Pandemic Infl uenza Planning 823
P. Edward French
Mississippi State University
Eric S. Raymond
University of Georgia
Eric S. Raymond is a doctoral student
in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Georgia. His research interests
include American politics and institutions,
local government, urban policies, homeland
security, and emergency management.
E-mail: eraymond@uga.edu
Th e possibility of an infl uenza pandemic occurring
within the next two decades is very real; the role of
local governments in comprehensive preparation for
this global threat is crucial. Th e federal government has
provided broad guidelines for state and local offi cials who
are ultimately responsible for emergency response and
lifesaving services, vaccination and antiviral use, and the
provision of other critical support. Much of this infl uenza
pandemic preparedness has occurred under conditions
of uncertainty, and these government actions may have
unprecedented legal and ethical implications. Th is study
evaluates the pandemic infl uenza policies of eight large
U.S. cities to determine how Department of Health and
Human Services recommendations with ethical and
legal implications have been addressed. Th e authors fi nd
that several important aspects of these guidelines are
vague in many plans, and input from key stakeholders is
inadequate.
The 1918 infl uenza pandemic killed more than 50 million people worldwide, with an estimat-ed 675,000 deaths in the United States alone
during the outbreak (DHHS 2007). A pandemic of
this proportion occurring today would extrapolate
to 1.9 million deaths in the United States and 180
million to 369 million deaths globally if public health
interventions are not instigated (Osterholm 2005).
Th e impact on cities, states, the nation, and the global
community would be devastating. Experts note that
there have been between 10 and 13 infl uenza pan-
demics in the world since the early 1700s, and they
estimate that a pandemic will occur every 30 to 50
years (Knapp 2006). Th e last one occurred in 1968.
Based on this information, the probability of another
pandemic within the next quarter century is very real.
Th e likelihood of its arrival means that emergency
plans coordinating federal, state, and local responses
must be in place. Th e role of local governments in the
planning and implementation processes is paramount.
Planning for this health threat, however, can present
numerous obstacles. Whether a pandemic will be
caused by avian infl uenza or another virus is diffi cult
to predict. While the federal government has stock-
piled vaccine against the H5N1 strain, which is the
most likely viral source, this vaccine has been shown
to produce the desired level of antibody needed to
reduce the risk of contracting infl uenza in only
45 percent of healthy adults in a clinical study
(Progress Report 2007). Also, pandemics occur in
waves and endure for at least 18 months. Government
offi cials must be prepared to face the fi rst wave with-
out an eff ective vaccine and with a limited amount of
antiviral medications. Experts note that the imple-
mentation of nonpharmaceutical interventions during
this time period is perhaps the most crucial element in
limiting the eff ects and dissemination of a deadly virus
(Grinberg 2007). Such interventions may include
hospital infection control, decreased social mixing and
increased social distance, isolation and quarantine,
and international travel and border controls.
A myriad of ethical issues will arise with the next
infl uenza pandemic. Some of the decisions regarding
these matters will be unprecedented. While banning
public outings, closing public schools, and ask-
ing employees to stay at home may be troublesome
measures for local public offi cials to undertake, the
decisions regarding the allocation of limited resources
such as vaccines and antivirals, the imposition of
restrictive measures on the public such as isolation
and quarantines, and the level of risk that the public
workforce should be expected to face while assisting
individuals infected with the infl uenza virus are much
more formidable (Scanlon 2004; Upshur et al. 2007).
While the federal government will provide only broad
guidelines for state and local government actors,
specifi c decisions regarding vaccination at the local
level, maintenance of emergency response and lifesav-
ing services, and provision of other critical needs may
have unprecedented legal and ethical implications.
Whether the next pandemic starts in the United
States or abroad, it will only be a matter of time
before local government offi cials see their fi rst case.
Extensive pandemic infl uenza preparedness is crucial,
and much of this preparedness has occurred under
P. Edward French is an assistant
professor in the Department of Political
Science and Public Administration
at Mississippi State University. He is
the coauthor of three books and has
published in numerous academic journals.
His teaching and research interests
encompass local government administra-
tion, including human resource issues,
risk management, and selected topics in
public management and policy.
E-mail: efrench@ps.msstate.edu
Pandemic Infl uenza Planning: An Extraordinary Ethical
Dilemma for Local Government Offi cials
Tough Public
Policy Choices
Confronting
America
current conditions of uncertainty. Th ese proposed interventions
must take into account global interest and fundamental human
rights if the American and international communities are expected
to support restrictions that have the potential to impact individual
civil liberties and national and world trade, travel, and economies.
The Potential Pandemic Strain: H5N1
An epidemic occurs when the population in a specifi c area is af-
fected by the outbreak of a contagious disease.
When this epidemic broadens its geographic
area to include a region, nation, or the entire
world, a pandemic occurs. According to
public health experts, the avian fl u should
be considered a permanent pandemic threat.
At the present time, the spread of highly
pathogenic Infl uenza A virus subtype H5N1
has mainly been confi ned to animal popu-
lations. Th is virus is currently endemic in
the bird populations of Southeast Asia, and
outbreaks have occurred in Africa, Europe,
and the Middle East (Gostin and Berkman
2007). Two of the three essential prerequisites
for an infl uenza pandemic of this strain have
been met on numerous occasions: (1) the
identifi cation of a novel strain in animal populations, and (2) viral
replication causing the disease in humans (Gostin 2004). However,
even though human-to-human transmission of avian infl uenza has
occurred, the transmission has yet to be highly effi cient; thus, the
third prerequisite of a pandemic has not been fulfi lled to this date.
Th e H5N1 strain is suffi ciently diff erent from ordinary seasonal fl u
that individuals have little immunity to this virus.1 Th is strain usu-
ally aff ects the tissues of the lower respiratory tract, resulting in the
accumulation of large amounts of fl uid in the lungs (Miller 2006).
Death may result within 24 to 48 hours. Th e federal government
drafted its pandemic infl uenza plan in 2005, after the H5N1 avian
infl uenza virus had been documented in 16 countries. Since that
time, presence of the virus has been noted in 60 countries, and ap-
proximately 300 people worldwide have been infected (Gostin and
Berkman 2007). Of these infected individuals, 60 percent have been
killed by the virus. If this strain is able to mutate into a form that is
easily transmissible between humans, the stage for a global pandem-
ic will be set. Th e mortality rate will depend on how many people
become infected, the virulence of the virus, and the eff ectiveness of
emergency preparedness
plans.
While vaccination will be one of the most cost-eff ective interven-
tions, a pandemic infl uenza vaccine most likely would not be
available for at least six months. Th is six-month period results from
the time needed to collect the virus, decipher its genetic makeup,
develop a prototypic vaccine, and manufacture the fi nal vaccine
product, which must be evaluated by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration for use (Fauci 2006; Lister 2005). Currently, worldwide vac-
cination production is limited to only nine facilities. Th e existence
of this small number of manufacturing facilities reduces production
capabilities to an estimated 300 million to 424 million trivalent
fl u vaccines in the event of a pandemic outbreak (Emanuel and
Wertheimer 2007; Lister 2005). Th is situation has left government
offi cials with few options but to develop carefully planned vaccina-
tion distribution policies in order to maximize both the distribution
of the vaccine and its eff ectiveness (Emanuel and Wertheimer 2007),
and to develop emergency preparedness plans that incorporate other
public health interventions focused on limiting the wide spread of
the pandemic virus.
Emergency Management Framework
Th ere are few natural disasters that have the capacity to signifi cantly
disrupt the economic and social underpinnings of society. Hurri-
canes, major earthquakes, and even volcanic
eruptions are certainly capable of decimating
towns or regions of the country. Th ese natural
occurrences pale in comparison, however, to
the level of social, political, and economic
disruption that a public health emergency
such as an infl uenza pandemic would cre-
ate. In fact, “an infl uenza pandemic has the
potential to cause more deaths and illness
than any other public health threat” (Milgrim
2007, 13). In the United States alone, current
estimates predict an economic impact of $70
billion to $200 billion, 314,000 to 734,000
hospitalizations, and total deaths between
89,000 to 207,000 persons, depending on the
severity of the viral strain (Haber et al. 2007;
Lister 2005; Luke and Subbarao 2006).
A recent poll found that 87 percent of Americans are unprepared
for a public health crisis such as an infectious disease epidemic or
food-born illness outbreak (Late 2007). While few disasters will
off er advance notice, with proper planning and preparation, local
offi cials and residents of a stricken area can reduce the unknowns
that confound a normal response. Th e ultimate goal for residents is
to reduce their own vulnerability, while the objective of municipal
offi cials is to protect the public while minimizing interruptions to
the operations of their governments (French, Goodman, and Stanley
2008). Emergency management requires much more than a rapid
response to an emergency situation, and entails four phases that are
common to all disasters: mitigation, preparedness, response, and re-
covery (Petak 1985; Waugh 1994; Waugh and Streib 2006). Mitiga-
tion includes evaluation of the risk presented by a potential disaster
and attempts to minimize or eliminate these hazardous conditions.
International eff orts to mitigate the possibility of pandemic infl u-
enza from the H5N1 strain have included work to contain avian fl u
outbreaks among poultry and concentrated eff orts to improve the
laboratory diagnosis at the onset of an outbreak. Th e international
community has also established early-warning networks in more
than 75 countries and off ered logistical and fi nancial support to
countries that have been hardest hit by this virus (Progress Report
2007). Preparedness plans of the U.S. government call for stockpil-
ing enough vaccine to inoculate approximately 3 million Americans
against the H5N1 virus and 16 million doses of antiviral drugs for
treatment of exposed individuals. However, this stockpiling may
be of little or no use, as the H5N1 strain tends to mutate, or the
pandemic may be caused by a diff erent virus.
Emergency management eff orts frequently cross jurisdictional
boundaries and often require the coordination of federal, state, and
local responsibilities and authority (Waugh 1994). Th e National
Strategy for Pandemic Infl uenza, which was issued by President
Th ere are few natural disasters
that have the capacity
to signifi cantly disrupt
the economic and social
underpinnings of society.…
natural occurrences pale in
comparison, however, to the level
of social, political, and economic
disruption that a public health
emergency such as an infl uenza
pandemic would create.
824 Public Administration Review • September | October 2009
Pandemic Infl uenza Planning 825
George W. Bush on November 1, 2005, outlines the responsibilities
that individuals, industry, state and local governments, and the fed-
eral government have in preparing for and responding to a pandem-
ic. Th e U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
serves as the federal government’s primary agency for response to
a disease outbreak, while state, local, and tribal governments are
responsible for detecting and responding to disease outbreaks, in
addition to implementing activities to reduce the health, social, and
economic consequences of an outbreak (DHHS 2007). Response
and recovery in the event of a pandemic infl uenza outbreak require
the collaboration and cooperation of these three levels of govern-
ment. Also, businesses, community-based organizations, and faith-
based organizations must have continuity of operations plans in the
event of an infl uenza pandemic. Individuals and communities who
are well prepared will fair better than those who are unprepared.
The Model for Infl uenza Preparedness
Th e DHHS has developed a pandemic infl uenza plan that provides
the framework for the federal government’s planning and response
to the pandemic infl uenza threat. Th is strategic plan identifi es key
response actions, the roles and responsibilities of DHHS agencies
and offi ces, and recommendations on the use of vaccines and anti-
viral drugs. Th e national plan also includes public health guidance
for state and local partners that details how health departments and
other local and state government agencies can prevent, mitigate,
respond to, and recover from an infl uenza pandemic. Plans at the
local level can be tailored to the needs of the specifi c local commu-
nity. However, common eff orts of these plans
should include community preparedness and
leadership, infl uenza surveillance, infection
control, vaccine and antiviral drug distribu-
tion and use, public health communication,
and public workforce support. In the event of
a pandemic, local government offi cials have
considerable responsibility, and they must be
well prepared to meet a very broad spectrum
of
public health needs.
Implementation of pandemic preparedness plans will have signifi –
cant legal and ethical implications. Th e extent of the hardships
that will occur, including disruptions to trade, travel, economics,
and personal liberty, are consequences of a public health strategy
that has been developed under conditions of scientifi c and political
uncertainty. No one can predict with certainty when the next pan-
demic will take place; however, for this threat to become a reality, it
requires only that the H5N1 virus mutate into a form that can be
easily transmitted from one person to another. As a result, decision
makers at all levels of government need to attempt to balance indi-
vidual freedoms with the common good in order to minimize the
human and economic harm that will result when another pandemic
infl uenza outbreak occurs.
Ethical Concerns
Emergency management has evolved into a collaborative, dynamic,
and fl exible response that requires intergovernmental, multiorgani-
zational, and intersectoral cooperation (Waugh and Streib 2006).
While a national strategy for pandemic preparedness will focus on
slowing the entry of the virus into the United States, local gov-
ernment offi cials will be responsible for implementing plans that
address public health interventions and maintenance of the infra-
structure of the community. Th e degree of hardship imposed by the
next infl uenza pandemic will be signifi cantly related to the quality
of local government preparedness. While this planning occurs under
several conditions of uncertainty, including the timing, virulence,
and scope of the future outbreak, local preparation requires a public
health strategy that considers both the legal and ethical implications
of its implementation. Th e development of policy with respect to
ethics and the implementation of policy in an ethical manner have
become increasingly important for government in rebuilding public
trust and ensuring that government offi cials and employees respond
to situations in ways that are legally and morally standard (West et
al. 1998).
Th erapeutic countermeasures and public health interventions are
the foundation of most plans, and these measures have the po-
tential to create fi nancial, political, and legal issues that must take
into account economic interests and fundamental human rights in
their resolution. Local government offi cials are faced with the task
of weighing the advantages and disadvantages of their pandemic
infl uenza plans. Responsibility and accountability to the public
require that administrators and policy makers evaluate the potential
risk associated with policies and practices (Hall and Jennings 2008).
Ethical decision making, a fundamental basis of the democratic ad-
ministration of policy, requires that considerable attention be given
to the values and principles that guide the choices government lead-
ers and employees make (Bowman and Knox 2008; Menzel 1993).
Th ey must consider the underlying values of
each step and the potential consequences.
Responsible risk taking requires that offi cials
have respect for the democratic processes and
legal responsibility of the task at hand and
be committed to ethical decision making
(Berman and West 1998). For example, the
allocation of vaccines and antiviral therapy
requires complex decision making that has
several ethical dimensions. Th e governments
of most developed countries now recommend
that vaccinations be given to high-risk populations as a strategy for
addressing seasonal infl uenza, and mass vaccination could be imple-
mented in the event of a severe outbreak (Gostin 2004). However,
the H5N1 strain is not a human pandemic virus. While the U.S.
government has stockpiled vaccine against the current avian fl u
H5N1 strain, it is diffi cult to predict whether this strain will cause
the next human pandemic. Regardless of which virus causes this
health crisis, six months from its onset will be needed to develop the
targeted vaccine.
As the vaccine becomes available, local government offi cials must
implement a vaccine distribution prioritization policy that addresses
the fair allocation of limited vaccines and antiviral medications.
In a 2002 meeting of public health offi cials from 46 states, repre-
sentatives attempted to determine which factors were of greatest
importance—reducing deaths, reducing disease, limiting impact,
ensuring essential services, or implementing equitable distribution
of a vaccine—in the event of an infl uenza pandemic; the partici-
pants were hopelessly divided (Davis 2005). Local government
offi cials must decide how to equitably balance the treatment of
those individuals infected with the virus with the need to maintain
In the event of a pandemic,
local government offi cials have
considerable responsibility, and
they must be well prepared to
meet a very broad spectrum of
public health needs.
essential services provided by health care workers and fi rst respond-
ers while preventing further spread of the virus to political leaders
and other members of the population (Gostin 2004). Although the
DHHS has published recommended guidelines for this policy, most
state and local governments have tailored their vaccination distribu-
tion prioritization policies to their own preparedness plans. Many
of these plans do follow the DHHS guidelines, which eff ectively
have created a tiered system of eight groups, dividing higher-priority
groups from others (DHHS 2005; Lister 2005). Th e fi rst tier con-
sists of “health care service” providers; the second tier of “medically
high risk” individuals; the third and fi fth tiers of “medically at-risk
groups”; the fourth, sixth, and seventh tiers of people engaged in the
“preservation of social function,” and the eighth tier of the “lowest
medical risk” (DHHS 2005). Th is prioritization policy considers
medically high-risk and at-risk individuals to be of higher priority,
based on their position within the system, than individuals who
would ensure the preservation of social continuance. Ethical and
legal concerns arise from these prioritizations and also from the
imposition of vaccinations or treatment on individuals in society
who oppose such interventions. Local government offi cials must be
conscientious of the personal values of these individuals while pre-
venting harm to the overall community. While public health offi cials
do have the legal authority to compel vaccination and treatment,
there must be a reasonable relationship between the public health
intervention and the demonstrable threat to the community (Gostin
and Berkman 2007).
In the event of a local outbreak of infl uenza caused by a pandemic
strain, local government entities must be able to investigate and con-
tain potential or known cases. Civil confi nement may be required to
separate infected or exposed individuals from the healthy popula-
tion. Local offi cials may fi nd it necessary to implement various levels
of movement restriction within their jurisdiction. While isolation
and quarantine are judicially sanctioned, an individual’s entitlement
to civil liberties becomes a concern. Isolation or quarantine must
take place in a humane and habitable environment, and compen-
sation for work and other essential activities are to be considered
(Gostin 2004). Th e usefulness of isolation and quarantine measures
depends a great deal on when the measures are initiated. Beyond
the technical aspects of quarantine measures, however, there also are
issues of civil liberties infringement and which level of government
should have the power to enforce the quarantines.
A 2003 report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on
quarantine and isolation lessons learned from
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome)
revealed some interesting points concerning
these issues. Th is report reviewed the expan-
sive and intrusive (although eff ective) meas-
ures used by many Asian countries, including
China and Singapore, to contain the disease.
Th ese measures included mandatory closure
of schools, child care facilities, markets, and
public transportation; restrictions on travel;
and the cordoning off of entire sections of
towns (Rothstein et al. 2003). Th ese coun-
tries enforced the usage of electronic cameras
in homes to ensure that individuals did not
break the quarantine, and individuals were re-
quired to take their temperature in front of the camera several times
a day. Government offi cials also used telephone calls as another
measure to ensure that individuals did not break the quarantine.
Finally, both law enforcement offi cials and the military were used to
enforce these measures, and for anyone who did break the quaran-
tine, an electronic tag was placed around their ankle (Rothstein et
al. 2003). Clearly, such actions, if attempted in the United States,
would face many social, cultural and political challenges.
In addition to quarantine measures, local government offi cials may
fi nd it necessary to restrict social mixing and increase social distance
during a declared state of emergency for an infl uenza pandemic.
Businesses or schools may need to close, and public meetings
may be suspended. Also, voluntary social distancing would allow
individuals to avoid exposure. Civic activities, large gatherings, and
mass transportation systems would be aff ected as local authorities
intervene to avert spread of the infl uenza virus at the earliest stage.
Th e importance of public cooperation in the enforcement of these
measures does have historical precedence. A study was conducted of
seven U.S. communities that implemented signifi cant social isola-
tion measures during the second wave of the deadly 1918 infl uenza
pandemic. Th e authors of this study reviewed nearly 300 federal,
state, and local documents, as well as more than 1,400 periodicals
and medical journals published between 1918 and 1920 (Markel et
al. 2006). Based on this extensive review of these documents, they
found that public cooperation played a major role in the successful-
ness of the quarantine measures. Specifi cally, “protective seques-
tration, if enacted early enough in the pandemic, crafted so as to
encourage the compliance of the population involved, and contin-
ued for the lengthy time period in which the area is at risk, stands
the best chance of guarding against infection” (Markel et al. 2006,
1963). Ultimately, if government offi cials expect the American pub-
lic to accept social distancing measures, they must understand that
social, political, and cultural factors will play a predominant role.
In the event of an infl uenza pandemic, careful attention to these
social, political, and cultural factors will be required if government
offi cials expect the American public to “buy in” to the potentially
extensive restrictions that could be placed on civil liberties. Th e
quality of democracy and its administration is rooted in ethical de-
cision making (Bowman and Knox 2008). Public health interven-
tions that are intended to address the pandemic spread of H5N1
infl uenza have created ethical and legal questions whose answers
require the delicate balance of personal liberty with restrictions
that could severely impact national and world
trade, travel, and economics. Ethical decision
making during this health crisis should be
focused on the best patient and public health
outcomes with respect to the unique circum-
stances created by an avian infl uenza pan-
demic (Upshur et al. 2007). In addition, local
government offi cials must address these issues
with community stakeholders and solicit
input from all members of their localities. If
local government authority and accountabil-
ity in policy decisions are addressed before the
onset of a pandemic, the individuals aff ected,
both directly and indirectly, by public health
interventions will be more familiar with and
If local government authority
and accountability in policy
decisions are addressed before
the onset of a pandemic, the
individuals aff ected, both
directly and indirectly, by
public health interventions
will be more familiar with and
understanding of the purpose
and challenges of the pandemic
infl uenza plan.
826 Public Administration Review • September | October 2009
Pandemic Infl uenza Planning 827
understanding of the purpose and challenges of the pandemic
infl uenza plan. Educating the public regarding these objectives
and the actions that local government authorities have taken to
safeguard their individual rights is essential to maintaining the
trust that citizen members have placed in their local political and
administrative leaders.
Case Studies
Th e DHHS has developed a state and local pandemic infl uenza
planning checklist based on the Federal Pandemic Infl uenza Plan
that identifi es important activities that are recommended for inclu-
sion in state and local plans. Th is checklist is divided into 10 areas,
outlining key aspects for state and local jurisdictions preparedness in
the event of a disease outbreak.2 Th e authors have identifi ed several
of the recommendations included in the checklist that have ethical
implications for local community stakeholders. Th ese guidelines
were found under the areas of community preparedness leader-
ship and networking, vaccine distribution and use, antiviral drug
distribution and use, community disease control and prevention,
public health communications, and workforce support. Th e authors
considered these areas to have the potential to create political, legal,
and fi nancial issues that must take into account economic interest
and fundamental human rights in their resolution.3 Th e following
table outlines key recommendations by the DHHS that are used in
this study.
Th e pandemic infl uenza policies of eight large cities across the
United States were evaluated to determine whether and how these
recommendations have been incorporated into local government
preparedness plans. Th e municipalities evaluated in this study in-
clude Austin/Travis County, Texas; Boston, Massachusetts; Cleve-
land/Cuyahoga County, Ohio; Kansas City, Missouri; Louisville,
Kentucky; Memphis, Tennessee; Seattle/King County, Washington;
and Tulsa/Tulsa County, Oklahoma. Each of these eight cities falls
into the top 100 cities according to the 2000 population classifi ca-
tion of the U.S. Census Bureau (2000). Also, at least one city from
each of the four census regions is represented.4 Th e preparedness
plans for these localities varied in length from 21 pages to 336
pages. Some of the plans were very detailed in their preparations for
pandemic infl uenza, while other plans were generalized and noted
that specifi c details would be developed as the community pro-
gressed through the pandemic phases.
Discussion of Findings
Th e unique circumstances and uncertainty created by an infl uenza
pandemic require considerable planning by local government of-
fi cials with signifi cant input from community
stakeholders. Th e DHHS places substan-
tial emphasis on community preparedness,
leadership, and networking that includes all
relevant stakeholders in the locality—govern-
ment, public health, emergency response,
education, business, faith-based organiza-
tions, and private citizens. Th is action helps
to ensure that the pandemic infl uenza plan is
responsive to the community’s needs and that
local government offi cials and employees are
prepared to address the unprecedented issues
that may arise from a pandemic. Th e pan-
demic infl uenza plans of only half the communities reviewed in this
analysis referred directly to a pandemic preparedness coordinating
committee representing relevant stakeholders. Th e City of Mem-
phis/Shelby County Health Department actually noted community
input obtained during a series of stakeholder meetings with leaders,
including elected and appointed offi cials, emergency responders,
health and medical providers, media, service and human need pro-
viders, schools and education community, and business and industry
(Memphis/Shelby County Health Department 2007). Th e other
plans did not mention specifi c consultation with other community
stakeholders in their initial development.
Community preparedness leadership and networking also require
that accountability and responsibility, capabilities, and resources
for key stakeholders engaged in planning and executing specifi c
components of the plan be delegated. All eight preparedness plans
addressed this issue and specifi cally identifi ed the legal authorities
responsible for case identifi cation, isolation, quarantine, movement
restriction, and other health service requirements. In addition, these
eight plans included detailed communication operational sections
that addressed how information during the pandemic phases would
be communicated to public and private sector audiences. Only four
of the plans, however, identifi ed state and local law enforcement
personnel who would be responsible for maintaining public order
and implementing control measures. Also, several of the plans did
not address the provision of psychosocial support services for local
community members aff ected by containment procedures, and
several failed to create a demographic profi le of the community
that included special needs populations and language minorities
to ensure that the needs of these residents were addressed in the
operational plan.
In regard to vaccine and antiviral drug distribution and use, all
eight plans incorporated state-based plans for distribution, use, and
monitoring. Most of the plans also noted specifi c guidelines for
the procurement, storage, security, distribution, and monitoring
of actions to ensure access to the treatments during a pandemic.
Specifi c references by six of the plans were made to procedures for
tracking the number and priority of vaccine recipients, the training
requirements of involved personnel, and the distribution plan for
specifi c locations in the community. However, only two of the plans
actually included information for citizens in advance about where
they would be vaccinated. Th e needs of vulnerable and hard-to-reach
populations were addressed in the operational plans of six of these
localities. Yet contingency planning for the use of unlicensed antivi-
ral drugs that might be administered under investigational new drug
or emergency use guidelines was only included
in two of these plans.
Several of the DHHS guidelines regarding
community disease control and prevention
and public health communications were
implemented in all of these plans. Operational
plans for the investigation and containment of
potential cases, including isolation, quaran-
tine, and enforcement of these measures, were
outlined in each of the eight communities’
plans. Almost all of these plans included guide-
lines for utilizing various levels of movement
Public health communication
details for all plans included
planning and coordination of
emergency communication
activities with private industry,
education, and nonprofi t
partners and regular review,
exercise, and updates of these
plans.
Table 1 Key Recommendations for Pandemic Infl uenza Planning
Specifi c Activity
Community prepared-
ness leadership and
networking
Establish a Pandemic Preparedness Coordinating Committee representing all relevant stakeholders
Delineate accountability and responsibility, capabilities, and resources for key stakeholders engaged in planning and executing specifi c com-
ponents of the operational plan
Within every state, clarify which activities will be performed at a state, local, or coordinated level, and indicate what role the state will have
in providing guidance and assistance
Ensure the existence of a demographic profi le of the community (including special needs populations and language minorities) and ensure
that the needs of these populations are addressed in the operation plan
Address the provision of psychosocial support services for the community, including patients and their families, and those affected by com-
munity containment procedures in the plan
Test the communication operational plan that addresses the needs of targeted public, private sector, government, public health, medical, and
emergency network of communication personnel, including lead spokespersons and persons trained in emergency risk communication; and
links to other communication networks
Identify for all stakeholders the legal authorities responsible for executing the operational plan, especially those authorities responsible for
case identifi cation, isolation, quarantine, movement restriction, health care services, emergency care, and mutual aid
Identify the state and local law enforcement personnel who will maintain public order and help implement control measures
Vaccine distribution
and use
Work with health care partners and other stakeholders to develop state-based plans for vaccine distribution, use, and monitoring
Exercise an operational plan that addresses the procurement, storage, security, distribution, and monitoring actions necessary to ensure ac-
cess to this product during a pandemic
Ensure the operational plan delineates procedures for tracking the number and priority of vaccine recipients, where and by whom vaccina-
tions will be given, a distribution plan for ensuring that vaccine and necessary equipment and supplies are available at all points of distribu-
tion in the community, the security and logistical support for the points of distribution, and the training requirements for involved personnel
Address vaccine security issues, cold chain requirements, transport and storage issues, and biohazardous waste issues in the operational plan
Address the needs of vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations in the operational plan
Inform citizens in advance about where they will be vaccinated
Antiviral drug distribu-
tion and use
Develop state-based plans for distribution and use of antiviral drugs during a pandemic through the Strategic National Stockpile
Test the operational plan that addresses the procurement, storage, security, distribution, and monitoring actions necessary to assure access to
these treatments during a pandemic
Ensure the jurisdiction has a contingency plan if unlicensed antiviral drugs administered under Investigational New Drug or Emergency Use
Authorization provisions are needed
Community disease
control and prevention
Exercise the jurisdiction’s operational plan to investigate and contain potential cases or local outbreaks of infl uenza potentially caused by a
novel or pandemic strain
Exercise the jurisdiction’s containment operational plan that delineates procedures for isolation and quarantine, the procedures and legal
authorities for implementing and enforcing these containment measures and the methods that will be used to support, service, and monitor
those affected by these containment measures in health care facilities, other residential facilities, homes, community facilities, and other
settings
Ensure the jurisdiction has exercised the operational plan to implement various levels of movement restrictions within, to, and from the
jurisdiction
Inform citizens in advance about what containment procedures may be used in the community
Public health commu-
nications
Assess readiness to meet communications needs in preparation for an infl uenza pandemic, including regular review, exercise, and update of
communications plans
Plan and coordinate emergency communication activities with private industry, education, and nonprofi t partners
Workforce support Develop a continuity of operations plan for essential health department services, including contingency planning for increasing the public
health workforce in response to absenteeism among health department staff and stakeholder groups that have key responsibilities under a
community’s response plan
Ensure availability of psychosocial support services for employees who participate in or provide support for the response to public health
emergencies such as infl uenza pandemics
Develop workforce resilience programs and ensure readiness to deploy to maximize responders’ performance and personal resilience during a
public health emergency
restrictions within, to, and from the jurisdiction, and more than half
detailed how citizens would be informed of the containment proce-
dures that may be used in community disease control and prevention
eff orts. Public health communication details for all plans included
planning and coordination of emergency communication activities
with private industry, education, and nonprofi t partners and regular
review, exercise, and updates of these plans.
Most of the pandemic preparedness plans evaluated in this study
had developed contingency plans for the provision of essential
828 Public Administration Review • September | October 2009
Pandemic Infl uenza Planning 829
health department services that addressed potential absenteeism
among health department staff and stakeholder groups with key
responsibilities in the community’s response plan. However, only
the City of Memphis/Shelby County Health Department included
the availability of psychosocial support services for employees who
would participate either directly or indirectly in the public health
emergency responses. Th is locality’s plan also provided for the
development of workforce resilience programs aimed at enhancing
and maximizing emergency responders’ performance during a public
health emergency. None of the other seven preparedness plans made
specifi c reference or provisions for these issues.
Conclusions and Implications
Th e existing literature suggests that a future infl uenza pandemic is
inevitable, and the severity of such a pandemic can only be miti-
gated by the thoughtful planning of government offi cials and the
respectful interpretation of past infl uenza statistics. Government
offi cials must use available information and guidelines in order to
develop policies that will maximize positive social and economic
return in their communities while being sensitive to public concerns
regarding factors that were considered during policy formulation.
While the federal government has provided only broad guidelines
for state and local government actors, specifi c decisions regarding
vaccination, nonpharmaceutical interventions, and the maintenance
of critical services during a pandemic may have unprecedented legal
and ethical implications. In many cases, these interventions must
take into account economic and global interests and fundamental
human rights. Eff ective emergency management during an infl uenza
pandemic entails mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery as
local government offi cials focus on protecting the public with mini-
mal interruptions to their government functions. In many cases,
these eff orts will require the coordination of federal, state, and local
authorities; however, most of the responsibility for the development
and implementation of these pandemic preparedness plans rests
with local health departments. Th is consequence has the potential
to be of great concern to city and town offi cials who will be directly
involved with many of the nonpharmaceutical interventions.
Th e plans reviewed in this analysis illustrate the myriad of issues
that will accompany the next infl uenza pandemic. Th ere are numer-
ous ethical and legal implications regarding the allocation of vac-
cines and antivirals, the imposition of restrictive measures such as
isolation and quarantines, bans on public outings and assemblies,
and the maintenance of emergency response and critical services in
which leaders in public health positions may lack adequate prepara-
tion and training. Only half of the plans included in this study
actually mentioned the existence of a pandemic preparedness com-
mittee representing all relevant stakeholders, and many segments
of these plans are implemented with little or no input from the
mayor, council, city manager, police chief, department heads, or
other local government offi cials. Th e potential economic, political,
and legal issues that will emerge with the next infl uenza pandemic
require a plan that will be seen as both legitimate and in the best
interest of all citizens. Local government offi cials are the fi rst and
most signifi cant point of contact between citizens and their govern-
ment, and their insight, knowledge, and expertise are crucial for
policy decisions. In our democratic society, citizen members place
their trust in political and administrative leaders who are expected
to continually engage in ethical decision making. Ultimately, the
eff ectiveness of these pandemic infl uenza plans rests on convincing
the American public that the preparation and implementation of
these measures are focused on the best patient and public health
outcomes while safeguarding their individual rights.
Notes
1. Seasonal fl u is caused by a virus that can be transmitted from
person to person and produces a respiratory illness. Individuals
may have some immunity, and a vaccine is available for reducing
transmission. Low pathogenic avian (or bird) fl u occurs commonly
in the bird population and causes relatively few problems. Th e
highly pathogenic H5N1 strain is fatal to domestic fowl, can
be transmitted from birds to humans, and can cause death in
individuals who become infected by the virus. Currently, a human
vaccine is in very limited supply, and humans have no developed
immunity to the H5N1 virus.
2. Th ese 10 areas include community preparedness leadership and
networking, surveillance, public health and clinical laboratories,
health care and public health partners, infection control and clinical
guidelines, vaccine distribution and use, antiviral drug distribution
and use, community disease control and prevention, public health
communications, and workforce support (including psychosocial
considerations and information needs).
3. Coincidentally, after this research was completed, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention published its “Planning
and Responding to Pandemic Infl uenza Ethical Considerations
Checklist.” Th is checklist addresses many of the DHHS
recommendations that were identifi ed in this study as having
ethical implications for local community stakeholders. Th e ethical
considerations provided by this additional tool, if implemented,
should enhance the legitimacy of decision making for pandemic
infl uenza planning at the local government level.
4. Th e eight cities included in this analysis are not considered by the
authors to be a representative sample of all top-100 population
municipalities from which statistical inferences could be made.
Th ese cities were chosen based on their closeness in population and
their respective locations across the United States. Th e pandemic
preparedness plans of these eight cities were available online.
References
Austin/Travis County Health and Human Services Department. 2006.
Preparedness and Response Plan for Pandemic Infl uenza. http://
www.ci.austin.tx.us/pandemicfl u/downloads/fl u_plan [accessed
May 19, 2009].
Berman, Evan M., and Jonathan P. West. 1998. Responsible Risk-Taking.
Public Administration Review 58(4): 346–52.
Boston Public Health Commission. 2007. Pandemic Infl uenza Plan.
http://www.bphc.org/bphc/pdfs/panfl uplan_1206 [accessed May
27, 2008].
Bowman, James B., and Claire Connolly Knox. 2008. Ethics in
Government: No Matter How Long and Dark the Night. Public
Administration Review 68(4): 627–39.
City of Memphis and Shelby County Health Department. 2007.
Pandemic Infl uenza Response Plan. http://www.memphistn.gov/
framework.aspx?page=812 [accessed May 19, 2009].
Cleveland/Cuyahoga County. 2006. Cuyahoga County Pandemic
Infl uenza Response Plan. www.ccbh.net/ccbh/export/sites/default/
CCBH/pdf/ESI_Docs/ESI_Cuyahoga_County_Pandemic_
Infl uenza_Respose_Plan [accessed May 19, 2009].
Davis, Mike. 2005. Th e Monster at Our Door: Th e Global Th reat of Avian Flu. New York: Owl Books.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J., and Alan Wertheimer. 2007. Vaccine Prioritization during an Infl uenza Pandemic: Overview of Health and Human Services’ Response Plan
Concerning Vaccine Prioritization. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Law School, Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan. http://cipp.gmu.edu/archive/
PandemicMonograph_1007 [accessed May 19, 2009].
Fauci, Anthony S. 2006. Pandemic Infl uenza Th reat and Preparedness. Emerging Infectious Diseases 12(1): 73–77.
French, P. Edward, Doug Goodman, and Rodney E. Stanley. 2008. Two Years Later: Hurricane Katrina Still Poses Signifi cant Human Resource Problems for Local
Governments. Public Personnel Management 37(1): 67–75.
Gostin, Lawrence O. 2004. Pandemic Infl uenza: Public Health Preparedness for the Next Global Health Emergency. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 32(4):
565–74.
Gostin, Lawrence O., and Benjamin E. Berkman. 2007. Pandemic Infl uenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health. Administrative Law Review 59(1): 121–76.
Grinberg, Maya. 2007. Learning from the 1918 Pandemic. Risk Management 54(8): 10.
Haber, Michael J., David K. Shay, Xiaohong M. Davis, Rajan Patel, Eric Weintraub, Evan Orenstein, and William W. Th ompson. 2007. Eff ectiveness of
Interventions to Reduce Contact Rates during a Simulated Infl uenza Pandemic. Emerging Infectious Diseases 13(4): 581–89.
Hall, Jeremy L., and Edward T. Jennings, Jr. 2008. Taking Chances: Evaluating Risk as a Guide to Better Use of Best Practices. Public Administration Review 68(4):
695–708.
Kansas City, Missouri, Health Department. 2008. Pandemic Infl uenza Preparedness Plan. http://www.kcmo.org/health.nsf/web/fl uplan [accessed May 19, 2009].
Knapp, Darrell. 2006. Avian Flu: Bracing for a Pandemic. Risk Management 53(7): 42–48.
Late, Michele. 2007. APHA Poll: Americans are not Ready for Public Health Crises. Th e Nation’s Health 37(4): 1–3.
Lister, Sarah A. 2005. Pandemic Infl uenza: Domestic Preparedness Eff orts. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
RL33145 [accessed May 19, 2009].
Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness. 2006. Pandemic Infl uenza and Highly Infectious Respiratory Disease Standard Operating Guide.
http://www.louisvilleky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5596F977-6F11-4E35-BFFF-344A82EE77CA/0/LMHD_Pandemicinfl uenza_v10 [accessed May 19, 2009].
Luke, Catherine J., and Kanta Subbarao. 2006. Vaccines for Pandemic Infl uenza. Emerging Infectious Diseases 12(1): 66–72.
Markel, Howard, Alexandra M. Stern, J. Alexander Navarro, Joseph R. Michalsen, Arnold S. Monto, and Cleto DiGiovanni. 2006. Nonpharmaceutical Infl uenza
Mitigation Strategies, U.S. Communities, 1918–1920 Pandemic. Emerging Infectious Diseases 12(12): 1961–64
Menzel, Donald C. 1993. Ethics Induced Stress in the Local Government Workplace. Public Personnel Management 22(4): 523–37.
Milgrim, Michelle. 2007. Vaccine Prioritization During an Infl uenza Pandemic. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Law School, Critical Infrastructure
Protection Plan. http://cipp.gmu.edu/archive/PandemicMonograph_1007 [accessed May 19, 2009].
Miller, Henry I. 2006. Dee-fense! Dee-fense! Preparing for Pandemic Flu. Issues in Science and Technology 22(4): 79–85.
Osterholm, Michael T. 2005. Preparing for the Next Pandemic. Foreign Aff airs, July/August.
Petak, William J. 1985. Emergency Management:
A Challenge to Public Administration. Special issue, Public Administration Review 45: 3–7.
Progress Report on U.S. Pandemic Flu Preparations. 2007. Th e Nation’s Health 37(7): 8.
Rothstein, Mark A., M. Gabriela Alcalde, Nanette R. Elster, Mary A. Majumder, Larry I. Palmer, and T. Howard Stone. 2003. Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons
Learned from SARS: A Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. http://www2a.cdc.gov/PHLP/docs/Quarantine-Isolation-Lessons-Learned-
from-SARS [accessed May 19, 2009].
Scanlon, Joe. 2004. Lessons Learned or Lessons Forgotten: Th e Canadian Disaster Experience. Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Paper no. 1. http://www.
iclr.org/pdf/research%20paper%2016%20-%20paper%201%20joe%20scanlon [accessed May 19, 2009].
Seattle/King County Public Health. 2007. Pandemic Infl uenza Response Plan. http://www.metrokc.gov/health/pandemicfl u/plan/panfl u-response-plan
[accessed May 19, 2009].
Tulsa Health Department. 2007. Pandemic Infl uenza Plan. http://www.tulsa-health.org/emergency-preparedness/pandemic-infl uenza-planning/ [accessed May 19,
2009].
Upshur, Ross E. G., Karen Faith, Jennifer L. Gibson, Alison K. Th ompson, C. Shawn Tracy, Kumanan Wilson, and Peter A. Singer. 2007. Ethics in an Epidemic:
Ethical Considerations in Preparedness Planning for Pandemic Infl uenza. Health Law Review 16(1): 33–40.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2000. Top 100 Cities. http://www.census.gov/popest/geographic/estimates_geography.html [accessed July 4, 2008].
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 2005. Pandemic Infl uenza Plan. http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicfl u/plan [accessed May 19, 2009].
———. 2007. Pandemic Flu: General Information. www.pandemicfl u.gov/General/index.html [accessed May 19, 2009].
Waugh, William L., Jr. 1994. Regionalizing Emergency Management: Counties as State and Local Government. Public Administration Review 54(3): 253–58.
Waugh, William L., Jr., and Gregory Streib. 2006. Collaboration and Leadership for Eff ective Emergency Management. Special issue, Public Administration Review
66: 131–40.
West, Jonathan, Evan Berman, Stephen Bonczek, and Elizabeth Kellar. 1998. Frontiers in Ethics Training. Public Management 80(6): 4–6.
830 Public Administration Review • September | October 2009
Christopher J. Koliba is an associate
professor in the Department of Community
Development and Applied Economics and
director of the master of public admin-
istration program at the University of
Vermont. He earned a doctorate from the
Maxwell School at Syracuse University.
He has published on topics relating to
governance networks, action research,
communities of practice, and progressive
educational policy. He is the lead author of
the book Governance Networks in Public
Administration and Public Policy (CRC
Press), which was published in 2010.
E-mail: Christopher.Koliba@uvm.edu
Russell M. Mills is a doctoral candidate
in the Department of Political Science at
Kent State University. His current research,
funded by a grant from the IBM Center
for the Business of Government, examines
the Federal Aviation Administration’s use
of voluntary regulatory safety partner-
ships with air carriers. Other research
interests include the policy implications of
governance networks and state-level public
policy making.
E-mail: rmills2@kent.edu
Asim Zia is an assistant professor in the
Department of Community Development
and Applied Economics at the University of
Vermont. He has a doctorate in public policy
from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
In 2005, the Association for Public Policy
Analysis and Management honored him
with its best doctoral dissertation award.
His research focuses on the policy analysis
of complex systems, governance networks,
and decision analysis.
E-mail: Asim.Zia@uvm.edu
Spotlight
on Critical
Grassroots Public
Administration
Issues
210 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011
Christopher J. Koliba Russell M. Mills
University of Vermont Kent State University
Asim Zia
University of Vermont
What is the most eff ective framework for analyzing
complex accountability challenges within governing
networks? Recognizing the multiscale and intersector
(public, private, and nonprofi t) characteristics of these
networks, an accountability model is advanced organized
around democratic (elected representatives, citizens, and
the legal system), market (owners and consumers), as
well as administrative (bureaucratic, professional and
collaborative) relationships. Th is concept draws from
2005 events following Hurricane Katrina. Multiple
failures of governing networks to plan for and respond
to Katrina include a breakdown in democratic, market,
and administrative accountability as well as a pervasive
confusion over trade-off s between accountability types
emerging from crises. Th is essay off ers several useful
recommendations for emergency management planners as
well as for those who teach and research.
The disaster that resulted from the Gulf Coast landfall of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, may be understood as the result of mul-
tiple failures in the accountability regimes (Mashaw
2006) of the governance networks that were respon-
sible for preparing and responding to it. Th e disaster
exposed “failed systems of engineering, economics,
public safety, logistics, recovery, and race relations”
(Cigler 2007b, 64). Th ese systemic breakdowns were
promulgated by poorly coordinated responses between
all levels of government (Ink
2006) and across the public,
voluntary, and private sectors
(Edwards 2009; Ink 2006; GAO
2006), as well as individual
leaders’ failures to execute sound,
professional judgment (Kettl
2005). Drawing on the plethora
of studies of the response and
recovery following Hurricane
Katrina undertaken since 2005,
we argue that Hurricane Katrina
exposed some of the biggest
breakdowns of governance
networks in modern history, and
highlight the need for further theoretical and empiri-
cal development of analytical tools to identify and
assess how and where failures of accountability lead to
failures in
performance.
While Hurricane Katrina provides essential les-
sons regarding emergency management responses
to catastrophic disasters, the case also raises ques-
tions relating to how accountability functions within
governance networks more generally. Certain net-
work characteristics may be said to persist across any
interorganizational network implicated in the policy
stream. In this paper, we introduce an accountability
model that considers the kinds of multisector, cross-
jurisdictional, collaborative arrangements often found
within governance networks. Th e fi rst half of the pa-
per introduces this conceptual model. An operational
defi nition of governance networks is provided, draw-
ing links to the existing accountability and network
governance literatures.
In the second half of the paper, we apply the ac-
countability framework to a number of studies that
were conducted of some of the governance networks
implicated in the response and recovery eff orts fol-
lowing Hurricane Katrina. We discuss how trade-off s
between accountability types may have led to failures
in network performance and off er some recommenda-
tions for emergency management
practitioners and policy makers.
Defi ning Governance
Networks
We fi nd interorganizational
networks described across much
of the policy implementation
(Hill and Hupe 2006) and
intergovernmental (O’Toole
2000) literatures. Interorganiza-
tional networks have also been
implicated in the literature
pertaining to policy networks
(Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan
Accountability in Governance Networks: An Assessment
of Public, Private, and Nonprofi t Emergency Management
Practices Following Hurricane Katrina
. . . [W]e argue that Hurricane
Katrina exposed some of
the biggest breakdowns of
governance networks in modern
history, and highlight the
need for further theoretical
and empirical development of
analytical tools to identify and
assess how and where failures of
accountability lead to failures in
performance.
Accountability in Governance Networks 211
Such standards often are put into writing and appear as contracts,
regulations, laws, performance standards, and formal rules and are
explicitly stated within performance measures. Kearns defi nes im-
plicit standards as “ill-defi ned and, perhaps, shifting notions of what
constitutes responsible or appropriate behavior” that “are rooted
in professional norms and social values, beliefs, and assumptions
about the public interest, the public trust, and how (and to whom)
organizational behavior should be explained . . . they can involve
powerful sanctions for nonperformance or noncompliance” (1996,
66–67). Implicit norms exist as “theories-in-use” (Argyris and Schön
1996) that rely on the active participation of actors to create, recre-
ate, enforce, and object to them. Implicit norms may be understood
as a weaker accountability tool because they are often predicated on
tacit knowledge. Implicit standards may include principal–agent
norms (Milward and Provan 1998), democratic values (Sørenson
and Torfi ng 2005), policy goals (Stone 2002), and reciprocity and
trust (Behn 2001). Th ose to whom accounts are rendered will inevi-
tably prioritize diff erent combinations of policy goals, performance
measures, and other desired procedures and outcomes, placing value
on and rendering judgment of performance indicators diff erently
(Radin 2006).
Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) model of accountability is arguably
the most infl uential framework used to analyze the accountability
structures of governmental organizations. Drawing on a study of
the space shuttle Challenger explosion, they illustrate four diff erent
accountability structures at work within NASA, and among govern-
ment actors in general: political, legal, bureaucratic, and profes-
sional. In their 2 x 2 accountability model, Romzek and Dubnick
conjoin four accountability frames to considerations of external and
internal control and high and low degrees of control. Th ey suggest
that degrees of control may be understood in terms of the strength
of ties. Presumably, stronger ties elicit higher levels of control.
Within governance networks, the degree of centrality and the rela-
tive strengths of the “controlling” entities are
often highly contextual and contingent on the
positionality of the organizational actors within
the governance network.
Table 1 lays out the governance network ac-
countability model that will be introduced and
applied in this manuscript. Th e basic elements
of accountably outlined here are applied to
eight diff erent accountability types situated
within one of three accountability frames.
Within a governance network framework,
power is interpreted in terms of the vertical
and horizontal nature of relationships between
actors “to whom” and “from whom” account-
ability is being rendered (Bardach and Lesser
1996). Each accountability frame is considered
in light of the relational power that exists between actors within
governance networks. By building on these assertions, we seek to
give shape to the theoretical and practical applications of “narra-
tives of accountability” (Scott 2006) that need to be developed for
governance networks. An accountability framework applied to gov-
ernance networks must account for its democratic anchorage; the
possibility that market-oriented businesses, corporations, or fi rms
1997; Rhodes 1997), public–private partnerships (Linder and
Rosenau 2000), third-party governance (Salamon 2002), govern-
ance networks (Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Koliba, Meek, and Zia
2010; Sørensen and Torfi ng 2005), cross-sector collaborations
(Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006), and public management net-
works (Agranoff 2007). All of these literatures describe networks
as possessing the capacity to involve public, private, and volun-
tary sector actors, often spanning international, national, re-
gional, state, local, and individual levels or planes (Guo and Acar
2005). Th ey also assume that government agencies need not serve
as the “lead organization” (Provan and Kenis 2008) or a major
“hub” in the network. Governance networks are relatively stable
patterns of coordinated action and resource exchanges involving
policy actors crossing diff erent social scales, drawn from the pub-
lic, private, or nonprofi t sectors and across geographic levels, who
interact through a variety of competitive, command and control,
cooperative, and negotiated arrangements for purposes anchored
in one or more facets of the policy stream (Koliba, Meek, and
Zia 2010).
Many have noted how the shift from a monocentric system of
government to a polycentric system of governance raises serious
accountability challenges (Acar, Guo, and Yang 2008; Behn 2001;
Mashaw 2006; Page 2004; Posner 2002; Scott 2006). Because it
can no longer be assumed that the state possesses the same kind of
authority that traditionally has been ascribed to public organiza-
tions, governing these interorganizational networks creates new
accountability challenges. Th ese challenges arise when states are
displaced as central actors, when market forces are considered, and
when cooperation and collaboration is recognized as an integral
administrative activity.
Discerning the accountability structures amid the complexity that
emerges in cross-sector, cross-jurisdictional arrangements requires
us to consider the dynamics at work when
the accountability structures of one network
actor comingle, compete, or complement the
accountability
structures of other network
actors.
As a result of unpacking these dynam-
ics, we may be able to ascertain the extent
to which “hybrid accountability regimes”
(Mashaw 2006, 118) emerge within govern-
ance networks.
A Governance Network Accountability
Framework
Accountability may be construed as “the
obligation to give an account of one’s actions
to someone else, often balanced by a responsi-
bility of that other to seek an account” (Scott
2006, 175). Obligations are structured and/
or enforced through the adoption of explicit
standards and implicit norms (Kearns 1996) and through a rec-
ognition and responsiveness to particular individuals, groups, or
organizations (Mashaw 2006). Kearns defi nes explicit standards
as being “codifi ed in law, administrative regulations, bureaucratic
checks and balances, or contractual obligations to other organiza-
tions” (1996, 66). In essence, explicit standards are reifi ed “artifacts”
that provide stable parameters used to structure coordinated action.
Discerning the accountability
structures amid the complexity
that emerges in cross-
sector, cross-jurisdictional
arrangements requires us to
consider the dynamics at
work when the accountability
structures of one network
actor comingle, compete, or
complement the accountability
structures of other network
actors.
212 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011
expands the capacity for citizens to access networks and benefi t
from the outputs and outcomes of network activity (Sørensen and
Torfi ng 2005). In democratic systems, political accountability may
be framed as “democratic” accountability through which elected
representative and citizens serve as the actors to whom accountability
must be rendered. Th e standards and norms used by citizens and
elected offi cials to hold public bureaucracies accountable may be
understood in terms of the laws and regulations passed by elected
offi cials, the rights of citizens to exercise their voice, and the kind
of norms often ascribed to deliberations about public policy (Stone
2002).
We refi ne Romzek and Dubnick’s sense of political accountability by
narrowing in on the critical roles that elected representatives and cit-
izens play, recasting political accountability as the democratic frame
through which elected representative accountability empowers elected
representatives to serve as the principal actors in the legislative and
executive branches of democratic governments. Although voted
into offi ce by citizens, elected representatives become the principal
of public bureaucracies through their powers to allocate resources,
mandate certain actions, or monitor the day-to-day administration
of the executive branch. Elected representative accountability is built
on stronger formal ties that have been established through constitu-
tional law and the separation of powers.
Citizens, by contrast, may directly hold public organizations ac-
countable through the horizontal (and essentially weaker) ties forged
through maximum feasible participation regulations, sunshine laws,
and deliberative forums. Th e importance of citizen accountability for
the democratic frame of governance networks is recognized within
the literatures pertaining to citizen participation and public ad-
ministration (Cooper 1984), deliberative democracy (Fung 2006),
participatory governance (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary 2005),
and collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash 2007). It has been
widely noted that citizens possess relatively weak controls over other
are implicated in and by network activity; and the interplay of both
bureaucratic and collaborative ties within network structures.
Two familiar dichotomies posed within the public administration
and political science fi elds are useful here: the politics–administra-
tion dichotomy (Goodnow 1900) and the distinction between
democracy and markets (Stone 2002). Th at it takes a combination
of political and administrative accountabilities to eff ectively govern
public institutions has been a widely accepted assumption in public
administration (Appleby 1943). However, the division between po-
litical and administrative functions in public administration theory
is still widely assumed (see Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Rosen-
bloom 1983). Stone (2002) draws a distinction between the market
and the polis (democracy) as a means of understanding how policy
is framed through goals, problems, and solutions. Distinctions
between democracy and markets have been interpreted through
neoliberal, neocorporate, neoconservative, and critical theory lenses,
all of which may be useful in determining the apparent trade-off s
existing between them (Miraftab 2005). Out of a recognition of
these trade-off s, we construct a three-pronged theory of accountabil-
ity for governance networks encompassing democratic, market, and
administrative frames.
Democratic Frame
Romzek and Dubnick refer to political accountability as responsive-
ness to the needs and concerns of political constituents and public
stakeholders. Political accountability structures rely on public access
to governmental decision-making processes directly through open
meeting laws, freedom of information acts, maximum feasible
participation requirements, and sunshine laws, or indirectly through
the representation of elected offi cials. In essence, political account-
ability confers the vestiges of “democratic anchorage” on public bu-
reaucracies. Th e depth and breadth of the democratic anchorage of a
governance network is said to depend on the roles of elected offi cials
and public administrators and the extent to which the network
Table 1. Governance Network Accountability Framework
Accountability
Frame Accountability Type
To Whom Is
Account Rendered? Strength of Ties Explicit Standards Implicit Norms
Democratic Elected representative Elected offi cials Strong (weaker when
“lame duck”)
Laws, statutes, regulations Representation of collective interests, policy goals
Citizen Citizens Weak (stronger
during elections)
Maximum feasible
participation, sunshine
laws, deliberative forums
Deliberation, consensus,
majority rule
Legal Courts Strong Laws, statutes, contracts Precedence,
reasonableness, due process, substantive rights
Market Shareholder/
owner
Shareholders/
owners
Strong Profi t, performance
measures
Effi ciency
Consumer Consumers Weak Consumer law, product
performance measures
Affordability, quality,
satisfaction
Administrative Bureaucratic Principals,
supervisors,
bosses
Strong Performance measures,
administrative
procedures,
organizational charts
Deference to positional
authority; unity of command, span of control
Professional
Experts,
professionals
Weak (stronger when
capacity to revoke
licenses exists)
Codes of ethics,
licensure, performance
standards
Professional norms,
expertise, competence
Collaborative Collaborators,
peers,
partners
Weak Written agreements,
decision-making
procedures, negotiation
regimes
Trust, reciprocity,
durability of relationships
Accountability in Governance Networks 213
purchase, the consumer may be understood as holding a corporation
accountable. “Th e central mechanism of this modality is competi-
tion. Th us, a standard is set through the interaction of buyers and
sellers, which also forms the basis for monitoring and rewarding
compliant behavior through loyalty and for punishing deviant
behavior through exit” (Scott 2006, 178). Mulgan observes that
While a customer may hold a private sector provider account-
able in the case of a faulty individual purchase or contract,
he or she has no general right to demand that the private
provider off er services that meet his or her perceived needs. In
a competitive market, the main mechanism of responsiveness
is consumer choice, the capacity of the consumer to exit to an
alternative provider. (2000, 569)
Within the context of governance networks, consumer account-
ability may be understood within the New Public Management
edict to treat “citizens as customers.” Existing as atomized individual
consumers of goods and services, consumer accountability exhibits
relatively weak measures of control.
Administrative Frame
An administrative frame of governance network accountability
may be viewed in terms of the vertical and horizontal ties within
hierarchical bureaucracies and fl atter collaborative arrangements.
Th e administrative frame encompasses the implementation of poli-
cies and decisions (Chandler and Plano 1982) and is directed at
the relationships between actors who, by virtue of their positional
authority within (and across) organizations, interact with each other
to achieve some collective ends. Th e administrative frame focuses
on the processes, procedures, and practices that are employed in
the administration and management of formally organized social
networks. Our chief concern here is distilling administrative rela-
tionships down to their basic processes and exploring how account-
ability may be framed administratively in terms of the dynamics
operating between principals and agents, professionals, and collabo-
rators.
Bureaucratic accountability structures are characterized by hierarchi-
cal arrangements through which there are clear relationships be-
tween subordinates and superiors who rely on the classical principles
ascribed to hierarchical, bureaucratic structures such as the “unity
of command” and “span of control” (Fayol 1949). Th ese principles
may be embodied within the formal operating standards and proce-
dures in place, along with stated rules and regulations. Bureaucratic
accountability structures rely on an adherence to intraorganiza-
tional rules and procedures and, more informally, “principal–agent”
norms (Milward and Provan 1998). Th is form of accountability
stresses the importance of authority embodied in vertically arranged
relationships within formal organizations. Individual nonprofi t
organizations may rely on bureaucratic accountability structures, as
do hierarchically arranged businesses. Th is form of accountability is
premised on the capacity of principals to exert strong measures of
control over their agents.
Within the context of Romzek and Dubnick’s accountability frame-
work, professional accountability structures rely on the skills and ex-
pertise of “professionals” to inform sound judgments and discretion.
Th ey assert that “[p]rofessional accountability is characterized by
actors operating within a governance network, with their positions
strengthened during election periods.
Romzek and Dubnick suggest that a legal accountability structure
stresses the role that judiciary and quasi-judiciary procedures play in
ensuring the execution of sound and reasonable judgments within
an organization. Although they diff erentiate legal from political
accountability, we follow Mashaw’s (2006) lead in equating legal
accountability with a democratic frame of reference. Legal account-
ability is ensured through laws and other explicit standards such
as due process, substantive rights, and legal agreements found in
binding contractual arrangements (Rosenbloom 1983). Presumably,
all types of organizations and individuals are held to some measure
of legal accountability, often predicated on adherence to the “rule
of law,” constitutional law, civil and criminal laws, and/or legisla-
tive mandates. Legal accountability distinguishes itself through the
centrality of the legal system and the roles that judges and juries
play as principal actors within it. Also, it is important to note that
public managers have been recognized as taking on “quasi-judicial”
roles as well (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary 2005; Rosenbloom
1983). Legal accountability is mediated through a legal system that
can enforce strong measures of control by applying the reifi ed laws
that are in place.
Market Frame
A market frame may be understood by diff erentiating between
capital and production markets (Mashaw 2006, 122). Th e profi t-
making obligations of businesses dominate private sector account-
ability structures (Mulgan 2000). In the private sector, account-
ability applies to owners and shareholders who have rights to call
the company’s managers to account for the company’s performance,
and, secondarily, to customers whose main right is to refuse to
purchase (Mulgan 2000, 569). Th us, a market frame of accountabil-
ity may be divided into two distinct but interrelated components:
shareholder accountability and consumer accountability (Scott
2006). It should be noted, however, that this interpretation of
corporate accountability structures does not take into consideration
that a broader interpretation of “stakeholder” accountability exists in
U.S. constitutional law (Nace 2005)—the role of labor unions and
collective bargaining, and more recent considerations of corporate
social responsibility and the “triple bottom line” (Fox, Ward, and
Howard 2002).
Legal scholars have advanced the “shareholder primacy norm,”
through which “[c]orporate directors have a fi duciary duty to
make decisions that are in the best interests of the shareholders”
(Smith 1998, 278). Shareholders, or in the case of privately owned
businesses, owners, are thought to be motivated by the maximiza-
tion of profi t. Shareholder accountability calls for the alignment of
performance measures with profi tability. Shareholder accountability
requirements push companies to undertake the most effi cient set
of practices possible in order to maximize profi ts. Shareholders and
owners exist as principals within the corporate governance structure
and therefore, may be said to exert strong control over the opera-
tions of the business.
Consumer accountability is a market-based accountability predicated
on the ability of consumers to choose between alternative, compet-
ing goods or
services.
Th rough a consumer’s choice or refusal to
214 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011
(summarized in table 1), ultimately creating hybrid accountabil-
ity regimes (Mashaw 2006). Th ese regimes are structured by the
sectoral characteristics of network actors, with state actors bringing
with them the democratic anchorage associated with representa-
tion and citizenship, and private sector actors bringing a market
frame of owners and consumers. Th ese regimes are structured as a
complex array of vertically and horizontally aligned relationships,
some of which persist through the operational characteristics of
bureaucracies and collaboratively arranged social networks. Th ere
are substantive challenges to defi ning the hybridized accountability
regimes of governance networks as the aggregate of discrete account-
ability types. We argue that these discrete types combine, comingle,
and compete with each other, often forming the basis of trade-off s.
Where trade-off s are evident, confusion over which accountability
type trumps another is bound to persist, a point articulated by
Romzek and Dubnick (1987). We will now draw on this typology
to explore the hybrid accountability regimes at work within the gov-
ernance networks responsible for the response and recovery activities
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, paying particular attention
to the networks used to process requests for assistance.
Accountability and Governance Networks Responses
to Hurricane Katrina
Th e disaster resulting from the landfall of Hurricane Katrina on Au-
gust 29, 2005, was estimated in 2006 to cost $96 billion in current
dollars of property damage, 1,330 lost lives, and involved the evacu-
ation of 1.1 million people. Eighty percent of New Orleans was sub-
merged under 20 feet of water (Derthick 2007, 37). Studies of the
governance networks responsible for the maintenance of the levee
system highlight the apparent confusion over who had what author-
ity in maintaining the complex, patchwork levee system (Derthick
2007, 39). Derthick highlights the confusion that existed among
the Orleans Levee District, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
elected offi cials over who had responsibility for levee maintenance.
It would appear that the failed levee system brings to light the fact
that a competent governance network with the chief function of
maintaining the levees did not exist in this case.
Derthick observes that some governance networks developed prior
to Katrina were eff ective, particularly the network that put together
and implemented the “contrafl ow” plan that led to the unidirec-
tional fl ow of traffi c out of the city. Between 1 million and 1.2
million people out of a population of 1.4 million were successfully
evacuated (Derthick 2007, 38). In the months prior to the landfall,
1.5 million Louisiana Citizen Awareness and Disaster Evacuation
guides were distributed through media outlets, the Red Cross, and
area Walmarts, Home Depots, and Lowes, pointing to a successful
public information campaign mounted through a network involving
actors from across sectors. Th e major oversight within the evacua-
tion planning and implementation network was the lack of a plan
for the evacuation of residents who had no access to transportation
in order to fl ee the area (Derthick 2007, 38).
Kiefer and Montjoy observe that “[b]y the summer of 2005, several
overlapping networks for disaster management were in place in
southeastern Louisiana, largely in response to federal stimuli” (2006,
125). At the interstate level, the Emergency Management Assist-
ance Compact (EMAC), essentially the coordinating mechanism
between states, mobilized more than 220 diff erent governmental,
placement of control over organizational activities in the hands of
the employee with the expertise or special skills to get the job done”
(1987, 187). Professional accountability may also be maintained
through compliance with profession or industry best practices, rules,
or codes of ethics. Professional practice has been equated with ethi-
cal behavior, competence, discretion, and responsiveness. Profes-
sional accountability is manifested through networked relationships
between other professionals and the means by which they associate
with one another. Professional accountability is generally premised
on the development of weaker measures of control (with the noted
exception being the capacity of professions to sanction those in
violation of professional codes of conduct or revoke licenses).
Both individual network actors and governance networks as a
whole (Agranoff and McGuire 2003) are predicated on the relative
strength or weakness of the horizontal ties forged between actors.
When two actors enter into a horizontal relationship, they are not
beholden to the traditional principal–agent dynamics of vertically
arranged relationships. Instead, social network theorists have equat-
ed horizontal relationships with cooperative behaviors and norms of
trust and reciprocity (Th ompson 2003). Collaborative accountability
binds actors as peers or partners (Mashaw 2006). Acar, Guo, and
Yang (2008) refer to the existence of accountability between peers
as “partnership” or “community” accountability. Even within the
most hierarchically arranged organizations, workers interact with
each other as peers or partners organized around collective endeav-
ors, a fact that is particularly documented within the literature on
teamwork and small group behavior (Langfred and Shanley 2001)
and discussions of “clan governance” (Ouchi 1980).
Horizontal ties may be understood within the context of social capi-
tal and the normative foundations of trust that give shape to social
networks. Th ompson describes how trust is a fundamental norm of
social networks, observing that it is “established to precisely econo-
mize on transactions costs” (2003, 32). He goes on to add that “trust
implies an expected action . . . which we cannot monitor in advance,
or the circumstances associated with which we cannot directly
control. It is a kind of device for coping with freedoms of others.
It minimizes the temptation to indulge in purely opportunistic be-
havior” (46). However, the application of game theory to the study
of cooperative behavior reveals that “the foundation of cooperation
is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship.” Axelrod’s
study of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma underscores the need for
networked actors to challenge such behaviors in an eff ort to bring
about cooperative behaviors (1980, 184). He cites how the “durabil-
ity” of the relationship is built up over time through what he views
as a “trial-and-error learning about possibilities for mutual rewards”
and imitation of past successful relationships (1980, 182; see also
Hanaki et al. 2007). Th e “reputational capital” of network actors
becomes a key element within the establishment of durable, hori-
zontally aligned relationships (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Reputation
becomes an important element in the bargaining, negotiating, and
mutual adjustment activities undertaken in networked relationships
(Morris, Morris and Jones 2007, 95). Th e capacity of one collabora-
tor to punish a fellow collaborator suggests that horizontal ties may
be built on stronger measures of control than previously thought.
We suggest that governance networks will likely draw on a com-
bination of some or all of the accountability types identifi ed here
Accountability in Governance Networks 215
A GAO study (2006) of the procedures used to process requests for
assistance discussed the relationship between Red Cross and FEMA
at length. Each of these fi ndings is described in table 2.
FEMA was not the only coordination node for the fl ow of supplies
and services. Th e EMAC network, coordinating largely through
state-level emergency management agencies and governors’ offi ces,
had challenges pertaining to the channeling of supplies and services
to the region as well (Kapucu, Augustin, and Garayev 2009). Waugh
notes that “[r]equests for assistance were delayed when governors
and their staff s did not understand the EMAC system” (2007, 108),
adding that “[p]oor communication between state emergency man-
agement offi ces, including governor’s offi ces, local agencies meant
poor situational awareness and poor response to local needs. (110).
We may view all of these challenges in light of accountability types
introduced earlier.
Accountability Failures and Trade-Offs in Governance
Networks
This exercise reveals that many of the governance networks
responsible for the response and recovery needs following the
landfall of Hurricane Katrina suffered from failures in account-
ability across all types. The general lack of coordination and
failure of initiative may be understood as a problem in the
representative accountability structures at work. Generally, elected
officials, federal, state, and local legislatures, and governmental
agencies saw other political actors as chiefly responsible for the
coordination and initiative needed to successfully respond to the
landfall of a Category 4 hurricane (Forgette, King, and Dettrey
2008; Martinko et al. 2009; Schneider 2008). The resulting fail-
ure of initiative led to substantive “intergovernmental challeng-
es” (Cigler 2007b). That a disaster of this magnitude had been
anticipated, yet local, state, and national elected officials failed
to collectively address the visibly crumbling levee system, points to
failures in the very checks and balances to be found in a democratic
accountability frame.
nonprofi t, and business entities (Kapucu, Augustin, and Garayev
2009). Of the total 66,000 people deployed to the Gulf coast, 6,000
were employed within the fi rst 36 hours of landfall (Waugh 2007,
108). Comfort (2007) estimates that at least 535 diff erent organiza-
tions (57 percent of which were public, 16 percent were nonprofi t,
and 27 percent were private) were involved in at least some aspect
of the response and recovery eff orts. Th ese statistics do not account
for the thousands of individual ad hoc rescuers (Brinkley 2006) and
emergent response groups (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, and Hollings-
head 2007) who risked their own lives to save their fellow citizens
(Brinkley 2006).
However, the House Select Committee that studied the processes
and procedures used to coordinate and allocate assistance found the
response lacking, identifying the following problems:
• Lack of coordination between organizations across all layers
and sectors
• Communication failures in faulty equipment, poor system
designs, untrained operators, unmet budget requests, lack of
planning, and poor management
• Information gaps across departments and between jurisdictions
• Inadequate training, particularly joint training between groups
• Delays in medical care as a result of “deployment confusion,
uncertainty about mission assignments, and red tape”
• Underutilization of the private sector, especially with respect to
evacuation needs
• Lack of emergency and temporary shelter
• Failure of initiative “at all levels [of government] to take a
proactive approach to the crisis” (Ink 2006, 801–2).
Reports distributed by the White House, the House Select Com-
mittee, the Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO), and some
analytical case studies (GAO 2006; Ink 2006; Kiefer and Montjoy
2006; Roberts 2008) all single out the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) as the “lead organization” during the
response and recovery phases of crisis. However, FEMA had lost
experienced, professional staff during the lead up to Katrina (Cigler
2007b, 69). FEMA also removed itself from most mitigation and
preparation activities associated with hurricane planning in the years
leading up to the summer of 2005 (Cigler 2007b). Once Katrina
made landfall, FEMA was chiefl y responsible for coordinating the
fl ow of supplies and services to the region, including the procure-
ment of buses to be used to remove victims stranded at the New
Orleans Super Dome and Convention Center. Th e buses, however,
failed to come because “they had to be procured from contractors
all over the country, hundreds or even thousands of miles away”
(Derthick 2007, 42). Derthick concludes that “FEMA did not
know what it could deliver or when and made promises that were
unreliable” (42). Th is held true not only for the buses, but also for
the supplies that FEMA did control: generators, food, water, and
ice (42). Figure 1 illustrates the standard procedures employed to
respond to requests for assistance used during the crisis.
As the lead organization within the response and recovery activities,
FEMA was responsible for approving requests and tasking network
actors with fulfi lling the requests. Th e Red Cross was responsible for
taking the requests that fi ltered up to it through local government
and other voluntary organizations.
Suppliers of Supplies, Equipment and Services
Red Cross
Processes requests for assistance
State Governments
Meets needs if able or requests
federal assistance
People in Need
Voluntary Organizations
Identify needs and request assistance
Local Government Agencies
Identify needs and drequest assistance
FEMA
Approves requests and tasks
agencies to fill requests
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (2006).
Figure 1 Standard Process for Requesting Assistance
216 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011
Th e role of the for-profi t, private business sector in the response
and recovery eff orts following Hurricane Katrina should not be
understated (Cigler 2007a, 4). As victims of and responders to
disasters, local businesses and regional and national corporations
had a key role to play in providing supplies and services needed
for the response and recovery eff orts. However, Th e House Select
Committee studying the response and recovery eff orts cited failures
in the delivery of key resources from private vendors (Ink 2006).
Subsequently, reports of profi teering were cited (Dreier 2006). Th e
failure to have predetermined contractual arrangements with pro-
viders of emergency goods and services may have exacerbated the
problems associated with the sluggishness of response. Th e systems
in place for Gulf Coast states may be compared to those in place
in Florida. Kapucu’s (2008) comparison of these systems suggests
that Florida benefi ted from predetermined contracts with providers
of goods and services. Shareholder accountability plays a major role
in determining the extent to which private businesses are willing
to enter into such agreements. With the proliferation of “just-in-
time” inventories, the need to maintain effi cient levels of inven-
tories may compete with the need to stock inventories in cases
of emergencies (Cigler 2007a). A trade-off between shareholder
interests and citizen interests may need to be weighed in this case.
Ultimately, distinctions between donated goods and services, and
making goods and services available for purchase and contracts
should be made.
Consumer accountability often does not exist within emergency
contexts. Victims seeking assistance often do not have the luxury
of fi nding alternative suppliers of needed goods and services. Th ere
are no means for consumers to “vote with their feet” or pocketbook
in cases of emergencies. Th e inherent mo-
nopolies associated with response and recovery
eff orts essentially render consumers impotent.
Institutional racism (Cigler 2007b; Stivers
2007), class and social vulnerability (Forgette,
King, and Dettrey 2008; Jurkiewicz 2007), and
environmental vulnerability (Forgette, King,
and Dettrey 2008) weakened the capacity for
the consumers of public goods and service to
exercise their individual and collective will.
Stivers (2007), Jurkiewicz (2007), and others (Bullard and Wright
2009) have examined the critical roles that institutional racism
and classism played in undermining the political authority of
the poor, black residents who made up the disproportionately
high percentage of the most eff ected victims. Th ey argue that
there is a relationship between the perceived powerlessness of this
population and the widespread failure in citizen accountability. In
essence, poverty and racism led to the social and environmental
vulnerability of certain segments of the population, which likely
contributed to the weakening of citizen accountability in this
case. A number of studies have recently been published looking at
the relationship that race and other variables play in shaping how
citizens ascribed blame in the case of Katrina. Forgette, King, and
Dettrey (2008, 686) found that those who were most environ-
mentally and socially vulnerable to disasters such as Katrina were
more likely to ascribe blame for the failed responses to the federal
government. Other studies have concluded that citizens’ prior
partisan affi liations and political ideologies had a great degree
of infl uence over how citizens ascribed blame in both a regional
(Forgette, King, and Dettrey 2008) and a national (Malhotra
2008) context. Th e factors of race, class, and vulnerability, as well
as partisanship and political ideology (Gomez and Wilson 2008),
complicate the capacity that citizen accountability can play in
instances such as these.
Th e general lack of coordination may also be considered a break-
down in legal accountability, particularly when the matter of
contracting practices are taken into consideration. Understood
within the context of the system used to process requests, the
failure to have predetermined contractual arrangements with
providers of emergency goods and services
in place led to confusion regarding which
contractors to work with, how to structure
these contracts, and who had authority over
them. Ironically, the requirements to follow
existing contractual procedures, as in the case
of the procurement of buses, suggests ways in
which existing legal accountability structures
may get in the way of expediency, particularly
in times of crisis.
Table 2 Failures in Request for Assistance: FEMA–Red Cross Relations
• Failure to clarify roles and responsibilities. Confl icts arose between FEMA and the Red Cross regarding the role of the FEMA ESF-6 coordinator and to whom
the nonprofi t Red Cross should report. As a result, the two organizations spent time negotiating operating procedures rather than focusing solely on coordinating
mass care services in the early days of the hurricane response effort (GAO 2006).
• Failure to have a standard process for requesting assistance. Although the system for processing requests outlined in fi gure 1 was predetermined, the mecha-
nisms for fi ltering requests from local governments and voluntary organizations to the Red Cross were not fully developed ahead of time (GAO 2006, 11). The
failure to articulate procedures within this stage of the processing system led to a great deal of confusion between actors within the network.
• Rotation of Red Cross personnel led to a lack of continuity. The Red Cross relies heavily on volunteer personnel, many of whom take leaves of absence from
their workplace to devote time to public service. The average stint for Red Cross volunteers in disasters of this nature range from a few days to a few weeks.
Volunteer staff members were placed in key positions within the processing system. With no clear system in place for fi ltering requests from the public to FEMA, it
was left to individual Red Cross volunteers to devise informal means of getting FEMA’s attention and seeing to it that requests were processed in a timely manner.
As volunteers cycled out of these key positions, their knowledge and investment in seeing that these requests were processed left with them (GAO 2006).
• Failure to involve Red Cross offi cials in important policy meetings. Frequent “policy meetings” were convened within the FEMA command center. During
these meetings, FEMA and other key government offi cials discussed the response and recovery efforts and addressed problems. Although Red Cross offi cials were
allowed to attend these meetings, they were not permitted to participate in them (GAO 2006, 13), resulting in missed opportunities to coordinate responses and
engage in joint problem solving.
• Failure to have predetermined contractual arrangements with providers of emergency goods and services. The GAO found that “[t]here was inadequate
planning and preparation in anticipating requirements for needed goods and services…, a lack of clearly communicated responsibilities for contracting activities
across agencies and jurisdictions…[and], insuffi cient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective contractor oversight” (GAO 2006,
executive summary).
Consumer accountability often
does not exist within emergency
contexts. Victims seeking
assistance often do not have the
luxury of fi nding alternative
suppliers of needed goods and
services.
Accountability in Governance Networks 217
also be considered within the context of the eff ectiveness of horizon-
tal ties (Ink 2006). Squabbles over jurisdictions and responsibilities
may be considered problems between peers or partners (a matter of
collaborative accountability).
Th e failure to clarify roles and responsibilities, as in the case of the
ESF-6 coordinator, may be understood as a discrepancy between
FEMA and the Red Cross as to which accountability mechanisms
were at work. In the traditional command and control system,
FEMA edicts regarding its view of the chain of command would not
be questioned. However, this arrangement may also be framed as a
“partnership,” with Red Cross personnel having a say in how best to
organize the systems in place to process claims. Th e GAO’s observa-
tion that key Red Cross offi cials were excluded from active partici-
pation in important policy meetings coordinated by FEMA suggests
confl icting perceptions of the Red Cross’s relationship to FEMA.
Moynihan’s (2009) study of incident command systems is relevant
here and may be used as a framework to analyze the proper govern-
ance structures needed in times of emergency. With the turnover
of Red Cross and FEMA personnel, few opportunities existed for
FEMA and Red Cross workers to build cooperative, durable rela-
tionships. Recalling Axelrod’s iterated prisoner’s dilemma, neither
party in these exchanges expected to continue interacting with the
other. Th e incentives to cooperate did not exist. Putting people in
charge of important roles and functions that require extensive time
and follow through into temporary roles would appear to be a recipe
for systems failure. In the case of Florida’s emergency management
system, existing networks of service providers spanning all three
sectors are often maintained over time, creating the context for the
establishment of durable relationships (Kapucu 2008).
As a result of our application of the governance network account-
ability framework to the failed responses following landfall of Hur-
ricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast, we are left to draw a number of
conclusions concerning accountability within emergency manage-
ment networks.
1. Strike a balance between bureaucratic and collaborative
accountability structures in designing emergency management
networks. Studies of eff ective agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard
(Baker and Refsgaard 2007) and more resilient regions such as Flor-
ida (Kapucu 2008) point to the important role that collaborative
accountability plays in emergency management situations. Others
have suggested that greater centralization of command in the early
phases of emergency response is needed, whether it is understood
as a centralized incident command center (Moynihan 2009) or
more broadly as an enhanced capacity of the federal government to
exert control (Jurkiewicz and O’Keefe 2009). Th e FEMA and Red
Cross arrangements discussed in this article suggest that the eff ective
“mixed-form” governance networks (Koliba, Meek, and Zia 2010)
implicated in emergency management situations will be structured
through a combination of command and control and collaborative
administrative authorities. Such hybridized structures should be
clarifi ed and built up over time. Moynihan (2009) describes this as
the “network diversity” of emergency response.
2. Focus on developing the collaborative management skills of
emergency management professionals. Having interviewed some
key emergency management professionals implicated in the response
Breakdowns in the bureaucratic accountability structures can be rec-
ognized in the general observations concerning the lack of coordina-
tion, gaps in information, communication failures, slow delivery
of goods and services, lack of clarity about roles and authority, and
failure of initiative (Ink 2006). Within the context of the systems
used to process requests for assistance, the problematic principal–
agent relationship between FEMA and the Red Cross may be cited.
Th e controversy regarding the place of the FEMA ESF-6 (Emer-
gency Support Function) coordinator within the chain of command
may be construed as FEMA adhering to bureaucratic accountability
structures too rigidly, as the time it took to negotiate this chain of
command resulted in serious delays. Th is phenomenon also appears
to be the case in the delays associated with the federal Transporta-
tion Security Administration’s requirements to screen all equipment,
supplies, and personnel that needed to be airlifted into the region
(Derthick 2007).
Th e turnover of key Red Cross and FEMA personnel made it very
diffi cult to sustain institutional knowledge, rules, and procedures.
Long-term volunteers tend to go through stages of development that
ultimately led to substantial fatigue (Wymer and Starnes 2001). A
recent study of the recruitment and retention of Red Cross volun-
teers in one local chapter suggests that it is only through long-term
service that volunteers “appreciate the [broader] organization’s
mission and principle and fi nd their allegiance to the organization as
a whole” (Hustinx and Handy 2009, 202). We can surmise that in
situations in which there is a need for a strong command and con-
trol structure, giving short-term volunteers with little understanding
or appreciation of organizational mission substantial administrative
responsibilities is extremely problematic.
Th e loss of key career emergency management professionals within
FEMA was cited as a major challenge facing the response and
recovery eff orts (Kettl 2005), leading to a breakdown of professional
accountability structures. A lack of expertise, inadequate training of
key emergency management personnel, and the failure of initia-
tive may all be linked to a dearth of professional expertise and, by
inference, professional accountability. Th e turnover in Red Cross
and FEMA personnel and, in some cases, the lack of professional
expertise of those processing claims for assistance may be viewed in
terms of professional accountability.
Garnett and Kouzmin observe that FEMA director Michael Brown
failed to “widen his decision circle,” exhibiting signs of “group
think” (2007, 174). At the same time, the Homeland Security
Operations Center and New Orleans Mayor’s Offi ce suff ered from
“information bias” that contributed to poor situational awareness
(174–75). A study of the administrative performance of the EMAC
in Mississippi and Louisiana found a dearth of professional develop-
ment training for key emergency management personnel (Kapucu,
Augustin, and Garayev 2009, 21). Th ese oversights suggest the fail-
ure of certain network actors to involve, and therefore be account-
able to, professional emergency management practitioners.
Finally, the failures in the governance networks associated with
the response and recovery eff orts need to be considered within the
context of failures in collaborative accountability. Th e House Select
Committee’s observations regarding the lack of coordination, com-
munication failures, information gaps, and failures of initiative may
218 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011
accountability regimes presented here. Th e extent to which pub-
lic–private partnerships are shaped through grants, contracts, or
reciprocal partnership agreements needs to be evaluated based on
the types of resources each actor brings to the network. Implications
for the accountability regimes that guide network activities need to
be monitored.
Th e ongoing conversation within the fi eld of public administration
about the lessons learned from the case of Hurricane Katrina has
not, until now, been couched in terms of the lack of, or trade-off s
between, accountability structures. Th e clearest demarcation of such
trade-off s in this case occurs between bureaucratic and collaborative
accountability structures, which may be construed as a matter of
vertical versus horizontal alignments. Th e tensions that arose be-
tween the various levels of government as to who had authority and
responsibility for what functions may be understood in the context
of this trade-off .
Conclusion
Just as Romzek and Dubnick’s study of the Challenger disaster
yielded insights into the accountability frameworks at work within
government agencies, we hope that this article has shed light on the
complex realities at work within governance networks involving ac-
tors spanning sectors and geographic scale. Th e public administration
fi eld has an important and unique role to play within the analysis of
all forms of governance networks because of its central concern for
the quality of democratic anchorage that exists within and around
them. Ascertaining the public value of such networks needs to be
considered not only as a matter of qualitatively and quantitatively
defi ned outputs and outcomes, but also in terms of the accountabil-
ity regimes in place to ensure that the public interest is being served.
By studying the range of explicit standards and implicit norms that
shape the hybridized accountability regimes of governance networks,
researchers may better understand how accountability structures
impact network
dynamics.
Th e extent to which the critical actors
operating within governance network under-
stand to whom accounts need to be rendered
can be determined through the traditional
tools of observation and survey found in the
social sciences. We believe that the governance
network accountability framework introduced
here can be factored into “agent-based” models
(North and Macal 2007). We also believe that
the trade-off problems that are apparent here
can be modeled as complexity issues because
emergent structures and function arise when
trade-off preferences are not clearly defi ned in
law, constitution, or practice.
Acknowledgments
Th e authors wish to thank the editors of Public Administration
Review and the reviewers of this article for their thoughtful
feedback.
References
Acar, Muhittin, Chao Guo, and Kaifeng Yang. 2008. Accountability When Hierar-
chical Authority is Absent: Views from Public Private Partnership Practitioners.
American Review of Public Administration 38(1): 3–23.
and recovery eff orts pertaining to Hurricane Katrina, Getha-Taylor
(2007) underscores the need to focus on improving the collabo-
rative capacities of emergency management administrators and
volunteers. She asserts that public managers in emergency manage-
ment networks need to “lead by example,” “focus on relationships,”
engage in more training in collaborative management skills, and
recognize when and where collaboration leads to eff ective outcomes.
It is imperative that collaborative managers operating in emergency
management networks become aware of the skills and knowledge
needed to build trusting and durable relationships with fellow col-
laborators, and therefore a more robust governance network.
3. Rethink federalism in emergency management? Th e accounta-
bility challenges associated with the response and recovery networks
implicated in Hurricane Katrina have been framed as questions
pertaining to federalism (Birkland and Waterman 2008; Roberts
2008). In a recent “Letter to the President-Elect Regarding Katrina,”
Jurkiewicz and O’Keefe (2009) assert that the political culture of
Louisiana is so problematic that strong federal intervention is called
for if a repeat of the Katrina disaster is to be avoided. Th e place-
ment of FEMA in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has
been identifi ed as one of the major contributors to the agency’s
failed performance (Birkland and Waterman 2008; Roberts 2008).
Whether FEMA ultimately stays in or is removed from the depart-
ment, the need to build the agency’s collaborative capacity has been
widely noted (Edwards 2009; Getha-Taylor 2007; Roberts 2008).
Describing what a “new FEMA” must do, Edwards observes that it
“must have the capacity to link to state and local agencies and sup-
port the increased capacity to handle their own problems” (2009,
66). Birkland and Waterman (2008) distinguish between “excep-
tional” and “normal” disaster situations, suggesting that a stronger
federal role is needed when disasters reach a certain scale. Th e need
to mobilize national resources in order to meet the needs of stricken
regions would appear to call for a clearly articulated and implement-
ed federal role built on its capacity to collaborate with states, local
governments, nonprofi ts, and businesses.
4. Have elected representatives avoid playing
the “blame game.” In a study of citizens’ attri-
bution of blame following Hurricane Katrina,
Maestas et al. (2008) found that the messages
of blame framed by journalists and elected
representatives across local, state, and federal
government played a signifi cant role in how
citizens ascribed blame. Th ey conclude that “in
systems where policy in the same area is carried
out by multiple levels of government, political
actors [elected representatives] have incentives
to shift blame to actors at other levels, further
complicating the public’s task in assigning
blame to the appropriate targets” (2008, 609). As long as these
kinds of dynamics persist, the capacity of policy makers and public
administrators to approach emergency management from the kind
of systems perspectives needed is severely undermined.
5. Deepen our understanding of the role of public–private part-
nerships in emergency management networks. Th e line between
humanitarian aid, purchased goods, and contracted services needs
to be more clearly drawn and evaluated based on the hybridized
By studying the range of
explicit standards and implicit
norms that shape the hybridized
accountability regimes
of governance networks,
researchers may better
understand how accountability
structures impact network
dynamics.
Accountability in Governance Networks 219
Agranoff , Robert. 2007. Managing within Networks: Adding Value to Public Organizations. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Agranoff , Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2003. Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Governments. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Ansell, Chris, and Alison Gash. 2007. Collaborative Governance in Th eory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Th eory 18(4): 543–71.
Appleby, Paul H. 1943. Government Is Diff erent. In Classics of Public Administration, 5th ed., edited by Jay M. Shafritz, Albert C. Hyde, and Sandra J. Parkes, 131–35.
Belmont, CA: Th omson/Wadsworth, 2004.
Argyris, Chris, and Donald A. Schön. 1996. Organizational Learning II: Th eory, Method, and Practice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. Th e Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Baker, Daniel, and Karen Refsgaard. 2007. Institutional Development and Scale Matching in Disaster Response Management. Ecological Economics 63(2–3): 331–43.
Bardach, Eugene, and Cara Lesser. 1996. Accountability in Human Services Collaboratives—For What? And to Whom? Journal of Public Administration Research and Th eory
6(2): 197–224.
Behn, Robert D. 2001. Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Bingham, Lisa Blomgren, Tina Nabatchi, and Rosemary O’Leary. 2005. Th e New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work
of Government. Public Administration Review 65(5): 547–58.
Birkland, Th omas, and Sarah Waterman. 2008. Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in Hurricane Katrina? Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 38(4): 692–714.
Brinkley, Douglas. 2006. Th e Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. New York: Morrow.
Bryson, John M., Barbara C. Crosby, and Melissa Middleton Stone. 2006. Th e Design and Implementation of Cross-sector Collaborations: Propositions from the Literature.
Special issue, Public Administration Review 66: 44–55.
Bullard, Robert, and Beverly Wright. 2009. Th e Color of Toxic Debris: Th e Racial Injustice in the Flow of Poison Th at Followed the Flood. American Prospect, March, A9–23.
Chandler, Ralph C., and Jack C. Plano. 1982. Th e Public Administration Dictionary. New York: Wiley.
Cigler, Beverly A. 2007a. Hurricane Katrina: Two Intergovernmental Challenges. Paper presented at the Conference of the American Academy of Certifi ed Public Managers,
Madison, WI, September 8–12.
———. 2007b. Th e “Big Questions” of Katrina and the 2005 Great Flood of New Orleans. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 64–76.
Comfort, Louise K. 2007. Crisis Management in Hindsight: Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Control. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 189–97.
Cooper, Terry L. 1984. Citizenship and Professionalism in Public Administration. In Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Administration, edited by Camilla Stivers, 266–79. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 2001.
Derthick, Martha. 2007. Where Federalism Didn’t Fail. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 36–47.
Dreier, Peter. 2006. Katrina and Power in America. Urban Aff airs Review 41(4): 528–49.
Edwards, Frances L. 2009. Obstacles to Disaster Recovery. Th e Public Manager 37(4): 66–71.
Fayol, Henri. 1949. General and Industrial Management. Trans. Constance Storrs. London: Pitman.
Forgette, Richard, Marvin King, and Bryan Dettrey. 2008. Race, Hurricane Katrina, and Government Satisfaction: Examining the Role of Race in Assessing Blame. Publius:
Th e Journal of Federalism 38(4): 671–91.
Fox, Tom, Halina Ward, and Bruce Howard. 2002. Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: A Baseline Study. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Fung, Archon. 2006. Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance. Special issue, Public Administration Review 66: 66–75.
Garnett, James L., and Alexander Kouzmin. 2007. A. Communicating throughout Katrina: Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis Communication.
Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 171–88.
Getha-Taylor, Heather. 2007. Collaborative Governance: Lessons from Katrina. Public Manager 36(3): 7–11.
Gomez, Brad T., and J. Matthew Wilson. 2008. Political Sophistication and Attributions of Blame in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina. Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 38(4):
633–50.
Goodnow, Frank J. 1900. Politics and Administration: A Study in Government. New York: Russell & Russell.
Guo, Chao, and Muhittin Acar. 2005. Understanding Collaboration among Nonprofi t Organizations: Combining Resource Dependency, Institutional, and Network Perspec-
tives. Nonprofi t and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 34(3): 340–61.
Hanaki, Nobuyuki, Alexander Peterhansl, Peter S. Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts. 2007. Cooperation in Evolving Social Networks. Management Science 53(7): 1036–50.
Hill, Michael, and Peter Hupe. 2006. Implementing Public Policy: An Introduction to the Study of Operational Governance. London: Sage Publications.
Hustinx, Lesley, and Femida Handy. 2009. Where Do I Belong? Volunteer Attachment in a Complex Organization (Red Cross). Administration in Social Work 33(2):
202–21.
Ink, Dwight. 2006. An Analysis of the House Select Committee and White House Reports on Hurricane Katrina. Public Administration Review 66(6): 800–807.
Jurkiewicz, Carole L. 2007. Louisiana’s Ethical Culture and Its Eff ect on the Administrative Failures Following Katrina. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 57–63.
Jurkiewicz, Carole L., and Sean O’Keefe. 2009. A Letter to the President-Elect Regarding Katrina. Public Integrity 11(1): 79–90.
Kapucu, Naim. 2008. Culture of Preparedness: Household Disaster Preparedness. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 17(4): 526–35.
Kapucu, Naim, Maria-Elena Augustin, and Vener Garayev. 2009. Interstate Partnerships in Emergency Management: Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
in Response to Catastrophic Disasters. Public Administration Review 69(2): 297–313.
Kearns, Kevin P. 1996. Managing for Accountability: Preserving the Public Trust in Public and Nonprofi t Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Kettl, Donald F. 2005. Th e Worst Is Yet to Come: Lessons from September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. Report no. 05-01, Fels Government Research Service.
Kickert, Walter J. M., Erik-Hans Klijn, and Joop Koppenjan, eds. 1997. Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector. Th ousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Kiefer, John J., and Robert S. Montjoy. 2006. Incrementalism Before the Storm: Network Performance for the Evacuation of New Orleans. Special issue, Public Administration
Review 66: 122–30.
Klijn, Erik-Hans, and Chris Skelcher. 2007. Democracy and Governance Networks: Compatible or Not? Public Administration 85(3): 587–609.
Koliba, Christopher, Jack W. Meek, and Asim Zia. 2010. Governance Networks in Public Administration and Public Policy. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Th eory 27(2): 253–79.
220 Public Administration Review • March | April 2011
Langfred, Claus W., and Mark T. Shanley. 2001. Small Group Research: Autonomous Teams and Progress on Issues of Context and Level of Analysis. In Handbook of Organi-
zational Behavior, edited by Robert T. Golembiewski, 81–111. New York: Marcel Dekker.
Linder, Stephen H., and Pauline Vallaincourt Rosenau. 2000. Mapping the Terrain of the Public-Private Policy Partnership. In Public–Private Policy Partnerships, edited by
Pauline Vallaincourt Rosenau, 1–18. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Maestas, Cherie D., Lonna Rae Atkeson, Th omas Croom, and Lisa A. Bryant. 2008. Shifting the Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following
Hurricane Katrina. Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 38(4): 609–32.
Majchrzak, Ann, Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa, and Andrea B. Hollingshead. 2007. Coordinating Expertise among Emergent Groups Responding to Disasters. Organization Science
18(1): 147–61.
Malhotra, Neil. 2008. Partisan Polarization and Blame Attribution in a Federal System: Th e Case of Hurricane Katrina. Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 38(4): 651–70.
Martinko, Mark J., Denise M. Breaux, Arthur D. Martinez, James Summers, and Paul Harvey. 2008. Hurricane Katrina and Attributions of Responsibility. Organizational
Dynamics 38(1): 52–63.
Mashaw, Jerry L. 2006. Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Th oughts on the Grammar of Governance. In Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences,
edited by Michael W. Dowdle, 115–56. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Milward, H. Brinton, and Keith G. Provan. 1998. Principles for Controlling Agents: Th e Political Economy of Network Structure. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Th eory 8(2): 203–22.
Miraftab, Faranak. 2005. Public–Private Partnerships: Th e Trojan Horse of Neoliberal Development? Journal of Planning Education and Research 24(1): 89–101.
Morris, John C., Elizabeth D. Morris, and Dale M. Jones. 2007. Reaching for the Philosopher’s Stone: Contingent Coordination and the Military’s Response to Hurricane
Katrina. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 94–106.
Moynihan, Donald P. 2009. Th e Network Governance of Crisis Response: Case Studies of Incident Command Systems. Journal of Public Administration Research and Th eory
19(4): 895–915.
Mulgan, Richard. 2000. Accountability: An Ever-Expanding Concept? Public Administration 78(3): 555–73.
Nace, Ted. 2005. Gangs of America: Th e Rise of Corporate Power and the Disabling of Democracy. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
North, Michael J., and Charles M. Macal. 2007. Managing Business Complexity: Discovering Strategic Solutions with Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation. New York: Oxford
University Press.
O’Toole, Laurence J., Jr., ed. 2000. American Intergovernmental Relations: Foundations, Perspectives, and Issues. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Ouchi, William G. 1980. Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans. Administrative Science Quarterly. 25(1): 557–82.
Page, Stephen. 2004. Measuring Accountability for Results in Interagency Collaboratives. Public Administration Review 64(5): 591–606.
Posner, Paul L. 2002. Accountability Challenges of Th ird-Party Government. In Th e Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, edited by Lester M. Salamon,
523–51. New York: Oxford University Press.
Provan, Keith G., and Patrick Kenis. 2008. Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, And Eff ectives. Journal of Public Administration Research and Th eory
18(2): 229–52
Radin, Beryl A. 2006. Challenging the Performance Movement: Accountability, Complexity and Democratic Values. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Rhodes, R. A. W. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Refl exivity and Accountability. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.
Roberts, Patrick S. 2008. Dispersed Federalism as a New Regional Governance for Homeland Security. Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 38(3): 416–44.
Romzek, Barbara S., and Melvin J. Dubnick. 1987. Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy. In Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Administration,
edited by Camilla Stivers, 182–204. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.
Rosenbloom, David H. 1983. Public Administrative Th eory and the Separation of Powers. In Classics of Public Administration, 5th ed., edited by Jay M. Shafritz, Albert C.
Hyde, and Sandra J. Parkes, 446–57. Belmont, CA: Th omson/Wadsworth, 2004.
Salamon, Lester M., ed. 2002. Th e Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Schneider, Saundra. 2008. Who’s to Blame? (Mis) Perceptions of the Intergovernmental Response to Disasters. Publius: Th e Journal of Federalism 38(4): 715–38.
Scott, Colin. 2006. Spontaneous Accountability. Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences, edited by Michael W. Dowdle, 174–94. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Smith, D. Gordon. 1998. Th e Shareholder Primacy Norm. Journal of Corporation Law 23: 277–323.
Sørensen, Eva, and Jacob Torfi ng. 2005. Th e Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks. Scandinavian Political Studies 28(3): 195–218.
Stivers, Camilla. 2007. “So Poor and So Black”: Hurricane Katrina, Public Administration, and the Issue of Race. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 48–56.
Stone, Deborah. 2002. Policy Paradox: Th e Art of Political Decision Making. New York: W. W. Norton.
Th ompson, Grahame F. 2003. Between Hierarchies and Markets: Th e Logic and Limits of Network Forms of Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO). 2006. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and Red Cross Should be Improved for 2006 Season. Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce. GAO-06-712.
Waugh, William L. 2007. EMAC, Katrina, and the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi. Special issue, Public Administration Review 67: 107–13.
Wymer, Walter W., Jr. and Becky J. Starnes. 2001. Conceptual Foundations and Practical Guidelines for Retaining Volunteer Organizations: Part II. In Marketing Communica-
tions for Local Nonprofi t Organizations, edited by Donald R. Self, Walter W. Wymer, Jr., and Teri Kline Henley, 97–117. London: Haworth Press.
Order an Essay Now & Get These Features For Free:
Turnitin Report
Formatting
Title Page
Citation
Outline
