obligation
to seek the welfare of others·—is one; for they all hold that
a large portion of morality turns on the consideration that
should be given to the interests of our fellow-creatures. So
if the belief in the transcendental origin of moral obligation
does give any additional force to the internal sanction, it
appears to me that the utilitarian principle already has the
benefit of it.
On the other hand, if the moral feelings are not innate
but acquired (as I think they are), that doesn’t make them
any less natural. It is natural for man to speak, to reason,
to build cities, to cultivate the ground, though these are
acquired abilities. The moral feelings are indeed not ‘a part
of our nature’ in the sense of being detectably present in all
of us; but this is a sad fact admitted by the most strenuous
believers in the transcendental origin of those feelings. Like
the other acquired capacities I have referred to, the moral
faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth
from it. Like them, it can to a certain small extent spring
up spontaneously and can be brought by cultivation to a
high degree of development. Unfortunately, it can —by a
sufficient use of external sanctions and of the force of early
impressions—be cultivated in almost any direction; so that
there is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that
these influences can’t make it act on the human mind with
all the authority of conscience. To doubt that the same power
might be given by the same means to the principle of utility,
even if it had no foundation in human nature, would be
flying in the face of all experience.
But while the culture of the intellect continues, purely
artificial moral associations gradually give way through the
dissolving force of analysis. If this were the case:
•The feeling of duty when associated with utility seems
as arbitrary ·as any of those others·;
•There is no prominent part of our make-up, no pow-
erful class of feelings, with which that association
harmonizes, making us feel it as congenial and inclin-
ing us not only to encourage it in others (for which we
have abundant ·self·-interested motives), but also to
value it in ourselves; in short,
•Utilitarian morality has no natural basis in our feel-
ings,
—in that case it might well happen that this association ·of
duty with utility· was analysed away, even after it had been
implanted by education. But there is this basis of powerful
natural sentiment; and this will constitute the strength of
the utilitarian morality once general happiness is recognised
as the ethical standard. This firm foundation is that of
21
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 3: What will motivate us?
the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity
with our fellow creatures. It is already a powerful force in
human nature, and fortunately one of those that tend to be
made stronger—even without being explicitly taught —by
the influences of advancing civilisation. The social state is
at once so natural, so necessary and so habitual to a man
that, except in some unusual circumstances or an effortful
thought-experiment, he never thinks of himself as anything
but a member of a group; and this association becomes
stronger and stronger as mankind moves further from the
state of savage independence. Thus, any condition that is
essential to a state of society becomes more and more an
inseparable part of each person’s conception of the state of
things that he is born into and that is the destiny of a human
being.
Now society between human beings—except in the re-
lation of master to slave—is obviously impossible on any
other basis than that the interests of all are to be consulted.
Society between •equals can only exist on the understanding
that the interests of all are to be regarded •equally. And
since in all states of civilisation every person except an
absolute monarch has equals, everyone is obliged to live on
these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance
is made towards a state in which it will be impossible to
live permanently with anybody except on terms of equality.
In this way people grow up unable to think of a state of
total disregard of other people’s interests as one they could
possibly live in. They have to conceive of themselves as at
least refraining from all the most harmful crimes and (if
only for their own protection) living in a state of constant
protest against them. They are also familiar with the fact of
co-operating with others and of acting (at least for the time
being) in the interests of a group rather than of themselves
as individuals. So long as they are co-operating, their
purposes are identified with those of others; there is at
least a temporary feeling that the interests of others are their
own interests. All strengthening of social ties and all healthy
growth of society gives to each individual a stronger personal
interest in •acting with regard for the welfare of others; and
it also leads him to identify his •feelings more and more with
their good, or at least with an even greater degree of concern
for it in his actions. He comes, as though instinctively,
to be conscious of himself as a being who pays regard to
others as a matter of course. The good of others becomes
to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to,
like any of the physical conditions of our existence. Now,
however •much or little of this feeling a person has, he has
the strongest motives both of ·self·-interest and of sympathy
to express this feeling in his behaviour, and to do all he can
to encourage it in others; and even if he has •none of it
himself, it is as much in his interests as in anyone else’s that
others should have it. Consequently the smallest seeds of the
feeling are laid hold of and nourished by the •contagion of
sympathy and the •influences of education; and a complete
web of supporting association is woven around it by the
powerful force of the external sanctions. [Regarding ‘contagion’:
Mill means merely that through sympathy a feeling can be passed on
from one person to another.]
As civilisation goes on, this way of thinking about our-
selves and about human life is increasingly felt to be natural.
Every step in political improvement makes it more so, by
•removing the sources of conflicts of interest, and
•removing the inequalities in legal status between
individuals or classes, because of which it is still prac-
ticable to disregard the happiness of large portions of
mankind.
As the human mind improves, there is a steady increase
in the influences that tend to generate in each individual a
22
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 3: What will motivate us?
feeling of unity with all the rest; a feeling which in its perfect
state would make him never think of or want any benefit for
himself if it didn’t also involve benefits for all the rest. Now
suppose this were the case:
This feeling of unity is taught as a religion. The whole
force of education, of institutions and of opinion is
directed—as it used to be in the case of religion—
to making every person grow up from infancy sur-
rounded on all sides both by people who have the
feeling of unity, who say they have it, and who act on
it.
I don’t think that anyone who can realize this conception
[= ‘make it real to himself in his mind’] will have any doubts about
the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the happiness
morality. To any student of ethics who finds the realization
difficult [i.e. who can’t get a real sense of what it would be like if the
above scenario came true], I recommend that he get help from
the second of M. Comte’s two principal works, the Traité
de politique positive. I have the strongest objections to the
system of politics and morals presented in that book; but I
think it has more than adequately shown the possibility of
•giving to the service of humanity, even without help
from a belief in God, both the psychological power and
the social effectiveness of a religion; and •making it
take hold of human life and colour all thought, feeling
and action far more thoroughly than any religion has
ever done; the danger being not that it might be insuf-
ficient but that it might be so excessive as to interfere
unduly with human freedom and individuality.
This feeling ·of unity· that constitutes the binding force
of the utilitarian morality on those who accept it doesn’t
have to wait until . . . .everyone has it. It’s true that in the
comparatively early state of human advancement in which
we now live, a person can’t feel such total sympathy with
everyone else that he couldn’t do anything that would work
against their interests; but even now a person in whom the
social feeling is at all developed can’t bring himself to think
of the rest of his fellow creatures as struggling rivals with
him for the means of happiness, rivals whom he must want
to see defeated in their aims so that he can succeed in his.
The deeply rooted conception that every individual has of
himself as a social being, even now, tends to make him feel it
as one of his natural wants that his feelings and aims should
harmonize with those of his fellow creatures. (If differences
of opinion and of mental culture make it impossible for him
to share many of their actual feelings—perhaps even make
him denounce and defy those feelings—he still needs to be
aware that his real aim doesn’t conflict with theirs, and that
he isn’t •opposing but •promoting what they really wish for,
namely their own good.) In most individuals this feeling ·of
unity· is much weaker than their selfish feelings, and is often
entirely lacking. But to those who have it, it bears all the
marks of a natural feeling. It doesn’t present itself to their
minds as •a superstition they were brought up in or •a law
forced on them by the power of society, but as •an attribute
that it would be bad for them to lack. This conviction is
the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality. It
is this that •makes any mind with well-developed feelings
work with rather than against the outward motives to care
for others, the motives provided by what I have called ‘the
external sanctions’; and when those sanctions are absent or
act in an opposite direction, •constitutes in itself an internal
binding force that is strong in proportion to the sensitiveness
and thoughtfulness of the ·person’s· character. Apart from
people whose mind is a moral blank, few could bear to lay
out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to
others except in ways that would serve their own interests.
23
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 4: What proof for the principle of utility?
Chapter 4: What sort of proof can be given for the principle of utility?
I have already remarked ·on page 3· that questions of ulti-
mate ends don’t admit of ‘proof’ in the ordinary meaning of
that term. It’s true of all first principles—the first premises
of our knowledge, as well as those of our conduct—that they
can’t be proved by reasoning. But the first principles of our
knowledge, being matters of fact, can be the subject of a
direct appeal to the faculties that make judgments of fact—
namely our ·outer· senses and our internal consciousness.
Can an appeal be made to those same faculties on questions
of practical ends [= ‘questions about what we ought to aim at’]? If
not, what other faculty is used for us to know them?
Questions about ends are, in other words, questions
what things are desirable. The utilitarian doctrine is that
happiness is desirable as an •end, and is the only thing that
is so; anything else that is desirable is only desirable as
•means to that end. What should be required regarding this
doctrine—what conditions must it fulfil—to justify its claim
to be believed?
The only proof capable of being given that an object is
visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that
a sound is audible is that people hear it; and similarly
with the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I
apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that
anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it. [This
paragraph up to here is given in Mill’s exact words.] If ·happiness·,
the end that the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself, were
not acknowledged in theory and in practice to be an end,
nothing could ever convince any person that it was an end.
No reason can be given why
•the general happiness is desirable,
except the fact that
•each person desires his own happiness, so far as he
thinks it is attainable.
But this is a fact; so we have not only all the proof there
could be for such a proposition, and all the proof that could
possibly be demanded, that
happiness is a good, that
each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and
therefore that
general happiness is a good to the aggregate of all per-
sons.
Happiness has made good its claim to be one of the ends of
conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.
But this alone doesn’t prove it to be the sole criterion.
To prove that in the same way, it seems, we would have to
show not only that people desire happiness but that they
never desire anything else. Now it’s obvious that they do
desire things that common language sharply distinguishes
from happiness. For example, they desire virtue and the
absence of vice, and this desire is just as real as their desire
for pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire for virtue
is not as universal as the desire for happiness, but it is just
as authentic a fact as the other. So the opponents of the
utilitarian standard think they have a right to infer that there
are other ends of human action besides happiness, and that
happiness is not the standard for approval and disapproval.
But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire
virtue, or maintain that virtue is not something to be desired?
Quite the contrary! It maintains not only that virtue is
to be •desired, but further that virtue is to be •desired
disinterestedly, for itself. Utilitarian moralists believe that
actions and dispositions are virtuous only because they
24
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 4: What proof for the principle of utility?
promote an end other than virtue; and that it is on this
basis that we decide what is virtuous. But set all that aside;
it is still open to the utilitarians to place virtue at the very
head of the things that are good as means to the ultimate
end. They also recognise as a psychological fact that an
individual could regard virtue as a good in itself, without
looking to any end beyond it; and they hold this:
The mind is not in a right state, not in a state con-
sistent with utility, not in the state most conducive
to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in
this manner—as something that is desirable in itself
even when, in the particular case, it wouldn’t produce
those other desirable consequences that it tends ·in
general· to produce.
This opinion doesn’t depart in the slightest from the happi-
ness principle. The ingredients of happiness are very various,
and each of them is desirable •in itself and not merely •when
considered as adding to some total. The principle of utility
doesn’t mean that any given pleasure (music, for instance)
and any given freedom from pain (good health, for instance)
is to be looked on ·only· as a means to a collective something
called ‘happiness’, and to be desired ·only· on that account.
They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides
being means to the end they are also a part of it. Well,
according to the utilitarian doctrine, virtue is not naturally
and originally part of the end (·happiness·) but it is capable
of becoming so; and in those who unselfishly love it virtue
has become so, and is desired and cherished not as a means
to happiness but as a part of their happiness.
To illustrate this further, let us consider something else
that is like virtue in the respect I have been discussing. That
is, something of which this is true:
It was originally a means ·to something that is de-
sired·, and if it weren’t a means to anything else it
would be of no interest to anyone; but by association
with what it is a means to it comes to be desired for
itself, and indeed desired with the utmost intensity.
What I have in mind is money. There is nothing intrin-
sically more desirable about money than about any heap
of glittering pebbles. Its value is solely the value of the
things that it will buy; the desire for it is the desire for other
things that it can lead to. Yet the love of money is not only
one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but many
people desire money in and for itself; the desire to have it is
often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on getting
stronger even when the person is losing all the desires that
point to ends to which money might be a means. So it is
true to say that money is desired not for the •sake of an end
but as •part of the end. From being a means to happiness it
has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual’s
conception of happiness. The same may be said of most
of the great objects of human life—power, for example, or
fame; except that each of these brings a certain amount of
immediate pleasure, which at least seems to be naturally
inherent in them, whereas nothing like that can be said
about money. Still, the strongest natural attraction of power
and of fame is the immense aid they give to the attainment of
our other wishes; this generates a strong association between
them and all our objects of desire; and that association gives
to the direct desire for power or fame the intensity it often has,
so that in some people it is stronger than all other desires. In
these cases the means have become a part of the end, and a
more important part of it than any of the things that they are
means to. What was once desired as a help towards getting
happiness has come to be desired for its own sake—as a part
of happiness. The person is made, or thinks he would be
made, happy by merely having power or fame, and is made
unhappy by failure to get it. The desire for it isn’t a different
25
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 4: What proof for the principle of utility?
thing from the desire for happiness, any more than is the
love of music or the desire for health. They are included in
happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire
for happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea,
but a concrete •whole; and these are some of its •parts. And
the utilitarian standard allows and approves of their being
so. Life would be a poor thing, very poorly provided with
sources of happiness, if nature didn’t arrange for this way
in which things that are intrinsically indifferent, but lead
to or are otherwise associated with the satisfaction of our
basic desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure
more valuable than the basic pleasures—more permanent
. . . and more intense.
Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of
this description. Originally the only reason for wanting it was
its conduciveness to pleasure and especially to protection
from pain. But this created an association ·of virtue with
pleasure and absence of pain·, and through this association
virtue can be felt to be a good in itself, and can be desired
as such with as much intensity as any other good. The
desire for virtue differs from the love of money, of power, of
fame, in this: •those three can and often do make the person
•noxious to the other members of the society to which he
belongs, whereas the disinterested •love of virtue makes
him a •blessing to them—nothing more so! And so the
utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those
other acquired desires
•up to the point beyond which they would do more
harm than good to the general happiness,
demands the cultivation of the love of virtue
•up to the greatest strength possible
because it is more important than anything else to the
general happiness.
The upshot of the preceding lines of thought is that really
nothing is desired except happiness. Anything that is desired
otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself (and
ultimately a means to happiness) is desired as being itself
a part of happiness, and it isn’t desired for itself until it
has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake
desire it either •because a person’s awareness of his virtue
is a pleasure, or •because his awareness of his not being
virtuous is a pain, or •for both reasons united. For the fact
is that this pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but
almost always together: one person feels pleasure at the
degree of virtue he has achieved, and pain at not having
achieved more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and
the other no pain, he wouldn’t love or desire virtue, or would
desire it only for the other benefits that it might produce for
himself or for persons whom he cared for. So now we have an
answer to the question: What sort of proof can be given for
the principle of utility? If the opinion that I have now stated
is psychologically true —if human nature is so constituted
that we desire nothing that isn’t either a •part of happiness or
a •means to it—we can’t have and don’t need any other proof
that •these are the only desirable things. If so, happiness
is the only end of human action, and the promotion of it is
the test by which to judge all human conduct; from which it
necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality,
since a part is included in the whole.
Is this really so? Do human beings desire nothing for
itself except that which is a pleasure to them or that whose
absence is a pain? We are now confronted by a question
of fact and experience, which like all such questions de-
pends on evidence. It can only be answered by practised
self-awareness and self-observation, assisted by observation
of others. I believe that when these sources of evidence are
consulted without any bias, they will declare that
•desiring a thing and •finding it pleasant,
26
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 4: What proof for the principle of utility?
are entirely inseparable phenomena, or rather they are two
parts of the same phenomenon, and that the same is true of
•aversion to a thing and •thinking of it as painful.
Strictly speaking, they are two different ways of naming the
same psychological fact; •to think of an object as desirable
(unless as a means) and to think of it as pleasant are one
and the same thing; and •it is a physical and metaphysical
impossibility to desire anything except in proportion as the
idea of it is pleasant.
This seems to me to be so obvious that I expect it will
hardly be disputed. The objection that will be made is not
that
desire could be ultimately directed to something other
than pleasure and freedom from pain,
but that
the will is a different thing from desire; and a solidly
virtuous person or any other person whose purposes
are fixed carries out his purposes without any thought
of the pleasure he has in contemplating them or
expects to get from their fulfilment; and he persists
in acting on his purposes even if these pleasures
are greatly lessened by changes in his character or
the weakening of his passive sensibilities (·i.e. his
desires·), or are outweighed by the pains that the
pursuit of his purposes may bring on him.
All this I fully admit, and have stated it elsewhere as
positively and emphatically as anyone. Will is an •active
phenomenon, and is a different thing from desire, which
is the state of •passive sensibility. Though originally an
offshoot from desire, will can in time take root and detach
itself from the parent stock; so much so that in the case of
an habitual purpose, instead of willing the thing because we
desire it we often desire it only because we will it. But this
is merely an instance of a familiar phenomenon, namely
the power of habit, and isn’t at all confined to the case
of virtuous actions. (1) Many indifferent things that men
originally did from a motive of some sort they continue to do
from habit. Sometimes this is done unconsciously, with the
person becoming aware of it only after the action; at other
times it is done with conscious volition, but volition that has
become habitual and is put into operation by the force of
habit. (2) This may be in opposition to the person’s deliberate
preference, as often happens with those who have acquired
habits of vicious or hurtful self-indulgence. (3) Or it may be
that the habitual act of will in the individual instance is not
in •contradiction to the general intention prevailing at other
times but in •fulfilment of it.
That’s the case for a person of confirmed virtue, and
for anyone who deliberately and consistently pursues any
definite end. The distinction between will and desire, un-
derstood in this way, is an authentic and highly important
psychological fact; but the fact consists solely in this—•that
will, like all every other part of our make-up, is amenable
to habit, and •that we can will from habit something we no
longer desire for itself or desire only because we will it. It
is still true that will at the beginning is entirely produced
by desire —taking ‘desire’ to cover the repelling influence of
pain as well as the attractive influence of pleasure. Now let
us set aside the person who has a confirmed will to do right,
and think about the one in whom that virtuous will is still
feeble, conquerable by temptation, and not to be fully relied
on; how can it be strengthened in him? Where the will to
be virtuous doesn’t exist in sufficient force, how can it be
implanted or awakened? Only by making the person desire
virtue—by making him think of it in a pleasurable light, or
of its absence in a painful one. By
•associating right-doing with pleasure or wrong-doing
with pain, or by
27
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
•bringing out and impressing and bringing home to the
person’s experience the pleasure naturally involved in
doing right or the pain in doing wrong,
it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous which, when
it is firmly built into the person’s make-up, acts without
any thought of either pleasure or pain. Will is the child
of desire, and moves out of the control of its parent only
to come under the control of habit. Something’s being a
result of habit doesn’t count towards its being intrinsically
good; and the only reason for wishing that the purpose
of virtue should become independent of pleasure and pain
·by becoming habitual· is the fact that the influence of the
pleasurable and painful associations that prompt virtuous
behaviour can’t be depended on for unerring constancy of
action until it has acquired the support of habit. Habit is
the only thing that makes patterns of feeling and conduct
certain; and it is because of the importance to others of being
able to rely absolutely on one’s feelings and conduct, and
the importance of this to oneself, that the will to do right
should be made to grow into this habitual independence
—·this independence from desire that is bought about by
habit·. In other words, this ·virtuous· state of the will is a
•means to good, not •intrinsically a good; and so it doesn’t
contradict the •doctrine that nothing is a good to human
beings except to the extent that it is either itself pleasurable
or is a means of getting pleasure or avoiding pain. But if this
•doctrine is true, the principle of utility is proved. Whether
the doctrine is true must now be left to the judgment of the
thoughtful reader.
Chapter 5: The connection between justice and utility
[In this chapter Mill frequently uses the word ‘sentiment’. In his usage, a
‘sentiment’ could be either belief or a feeling. That ambiguity has work to
do: Mill thinks that ‘That is unjust!’ expresses the speaker’s feelings, but
many of his opponents think it expresses the speaker’s belief that the
action in question objectively has a certain intrinsic quality. Speaking of
the ‘sentiment’ that is expressed is one way of staying neutral between
the two views. The present version of the chapter uses ‘sentiment’ every
time that Mill does (and only then), and uses ‘feeling’ every time that Mill
does (and only then).]
Down through the ages, one of the strongest objections
to the doctrine that utility or happiness is the criterion of
right and wrong has been based on the idea of justice. The
•powerful sentiment and •apparently clear thought that this
word brings to mind, with a rapidity and certainty resembling
an instinct, have seemed to the majority of thinkers to •point
to an inherent quality in things, •to show that what is just
must have an existence in nature as something absolute,
fundamentally distinct from every variety of what is expedi-
ent. The concept of justice (they have thought) conflicts with
the concept of expediency, though they commonly admit
that in the long run justice and expediency go together as a
matter of fact.
In the case of this moral sentiment (as of all the others)
there is no necessary connection between the question of its
28
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
•origin, and the question of its •binding force. That a feeling
is bestowed on us by nature doesn’t necessarily mean that
we should always do what it prompts us to do. The feeling
of justice might be a special instinct (·and thus bestowed by
nature·) and yet need to be controlled and enlightened by a
higher reason, just as all our other instincts do. If we have
intellectual instincts that lead us to think in a particular
way, as well as animal instincts that prompt us to act in a
particular way, the intellectual ones aren’t necessarily more
infallible in their sphere than the animal ones are in their
sphere; just as wrong actions can be prompted by the animal
instincts, wrong judgments [= ‘wrong beliefs’] may sometimes
be prompted by the intellectual instincts. But although
it is one thing to •believe that we have natural feelings of
justice and another to •accept them as an ultimate criterion
of conduct, these two opinions are very closely connected in
point of fact. Mankind are always inclined to think that any
•subjective feeling that they can’t explain in any other way is
a revelation of some •objective reality. What we need to do
now is to discover whether the reality to which the feeling of
justice corresponds is one that needs to be revealed in any
such special manner. That is, to discover whether
the justice or injustice of an action is a •special quality
all on its own, and distinct from all the action’s other
qualities,
or rather
the justice or injustice of an action is only a combi-
nation of certain of those qualities seen or thought
about in a •special way.
[This is what Mill, on page
30
, calls ‘the main problem’.] For the
purpose of this inquiry it is practically important to consider
whether
the feeling of justice and injustice is sui generis—·not
a special case of something more general·—like our
sensations of colour and taste (·such as something’s
tasting sweet·),
or rather
the feeling of justice and injustice is a derivative
feeling, formed by a combination of other feelings
(·comparable with something’s tasting stale·).
It is especially important to look into this; here is why.
(1) People are usually willing enough to agree that
objectively—·out there in the world·—the dictates
of justice coincide with a part of the field of general
expediency, ·i.e. that very often the just action is also
the action that will be most expedient from the point
of view of people in general·. (2) But the subjective
mental feeling of justice is different from the feeling
that commonly goes with simple expediency, and
except in the extreme cases of expediency the feeling
of justice is far more imperative in its demands. (3) So
people •find it hard to see justice as only a particular
kind or branch of general utility, and they •think that
its greater binding force requires it to have a totally
different origin.
To throw light on this question we must try to find out what it
is that marks off justice, or injustice, as special. (I’ll put this
in terms of injustice because justice, like many other moral
attributes, is best defined by its opposite.) When actions are
described as ‘unjust’, is there some one quality that is being
attributed to all of them, a quality that marks them off from
actions that are disapproved of but aren’t said to be ‘unjust’?
If so, what quality is it? If some one common quality (or
collection of qualities) is always present in everything that
men customarily call ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, we can judge whether
the general laws of our emotional make-up could
enable this particular quality (or combination of qual-
ities) to summon up a sentiment with the special
29
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
character and intensity ·of the sentiment of justice or
injustice·,
or whether instead
the sentiment ·of justice or injustice· can’t be ex-
plained, and must be regarded as something that
nature provided independently of its other provisions.
If we find the former to be the case, we shall by answering
this question have also solved the main problem. If the latter
is the case, we’ll have to look for some other way of tackling
the main problem.
To find the qualities that a variety of objects have in
common we must start by surveying the objects themselves
in the concrete [= ‘not partial descriptions of them but the objects
themselves as they are in actuality, with all their qualities’]. Let us
therefore turn our attention to the various ways of acting
and arrangements of human affairs that are universally or
·at least· widely characterized as ‘just’ or as ‘unjust’, taking
them one at a time. A great variety of things are well known
to arouse the sentiments associated with those names. I
shall survey ·five of· them rapidly, not trying to put them in
any special order.
(1) It is usually considered unjust to deprive anyone of his
personal liberty, his property, or anything else that belongs
to him by law. This gives us one instance of the application
of the terms ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ in a perfectly definite sense,
namely: It is just to respect, and unjust to violate, the legal
rights of anyone. But there are several exceptions to this,
arising from the other ways in which the notions of justice
and injustice come up. For example, the person who suffers
the deprivation may (as they say) have ‘forfeited’ the rights
that he is deprived of. I’ll return to this case soon.
(2) ·The second kind of case will come in the last sentence
of this paragraph; a preliminary matter needs to be sorted
out first·. The legal rights of which someone is deprived may
be rights that he oughtn’t to have had in the first place, i.e.
the law that gives him these rights may be a bad law. When
that is so or when (which is the same thing for our purpose)
it is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the justice
or injustice of breaking that law. Some maintain that no
law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed by an individual
citizen; that if the citizen is to show his opposition to it, he
should do so only by trying to get the law altered by those
who are authorized to do that. This opinion condemns many
of the most famous benefactors of mankind, and would often
protect pernicious institutions against the only weapons
that in the circumstances have any chance of succeeding
against them. Those who have this opinion defend it on
grounds of expediency, relying principally on the importance
to the common interests of mankind of preserving unbroken
the sentiment of submission to law. Other people hold the
directly contrary opinion, namely that any law that is judged
to be •bad may blamelessly be disobeyed, even if it isn’t
judged to be •unjust, but only thought to be bad because
inexpedient; while others would permit disobedience only
to •unjust laws; while yet others say that all laws that are
inexpedient are unjust, because every law imposes some
restriction on the natural liberty of mankind, and this
restriction is an injustice unless it is made legitimate by
tending to the people’s good. Among these differences of
opinion this much seems to be universally agreed:
There can be unjust laws; so law is not the ultimate
criterion of justice.
A law may give one person a benefit, or impose harm on
someone else, which justice condemns. But when a law is
thought to be unjust, it seems always to be because it is
thought to infringe somebody’s right (just as when a breach
of law is unjust). Because it’s a law that is thought to infringe
the person’s right, this can’t be a legal right, so it is labelled
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
differently and is called a ‘moral right’. So we can say that a
second case of injustice consists in taking or keeping from a
person something to which he has a moral right.
(3) It is universally considered just that each person
should get what he deserves (whether good or evil) and
unjust that someone should obtain a good or be made to
undergo an evil which he doesn’t deserve. This is perhaps
the clearest and most emphatic form in which the idea of
justice is conceived by people in general. As it involves the
notion of desert [= ‘deservingness’], the question arises, what
constitutes desert? Broadly speaking, a person is understood
to deserve good if he does right, and to deserve evil if he does
wrong; and in a more special sense, to deserve good from
those to whom he does or has done good, and to deserve evil
from those to whom he does or has done evil. The injunction
‘Return good for evil’ has never been regarded as a case of
the fulfilment of justice, but as one in which the claims of
justice are set aside in obedience to other considerations.
(4) It is agreed to be unjust to break faith with anyone—to
fail to do something we have said or clearly implied that we
would do, or disappoint expectations raised by our conduct,
at least if we knew we were raising them and meant to do so.
Like the other obligations of justice I have already spoken
of, this one isn’t regarded as absolute. Rather, it is thought
of as capable of being overruled when •there is a stronger
obligation of justice on the other side, or when •the other
person has acted in a way that is deemed to clear us of our
obligation to him and to constitute a forfeiture of the benefit
that he has been led to expect.
(5) Everyone agrees that it is inconsistent with justice
to be partial—to show favour or preference to one person
over another in matters to which favour and preference don’t
properly apply. But impartiality seems to be regarded not
as a duty in itself but rather as a needed part of some
other duty; for it is agreed that favour and preference are
not always blameworthy, and indeed the cases where they
are condemned are the exception rather than the rule. If
a person could in some way favour his family or friends
over strangers without violating any other duty, he would
be blamed rather than applauded for not doing so. No-one
thinks it unjust to choose one person in preference to another
as a friend, a connection, or a companion. Where rights
are concerned, impartiality is of course obligatory, but this
comes from the more general obligation to give everyone
what he has a right to. For example, an arbitration court
must be impartial because it is bound to set aside every
other consideration and award a disputed item to the one
of two parties who has the right to it. In some other cases
impartiality means being solely influenced by desert; as with
the administering of reward and punishments by judges,
teachers or parents. In yet other cases impartiality means
being solely influenced by concern for the public interest, as
in making a selection among candidates for a government
job. In short, impartiality considered as an obligation of
justice can be said to mean being influenced only by the
considerations that (it is supposed) ought to influence the
matter in hand, and resisting the pull of any motives that
prompt to conduct different from what those considerations
would dictate.
Closely allied to the idea of impartiality is that of equality,
which often plays a part in one’s thought of justice and in
the performance of just actions. Many people think it is the
essence of justice. But in this context, even more than in any
of the others, the notion of justice varies in different persons,
with the variations conforming to their different notions of
utility, ·i.e. of what is expedient·. Each person maintains
that equality is demanded by justice except where he thinks
that expediency requires inequality. The justice of giving
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
equal protection everyone’s rights is maintained by those who
support the most outrageous inequality in what rights people
have. Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted that
the rights of the slave, such as they are, ought to be as
sacred as those of the master; and that a court that fails to
enforce them with equal strictness is lacking in justice; while
at the same time social arrangements that leave to the slave
scarcely any rights to enforce are not thought unjust because
they are not thought to be inexpedient. Those who think that
utility requires distinctions of rank don’t think it unjust that
riches and social privileges should be distributed unequally;
but those who think this inequality to be inexpedient think
it unjust also. Whoever thinks that government is necessary
sees no injustice in whatever inequality is involved in giving
to the magistrate powers not granted to other people. Even
among those who hold doctrines that advocate abolishing all
social distinctions, there are as many questions of justice
as there are differences of opinion about expediency. Some
communists consider it unjust to share out the products
of the community’s work in any way except exactly equally;
others think it just that those whose wants are greatest
should receive most; while others hold that those who work
harder or who produce more or whose services are more
valuable to the community can justly claim a larger share in
the division of the products. And every one of these opinions
can plausibly be backed by the sense of natural justice.
Among so many different uses of the term ‘justice’ (not
regarded as an ambiguous word!), it is a little difficult to
get hold of the mental link which holds them together and
on which the moral sentiment associated with the term
essentially depends. Perhaps we may get some help with
this puzzle from the history of the word, as indicated by its
etymology.
In most languages, if not in all, the etymology of the
word that corresponds to ‘just’ points distinctly to an origin
connected with law. [Mill illustrates this with references to
Latin, Greek, German and French.] I am not committing the
fallacy. . . . of assuming that a word must still continue to
mean what it originally meant. Etymology is slight evidence
of what idea is now signified by the word, but it is but the
very best evidence of how it arose. I don’t think there can
be any doubt that the. . . .original element in the formation
of the notion of justice was ·the idea of· conformity to law.
It constituted the entire idea among the Hebrews, up to the
birth of Christianity; as might be expected in the case of
a people whose laws tried to cover all subjects on which
guidance was required, and who believed those laws to have
come directly from God. But other nations (especially the
Greeks and Romans), knowing that their laws had originally
been made and were still being made by men, weren’t afraid
to admit that those men might make bad laws; that men
might lawfully do things. . . .that would be called unjust if
done by individuals without permission from the law. And
so the sentiment of injustice came to be attached not to all
violations of law but only to
•violations of laws that do and ought to exist,
•violations of non-existent laws that ought to exist, and
•laws themselves when they are taken to be contrary
to what ought to be law.
In this way the idea of law and of laws was still predominant
in the notion of justice, even when the laws actually in force
ceased to be accepted as the standard of it.
It’s true that mankind consider the idea of justice and
its obligations as applicable to many things that aren’t—and
that nobody thinks should be—regulated by law. Nobody
wants laws to interfere with all the details of private life, yet
everyone agrees that in all daily conduct a person may and
does show himself to be either just or unjust. But even here
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
the idea of the breach of what ought to be law still lingers in
a modified form. It would always give us pleasure, and would
chime in with our feelings about what is fit ·or appropriate
or suitable·, if acts that we think unjust were punished,
though we don’t always think it expedient that this should
be done by the courts. We forgo that gratification because
of inconveniences that it would bring. We would be glad to
see just conduct enforced and injustice repressed, even in
the smallest details of our lives, if we weren’t rightly afraid
of trusting the officers of the law with such unlimited power
over individuals. When we think that a person is bound in
justice to do a thing, it is an ordinary use of language to say
‘He ought to be made to do it’. We would be gratified to see
the obligation enforced by anybody who had the power to
enforce it. If we see that it would be inexpedient for it to be
enforced by law, we
•regret that it can’t be enforced by law,
•consider it bad that the person can get away with it,
and
•try to make amends for this by subjecting the offender
to a strong expression of our own and the public’s
disapproval.
Thus the idea of legal constraint is still the generating idea of
the notion of justice, though it goes through several changes
before emerging as the notion of justice that exists in an
advanced state of society.
I think that the above is a true account, as far as it goes,
of the origin and development of the idea of justice. But it
doesn’t yet contain anything to distinguish •that obligation
from •moral obligation in general. For the truth is that
the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law,
enters not only into the conception of injustice but into
the conception of any kind of wrong. Whenever we call
something ‘wrong’ we mean to imply that a person ought
to be punished somehow for doing it; if not by law, by the
opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the
reproaches of his own conscience. This ·relation to the idea
of enforcement by law· seems to be the real turning point
of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.
It is a part of the notion of duty in every one of its forms
that a person may rightfully be compelled to do his duty,
just as he may rightfully be compelled to pay a debt. . . . If
we don’t think it would be all right to make a person do
a certain thing, we don’t call it his ‘duty’. There may be
reasons of prudence, or of the interests of other people, that
count against actually using compulsion, but we clearly
understand that the person himself would not be entitled
to complain ·if he were compelled·. In contrast with this,
there are other things that we •wish people would do, •like
or admire them for doing, perhaps •dislike or despise them
for not doing, but yet •admit that they are not bound to do.
It is not a case of moral obligation; we don’t blame them, i.e.
we don’t think that they are proper objects of punishment.
It may become clear later on how we get these ideas of
deserving and not deserving punishment; but I don’t think
there is any ·room for· doubt •that this distinction lies at the
bottom of the notions of right and wrong; •that whether we
call a bit of conduct ‘wrong’ rather than using some other
term of dislike or discredit depends on whether we think that
the person ought to be punished for it; and whether we say
it would be ‘right’ for a person to do such-and-such rather
than merely that it would be desirable or praiseworthy for
him to do so depends on whether we would like to see the
person compelled to act in that manner rather than merely
persuaded and urged to do so.
So the notion of fitness to be punished is the character-
istic difference that marks off (not justice, but) •morality in
general from the •remaining provinces of expediency and
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
worthiness; so we are still looking for the characteristic that
distinguishes •justice from •other branches of morality. Now
it is known that ethical writers divide moral duties into two
classes, to which they give the ill-chosen labels ‘duties of
perfect obligation’ and ‘duties of imperfect obligation’. The
latter are duties in which, though the act is obligatory, the
particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice.
For example, we are bound to engage in acts of charity or
beneficence, but we aren’t bound to perform them towards
any definite person or at any prescribed time. In the more
precise language of legal theorists, duties of perfect obligation
are the •ones that create a correlative right in some person
or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are the •moral
obligations that don’t give rise to any right. I think it will
be found that this distinction exactly coincides with the
distinction between •justice and •the other obligations of
morality. In my survey ·on pages 30–32· of the various
common ideas about ‘justice’, the term seemed generally to
involve the idea of a personal right—a claim on the part of one
or more individuals, like what the law gives when it confers
an ownership or other legal right. Whether the injustice
consists in (1) and (2) depriving a person of something he
owns, or in (4) breaking faith with him, or in (3) treating
him worse than he deserves or (5) worse than other people
who have no greater claims, in each case the supposition
implies two things —a wrong done, and some definite person
who is wronged. Injustice may also be done by treating
a person better than others, but in that case some other
definite people, his competitors, are wronged.
It seems to me that this feature in the case—some
person’s having a right correlated with the moral obli-
gation—constitutes the defining difference that separates
•justice from •generosity or •beneficence. Justice implies
something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to
do, but which some individual person can claim from us as
his moral right. No-one has a moral right to our generosity
or beneficence, because we are not morally bound to practise
those virtues towards any given individual. It will be found
with this as with every correct definition that the particular
cases that seem to conflict with it are those that most confirm
it. Some moralists have tried to argue that although no given
individual has a right to our beneficence, mankind in general
does have a right to all the good we can do them. Someone
who maintains that automatically includes generosity and
beneficence within the category of justice. He is obliged to
say that
we owe our utmost exertions to our fellow creatures,
thus assimilating those exertions to a debt;
or that
nothing less than our utmost exertions can be an
adequate return for what society does for us, thus
classifying the case as one of gratitude,
both of which are acknowledged cases of justice. Wherever
there is a right, the case is one of justice and not of the virtue
of beneficence. If you don’t draw the general line between
•justice and •morality where I have drawn it, you’ll turn out
to be drawing no line between them and to be merging all
morality in justice.
Now that we have tried to discover the distinctive elements
that make up the idea of justice, we are ready to start looking
for the right answer to these questions:
•Is the feeling that accompanies the idea of justice
attached to it by a special provision of nature?
•Could that feeling have grown out of the idea itself,
in accordance with some known laws ·about human
nature·?
If the answer to the second question is Yes, then a more
particular question arises:
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
•Could the feeling have originated in considerations of
general expediency?
Although •the sentiment itself doesn’t arise from anything
that would or should be termed an idea of ‘expediency’,
•whatever is moral in it does.
We have seen that the two essential ingredients in the
sentiment of justice are •the desire to punish a person who
has done harm, and •the knowledge or belief that there is
some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has
been done.
Now it appears to me that the desire to punish a person
who has done harm to some individual is a spontaneous
outgrowth from two sentiments that are both utterly natural,
and that either are instincts or resemble instincts. They are
the impulse of self-defence, and the feeling of sympathy.
It is natural to resent, and to repel or retaliate for, any
harm done or attempted against ourselves or against those
with whom we sympathise. We needn’t discuss the origin
of this sentiment here. Whether it is an instinct or a result
of intelligence, we know that it is common to all animal
nature; for every animal tries to hurt those who have hurt
it or its young, or who it thinks are about to do so. In this
matter human beings differ from other animals in only two
respects. (1) They are capable of sympathising not only with
their offspring, or (like some of the more noble animals) with
some superior animal who is kind to them, but with all
human beings —even with all sentient beings. (2) They have
a more developed intelligence, which gives a wider range
to the whole of their sentiments, whether self-regarding or
sympathetic. By virtue of his superior intelligence, even
apart from his greater range of sympathy, a human being
can understand the idea of a community of interest between
himself and the human society of which he forms a part, so
that any conduct that threatens the security of the society
generally is threatening to his own security in particular,
and calls forth his instinct (if that’s what it is) of self-defence.
With that superiority of intelligence joined to the power of
sympathising with human beings generally, the human being
can take on board the collective idea of his tribe, his country,
or mankind, in such a way that any act hurtful to them
arouses his instinct of sympathy and urges him to resist.
One element in the sentiment of justice is the desire to
punish. That, I think, is the natural feeling of retaliation
or vengeance processed by intellect and sympathy so that
it applies to the injuries. . . .that wound us by wounding
society at large. This sentiment in itself has nothing moral
in it; what is moral is its being pure purely at the service
of the social sympathies, so that it is aroused only when
they call it up. For the natural feeling would make us resent
indiscriminately whatever anyone does that is disagreeable
to us; but when it is made moral by the social feeling, it acts
only in ways that conform to the general good. A just person
resents a hurt to society even if it isn’t directly a hurt to him,
and he doesn’t resent a hurt to himself, however painful,
unless it is a kind of hurt that society, as well as he himself,
would want to prevent.
You might want to object against this doctrine: ‘When
we feel our sentiment of justice outraged, we aren’t thinking
of society at large or of any collective interest, but only of
the individual case.’ Well, it is certainly common enough—
though the reverse of commendable—for someone to feel
resentment merely because he has suffered pain; but a
person whose resentment is really a moral feeling, i.e. who
considers whether an act is blamable before he allows himself
to resent it, though he may not explicitly say to himself that
he is standing up for the interests of society, certainly does
feel that he is asserting a rule that is for the benefit of others
as well as for his own benefit. If he is not feeling this—if he is
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
regarding the act solely as it affects him individually—he is
not consciously just; he is not concerning himself about the
justice of his actions. This is admitted even by anti-utilitarian
moralists. When Kant (as I remarked ·on page 3·) propounds
as the fundamental principle of morals ‘Act in such a way
that the rule on which you act •could be adopted as a law
by all rational beings’, he virtually acknowledges that the
interest of mankind. . . . must be in the person’s mind when
he is conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. If
that isn’t what Kant is getting at, he is using words without
a meaning: for he couldn’t plausibly mean that a rule even of
utter selfishness •couldn’t possibly be adopted by all rational
beings, that there is some insuperable obstacle in the nature
of things to its adoption. To give any meaning to Kant’s
principle we must take it to be saying that we ought to shape
our conduct by a rule that all rational beings might adopt
with benefit to their collective interest.
To recapitulate: the idea of justice involves two things:
a •rule of conduct, and a •sentiment that sanctions the rule.
The •rule must be supposed to be common to all mankind,
and intended for their good. The •sentiment is a desire that
punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
A third thing is also involved, namely the thought of some
definite person who suffers by the infringement—someone
whose rights. . . . are violated by it. And the sentiment of
justice appears to me to be:
(1) the animal desire to repel or retaliate for a hurt or
damage to oneself or to those with whom one sympa-
thises, widened so as to include all persons—with the
widening brought about by (2) the human capacity for
broadened sympathy and the human conception of
intelligent self-interest.
The feeling gets its •status as moral from (2), and its •unique
impressiveness and psychological force from (1).
I have treated the idea of a right that the injured person
has, and that the injury violates, not as a separate element
in the make-up of •the idea and •the sentiment but as one of
the forms in which the other two elements clothe themselves.
These elements are
a hurt to some assignable person or persons, and
a demand for punishment.
An examination of our own minds, I think, will show that
these two include the whole of what we mean when we speak
of ‘violation of a right’. When we call something a person’s
‘right’, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to protect
him in his possession of it, either by the force of law or by
the force of education and opinion. If we think he has a
strong enough claim, on whatever basis, to have something
guaranteed to him by society, we say that he has ‘a right’ to it.
If we want to prove that something does not belong to him by
right, we think we have done that as soon as it is admitted
that society ought not to take measures for guaranteeing
that he keeps it but should leave that to chance or to his
own efforts. Thus, a person is said to have a right to what
he can earn in fair professional competition, because society
ought not to allow anyone else to hinder him from trying to
earn as much as he can in that manner. But he doesn’t have
a right to three hundred pounds a year, even if that is what
he happens to be earning; because society is not called on
to ensure that he will earn that sum. On the other hand, if
he owns ten thousand pounds worth of government bonds
at three per cent, he has a right to three hundred pounds a
year because society has come under an obligation to provide
him with an income of that amount.
As I see it, then, for me to have a right is for me to have
something that society ought to defend me in the possession
of. Why ought it to do so? The only reason I can give
is general utility. If that phrase doesn’t seem to convey a
36
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
good enough sense of how strong the obligation is—i.e. good
enough to account for the special energy of the feeling—that’s
because the make-up of the sentiment includes not only a
•rational element but also an •animal element, the thirst for
retaliation; and this thirst gets its intensity as well as its
moral justification from the extraordinarily important and
impressive kind of utility that is concerned. The ·general·
interest that is involved is that of security, which everyone
feels to be the most vital of all interests. All •other earthly
benefits are needed by this person and not by that, and
many of them can if necessary be cheerfully done without
or replaced by something else; but no human being can
possibly do without •security. We depend on it for all our
immunity from evil. And we depend on it for the whole value
of every single good that goes beyond the passing moment;
because if we could be deprived of anything the next instant
by whoever was at that moment stronger than ourselves,
nothing could be of any worth to us except the gratification
of the instant. Second only to food and drink, security is
the most indispensable of all the requirements of life; and
it can’t be had unless the machinery for providing it is kept
running continuously. That’s why our notion of the claim
we have on our fellow-creatures to join in making safe for
us the very groundwork of our existence gathers feelings
around it that are much more intense than those concerned
in any of the more ordinary kinds of utility. They are so
much more intense that this difference in •degree (as is often
the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in •kind.
The claim takes on the absoluteness, the apparent infinity
that won’t let it be weighed against other considerations,
which distinguish the feeling of right and wrong from that
of ordinary expediency and inexpediency. The feelings
concerned are so powerful, and we rely so absolutely on
finding a responsive feeling in others (because the interests
of everyone are involved) that
ought and should grow into must, and
recognised indispensability becomes moral necessity,
analogous to physical necessity and often as strongly binding
a force as physical necessity is.
If that analysis or something like it is not the correct ac-
count of the notion of justice, if justice is totally independent
of utility and is an independently existing standard that the
mind can recognise by simply looking into itself, it’s hard to
understand why that internal oracle is so ambiguous, and
why so many things appear just or unjust depending on the
light in which they are looked at.
We are continually being told that utility is an uncer-
tain standard which every different person interprets differ-
ently, and that there is no safety but in the unchangeable,
unerasable, unmistakable dictates of justice, which are self-
evident and independent of the fluctuations of opinion. This
would make one think •that there could be no controversy on
questions of justice; •that if we take that for our rule—·the
supposedly unmistakable dictate of justice·—the question of
how to apply it to any given case could be answered with as
much certainty as if it had been proved by a mathematical
demonstration. This is so far from being the case that there
is as much disagreement and discussion about what is •just
as about what is •useful to society. It’s not just that different
nations and different individuals have different notions of
justice; in the mind of •one and the same individual justice
isn’t some •one rule, principle or maxim, but •many, which
don’t always coincide in their dictates and which the indi-
vidual chooses between on the basis of some extraneous
standard or of his own personal inclinations.
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
·Punishment·
For instance, some say that (1) it is unjust to punish anyone
for the sake of setting an example for others; that pun-
ishment is just only when it is intended for the good of
the sufferer himself. Others maintain the exact opposite,
contending that (2) to punish adults for their own benefit
is despotism and injustice, since if the matter at issue is
solely their own good no-one has a right to control their own
judgment of it; but that •someone may justly be punished to
prevent evil to others, this being the exercise of the legitimate
right of self-defence. Mr. Owen affirms that (3) is unjust to
punish at all; for the criminal didn’t make his own character;
his upbringing and environment have made him a criminal,
and he isn’t responsible for these. All these opinions are
extremely plausible; and so long as the question is argued
simply as one of justice, without going down to the principles
that underlie justice and are the source of its authority, I
don’t see how any of these reasoners can be refuted. For
in truth each of the three builds on rules of justice that are
admittedly true. (1) appeals to the acknowledged injustice of
•singling out an individual and sacrificing him, without
his consent, for other people’s benefit.
(2) relies on the acknowledged justice of self-defence, and the
admitted injustice of
•forcing one person to conform to someone else’s no-
tions of what is good for him.
(3) The Owenite invokes the admitted principle that
•it is unjust to punish anyone for what he cannot help.
Each ·moralist· is triumphant so long as he isn’t forced to
take into consideration any maxims of justice except the one
he has selected; but as soon as their different maxims are
brought face to face, each disputant seems to have exactly
as much to say for himself as the others have to say for
themselves. No one of them can carry out his own notion of
justice without trampling on some other notion of it that is
equally binding.
These are difficulties; they have always been felt to be
such; and many devices have been invented to get around
them rather than to overcome them. As a refuge from (3)
men imagined what they called ‘freedom of the will’, fancying
that they couldn’t justify punishing a man whose will is
in a thoroughly odious state unless prior circumstances
are thought to have played no part in his coming to be in
that state. A favourite device for escaping from the other
difficulties has been the fiction of a contract—a contract
through which at some unknown period all the members
of society promised to obey the laws and consented to be
punished for any disobedience to them. This contract was
supposed to give to the legislators a right which it is assumed
they wouldn’t otherwise have had, to punish lawbreakers
either for their own good or for the good of society. This
nice idea was thought to get rid of the whole difficulty and
to legitimize the infliction of punishment on the strength
of another accepted maxim of justice,. . . . namely that
something isn’t unjust if it is done with the consent of the
person who is supposed to be hurt by it. I need hardly
remark that even if this ‘consent’ were not a mere fiction,
this maxim doesn’t have greater authority than the others
that it is brought in to supersede. On the contrary, it’s an
instructive specimen of the loose and irregular manner in
which supposed principles of justice spring up. . . .
And when it is agreed that it is legitimate to inflict ·some·
punishment, many conflicting conceptions of justice come
to light when people discuss ·what·—i.e. discuss the proper
apportionment of punishments to offences. No rule on this
subject recommends itself so strongly to the primitive and
spontaneous sentiment of justice as the lex talionis—•an eye
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. This principle of Jewish
and Moslem law has been generally abandoned in Europe as
a practical maxim, but I suspect that there is in most minds
a secret hankering after it; and when retribution happens
falls on an offender in that precise shape, the general feeling
of satisfaction that arises shows how natural is the sentiment
that endorses this •repayment in kind. For many people the
test of justice in this area is that the punishment should
be proportional to the offence, meaning that it should be
exactly measured by the culprit’s moral guilt (whatever their
standard is for measuring that). According to these people,
the question
What amount of punishment is necessary to deter
potential offenders from offending?
has nothing to do with the question of justice, whereas for
other people that question is the whole topic. According
to them, men cannot justly inflict on a fellow creature,
no matter what his offences have been, any amount of
suffering beyond the least that will suffice to prevent him
from repeating his misconduct and others from imitating it.
(Men cannot justly do this; ·they may have a different view
about what God can justly do·.)
·Wages·
To take another example from a subject I have already
referred to. In a co-operative industrial association, is it
just or not that someone’s talent or skill should entitle
him to higher pay? On the negative side of the question
it is argued that whoever does his best deserves equally
well, and can’t justly be put in a worse position through
no fault of his own; that higher abilities already bring more
than enough advantages—the admiration they arouse, the
personal influence they command, and the internal sources
of satisfaction that come with them —without adding to
these a greater share of the world’s goods; and that society
is bound in justice to •compensate the less favoured for
this undeserved inequality of advantages, rather than to
•make it worse. On the opposite side it is maintained that
society receives more from the more efficient worker; that
because his services are more useful, society owes him a
larger return for them; that a greater share of the joint result
is actually his work, and not to allow his claim to it is a kind
of robbery; that if he is only to receive as much as others,
he can only be justly required to produce as much and to
give a smaller amount of time and effort in proportion to his
greater efficiency. Who is to decide between these appeals
to conflicting principles of justice? In this case justice has
two sides to it, which can’t be brought into harmony, and
the two disputants have chosen opposite sides—one looking
to what it is just that •the individual should receive, the
other to what it is just that •the community should give.
Each from his own point of view is unanswerable; and any
choice between them on grounds of justice must be perfectly
arbitrary. Only social utility can decide the preference.
·Taxation·
Then consider how many and how irreconcilable are the
standards of justice that people bring into discussions
of. . . .taxation. One opinion is that payment to the state
should be numerically proportional to the person’s wealth.
Others think that justice dictates ‘graduated taxation’, as
they call it, taking a higher percentage from those who have
more to spare. In the light of natural justice a strong case
might be made for disregarding wealth altogether and taking
the same absolute sum from everyone who could pay it—just
as the subscribers to an association or a club all pay the
39
Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
•same sum for the •same privileges, whether or not they
can all equally afford it. Since the protection (it might
be said) of law and government is provided to everyone
and equally demanded by everyone, there is no injustice
in making them all buy it at the same price. It is regarded as
justice, not injustice, for a shop-keeper to charge to all his
customers the same price for the same article, not varying the
price according to their means of payment. Nobody actually
advocates this doctrine, as applied to taxation, because it
conflicts so strongly with man’s feelings of humanity and of
social expediency; but the principle of justice it relies on is as
true and as binding as any principles of justice that can be
appealed to against it. Accordingly it silently influences lines
of defence that are employed for other ways of assessing
taxation. People feel obliged to argue that the state does
more for the rich than for the poor, as a justification for its
taking more from them (though really that isn’t true, for
if there were no law or government the rich would be far
better able to protect themselves than the poor would be,
and indeed would probably succeed in making the poor their
slaves). And others defer to the same-price-for-same-goods
conception of justice when they maintain that all should pay
an equal tax for the protection of their persons (these being
of equal value to all), and an unequal tax for the protection
of their property (which is unequal ·in its value·). Opponents
of this proposal reply that my everything is as valuable to
me as your everything is to you, ·even if you own much more
than I do·. The only way of extricating ourselves from these
confusions is the utilitarian way.
Well, then, is the line between the just and the expedient
a merely imaginary distinction? Have mankind been deluded
in thinking that justice is a more sacred thing than policy,
and that policy considerations ought not to be listened to
until the demands of justice have been satisfied? By no
means. The account I have given of the nature and origin
of the sentiment of justice recognises a real distinction. I
attach importance to this justice/expediency distinction —at
least as much as any of the moralists who grandly express
their utter contempt for the consequences of actions as an
element in their morality! While I dispute the claims of any
theory that sets up an imaginary standard of justice that
isn’t based on utility, I regard the justice that is based on
utility as being the chief part, and incomparably the most
sacred and binding part, of all morality. ‘Justice’ is a name
for certain kinds of moral rules that
concern the essentials of human well-being more
closely,
and therefore
are more absolutely binding,
than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion
that we have found to be of the essence of the idea of
justice—that of a right residing in an individual—implies
and testifies to this more binding obligation.
The moral rules that forbid mankind to •hurt one an-
other (remembering always to include in this the •wrongful
interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to
human well-being than any maxims, however important,
that merely point out the best way of managing some aspect
of human affairs. They have also the special feature that
they have more to do with mankind’s social feelings than
anything else does. Their being observed is the only thing
that preserves peace among human beings: if it weren’t for
the fact that obedience to them is the rule and disobedience
the exception, everyone would see everyone else as an enemy
against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself.
Almost equally important is the fact that these are the
precepts that mankind have the strongest and the most
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
direct reasons to get one another to accept. By merely giving
each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they may
gain nothing (or think they gain nothing). Everyone has
an unmistakable interest in urging on others the duty of
positive beneficence, but nothing like as strong an interest
·as everyone has in urging on others the duty of justice·: a
person might not need the benefits that others might give
him, but he always needs them not to harm him. Thus the
moralities that protect every individual from being harmed by
others, either directly or by being hindered in his freedom to
pursue his own good, are both •the ones that he himself has
most at heart and also •the ones that he has the strongest
interest in announcing and enforcing by word and deed. It
is by a person’s •observance of these that we test and decide
whether he is fit to exist as one of the fellowship of human
beings, for •that determines whether he will be harmful
to those with whom he is in contact. Now, these are the
moralities that primarily make up the obligations of justice.
The •most conspicuous cases of injustice—the ones that
give its tone to the feeling of repugnance that characterises
the sentiment—are acts of wrongful aggression, or wrongful
exercise of power over someone; the •next are acts that
consist in wrongfully withholding from a person something
that is his due; in both cases a positive hurt is inflicted
on him, in the form either of direct suffering or of the lack
of some good that he had reasonable grounds, either of a
physical or of a social kind, for counting on.
The same powerful motives that command us to observe
these primary moralities tell us to punish the people who
violate them. This calls up the impulses of •self-defence, of
•defence of others and of •vengeance against such people;
and for that reason retribution or evil for evil comes to be
closely connected with the •sentiment of justice, and is
included in everyone’s •idea of justice. Good for good is
also one of the dictates of justice. This is obviously socially
useful, and carries with it a natural human feeling; but it
doesn’t have at first sight the obvious connection with hurt or
injury that is the source of the characteristic intensity of the
sentiment of justice, and is present in the most elementary
cases of just and unjust. But although the connection
·with hurt or injury· is less •obvious, it is not less •real.
Someone who accepts benefits and refuses to give benefits in
return at a time when they are needed inflicts a real hurt, by
disappointing a very natural and reasonable expectation—an
expectation that he must at least tacitly have encouraged, for
otherwise (in most cases) the benefits would not have been
conferred ·in the first place·. The •disappointment of expecta-
tion ranks high among human evils and wrongs, as is shown
in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of
two highly immoral acts —•breach of friendship and •breach
of promise. Few hurts that human beings can receive are
greater, and none wound more, than when someone that
a person has habitually and confidently relied on fails him
in his hour of need; and few wrongs are greater than this
mere withholding of good; none arouse more resentment in
the suffering person or in a sympathising spectator. So the
principle of giving to each what he deserves—i.e. good for
good as well as evil for evil —is not only included within the
idea of justice as I have defined it but is a proper object of
that intensity of sentiment which leads people to put •the
just higher than •the merely expedient.
Most of the •maxims of justice that are current in the
world, and commonly appealed to in dealings where justice is
involved, are simply ways of putting into effect the •principles
of justice that I have spoken of. That
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
•a person is responsible only for what he has voluntar-
ily done or could voluntarily have avoided,
•it is unjust to condemn any person without giving him
a hearing,
•the punishment ought to be proportional to the of-
fence,
and the like, are maxims intended to prevent the just princi-
ple of evil for evil from being twisted to the infliction of evil
without that justification. Most of these common maxims
have come into use from the practice of courts of justice,
which have laid down the rules that are necessary if they
are to fulfil their double function of •inflicting punishment
when it is due and of •awarding to each person his right. It
was only natural that they should have been led to a more
complete recognition and elaboration of such rules than was
likely to occur to anyone else.
The first of the judicial virtues, impartiality, is an obli-
gation of justice partly for the reason just given—namely
that it is a necessary condition of the fulfilment of the other
obligations of justice. But this isn’t the only source of the
high status among human obligations of the maxims of
equality and impartiality—maxims that are included among
the precepts of justice by the common run of people and by
those who are most enlightened. From one point of view they
can be seen as following from the principles I have already
laid down. If it is a duty to do to each according to his
deserts, returning good for good as well as repressing evil by
evil, it necessarily follows that we should (when no higher
duty forbids this) treat equally well all who have deserved
equally well of us, and that society should treat equally well
all who have deserved equally well of it—that is, who have
deserved equally well period. This is the highest abstract
standard of social and distributive justice. All institutions
and the efforts of all virtuous citizens should be made to
converge on this standard as far as possible.
But this great moral duty rests on a still deeper founda-
tion, being a direct upshot of the first principle of morals,
and not a mere logical inference from secondary or derivative
doctrines. It is involved in the very meaning of utility, or the
greatest happiness principle. That principle is a mere form
of words with no intelligible meaning unless one person’s
happiness counts for exactly as much as another’s (assuming
that they are equal in degree, and with the proper allowance
made for differences in kinds of happiness —·see pages 5–8
above·). Bentham’s dictum, ‘everybody to count for one,
nobody for more than one’ might be written under the
principle of utility as an explanatory commentary. [At this
point Mill has a long footnote, which is here raised into the main text.]
·STAR T OF THE LONG FOOTNOTE·
This implication, in the first principle of the utilitarian
scheme, of perfect impartiality between persons is regarded
by Mr. Herbert Spencer (in his Social Statics) as disproving
utility’s claim to be a sufficient guide to right; because (he
says) the principle of utility presupposes the underlying prin-
ciple that everybody has an equal right to happiness. It may
be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts
of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same
or by different persons. But this isn’t •a presupposition
of the principle of utility, or •a premise that is needed in
defence of the principle; rather, it is •the principle itself; for
what is the principle of utility if not the proposition that that
‘happiness’ and ‘desirable’ are synonymous terms? The only
underlying principle that is implied is this: the truths of
arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness, as of
all other measurable quantities.
Mr. Spencer, in a letter on the subject of the preceding
note, objects to being considered an opponent of utilitari-
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
anism, and says that he regards happiness as the ultimate
end of morality; but he thinks that that end is only partially
achievable by empirical generalisations from the observed
results of conduct, and is completely achievable only by
deducing from the laws of life and the conditions of existence
what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness
and what kinds to produce unhappiness. I entirely agree
with this doctrine, except for the word ‘necessarily’; and
when that word is set aside, I don’t know of any modern
advocate of utilitarianism who would disagree. Mr Spencer
in Social Statics especially picked on Bentham. But Bentham
is utterly willing to deduce the effect of actions on happiness
from the laws of human nature and the universal conditions
of human life; no writer is more so! He is usually accused
of relying too exclusively on such deductions, and refusing
to be bound by the generalisations from specific experience
that Mr. Spencer thinks that utilitarians generally confine
themselves to. My own opinion (and, I gather, Mr. Spencer’s)
is that in ethics, as in all other branches of scientific study,
what is needed to give to any general proposition the kind
and degree of evidence that constitutes scientific proof is
that the results of these two processes shall harmonize, each
corroborating and verifying the other.
·END OF THE LONG FOOTNOTE·
Everyone’s equal claim to •happiness (in the opinion of the
moralist and the legislator) involves an equal claim to all
•the means to happiness, except when the maxim is limited
by the inevitable conditions of human life and the general
interest (which includes the interests of every individual).
When such limits are set, they ought to be strictly construed
[Mill’s own phrase]. Just as with every other maxim of justice,
this one is far from being universally applied or thought to
be applicable; on the contrary, as I have already remarked,
it bends to every person’s ideas of social expediency. But
whenever it is taken to be applicable at all, it is held to be
something that justice dictates. All people are judged to
have a right to equality of treatment, except when some
recognised social expediency requires the reverse. And
so it comes about that when any social inequality stops
being considered expedient it comes to be considered not
merely as inexpedient but as unjust. Then it appears to be
so tyrannical that people are apt to wonder how it could
ever have been tolerated; forgetting that they themselves
may—under an equally mistaken notion of expediency—be
tolerating other inequalities which, if they were corrected,
would seem quite as monstrous as the one that the people
have eventually learnt to condemn. The entire history of
social improvement has been a series of transitions in which
one custom or institution after another moves from being
a supposed primary necessity of social existence into the
category of a universally condemned injustice and tyranny.
That is what has happened with distinctions of slaves and
freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so
it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of
colour, race, and sex.
From what I have said it appears that ‘justice’ is a name
for certain moral requirements which, regarded collectively,
stand higher in the scale of social utility—and are therefore
more bindingly obligatory —than any others; though par-
ticular cases may occur in which some other social duty
is important enough to overrule one of the general maxims
of justice. Any of those maxims could be overruled in that
way. Thus, to save a life it may be not merely •allowable
but a •duty to steal or take by force the necessary food or
medicine, or to kidnap the only qualified medical practitioner
and compel him to serve. We don’t call anything ‘justice’ that
isn’t a virtue; so in these cases of overruling we usually say
not that •justice must give way to some other moral principle
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Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill 5: Connecting justice and utility
but rather that what is just in ordinary cases is not just
in this particular case because of that other principle, ·the
one that does the overruling·. By this useful adjustment of
language we enable justice to keep its character as something
that can’t be overruled, and we’re spared the necessity of
maintaining that injustice can sometimes be praiseworthy.
The considerations that I have brought forward seem
to me to resolve the only real difficulty confronting the
utilitarian theory of morals. It has always been evident
that all cases of •justice are also cases of •expediency: the
difference is in the special sentiment that attaches to •the
former and not to •the latter. If
•this characteristic sentiment has been sufficiently
accounted for; if
•there is no need to credit it with having some special
origin all of its own; if
•it is simply the natural feeling of resentment, made
moral by being made coextensive with the demands
of social good; and if
•this feeling not only does but ought to exist in all
the classes of cases to which the idea of justice
corresponds;
then the idea of justice no longer presents itself as a
stumbling-block to utilitarian ethics. ‘Justice’ remains the
appropriate name for certain social utilities. The utilities in
question •are vastly more important, and therefore more ab-
solute and imperative, than any others are as a class (though
not more so than others may be in particular cases); so they
•ought to be (and naturally are) guarded by a sentiment that
differs from others not only in degree but also in kind. The
sentiment of justice is distinguished from the milder feeling
that attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure
or convenience by the more definite nature of its commands
and by the sterner character of its sanctions.
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- Chapter 1: General Remarks
Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is
·Higher and Lower Pleasures·
·Happiness as an Aim·
·Self-Sacrifice·
·Setting the Standard too High?·
·Is Utilitarianism Chilly?·
·Utilitarianism as `Godless’·
·Expediency·
·Time to Calculate?·
·Bad Faith·
Chapter 3: What will motivate us to obey the principle of utility?
Chapter 4: What sort of proof can be given for the principle of utility?
Chapter 5: The connection between justice and utility
·Punishment·
·Wages·
·Taxation·
Phil4: Intro Ethics October 21, 2016
Handout #2 Prof. Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Mill’s Utilitarianism
I. Three Branches of Ethics
1. Normative Ethics: the study and development of systems of right and wrong—systems of rules,
principles or procedures for figuring out what one should do and should not do (morally speaking).
Examples of normative ethical systems: Utilitarianism, Kantian or Deontological Ethics,
Virtue Ethics, Religious Moralities (e.g. Judeo-Christian law, Islamic code, etc.),
Transcendentalism
2. Moral Psychology: the study of the source and nature of moral thoughts and motives —an evaluation of
answers to the questions “Why do people act morally (when they do)?” and “Why should we be Moral?”
Examples of theories in moral psychology: a) Religious—(a) normative: we should be
moral because God wants us to be moral, or loves what is right; (b) psychological: people
sometimes or always act morally (even when they know they are sufficiently clever or
powerful to avoid earthly punishments) out of fear of God’s wrath or a desire for God’s
love; b) Teleological— (a) normative: we should be moral because the function of people
is to be moral, people are “malfunctioning” when they act immorally; (b) psychological:
people will act morally so long as their cognitive and/or affective faculties are not
impaired (in some biologically defined sense of that term); c) Rational—(a) normative:
we should be moral because (Hobbes) in the long run immorality is contrary to our own
“selfish” interests or (Kant) immoral motives involve some sort of inconsistency or
incoherence; (b) psychological: we act morally when we (Hobbes) deliberate clearly
giving proper weight to the risks of social chaos and our long-term self-interest, or (Kant)
we choose rules for action in a coherent or consistent manner
3. Meta-ethics: the study of moral epistemology and moral metaphysics. (a) Moral epistemology is the
study of moral knowledge and the justification of our moral beliefs—an evaluation of answers to the
questions: Do we have any moral knowledge? Are any of our moral beliefs rationally held? Can we
rationally resolve disagreements on moral matters? Can we rationally resolve conflicts internal to our
common sense moral views? How can we rationally extend our moral views to matters on which we
currently find ourselves with no settled opinion? How do we know right from wrong? (b) Moral
metaphysics is the study of the nature of moral phenomena — an evaluation of answers to the questions:
Are there facts about what is wrong and what is right? If there are such facts, what makes something wrong
or right? How did certain things come to be good and other things come to be bad? What is the relation
between the purported moral facts—e.g. facts about what is good or bad—and social scientific facts about
the physical world—e.g. biological, psychological, sociological and economic facts about (a) the kinds of
actions, laws and institutions that tend to promote happiness, pleasure and satisfaction or misery, pain and
dissatisfaction (however measured) (b) facts about those actions, laws and institutions that tend not to do
so, (c) facts about the nature of suffering and happiness themselves, and (d) facts about what people
actually think, feel and do? Do the social scientific facts entail the moral facts? Or are value-laden facts
wholly “distinct” from value-neutral facts? If value-laden claims can be distinguished from value-neutral
claims, under what conditions can we reasonably or cogently infer an “ought” from an “is”? Are there any
moral facts that are universal in scope, or are all acts right at some places and times and wrong at others?
Examples of meta-ethical positions: Expressivism, Nihilism, Projectivism,
Constructivism and various other forms of Anti-Realism, Realism (Natural and Non-
natural), and Relativism.
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II. Utilitarianism
A. Utilitarianism is commonly interpreted as a normative ethical view: it consists in the Principle of
Utility, which is a First Principle of morality. The Principle of Utility is usually formulated as a claim
about what we should do, but Mill advances it as a claim about which actions are right and which wrong.
The Principle of Utility (“the greatest happiness principle”): actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse
of happiness.
Mill’s initial definition of ‘happiness’: “by ‘happiness’ is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by
‘unhappiness’, pain and the privation of pleasure.”
B. In Utilitarianism, Mill addresses questions from all three branches of ethics described above. Here’s an
overview:
* In chapter 1 he explains what a first principle of morality is and argues that morality must have
a first principle.
* In chapter 2 he argues that the principle of utility is the first principle of morality. He then does
two more things: first he tries to explain the principle of utility by giving a relatively sophisticated
account of happiness; then he defends the claim that the principle of utility is the first principle of
morality from some objections. Thus, in chapter 2, Mill is concerned with advancing and
defending a position in normative ethics.
* In chapter 3 Mill turns to questions of moral motivation, and asks, “What are the motives or
reasons we have for obeying the principle of utility?” That is, why do we act benevolently (when
we do) and why should we act so as to maximize the happiness produced by our actions? What
arguments can be given to convince someone to live by utilitarian norms or rules when she does
not already live in this way or see the wisdom of living in this way?
* In chapter 4 Mill addresses meta-ethical concerns. He tries to prove that the principle of utility
is true—that it is a fact that we should act so as to promote happiness, and he tries to say
something about what sort of fact this is and how it is connected to less value-laden sorts of
facts—here facts about what normal people actually desire when they are thinking clearly.
* In chapter 5 Mill returns to normative ethics and addresses the most important kind of objection
to Utilitarianism—the claim that it cannot account for considerations of justice or rights. This
criticism is often sharpened by arguing that Utilitarianism implies that we are sometimes obligated
to violate the rights of innocent people. Mill tries to argue (a) that some of intuitions about justice
and rights are not to be trusted, but (b) adopting the utilitarian ethic is compatible with retaining
certain beliefs about justice (i.e. those not grounded in a thirst for revenge and other retributivist
emotions).
III. Chapter 1: What is a first principle? Why must morality have one?
A. Phrases Mill uses interchangeably with ‘first principle’: ‘the criterion of right and wrong’, ‘the
summum bonum’, ‘the foundation of morality’, a ‘test of right and wrong’, and ‘an ultimate standard’.
Mill’s argument for the necessity of a first principle of morality:
B. Most sciences—or branches of inquiry—are not based on first principles. Contrary to some
appearances algebra is not based on axioms: “algebra derives none of its certainty from what are commonly
taught to learners as its elements, since these. . .are as full of fictions as English law, and of mysteries as
theology.”
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C. But morality and its development is a “practical art.” It doesn’t just tell us how things are, and how
they will be, it tells us how we should make things be. It provides us with rules of action, and, according to
Mill, rules of action tell us how to act so as to achieve some end or goal. Though the moral rules or
precepts we live by are distinct from the laws operative in our state or nation, Mill is arguing that morality
and law are structurally similar. They are the means our ancestors have crafted to achieve various goals.
But, Mill asks, how can we evaluate competing rules of action unless we know what goal (or goals) we are
trying to achieve?
“When we engage in a pursuit, a clear and precise conception of what we are pursuing would seem
the first thing we need, instead of the last we are to look forward to. A test of right and wrong
must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence
of having already ascertained it.”
Mill then allows that we needn’t have a first principle if we have some way of ranking principles in order
of their importance or force. He then makes a curious remark about how we would know we had
uncovered such a first-principle. “There ought either to be some fundamental principle or law at the root
of all morality, or, if there be several, there should be a determinate order of precedence among them, and
the one principle, or the rule for deciding between the various principles when they conflict, ought to be
self-evident.”
[Notice here the slide from a) a decision procedure—like ranking principles, and always following the
principle with a higher rank, to b) a moral principle by which one decides between the various competing
rules.]
Question: Is the principle of utility a good candidate for a self-evident truth? Is it a principle that you can
tell is true simply by understanding its meaning? What is the connection between “goodness” and
“happiness”? Is happiness the only thing that is intrinsically good? Is happiness a good candidate for the
“goal” in light of which we should craft our moral norms and laws?
IV. Chapter 2: Describing and Defending the Principle of Utility
The principle of utility says that acts are right insofar as they promote happiness and prevent suffering and
wrong when they promote pain and diminish happiness. But we need to know at least three things if we are
to have a more determinate grasp of the principle than this statement provides.
Question 1. “Happiness” is a pretty vague term. So what is happiness?
Question 2. Once we’ve further defined “happiness” we can ask: Whose happiness matters? Whose
happiness should we consider when we’re applying the principle of utility? How much weight should we
give to the happiness of the various people affected?
Question 3. What is meant by ‘promotion’? Are we simply required to take steps to increase happiness
and diminish suffering or must we seek to maximize happiness and eliminate suffering? Should we seek to
maximize aggregate happiness or average happiness?
In regard to #2, Mill says that the happiness of (a) “all sentient creatures,” should be counted for something,
and says that the pleasures and pains of (at least) each person should be counted equally; “the happiness
which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right conduct is not the agent’s own happiness but that of all
concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”
This idea of “equal weight” gives rise to the most challenging aspects of utilitarianism. Notice here
that if one’s own happiness is not to be valued above the happiness of others, it can hardly be argued that
the happiness of one’s loved ones can be counted as more important than the happiness of others. Some
utilitarians argue, on this basis, that we shouldn’t value our children over the children of strangers to the
extreme extent that most of us do. See the true stories of Zell Kravinsky who donated a kidney to a
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stranger, and the “effective altruists” described by Larissa MacFarquhar in her book Strangers Drowning.
Just to give you a sense: one couple adopted 20 foster kids even though they had 2 biological children and
new their biological kids would get less attention (and likely be less happy?) as a result.
The idea expressed by Mill’s quote above suggests that we should not favor anyone over anyone else in our
efforts to maximize happiness and that we should always assume this policy of neutrality. Some people
draw this conclusion from Peter Singer’s landmark essay “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” which is
posted on the course website as recommended reading. In that essay, Singer argues that benefiting yourself
in a minor way by spending $150 on a new pair of shoes is immoral when you know you could use that
same money to save the life of someone suffering from famine or disease, and he generalizes from this to
argue that we should give to others until doing so would make us worse off than them. (He has since
defended more modest proposals.) Is neutrality of this sort Singer recommends always appropriate? Is it
true that “as between [your] own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires [you] to be as strictly
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”
How does this chapter 1 claim jibe with what Mill says in chapter five about neutrality?
“Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself, but rather as instrumental to some
other duty; for it is admitted that favour and preference are not always censurable, and indeed the cases in
which they are condemned are rather the exception than the rule. A person would be more likely to be
blamed than applauded for giving his family and friends no superiority in good offices over strangers, when
he could do so without violating any other duty; and no one thinks it unjust to seek one person to another as
a friend, connection or companion.”
Further questions: Admittedly, in this passage Mill is describing our intuitive views about justice rather
than articulating or defending his utilitarian ethic, which is intended as a modification of the customary
morals accepted by most (if not all) of the audience to whom Mill’s book was addressed. But Mill never
says this intuitive limitation on neutrality is mistaken in any way. And the question remains: Is complete
neutrality with regard to the wellbeing of those your actions affect, compatible with your enjoying and
sustaining friendships? It seems that Mill has a different idea of the place for neutrality. Mill’s father
James and Jeremy Bentham argued that legislators ought to be neutral as between the happiness of their
constituents when formulating and voting on laws. Mightn’t Mill embrace a similar view with regard to
moral rules or social norms: when deciding on these general prohibitions and allowances (in our more
reflective moments) we ought to have as our goal the maximization of happiness and remain neutral as to
“where” this happiness is likely to be experienced.
In regard to #3, Mill says the ultimate end is the maximization of aggregate happiness.
In regard to #1 Mill develops a qualitative view of pleasure and pain according to which some pleasures
and pains count more than others. To compare the relative weight (or importance) of a pleasure Mill
suggests the following test,
“Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a
decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more
desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both,
placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a
greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of other pleasure which their
nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in
quality so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”
Mill is confident that the pleasures that this test will deem higher in value (and thus “worth more” in a
utilitarian calculus) will be the type-2 pleasures: the pleasures we derive from the use of our “higher”
faculties, where higher faculties are those that distinguish people from other animals.
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Type 1 pleasures: pleasures we derive from exercising those psychological capacities we share
with other animals—e.g. pleasures from eating, drinking, sexual reproduction, play, exploration,
etc.
Type 2 pleasures: the pleasures we derive from exercising uniquely human capacities—e.g.
sentential language, conversation, mathematics, science, business, etc.
“It is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of
appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which
employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower
animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would
consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience
would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is
better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he
for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him.”
Three questions: Is Mill’s prediction about the outcome of such a test correct? Do those who
have experienced both, prefer type 2 to type 1 pleasures? Is such a test a good way to determine
the degrees of pleasure or happiness that should figure in a utilitarian’s application of the principle
of utility? Does the qualitative view of happiness undercut the standing of the principle of utility
as a first principle of morality?
Again, according to Mill, the principle of utility is the first principle of morality. Let’s then call more
determinate or less general rules such as “Don’t lie,” “Don’t kill,” and “Don’t steal” secondary moral
rules. With this distinction in mind, consider the following variations on the principle of utility.
Direct Utilitarianism vs. Indirect Utilitarianism
Direct Utilitarianism: At any given time you should: (a) identify the set of actions open to you at
that time, (b) determine which of these actions will produce at least as much happiness as any
other action available to you at the time, and (c) perform that action (or one of those actions) that
you judge will produce at least as much happiness as would any other course of action available to
you at the time.
Indirect Utilitarianism: (1) Your actions should conform to a set of secondary moral rules. (2) In
quiet moments (or moments of reflection) you should take the time to select (and revise) the set of
secondary rules that guide your actions. (3) When selecting or revising the secondary rules from
which you will act, you should identify those rules the adoption of which (by you or your
community) would lead to the greatest aggregate happiness. (4) You should only adopt a set of
rules if you judge that the adoption of those rules (by you or your community) would lead to as
much happiness as would the adoption of any alternative set of rules.
Mill seems to accept some version of Indirect Utilitarianism in at least this respect: he doesn’t think it’s
practical for us to regularly apply the principle of utility when we’re faced with particular decisions in the
ordinary course of life. You need not—indeed, you should not—typically (much less invariably) decide
what to do by figuring out which of the actions available to you is likely to maximize aggregate happiness.
So there’s a sense in which it is not the case that we should apply the principle of utility to particular cases.
We should instead apply it to rules.
“To consider the rules of morality as improvable is one thing: to pass over the
intermediate generalization entirely and endeavor to test each individual action directly
by the first principle is another. It is a strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first
principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary ones.”
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Note that here Mill provides another role for a first principle of morality. A first principle is supposed to
allow for moral progress or the development of our moral system. It is supposed to provide an antidote to
conservatism. (Question: what are the other two functions?)
Utilitarian moral theorists are often divided into those who advocate direct utilitarianism and those who
advocate indirect utilitarianism. But these moral theorists are also commonly divided into “act utilitarians”
and “rule utilitarians”. Though it’s pretty clear that Mill advocates indirect applications of the principle of
utility rather than its direct use, he might still be an act utilitarian in thinking that what makes a
consequence or state of affairs morally good or worthy of choice is whether it in fact maximizes utility.
Act Utilitarianism vs. Rule Utilitarianism
Act Utilitarianism: The morally best world (or state of affairs) to create at a given time t is that
world (or state of affairs) that contains at least as much happiness any other state of affairs that can
be created at t.
Rule Utilitarianism: (1) The morally best world (or state of affairs) to create at a given time t is
that world (or state of affairs) in which your actions (or the actions of those in your community)
conform to the morally best set of secondary moral rules. (2) The morally best set of secondary
moral rules are those rules the adoption of which by you (or your community) would lead to at
least as much aggregate happiness as would the adoption of any alternative set of secondary rules.
Question: What is it for you or your community to “adopt” a rule?
Answer: It does not involve full compliance, as you can act contrary to rules accepted by most of the
people with whom you live. Indeed, on most accounts, you can violate one of your own moral rules, so
long as you feel bad about it. But most theorists insist that your adoption of a rule involves a fairly
established tendency to conform to that rule and a disposition to feel bad (guilty, remorseful or at least
troubled) when you fail to conform to it. Further complexity arises from hypocrisy: you may accept a rule
insofar as you judge or shun people who break that rule, even if you don’t follow that rule yourself. To
understand the relevant phenomenon further reflect on the rules you claim to accept: e.g. “don’t kiss on the
first date,” “look both ways before crossing the street” etc.
Question: Suppose that Mill accepts the view of goodness (or choice-worthiness) we’ve defined as act
utilitarianism above, but that he also advocates an indirect rather than a direct application of the PU, and so
embraces the claim we’ve titled “indirect utilitarianism”. In other words, suppose Mill thinks that the best
world to create is that world that contains the most aggregate happiness possible, but he thinks we should
do our best to follow those of our secondary moral rules that withstand utilitarian scrutiny: we should not
apply the principle of utility more regularly than this (much less every time we act or deliberate). Then,
unless Mill thinks we shouldn’t do what would make the world the best it can be, Mill is committed to
the hypothesis that we will in fact produce more happiness if we act on secondary moral rules than we
will if we consciously try to maximize happiness when acting or deciding what to do throughout our
days.
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle. . .the ultimate end, with reference to and for the
sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or the good
of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality. . .This being, according to the utilitarian
opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may
accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an
existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all
mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient
creation.”
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Questions: How plausible is Mill’s mixed view: i.e. indirect act utlitarianism? Is direct utilitarianism
psychologically possible? Could you adopt it as your ethical guide? What about indirect utilitarianism?
Which of our laws and/or norms would we abandon were we to evaluate them in a utilitarian manner?
V. Chapter 3: Moral Motivation
1. Ordinary moral rules bind us because we have been “trained” (by education and opinion) to follow
them. But since we were not brought up as utilitarians we do not regard the principle of utility with a
“feeling” of obligation. This might lead us to think that we need a reason if we are to accept that we should
promote general happiness, but that we do not need a reason “not to rob or murder, betray or deceive” (p.
26). But this is wrong. If we need a reason to follow the one moral principle we need a reason to follow
any moral principle.
2. The reasons for following the dictates of ordinary morality are also reasons for adopting the principle of
utility. They are both internal and external:
external: the hope of favor and the fear of displeasure of others (including, possibly, some God).
internal: a feeling of conscience “which in properly cultivated moral natures” arises and is strong
enough to make immoral action too “painful” to perform.
Questions: Are these good reasons for acting morally, or are they only causes of moral behavior? Is a
sense of obligation (to take care of one’s children or stay true to one’s boyfriend or girlfriend or respect the
property of another person) properly analyzed as aversion to the pain one knows or believes one would
experience were one to shirk that obligation? Are there moral motives that cannot be analyzed in terms of a
desire for pleasure or an aversion to pain?
3. Mill’s reply to the moral skeptic:
“Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to;
but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than the utilitarian one.”
“How can the will to be virtuous, where it does not exist in sufficient force, be implanted or awakened?
Only by making the person desire virtue—by making him think of it in a pleasurable light, or of its absence
in a painful one. It is by associating the doing right with pleasure, or the wrong with pain, or by eliciting
and impressing and bringing home to the person’s experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or
the pain in the other, that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous which, when confirmed, acts
without any thought of either pleasure or pain.”
Questions: What is Mill’s view of moral training? How does it differ from training pets and other animals
through rewards and punishments? Is moral education limited to “conditioning” of this sort? What role
does religious instruction play? What role do tales of saints and sinners (and other “morality tales”) play?
Is moral instruction the attempt to entrain an association of pleasure with bringing pleasure to others and an
association of pain with bringing others pain? What role do reasoning and argumentation play in moral
education? How do different cultures and societies answer these questions?
Which kinds of proposition can be treated as premises in an argument for the immorality of an act or the
value of a law, rule or plan? Do people disagree about the premises of such arguments? Suppose that a
skeptic grants that a given plan or prospective course of action will produce much more misery or suffering
than happiness or pleasure, but that this skeptic refuses to conclude that the act is immoral or bad. Does
Mill think that such a skeptic is making a mistake? What kind of mistake?
VI. Chapter 4 (Meta-ethics): The proof of Utilitarianism
As utilitarianism is a theory about what is most desirable, or what is desirable “in itself,” it does not admit
of a proof in the standard sense. Still, “The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is
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that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people actually hear it; and so of
the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce
that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it.”
Initial Questions: Might someone desire something that is not desirable? Consider a case in which food
looks good but tastes bad. (Or someone looks attractive but is actually horrible to spend time with.) You
might say something like, “I thought I wanted that, but I was wrong” or (more or less equivalently) “I
wanted that because it looked as though it would be enjoyable, but I don’t want it now because I now know
that it’s horrible.” Surely, Mill must take this phenomenon into account. Still, he might ask whether you
can desire something about which you are fully and accurately informed without its being desirable?
And if you do equate what is desirable with what you would want upon full information, you might take
this to support Mill’s claim that your desires are the best evidence you could have with regard to what is
“really” desirable.
(1) Mill’s desire-based characterization of intrinsic goodness: X is intrinsically good or
desirable for us just in case we would desire X for its own sake upon full and accurate information
about X.
With this claim in mind, consider the conclusion of Mill’s proof of utilitarianism, now modified to allow
for ignorance-based desires for things that are not really desirable:
(2) The Conclusion of Mill’s Proof: Happiness is the only thing we desire for its own sake upon
full and accurate information.
And recall, too, Mill’s claim that “happiness” can be defined in terms of pleasure.
(3) Mill’s Hedonistic Conception of Happiness: Our happiness consists in the type-1 sensory or
animal pleasures we get from food, sex and play and the type-2 pleasures we get from exercising
our uniquely human capacities for conversation, math, and science, with a predominance of the
type-2 pleasures over the type-1.
Remember that Mill characterizes the “happy life” marked by such pleasures as, “not a life of rapture; but
moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a
decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to
expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing.”
Now note that Mill’s claims (2) and (3) entail:
(4) A Hedonistic Conception of Final Ends: The only thing we desire for its own sake upon full
and accurate information is pleasure (as described above).
The problem raised by the miser and the monk is that they don’t seem to desire pleasure for its own
sake, especially when pleasure is characterized in the way Mill has described it. The miser seems to
desire money quite apart from the pleasures he might derive from exercising his capacities, and the monk
seems to desire virtue quite apart from these same forms of pleasure.
Of course, a miser might take pleasure in just knowing that he has a lot of money. His mere knowledge of
his wealth might ease his anxiety, or the thought of his purchasing power might keep a smile on his face.
But this is not the kind of miser that raises a problem for Mill’s proof. The problem is that some misers
seem to value money quite apart from these identifiable pleasures, as they are not made visibly happy by
their wealth. (Because they aren’t spending their money on fun objects and activities, they aren’t deriving
the type-1 and type-2 pleasures from it that Mill initially identifies with happiness.) And if a miser fails to
display the behavior and affect of someone we would describe as happy (if he is mopey and seems
miserable despite his wealth) we would be hard pressed to argue that his money is nevertheless making him
happy. Something similar might be said of a stern or visibly miserable priest or monk. Why are they
pursuing money and/or virtue when it is obviously not making them happy?
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Conclusion: Unless the misers and monks who meet this description are self-deceived about their lives of
wealth and virtue (and the relative scarcity of type-1 and type-2 pleasures they’re experiencing when
leading these lives) Mill has to avoid drawing claim (4) as a conclusion. (He must acknowledge that we
have final ends other than pleasure.) And to avoid (4), Mill must either abandon his claim (2) or his claim
(3) described above. Mill must either say: (a) that the miser wants something other than happiness for its
own sake: possessing money. Or Mill must say: (b) that happiness cannot be equated with pleasure: that
the miser’s happiness consists in his merely having money even when it is fairly obvious that this is not
bringing him pleasure.
Perhaps (a) is the more plausible conclusion to draw. After all, we wouldn’t normally characterize the
miser or monk we’ve described as happy. But the text suggests that Mill chooses (b) without admitting that
he is therein abandoning the equation of happiness with pleasure:
“What for example, shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more
desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that
of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means
for gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of
human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself; the desire to possess it
is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires
which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may then, be said
truly that money is desired not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. . .
What was once desired as an instrument for the attainment of happiness has come to be desired for
I its own sake. In being desired for its own sake it is, however, desired as part of happiness.”
Primary Questions: Does the miser/monk want something other than happiness for its own sake? Is this
the result of some form of ignorance or error on his or her part?
Secondary Questions: Direct utilitarianism is the view that we ought to maximize happiness. Indirect
utilitarianism is the view that we ought to adopt those rules that would best promote happiness. But Mill
sets out to show that happiness is the most desirable thing and the only thing desirable in itself or apart
from its effects. What is the missing step? Answer: that we ought to promote (or even maximize) that
which is most desirable. Can we give an argument to support this missing step? Does it need an argument
in its support? (If you don’t think this assumption requires support, wait until we read Kant.)
Four questions:
(1) Even if we grant Mill the premise that we ought to promote what is most desirable, has Mill shown that
we should (a) maximize happiness or only that we should (b) promote some happiness? Could a rational
egoist (or someone who defends the rationality of acting selfishly) use this argument to support his own
position? Why should we value the perspectives of other people we don’t already love or care about?
(2) Is the notion of happiness Mill uses in this argument the same notion he uses in explaining the principle
of utility? What’s the relationship between pleasure and the heterogeneous collection of activities and
states of affairs that one desires for themselves irrespective of their consequences? If Mill uses “happiness”
in two distinct senses, does this present a problem for his “proof” of the principle of utility?
(3) Does the fact that happiness is desirable follow from the fact that everyone desires happiness? (See
Mill’s comparison of his project with proving that something is visible by showing that people see it.)
Does ‘x is desirable’ mean x is desired or, instead, that it is appropriate or good that x be desired? Again,
what is the connection between desiring something about which one has relatively full and accurate
information and that thing’s being desirable? Might S be wrong to desire X even though S is not mistaken
about X’s more or less value-neutral properties?
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(4) Might a miser desire money for its own sake even when it is obvious to him or her that money is not
bringing him or her pleasure? Suppose this is possible: One might think the miser is wrong to value money
for its own sake, as money is really just valuable as a tool for the acquisition of things of independent
value. Is this right? Does the miser make a mistake in collecting money instead of using it to purchase
pleasurable objects and activities? Does Mill think the miser is mistaken, or does he think that the miser’s
non-instrumental desire for money entails that the miser’s happiness consists in the acquisition and
retention of currency? If the miser makes a mistake in valuing money for its own sake, is the person who
desires to be virtuous independently of his desire to promote happiness through benevolence guilty of a
similar mistake? Is it a mistake to desire virtue for its own sake?
VII. Mill on Justice and Utility: The Normative Consequences of Psychological Accounts of Our
Moral Judgments
“In the case of this, as of our other moral sentiments, there is no necessary connection between the question
of its origin, and that of its binding force.”
Mill’s Distinction Between Natural Instincts and Reliable Instincts: It is not the case that if we have an
innate or universal propensity to feel or judge certain kinds of acts to be unjust, then these acts really are
unjust. Innate and universal propensities or instincts can be unreliable.
Mill’s argument for the claim: Some of our instincts to act are bad: anger can lead to actions we judge
imprudent when thinking back on them in a “cool hour,” and appetites can lead to behavior we judge
gluttonous or unhealthy upon reflection. Similarly, illusory experiences can lead to judgments we come to
recognize are false, and there may be universal or innate forms of inference we judge to be fallacious upon
reflection (e.g. the gambler’s fallacy).
Indeed, we need to be especially careful in these cases, because when we are naturally or instinctively
disposed to make certain judgments, we typically assume that these judgments must be true or reliable. But
this assumption may not withstand scrutiny.
So we can ask:
(1) Regarding Mill’s “Proof” of the Principle of Utility: We assume that a person’s happiness is composed
of those experiences she continues to want (for their own sake) even after she has reflected on them in a
clear-headed, informed manner. We are disposed to think that what we desire (in these conditions) really is
desirable or good for us. But might we discover upon further reflection that even our considered desires
provide us with a largely unreliable guide as to what is truly good for us?
(2) We assume that those things that intuitively or immediately strike us as unfair or unjust or strike us as a
violation of a person’s moral rights really are unfair, or unjust, or a violation of a person’s rights. But
might we discover upon reflection that our intuitive or instinctual judgments regarding justice and injustice
provide us with a largely unreliable guide as to what is truly just and unjust?
Question: Mill seems to dismiss without argument the possibility that what is good for us is something
entirely different from what we want upon reflection in light of accurate information about it. But if he
does dismiss this possibility out of hand, how can he consistently think that the Kantian (or deontologist)
must seriously consider the possibility that our intuitive or instinctive judgments about injustice are largely
unreliable? Isn’t he being unfair here?
VIII. Mill’s Attempts to Characterize our Intuitive or Ordinary Judgments of Justice
A. Violation of Legal Rights: We call “unjust” the deprivation of property or liberty protected by the laws
of the land. Things are not clear when we judge that the law is a bad one and the property or liberty denied
someone is property or liberty they ought not to have been given. (E.g. protecting an escaped slave.)
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B. Bad Laws: We call unjust the enacting of laws that violate a person’s moral rights: laws denying racial,
ethnic or religious groups the rights to vote, speak, move freely, etc.
C. Desert: We call it just when bad things happen to people who intentionally do bad things (so long as the
bad received is proportionate with the bad paid out). We call it “unjust” when bad things are done to good
people or when bad people get away with doing bad things without adverse consequences.
D. Violations of Contracts (Both Explicit and Implicit): We call it unjust when someone breaks a promise
or violates what we take to be the legitimate expectations of others unless this is done to respect an
obligation we judge weightier.
E. Partiality: We judge it unjust when officials or those entrusted by a group with representing its interests
or distributing goods or services on its behalf fail to act in a wholly impartial manner by favoring their own
interests or the interests of their friends and families over the interests of strangers. (E.g. judges must
deliver their verdicts in an impartial manner, teachers must grade impartially, government officials must
award contracts in an impartial manner etc.)
F. Equality: It is said to be unjust that a few should have privileges and rights denied to the many, though
(Mill says) the interpretation of this claim is mired in controversy.
Question: Surely, Mill should conclude that the word “justice” is ambiguous or that its meaning is in some
less drastic way sensitive to features of the context in which it is used. Why then does he insist that it is
“not yet regarded as ambiguous”? Is he being sarcastic?
IX. The Genesis of Judgments of Justice
We need to look at the judgments of justice we make in each one of these areas and ask: (a) the
psychological question: what causes us to judge acts unjust in these cases? And (b) the normative question:
once we reflect on the sources of our judgments of justice do we find ourselves questioning the reliability
or truth of those judgments or does our confidence in these judgments remain in place?
Mill’s Psychology of Judgments of Morality: The idea of a law and conformity to law is the “primitive
element” in our idea of morality. In the paradigm case we judge an act unjust because we have determined
that it runs contrary to the law. With two exceptions: (a) We can think about the laws themselves and judge
them to be unjust. (b) There are unjust acts we don’t think should be prohibited by laws because of the
negative consequences of enforcement. (As already discussed in class, we don’t want the cops trying to
figure out which girls are cheating on their boyfriends.)
“We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way
or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinions of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the
reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality
and simple expediency.”
Mill’s Explanation of Judgments of Immorality: We are typically led to judge some person’s act immoral
by the prior judgment that she ought to suffer for having performed that act.
First Problem: If this proposal is supposed to be a plausible one, the judgment that someone ought to
suffer for some act must itself be interpreted as a moral judgment. For example, a narrow-minded person
might judge that his rival in business in some sense “ought” to be punished for winning a contract that this
narrow-minded person coveted, without therein judging that his rival acted unjustly or immorally in
securing that contract.) So what leads us to make these kinds of moral judgment (that is judgments about
who does and who does not deserve punishment)? Are judgments formed in this way reliable?
Second Problem: If it’s an accurate description or account of any of our judgments it would seem to be a
judgment regarding the immorality of acts in general, not judgments of the injustice of acts in particular.
(We should at least leave it open whether certain acts are judged to be immoral but not unfair or unjust.
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See Thomson on Kitty Genovese. Thomson says that failing to call the police was indecent, but not unfair
insofar as Kitty didn’t have a right to these efforts on her behalf. Mutatis mutandis with regard to Henry
Fonda and his failing to heal Thomson when in the room with her.)
Mill’s Initial Explanation of Judgments of Injustice: We are typically led to judge an act unjust by the prior
judgment that it is both immoral and violates someone particular person’s or group of persons’ rights.
Third Problem: If this proposal is supposed to be a plausible one, the judgment that someone has a right to
be treated in a certain way and the judgment that a second person violated that first person’s right are
themselves moral judgments. What leads us to make these kinds of judgment? Are judgments formed in
this way reliable?
Task: Go back to Mill’s characterization of the six different kinds of context in which we judge things
unjust. See whether his general explanation of judgments of injustice is confirmed by an examination of
judgments in these six different contexts.
So far we have Mill modeling judgments of injustice as follows:
The Cognitive Model of Judgments of Justice
(a) S believes that X violated some person’s rights.
(b) S believes that X ought to suffer for violating the rights in question.
So,
(c) S concludes that X acted unjustly.
Criticism 1a: Mill’s cognitive model is a fine hypothesis about the sources of certain fairly sophisticated
judgments of justice. But we need an explanation of how subjects come to accept the normative or value-
laden premises of an inference of this kind.
Criticism: 1b: Mightn’t I judge that X violated someone’s rights and so acted unjustly even if I think X
should be forgiven (i.e. not punished) for this violation? Perhaps Mill thinks judging that X acted unjustly
(or, more plausibly, expressing that judgment in words) is itself a form of punishment (as he explicitly
discusses loss of reputation as a form of punishment). But it still seems as though (b) is an idle wheel in
that case. Typically, the conclusion that X has acted unjustly is drawn immediately upon the recognition
that X violated someone’s rights and does not await the further judgment that X ought to be punished for
this violation.
But Mill concludes that, “the two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice are, the desire to punish a
person who has done harm and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals
to whom the harm has been done” (p. 95). This replaces the cognitive model above on which S is drawing
her conclusion from normative claims that she believes with something partially non-cognitive as it
involves the generation of a belief from a belief and a desire.
Cognitive Inference: A transition from beliefs in premises to a belief in some conclusion.
Non-Cognitive Inference: A transition from emotions, desires or intentions (i.e. states of mind
that cannot be coherently evaluated as true or false) to belief in some conclusion.
The Non-Cognitive Model
(a’) S believes that X harmed someone (or some group).
(b’) S wants X to suffer for having harmed someone.
So,
(c’) S concludes that X acted unjustly.
First, note that (a)-(c) is much more reliable than (a’)-(c’). I realize upon reflection that S might falsely
judge that X acted unjustly even if she knows that X harmed Y and even if S really does want to punish X
for this harm. Let X be a judge and Y be S’s brother who is justly imprisoned by X for a crime. S wants X
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to suffer for sending his brother to jail (which is surely a harm) but X did not act unjustly. Or let X be a
boxer who knocks out Y and let S be a fan of Y’s who wants X to suffer for the KO.
Criticism 2: Mill’s non-cognitive model is a fine hypothesis about the sources of certain fairly
unsophisticated, rather unreliable judgments of justice. Moreover its single premise is fairly value-neutral
insofar as we can give a value-neutral definition of “harm.” (And perhaps we feel we already have accurate
models of how a person typically discovers that another person has been intentionally harmed.)
Something similar holds for (b’): Mill gives a pretty good explanation of how people come to desire the
suffering of others. The desire to repel attacks is said to be universal and probably innate as it is shared by
the primate species from which we’ve evolved. Mill says the same thing about the desire to retaliate: it is
probably innate as it’s inherited from our evolutionary ancestors. (Indeed, Karen Wynn and Paul Bloom at
Yale have recently published experiments that show infants as young as 3-months-old like it when
hinderers are punished and helpers are rewarded.) There are of course differences between our desires for
punishment and the desires of non-human primates. But according to Mill, the desire for punishment
enjoyed by human beings primarily differs from the similar desires of non-human animals in that humans
are capable of greater sympathy and have more general intelligence. Because of our greater sympathy
we often want people to suffer for harming those who are unrelated to us (neither friends nor family). And
because of our greater intelligence we can think of large groups of people (nations, etc), assign interests to
these groups (by thinking about what’s “good for America” etc.) and (by sympathizing with the group as a
whole) we can come to desire the suffering of those who intentionally frustrate the group’s interests and the
interests of members of the group we’ve never met (e.g. outrage at attacks on “us”).
But Mill wants to derive the conclusion that judgments of justice are only reliable when they are grounded
in considerations of utility. “I conceive that the sentiment [of justice] does not arise from anything which
would commonly, or correctly, be termed an idea of expediency; but that though, the sentiment does not,
whatever is moral in it does” (p. 95).
“To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession
of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility. If that
expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for
the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational
only but an animal element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral
justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned” (p. 98).
Criticism: Mill hasn’t shown that the only part of our judgments of justice worth retaining are those that
advance overall utility. To show that inferences of the kind depicted by (a’)-(c’) are unreliable does
nothing to show that inferences of the form (a)-(c) are unreliable. Mill might argue that believing that
some X ought to suffer for harming someone or violating her rights is nothing beyond wanting X to
suffer for the harm she’s caused. But it’s hard to see how any such argument could succeed. For
instance, I can believe that a family member ought to suffer for harming others and yet find myself unable
to desire his suffering. I can know that my spouse has acted unjustly in committing a string of robberies
even as I do everything I can to help her escape the authorities.
Conclusion: There remains to this day a debate between utilitarians and deontologists about the relationship
between judgments of justice and judgments of utility. And utilitarians are still trying to “debunk” those of
our intuitions about justice that do not conform to the utilitarian conception of morality. We now turn to a
deontic conception of this kind with an examination of Kant’s Groundwork.
Phil 4: Intro Ethics April 12, 2016
Handout #3: Critiques of Consequentialism Prof. Aaron Z. Zimmerman
(1) An initial distinction: Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value
X has intrinsic value if and only if X has value and X would have value even if it had no valuable
consequences or produced nothing valuable distinct from itself.
X has merely instrumental value if and only if X has value but X would not have value if it neither
had valuable consequences nor produced anything valuable distinct from itself.
Examples: Money (or rather having money) has merely instrumental value. Pleasure seems to have both
intrinsic and instrumental value. It’s good “in itself” and also good when (e.g.) the pleasure that comes
from accomplishing something difficult or the pleasure of earning parental approval reinforces the
disposition to work hard or perform prudent and virtuous actions. Is there anything that has only intrinsic
value? (Mill and Aristotle say that only happiness has wholly intrinsic value—are they right? How must
we understand ‘happiness’ to make them right?)
(2) Consequentialism I
‘Consequentialism’ is the name for a family of ethical views—utilitarianism is just one of them.
Consequentialism (Ends Def.): The only things with intrinsic value are certain states of affairs;
everything else that has value owes its value to its relation to intrinsically valuable states of affairs.
Question: What’s the problem with this definition according to Williams?
(3) Different Versions
Different versions of consequentialism result from different views about what is intrinsically valuable.
Williams argues that consequentialists must admit that certain actions are themselves intrinsically valuable
if they are to escape gross Hedonism. If a consequentialist thinks, e.g., that a person’s happiness is
intrinsically valuable, he must allow that certain actions are intrinsically valuable, because (Williams
argues) happiness is not a sensation produced by certain activities; it is instead a matter of actually doing
things with a certain amount of enjoyment.
“To say a man finds certain actions or activities pleasant, or that they make him happy, or that he
finds happiness in them, is certainly not always to say that they induce certain sensations in him,
and in the case of happiness it is doubtful whether that is ever what is meant. Rather it means such
things (among others) as that he enjoys doing these things for their own sake.”
Nozick makes a similar point when describing his experience machine. “Would you plug in? What else
can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?” If ‘happiness’ is used to cover all (or
most) of what matters to a person (even when she is thinking in a largely self-interested way) happiness
must include more than mere experience. But doesn’t understanding “happiness” so that it refers to
something non-mental—something other than a state of mind—conflict without ordinary understanding of
the term? So shouldn’t we conclude from Nozick’s experience machine that we place intrinsic value on
things other than happiness? Moreover, as Nozick points out, the question remains, “Why do we want to
do the activities rather than merely have the experience of doing them?”
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(4) Consequentialism II
Consequentialism (Maximizing+Uniqueness): An action A performed by a person P at a time t
is the morally right action for P at t if and only if P’s performing A produces more intrinsic value
than any other action available to P at t.
Consequentialism (Maximizing Only): An action A performed by a person P at a time t is a
morally right action for P at t if and only if P’s performing A produces as much intrinsic value as
any other action available to P at t.
Williams says that these definitions make the moral rightness of an action objective rather than subjective.
An action A is available to a person P at a time T if and only if P is physically capable of
performing A at t.
Non-culpable ignorance: P may be physically capable of performing A at t but be unaware that he can A
at t. If P is not to blame for being unaware that he can A at t, then even if Aing is the right thing for P to do
at t, P is not to be blamed for failing to A at t.
Questions: Can you think of an example in which someone is excused from blame despite not doing what is
right? How does Mill distinguish the narrow class of blamable actions from actions that just fail to be
morally best? Recall the following passage:
“We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to punished in some
way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by
the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between
morality and simple expediency.
(5) Rejecting Consequentialism
Williams first claims that non-consequentialists might want to simply talk about the rightness and
wrongness of actions and refuse to evaluate the moral properties of the consequences or “states of affairs”
that result. But these consequences will include the feelings and emotional responses of the people affected
by the act, the quality of life that results for those people, and so on. So it is absurd to suppose that these
items might be given no moral weight or importance.
But Williams goes on to suggest that non-consequentialists (e.g. Kantians) might just reject the maximizing
conception of right action altogether.
“A non-consequentialist can hold both that it is a better state of affairs in which more people keep
their promises, and that the right thing for X to do is something which brings it about that fewer
promises are kept.”
Questions: Can you describe such a case? How can someone admit that X-ing would produce more value
than not X-ing, that X-ing will in the long run lead to better results than not-Xing, and still think it not right
to X? What about hurting one person to save many? Consider here Williams’ examples of George and
Jim. What are your intuitions about these cases?
(6) Limiting the Scope of Non-Consequentialism
What is it to say, “No action is absolutely right”? What is it to say that there are no absolute truths in
morality?
(1) Brute Relativism: A person P is right to A in community c at time t, while (Temporal) a
relevantly similar person P’ is wrong to A in community c at time t+n, or (Spatial) a relevantly
similar person P’’ is wrong to A in community c’≠c at t, where there are no morally relevant
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differences between the situations faced by P and P’ or P and P’’ except for the times at which or
places where their respective actions are performed.
Question: Can you think of an example that shows brute relativism to be true? How could brute relativism
be true? Doesn’t it conflict with the principle we called “Rationality as Conceptual Supervenience” when
discussing Thomson and her arguments from analogy?
(2) No Simple Answers: There is no type of action such that it is always and everywhere right to
perform that type of action.
Problem: What about the following type of action: the right action? If we sort actions into the right type and
the wrong type we can say that it is always and everywhere right to perform the right type of action and
always and everywhere wrong to perform the wrong type of action.
(2’) No Simple Non-Trivial Answers: There is no type of action, other than those that are
semantically (or linguistically) guaranteed to be always and everywhere right, such that it is
always and everywhere right to perform that type of action.
Examples: It is right to help someone, but not if you know that your helping them will just enable them to
harm someone else. (Don’t lend your friend money if he’s going to buy a gun to kill an innocent person.)
It is wrong to kill someone, but not if you know that that person is going to kill you for selfish reasons and
you have no other way to stop her from doing so.
Problem 2: But what if we build all the exceptions to a rule into our specification of an action type? We
can say that it is always and everywhere wrong to kill someone for any reason unless it is necessary for
self-defense, or one is a combatant in a justly fought war, etc. We can then say that the type of action
picked out by ‘a killing not done in self-defense, not committed against a combatant in just conditions of
war, etc.’ is always and everywhere wrong. We can say it is always and everywhere wrong to kill someone
when that person is not trying to kill you, or that person is not fighting against you in a war you are justly
pursuing, and so on.
Potential Problems: (1) these highly “disjunctive” action types are (perhaps) not really kinds of
action at all, or (2) these actions types cannot be easily denoted in non-moral vocabulary so as to
be cited in sufficiently simple rules that we might use to guide our actions. (The ‘etc’ in our rule
cannot be eliminated.)
I think (1) is a bogus concern. We already have simple vocabulary to pick out the relevant kinds or
properties (i.e. with predicates like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ that are already in our moral vocabulary), and it is
rare that we have two distinct vocabularies that line up perfectly. We should expect that moral properties
(like the property expressed by ‘right action’) would only be picked out by highly disjunctive predicates if
these predicates were not part of our ethical vocabulary. But the second worry is a real one and may place
limitations on the usefulness of moral theories or sets of moral rules that can be articulated.
(2’’) No Simple General Non-Trivial Answers: There is no type of action, other than (a) those
that are semantically (or linguistically) guaranteed to be always and everywhere right, and (b)
those that are picked out with highly disjunctive and hard to deploy descriptions, such that it is
always and everywhere right to perform that type of action.
(2’’) is probably right, but (one might say) big whoop. Is (2’’) a surprising thesis? It does point out that
moral decision-making is difficult precisely because the moral facts are extremely hard to describe in non-
moral vocabulary.
There is, however, a more subtle way in which context can affect moral wrongness or (at least) some
related property such as blameworthiness. For example, Thomas Jefferson had slaves. (Indeed, unlike
George Washington, Jefferson didn’t leave his slaves their freedom in his will.) But compare Jefferson
with Wolfgang Priklopil, an Austrian man who kidnapped a 10-year-old girl and kept her enslaved in his
4
basement from 1998-2006. I take it that most people judge Jefferson and other slavers of his day less
harshly than they judge Prikopil. Some of this is just ignorance: we judge some of the 18th and 19th century
slavers less harshly than we would were we to learn the details of their crimes. But mightn’t one justify
adopting a less harsh attitude toward slavers of the past than slavers of the present by judging each in
relation to his or her contemporaries?
Relativism About Character: A person P is immoral (equivalently: P has a bad character) just in
case P’s motives and actions are significantly worse than those of others in her social context.
So, the relativist might say that Prikopil (or a contemporary European man who engages in human
trafficking by importing young women from Southeast Asia and forcing them to work as prostitutes
without just compensation) is immoral because significantly worse than his cohort in his treatment of
people (where his cohort is taken to be other similarly situated European males). And yet the relativist
might resist saying that Thomas Jefferson was (straightforwardly) immoral even though he too kept slaves
if it is taken for granted that Jefferson’s behavior towards his slaves and slavery in general, though worse
than an abolitionists, was not significantly worse than the other members of his cohort (where the relativist
might take this to be Southern property owners).
Questions: Is relativism about character true? To judge a person immoral do you compare him with others
who are similarly situated in society? Or do you have some kind of absolute standard in mind? Mightn’t
our evaluations of others combine both? Might we have some minimal standards we think anyone must
respect on pain of gross depravity no matter how challenging the moral environment they face whereas our
overall assessment of a person also takes into account how well they coped with the challenges presented
by their society in comparison to their cohorts?
Further questions: Mightn’t one be a relativist about the goodness or badness of people (or their characters)
and yet be a universalist about the goodness or badness of actions or motives or institutions? For instance,
mightn’t one argue that the desire to enslave others, or the act of enslaving another, or the institution of
slavery is bad or wrong or something that shouldn’t have been indulged, permitted or allowed, and that this
is true of every such desire to enslave, act of enslavement or practice of slavery known to history? And
mightn’t one combine this view toward slavery (on which it is always bad) with the more nuanced, partially
relativist evaluation of slave owners described above?
Moral Universalism About Certain Motives or Actions or Institutions: There are certain
motives, actions or institutions that have been, are and always will be bad or wrong to indulge or
permit.
A further sense of “everything is relative”:
(3) Strong Act Consequentialism: Whether an action is right is entirely determined by that action’s
consequences. So unless a rule proscribes or requires a type of action that is picked out by reference to its
consequences—e.g., “Do the kind of thing that will lead to the best consequences”— it cannot be a good or
useful moral rule.
Question: What would Mill say about (3)?
2
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY*
BERNARD WILLIAMS
1. THE STRUCTURE OF CONSEQUENTIALISM
No one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that
has value, has it in virtue of its consequences. If that were so, one
would just go on for ever, and there would be an obviously
hopeless regress. That regress would be hopeless even if one takes
the view which is not an absurd view, that although men set
themselv~s ends and work towards them, it is very often not really
the supposed end, but the effort towards it on which they set
value-that they travel, not really in order to arrive (for as soon as
they have arrived they set out for somewhere else), but rather they
choose somewhere to arrive, in order to travel. Even on that view,
not everything would have consequential value; what would have
non-consequential value would in fact be travelling, even though
people had to think of travelling as having the consequential value,
and something else-the destination-the non-consequential
value.
If not everything that has value has it in virtue of consequences,
then presumably there are some types of thing which have non-
consequential value, and also some particular things that have
such value because they are instances of those types. Let us say,
using a traditional term, that anything that has that sort of value,
has intrinsic value. 1 I take it to be the central idea of consequen-
Bernard Williams, from Utilitarianism: For and Against, ed. Smart and Williams
(Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 82-118. Reprinted by p€rmission of the
publisher.
* This is not the title of the original printing.
1 The terminology of things ‘being valuable’, ‘having intrinsic value’, etc., is not
meant to beg any questions in general value-theory. Non-cognitive theories, such as
Smart’s, should be able to recognize the distinctions made here.
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 21
tialism that the only kind of thing that has intrinsic value is states
of affairs, and that anything else that has value has it because it
conduces to some intrinsically valuable state of affairs.
How much, however, does this say? Does it succeed in
distinguishing consequentialism from anything else? The trouble is
that the term ‘state of affairs’ seems altogether too permissive to
exclude anything: may not the obtaining of absolutely anything be
represented formally as a state of affairs? A Kantian view of
morality, for instance, is usually thought to be opposed to
consequentialism, if any is; at the very least, if someone were
going to show that Kantianism collapsed into consequentialism, it
should be the product of a long and unobvious argument, and not
just happen at the drop of a definition. But on the present account
it looks as though Kantianism can be made instantly into a kind of
consequentialism-a kind which identifies the states of affairs that
have intrinsic value (or at least intrinsic moral value) as those that
consist of actions being performed for duty’s sake. 2 We need
something more to our· specification if it is to be the specification
of anything distinctly consequentialist.
The point of saying that consequentialism ascribes intrinsic
value to states of affairs is rather to contrast states of affairs with
other. candidates for having such value: in particular, perhaps,
actions. A distinctive mark of consequentialism might rather be
this, that it regards the value of actions as always consequential
(or, as we may more generally say, derivative), and not intrinsic.
The value of actions would then lie in their causal properties, of
producing valuable states of affairs; or if they did not derive their
value in this simple way, they would derive it in some more
roundabout w,ay, as for instance by being expressive of some
motive, or in accordance with some rule, whose operation in
society conduced to. desirable states of affairs. (The lengths to
which such indirect derivations can be taken without wrecking the
point of consequentiaiism is something we shall be considering
later. 3)
2 A point noted by Smart, p. 13. [All of Williams’s references to J. J. C. Smart
are to Smart’s essay ‘An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics’, in
Utilitarianism: For and Against, pp. 3-74-Ed.]
3 [Williams is referring here to a section of his essay that is not reprinted in this
volume-Ed.]
I
• i
22 BERNARD WILLIAMS
To insist that what has intrinsic value is states of affairs and not
actions seems to come near an important feature of consequen-
tialism. Yet it may be that we have still not hit exactly what we
want, and that the restriction is now too severe. Surely some
actions, compatibly with consequentialism, might have intrinsic
value? This is a question which has a special interest for
utilitarianism, that is to say, the form of consquentialism concerned
particularly with happiness. Traditionally utilitarians have tended
to regard happiness or, again, pleasure, as experiences or sensa-
tions which were related to actions and activity as effect to cause;
and, granted that view, utilitarianism will indeed see the value of all
action as derivative, intrinsic value being reserved .for the
experiences of happiness. But that view of the relations between
action and either pleasure or happiness is widely recognized to be
inadequate. To say that a man finds certain actions or activity
pleasant, or that they make him happy, or that he finds his
happiness in them, is certainly not always to say that they induce
certain sensations in him, and in the case of happiness, it is doubtful
whether that is ever what is meant. Rather it means such things
(among others) as that he enjoys doing these things for their own
sake~ It would trivialize the discussion of utilitarianism to tie it by
definition to inadequate conceptions of happiness or pleasure, and
we must be able to recognize as versions of utilitarianism those
which, as most modern versions do, take as central some notion
such as satisfaction, and connect that criterially with such matters as
the activities which a man will freely choose to engage in. But the
activities which a man engages in for their own sake are activities in
which he finds intrinsic value. So any specification of consequen-
tialism which logically debars action or activity from having intrinsic
value will be too restrictive even to admit the central case,
utilitarianism, so soon as that takes on a more sophisticated and
adequate conception of its basic value of happiness.
So far then, we seem to have one specification of consequen-
tialism which is too generous to exclude anything, and another one
which is too restrictive to admit even the central .case. These
difficulties arise from either admitting without question actions
among desiraole states of affairs, or blankly excluding all actions
from the state of affairs category. This suggests that we shall do
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 2
3
better by looking at the interrelations between states of affairs and
actions.
It will be helpful, in doing this, to introduce the notion of the
right action for an agent in given circumstances. I take it that in
any form of direct consequentialism, and certainly in act-
utilitarianism, the notion of the right action in given circumstances
is a maximizing notion:4 the right action is that which out of the
actions available to the agent brings about or represents the
hight(st degree of whatever it is the system in question regards as
intrin’sically valuable-in the central case, utilitarianism, this is of
course happiness. In-this argument, I shall confine myself to direct
consequentialisin, for which ‘right action’ is unqualifiedly a
maximizing notion.
The notion of the right action as that which, of the possible
alternatives, maximizes the good (where this embraces, in un-
favourable circumstances, minimizing the bad), is an objective
notion in this sense, that it is perfectly possible for an agent to be
ignorant or mistaken, and non-culpably ignorant or mistaken,
about what is the right action in the circumstances. Thus the
assessment by others of whether the agent did, in this sense, do the
right thing, is not bounded by the agent’s state of knowledge at the
time, and the claim that he did the wrong thing is compatible with
recognizing that he did as well as anyone in his state ·of knowledge
could have done. 5 It might be suggested that, contrary to this, we
have already imported the subjective conditions of action in
speaking of the best of the actions available to him: if he is ignorant
or misinformed, then the actions which might seem to us available
to him were not in any real sense available. But this would be an
exaggeration; the notion of availability imports some, but not all,
kinds of subjective condition. Over and above the question of
actions which, granted his situation and powers, were physically
not available to him, we might perhaps add that a course of action
was not really available· to an agent if his historical, cultural, or
psychological situation was such that it could not possibly occur to
him. But it is scarcely reasonable to extend the notion of
I
4 Cf. Smart’s definition, p. 45.
5 In Smart’s terminology, the ‘rational thing’: pp. 46-7.
24 BERNARD WILLIAMS
unavailability to actions which merely did not occur to hi~; and
surely absurd to extend it to actions which did occur to him, but
where he was misinformed about their consequences.
If then an agent does the right thing, he does the best of the
alternatives available to him (where that, again, embraces the le_ast
bad: we shall omit this rider from now on). Standardly, the ~ction
will be right in virtue of its causal properties, of maximally
conducing to good states of affairs. Some~imes, however, the
relation of the action to the good state of affaiis may not be that of
cause to effect-the good state of affairs may be constituted, or
partly constituted, by th~ agent’~ do~ng that act (a~ when un_der
utilitarianism he just enJoys domg It, and there IS no proJect
available to him more productive of happiness for him or anyone
else). . .
Although this may be so under.consequenhahsm, there s~em~ to
be an important difference between this situation _an_d a situatiOn
of an action’s being right for some non-consequ~ntiahst rea_son, as
for instance under a Kantian morality. This difference might be
brought out intuitively by saying that for th~ c~nsequentialist,
even a situation of this kind in which the action Itself possesses
intrinsic value is one in which the rightness of the act is derived
from the goodness of a certain state of affairs-the act. is right
because the state of affairs which consists in its being done IS better
than any other state of affairs accessible to the agent; whereas for
the non-consequentialist it is sometimes, at least, the othe: way
round and a state of affairs which is better than the alternatives IS
so be~ause it consists of the right act being done. This intuitive
description of the difference has something in it, but it needs to be
made more precise. .
We can take a step towards making it more precise, pe~hap~, m
the following way. SupposeS is some particular concrete SituatiOn.
Consider the statement, made about some particular agent
InS, he did the right thing in doing A. (1)
For conseq{i.entialists, (1) implies a statement of the form
The state of affairs P is better than any other state of
accessible to him.
Here a state of affairs being ‘accessible’ to an agent means that it is
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 25
a_stat~ of affairs which is the consequence of, or is constituted by,
hts domg an act available to him (for that, see above); and pis a
state of _affairs acces~ible to him only in virtue of his doing A. 6
Now m the exceptiOnal case where it is just his tloing A which
carries the intrinsic value, we get for (2)
The state of affairs which consists in his doing A is better than
any other state of affairs accessible to him. (3)
It was just the possibility of this sort of case which raised the
difficulty o~ n?t being able to distinguish between a sophisticated
~onse~uenttahsm and non-consequentialism. The question thus is:
If (3) IS what we get for consequentialism in this sort of case, is it
what _a non-consequentialist would regard as implied by (1)? If so,
we still cannot tell the difference between them. But the answer in
fact seems to be ‘no’.
There are two reasons for this. One reason is that a non-
consequentialist, though he must inevitably be able to attach a
se~se to (1), does not have to be able to attach a sense to (3) at all,
whtle the consequentialist, of course, attaches a sense to (1) only
· .• .,. because he attaches a sense to (3). Although the non-conse-
quentialist i~ concerned with right actions-such as the carrying
·’ out of ~romtses-he may have no general way of comparing states
of affairs from a moral point of view at all. Indeed, we shall see
later, and in greater depth than these schematic arguments allow
that the emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is ~
peculi~r feature of consequentialism in general, and of utilitarianism
·· · .. · tn particular.
‘ . A different kind of reason emerges if we suppose that the non-
. ”:~o~sequentialist does admit, in general, comparison between
;l)st~tes of affairs. Thus, we might suppose that some non-
equentialist woulcj consider it a better state of things in which
, . rather than fewer, people kept their promises, and kept
… · for non-consequentialist reasons. Yet consistently with that
. could accept, in a particular case, all of the following: that X
‘Only’ here may seem a bit strong: but I take it that it is not an unreasonable
1
em:mo on an account of hi~ doing the right thi~g in S that his action is uniquely
~ut from the alternatives. A further detail: one should strictly say, not that
hes a statement of the form (2), but that (1) implies that there is a true
ent of that form.
BERNARD WILLIAMS
26
would do the right thing only if he kept his promise; that keeping
his promise involve (or consist in) doing A; that several other
people would, as a matter of fact, keep their promises (and for the
right reasons) if and only if X did not do A. There are all sorts of
situations in which this sort of thing would be true: thus it might be
the case that an effect of X’s doing A would be to provide some
inducement to these others which would lead them to break
promises which otherwise they would have kept. Thus a non-
consequentialist can hold both that it is a better state of affairs in
which more people keep their promises, and that the right thing
for X to do is something which brings it about that fewer promises
are kept. Moreover, it is very obvious what view of things goes
with holding that. It is one in which, even though from some
abstract point of view one state of affairs is better than another, it
does not follow that a given agent should regard it as his business
to bring it about, even though it is open to him to do so. More than
that, it might be that he could not properly regard it as his
business. If the goodness of the world were to consist in people’s
fulfilling their obligations, it would by no means follow that a, given
agent should regard it as his business to bring it about, even
though it is open to him to do so. More than that, it might be that
he could not properly regard it as his business. If the goodness of
the world were to consist in people’s fulfilling their obligations, it
would by no means follow that one of my obligations was to bring
it about that other people kept their obligations.
Of course, no sane person could really believe that the goodness
• of the world just consisted in people keeping their obligations. But
that is just an example, to illustrate the point that under non-
consequentialism (3) does not, as one might expect, follow from
(1). Thus even allowing some actions to have intrinsic value, we
can still distinguish consequentialism. A consequentialist view,
then, is one in which a statement of the form (2) follows from a
statement of the form (1). A non-consequentialist view is one in
which this is not so-not even when the (2)-statement takes the
special form of (3).
This is not at all to say that the alternative to consequentialism is
that one has to accept that there are some actions which one ..
should always do, or again some which one should never do,
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 2
7
what~ver the consequences: this is a much stronger position than
any mvolv~d,_ as I have defined the issues, in the denial of
conseq~entiahsm. All that is involved, on the present account i
the. demal of consequent~alis~, is that with respect to some t ~ o~
ac~IOn, there are some situatiOns in which that would be th~~i ht
~hmg to do, even though the state of affairs produced by o;e’s
omg . that would be worse than some other state of affairs
a_cc:ssible to one. The claim that there is a type of action which is
ng t whatever the consequences can be put by saying that with
respect to some type of a t” d .· . . . . cIOn, assume as bemg adequately
:ecifie~, then _whatever the situation may (otherwise) be, that will
the. nght thmg to do, whatever other state of affairs might be
a~ce;ti?le to one, however much better it might be than the state
o a qirs produced by one’s doing this action.
. . If that some”:hat . Moorean formulation has not ho elessl
concealed the pomt, It will be seen that this second positi;’n-thy
. what~ver the consequences position-is very much stronger tha~
the ~Irst, the m~re ~ejection of consequentialism. It is perfectly
co~sistent, ~nd It might be thought a mark .of sense to believe
wh~le not.b~mg a.consequentialist, that there was no t;pe of actio~
.. ,•:i \Vhtc~ satisfte~ this seco·n·d c~ndition: that if an adequate (and non-
‘·· ~uestion-be~g~ng) specifica~IOn of a type of action has been iven
,>l~advance, It IS always possible to think of some situation in !hich
.··•···. · ….• ef ~onseq~ences of domg the action so specified would be so
, ~~ u that It would ~e righ~ to do something else.
. .• · ?f cour~e, one. U:Ight thmk that there just were some t es of
. · .. action which satisfied this condition. though it yp
.. obsctu h ‘ seems to me .• .. · · .. :, .· e e ow one could have much faith in a list of such actions
ss .one supposed that it had supernatural warrant. Alternatively
might th.I~k tha~ ~hile logically there was a difference betwee~
.·.·two positions.’ m ~ocial and psychological fact they came to
.the s~m~ th~ng, smce so soon (it might be claimed) as people
‘.,up thmkmg m terms of certain things being right or wrong
. . t~e consequences’ they turn to thinking in purely
… ,..,..·r.~~~~-~ntial terms. This might be offered as a very general
. t~on about . ~uman thought., o.r (more plausibly) as a
J!.M,JCH::>lCigH:;al p:op?si:IOn about certam Situations of social change
utihtanamsm (in particular) looks the 1 h ‘ on y co erent
28 BERNARD WILLIAMS
alternative to a dilapidated set of values. At the level of language,
it is worth noting that the use of the word ‘absolute’ mirrors, and
perhaps also assists, this association: the claim that no type of
action is ‘absolutely right’-leaving aside the sense in which it
means that the rightness of anything depends on the value-system
of a society (the confused doctrine of relativism)–can mean either
that no type of .action is right-whatever-its-consequences, or,
alternatively, that ‘it all depends on the consequences’, that is, in
each case the decision whether an action is right is determined by
its consequences.
A particular sort of psychological connection–or, in an old-
fashioned use of the term, a ‘moral’ connection-between the two
positions might be found in this. If people do not regard certain
things as ‘absolutely out’, then they are prepared to start thinking
about extreme situations in which what would otherwise be out
might, exceptionally, be justified. They will, if they are to get clear
about what they believe, be prepared to compare different
extreme situations and ask what action would be justified in them.
But once they have got used to that, their inhibitions about
thinking of everything in consequential terms disappear: the
difference between the extreme situations and the less extreme
presents itself no longer as a difference between the exceptional
and the usual, but between the greater and the less-and the
consequential thoughts one was prepared to deploy in the greater
it may seem quite irrational not to deploy in the less. A fortiori,
someone might say: but he would have already had ‘to complete
this process to see it as a case of a fortiori.
One could regard this process of adaptation to consequentialism,
moreover, not merely as a blank piece of psychological association,
but as concealing a more elaborate structure of thought. One
might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral
category; and in more than one way. It could be a feature of a
man’s moral outlook that he regarded certain courses of action as
unthinkable, in the sense that he would not entertain the idea of
doing them: and the witness to that might, in many cases, be that
they simply would not come into his head. Entertaining certain
alternatives, regarding them indeed as alternatives, is itself
something that he regards as dishonourable or morally absurd.
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 29
But, furthe~, he m_ight equally find it unacceptable to consider
wha~ ~o do m certam conceivable situations. Logically, or indeed
empiriCally CO~lC~ivable they may be, but they are not to him
n:oral_ly conceivable, meaning by that that their occurrence as
Situ~tiOns prese~ting him with a choice would represent not a
~pe~Ia~ problem_m his moral world, but something that lay beyond
Its h~Its. For him, there are certain situations so monstrous that
the Ide~ that t~e. processes of moral rationality could yield an
answe~ m them IS msane: they are situations which so transcend in
enormity _the hun:an business of moral deliberation that from a
moral pomt ~f view it can?ot m~tt~r any more what happens.
Equally, f?r him, to spend time thmkmg what one would decide if
one ‘Yere m such a situ~tion is also insane, if not merely frivolous.
. Fors~ch a man, and mdeed for anyone who is prepared to take
him ~enousl~, the demand, in Herman Kahn’s words, to think the
unt~mkable IS not an unquestionable demand of rationality, set
agamst a cowardly or inert refusal to follow out one’s moral
thought~. Ra_tion~lity he sees as a demand not merely on him, but
on ~he situatiOns m, and about, which he has to think; unless the
environment re:ea~s mi~imum sanity, it is insanity to carry the
deco~um of_ samty I~t.o It. Consequentialist rationality, however,
and _m particular utilitarian rationality, has no such limitations:
makmg_ the best of a bad job is one of its maxims, and it will have
so_m_ethmg to say eve~ on the difference between massacring seven
mdhon, and massacnng seven million and one.
There are other important questions about the idea of the
morally unthinkable which we cannot pursue here. Here we have
been c?ncerned with 1 the role it might play in someone’s
conn_ectmg, by more than a mistake, the idea that there was
n?thmg ‘:hich was right whatever the consequences, and the
different Idea that everything depends on consequences. While
~omeone might, in this way or another, move from one of those
, I~eas to the other, it is very important that the two ideas are
dtff~r~nt: especially important in a world where we have lost
traditiOnal reasons for resisting the first idea, but have more than
enough reaso,ns for fearing the second.
30 BERNARD WILLIAMS
2. NEGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY: AND TWO EXAMPLES
Although I have defined a state of affairs being accessible to an
agent in terms of the actions which are available to him,
7
nevertheless it is the former notion which is really more important
for consequentialism. Consequentialism is basically indifferent to
whether a state of affairs consists in what I do, or is produced by
what I do, where that notion is itself wide enough to include, for
instance, situations in which other people do things which I have
made them do, or allowed them to do, or encouraged them to do,
or given them a chance to do. All that consequentialism is
interested in is the idea of these doings being consequences of what
I do, and that is a relation broad enough to include the relations
just mentioned, and many others.
Just what the relation is, is a different question, and at least as
obscure as the nature of its relative, cause and effect. It is not a
question I shall try to pursue; I will rely on cases where I suppose
that any consequentialist would be bound to regard the situations
in question as consequences of what the agent does. There are
cases where the supposed consequences stand in a rather remote
relation to the action, which are sometimes difficult to assess from
a practical point of view, but which raise no very interesting
question for the present enquiry. The more interesting points
about consequentialism lie rather elsewhere. There are certain
situations in which the causation of the situation, the relation it has
to what I do, is in no way remote or problematic in itself, and
entirely justifies the claim that the situation is a consequence of
what I do: for instance, it is quite clear, or reasonably clear, that if
I do a certain thing, this situation will come about, and if I do not,
it will not. So from a consequentialist point of view it goes into the .
calculation of consequences along with any other state of affairs
accessible to me. Yet from some, at least, non-consequentialist
points of view, there is a vital difference between some such
situations and others: namely, that in some a vital link in the
production of the eventual outcome is provided by someone else’s
doing something. But for consequentialism, all casual connections
7 See last section, pp. 24-5.
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 31
are on the same level, and it makes no difference, so far as that
goes, whether the causation of a given state of affairs lies through
another agent, or not.
. C~rrespondingly, there is no relevant difference which consists
~ust m o~e state of affairs being brought about by me, without
InterventiOn of other agents, and another being brought about
. through .the interv~ntion of other agents; although some genuinely
· causal differences mvolving a difference of value may correspond
. to .that (as when, for i~stance, the other agents derive pleasure or
. pam fron: the transaction), that kind of difference will already be
mcluded m the specification of the state of affairs to be produced.
?ranted that the states of affairs have been adequately described
m causally ~nd e:aluatively relevant terms, it makes no further
comprehensible difference who produces them It I·s beca . . . . use. conse-
. ~uentmhsm attaches value ultimately to states of ff · d t · . h a mrs, an
Is con.cern .Is wit what states of affairs the world contains, that it
essentially mvolv.es the notion of negative responsibility: that if I
am eve: respons1~le for anything, then I must be just as much
re~ponsible for thmgs that I allow or fail to prevent, as I am for
thmgs Jhat I myself, in the more everyday restricted sense, bring
‘.about .. Those things also must enter my deliberations, as a
…. responsible moral. agent, on the same footing. What matters is
··. what states o~ affaus the world contains, and so what matters with
• respect to a giVen action is what comes about if it is done and what
. fo~es. about if it is not done, and those are que~tions not
· ·, trmsically affected by the nature of the causal 1· k · . . , m age, m
by .whether the outcome is partly produced by other
. e strong d~ct:in~ of ~egative responsib~lity flows directly
consequentiahsm s asstgnment of ultimate value to states of
· ………. .,~··-~ · L~oked at from another point of view, it can be seen also
.a special application of something that is favoured in many
… ,. outlooks not themselves consequentialist-something which,
· ·is ~ fairly modest s_ense of ‘responsibility’, introduced merely by one’s
.re ect on, and deci~e, what one ought to do. This presumably esca es
nonsenseb,an (p. 54) on the notion of ‘the responsibility’ as ‘a piece of metaphyskal
-his remarks seem to be concerned solely with situations of interpersonal
BERNARD WILLIAMS
32
indeed, some thinkers have been disposed to regard as the essence
of morality itself: a principle of impartiality. Such a principle will
claim that there can be no relevant difference from a moral point
of view which consists just in the fact, not further explicable in
general terms, that benefits or harms accrue to one person rather
than to another-‘it’s me’ can never in itself be a morally
comprehensible reason 9 This principle, familiar with regard to the
reception of harms and benyfits, we can see consequentia\ism as
extending to their production: from the moral point of view, there
is no comprehensible differerice which consists just in my bringing
about a certain outcome rather than someone else’s producing it.
That the doctrine of negative responsibility represents in this way
the extreme of impartiality, and abstracts from the identity of the
agent, leaving just a locus of causal intervention in the world-that
fact is not merely a surface paradox. It helps to explain why
consequentialism can seem to some to express a more serious
attitude than non-consequentialist views, why part of its appeal is
to a certain kind ofhigh-mindedness. Indeed, that is part of what is
wrong with it. For a lot of the time so far we have been operating at an
exceedingly abstract level. This has been necessary in order to get
clearer in general terms about the differences between conse-
quentialist and other outlooks, an aim which is important if we
want to know .. what features of them lead to what results for our
thought. Now, however, let us look more concretely at two
examples, to see what utilitarianism might say about them, what we
might say about utilitarianism and, most importantly of all,
what would be implied by certain ways of thinking about the
situations. The examples are inevitably schematized, and they are
open to the objection that they beg as many questions as they·.
illuminate. There are two ways in particular in which examples in
moral philosophy tend to beg important questions. One is that,
presented, they arbitrarily cut off and re~trict the range
alternative courses of action-this objection might particularly be ;,
made against the first of my two examples. The second is that ,
9
There is a tendency in some writers to suggest that it is not a comprehensib( ;
reason at all. But this, I suspect, is due to the overwhelming importance
writers ascribe to the moral point of view.
. . CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 33
mevitably present one with the situation . . ~ut off questions about how the a ent ~s a gomg concern, and
mgly about moral considerations g h. ~ot .mto It, and correspond-
. objection might perhaps spe . II w ~c m.tght flow from that: this
f
cia Y anse with r d
, o my two situations. These diffic I . egar. to the second
accepted, and if anyone finds th u ties, however’ JUSt have to be
· . ese examples c · 1· 1 .
m this sort of respect the h . . npp mg Y defective
h
. , n e must m his th
t em m richer and less question-be . own ought rework
presentation of any im . d . g~mg form. If he feels that no
· agme situatiOn c b
• misleading in morality and th t th an ever e other than
. . f h ‘ a ere can neve b . :y· .or t e concrete experienced co I . r e any substitute
(‘ then this discussion, with him ‘;;; exity ofactualmoral situations,
, … · .. •··.· .. · then one may legitimately wo’ d ustc hertamly gnnd to a halt: but
· ‘·< ·h. n er w ether e d" · ··•·.···.· Im about conduct will not . d very Iscusswn with i·•···b · gnn toahalt in 1 d" . ' a out the actual sitautions S d' .' c u mg any discussion
.·•· • .think and feel about situati’o~~~~ Isc~ssi~~ about how one would
(that is to say, situations to t;:~we:t Ifferent from the actual
I.mportant role in discussion of th t telnt Imagmary) plays an
, (l) G e ac ua .
: eorge, who has just taken h” Ph . .
·'”‘tremely difficult to get a . ob H IS .D. m chemistry, finds it
cuts down thy num6er .of ~ IS not ve~y robust in health,
atisfactorily. His wife has t JObs he might be able to do
I
o go out to work t k h
tse f causes a great deal of st . . o eep t em, which
.··. h · ram, smce they ha 11 ·
t ere are severe problems b . ve sma children
•·· •.. · .. · ts of all this, especially on t~eouht “lldookmg after the~. The ch . c I ren’ are damagi A
. emist, who knows about th” “t . ng. n
ge a decently paid J. ob I·n IS s_I uation, says that he can get
. a certam laborato h” h
: . mto chemical and biolo ical w f ry’ w IC pursues
‘. accept this, since he is o g dar are. George says that he
,, .. . . The older man repli!p~~=t ~o chemical and biOlogical
‘ , come to that but afte . e IS not too keen on it
, . . the job or the !abo :all George’s refusal is not going to
, s to know that “f G ra ory go away; what is more he
:/ ·. I eorge refuses th · b · · ‘
:’ ‘contemporary of George’s wh . e JO ‘.It Will certainly go
‘ , and is likely if a ointed o IS not mhibited by any such
·. . . zeal than G pp to push along the research with
.· •. . . . eorge would Inde d ·t · , . . and his famil but . e ‘ I IS not merely concern
alarm about this oJ:er (t~ speak frankly and in confidence)
.: man s excess of zeal, which has led the
34 BERNARD WILLIAMS
older man to offer to use his influence to get George the job .
George’s wife, to whom he is deeply attached, has views (the
details of which need not concern us) from which it follows that at
least there is nothing particularly wrong with research into CBW.
What should he do?
(2) Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South
American town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty
Indians, most terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several
armed men in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki shirt
turns out to be the captain in charge and, after a good deal of
questioning of Jim which establishes that he got there by accident
while on a botanical expedition, explains that the Indians are a
random group of the inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest
against the g-overnment, are just about to be killed to remind other
possible protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However,
since Jim is an honoured visitor from another land, the captain is
happy to offer him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians
himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the
other Indians will be let off. Of course, if Jim refuses, then there is
no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to
do when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim., with some desperate
recollection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether, if he got hold
of a gun, he could hold the captain, Pedro, and the rest of the
soldiers to threat, but it is quite clear from the set-up that nothing
of that kind is going to work: any attempt at that sort of thing will
mean that all the Indians will be killed, and himself. The men
against the wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation·,
and are obviously begging him to accept. What should he do?
To t-hese dilemmas, it seems to me that utilitarianism replies, in
the first case, that George should accept the job, and in the·
second, that Jim should kill the Indian. Not only does utilitarianism
give these answers but, if the situations are essentially as described,·
and there are no further special factors, it regards them, it seems •
to me, as obviously the right answers. But many of us would
certainly ·wonder whether, in (1), that could possibly be the ·
answer at all; and in the case of (2), even one who came to thin
that perhaps that was the answer, might well wonder whether
was obviously the answer. Nor is it just a question of the righ
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 35
or obvious~ess o~ these answers. It is also a question of what
sort of consideratiOns come into finding the answer A f t f
tT · · · . . ea ure o
u I Itanamsm IS that It cuts out a kind of consideration which for
some o_thers ~ak~s a di~ference to what they feel about such cases:
a_ consider~tiOn mvolvmg the idea, as we might first and very
Simply put It, that each of us is specially responsible for what he
does, rather ~han for what other people do. This is an idea closely
: . co_n_nec_te~ With the value of integrity. It is often suspected that
:: ,, .· utihtanamsm, at least in its direct forms, makes integrity as a value
more or less unintelligible. I shall try to show that this suspicion is
correct. Of course, even_ if that is correct, it would not necessarily
follow_ that we should reJect utilitarianism; perhaps, as utilitarians
·. sometime~ suggest, we should just forget about integrity, in favour
· o_f such thmgs as a concern for the general good. However if I am
right, we cannot me~ely do that, since the reason why utilit;rianism
. cannot ~nderstand mtegrity is that it cannot coherently describe
the relatiOns between a man’s projects and his actions.
3. TWO KINDS OF REMOTER EFFECT
Io~ of what we have to say about this question will be about the
at10ns between my projects and other people’s projects. But
. we get o~ to that, we should first ask whether we are
. mg too hastily what the utilitarian answers to the dilemmas
ll,be. In terr~1s of more direct effects of the possible decisions,
ere does_ not _mdeed seem much doubt about the answer in either
; .·but It might be said that in terms of more remote or less
. . effects counterweights might be found to enter the
~anan_ scales. _Thus the effect on George of a decision to take
. J_ob mi?~t be mvoked, _o~ _its effect on others who might know
s d~cision. The possibility of there being more beneficent
!~~~8~,;:-~ m th~ future from which he might be barred or
ed, m~ght be mentioned; and so forth. Such effects-in
•• . · ~r, possible effects on the agent’s character, and effects on
pubhc at large-are_often invoked by utilitarian writers dealing
…. _probl~ms a~out lymg or promise-breaking, and some similar
. ,· derabons might be invoked here.
is one very general remark that is worth making about
36 BERNARD. WILLIAMS
arguments of this sort. The certainty that attaches to these
hypotheses about possible effects is usually pretty low; in some
cases, indeed, the hypothesis invoked is so implausible that it
would scarcely pass if it were not being used to deliver the
respectable moral answer, as in the standard fantasy that one of
the effects of one’s telling a particular lie is to weaken the
disposition of the world at large to tell the truth. The demands on
the certainty or probability of these beliefs as beliefs about
particular actions are much milder than they would be on beliefs
favouring the unconventional course. It may be said that this is as
it should be, since the presumption must be in favour of the
conventional course: but that scarcely seems a utilitarian answer,
unless utilitarianism has already taken off in the direction of not
applying the consequences to the particular act at all.
Leaving aside that very general point, I want to consider now
two types of effect that are often invoked by utilitarians, and which
might be invoked in connection with these imaginary cases. The
attitude or tone involved in invoking these effects may sometimes
seem peculiar; but that sort of peculiarity soon becomes familiar in
utilitarian discussions, and indeed it can be something of an
achievement to retain a sense of it.
First, there is the psychological effect on the agent. Our
descriptions of these situations have not so far taken account of
how George or Jim will be after they have taken the one course or
the other; and it might be said that if they take the course which
seemed at first the utilitarian one, the effects on them will be in
fact bad enough and extensive enough to cancel out the initial
utilitarian advantages of that course. Now there is one version of
this effect in which, for a utilitarian, some confusion must be
involved, namely that in which the agent feels bad, his subsequent
conduct and relations are crippled, and so on, because he thinks
that he has done the wrong thing-for if the balance of outcomes
was as it appeared to be before invoking this effect, then he has not
(from the utilitarian point of view) done the wrong thing. So that
version of the effect, for a rational and utilitarian agent, could not
possibly make any difference to the assessment of right and wrong.
H;owever, perhaps he is not a thoroughly rational agent, and is
disposed to have bad feelings, whichever he decided to do. Now
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 37
such feelings, which are from a strictly utilitarian point of view
irrational-nothing, a utilitarian can point out, is advanced by
having them-cannot, consistently, have any great weight in a
utilitarian calculation. I shall consider in a moment an argument to
suggest that they should have no weight at all in it. But short of
that, the utilitarian could reasonably say that such feelings should
not be encouraged, even if we accept their existence, and that to
give them a lot of weight is to encourage them. Or, at the very
best, even ifthey are straightforwardly and without any discount
to be put into the calculation, their weight must be small: they are
after ‘all (and at best) one man’s feelings.
That consideration might seem to have particular force in Jim’s
case. In George’s case, his feelings represent a larger proportion of
what is to be weighed, and are more commensurate in character
with other items in the calculation. In Jim’s case, however, his
feelings might seem to be of very little weight compared with other
things that are at stake. There is a powerful and recognizable
appeal that can be made on this point: as that a refusal by Jim to
do what he has been invited to do would be a kind of self-indulgent
, squeamishness. That is an appeal which can be made by other than
,utilitarians-indeed, there are some uses of it which cannot be
consistently made by utilita~ians, as when it essentially involves
·the idea that there is something dishonourable about such self-
indulgence. But in some versions it is a familiar, and it must be
said. a powerful, weapon of utilitarianism. One must be clear,
~hough, about what it can and cannot accomplish. The most it can
ido, so far as I can see, is to invite one to consider how seriously,
•· and for what reasons, one feels that what one is invited to do is (in
these circumstances) wrong, and, in particular, to consider that
question from the utilitarian point of view. When the agent is not
·seeing the situation· from a utilitarian point of view, the appeal
not force him to do so; and· if he does come round to seeing it
fro.m a utilitarian point of view, there is virtually nothing left for
the appeal to do. If he does not see it from a utilitarian point of
. view, he will not see his resistance to the invitation, and the
‘<;unpleasant feelings he associates with accepting it, just as
disagreeable experiences of his; they figure rather as emotional
‘.·expressions of a thought that to accept would be wrong. He may
BERNARD WILLIAMS
38
be asked, as by the appeal, to consider whether he is right, and
indeed whether he is fully serious, in thinking that. But the
assertion of the appeal, that he is being self-indulgently squeamish,
will not itself answer that question, or even help to answer it, since
it essentially tells him to regard his feelings just as unpleasant
experiences of his, and he cannot, by doing that, answer the
question they pose when they are precisely not so regarded, but
are regarded as indications 10 of what he thinks is right and wrong.
If he does come round fully to the utilitarian point of view then of
course he will regard these feelings just as unpleasant experiences
of his. And once Jim-at least-has come to see them in that light,
there is nothing left for the appeal to do, since of course his
feelings, so regarded, are of virtually no weight at all in relation to
the other things at stake. The ‘squeamishness’ appeal is not an
argument which adds in a hitherto neglected consideration.
Rather it is an invitation to consider the situation, and one’s own
‘ feelings, from a utilitarian point of view. .
The reason why the squeamishness appeal can be very unsettlmg,
and one can be unnerved by the suggestion of self-indulgence in
going against utilitarian considerations, is not that we are
utilitarians who are uncertain what utilitarian value to attach to
our moral feelings, but that we are partially at least not
utilitarians and cannot regard our moral feelings merely as objects
ofutilitariari value. Because our moral relation to the world is partly
given by such feelings, and by a sense of what we can or cannot
‘live with’, to come to regard those feelings from a purely
utilitarian point of view, that is to say, as happenings outside one’s ,
moral self, is to lose a sense of one’s moral identity; to lose, in the .
most .literal way, one’s integrity. At this point utili~arianism ‘.
alienates one from one’s moral feelings; we shall see a httle later ·
how, more basically, it alienates one from one’s actions as,
well.
If, then, one is really going to regard one’s feelings from’. 1:
strictly utilitarian point of view, Jim should give very little weight
at all to his; it seems almost indecent, in fact, once one has
I 0 On the non-cognitivist meta-ethic in terms of which Smart presents
utilitarianism, the term ‘indications’ here would represent an understatement.
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 39
that point of view, to suppose that he should give any at all. In
?~orge’s ~ase one might feel that things were slightly different. It
IS mterestmg, though, that one reason why one might think that-
na~ely that ~ne person principally affected is his wife-is very
dubiously available to a utilitarian. George’s wife has some reason
. to be interested in George’s integrity and his sense of it· the
. Indians, quite properly, have no interest in Jim’s. But it is not ~tall
. clear how utilitarianism would describe that difference
There _is an argument, and a strong one, that a strict. utilitarian
:should giVe not mer~ly small extra weight, in calculations of right
and wrong, to f~elmgs of this kind, but that he should give
\abs_olutely no weight to them at all. This is based on the point,
,\Vhi_ch we have already seen, that if a course of action is, before
; takmg these ~orts of feelings into account, utilitarianly preferable,
bad feelmgs about that kind of action will be from a utilitarian
. .. t o_f view irrational. Now it might be thought that even if that
s?, It would not mean that in a utilitarian calculation such
ngs should not be taken into account; it is after all a well-
>Irr. ·.n .. ,,.,., ‘boast of utilitarianism that it is a realistic outlook which
the ~est i~ the world as it is, and takes any form of happiness
~nhappmess mto account. While a utilitarian will no doubt seek
, ~iminish the incidenc~ of feelings which are utilitarianly
. . twnal-or at least of disagreeable feelings which are so-he
. ·. t be expected to take them into account while they exist. This
out do_ubt classical utilitarian doctrine, but there is good
n to thmk that utilitarianism cannot stick to it without
racing_ results which are startlingly unacceptable and perhaps
,~ ……… ..,._vatmg.
~e that there is in a certain society a racial minority.
~OQSide:rmg merely the ordinary interests of the other citizens as
to their sentiments, this minority does no partic~lar
,. we. may suppose that it does not confer any very great
ts either. Its presence is in those terms neutral or mildly
“‘·'”‘··~.Ll\..,lal. How~ver, the other citizens have such prejudices that
fmd the si_ght of this group, even the knowledge of its
ce, ver~ dis~gre~able. Proposals are made for removing in
·way this mmonty. If we assume various quite plausible
(as that programmes to change the majority sentiment are
40 BERNARD WILLIAMS
likely to be protracted and ineffective) then even if the removal
would be unpleasant for the minority, a utilitarian calculation
might well end up favouring this step, especially if the minority
were a rather small minority and the majority were very severely
prejudiced, that is to say, were made very severely uncomfortable
by the presence of the minority.
A utilitarian might find that conclusion embarrassing; and not
merely because of its nature, but because of the grounds on which
it is reached. While a utilitarian might be expected to take into
account certain other sorts of consequences of the prejudice, as
that a majority prejudice is likely to be displayed in conduct
disagreeable to the minority, and so forth, he might be made to
wonder whether the unpleasant experiences of the prejudiced
people should be allowed, merely as such, to count. If he does
count them, merely as such, then he has once more separated
himself from a body of ordinary moral thought which he might
have hoped to accommodate; he may also have started on the path
of defeating his own view of things. For one feature of these
sentiments is that they are from the utilitarian point of view itself
irrational, and a thoroughly utilitarian person would either not
have them, or if he found that he did tend to have them, would
himself seek to discount them. Since the sentiments in question are
such that a rational utilitarian would discount them in himself, it is
reasonable to suppose that he should discount them in his
calculations about society; it does seem quite unreasonable for him
to give just as much weight to feelings-considered just in
themselves, one must recall, as experiences of those that have
them-which are essentially based on views which are from a
utilitarian point of view irrational, as to those which accord with
utilitarian principles. Granted this idea, it seems reasonable for
him to rejoin a body of moral thought in other respects congenial
to him, and discount those sentiments, just considered in
themselves, totally, on the principle that no pains or discomforts
are to count in the utilitarian sum which their subjects have just
because they hold views which are by utilitarian standards
irrational. But if he accepts that, then in the cases we are at
present considering no extra weight at all can be put in for bad
feelings of George or Jim about their choices, if those choices are,
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 41
lea_ving out those feelings, on the first round utilitarianly
ratiOnal.
The psyc~ological eff~c~ o~ the agent was the first of two general
effects ~o~sidered by utthtanans, which had to be discussed. The
second_ Ism_ g~neral a more substantial item, but it need not take so
long, smc~ I~ IS both clearer and has little application to the present
ca~es. This IS the precedent effect. As Burke rightly emphasized
this effect can be important: that one morally can do wha~
~omeone has actually done, is a psychologically effective principle
If not a de~~tically valid one. For the effect to operate, obvious!;
so~e conditions must hold on the publicity of the act and on such
~hmgs as the status of the agent (such considerations weighed
Importantly_ wit~ Sir Thomas More); what these may be will var
evidently With cucumstances. y
_I? o:der for the precedent effect to make a difference to a
utthtanan calcualtion, it must be based upon a confusion. For
s~ppose that there is an act which would be the best in the
Circumstances, excep~ that doing it will encourage by precedent
other peopl~ to ~o thmgs which will not be the best things to do.
Then the SituatiOn of those_ ?ther people must be relevantly
dif~erent from that of the ongmal agent; if it were not, then in
domg the same as what would be the best course for the original
agen~, th~y would necessarily do the best thing themselves. But if
the Situations ar~ in t~is way relevantly different, it must be a
confus~d ~ercept10n which takes the first situation, and the agent’s
course m It, as an adequate precedent for the second.
· However: t~e fa~t that the precedent effect, if it really makes a
. . Is m this sense based on a confusion, does not mean
It Is not perf~ctly real, nor that it is to be discounted: social
effects are b~ t~etr nature confused in this sort of way. What it
.does emp?a~Iz~ ts tha_t calcul~tions of the precedent effect have got
:t? be reahsti~, mvolvmg considerations of how people are actually
:: hkely. to be I~fluenced. In the present examples, however, it is
. Implausible to think that the precedent effect could be
ked _to make any difference to the calculation. Jim’s case is
”··,··:.·.”‘ •. v.· t..-.·.-.,-,.~.r~;nary e~ough, and it is hard to imagine who the recipients
· ?ft?~ effect might be supposed to be; while George is not in a
:·sufficiently public situation or role for the question to arise in that
BERNARP WILLIAMS
42
form, and in any case one might suppose that the motivations of
others on such an issue were quite likely to be fixed one way or
another already.
No appeal, then, to these other effects is going to make a
difference to what the utilitarian will decide about our examples.
Let us now look more closely at the structure of those de-
cisions.
4. INTEGRITY
The situations have in common that if the agent does not do a
certain disagreeable thing, someone else will, and in Jim’s
situation at least the result, the state of affairs after the other man
has acted, if he does, will be worse than after Jim has acted, if Jim
does. The same, on a smaller scale, is true of George’s case. I have
already suggested that it is inherent in consequentialism that it
offers a strong doctrine of negative responsibility: if I know that
I do X 0
1
will eventuate, and if I refrain from doing X, 02 will,
·and th~t 0 is worse than 0 1, then I am responsible for 02 if I 2 d.’
refrain voluntarily from doing X. ‘You could have prevente It , as
will be said, and truly, to Jim, if he refuses, by the relatives ofthe
other Indians. (I shall leave the important question, which is to the
side of the present issue, of the obligations, if any, that nest round.
the word ‘know’: how far does one, under utilitarianism, have
research into the possibilities of maximally beneficent action
including prevention?)
In the presentcases, the situation of 0 2 includes another
bringing about results worse than 01. So far as 02 has
identified up to this point-merely as the worse outcome
will eventuate if I refrain from doing X-we might equally
said that what that other brings about is 0 2 ; but that would be
underdescribe the situation. For what occurs if Jim refrains
action is not solely twenty Indians dead, but Pedro’s killing
“Indians and that is not a result which Pedro brings about, tho
the de~th of the Indians is. We can say: what one does is’
included in the outcome of what one does, while what an
does can be included in the outcome of what one does. For tha …
be so, as the terms are now being used, only a very weak conditi ·
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 43
has to be satisfied: for Pedro’s killing the Indians to be the
· outcome of Jim’s refusal, it only has to be causally true that if Jim
had not refused, Pedro would not have done it. .
. That _m_ay be enough for us to speak, in some sense, of Jim’s
·responst~Il~ty for that outcome, if it occurs; but it is certainly not
en_ough, It IS worth noticing, fo~ us to speak of Jim’s making those
. thmgs happen. For granted this way of their coming about, he
could ~ave made them happen only by making Pedro shoot, and
· .. there Is no acceptable sense in which his refusal makes Pedro
, ~hoot. If th_e c~ptain had said on Jim’s refusal, ‘you leave me with
110 alternati:e , he would have been lying, like most who use that
, … ·. P.?r~se. While_ t~e d_eaths, and the killing, may be the outcome of
Jim s refusal, It Is misleading to think, in such a case, of Jim having
>~n eff~ct on the w~rl? through the medium (as it happens) of
]:>edro _s acts; for this IS to .leave Pedro out of the picture in his
;esse?~Ial rol~ of ~n~ who has intentions and projects, projects for
. . ~ W~Ich Jim s refusal would leave an opportunity. Instead
~hmkmg m terr~s of supposed effects of Jim’s projects on Pedro
Is more revealmg to think in terms of the effects of Pedro’~
· .. · ~c~s. on Jim’s decision. This is the direction from which I want
cncttize the notion of negative responsibility.
.·. are of course other ways in which this notion can be
:–:·~ .. , .. “”u.vd. Many have hoped to discredit it by insisting on the basic
•·rel~vance ~f the distinction between action and inaction,
~ n~tervemng and letting things take their course. The
chon IS c~rtainly of great moral significance, and indeed it is
easy to _thmk of any m?ral o~tl?ok which could get along
ut.makmg s_om~ use of It. But It IS unclear, both in itself and
moral applications, and the unclarities are of a kind which
!’ . Y cause it ~o give way when, in very difficult cases, weight
::to: be put on It. There IS much to be said in this area, but I
ether th~ sort of. dilemma we are considering is going to
e>t( .. ~.s :ohred by a simple use of this distinction. Again the issue of
.•. , responsibility can be pressed on the ques,tion of how
(lre to ?~ pl_ac~d on one’s apparently boundless obligation,
~y utthtanamsm, to improve the world. Some answers are
to tha~, too~and ~nswers which stop short of relapsing
bad fatth of supposmg that one’s responsibilities could be
44
BERNARD WILLIAMS
adequately characterized just by_ app~al to one’s role.11 But, once
· while that is a real questiOn, tt cannot be brought to bear
agam, · · · · h d t th” k of
directly on the present kind of case, s~nce It IS ar o m .
anyone supposing that in Jim’s case It wo~ld b~ an adequate
response for him to say that it was none of hts busme~~- .
What projects does a utilitarian agent have? As_ a utihtan~n, he
has the general project of bringing about maxtma~ly desua?le
outcomes; how he is to do this at any given moment IS a que~ti~n
of what causal levers,. so to speak, are at that n:oment “‘:’tthm
reach. The desir’able outcomes, however, do not JUSt consi~t of
agents carrying out that project; there must be other more baste or
lower-order projects which he and other agents have, an_d the
desirable outcomes are going to consist, in part, of the maximally
harmonious realization of those projects (‘in part’, because one
component of a utilitarianly desirable outcome may. be ~he
occurrence of agreeable experiences which are not the sa~Isfactwn.
of anybody’s projects). Unless there were fir~t-order projects, the
general utilitarian project would have nothmg to work on,. and
would be vacuous. What do the more basic or lo~er-order ~roJects
· ? Many will be the obvious kinds of des1res for thmgs for
compnse. . . b . · f of
oneself, one’s family, one’s friends, mcludt_ng astc necessi tes …
life and, in more relaxed circumstances, obJects of taste. Or there .
may be pursuits and interests of an intellectual, cultural, or:
creative character. I introduce those as a separate cl~ss
because the objects of them lie in a separate class and provtd.
some utilitarians, in their churchy way, are fond of sayt
‘higher’ pleasures. I introduce them separat~ly because :
agent’s identification with them may be of a dtffere~t order·
does not have to be: cultural and aesthetic interests JUSt bel
for many, along with any other taste;_ but_ some peopl
commitment to these kinds of interests JUSt IS ~t one~ m
thoroughgoing and serious than their pursuit of vano_us obJects
taste, while it is more individual and permeated wtth ch
than the desire for the necessities of life. .
Beyond these, someone may have projects connected wtth
11 For some remarks bearing on this, see Morality, the sectio~ on ‘Good~ess .•.
1 S
‘ and Cohen’s article there cited. [Williams’s book Morallty was publ ..
roe , ~
Harper & Row in 1972-Ed.]
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 45
support of some cause: Zionism, for instance, ·Or the abolition of
……….. chemical and biological warfare. Or there may be projects which
· · · .. flow from some more general disposition towards human conduct
::and character, such as a hq.tred of injustice, or of cruelty, or of
killing. (
.. It may be said that this last sort of disposition and its associated
· project do not count as (logically) ‘lower-order’ relative to the
higher-order project of maximizing desirable outcomes; rather, it
~ay be said, it is itself a ‘higher-order’ project. The vital question
,,Is not, however, how it is to be classified, but whether it and
….. u,, ….. ,~ •. u projects are to count among the projects whose satisfaction
:to ~e i~cluded in the maximizing sum and, correspondingly, as
ntnbutmg to the agent’s happiness. If the utilitarian says ‘no’ to
… t; then he is almost certainly committed to a version of
.:, · itarianism as absurdly superficial and shallow as Benthamite
· · ·ons have often been accused of being. For this project will be
· .·. ted, presumably, on the ground that it involves, in the
~cification of its object, the mention of other people’s happiness
riterests: thus it is the kind of project which (unlike the pursuit
. d for myself) presupposes a reference to other people’s
ects. But that criterion would eliminate any desire at all which
ot blankly and in the most straightforward sense egoistic. 12
we should be reduced to frankly egoistic first-order projects
… · .. . r all essential purposes-the one second-order utilitarian
· .ect of maximally satisfying first-order projects. Utilitarianism
a tendency to slide in this direction, and to leave a vast hole in
of human desires, between egoistic inclinations and
· .. ·.· .. es at one end, and impersonally benevolent happiness-
agement at the other. But the utilitarianism which has to leave
· ·hole is the most primitive form, which offers a quite
tary account of desire. Modern versions of the theory are
moosc:~d to be neutral with regard to what sorts of things make
happy or what their projects are. Utilitarianism would do
.·. · •. · · .to acknowledge the evident fact that among the things
~ke people happy is not only making other people happy,
, t~e subject of egoistic and non-egoistic desires, see ‘Egoism and
; m Problems of the Self (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
BERNARD WILLIAMS 46
but being taken up or involved in any of~ ~ast rang~ o! projects,
or-if we waive the evangelical and morahzmg associatiOns of the
word–commitments. One can be committed to such things as a
person, a cause, an institution, a career, one’s own genius, or the
purs11it of danger. . .
Now none of these is itself the pursuzt of happzness: by an
exceedingly ancient platitude, it is not at all clear ~hat there could
be anything which was just that, or at least anythmg that had _the
slightest chance of being successful. H~ppiness, r~ther, re~mr~s
being involved in, or at least content With, somet~mg ~lse. It IS
not impossible for utilitarianism to accept ~hat pomt: It _does not
have to be saddled with a naive and absurd philosophy of mmd about
the relation between desire and happiness. What it does have to
~ay is that if such commitments are worth while, then pursuin.g the
projects that flow from them, and realizing some of those projects,
will make the person for whom they are worth while, happy. It
may be that to claim that is still wrong: it may well be ~h~t a
commitment can make sense to a man (can make sense of his hfe)
without his supposing that it will make him happy .
14
But that is n_ot
the present point; let us grant to utilitarianism that all worth:Vh~le.
human projects must conduce, one way or another, to happmes~;’
The point is that even if that is true, it does not follow, nor ~auld It
possibly be true, that those project~ are. themselves projects of
pursuing happiness. One has to believe m, _or at least want, or,.,
quite minimally, be content with, other thmgs, for there to
anywhere that happiness can come from. .
Utilitarianism, then, should be willing to agree that Its gen .
aim of maximizing happiness does not imply that what everyone 1 ••.
doing is just pursuing happiness. On the contrary, ~eople have· ,
be pursuing other things. What those other thmgs may
13 This does not imply that there is no such thing as the project of .
pleasure. Some writers who have correctly resisted the view that all desi .
desires for pleasure, have given an account of pleasure so thor~ughly adv~rbi
to leave it quite unclear how there could be a distinctively hedoms~ w_ay o! hfe
Some room has to be left for that, though there are important dif~Icult.Ies
defining it and living it. Thus (particularly in the case of the very nch) It
highly ritual aspects, apparently part o.f ~.strategy to cou.nter bo~edom.
14 For some remarks on this possibility, see Morallty, section on
morality about?’
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 47
uilitariani~m, stic~ing to its professed empirical stance, should be
prepared J~St to fmd out. No doubt some possible projects it will
:vant to d1scour~ge, on the grounds that their being pursued
mvolves a negative balance of happiness to others: though even
there, the u~blinking accountant’s eye of the strict utilitarian will
· have somet~mg to put in the positive column, the satisfactions of
. the destructiVe ~gent. Beyond that, there will be a vast variety of
generally. beneficent or at least harmless projects; and some, no
doubt, will take the form not just of tastes or fancies but of what I
have called ‘_commitments’. It may even be that ~he utilitarian
. >• researcher :”Ill f~n.d that many of those with commitments, who
·· : have really Identified themselves with objects outside themselves
· wh? ~~e thoroughly involved with other persons, or institutions, 0 ;
actiVIties or causes, ~re actually happier than those whose projects
·· . w~nts are _n_ot like that. If so, that is an important piece of
Itanan emp1ncal lore.
When ~ say ‘~appier’ here, I have in mind the sort of
tion W?Ich any utilitarian would be committed to
“‘”‘~’-‘L’l1 1 ” 11 : as for msta~ce t_h~t such people are less likely to have a
‘:n or commit smc1de. Of course that is not all that is
ly mvolved, but the point in this argument is to use to the
rr::::,xirn_· urn ?~gr~e utilitarian notions, in order to locate a breaking-
I~ utihtan_an thought. In appealing to this strictly utilitarian
, _I am bemg more consistent with utilitarianism than Smart
h1s struggles with _the problem of the brain-electrode man
\P· 22) commends the idea that ‘happy’ is a partly evalu~tiv~
m the sense that we call ‘happiness’ those kinds of
~u.:~.La\…u • w~ich, as things are, we approve of. But by what
IS t~1s surplus element of approval supposed, from a
H.~t3r1a.n pomt of v1ew, to be allocated? There is no source for it
•·· … · . . Y utilitarian view, except further degrees of satisfaction’
· ?ere are none of those available, or the problem would no~
‘ ·Nor ~oes it help to appeal to the fact that we dislike in
. ct th1~gs whi_ch :ve like when we get there, for from a
. n p~mt of v1ew 1t would seem that the original dislike was
. Y ~~ratiOnal or based on an error. Smart’s argument at this
seems t_o be embarrassed by a well-known utilitarian
s, which comes from a feeling that it is not respectable to
48 BERNARD WILLIAMS
ignore the ‘deep’, while not having anywhere left in human life to
locate it. 15
Let us now go back to the agent as utilitarian, and ?is higher-
order project of maximizing desirable outcom_es. At this leve_l, he
is committed only to that: what the outcome will actually ~onsist of
will depend entirely on the facts, on what pers?n~ with what
projects and what potential satisfactions there are ‘:Ithm cal~ulable
reach of the causal levers near which he finds himself. His own
substantial projects and commitments come into it, but o~ly as _one
lot among others-they potentially provide one set of satisfactiOns
among those which he may be able to a_ssist _from where he
happens to be. He is the agent of the sat1~fact10n. syst~m :Vh,o
happens to be at a particular point at a part~c~lar time: ~~ J1~ s
case, our man in South America. His own decisions as a utihtanan
agent are a function of all the satisfactions _which he can affect
from where he is: and this means that the proJects of others, to an
indeterminately great extent, determine his decision.
This may be so either positively or negatively. It will be so
positively if agents within the causal field of his decision. have
projects which are at any rate harmless, and so should be ~ss!sted.
It will equally be so, but negatively, if there is an agent withm the
causal field whose projects are harmful, and have to be frustrat_ed
to maximize desirable outcomes. So it is with Jim and the soldter
Pedro. On the utilitarian view, the undesirable projects of other
people as much determine, in this negative way, one’s decisions ·
the desirable ones do positively: if those people were not there,
had different projects, the causal nexus would be different, and· •
is the actual state of the causal nexus which determines ·
decision. The determination to an indefinite degree of
decisions by other people’s projects is just another aspect of
unlimited responsibility to act for the best in a causal frame
formed to a considerable extent by their projects.
The decision so determined is, for utilitarianism,
decision. But what if it conflicts with some project of mine?
the utilitarian will say, has already been dealt with: the satisfacti ·
15 One of many resemblances in spirit between utilitarianism and hig
evangelical Christianity.
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND INTEGRITY 49
to you of f~lfilling your project, and any satisfactions to others of
your so domg, have ~lready been through the calculating device
and_ have been_ found Inadequate. Now in the case of many sorts of
projects,. t~at IS a perfectly reasonable sort of answer. But in the
cas~ of pro~ects of the sort I have called ‘commitments’, those with
W~Ich one Is more deeply and extensively involved and identified
this cannot just by itself be an adequate answer, and there may b~
no adequate answer at all. For, to take the extreme sort of case
ho~ ca~ a man, a utilitarian agent, come to regard as on~
sat~sfactiOn amon~ others, and a dispensable one, a project or
attit,ude r?und which he has built his life, just because someone
.else s p~oj~cts have so structured the causal scene that that is how
the utihtanan sum comes out?
·. The ~oint her~ is n~t, as utilitarians may hasten to say, that if
the project or ~thtude Is that central to his life, then to abandon it
be very disagreeable to him and great loss of utility will be
l”””‘.”C> I have already argued in Section 3 that it is not like that·
the co~trary, o~ce he is prepared to look at it like that, th~
. . t m_any ~eno~s case IS over anyway. The point is that he is
tif~ed With his actiOns as flowing from projects and attitudes
. m _some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what
. hfe IS ~bout (or, in some cases, this section of his Iife-
ess Is not necessarily the same as persistence). It is absurd
and ~f such a m_an, when the sums come in from the utility
:··n~~tvvo1·k W~Ich the pro!ects of oth_ers have in part determined, that
:.should JUst step aside from his own project and decision and
. . . ledge t~e ?ecision which utilitarian calculation requires. It
•. ·.·. al~en~te ~Im m a real sense from his actions and the source of
.actiOn m ~Is own convictions. It is to make him into a channel
the mp~t _o~ everyone’s projects, including his own, and
. t of _optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to
hzs act_IOns and his decisions have to been as the actions and
ns which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he
ost closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense an
on his integrity. 16 ‘
· Inter~stingly related to these notions is the Socratic idea that courage is a
particularly connected with_keeping a clear sense of what one regards as most
·They also centrally raise questions about the value of pride. Humility,
50 BERNARD WILLIAMS
These sorts of considerations do not in themselves give solutions
to practical dilemmas such as those provided by our examples; but
I hope they help to provide other ways of thinking about them. In
fact, it is not hard to see that in George’s case, viewed from this
perspective, the utilitarian solution would be wrong. Jim’s case is
different, and harder. But if (as I suppose) the utilitarian is
probably right in this case, that is not to be found out just by
asking the utilitarian’s questions. Discussions of it-and I am not
going to try to carry it further here-will have to take seriously the
distinction between my killing someone, and its coming about
because of what I do that someone else kills them: a distinction
based not so much on the distinction between action and inaction,
as on’ the distinction between my projects and someone else’s
projects. At least it will have to start by taking that seriously, as
utilitarianism does not; but then it will have to build out from there
by asking ;why that distinction seems to have less, or a different,
force in this case than it has in George’s. One question here would
be how far one’s powerful objection to killing people just is, in
fact, an application of a powerful objection to their being killed.
Another dimension of that is the issue of how much it matters that
the people at risk are actual, and there, as opposed to hypothetical,
or future, or merely elsewhere. 17
There are many other considerations that could come into such
a question, but the immediate point of all this is to draw one·
particular contrast~)with utilitarianism: that to reach a groun?ed ,
decision in such a case should not be regarded as a matter of JUSt·
discounting one’s reactions, impulses, and deeply held projects in
the face of the pattern of utilities, nor yet merely adding them in_:_: ·
but in the first instance of trying to understand them.
as something beyond the real demand of correct self-appraisal, was speci~lly, a
Christian virtue because it involved subservience to God. In a secular context It can ·
only represent subservience to other men and their projects.
17 For a more general discussion of this issue see C. Fried, An AnatOmy
Values (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), Part Three.
3
WAR AND MASSACRE
THOMAS NAGEL
FROM the apathetic reaction to atrocities committed in Vietnam
by the United States and its allies, one may conclude that moral
t”estrictions on the conduct of war command almost as little
sympathy among the general public as they do among those
char~e~ with the formation of US military policy. 1 Even when
restnctwns on the conduct of warfare are defended, it is usually on
le~al grounds alone: their moral basis is often poorly understood. I
‘\¥ISh to argue t?at certain restrictions are neither arbitrary nor
•… ~erely conv~ntiOnal, and that their validity does not depend
~Imply on their usefulness. There is, in other words, a moral basis
for the rules of war, even though the conventions now officially in
~orce are far from giving it perfectexpression.
I
o elabo.rate moral t~eory is required to account for what is wrong
,cases like the Mylm massacre, since it did not serve, and was not
· ntended to serve, any strategic purpose. Moreover if the
· ·pation of the United States in the Indo-Chines~ war i~
r~Iy wro~g t.o. be~in with, then that engagement is incapable of
. · dmg a JUStificatiOn for any measures taken in its pursuit-not
.ly.for ~h~ measures which are atrocities in every war, however
. tIts mms. . .
: ~ut _this war has revealed attitudes of a more general kind,
> .• · .. · ch mfluenced the conduct of earlier wars as well. After it has
. .··. Nagel, ‘War and Mass.acre’, from M?rt~l Questions (Cambridge University
, 1979), pp. 53-74. Repnnted by permiSSion of the publisher.
:.·.This essay was completed in 1971. Direct US military involvement in the
etnam War lasted from 1961 to 1973. Hence the present tense.
·I
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